Slide 10
Slide 10
10: Externali0es
1
In this chapter,
look for the answers to these questions
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permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
Introduc0on
• One
of
the
Ten
Principles
from
Chapter
1:
Markets
are
usually
a
good
way
to
organize
economy
ac5vity.
In
absence
of
market
failures,
the
compe00ve
market
outcome
is
efficient,
maximizes
total
surplus.
• One
type
of
market
failure:
externality,
the
uncompensated
impact
of
one
person’s
ac0ons
on
the
well-‐being
of
a
bystander.
• Externali0es
can
be
nega+ve
or
posi+ve,
depending
on
whether
impact
on
bystander
is
adverse
or
beneficial.
3
Introduc0on
• Self-‐interested
buyers
and
sellers
neglect
the
external
costs
or
benefits
of
their
ac0ons,
so
the
market
outcome
is
not
efficient.
• Another
principle
from
Chapter
1:
Governments
can
some5mes
improve
market
outcomes.
In
presence
of
externali0es,
public
policy
can
improve
efficiency.
4
Examples
of
Nega0ve
Externali0es
• Air
pollu0on
from
a
factory
• The
neighbor’s
barking
dog
• Late-‐night
stereo
blas0ng
from
the
dorm
room
next
to
yours
• Noise
pollu0on
from
construc0on
projects
• Health
risk
to
others
from
©
M.
Shcherbyna/ShuXerstock.com
second-‐hand
smoke
• Talking
on
cell
phone
while
driving
makes
the
roads
less
safe
for
others
5
Recap
of
Welfare
Economics
P The market for gasoline
$5 The market eq’m
maximizes consumer
+ producer surplus.
4
Supply curve shows
3 private cost, the costs
$2.50 directly incurred by sellers.
2
Demand curve shows
private value, the value
1
to buyers (the prices they
are willing to pay).
0
0 10 20 25 30 Q
(gallons)
6
Analysis
of
a
Nega0ve
Externality
P The market for gasoline
$5 Social cost
= private + external cost
4 external
cost Supply (private cost)
3 External cost
= value of the
2 negative impact
on bystanders
1 = $1 per gallon
(value of harm
0 from smog,
0 10 20 30 Q
greenhouse gases)
(gallons)
7
Analysis
of
a
Nega0ve
Externality
P The market for gasoline
The socially
$5
Social optimal quantity
cost is 20 gallons.
4
S
3 At any Q < 20,
value of additional gas
2 exceeds
At any Qsocial
> 20, cost.
D social cost of the
1 last gallon is
greater than its value
0 to society.
0 10 20 25 30 Q
(gallons)
8
Analysis
of
a
Nega0ve
Externality
P The market for gasoline
$5
Social Market eq’m
cost (Q = 25)
4
S is greater than
social optimum
3
(Q = 20).
2 One solution:
D tax sellers
1 $1/gallon,
would shift
0 S curve up $1.
0 10 20 25 30 Q
(gallons)
9
“Internalizing
the
Externality”
10
Examples
of
Posi0ve
Externali0es
• Being
vaccinated
against
contagious
diseases
protects
not
only
you,
but
people
who
visit
the
salad
bar
or
produce
sec0on
aier
you.
• R&D
creates
knowledge
others
can
use.
©
Peter
Bernik/ShuXerstock.com
11
Posi0ve
Externali0es
• In
the
presence
of
a
posi0ve
externality,
the
social
value
of
a
good
includes
– private
value
–
the
direct
value
to
buyers
– external
benefit
–
the
value
of
the
posi0ve
impact
on
bystanders
12
ACTIVE LEARNING 1
Analysis
of
a
posi0ve
externality
P The market for flu shots
External benefit
$50 = $10/shot
0 Q
0 10 20 30 13
ACTIVE LEARNING 1
Answers
Socially optimal Q
P The market for flu shots
= 25 shots.
$50
external To internalize the
40 benefit externality, use
subsidy = $10/shot.
S
30
Social value
20 = private value
+ $10 external benefit
10
D
0 Q
0 10 20 25 30 14
Effects
o f
E xternali0es:
S ummary
If
nega0ve
externality
– market
quan0ty
larger
than
socially
desirable
If
posi0ve
externality
– market
quan0ty
smaller
than
socially
desirable
To
remedy
the
problem,
“internalize
the
externality”
– tax
goods
with
nega0ve
externali0es
– subsidize
goods
with
posi0ve
externali0es
15
Public
Policies
Toward
Externali0es
Two
approaches:
• Command-‐and-‐control
policies
regulate
behavior
directly.
Examples:
– limits
on
quan0ty
of
pollu0on
emiXed
– requirements
that
firms
adopt
a
par0cular
technology
to
reduce
emissions
• Market-‐based
policies
provide
incen0ves
so
that
private
decision-‐makers
will
choose
to
solve
the
problem
on
their
own.
Examples:
– correc0ve
taxes
and
subsidies
– tradable
pollu0on
permits
16
Command-‐and-‐control
policies
• E.g:
it
is
a
crime
to
dump
poisonous
chemicals
into
the
water
supply.
But
it
is
impossible
to
prohibit
all
pollu0ng
ac0vity.
• For
instance,
virtually
all
forms
of
transporta0on
produce
some
undesirable
pollu0ng
by-‐products.
But
it
would
not
be
sensible
for
the
government
to
ban
all
transporta0on.
• Society
has
to
weigh
the
costs
and
benefits
to
decide
the
kinds
and
quan00es
of
pollu0on
it
will
allow.
• Environmental
regula0ons:
e.g.
dictates
a
maximum
level
of
pollu0on
that
a
factory
may
emit;
requires
that
firms
adopt
a
par0cular
technology
to
reduce
emissions;
etc
17
Correc0ve
Taxes
&
Subsidies
• Correc+ve
tax:
a
tax
designed
to
induce
private
decision-‐makers
to
take
account
of
the
social
costs
that
arise
from
a
nega0ve
externality
• Also
called
Pigouvian
taxes
aier
Arthur
Pigou
(1877-‐1959).
• The
ideal
correc0ve
tax
=
external
cost.
• For
ac0vi0es
with
posi0ve
externali0es,
ideal
correc0ve
subsidy
=
external
benefit.
18
Correc0ve
Taxes
&
Subsidies
• Other
taxes
and
subsidies
distort
incen0ves
and
move
economy
away
from
the
social
op0mum.
• Correc0ve
taxes
&
subsidies
– align
private
incen0ves
with
society’s
interests
– make
private
decision-‐makers
take
into
account
the
external
costs
and
benefits
of
their
ac0ons
– move
economy
toward
a
more
efficient
alloca0on
of
resources
19
Correc0ve
Taxes
vs.
Regula0ons
• Different
firms
have
different
costs
of
pollu0on
abatement
(cunng
pollu0on).
• Efficient
outcome:
Firms
with
the
lowest
abatement
costs
reduce
pollu0on
the
most.
• A
pollu0on
tax
is
efficient:
– Firms
with
low
abatement
costs
will
reduce
pollu0on
to
reduce
their
tax
burden.
– Firms
with
high
abatement
costs
have
greater
willingness
to
pay
tax.
• In
contrast,
a
regula0on
requiring
all
firms
to
reduce
pollu0on
by
a
specific
amount
not
efficient.
20
Correc0ve
Taxes
vs.
Regula0ons
21
Example
of
a
Correc0ve
Tax:
The
Gas
Tax
The
gas
tax
targets
three
nega0ve
externali0es:
– Conges0on
The
more
you
drive,
the
more
you
contribute
to
conges0on.
– Accidents
Larger
vehicles
cause
more
damage
in
an
accident.
– Pollu0on
Burning
fossil
fuels
produces
greenhouse
gases.
22
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
A.
Regula0ng
lower
SO2
emissions
• Acme
and
US
Electric
run
coal-‐burning
power
plants.
Each
emits
40
tons
of
sulfur
dioxide
per
month,
total
emissions
=
80
tons/month.
• Goal:
Reduce
SO2
emissions
25%,
to
60
tons/month
• Cost
of
reducing
emissions:
$100/ton
for
Acme,
$200/ton
for
USE
Policy
op0on
1:
Regula0on
Every
firm
must
cut
its
emissions
25%
(10
tons).
Your
task:
Compute
the
cost
to
each
firm
and
total
cost
of
achieving
goal
using
this
policy.
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 23
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
A.
Answers
• Each
firm
must
reduce
emissions
by
10
tons.
• Cost
of
reducing
emissions:
$100/ton
for
Acme,
$200/ton
for
USE.
• Compute
cost
of
achieving
goal
with
this
policy:
Cost
to
Acme:
(10
tons)
x
($100/ton)
=
$1000
Cost
to
USE:
(10
tons)
x
($200/ton)
=
$2000
Total
cost
of
achieving
goal
=
$3000
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 24
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
B.
Tradable
pollu0on
permits
• Ini0ally,
Acme
and
USE
each
emit
40
tons
SO2/month.
• Goal:
reduce
SO2
emissions
to
60
tons/month
total.
Policy
op0on
2:
Tradable
pollu0on
permits
• Issue
60
permits,
each
allows
one
ton
SO2
emissions.
Give
30
permits
to
each
firm.
Establish
market
for
trading
permits.
• Each
firm
may
use
all
its
permits
to
emit
30
tons,
may
emit
<
30
tons
and
sell
leiover
permits,
or
may
purchase
extra
permits
to
emit
>
30
tons.
Your
task:
Compute
cost
of
achieving
goal
if
Acme
uses
20
permits
and
sells
10
to
USE
for
$150
each.
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 25
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
B.
Answers
• Goal:
reduce
emissions
from
80
to
60
tons
• Cost
of
reducing
emissions:
$100/ton
for
Acme,
$200/ton
for
USE.
Compute
cost
of
achieving
goal:
Acme
– sells
10
permits
to
USE
for
$150
each,
gets
$1500
– uses
20
permits,
emits
20
tons
SO2
– spends
$2000
to
reduce
emissions
by
20
tons
– net
cost
to
Acme:
$2000
−
$1500
=
$500
con$nued…
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 26
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
B.
Answers,
con$nued
• Goal:
reduce
emissions
from
80
to
60
tons
• Cost
of
reducing
emissions:
$100/ton
for
Acme,
$200/ton
for
USE.
USE
– buys
10
permits
from
Acme,
spends
$1500
– uses
these
10
plus
original
30
permits,
emits
40
tons
– spends
nothing
on
abatement
– net
cost
to
USE
=
$1500
Total
cost
of
achieving
goal
=
$500
+
$1500
=
$2000
Using
tradable
permits,
goal
is
achieved
at
lower
total
cost
and
lower
cost
to
each
firm
than
using
regula$on.
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 27
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
Tradable
Pollu0on
Permits
• A
tradable
pollu0on
permits
system
reduces
pollu0on
at
lower
cost
than
regula0on.
– Firms
with
low
cost
of
reducing
pollu0on
do
so
and
sell
their
unused
permits.
– Firms
with
high
cost
of
reducing
pollu0on
buy
permits.
• Result:
Pollu0on
reduc0on
is
concentrated
among
those
firms
with
lowest
costs.
28
Tradable
Pollu0on
Permits
in
the
Real
World
• SO2
permits
traded
in
the
U.S.
since
1995.
• Nitrogen
oxide
permits
traded
in
the
northeastern
U.S.
since
1999.
• Carbon
emissions
permits
traded
in
Europe
since
January
1,
2005.
29
Correc0ve
Taxes
vs.
Tradable
Pollu0on
Permits
• Like
most
demand
curves,
firms’
demand
for
the
ability
to
pollute
is
a
downward-‐sloping
func0on
of
the
“price”
of
pollu0ng.
– A
correc0ve
tax
raises
this
price
and
thus
reduces
the
quan0ty
of
pollu0on
firms
demand.
– A
tradable
permits
system
restricts
the
supply
of
pollu0on
rights,
has
the
same
effect
as
the
tax.
• When
policymakers
do
not
know
the
posi0on
of
this
demand
curve,
the
permits
system
achieves
pollu0on
reduc0on
targets
more
precisely.
30
Objec0ons
to
the
Economic
Analysis
of
Pollu0on
• Some
poli0cians,
many
environmentalists
argue
that
no
one
should
be
able
to
“buy”
the
right
to
pollute,
cannot
put
a
price
on
the
environment.
• However,
people
face
tradeoffs.
The
value
of
clean
air
and
water
must
be
compared
to
their
cost.
• The
market-‐based
approach
reduces
the
cost
of
environmental
protec0on,
so
it
should
increase
the
public’s
demand
for
a
clean
environment.
31
Private
Solu0ons
to
Externali0es
Types
of
private
solu0ons:
• Moral
codes
and
social
sanc0ons,
e.g.,
the
“Golden
Rule”
• Chari0es,
e.g.,
the
Sierra
Club
• Contracts
between
market
par0cipants
and
the
affected
bystanders
32
Private
Solu0ons
to
Externali0es
• The
Coase
theorem:
If
private
par0es
can
costlessly
bargain
over
the
alloca0on
of
resources,
they
can
solve
the
externali0es
problem
on
their
own.
33
The
Coase
Theorem:
An
Example
Dick
owns
a
dog
named
Spot.
Nega0ve
externality:
Spot’s
barking
disturbs
Jane,
Dick’s
neighbor.
©Viorel
Sima/ShuXerstock.com
The
socially
efficient
outcome
maximizes
Dick’s
+
Jane’s
well-‐being.
– If
Dick
values
having
Spot
more
See Spot bark.
than
Jane
values
peace
and
quiet,
the
dog
should
stay.
Coase
theorem:
The
private
market
will
reach
the
efficient
outcome
on
its
own…
34
The
Coase
Theorem:
An
Example
• CASE
1:
Dick
has
the
right
to
keep
Spot.
Benefit
to
Dick
of
having
Spot
=
$500
Cost
to
Jane
of
Spot’s
barking
=
$800
• Socially
efficient
outcome:
Spot
goes
bye-‐bye.
• Private
outcome:
Jane
pays
Dick
$600
to
get
rid
of
Spot,
both
Jane
and
Dick
are
beXer
off.
• Private
outcome
=
efficient
outcome.
35
The
Coase
Theorem:
An
Example
• CASE
2:
Dick
has
the
right
to
keep
Spot.
Benefit
to
Dick
of
having
Spot
=
$1000
Cost
to
Jane
of
Spot’s
barking
=
$800
• Socially
efficient
outcome:
See
Spot
stay.
• Private
outcome:
Jane
not
willing
to
pay
more
than
$800,
Dick
not
willing
to
accept
less
than
$1000,
so
Spot
stays.
• Private
outcome
=
efficient
outcome.
36
The
Coase
Theorem:
An
Example
• CASE
3:
Jane
has
the
legal
right
to
peace
and
quiet.
Benefit
to
Dick
of
having
Spot
=
$800
Cost
to
Jane
of
Spot’s
barking
=
$500
• Socially
efficient
outcome:
Dick
keeps
Spot.
• Private
outcome:
Dick
pays
Jane
$600
to
put
up
with
Spot’s
barking.
• Private
outcome
=
efficient
outcome.
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 38
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
Why
Private
Solu0ons
Do
Not
Always
Work
1.
Transac+on
costs:
The
costs
par0es
incur
in
the
process
of
agreeing
to
and
following
through
on
a
bargain.
These
costs
may
make
it
impossible
to
reach
a
mutually
beneficial
agreement.
2.
Stubbornness:
Even
if
a
beneficial
agreement
is
possible,
each
party
may
hold
out
for
a
beXer
deal.
3.
Coordina0on
problems:
If
#
of
par0es
is
very
large,
coordina0ng
them
may
be
costly,
difficult,
or
impossible.
39
Summary
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 40
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
Summary
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 41
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
Summary
© 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as 42
permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.