Robustness of BB84 Quantum Key Distribution under

Depolarizing Channel Noise: Simulation, Theory, and

Practical Thresholds
Arnav Kumar

August 10, 2025

Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) in the form of the BB84 protocol gives uncon-
ditional security guarantees based on quantum mechanics, but since experiments deal
with imperfect systems, it is necessary to handle experiment particular noise sources
as well as instrumental artefacts. We study in this contribution BB84 in a depolariz-
ing channel and measure to what extent a growing noise raises the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) and impairs the secure key fraction. The simulation is in the form of a
Monte Carlo simulation model of 105 qubits and the experiment is repeated 10 times
at each of 10 noise settings which range between depolarizing probabilities of between
0 and 26 percent in steps of 2 percent. QBER, the asymptotic secure fraction of key of
Shor–Preskill, and overall throughput are reported with 95% confidence intervals of all.
These findings support the Q ≈ p/2 relation, and accurately specify the useful security
limit where RQKD is near zero. These results provide a consistent baseline that can
be used to guide theoretical and experimental studies and serve to guide engineering
trades, noise budgets and abort criteria suitable to BB84 deployments.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security, but real op-
tical links are never pristine. Noise, misalignment, and device imperfections inevitably
raise the observed error rate. This paper examines the standard BB84 protocol under
a depolarizing channel and quantifies how the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and
secret key yield degrade across a controlled noise sweep. We implement a transparent
Monte Carlo simulator that models BB84 state preparation and measurement, sifting,
and channel depolarization in matched bases as an effective bit flip with probability
p/2. For each depolarizing probability p ∈ [0, 0.26] in steps of 0.02, we transmit 105
signals per trial, repeat 10 trials, and report the mean QBER and the Shor–Preskill
secure key fraction RQKD = max{0, 1 − 2H2 (Q)}, along with 95% confidence intervals.
The results are consistent with theory. The measured QBER closely follows Q ≈ p/2
and RQKD collapses near the canonical ∼ 11% QBER threshold. At p = 0.10 (QBER
≈ 0.05), we obtain RQKD ≈ 0.43 per sifted bit. As noise increases, the secure fraction
drops rapidly and becomes numerically indistinguishable from zero between p = 0.22
and p = 0.24. These data quantify an operational noise budget for BB84 and provide
a reproducible baseline for studying practical effects such as reconciliation inefficiency,
finite-key penalties, and alternative noise models.

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1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has progressed through an initial theoretical framework
to the current maturity in being able to withstand the attacks by adversaries which utilize
quantum capabilities. A major concrete instantiation of QKD is the seminal BB84 protocol
due to Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1], the basis of most discrete-variable implementations
in practice. The security of it hinges on the fact that non-orthogonal quantum states are
unable to be measured without disturbing them forcing an eavesdropper to introduce mea-
surable errors to the transmitted data. Shor and Preskill [2] give a quantitative formulation
of the impossibility of such a measurement as the lower bounds on security.
Although conceptually beautiful, BB84 assumes noise-free channel. In actual implemen-
tations, however, there are many degrading effects that typically include loss of photons in
fiber, component misalignment, detector dark counts, and environmental disturbances like
turbulence in free space links [3]. All this puts up the quantum bit error rate (QBER) leading
to this increasing the degree of privacy amplification required, and potentially making the
produced key insecure above a threshold QBER. Therefore, mathematical modeling of the
observable behavior of QBERs under nematic, exotic and classical noise models is invaluable
to the theoretical reasoning as well as system-level design.
Despite the large number of channel models which exist, the depolarizing channel can be
singled out as being relatively tractable and a realistic model. It supports every qubit state
in the same manner, by randomly tossing the qubit sent out with probability p and otherwise
leaving it undisturbed with probability 1 − p. Under the standard, matched basis BB84 this
task is equivalent to a binary symmetric channel with bit-flip rate p/2. The formulation
allows closed forms of the QBER and a secure key rate and has the advantage of providing
a simple cross-check against which numerical simulations may be compared.
Bennett–Brassard 84 (BB84) is traditionally seen as the archetypical discrete-variable
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in that it detects eavesdropping due to disturbance
in non-orthogonal bases and produces a lengthy safe key in favorable circumstances [1]. Real
world implementations are however marked by channel degradations and imperfect devices
that can cause errors which become indistinguishable in terms of adversarial noise at the
bit level of the quantum bit-error rate (QBER). This makes it necessary to determine the
relationship between defined noise models, QBER and the derived secret-key rate not only
as a security decision, e.g. to abort a run, but also as an engineering trade-off, e.g. leveling
out operations and link budgets.
The depolarizing channel is in particular an appealing simple model since it applies
uniformly to all qubit states, and maps between complementary bases to a binary symmetric
channel with bit-flip probability p/2. The symmetry allows direct theoretical calculations.
QBER scales linearly with p and the asymptotic, one-way post-processing secure rate is
asymptotic to the Shor–Preskill bound [2]. Prior surveys have explored the impact achieved
by practical imperfections upon QKD and privacy amplification as a means through which
possible leakage is eliminated [4]. Here, we describe an empirical, reproducible study of a
BB84 under depolarization, focusing on state-of-the-art law of Q ≈ p/2 and the sudden
collapse of the secret-key rate at the ∼ 11% threshold.

2
2 Related Work
Theoretical and experimental research in quantum key distribution (QKD) on noisy channels
have progressed in the fields. The original security analyses of the seminal BB84 protocol
[1, 2] model noise as a parameter and compute bounds on secure key rate as a function
only of measured QBER. Such results are systematically collected in comprehensive surveys,
especially the one by Scarani et al. [4] and continuously applied towards relevant aspects like
device imperfection and finite-key effects [5, 6].
The problem of finite-key analyses is quantifying secure key rates in the presence of
statistical fluctuations in QBER caused by limited resources. Tomamichel et al. [7] show
the effect of these fluctuations on the rate of the secure key at small founding populations.
Practical imperfection in real-world devices is pragmatically captured, as in composable
security treatments, such as GLLP [8]. Decoy-state methods [9, 10] also proved useful,
particularly to enhance resistance even to photon-number-splitting attacks.
Experimental work offers a practical set of noise performance levels at practical oper-
ating conditions. BB84 was demonstrated by Gobby et al. [11] on 122 km of conventional
telecommunication fibre with QBER less than 5%, and secure QKD on 421 km of optical
fibre demonstrated by Boaron et al. [12]. Reported trends were also apparent with Yuan et
al. [13] reporting 10 Mb/s quantum key distribution, Liao et al. [14] showing free-space QKD
in satellite-to-ground links with QBERs between 1% and 8% and Yin et al. [15] entanglement
distribution between 1200 km.
Simulation experiments, including by Fung et al. [16] and others, study the performance
of QKD in symmetrical noise conditions, such as depolarization and frequently reproduce
a theoretical threshold of 11% QBER under some conditions of one way decoding. The
contribution introduces a parameterized, transparent simulator and glues theory expressions
with the Monte Carlo estimation using the depolarizing model of the channel.
In the recent years, the developments have not only advanced on BB84 but also on twin-
field QKD [17] that breaks the rate-distance bound and on security analyses of realistic
imperfections of devices [5]. BB84 has however continued to serve as the basis of realization
of QKD performance under different noise levels.

3 Methodology
3.1 Protocol and Channel Model
We simulate BB84 with uniform random bits and bases for Alice, uniform random measure-
ment bases for Bob, and classical sifting that retains only matched-basis outcomes (empiri-
cally ≈ 0.5 of transmissions). The channel is modeled as depolarizing with probability p. In
the matched basis, depolarization induces an effective bit flip with probability p/2, so the
sifted key behaves as a binary symmetric channel.

3.2 Metrics
On the sifted key, we measure QBER Q as the fraction of mismatches between Alice and Bob.
We report two key-rate quantities per sifted bit: (i) the Shannon-limit fraction RShannon =

3
1 − H2 (Q) (useful as a trusted-noise upper bound), and (ii) the QKD-secure fraction

RQKD = max{0, 1 − (1 + fEC )H2 (Q)}, (1)

with fEC = 1.0 so that RQKD = 1 − 2H2 (Q) in this study [2]. For a system-level view, we
also compute the secure throughput per transmitted bit as (sift fraction)×RQKD .

3.3 Design, Parameters, and Statistics

We sweep p from 0.00 to 0.26 in steps of 0.02. For each p, we simulate 105 transmissions,
repeat 10 trials with independent randomness, and record the mean, standard deviation, and
95% confidence interval for QBER and key-rate metrics. The theoretical reference curves
use Q = p/2 and the formulas above. Assumptions include single-photon signals, ideal
detectors (no losses/dark counts), asymptotic analysis, and one-way post-processing with
perfect efficiency (fEC = 1.0).

3.4 Channel Model and Mathematical Formalism

The qubit depolarizing channel can be described by the Kraus operator representation:
3
X
E(ρ) = Ki ρKi† , (2)
i=0
r r
3p p
where K0 = 1 − I, K1 = X,
4 4
r r
p p
K2 = Y, K3 = Z, (3)
4 4
where X, Y, Z are the Pauli operators and I is the identity. For BB84 states, matched-basis
measurements reduce the effect of this channel to a binary symmetric channel with bit-flip
probability p/2, as analyzed in detail by Renner et al. [18].

3.5 Simulation Algorithm

The simulation follows these high-level steps:

1. Generate N random bits and bases for Alice.

2. Generate random bases for Bob.

3. Identify positions where Alice and Bob chose the same basis (sifted key).

4. For each sifted bit, flip it with probability p/2 to model depolarization.

5. Compute QBER as the fraction of mismatches.

6. Calculate RQKD and throughput metrics.

4
3.6 Statistical Analysis and Confidence Intervals
Individual noise probability p was determined separately with the help of 10 repetitions
each consisting of an ensemble of N = 105 signals. The quantum bit error rate (QBER)
was calculated, in each replication, as the percentage of mismatches on the sifted key. The
average values of QBER and key rate were acquired by aggregating over the repetitions.
The uncertainty in statistical results was measured
√ using 95% interval of confidence using
the commonly known formula x̄ ± t0.975, n−1 (s/ n), where t refers to the Student t multiplier
with n − 1 degrees of freedom, and s is a sample standard deviation.

3.7 Computational Environment

Simulations were executed on a MacBook Pro (Apple Silicon M3) under macOS, using
Python with NumPy, Pandas, and Matplotlib. Runs are deterministic given the random
seed.
• Hardware: Apple M3 (laptop, integrated GPU not used)

• Software: Python 3.x; NumPy, Pandas, Matplotlib (exact versions listed in the CSV
metadata / requirements.txt)

• Reproducibility: fixed seed (--seed 42) and CLI parameters (below)

Note. If your journal requires exact versions, list them here after running python --version,
pip show numpy pandas matplotlib (e.g., Python 3.11.6; NumPy 1.26; Pandas 2.2; Mat-
plotlib 3.8).

4 Results
To interpret the trends, we partition the noise range into four regimes:
1. Low-noise regime (p < 0.06): QBER remains well below 3%, and RQKD is above
0.75 per sifted bit. Confidence intervals are negligible at this scale.

2. Moderate-noise regime (0.06 ≤ p < 0.18): QBER grows linearly with p/2, with
RQKD decreasing steadily but remaining positive. This is the operationally viable
range for BB84.

3. Threshold regime (0.18 ≤ p < 0.24): RQKD approaches zero rapidly. The secure
key fraction falls below 0.05 near p = 0.22, consistent with the theoretical 11% QBER
bound.

4. High-noise regime (p ≥ 0.24): RQKD is zero; no secure key can be distilled.

Figure 1 demonstrates that Q grows linearly with p and closely follows the theoretical
Q = p/2 trend. The confidence intervals are extremely tight due to the large block sizes
and averaging over 10 trials. In Figure 2, the secure fraction RQKD begins at unity and
decreases smoothly, becoming numerically indistinguishable from zero between p = 0.22 and

5
 QBER vs Depolarizing Noise (BB84)
Theory (QBER p/2)
QKD threshold (~11% QBER)
12 Simulated (mean ± 95% CI)

10

8
QBER (%)

0
0 5 10 15 20 25
Depolarizing Probability (%)

Figure 1: QBER vs. depolarizing probability. Points represent the mean over 10 trials with
95% confidence intervals. The dashed line shows the theoretical prediction Q = p/2.

6
 QKD-Secure Key Rate vs Depolarizing Noise (BB84)
1.0 Theory: 1 - 2 H2(Q)
Simulated (QKD bound)
Secure Key Rate (per sifted bit)

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
Depolarizing Probability (%)

Figure 2: Secure key fraction per sifted bit RQKD vs. depolarizing probability. The threshold
near ∼ 11% QBER is clearly visible.

7
 Overall Throughput (QKD-secure) vs Depolarizing Noise (BB84)
0.5
Secure Key Rate (per transmitted bit)

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
Depolarizing Probability (%)

Figure 3: Secure throughput per transmitted bit vs. depolarizing probability. This highlights
the rapid drop in useful yield as noise approaches the threshold.

8
p = 0.24 (near the ∼ 11% QBER threshold). For a system-level perspective, Figure 3 plots
the secure throughput per transmitted bit. This visualization highlights how quickly useful
yield diminishes as noise approaches the threshold.
The threshold interpolation from our CSV data yields pth ≈ 0.2400 (≈ 24.00%), corre-
sponding to QBER ≈ 11.95%. This threshold was determined by identifying the last data
point with positive secure key rate (at p = 0.22, RQKD = 0.0030) and the first point with
zero secure key rate (at p = 0.24, RQKD = 0.0000), then performing linear interpolation
between these boundary points.
Table 1 summarizes representative points drawn directly from the CSV of the latest run
(seed 42). At p = 10%, the secure fraction remains sizable. By p = 22%, it has already
dropped to ≈ 0, and at p = 26% it is strictly 0 under the asymptotic bound.

Table 1: Representative performance at three depolarizing noise levels (from the latest run,
seed=42). QBER is measured on the sifted key; RQKD = max(0, 1 − 2H2 (Q)) is the secure
fraction per sifted bit; throughput is per transmitted bit (sift fraction × RQKD ).
Noise p (%) QBER RQKD (per sifted bit) Throughput (per transmitted bit)
10 0.0500 0.4272 0.2136
22 0.1100 0.0002 0.0001
26 0.1300 0.0000 0.0000

Table 2: Full sweep results from p = 0.00 to p = 0.26 in steps of 0.02. Values are means over
10 trials (seed 42).
Noise p (%) QBER RQKD Throughput
0 0.0000 1.0000 0.4994
2 0.0098 0.8407 0.4198
4 0.0198 0.7195 0.3601
6 0.0304 0.6070 0.3037
8 0.0402 0.5141 0.2569
10 0.0500 0.4269 0.2135
12 0.0592 0.3515 0.1756
14 0.0706 0.2636 0.1321
16 0.0801 0.1947 0.0974
18 0.0899 0.1279 0.0641
20 0.1003 0.0601 0.0300
22 0.1098 0.0030 0.0015
24 0.1195 0.0000 0.0000
26 0.1302 0.0000 0.0000

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5 Discussion and Comparative Benchmarking
Our simulation threshold aligns with the Shor–Preskill limit of approximately 11% QBER
for one-way post-processing [2]. In fiber experiments such as Gobby et al. [11], QBERs
below 5% were achieved over 122 km, while recent long-distance demonstrations by Boaron
et al. [12] maintained secure key distribution over 421 km with carefully controlled noise
levels. Free-space demonstrations, including satellite-based implementations by Liao et al.
[14] and Yin et al. [15], reported QBERs ranging from 1–8% when factoring in atmospheric
turbulence and tracking accuracy. Our results therefore represent an upper bound, given the
idealized error-correction efficiency (fEC = 1.0) and absence of finite-key penalties.
The experimental context provided by these demonstrations shows that practical QKD
systems can achieve QBERs well below the theoretical threshold under controlled conditions,
validating the operational relevance of our simulation framework. However, the rapid degra-
dation near the threshold emphasizes the importance of robust error correction and noise
mitigation strategies in practical deployments.

6 Conclusions
Two observations matter operationally. First, the linear law Q ≈ p/2 means even modest
depolarization quickly becomes visible in the sifted key, implying nontrivial error-correction
and privacy amplification costs. Second, the security threshold is unforgiving. Once QBER
nears ∼ 11%, the asymptotic one-way key rate vanishes [2]. In practice, non-ideal recon-
ciliation (fEC > 1), finite-key penalties [7], and device imperfections (such as dark counts
and alignment drift) lower the effective limit [4, 3]. Our simulation therefore represents an
upper bound on achievable performance under symmetric noise, and it provides a baseline
for stress-testing QKD systems and tuning abort conditions.
Recent experimental demonstrations [12, 13, 14] confirm that practical QKD systems
can achieve QBERs well below the theoretical threshold under controlled conditions. This
validates the operational relevance of our simulation framework. Nevertheless, the rapid
degradation near the threshold emphasizes the critical importance of robust error correction
and noise mitigation strategies in practical deployments.

7 Future Work
Extensions of this work could include several important directions. Modeling error-correction
inefficiency (fEC > 1) would reflect the realities of reconciliation algorithms, which often op-
erate at 5–10% above the Shannon limit. Incorporating finite-key analysis [7] would allow us
to quantify the penalties for shorter block sizes and provide more realistic security bounds.
Loss models and detector imperfections (including dark counts and efficiency mismatch)
would bridge the gap between our idealized simulation and field deployments [3]. Finally,
testing alternative protocols such as decoy-state BB84 [9] under depolarization would reveal
whether threshold behavior shifts significantly under more sophisticated designs. Compar-
ison with twin-field QKD approaches [17] could illuminate the trade-offs between different
QKD implementations under realistic noise conditions.

10
8 Reproducibility
All code and figures were generated with the following command (seeded, deterministic):

python research.py --bits 100000 --trials 10 --start 0.00 --stop 0.26 \

--step 0.02 --fec 1.0 --seed 42 --outdir ./out --savefig --dpi 400

Artifacts used in this manuscript (from the last run):

• CSV: out/bb84 depolarizing results 20250810 080748.csv

• Vector figures: out/vector figs/fig qber.pdf, fig skr qkd.pdf, fig skr tx qkd.pdf

Script version: 1.2.0; Python/NumPy/Pandas/Matplotlib as listed in the metadata JSON.

Results regenerate deterministically with the same seed.

11
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