Desert One and Its Disorders

Charles Cogan

The Journal of Military History, Volume 67, Number 1, January 2003,

pp. 201-216 (Article)

Published by Society for Military History

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0017

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/40443

[69.243.14.104] Project MUSE (2025-05-08 08:59 GMT)

 Notes

Desert One and Its Disorders

✩

Charles G. Cogan1

Abstract
Desert One—largely a Special Forces operation—ended in abject
failure and cost Jimmy Carter a second term as president. It was not
only an organizational failure, due to a splintering of the U.S. armed
forces, but a failure of political will and political appreciation. The
U.S., confronted virtually for the first time with the new hostile force of
Islamic fundamentalism, in the form of a devilish “soft war” scenario
put together by Imam Khomeini and his lieutenants, reacted tenta-
tively and with a certain propitiation. When five months later a
hostage rescue operation was finally mounted, it was so conceived
that the U.S. could call it off at any step along the way. Desert One
turned out to be the defining moment that led to a sea-change in
American military policy in the 1980s: the spread of the principle of
joint operations for the U.S. armed forces (Goldwater-Nichols Act),
and the companion Cohen-Nunn Act consolidating Special Forces
under a U.S. Special Operations Command.

I would like to examine the role of United States Special Forces, in

particular as seen through the Desert One operation in April 1980
to rescue the American hostages held in the U.S. Embassy in Iran.
This unsuccessful operation was the defining moment not only for
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1. The author was the chief of the Near East and South Asia Division in the
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency between mid-1979 and
mid-1984. What follows is a version of the presentation the author made to a confer-
ence on “Special Forces” held 11–12 June 2001 in Paris, under the joint sponsorship
of the Centre d’Études d’Histoire de la Défense and the Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique.

Charles G. Cogan is a Senior Research Associate at the John F. Kennedy School

of Government, Harvard University. He spent thirty-seven years in the Central
Intelligence Agency, lastly as CIA Chief in Paris. After leaving the CIA, he earned
a doctorate in public administration at Harvard. He is currently working on a
book for the United States Institute of Peace in its Cross-Cultural Negotiations
series, entitled French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with “La Grande Nation.”

The Journal of Military History 67 (January 2003): 201–16 © Society for Military History ★ 201
CHARLES G. COGAN

U.S. Special Forces, but also for the American military as a whole.
After Desert One, nothing was as it had been before, and the role of
Special Forces was changed completely.
In the aftermath of the failed rescue mission, the Carter administra-
tion named a commission of inquiry headed by Admiral James L. Hol-
loway. The commission’s report recommended the creation of a task
force for counter-terrorism, as well as an expert group on special opera-
tions.2 There followed, in 1983, a partial consolidation with the creation
of a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and finally, in 1987, all
Special Forces were put together under a single command at Tampa,
Florida, called the United States Special Operations Command (USSO-
COM).
But before analyzing this unfortunate operation, I would like to
describe briefly Special Forces or, to use the precise term, Special Oper-
ations Forces (SOF).

Special Forces
The Special Forces’ mission is to conduct unconventional opera-
tions. The other elements of the American armed forces, who engage in
conventional wars, are known officially as General Purpose Forces.
From the beginning, that is, during the Second World War, Special
Forces have been characterized by two main tendencies.3 The first is
what I would call the commando approach, utilizing elite assault troops.
The example is the Rangers, heirs of the tradition of the British com-
mandos, with whom the Army Rangers had their first experience of com-
bat in World War II. During this conflict, the “commando-type” troops on
the American side comprised the following units:
• Six battalions of Rangers of the U.S. Army.
• Four battalions of Rangers belonging to the U.S. Marines.
• The lst Special Service Force, a combined American-Canadian unit.4
All these units were dissolved at the end of the Second World War.5
Second is the more clandestine approach, emphasizing infiltration
and intelligence. The main example is the Special Forces of the U.S.
Army, often called just Special Forces, who form the preponderant part

2. Rescue Mission Report, August 1980 (Washington: Pentagon Library), vi.

3. Interview of 25 April 2001 with Major General (Retired) David Baratto, former
commander of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.
4. Presentation by Colonel Paul Gaujac on 12 June 2001 at the same conference
on “Special Forces” at which this paper was first given; interview on 6 June 2001 with
Robert Mattingly, who was formerly an intelligence officer with Joint Task Force 1-79,
which ran the Desert One operation.
5. Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Opera-
tions Forces (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 11; Mattingly interview.

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 Desert One and Its Disorders

of the Special Operations or SOF Community. Here the ancestor was the
Operational Groups of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), whose mis-
sion during World War II was to train and fight with the guerrilla groups
combating the Axis and which cooperated closely with the British para-
military service, the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The OSS was
also dissolved after the war. The founding father and first commander of
the U.S. Army’s Special Forces, Colonel Aaron Bank, was an officer of the
OSS during the Second World War. Today, the emblem of USSOCOM is
the spearpoint of the OSS.6
(I would note in passing that the concept of “communities” is preva-
lent in the United States, as in the SOF Community, or the Intelligence
Community, the latter grouping together all the agencies—a dozen in
all—dealing with intelligence.)
Thus the SOF Community—the Special Operations Forces—is com-
posed of the following elements:
Firstly, within the Army are 12,500 personnel on active duty, most
of whom are at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. They are broken down into
the following units:
• The Special Forces properly speaking, otherwise known as the
Green Berets.
• The Rangers.
• Special Operations Aviation.
• Special Support Units.
• Psychological Operations Unit, whose mission is to conduct pro-
paganda operations in the theater of operations and to commu-
nicate with the civil population.
• Civil Affairs Unit, whose mission in general is to assist local
authorities in establishing themselves in the zone of operations.
Secondly, within the Navy are 2,700 troops on active duty in the fol-
lowing units:
• The Sea-Air-Land Teams (Seals).
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• The Special Boat Units, whose mission is to aid the Seals and oth-
ers to infiltrate towards an objective.
• A unit which assists in infiltration through the use of mini-sub-
marines.
Thirdly, within the Air Force are 5,800 personnel on active duty, who
man the long-range H-53 helicopters and the C-130 transport aircraft.7
These figures do not include those within the reserves who also form
a part of the Special Operations, or SOF Community, and several small

6. Mattingly interview.
7. These figures are as of 1998. Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations
Forces in Action: the Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (London: Frank Cass,
1998), 9.

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 203

CHARLES G. COGAN

specialized units whose mission is principally counter-terrorism, in par-

ticular the Army’s Delta Force and Seal Team Six of the Navy.
The Special Forces and their various predecessors dating from the
Second World War have had a history of ups and downs: valued in time
of war but generally unappreciated afterwards, and always remaining
under the suspicious eye of officers from the conventional arms.
In the early years of the Vietnam War, Special Forces played a large
role in the raids into North Vietnam and the purging of Vietcong guerrilla
cadres. But as the war gradually became one of movement, involving
large-scale units, the Special Forces were often either underused or not
appropriately employed.
After the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, a sentiment of “never again” per-
meated the ranks of the officers in the conventional arms—which meant
that there should be no more involvement in counter-guerrilla wars that
become wars of attrition. Added to this was the repugnance of the Amer-
ican public towards the excesses of Vietnam in the context of methods
of unconventional war. As a result, many of the Special Forces units were
demobilized, and Special Forces budgets were deeply cut.

The Hostage Crisis

When the hostage crisis began at the American Embassy in Tehran
on 4 November 1979, that is, seven years after the virtually total with-
drawal of American soldiers from Vietnam, the American military was
still in the shock of defeat, and the Special Forces were at a low ebb. The
Vietnam War, which saw the death of 58,000 Americans and several mil-
lion Vietnamese, was being regarded more and more, retrospectively, as
having been a useless war. Thus within the United States, the tendency
to reject high casualties grew inexorably until the concept of a war of
zero casualties emerged in the 1990s.
On the eve of the incident at Tehran, a passing out ceremony hon-
ored the newly created “Delta Force,” a small unit of some 120 men
trained as an all-purpose counter-terrorist arm. Delta Force had just
completed an anti-terrorist exercise which qualified it for a certificate of
operational readiness. It was immediately considered for a hostage res-
cue mission at Tehran, should this become necessary.
But Delta Force did not have the means either to get to Iran or to
make a clandestine approach to the American Embassy. The United
States had a glaring lack of a centralized command that could conduct a
turn-key operation, having under its control all the necessary support ele-
ments—air transport, intelligence, logistics, and combat air support. The
government had to improvise, calling on units from various services. All
these disparate units of the operation never held an exercise as a whole.

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 Desert One and Its Disorders

At the moment of the taking of hostages at Tehran, the United States

was at a loss as to how to react on the political-operational level. A prece-
dent at Tehran had occurred, which, however, was deceptive. In Febru-
ary 1979, ten months earlier, a Iranian group of youths had seized the
U.S. Embassy, but within several days the Iranian government inter-
vened to evacuate the intruders. On 4 November 1979, a group of mili-
tants calling themselves the followers of the line of the Imam (Imam
Khomeini) invaded the Embassy. At the beginning, Washington thought
that this incident would be a remake of the February incident and logi-
cally assumed a similar dénouement. It is interesting to note that, well
after the November 1979 seizure, the militants stated that they had not
expected to spend more than several days at the Embassy.
However, after some time, nothing of the sort took place. The “stu-
dents” camped at the Embassy, and the affair rapidly became an inter-
national incident. The “CNN effect,” as it later came to be known, was
making itself felt.
The key point, in contrast to February 1979, was that the secular
government, the so-called moderates, was no longer in place. The strug-
gle between the moderates and the fundamentalist extremists for the
favor of the Imam was being won by the extremists. On the eve of the
seizure of the Embassy, the government of the moderates was over-
thrown, apparently as a sign of protest against the meeting held on 3
November 1979 in Algiers between U.S. National Security Adviser Zbig-
niew Brzezinski and the leaders of the Iran government: Mehdi
Bazargan, the Prime Minister; Ibrahim Yazdi, the Foreign Minister, and
Mustafa Ali Chamran, the Minister of Defense.
A fortnight earlier, the Shah, the former ruler of Iran who had been
forced to leave his country in January 1979, had traveled to the United
States for treatment of cancer. The arrival of the seriously ill Shah
brought Iranian tempers to a boiling point. Very quickly, Washington’s
decision to let the Shah in the country was seen as a grave error, and
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later on the Shah was eased out, first to Panama and then to Egypt.
The new government in Tehran, if it could be called as such, was
hard to come to grips with. The supreme authority, Imam Khomeini, was
outside of Tehran in the holy city of Qom, inaccessible to foreigners. At
the head of the government in Tehran were the elusive figures of Sadegh
Ghotbzadeh and Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, whose standing with the Imam
was uncertain and changing.
During the first days in Washington, all sorts of solutions were con-
sidered, including a declaration of war, a naval blockade, and the mining
of Iranian ports. A senior official in the Intelligence Community even
proposed that elements of the 82nd Airborne Division be landed at
Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport, with the announced mission of marching
from the airport to the Embassy, recuperating the hostages, and then

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 205

CHARLES G. COGAN

marching back to the airport and departing. This was, of course, an

impractical option given the density of the population of Tehran, a city
of four million people, but it was indicative of the frustration in Wash-
ington at what later came to be called asymmetric warfare.
Moreover, Washington was confronted with the phenomenon of
Islamic fundamentalism, a new and disturbing situation. In the space of
several weeks in November 1979, the Mecca mosque was also attacked,
followed, after the exhortations of Khomeini, by an attack on the Amer-
ican Embassy at Islamabad. Islamic fundamentalism seemed to have the
effect of a tidal wave which could sweep away the American position in
the Muslim world.
Down deep, the Americans had not absorbed either the import of the
Islamic revolution in Iran or the depth of the anti-American feeling that
prevailed in the country as a result of the reinstallation of the Shah on
the throne in the 1950s and the repression of the dissidents in 1963,
which had propelled Imam Khomeini into exile. The Americans were
aware that they faced a religious zealot at the head of the Iranian state,
but they continued to think—wrongly, I believe—that Iran had other
political forces that counted for something, such as the moderates within
the revolutionary government or a number of military officers who
retained some influence.
According to Iranian affairs expert Gary Sick,
[Secretary of State Cyrus R.] Vance, and most in the State Depart-
ment, held that Iran’s revolution was unique, and that there were
good reasons therefor. The perception that the U.S. was behind
the Shah explained why the regime was acting the way it was. To
deal with the regime, one had to understand what had gone on
before . . . A second point of view was represented by Brzezinski
. . . with some people in the Pentagon, and others outside the
Administration. They felt that to deal with the revolution, one
had to stand up to them. Make them understand your motives.
Don’t relinquish national honor.8
The extreme manifestation of the point of view of the State Depart-
ment was the notion that the United States should act in such a way that
Khomeini would regard the liberation of the hostages as a personal tri-
umph. President Jimmy Carter had some sympathy for this point of
view. In January 1980 he proposed a plan in six points aimed at arriving
at a peaceful solution; the second point contained the following soothing
phrases:

8. Interview with Gary Sick, 19 December 1989. Cited in Charles G. Cogan, “Not
to Offend: Observations on Iran, the Hostages, and the Hostage Rescue Mission—Ten
Years Later,” Comparative Strategy 9, no. 1 (1990): 420.

206 ★ THE JOURNAL OF

 Desert One and Its Disorders

The United States understands and sympathizes with the griev-

ances felt by many Iranian citizens concerning the practices of
the former regime. The United States is prepared to work out in
advance firm understandings on a forum in which those griev-
ances may subsequently be aired, so that the hostages could be
released with the confidence that those grievances will be heard
in an appropriate forum after the release has taken place.9
But as Peter Rodman has observed,
Americans find it congenitally difficult to grasp the possibility
that an adversary can be implacably hostile, uninterested in com-
promise, determined only to do America harm. The expression of
bitter grievances against the United States rather tends to evoke
sympathy, triggering a reflex to show understanding, on the
assumption that the embittered must be, and can be, conciliated.
. . . The alternative assumption—that an implacable enemy can
only be fought—has implications that no democracy can relish.10
During the period that stretched from November 1979 until the
failed operation of April 1980, Washington tried, through various chan-
nels, to encourage the moderates within the Iranian political landscape
and at the same time to make approaches aimed at obtaining the release
of the hostages through negotiation. All these efforts turned out to be
fruitless. But the Carter administration’s continued hopes for a peaceful
resolution of the affair caused delays in the implementation of an oper-
ation to liberate the hostages by force. And the Carter administration
waited until 7 April 1980 to break diplomatic relations with Iran.

Towards a Military Rescue Operation

Little by little, in spite of the hesitations of the President, the admin-
istration moved toward a decision in favor of a military rescue operation
in Tehran. Without a declaration of war, without an open threat, the
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administration proceeded to put in motion a clandestine operation vir-

tually at the other end of the world. Even after the fact, the principle of
a clandestine operation to free the hostages was supported by the Hol-
loway Commission: “The concept of a small clandestine operation was
valid, and it fitted with the principles of national policy. It offered us the
best possibility of bringing back the hostages alive and the least danger
of starting a war with Iran.”11

9. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 400.
Cited in Cogan, “Not to Offend,” 421–22.
10. Peter Rodman, “The Hostage Crisis: How Not to Negotiate,” Washington
Quarterly, Summer 1981, 10. Cited in Cogan, “Not to Offend,” 422.
11. Rescue Mission Report, 2.

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 207

CHARLES G. COGAN

Because the challenge was so formidable, during the planning of the

operation it was believed advisable—wrongly, I believe—to have a means
of getting out of the operation at each stage in its unfolding. This view-
point, very much that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, robbed the operation
of what, it seems to me, was a vital element: confidence in a victorious
result.
In his heart of hearts, President Carter did not want to do this oper-
ation, but after months of hesitation, he finally became convinced that a
diplomatic solution was impossible. On 11 April 1980, the President
announced to his immediate advisers that he had lost hope in such a
solution. The Under Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who was
present in the absence of Secretary of State Vance, agreed with the Pres-
ident, without knowing the full extent of Vance’s objections to the use of
force in this case; and in fact, shortly after the failed rescue operation,
Vance resigned from the Cabinet as a sign of protest.
Another factor that contributed to this sense of tentativeness was
the distrust of the conventional forces officers towards non-conventional
warfare and the personnel engaged in it. Added to this was another fac-
tor that tended to undermine smooth cooperation: this operation was
not purely military, run solely by the military. Also participating was the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with all that implied in terms of ten-
sions between civilians and military people.
But above all, to situate better the various hesitations, it was the
complexity of the operation itself that rendered it so formidable. The
observation after the fact by Defense Secretary Harold Brown that only
the United States could have undertaken an operation of such complex-
ity was not only a pitiful attempt at justification, but also an irrefutable
affirmation. The operation did not involve merely one or two or even a
half-dozen hostages; instead, fifty-three hostages had to be liberated.
(There were sixty-six at the beginning, but early on the Iranians released
thirteen hostages for “humanitarian” reasons. These were women and
blacks). Besides, three of the hostages, including the chargé d’affaires,
were not in the Embassy compound but were being held in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, where they had gone at the outset of the incident to
try to negotiate an end to the takeover. And beyond that, six others had
fled the Embassy and, unknown to the Iranians, had taken refuge in the
Canadian Embassy. The presence of the three in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs complicated the rescue operation by requiring an additional heli-
copter in order to liberate them. On the other hand, the six at the Cana-
dian Embassy did not figure in the calculations of the planners, and in
the event they were exfiltrated surreptitiously shortly before Desert One.
The operation, as it was conceived, was both complicated and
hybrid. Delta Force belonged to the Army. The transport aircraft, the EC-
130 “Hercules,” were from the Air Force. The helicopters, the RH-53D

208 ★ THE JOURNAL OF

 Desert One and Its Disorders

Caspian
Soviet Unio
n
Sea

Te Mas
hha
hr d
an
Manzariyeh
 Helicopter rendezvous
in hills

Afgha
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Air Base

Ta b a s
I
q

nis
DESERT ONE
R

Ya z d

tan
A

N
Ku

wa
it

P
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s

from Eg
Rangers n
G
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USS Nimitz
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USS Coral Sea

S
a

u
d
i
A
r a

b i
a
n

a
m
O Six C-130s
with Delta Team
12. This map was adapted from a sketch accompaning Otto Kreisher, “Desert
One,” Air Force Magazine 82 (January 1999): 7. (http://www.afa.org/magazine/
0199desertone.html).

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 209

CHARLES G. COGAN

“Sea Stallions,” belonged to the Navy. They were chosen because they
had a considerable range, but they had to be piloted for the most part by
Marines, because Navy pilots were not used to flying them long distances
over land. The helicopters that the Marines used were the same but were
a model (the CH-53) less advanced than the Navy’s, and this would
become one of the crucial factors in the failure of the operation.13
The helicopters were not capable of flying from the aircraft carrier
Nimitz on the Arabian Sea all the way to Tehran. They had to be refu-
eled at a small improvised airstrip six hundred miles from the Nimitz,
but still far away from Tehran. This refueling had to be accomplished by
C-130s taking off from Masirah Island, in Oman, some one thousand
miles from this improvised airstrip. The C-130s also had to bring in the
men of the Delta Force. The landing area chosen by the CIA as capable
of supporting the weight of the C-130s, some of which had to bring in
fuel bladders for the refueling, was called Desert One, which became the
nickname for this ill-fated operation.
From Desert One, Delta Force would travel by helicopter to a hiding
area some fifty miles southeast of Tehran. Then, after having left off the
Delta Force, the helicopters would go to another nearby hiding area.
The CIA, which was responsible for the arrangements inside Iran,
had the job of getting together the trucks and drivers who would bring
Delta Force in the middle of night from the hiding area to the Embassy,
located in the middle of Tehran. After Delta Force recuperated the
hostages, under the aerial protection, if need be, of AC-130 gunships, the
soldiers and hostages would be taken in the helicopters, which would
have arrived in a nearby stadium, to an abandoned airstrip southwest of
Tehran at Manzariyeh, which the Rangers would have occupied in the
meantime. From there, everyone would be loaded into large C-141 trans-
ports for evacuation to Egypt, leaving the helicopters behind.
The operation, designated “Rice Bowl” in its preparatory phase, was
run in Washington by a restricted group, Joint Task Force (JTF) 1-79,
under the direct orders of General David C. Jones, the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. For reasons of secrecy, the Joint Task Force (JTF)
had to be created ad hoc; existing structures of the Pentagon could not
be used. The chief of the JTF was General James Vaught, a veteran of the
Rangers and of airborne units. At the moment the operation unfolded,
Vaught was located at an advanced base at Wadi Qena, in Egypt. The in-
place commander at Desert One was Colonel James H. Kyle, an Air Force
officer who arrived there with the C-130s coming from Oman. The com-
mander of the Delta Force at Desert One was Colonel Charlie Beckwith,
a Special Forces veteran of the Vietnam War. The command of the heli-

13. Kreisher, “Desert One,” 7.

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 Desert One and Its Disorders

copters at Desert One devolved to Lieutenant Colonel Edward Seiffert, a

Marine officer.
The CIA had the mission of obtaining intelligence inside Iran, in par-
ticular on the situation of the hostages and the exact place of their deten-
tion. But shortly before the start of the operation, Special Forces sent
one its former officers, Major Dick Meadows, accompanied by several
Special Forces soldiers, into Tehran, in order to verify the information of
the CIA. This was in part due to the lack of confidence between the mil-
itary and the civilians of the CIA.
By chance, the cook at the Embassy, a Pakistani, had left Iran
shortly before the operation was launched. He reported that all the
hostages were located in the chancery building. (The Embassy com-
pound included a number of buildings spread over several hectares.)
This information, obtained by the CIA, was key. However, the military
officers were not very impressed. Firstly, they had been disappointed by
the failure of the CIA until that point to pinpoint the location of the
hostages and the circumstances of their detention. Secondly, the officers
running the operation were not aware of the source of the information,
the CIA not being accustomed to divulging its sources.

The Unfolding of the Operation

Thus the operation, named “Eagle Claw” for its active phase, got
underway on 24 April 1980. Forty-four aircraft were involved in the
operation. Washington leaders were apprehensive about the problems
that might be encountered at the Embassy, in particular the potential
loss of life among the hostages or in the Delta Force. Problems with the
helicopters were not anticipated, although Colonel Beckwith, the com-
mander of the Delta Force, had asked that ten instead of eight heli-
copters be put at his disposal. The estimate was that six was the
minimum number required to conduct the operation, but the Navy had
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informed him that eight was the maximum number that could be put in
the hangar of the Nimitz without taking away other aircraft that were
normally stationed there. However, the Holloway Commission later con-
cluded that in a situation of non-war, which was the case, twelve heli-
copters could have been used, and that no factors, either operational or
logistical, would have prevented the launching of eleven helicopters from
the Nimitz.14
The United States had another aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean
near the Persian Gulf: the Coral Sea, the principal ship in an Amphibi-
ous Ready Group, with a Marine unit (Battalion Landing Team) aboard.
The presence of the Coral Sea was a key element in a deception opera-
14. Rescue Mission Report, 33.

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 211

CHARLES G. COGAN

tion aimed at providing a decoy to the Soviet fleet, which was surveilling
U.S. naval movements in the region. One day before the launching of the
rescue operation, the Coral Sea headed toward Pakistan at high speed.
The Soviet fleet had no choice but to follow the more active of the two
aircraft carriers, leaving the Nimitz free of surveillance.15
And so, on 24 April, eight helicopters took off from the deck of the
Nimitz headed for Desert One. At a distance of two hundred miles out, a
warning light in one of the helicopters indicated a problem with the pres-
surization in a rotor blade. For the Marine pilot, such an indicator meant
that an imminent crash was possible and the helicopter should be
landed; however, his helicopter was not the one (CH-53) to which he was
accustomed, but the more advanced Navy model (RH-53D), which had
never crashed after such an indication.16 The Marine pilot did not know
this, so he abandoned his helicopter in Iranian territory and with his
crew got into another helicopter in the convoy. The number of heli-
copters was reduced to seven.
Next, the helicopter pilots were confronted with a severe dust
storm—called a haboob—which was a rather frequent phenomenon in
this part of Iran in the spring. Although the weather forecasters had sig-
naled the possibility of haboobs in an annex to their bulletins, this phe-
nomenon took the pilots by surprise. This lack of communications might
be explained by the fact that, for reasons of security, the reports of the
forecasters were not communicated directly to the pilots but had to be
filtered through intelligence officers.17 The Holloway Commission report
stated that a weather reconnaissance flight of a C-130 just before the
launching of the operation could have identified the haboob and deter-
mined the degree of gravity it presented.18
The commander of the helicopter flight, who alone had a special
radio that permitted contact with the Nimitz with a minimum possibil-
ity of interception, informed the Nimitz of the haboob and recom-
mended that the mission continue. The Task Force commander, General
Vaught, gave his agreement. These communications could not be heard
by the pilots in the other helicopters.19
The flight was very difficult for the pilots, who were navigating by
sight and operating in radio silence for security reasons. They could not
gain more altitude and get out of the haboob for fear of being intercepted
by Iranian radars. One of the pilots, who became very disoriented
because of a problem with his gyroscope,20 decided to turn back, not

15. Mattingly interview.

16. Rescue Mission Report, 44. See also Kreisher, “Desert One,” 7.
17. Ibid., 38.
18. Ibid., 40.
19. Ibid., 30.
20. Mattingly interview.

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 Desert One and Its Disorders

knowing that in twenty-five minutes he would have emerged from the

haboob. Interviewed afterwards, the pilot declared that if he had known
that he was rather close to getting out of the haboob, and that visibility
was normal at Desert One, he would probably have continued his flight.21
The number of helicopters was now down to six, which was the min-
imum called for in the planning. The six helicopters made a delayed
arrival at Desert One, and the follow-on phase was readied. But at the
moment when Delta Force, having arrived in the C-130s, was preparing
to embark on the helicopters, a fault in the secondary hydraulic system
was discovered in one of them. There then emerged a difference of opin-
ion. Some thought that the helicopter could still fly despite the defect in
the secondary system. But others, in particular Colonel Edward Seiffert,
who was in charge of the helicopters, thought that it was too dangerous
and therefore the operation should be aborted.22
Colonels Beckwith and Kyle appeared to believe that the operation
should be continued, and the former seemed to think that the helicopter
pilots, traumatized by the experience of the haboob, did not want to go
on. But at the same time, Colonel Beckwith did not want to reduce his
force by some twenty shooters, which would have been necessary if the
mission were reduced to five helicopters.23
Confronted with this impasse, Colonel Kyle could only recommend
to his superior echelon that the mission be called off. Thus, even though
Kyle was designated the overall commander at Desert One, in reality he
did not command either the pilots of the helicopters or the chief of the
Delta Force, both of whom, in effect, were in a position to exercise a
veto. The only one who could have resolved this dispute in place was
General Vaught, the commander of the Task Force, but he was far away,
at Wadi Qena in Egypt. It seems to me that he should have been placed
at Desert One.
The recommendation in favor of an abort was relayed by General
Vaught to the White House and to General Jones, the chairman of the
[69.243.14.104] Project MUSE (2025-05-08 08:59 GMT)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the leading hawk in the White
House, recounted in his memoir: “Should I press the President to go
ahead with only five helicopters? Here I was alone with the President.
Perhaps I could convince him to abandon military prudence, to go in a
daring single stroke for the big prize, to take the historic chance.”24
But Brzezinski thought the better of it and decided to recommend to
the President to continue the operation with five helicopters, but only if
Colonel Beckwith agreed. And having received a telephone confirmation
21. Rescue Mission Report, 45.
22. James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try (New York: Orion Books, 1990), 287–90.
23. Ibid.
24. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security
Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), 498.

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 213

CHARLES G. COGAN

from General Jones that Beckwith thought the operation was not feasi-
ble with only five helicopters, President Carter gave the order to call off
the operation and withdraw the force from Iran. Brzezinski recalled the
moment: “[The President] hung up . . . then put his head down on top of
his desk, cradling it in his arms for approximately five seconds. I felt
extraordinarily sad for him as well as for the country. Neither of us said
anything.”25
However, in the course of the evacuation of Desert One, one of the
helicopters crashed into a C-130, an explosion took place, and eight mil-
itary personnel were killed. The wounded were evacuated but the dead,
as well as the helicopters, were left behind. The balance-sheet was a total
failure.

The Aftermath
The unfortunate Jimmy Carter found himself quite alone following
this spectacular failure. As I already noted, Cyrus Vance resigned in
protest against the operation. Jimmy Carter courageously accepted total
responsibility for the failed operation. The Congress, particularly the
members of the intelligence oversight committees in the Senate and the
House, who had not been informed beforehand, severely criticized the
conduct of the operation. The Carter administration appointed a com-
mission of inquiry chaired by Admiral Holloway and composed of three
senior officers on active duty and three retired ones. The report of the
commission criticized especially the lack of centralization in the plan-
ning of the operation and in particular the insufficient number of heli-
copters, which was the specific cause of the failure. The Holloway
Commission also criticized the excessive secrecy employed by those
who managed the operation, as this prevented a necessary exchange of
information between military personnel belonging to the four different
services: the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines. But from
the point of view of the intelligence officers involved in the operation,
secrecy was primordial. And it was kept perfectly, right to the end.
The Holloway Commission judged that the preparations for the oper-
ation were adequate, except for the lack of an exercise of the operation
in its totality, which would have been helpful operationally. The prob-
lems of command and control would have surfaced and could have been
corrected.26
The Holloway Commission also noted that, in not utilizing an exist-
ing task force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the beginning, had to assem-
ble a staff, select units, and train the force before an operational

25. Ibid.
26. Rescue Mission Report, 3.

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 Desert One and Its Disorders

capability had been attained. A task force already in existence, even with
only a small staff and cadre units, would have provided an operational
structure and a professional expertise around which a larger force could
have been rapidly constituted.27
The Holloway Commission made two main recommendations:
First, that a joint task force to counter terrorism be created
under the direct orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Second, that there be established under the Joint Chiefs of
Staff a restricted group of advisers on special operations, compris-
ing senior officers both active and retired, and having a recognized
competence in this area.28
One wonders what would have been the outcome of this operation if
the number of helicopters assigned to it had been, for example, ten or
twelve. I believe that the operation would have unfolded without a par-
ticular problem. The helicopters would have arrived at the hideout place,
and everyone would have remained there during the daytime of 25 April
until the night. They would then have proceeded by truck, in convoy,
and with Iranian drivers, up to the Embassy. Surprise would likely have
been total and the hostages recuperated without too much difficulty. Of
course, there could have been some killed among the hostage-takers and
even some among the Americans. The rescue of the three hostages at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have been more difficult, I believe.
Another imponderable would have been the reaction of the Iranians out-
side the Embassy compound. If they heard shots coming from that direc-
tion, would they have rushed en masse towards the compound? In that
case there could have been a bloodbath, with the intervention of the AC-
130 gunships hovering over the compound area. Such a situation would
have had a very adverse effect on international public opinion. On the
other hand, a successful operation, that is, the liberation of the hostages,
would probably have brought forth less criticism than an embarrassing
failure, which was the case. As the saying goes, victory has a thousand
fathers; defeat is an orphan.
The opinion of an intelligence officer within JTF 1-79 is, then, not
without foundation:
Although it is easy to say in hindsight, the bottom line is that a dar-
ing commander in wartime could have and would have continued
with five or even four helicopters. Beckwith was a fine Special Forces
soldier, but his country was not at war, and his airlift had demon-
strated a tendency to break before the first shot was fired. In the
middle of the desert, far behind his envisioned time line, and doubt-
less already concerned about his transportation going into a hide site
laager that had never been walked by friendly feet or seen up close

27. Ibid., vi.

28. Ibid., 3.

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 215

CHARLES G. COGAN

by friendly eyes, he sought reassurance from a tired helicopter pilot

and a frustrated airfield manager. And he didn’t get it. Nor did Major
General Vaught order the mission to go forward; and neither did the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense or the Presi-
dent.29
In the course of the summer of 1980, plans were started for another
rescue operation. But this was never launched, because the Iranians,
having drawn some lessons from Desert One, had proceeded for a time
to disperse the hostages in different places of detention.
Finally, on 20 January 1981, at the precise hour of the inauguration
of President Ronald W. Reagan, the Iranians released the hostages. This
came at the end of protracted negotiations with Warren Christopher,
conducted under the sponsorship of the Algerians. A number of people
in the United States wondered whether it would have been best to have
awaited this favorable dénouement instead of launching an operation as
risky and as hybrid as “Eagle Claw.” The hostages themselves, in partic-
ular, seemed to hold this opinion. In any event, one thing was certain:
after the disaster of Desert One, the reelection of Jimmy Carter had
become impossible.

The Reorganization
The legislation that followed in 1986, that is, the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, accompanied by the Cohen-Nunn Act, changed everything. Gold-
water-Nichols spelled the end of the large independence that the various
branches of service (Army, Navy, Air Force) had enjoyed, and it also
strengthened the role of the Chairman of the JCS. From then on, the
emphasis was on joint operations. The Cohen-Nunn Act involved the
reorganization and the consolidation of all the Special Forces, that is, the
Special Forces of the Army, the Navy Seals and other Navy elements, and
the Air Force’s air commandos. All these units were regrouped under a
sole command called the United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) and located in Tampa, Florida. The USSOCOM commander
has under him all the Special Operations Forces in the United States and
furnishes units to the commanders of the geographic commands. Once
these units arrive in theater, they operate under the orders of the
regional commanders (the CINCs), except in the case of certain sensitive
operations which can be run from the United States. The USSOCOM
commander for his part controls the doctrine, the training, and the bud-
get for all Special Operations Forces.30

29. Mattingly interview.

30. N.B. Organizationally, the Marines are not considered part of Special Opera-
tions Forces.

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