United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support, Committee
on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

AIR FORCE READINESS

Expected at 9:30 a.m. ET
Wednesday, October 10, 2018

Actions Needed to Rebuild

Readiness and Prepare for
the Future
Statement of John H. Pendleton, Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-19-120T
 October 10, 2018

AIR FORCE READINESS

Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for
the Future
Highlights of GAO-19-120T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate

Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found

The 2018 National Defense Strategy GAO’s prior work has highlighted that the Air Force faces management and
emphasizes that restoring and readiness challenges in four interrelated areas:
retaining readiness across the entire
spectrum of conflict is critical to • Personnel: The Air Force has reported that pilot and aircraft maintainer
success in the emerging security shortfalls are a key challenge to rebuilding readiness. GAO found in April
environment. Air Force readiness has 2018 that the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations for 11 of
steadily declined primarily due to the 12 years, from fiscal years 2006 through 2017. Even as unmanned aerial
persistent demand on a fleet that has systems had become more prevalent and fighter pilot workloads had
aged and decreased in size since the increased, the Air Force had not reevaluated fighter squadron requirements.
1990s. The Air Force is working to both GAO recommended that the Air Force reevaluate fighter pilot squadron
rebuild the readiness of its forces and requirements to ensure it has the pilots necessary for all missions.
modernize its aging fleet to meet future
threats. However, according to the Air • Equipment: Air Force aircraft availability has been limited by challenges
Force, its readiness goals will take associated with aging aircraft, maintenance, and supply support. GAO
years to achieve as it continues to be reported in September 2018 that, from fiscal year 2011 through 2016, the Air
challenged to rebuild readiness amid Force generally did not meet availability goals for key aircraft. Further, in
continued operational demands. October 2017 GAO found F-35 availability was below service expectations
and sustainment plans did not include key requirements. GAO recommended
This statement provides information on
that DOD revise F-35 sustainment plans to include requirements and
Air Force (1) readiness and
management challenges including decision points needed to implement the F-35 sustainment strategy.
personnel, equipment, training, and • Training: The Air Force has identified the need to ensure its forces can
organization and utilization, and (2) successfully achieve missions to address a broad range of current and
plans to grow and modernize its force emerging threats. However, GAO reported in September 2016 that Air Force
in the context of readiness recovery combat fighter squadrons did not complete annual training requirements due
across DOD. Also, GAO summarizes
to aircraft availability and training range limitations, and had used the same
recommendations to address these
underlying assumptions for its annual training requirements from 2012 to
challenges and actions taken by the Air
Force. 2016. GAO recommended that the Air Force reassess its annual training
requirements to ensure its forces can accomplish a full range of missions.
This statement is based on previously
published work since 2016 related to • Organization and Utilization: Air Force management of its force structure
Air Force readiness challenges, fighter can also exacerbate readiness challenges. GAO found in July 2018 that the
pilot workforce requirements, weapon Air Force’s organization of its small F-22 fleet had not maximized aircraft
sustainment, aviation training, and availability, and that its utilization of F-22s reduced opportunities for pilots to
force structure. train for missions in high-threat environments. GAO found that unless the Air
Force assesses the organization and use of its F-22s, F-22 units are likely to
What GAO Recommends continue to experience aircraft availability and pilot training rates that are
GAO has made 14 recommendations below what they could be. GAO recommended that the Air Force reassess its
in prior unclassified work described in F-22 organizational structure to reduce risk to future operations.
this statement. DOD generally Looking to the future, the Air Force will have to balance the rebuilding of its
concurred with most of them and has
existing force with its desire to grow and modernize. To meet current and future
implemented 1. Continued attention to
demands, the Air Force has stated that it needs to have more squadrons.
these recommendations can assist and
guide the Air Force moving forward as However, the costs of such growth are as yet unknown, and will have to compete
it seeks to rebuild the readiness of its with other military services looking to increase their force structure and
forces. recapitalize their forces. Even with growth, the Air Force would be dependent on
the force of today for decades to come and will need to stay focused on
View GAO-19-120T. For more information, rebuilding the readiness of existing forces. Addressing GAO’s recommendations
contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or are necessary steps to meet current and future needs and can assist the Air
pendletonj@gao.gov.
Force moving forward.

United States Government Accountability Office

Letter
Letter

Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss issues related
to Air Force readiness.

In June 2017, we issued a report highlighting five key mission challenges

facing the Department of Defense (DOD). 1 In that report, we noted that
the United States faces an extremely challenging national security
environment at the same time it is grappling with addressing an
unsustainable fiscal situation in which DOD accounts for approximately
half of the federal government’s discretionary spending. Within this
environment, DOD is working to both rebuild the readiness of its current
forces and modernize to meet future threats. Since we issued that report,
the Department released a new National Defense Strategy in January
2018 that prioritizes the long-term challenges posed by highly capable
adversaries and emphasizes the need to rebuild readiness. Additionally,
Congress has passed appropriations to fund DOD’s effort to restore
military readiness.

This statement provides information on Air Force (1) readiness and

management challenges in four interrelated areas of personnel,
equipment, training, and organization and utilization, and (2) plans to
grow and modernize its force in the context of rebuilding readiness across
DOD. We also summarize our recommendations to address these Air
Force challenges and their actions taken. 2

This statement is based on our body of work issued from 2016 to 2018
examining Air Force readiness challenges, fighter pilot workforce
requirements, weapon system sustainment, aviation training, and force
structure. 3 To perform our prior work, we analyzed Air Force readiness,

1
This included a detailed discussion of our priority recommendations to DOD. Since
August 2015, we have identified priority recommendations in letters to the Secretary of
Defense—recommendations that we have made to DOD that we believe the department
should give a high priority to addressing. See GAO, Department of Defense: Actions
Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges, GAO-17-369 (Washington, D.C.: June
13, 2017). As of April 2018, 85 priority recommendations remained open.
2
The status of our recommendations made in the work cited in this statement is provided
in appendix I. Appendix I does not include recommendations made in classified reports.
3
A list of related classified and unclassified GAO products is provided in Related GAO
Products at the end of this statement.

Page 1 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 personnel, maintenance, and training data, and interviewed cognizant Air
Force officials involved in operations. The reports cited throughout this
statement contain more details on the scope of the work and the
methodology used to carry it out. We have also issued several classified
reports since 2016 examining these issues and made recommendations
to the Air Force; however this statement does not include that work.

We conducted the work on which this testimony is based in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives.

DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget

Background uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded military
readiness; in response, the department has made rebuilding the
readiness of the military forces a priority. The 2018 National Defense
Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the
entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security
environment. Nevertheless, DOD reported readiness of the total military
force remains low and has remained so since 2013. Our work has shown
that Air Force readiness, in particular, has steadily declined due to a
persistent demand for forces, a decline in equipment availability and
experienced maintenance personnel, the effect of high deployment rates
on units’ ability to conduct needed training, and a smaller inventory of
aircraft. 4 DOD has made department-wide progress in developing a plan
to rebuild readiness of the military force. 5 In August 2018, we reported
that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a Readiness
Recovery Framework that the Department is using to guide the military
4
The Air Force fleet has decreased in size since the 1990s. For example, the Air Force
experienced a 58 percent decrease in the number of fighter and bomber squadrons from
1991 to 2015 while maintaining a persistent level of demand from the combatant
commands for the use of its forces.
5
In September 2016, we reviewed DOD and the military services’ plans to rebuild
readiness and reported that the efforts may be at risk without a department-wide plan for
moving forward. We made five recommendations on implementing and overseeing
readiness rebuilding efforts. See GAO, Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding
Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan, GAO-16-841 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 7, 2016).

Page 2 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

services’ efforts and plans to regularly assess, validate, and monitor
readiness recovery. 6 According to officials, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the military services are currently revising readiness goals
and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align
with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning
Guidance. However, additional work remains to ensure that the actions
DOD is taking will ultimately achieve overall readiness goals. 7

DOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring in a challenging context

that requires the department to make difficult decisions regarding how
best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future
challenges. An important aspect of this, across all of the military services,
is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and
upgrading legacy weapon system platforms currently in operational use
and procuring platforms able to overcome rapidly advancing future
threats. Air Force leaders have stated that striking such a balance is
exceptionally difficult. While each of the military services, including the Air
Force, must grapple with these choices, senior leaders have called for
immediate readiness rebuilding with particular focus on aviation. In a
memorandum on September 17, 2018, the Secretary of Defense noted
that DOD faces shortfalls in aviation squadrons across the force with the
aviation inventory and supporting infrastructure suffering from systemic
underperformance and unrealized capacity. 8 In order to focus on meeting
DOD’s most critical priorities first, the Secretary of Defense emphasized
the need to rebuild readiness. As such, the Secretary directed the Air
Force to achieve a minimum of 80 percent mission capable rates for fiscal
year 2019 for the F-35, F-22, and F-16, while simultaneously reducing

6
GAO, Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a Readiness
Rebuilding Plan, GAO-18-441RC (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2018). The Readiness
Recovery Framework identifies primary readiness issues that each of the military services
face, actions to address identified issues, and milestones and metrics to assess progress
in addressing identified issues.
7
Section 333 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019, Pub.L.No. 115-232 (2018), requires us to report annually until 2021 on the
readiness of the armed forces to conduct full spectrum operations in the ground, sea, air,
space, and cyber domains. This work is ongoing.
8
Secretary of Defense Memorandum, NDS Implementation-Mission Capability of Critical
Aviation Platforms (Sept. 17, 2018).

Page 3 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 these platforms’ operating and maintenance costs every year starting in
fiscal year 2019. 9

Our prior work has identified management and readiness challenges in

Air Force Faces four interrelated areas—personnel, equipment, training, and organization
Several Interrelated and utilization, and we have made recommendations to help the Air Force
address rebuilding the readiness of its existing fleet.
Management and
Readiness
Challenges

Personnel: Pilot and The Air Force has reported that manpower shortfalls, particularly among
Aircraft Maintainer skilled pilots and maintainers, are a primary challenge to rebuilding
readiness. As we have previously reported, developing fighter pilots
Shortfalls Have Impeded requires a significant investment of time and funding. 10 According to Air
Readiness Recovery Force officials, a fighter pilot requires approximately 5 years of training to
be qualified to lead flights, at a cost of between about $3 million to $11
million depending on the specific type of aircraft. In April 2018, we
reported that according to Air Force pilot staffing level and authorizations
data for fiscal years 2006 through 2017, the Air Force had fewer fighter
pilots than authorizations for 11 of those 12 years (see fig. 1). This gap
grew from 192 fighter pilots (5 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year
2006, to 1,005 (27 percent) in fiscal year 2017. According to briefing
documents prepared by the Air Force, this gap was concentrated among
fighter pilots with fewer than 8 years of experience. The Air Force
forecasted that the fighter pilot gap will persist over time, even as the Air
Force takes steps to train more fighter pilots and improve retention.

9
Secretary Mattis also directed the same mission capable and cost control goals for the
Navy’s F-35 and F-18 fleets.
10
GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce
Requirements, GAO-18-113 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2018).

Page 4 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Figure 1: Air Force Active Component: Fighter Pilot Actual Staffing Levels
Compared with Authorizations, Fiscal Years 2006-2017

Air Force officials identified multiple factors that led to low numbers of
fighter pilots. For example, the military services trained fewer fighter pilots
than targeted over the last decade. In fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the
Air Force trained 12 percent fewer new fighter pilots than the targeted
amount. In our April 2018 report, we found that the military services had
not reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect increased fighter pilot
workload and the emergence of unmanned aerial systems. Fighter pilots
and squadron leaders from each of the military services we interviewed at
the time consistently told us that the fighter pilot occupation has
significantly changed in recent years due to changes in fighter aircraft
tactics and technology, additional training requirements, and the removal
of administrative support positions from squadrons. Without updating
squadron requirements to reflect this growing administrative burden on
fighter pilots, the currently identified differences between fighter pilot
numbers and authorizations may be understated. By contrast, without
updating future fighter pilot requirements to take into account changing
roles and missions—in particular the increasing role of unmanned aerial
systems in combat operations—forecasted fighter pilot gaps may be
overstated. In short, we concluded that reevaluating fighter pilot
requirements is a key first step to help the military services, including the
Air Force, clearly determine the magnitude of the gaps and target

Page 5 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

strategies to meet their personnel needs. In our April 2018 report, we
recommended that the Air Force reevaluate fighter pilot squadron
requirements to ensure it has the pilots necessary for all missions. 11 DOD
concurred with this recommendation.

The Air Force is also trying to manage a shortage of aircraft maintainer

personnel—both uniformed personnel and depot civilians. In September
2018, we found that the Air Force reported losing experienced
maintainers, either to retirement or to other programs such as the F-35
Lightning II (F-35). 12 For example, we reported that the Air Force’s C-17,
which is a long-range, heavy logistics transport aircraft, requires depot
modifications to keep it viable, but there was a shortage of depot
maintainer personnel due to attrition, inability to retain skilled workers,
and hiring freezes. The Air Force has several initiatives underway,
including hiring additional maintainer personnel and temporarily
transitioning active-duty maintenance units from some legacy aircraft. As
of August 2018, the Air Force had requested an increased end strength of
8,000 personnel to fill critical personnel needs in maintenance and pilots.
Officials stated that progress was being made in increasing end strength
and hiring additional personnel, which should address these challenges.
However, according to Air Force officials, it may take several years before
newly hired maintainer personnel will have the training and experience
they need to improve aircraft availability rates. We have work underway to
examine the Air Force’s management of its aircraft maintainer workforce
and DOD depot skill gaps and plan to report on these issues over the
next 6 months. 13

11
In House Report 115-676 accompanying the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the House Armed Services Committee noted that it
was concerned about the Air Force’s persistent pilot shortages and the effect of those
shortages on the readiness of the Air Force, and directed the Secretary of the Air Force to
address our recommendation to reevaluate requirements.
12
GAO, Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally
Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified,
GAO-18-678 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2018).
13
Our work on the Air Force’s management of its aircraft maintainer workforce is focused
on maintainer staff gaps, technical school training, and retention over the past 8 years.

Page 6 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Equipment: Aircraft Air Force aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated
Availability Has Been with aging aircraft, maintenance, and supply support. According to the Air
Force, the average age of the fleet is 28 years. The average ages of the
Limited by Aging Aircraft,
B-52 strategic bomber and the KC-135 tanker each exceed 50 years, and
Costly Maintenance, and the Air Force expects to continue to use these aircraft for decades. The
Diminished Supply Air Force spends billions of dollars each year to sustain its fixed-wing
Support aircraft fleet—comprised of both legacy and new aircraft—which needs
expensive logistics support, including maintenance and repair, to meet its
availability goals. We reported in September 2018 that from fiscal year
2011 through 2016, the Air Force generally did not meet aircraft
availability goals while it continued to accrue increased maintenance
costs. 14 Figure 2 summarizes the sustainment challenges we reported
that face selected Air Force aircraft.

Figure 2: Sustainment Challenges Affecting Selected Air Force Fixed-Wing Aircraft

a
Obsolescence is a lack of availability of a part due to its lack of usefulness or it is no longer current
or available for production.
b
Diminishing manufacturing sources is a loss or impending loss of manufacturers or suppliers of
items.

14
GAO, Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally
Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified,
GAO-18-678 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2018).

Page 7 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Sustainment challenges are not just an issue for older aircraft, but
represent an enduring challenge for the Air Force. The F-35—which is
intended to replace a variety of legacy fighter aircraft in the Air Force and
more broadly represents the future of tactical aviation for DOD—has
projected sustainment costs of over $1 trillion over a 60-year life cycle. 15
In October 2017, we reported that DOD’s projected operating and support
costs estimate for the F-35 rose by 24 percent from fiscal year 2012 to
fiscal year 2016 and are not fully transparent to the military services.

In October 2017, we also reported that the F-35 fleet faced sustainment
challenges that pose risks to its ability to meet current and future
warfighter readiness requirements. 16 The Air Force planned to procure
more than 1,700 F-35 aircraft and, as the largest participant in the F-35
program, its readiness could be disproportionately affected by the
sustainment challenges facing this program. In particular, DOD’s
capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots were 6 years behind
schedule, which resulted in average part repair times of 172 days—twice
that of the program’s objective. These repair backlogs have contributed to
significant F-35 spare parts shortages—from January to August 7, 2017,
F-35 aircraft were unable to fly 22 percent of the time because of parts
shortages. As a result, the Air Force had generally not met its aircraft
availability goals for its fielded F-35 aircraft (See fig. 3 for Air Force
personnel performing maintenance on the F-35).

15
In 2014, we reported that DOD officials considered the program to be unaffordable, and
recommended that DOD establish affordability targets linked to the services budgets to
determine what the services could afford. See GAO, F-35 Sustainment: Need for
Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates,
GAO-14-778 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2014). While some steps have been taken to
create affordability targets for the program, work remains to ensure that the Air Force can
afford to sustain the aircraft it plans to purchase.
16
GAO, F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting
Readiness and Cost Transparency, GAO-18-75 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2017).

Page 8 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Figure 3: Air Force Maintenance on F-35

Our work has shown that these challenges are largely the result of
sustainment plans that do not fully include key requirements or timely and
sufficient funding. In our October 2017 report, we recommended, among
other things, that DOD revise sustainment plans to ensure that they
include the key requirements and decision points needed to fully
implement the F-35 sustainment strategy and align funding plans to meet
those requirements. DOD concurred with this recommendation and DOD
officials report that they are focusing actions and resources toward
achieving key production, development and sustainment objectives by
2025. In addition, the conference report accompanying a bill for fiscal
year 2019 defense appropriations directed a higher appropriation amount
for the Air Force’s aircraft procurement than DOD requested in its
budget. 17 This appropriation may create more demand on the already
strained sustainment enterprise for which DOD has not always provided
timely funding (for example, funding for spare parts). 18

17
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 115-952 (2018).
18
GAO, F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting
Readiness and Cost Transparency, GAO-18-75 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2017).

Page 9 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Training: Units Are The Air Force has identified the need to ensure a full-spectrum capable
Challenged To Achieve force that can successfully perform missions addressing a broad range of
current and emerging threats; however, the Air Force has had difficulty
Full Spectrum Readiness
training for full spectrum readiness. For more than a decade, the Air
Force focused its training on supporting operations in the Middle East,
including Iraq and Afghanistan. Commanders established training
requirements that they deemed necessary to prepare aircrews to conduct
missions in these locations—such as close air support-to-ground forces—
limiting training for other missions. In September 2016, based on our
analysis of data on the completion of annual training, we found that
combat fighter squadrons were generally able to complete mission
training requirements for ongoing contingency operations, but were
unable to meet annual training requirements across the full range of
missions. 19 Wing and squadron commanders we interviewed at the time
cited several common limitations related to the challenges discussed in
this testimony that affected the ability of their squadrons to complete
training across the full range of missions including the maintenance unit’s
ability to provide adequate numbers of aircraft for training, adversary air
tasking, and manpower shortfalls in the squadrons. 20

We also reported in September 2016 that F-22 and F-35 squadrons faced
training range limitations. F-22 squadron commanders told us that the
airspace available limits their ability to train for their more complex
missions, including offensive counter air and defensive counter air
missions. Additionally, the commanders we interviewed at the time for
squadrons flying F-22 and F-35 aircraft told us that limits in training range
capabilities, such as threat replicators and targets, affected the training
completed at smaller regional training ranges, as well as at larger training
ranges such as the Utah Test and Training Range and the Nevada Test
and Training Range. According to these officials, the training ranges
lacked many of the more advanced threat replication systems that can
challenge F-35 and F-22 capabilities and provide effective training across
their full range of missions.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy cites, as the department’s principal

priority, the need to prepare for threats from advanced adversaries due to

19
GAO, Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve
Effectiveness, GAO-16-864 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2016).
20
Adversary air or “red air” missions are those in which the aircrews play the role of an
adversary threat in support of aircrews flying a “blue” (U.S. and allied force) training sortie.

Page 10 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

the magnitude of the threat they pose. Further, the Air Force reports that
it will confront an increasingly complex security environment in the
coming years that will demand a wider range of skill sets and different
capabilities than are currently being employed. For example, aircrews
may be called upon to conduct missions that require freedom of
maneuver in highly-contested air spaces. However, in our September
2016 report, we found that the Air Force has used the same underlying
assumptions to establish its annual training requirements from 2012
through 2016, which may not reflect current and emerging training needs.
Specifically, the total annual live-fly training sorties by aircraft, the criteria
for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix
between live and simulator training remained the same from 2012 through
2016. 21 We concluded that without fully reassessing the assumptions
underlying its training requirements, the Air Force could not be certain
that its annual training plans are aligned with its stated goals to ensure a
full-spectrum capable force that can successfully achieve missions across
a broad range of current and emerging threats. We recommended that
the Air Force reassess its annual training requirements and make any
appropriate adjustments to its future training plans to ensure that its
forces can accomplish a full range of missions. The Air Force has a
number of efforts under way to study or address some of the factors that
limit the ability of fighter squadrons to meet annual training requirements.

21
Section 351 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Pub. L. No.
114-328 (2016), directed the Secretary of the Air Force to enter into a contract with an
independent entity to conduct a review of the Air Force Ready Aircrew Program, including
an assessment of the assumptions underlying the annual continuation training
requirements of the Air Force and the overall effectiveness of the Aircrew Program, and
make recommendations for the improved management of such training requirements. The
Air Force was also directed to report on this review and assessment to the defense
committees. On August 30, 2018, the Air Force submitted its report, entitled Independent
Review and Assessment of the Air Force Ready Aircrew Program, to the Senate and
House Committees on Armed Services. Section 351 also included a provision for us to
review the Air Force’s report and examine (1) the extent to which the Air Force report
addressed the elements described in the Act, (2) the adequacy and completeness of the
assumptions reviewed to establish the annual training requirements of the Air Force, and
(3) any actions the Air Force plans to carry out to incorporate the results of the report into
annual training documents. Our review is currently ongoing.

Page 11 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Organization and The Air Force’s management of its limited force structure can also
Utilization: Air Force exacerbate some of the problems discussed above, as we found for the
F-22 fleet. The F-22, widely regarded as the best air superiority fighter
Management of Its Forces
aircraft in the world, is an integral part of the U.S. military’s ability to
Can Diminish Existing defeat high-end adversaries (See fig. 4 for an image of the F-22).
Capability
Figure 4: Air Force F-22

To meet its assigned air superiority responsibility, the Air Force is to

provide the combatant commanders with both mission capable aircraft
and pilots who are trained to fly those aircraft in the expected threat
environments. However, in July 2018, we found that Air Force
organization and utilization of its small fleet of F-22s has reduced its
ability to provide these two elements, thereby further limiting this
important capability. 22

22
GAO, Force Structure: F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could Improve
Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training, GAO-18-190 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2018).

Page 12 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Specifically, we found that the Air Force’s organization of its small F-22
fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft. Availability
was constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization. For
example, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the F-22
aircraft was time consuming and significantly reduced the aircraft’s
availability for missions. Maintenance availability challenges were
exacerbated by the Air Force’s decision to organize the F-22 fleet into
small units of 18 or 21 aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons
per wing. Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing, with 24
aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies
because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air
Force officials. Further, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to
operate from a single location. However, it generally deployed only a part
of a squadron, and the remaining part struggled to keep aircraft available
for missions at home. 23 Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and
deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel,
according to service officials. The Air Force had not reassessed the
structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010 and may be foregoing opportunities
to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and better
support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat
environments.

Further, we found that the Air Force’s utilization of its F-22 fleet limited
pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat
environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air
superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year.
However, F-22 pilots were not meeting their minimum yearly training
requirements for air superiority missions, according to Air Force training
reports and service officials. Moreover, using F-22s for exercises and
operational missions that do not require the F-22’s unique capabilities
interrupted pilot training and led to reduced proficiency. For example, F-
22 units were often directed to participate in partnership building
exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted

23
The deployment of partial squadrons occurs not just with F-22 squadrons, but across the
Air Force and with similar effects on squadron operations. Further, although the Air Force
has not deployed a complete flying squadron to meet operational requirements since the
late 1990s, it continues to provide readiness information to DOD and Congress at the
squadron level. In our June 2018 report, we recommended, among other things, that the
Air Force analyze and report the readiness data to DOD and Congress of the small pieces
of the squadrons that are deploying. GAO, Air Force Readiness: Changes to Readiness
Reports Could Help Stakeholders Take More Informed Actions, GAO-18-65C
(Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2018).

Page 13 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security
concerns about exposing the F-22’s unique capabilities. These
restrictions not only limited the value of the exercises, but also could
result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. The
Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—that is, a mission
that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to
threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require
the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but we reported that because there
are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons based at the F-22
locations in Alaska and Hawaii, the alert mission fell on the F-22 units.
Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission could not be used for any
other purposes, limiting opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority
skills. Unless the Air Force takes steps to assess and make necessary
adjustments to the current organization and use of its F-22s, F-22 units
are likely to continue to experience aircraft availability and pilot training
rates that are below what they could be. As a result, the Air Force may
incur increased risks in future operations in high threat areas. In July
2018, we recommended that the Air Force reassess its F-22
organizational structure and identify ways to increase F-22 pilot training
opportunities for high-end missions to reduce risk to future operations.
DOD concurred with both recommendations.

In September 2018, the Secretary of the Air Force described the need to
Air Force Will Need to grow the number of Air Force squadrons from 312 to 386—a 24 percent
Balance Near-term increase—between fiscal years 2025 and 2030 in order to meet persistent
operational demands and address the challenges identified in the
Readiness Recovery National Defense Strategy. 24 However, the details and costs of such
with Plans to Grow growth are as yet unknown and will have to compete with other military
services looking to increase their force structure and major defense
and Modernize the capabilities that require recapitalization. For example, over the next three
Force decades, the Navy plans to grow its fleet by nearly 25 percent—at an
estimated cost of about $800 billion—and modernizing and maintaining
the nation’s nuclear arsenal could cost $1.2 trillion over the same

24
As of September 2018, the Air Force reported it has 312 operational squadrons to
execute its core missions consisting of fighters, bombers, airlift,
intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, command and control, special operations,
space, cyber, missile, and personnel recovery squadrons.

Page 14 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

timeframe. 25 All of these investments would need to be made amid a
deteriorating national fiscal picture. 26

Even if it grows, the Air Force will be dependent on the force of today for
decades to come and will need to stay focused on rebuilding its
readiness. Many of the Air Force’s fourth generation fighters will be part
of the force structure for the next decade or more, and the Air Force plans
to retain the F-22 aircraft until 2060. In addition, the Air Force proposed
divesting the A-10 to make budgetary room for more modern aircraft.
However, as we reported in August 2016, the Air Force did not fully
examine the implications of this course of action and could not
demonstrate how it would meet the multiple missions being performed by
the aging A-10. 27 Therefore, focusing on rebuilding the existing force will
be crucial to positioning the Air Force for the future. While these
challenges are particularly acute in the Air Force, the Air Force is not
alone among the military services. Given persistently low readiness levels
across the military, we have called for a comprehensive readiness
rebuilding plan for the entire Department of Defense to guide rebuilding
efforts, including setting clear goals and identifying resources required to
meet those goals for all services, including the Air Force. 28

In sum, as it plans for the future, the Air Force will need to balance the
rebuilding of its existing force with its desire to grow and modernize. We
have made a number of recommendations—with which the Air Force
have generally concurred with but most have not yet been implemented—
that provide a partial roadmap to address important readiness challenges.
Implementing our recommendations to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron
requirements, revise F-35 sustainment plans, reassess annual training
requirements, and examine how the Air Force organizes and utilizes its F-
22 organizational structure are necessary steps to meet current and

25
These are Congressional Budget Office estimates. See Congressional Budget Office,
Costs of Building a 355-Ship Navy, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2017) and Congressional
Budget Office, Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046,
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2017).
26
GAO, The Nation’s Fiscal Health: Action Is Needed to Address the Federal
Government’s Fiscal Future, GAO-18-299SP (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2018).
27
GAO, Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10 and Other
Future Divestment Decisions, GAO-16-816 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2016).
28
GAO, Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a
Comprehensive Plan, GAO-16-841 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2016).

Page 15 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 future needs and can assist the Air Force moving forward. In addition,
sustained management attention and continued congressional oversight
will be needed to ensure that the Air Force demonstrates progress in
addressing its personnel, equipment, training, and organization and
utilization challenges.

Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact
GAO Contact and John Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202)
Staff 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this testimony are Chris Watson, Assistant
Director; Nick Cornelisse, Amie Lesser, Shari Nikoo, Michael Silver,
Nicole Volchko, and Lillian Yob.

Page 16 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Appendix I: Implementation Status of Key
Appendix I: Implementation Status of Key Prior
GAO Recommendations Related to Air Force
Readiness

Prior GAO Recommendations Related to Air

Force Readiness
Over the past three years, we issued several reports related to Air Force
readiness that are cited in this statement. Table 1 summarizes the status
of our key recommendations related to Air Force readiness since 2016; a
total of 14 recommendations. The Department of Defense (DOD) has
implemented 1 of these recommendations. For each of the reports, the
specific recommendations and their implementation status are
summarized in tables 2 through 7.

Table 1: Status of Key GAO Recommendations Related to Air Force Readiness Since 2016

Number of recommendations
Product date Product title and number Open Implemented
a
September 10, 2018 Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft 1 0
Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy
Guidance Need to Be Clarified (GAO-18-678)
July 19, 2018 Force Structure: F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could 2 0
Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training (GAO-18-190)
a
April 11, 2018 Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce 1 0
Requirements (GAO-18-113)
October 26, 2017 F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges 4 0
Affecting Readiness and Cost Transparency (GAO-18-75)
September 19, 2016 Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to 2 1
Improve Effectiveness (GAO-16-864)
August 24, 2016 Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10 3 0
and Other Future Divestment Decisions (GAO-16-816)
Total 13 1
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. I GAO-19-120T

Note: This table does not include recommendations made in classified reports.
a
This report also included recommendations directed to the Secretary of the Navy, which are not
counted here.

Table 2: Status of Recommendations from Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have
Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified (GAO-18-678)

Recommendation #1:
The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Status: Open
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment updates or issues new policy Concurrence: Yes
clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for
legacy weapon systems, including fixed-wing aircraft. Comments: We will monitor DOD’s efforts to
address this recommendation.
Source: GAO analysis. I GAO-19-120T

Note: This table does not include a recommendation that was directed to the Secretary of the Navy
and did not relate to the Air Force.

Page 17 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 Appendix I: Implementation Status of Key Prior
GAO Recommendations Related to Air Force
Readiness

Table 3: Status of Recommendations from Force Structure: F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could Improve Aircraft
Availability and Pilot Training (GAO-18-190)

Recommendation #1:
The Secretary of the Air Force should conduct a comprehensive Status: Open
assessment of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and Concurrence: Yes
assesses alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons. The
assessment could at a minimum assess the following two alternatives: Comments: We will monitor DOD’s efforts to address
consolidating the fleet into larger squadrons and/or wings in order to this recommendation.
improve aircraft availability, and revising the design of the deployable
units in squadrons to better support current deployment practices and
future operational concepts.
Recommendation #2:
The Secretary of the Air Force should identify and assess actions to Status: Open
increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for the high-end air superiority Concurrence: Yes
missions. This effort could consider alternatives such as: reducing exercise
events that do not contribute to F-22 pilot high-end air superiority training, Comments: We will monitor DOD’s efforts to address
increasing external adversary air support so all F-22 pilots can use their this recommendation.
available limited sorties to conduct high-end air superiority training rather
than having a significant portion of the F-22 pilots providing training support,
and finding alternatives to using F-22 units for alert missions, and other
missions that do not require the jet’s unique capabilities or prepare F-22
pilots for their primary missions.
Source: GAO analysis. I GAO-19-120T

Table 4: Status of Recommendations from Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce
Requirements (GAO-18-113)

Recommendation #1:
The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Director of Status: Open
Operations and the Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency reevaluate Concurrence: Yes
fighter pilot squadron requirements, to include updating current assumptions
of fighter pilot workload, and assessing the impact of future incorporation of Comments: We will monitor DOD’s efforts to
unmanned aerial systems platforms into combat aviation. address this recommendation.
Source: GAO analysis. I GAO-19-120T

Note: This table does not include two recommendations that were directed to the Secretary of the
Navy and did not relate to the Air Force.

Page 18 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 Appendix I: Implementation Status of Key Prior
GAO Recommendations Related to Air Force
Readiness

Table 5: Status of Recommendations from F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting Readiness
and Cost Transparency (GAO-18-75)

Recommendation #1:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Status: Open
and Logistics, in coordination with the F-35 Program Concurrence: Yes
Executive Officer, should revise sustainment plans to
ensure that they include the key requirements and Comments: As of June 2018, officials from the Office of the Under
decision points needed to fully implement the F-35 Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S))
sustainment strategy and align funding plans to meet said that USD(A&S) and the F-35 Program Executive Officer (PEO)
those requirements. are focusing actions and resources towards achieving key production,
development, and sustainment objectives by 2025. We will continue
to monitor the DOD’s efforts, but it is too soon to determine the extent
to which these efforts—when completed—will address the concerns
that we identified our report.
Recommendation #2:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Status: Open
Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the F-35 Concurrence: Yes
Program Executive Officer, should re-examine the metrics
that it will use to hold the contractor accountable under the Comments: As of June 2018, officials from the Office of the Under
fixed-price, performance-based contracts to ensure that such Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S))
metrics are objectively measurable, are fully reflective of stated that the F-35 Program Executive Officer (PEO) re-examines
processes over which the contractor has control, and drive sustainment metrics every year to allow the department to objectively
desired behaviors by all stakeholders. measure and hold the contractor accountable for delivering increased
availability and reduced cost, and to align sustainment processes and
deliverables to those which the contractor controls. We recognize the
department’s progress related to this recommendation, but the key
metrics being used by the F-35 program to incentivize the contractor
remain a concern as they are not fully reflective of processes over
which the contractor has control. This could make it difficult to hold
the contractor accountable under performance based contracts, as
we reported. We will continue to monitor DOD’s efforts in this area.
Recommendation #3:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Status: Open
and Logistics, in coordination with the F-35 Program Executive Concurrence: Yes
Officer, should, prior to entering into multi-year, fixed-price,
performance-based contracts, ensure that DOD has sufficient Comments: As of June 2018, officials from the Office of the Under
knowledge of the actual costs of sustainment and technical Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S))
characteristics of the aircraft after baseline development is stated that the F-35 Program Executive Officer (PEO) is overseeing a
complete and the system reaches maturity. Sustainment Actual Cost Working Group. Until DOD has a full
understanding of the actual costs of sustainment and technical
characteristics of the aircraft at system maturity, it may not be well
positioned to enter into a long-term, fixed-price, performance-based
contract. We will continue to monitor DOD’s efforts in this area.

Page 19 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 Appendix I: Implementation Status of Key Prior
GAO Recommendations Related to Air Force
Readiness

Recommendation #4:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Status: Open
and Logistics, in coordination with the F-35 Program Executive Concurrence: Yes
Officer, should take steps to improve communication with the
services and provide more information about how the F-35 Comments: As of June 2018, officials from the Office of the Under
sustainment costs they are being charged relate to the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S))
capabilities received. stated that USD(A&S) is currently undertaking a study on F-35
Sustainment Affordability and Transparency. The study examines
affordability and transparency issues between the services and the F-
35 Joint Program Office, which inhibit the services’ visibility into
expected F-35 costs versus budgets, what they are paying for in
sustainment, and what they are getting for that money. Officials said
that USD (A&S) expects to deliver a final report to the congressional
defense committees by September 2018. We will review DOD’s
report, once completed, to determine the extent to which DOD’s
efforts address our recommendation.
Source: GAO analysis. I GAO-19-120T

Table 6: Status of Recommendations from Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve
Effectiveness (GAO-16-864)

Recommendation #1:
To ensure that annual training plans are aligned with the Air Force’s Status: Open
stated goals to ensure that its forces can successfully achieve missions Concurrence: No
across a broad range of current and emerging threats, the Secretary of
Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to comprehensively Comments: Although DOD did not concur with this
reassess the assumptions underlying its annual training requirements— recommendation, as of August 2018, the Air Force has
including, but not limited to, the total annual training requirements by taken steps to address it. The Air Force has completed
aircraft, the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or one study on its fighter aircrew annual training
inexperienced, and the mix between live and simulator training— requirements and is currently evaluating the results of
and make any appropriate adjustments in future training plans. another. The studies are intended to help the Air Force
ensure that fighter aircrew training plans are aligned to
achieve a range of missions for current and emerging
threats, as recommended by us.
Recommendation #2:
To improve the Air Force’s ability to consistently monitor training results Status: Open
and better position it to allocate resources to address factors that limit the Concurrence: No
effectiveness of training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to establish desired learning objectives and Comments: DOD stated that that the Air Force’s Ready
training support elements needed to accomplish the training expectations Aircrew Program training differs significantly from other
in its annual Ready Aircrew Program tasking memorandums, and develop syllabus-directed courses of instruction and that desired
a process to collect data to assess the effectiveness of annual training learning objectives for this training are set at the
against these features. squadron level in accordance with current Air Force
guidelines. As of August 2018, DOD did not plan to take
any further additional actions to address this
recommendation.

Page 20 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 Appendix I: Implementation Status of Key Prior
GAO Recommendations Related to Air Force
Readiness

Recommendation #3:
To improve the Air Force’s ability to develop the capabilities needed to meet Status: Implemented
its virtual training needs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Concurrence: Yes
Secretary of the Air Force to continue to refine its planning for virtual training
to incorporate the desirable characteristics of a comprehensive strategy, Comments: In September 2017, the Air Force issued
including developing a risk-based investment strategy that identifies and the Air Force Operational Training Infrastructure 2035
prioritizes capability needs and includes a time line for addressing them. Flight Plan, which describes the Air Force’s vision for a
realistic and integrated operational training environment
and incorporates the desirable characteristics of a
comprehensive strategy, as recommended by GAO.
One of the 13 lines of effort included in the plan called
for the development of a funding strategy for
operational training infrastructure capabilities. That
funding strategy was issued in December 2017.
Source: GAO analysis. I GAO-19-120T

Table 7: Status of Recommendations from Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10 and Other
Future Divestment Decisions (GAO-16-816)

Recommendation #1:
To ensure that senior leaders have the quality information on which to base Status: Open
future force structure decisions, the Secretary of Defense should develop Concurrence: No
and promulgate department-wide guidance that establishes specific
informational requirements to be met before proposing divestment of major Comments: DOD stated that the department already
weapon systems that have not reached the end of their expected service has guidelines and robust procedures in place to
lives. provide senior leaders with quality information with
which to make divestment decisions, including through
its budgeting and acquisition process. As of August
2018, DOD has not taken action to address this
recommendation.
Recommendation #2:
To make a well-informed decision about the future of its A-10 aircraft, before Status: Open
again recommending divestment of the A-10, the Secretary of the Air Force Concurrence: No
should: (1) Develop quality information that fully identifies gaps in capacity
or capability that would result from A-10 divestment, including the timing and Comments: The Air Force stated that it had sufficient
duration of any identified gaps, and the risks associated with those gaps; understanding of the risks and the capability gaps when
and (2) Use that information to develop strategies to mitigate any identified deciding to divest the A-10. As of August 2018, the Air
gaps. Force has not taken action to address this
recommendation.
Recommendation #3:
To further inform decisions about the future of the A-10, the Secretary of the Status: Open
Air Force should, in considering divestment, develop a high-quality, reliable Concurrence: No
cost estimate utilizing best practices.
Comments: The Air Force stated that it used
programming and sustainment data to inform their cost
estimate. As of August 2018, the Air Force has not
taken action to address this recommendation.
Source: GAO analysis. I GAO-19-120T

Page 21 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified. Report numbers with

a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified. Classified and sensitive but
unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances
and need to know, upon request.

Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft

Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance
Need to Be Clarified. GAO-18-678. Washington, D.C.: September 10,
2018.

Military Readiness: Air Force Plans to Replace Aging Personnel

Recovery Helicopter Fleet. GAO-18-605. Washington, D.C.: August 16,
2018.

Military Aviation Mishaps: DOD Needs to Improve Its Approach for

Collecting and Analyzing Data to Manage Risks. GAO-18-586R.
Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2018.

Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a

Readiness Rebuilding Plan. GAO-18-441RC. Washington, D.C.: August
10, 2018. (SECRET)

Force Structure: F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could

Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training. GAO-18-190. Washington,
D.C.: July 19, 2018.

Military Personnel: Collecting Additional Data Could Enhance Pilot

Retention Efforts. GAO-18-439. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2018.

Air Force Readiness: Changes to Readiness Reports Could Help

Stakeholders Take More Informed Actions. GAO-18-65C. Washington,
D.C.: June 18, 2018. (SECRET)

Force Structure: Changes to F-22 Organization and Utilization Could

Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training. GAO-18-120C.
Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2018. (SECRET//NOFORN)

Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD
Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home. GAO-18-253.
Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.

Page 22 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

Related GAO Products

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons

Across the Military Services. GAO-18-464R. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2018.

Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft

Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance
Need Clarification. GAO-18-146SU. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.

Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce

Requirements. GAO-18-113. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2018.

Military Aircraft: F-35 Brings Increased Capabilities, but the Marine Corps
Needs to Assess Challenges Associated with Operating in the Pacific.
GAO-18-79C. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2018. (SECRET)

F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting

Readiness and Cost Transparency. GAO-18-75. Washington, D.C.:
October 26, 2017.

Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission

Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017.

Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve

Effectiveness. GAO-16-864. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2016.

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk

without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 2016.

Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10

and Other Future Divestment Decisions. GAO-16-816. Washington, D.C.:
August 24, 2016.

Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve

Effectiveness. GAO-16-635SU. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2016.

Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10

and Other Future Divestment Decisions. GAO-16-525C. Washington,
D.C.: July 12, 2016. (SECRET//NOFORN)

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk

without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-534C. Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2016. (SECRET)

Page 23 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness

 Related GAO Products

Air Force: Service Faces Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness.

GAO-16-482RC. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2016. (SECRET)

Force Structure: Performance Measures Needed to Better Implement the

Recommendations of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air
Force. GAO-16-405. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2016.

F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its

Central Logistics System. GAO-16-439. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2016.

F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to

Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates. GAO-14-778. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 2014.

(103039)
Page 24 GAO-19-120T Air Force Readiness
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