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Voluntary participation, state involvement: Indonesian propaganda in the

struggle for maintaining independence, 1945-1949

Zara, M.Y.

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2016
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Final published version

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Citation for published version (APA):

Zara, M. Y. (2016). Voluntary participation, state involvement: Indonesian propaganda in the
struggle for maintaining independence, 1945-1949. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van
Amsterdam].

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CHAPTER 4
Beyond National Boundaries:
Indonesian Propaganda Abroad
 ¤

CHAPTER 4

Beyond National Boundaries:

Indonesian Propaganda Abroad

Pro-Indonesian propaganda had thus far for the most part

only been distributed in Indonesia itself. The Dutch-Indonesian
conflict was fought in Indonesia, and that is where the belligerents
were. Additionally, the Republic’s claim of sovereignty were not
directly recognized by the major powers. Therefore diplomacy
and propaganda had to be undertaken to achieve this international
acknowledgement. The Republic faced numerous problems
with overseas propaganda. The Republican authorities did not
have sufficient power, resources, or personnel to conduct an
overseas propaganda campaign, and thus most of their energy was
concentrated on Indonesia itself. How the Republic attempted
to overcome these problems and what the effect of overseas pro-
Republican propaganda was is subject of this chapter.
As a nation-state in the making, the Republic of Indonesia
had no infrastructure of embassies and consulates, nor any official
representatives abroad. The Republican authorities relied heavily
on sympathetic Indonesians living overseas. These people, however,
faced a difficult task in promoting their new state. Most of the world
knew very little about Indonesian history, let alone Indonesian
nationalism, although some (the people of the Netherlands, for
instance) felt that the old colonial order should be restored. Many
Indonesians lived abroad for work or study, in some cases for years
or even decades, but they found it difficult to actively promote the
Republic. They were low on money, thanks to the war, and the

246
majority preferred to be repatriated to Indonesia after the Japanese
capitulation anyway, which of course meant a drastic decrease in
manpower for the running of a pro-Republic propaganda campaign
abroad. Pro-Republic propaganda in Australia was particularly
problematic as the Indonesians, propagandists and non-campaigners
alike, were vulnerable to deportation at any moment: the White
Australian Policy defined them as undesired aliens.1
This chapter endeavors to interpret how Indonesian propaganda
was practiced abroad and how it dealt with a variety of obstacles.
The questions I shall address are: 1) Which countries were targeted
and why? 2) Who were the Indonesian propagandists abroad, and
how did they become involved? 3) Which issues were addressed
abroad, and how was the propaganda surrounding them formulated
and disseminated?
In answering these questions, I focus particularly on Indonesian
propaganda in countries where a considerable Indonesian
population was living and where pro-Republic propaganda was
apparent during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. I acknowledge that
more countries played a role in advancing the goals of the Republic
abroad than I discuss in this chapter. According to Mohammad
Hatta, Indonesians, sometimes in collaboration with foreigners,
established eleven committees for independence abroad. These
were in Asia, the Arab world, Europe and the United States.

1
The Australian government first applied a discriminatory immigration policy
in the middle of the 19th century, when the discovery of gold in the country attracted
a huge number of Chinese immigrants. An anti-Chinese law was formulated, which
charged high fees to new Chinese immigrants entering Australia. This type of law
against Asian immigrants, particularly Chinese, was also applied in the USA and
Brazil. Stricter regulations were issued in 1901, the so-called ‘White Australian
Policy’; this targeted more groups than just the Chinese. Upon arrival, new
immigrants had to pass a dictation test of 50 words in any European language.
Later, in 1910, this requirement was relaxed to apply up to one year after arrival,
and in 1920 this was raised to three years. See Carmen Tiburcio, The Human
Rights of the Alien under International and Comparative Law (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2001), p. xx.

247
Zein Hassan, an Indonesian propagandist in Egypt, mentioned
a higher number: 25 committees. These included committees
in Singapore, Bombay, New Delhi, Colombo, Cairo, Baghdad,
Mecca and London, as well as Central Asia, Australia, and the
United States.2 The most active propagandists were working in
Australia, the Arab world and the Netherlands; their actions will
be explored in the following pages. I deliberately exclude pro-
Republic activities in several other countries as the most apparent
aspects of these were different in nature. In Singapore, for instance,
one of Indonesia’s closest neighbors, the pro-Republic activities of
the majority of Indonesians focussed on procuring weaponry and
financing the Republic through trade.3 The USA and the United
Nations were, as can be seen from several studies, key players in
Indonesia’s struggle for independence, in particular because they
put pressure on the Dutch to lessen the aggressive stance toward
Indonesia.4 Pro-Republic acitivities in the USA and the United
Nations were mainly diplomatic. Diplomacy seeks compromise and
finally solution and these were carried out mostly at the negotiation
table, but propaganda aims to change the mind, the heart and the
behavior by instilling, altering, or strengthening ideas. Propaganda
was for the most part aimed at the general populace by use of mass
communication media, while diplomacy was carried out between
state representatives.

2
‘Sepatah kata sambutan’, by Mohammad Hatta in Mohamad Bondan,
Genderang Proklamasi di Luar Negeri (Jakarta: Kawal, 1971), p. viii.
3
See Yong Mun Cheong, The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore
Connection, 1945-1949 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003).
4
See for example Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and
the United Nations (London: Stevens & Son, 1960) and Robert J. McMahon,
Colonialism and Cold War: the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian
Independence, 1945-1949 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

248
The Perkoempoelan Kemerdekaan Indonesia in the Arab World
To understand Indonesian propaganda in the Arab world one
should take into account the historical and sociological position of
Indonesians living there. The spread of Islam in the Indonesian
archipelago in the fifteenth century had inspired Indonesian Muslims
to embark upon pilgrimages to Islamic sites in the Arab world, in
particular Mecca and Medina. Throughout the 19th Century there
was an unprecedented proliferation in the number of Indonesian
pilgrims, possible in large part because of the increasing wealth of
Indonesian Muslims and the introduction of pilgrimage ships by the
colonial government of the Dutch Indies.
A considerable number of Indonesians established themselves
in Egypt, where the Al Azhar University was widely known among
Indonesian Muslims as the best place to study the teachings of
Islam. Despite the distance and difficulties of communication and
transportation, many of these Indies Muslims maintained ties with
their homeland. Some Indonesians stayed in the Arabian Peninsula
after finishing their pilgrimage, becoming religious teachers for new
generations of Indonesian students arriving annually, especially during
pilgrimage season.5 During the 1920’s and 1930’s, Indonesian students
and Islamic scholars in the Arabian Peninsula, carefully monitored
by the Dutch consulate in Jeddah, a main port city on the Arabian
Peninsula, absorbed the spirit of nationalism which at the time had
already attracted Indonesians from both the colony and abroad. They
introduced themselves as ‘Indonesians’ in an effort to replace the
existing term, ‘Jawi’, current in the Hejaz for all Muslims originating
from the Indies, British Malaya, Siam and the Philippines.6

5
On the history of Indonesians in the Arab world see Deliar Noer, The
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 25-29 and Michael Francis Laffan,
Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the Wind (London
and New York: Routledge and Curzon, 2003).
6
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri (Jakarta:

249
 The two World Wars made relying on financial support
from families in Indonesia increasingly difficult. Therefore, most
Indonesians were returned home by the Dutch who, loaned them
money and provided ships through their consulates in Jeddah. Some
chose to stay, and they became the foremost supporters of Indonesian
independence in the Arab world. They sought financial support from
the Dutch consulate to feed themselves. The consulate at first refused
but later extended a loan after the Indonesians protested. During the
Japanese occupation, the Dutch actively approached these students,
especially in Egypt, asking for their support for the return of the
Indies government to the Indies. They also lobbied for a visit by
Queen Wilhelmina’s son-in-law, the husband of the then-Princess
Juliana, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, to the Arab world to
ensure Indonesian and Dutch cooperation in the expulsion of the
Japanese from Indonesia.7
The news of the Indonesian proclamation of independence
reached the Indonesians in the Arab world at the end of August,
1945. Initially, there were no Arabic language reports about what had

Bulan Bintang, 1980), pp. 26-27.

7
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 31-32. In 1923, Muslims from
the Indies established Al-Jamiyatul Khairiyatul Jawiyah (the Javanese Service
Association), which later, with the involvement of Muslims from British Malay,
turned into Persatoean Pemoeda Indonesia-Malaja (The Association of Indonesian
and Malay Youth, Perpindom) in the 1930’s. The Perpindom was financially self-
supporting. Its membership consisted of students from Indonesia and the Malay
peninsula, who willingly risked the continuity of their study by concentrating on this
movement. It was supported financially by its members, sympathizers, and, shortly
before the proclamation, the loan from the Dutch embassy in Cairo, which was
insufficient to conduct large-scale propaganda operations. In addition to personal
communication and various meetings between them and other Indonesians, they also
published pamphlets and a magazine called Soeara Perpindom. This Indonesian-
language newspaper was aimed specifically at countering two Dutch-sponsored
Indonesian language newspapers widely read by Indonesian communities abroad,
Bintang Timoer in London and Penjoeloeh in Australia. Most of the articles in
Soeara Perpindom consisted of counterattacks against the articles in the two Dutch-
sponsored newspapers, as well as various articles about Indonesian history and
culture. See M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 33-35 and 53.

250
happened in Indonesia on 17 August, 1945. An Indonesian named
Mansur Abu Makarim first spread the news to Indonesian students.
He worked at the Dutch Embassy in Cairo and had already been
asked by the Indonesian students in the city to provide Indonesia-
related information as it circulated at the embassy. He read the news of
the proclamation in the Dutch newspaper Vrij Nederland, apparently
at the embassy. The Indonesian students in Perpindom (Persatoean
Pemoeda Indonesia-Malaja, The Association of Indonesian and
Malay Youth), an organization for Indonesian and Malay students
established in the 1930’s, responded to the news. It changed the
organization’s name. It should now reflect the need to defend the
already-declared independence. They chose Perkoempoelan
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PKI, Association of Indonesian
Independence, or in Arabic: Jam’iyatu Istiqlali Indonesia—not to
be confused with the Partai Komunis Indonesia whose abbreviation
is also PKI).8 The Republican government took no part in the
establishment and subsequent propagandizing of the PKI.
Seeking wider public sympathy, the Indonesian students forwarded
the news of Indonesian independence to the Egyptian media. According
to Zein Hassan, chief of the PKI, Egyptian newspaper editors warmly
welcomed the news since they shared anti-colonialist feelings with the
Indonesians. They used the news as a trigger to voice their anger at
the Allies who were, at the time and in the view of the Egyptian media,
oppressing the Egyptians in their own land.9 It was difficult for these
students to stay informed about the course of the revolution. This
absence of information, according to Zein Hassan, lasted from August,
1945, until March, 1947 when Indonesian delegates, sent to the Arab
world to seek support for the Republic and official acknowledgment,
led by Junior Minister of Foreign Affairs Agoes Salim, visited Cairo.

8
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 36 and 49.
9
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 49-50.

251
Only then could the students confirm what had happened in Indonesia
over the previous two years.
Indonesia’s propaganda was at the time necessarily based for the
most part on what Zein Hassan called, in 1970, ‘our imagination’
(gambaran khayal kami).10 This referred to the combination of the
limited information gleaned from print media and rumours and
the imagination of the Indonesian students. Thus, the propaganda
contained both truths and falsehoods. This could of course mislead
the audience. The PKI, for instance, published an Arabic-language
book entitled Indonesia as-Sairah (Indonesia in the Revolution),
on 17 August, 1946, commemorating the first year of the Republic.
The book, aimed at the Egyptian public, contained some correct
information, such as citing 17 August, 1945, as the date of proclamation
and the fact that the proclamation was announced by Soekarno.
However, the book also contained incorrect information, for example
that the proclamation ceremony was held in Ikada Square, one of
Jakarta’s largest public space (whereas it was in fact held at Soekarno’s
house, which was far smaller) and that the attendees numbered in
the thousands (whereas a likely assessment is mere hundreds). This
imaginative writing turned a modest proclamation ceremony into a
colossal public event, obviously to increase Indonesians’ confidence
abroad and to amaze foreign audiences with the splendor of
Indonesian nationalism.
According to an article about the PKI in Cairo, published by the
Jakarta-based pro-Republic newspaper Minggoean Merdeka in May,
1946, the history of the PKI’s activity, including their propaganda
campaign, could be divided into three phases: the period following
the cessation of transport and communication lines between
Indonesia and Egypt due to the Second World War, the phase
following Japan’s Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso’s announcement in

10
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 51-52.

252
Japanese parliament of the Japanese promise to grant independence
to Indonesia (September, 1944), and the last months of 1945 when
the news of the foundation of the Republic Indonesia became known
in Egypt.11 In the first phase, PKI propaganda focused on introducing
the Indonesian nation to Egyptian society, which at the time had no
knowledge about Indonesia as the Indonesian people were regarded
as citizens of the Dutch Indies. In response to Koiso’s promise,
Dutch representatives in Cairo persuaded the Indonesians living
there to cooperate with the Dutch, by stressing that Indonesia was
not ready to be independent and should therefore remain under the
Indies government. When news of the independence finally arrived
in Egypt, the PKI’s first priority was to liberate the Republican leaders
from the stain of collaboration with the Japanese.
By mid-1946, the PKI in Cairo had established communications
with 25 instances of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KIM, the
Committee for Indonesian Independence) throughout the world.
The KIM was an independent international committee established by
pro-Republic Indonesians and sympathetic foreigners, with branches
in the US, Australia, India, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.12 Despite using a

11
‘Perkoempoelan Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Cairo’, Minggoean Merdeka,
17 May, 1946. One may wonder why PKI Cairo lacked correct information about
events in Indonesia during 1945-1947 whereas the Minggoean Merdeka published
a story about the PKI’s movements in May 1946. The answer is because Indonesian
students in Cairo had no opportunity to check the correctness of each story they
heard about the events to Republican authorities. Indonesian students actually
met an Indonesian delegate to the Hoge Veluwe Conference in the Netherlands,
Soewandi, in Cairo on 7 April, 1946. This would be a great opportunity to confirm
many news stories about independence, but it was a short visit and no time was
available to verify facts. As a consequence, the students still relied on non-official
sources of news, including rumours, newspapers and correspondences with
Indonesians in other parts of the world, which possibly contradicted each other.
In other words, there were various news stories about what happened in Indonesia
circulating in Cairo, but the truth was uncertain.
12
‘Perkoempoelan Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Cairo’. The Committee for
Indonesian Independence also existed in India, and one of its activities was to
organize a conference among Indonesians living there in April, 1946, which resulted

253
name similar to that of the KIM, they actually shared only the pro-
independence drive, and although they occasionally cooperated
with each other, they were not under one umbrella organization.
A committee for Indonesian independence was established in
Mecca and became a branch of PKI Cairo. The Mecca committee’s
propaganda involved a face-to-face approach to Indonesians living
in Mecca during the pilgrimage season. The Mecca branch was also
in communication with the British Labor Party which, as mentioned
previously, was sympathetic to the struggle against the re-establishment
of colonial order. The same branch also sent a memorandum to the
UNO, which was preparing a meeting in London. To the UNO, the
committee stressed that Indonesians had the right to choose which
form of government they wanted and that the UNO should send a
team to investigate British and Dutch oppression in Indonesia.
The PKI’s close association with Egypt-based political and
social organizations was beneficial to the Republic. The PKI
approached the leaders of the al Ikhwan al Muslimun (the Islamic
Brotherhood, IM), one of the most influential Islamic organizations
in Egypt, established in 1928. This organization promoted anti-
colonialism and the unity of Islamic countries all over the globe.
The IM subsequently agreed to endorse the PKI’s vision in its
newspaper. On 29 September, 1946, the editor beseeched the
Egyptian government and kingdoms throughout the Arab world
to recognize the Republic of Indonesia, noting that even India, a
country still struggling against colonialism (being independent since
1947), had already declared support for Indonesia. India’s example
was expected to be followed by governments all over the Arab

in an appeal to call upon Indian leaders to help Indonesia, just like the Egyptian
leaders did. The Committee for Indonesian Independence in India was Persatoean
Indonesia Merdeka (The Association of Indonesian Independence, Persindom),
established in Bombay. See ‘Perkoempoelan Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Cairo’.

254
world.13 In the meantime, the Republican government, with the
help of the PKI, sent a sympathy-seeking letter to the Arab League,
a six-member organization of Arab countries consisting of the
Kingdom of Egypt, the Kingdom of Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The Chief Secretary of the Arab League,
Egyptian nationalist Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, replied, stating
that the Arab League supported Indonesian independence.14

Islamic Bond and Anti-British Sentiment

In an effort to persuade Arabs that the independence movement
in Indonesia was initiated and conducted by Muslims—and therefore
deserved support from a Muslim-majority country like Egypt—
Indonesian propagandists Islamized the Indonesian leaders. There
was no need to Islamize Vice President Mohammad Hatta—the
name ‘Mohammad’ already reflected his Islamic background. The
Islamization was therefore applied particularly to Soekarno, whose
Javanese name sounded strange to Arab ears and led the Egyptians
to question whether he was a Muslim or not. Zein Hassan from PKI
Cairo, basing his action on an existing practice among Indonesian
Muslims, who often had only a single name but later added ‘Ahmad’ or
‘Mohammad’ in front of their name, decided to add ‘Ahmad’ in front
of Soekarno’s name. Subsequently, the name ‘Ahmad Soekarno’ was
propagated by the Indonesian propagandists, particularly to Egyptian
journalists who were curious about events in Indonesia.15
On 16 October, 1945, a meeting was held in Cairo, attended
by sympathetizers with the Republic of Indonesia, involving such
leading anti-British figures in Egyptian politics as Saleh Harb Pasha

‘Akoei Repoeblik Indonesia: desakan soerat kabar Mesir’, Merdeka, 7

13

November, 1946.
14
‘Perkoempoelan Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Cairo’.
15
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 62.

255
(formerly Egypt’s Minister of Defense), Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha,
Secretary General of the Arab League Salahuddin Pasha, and other
representatives from the Egyptian universities, youth organizations,
political parties, the Palestine Committee, and sympathetic figures
from Algeria, Lebanon, Iran and China. This meeting resulted in a
committee called Lajnatud Difa’i ‘an Indonesia (the Committee for
Defending Indonesia). As most of the representatives were Muslims,
the Indonesian representatives delivered speeches underlining Islam
as the most decisive driving factor in the Indonesian struggle for
independence. They said that the golden age of Indonesian history
was marked by the birth of Indonesian Islamic heroes who fought
against the Portuguese and the Dutch. Given that some attendees were
anti-British, the Indonesian speakers also emphasized the challenge
Indonesian independence faced due to British intervention. These
speeches were later printed, copied, and distributed to Egyptians.
The committee sent a letter to Egypt’s Prime Minister Mahmoud
an-Nukrashi Pasha, emphasizing the need for Egyptian support for
Indonesian independence, stressing that ‘Arab and Islamic countries
are also feeling what is now happening in Indonesia—the greediness
of imperialism and the bitterness of occupation’. It referred also to
‘the humanitarian relationship and Islamic brotherhood [ukhuwah
Islamiyah]’ between Egypt and Indonesia.16
Another PKI propaganda effort, using the Islamic bond, was
addressed to the highest officials of Saudi Arabia. On 31 October,
1945, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faisal bin Abdulaziz
al Saud, visited London, and the PKI seized the opportunity to appeal
to him. The PKI sent a letter to the minister requesting his help to
deliver a protest from the Indonesians to the British government
regarding British interference in Indonesia and British support
to the Dutch. The PKI stressed that Saudi Arabia should support

16
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 65-66.

256
Indonesian independence and intervene in the conflict by urging
the British to stop helping the Dutch reinstate their power because
‘thousands of martyrs [syuhada] passed away defending this Islamic
state’. This letter was ‘on behalf of the 70 million Muslims who are
devout to Allah and are holding firmly to their rights’.17
The PKI also communicated its anti-British stance to various
other governments and politicians, both in Egypt and abroad.
On 15 October, 1945, the PKI sent a telegram to Clement Atlee,
then prime minister of the UK, declaring their protest of British
encroachment in Indonesia, which it saw as a contradiction of the
statement by the British War Minister that the British would not
fight the Indonesians.18 A number of telegrams were sent to various
governments and politicians around the world, portraying the British
intervention in Indonesia as a failure and urging cessation. The PKI
of Cairo sent a memorandum via its Indian counterpart to two main
political parties in India, the All-India Muslim League and the Indian
National Congress, expecting these two parties to use their influence
to persuade Indian people that Britain should stop using Indian
troops in Indonesia.19
The Egyptians’ hatred of the British was employed by the PKI
to appeal to the Egyptian people, particularly during the last months
of 1945 and the early months of 1946. The PKI propaganda focused
on the atrocities committed by the British against Indonesian
revolutionaries.20 The most important anti-British propaganda
was produced during the battle of Surabaya in November and
December, 1945. During these two months, Egyptian newspapers
published news about British bombardment in Surabaya. UK-based

17
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 82.
18
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 78.
19
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 83.
20
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 62.

257
newspapers such as The Sphere and The Illustrated London News,
also wrote about the same event, although with a heavily pro-British
tone. These newspapers claimed that the conflict began with an attack
by Indonesian extremists against British troops who were rescuing
prisoners of war. The PKI countered this assertion in its press
releases, claiming that the British tendency to divide Indonesians
into extremists and moderates was a way of blaming Indonesians for
the clash, and further stating that the bloodshed was actually because
the British had broken their agreement with Indonesia. Where
the Indonesian press, as previously noted, depicted Surabaya as
‘the Second Amritsar’, the PKI in Cairo dubbed it ‘the Stalingrad
of Indonesia’ in order to equate the Nazi’s brutal attack on the city
of Stalingrad and its population with the violence committed by the
British in Surabaya. This image also signified considerable confidence
among Indonesian propagandists, implying as it did that the foreign
invader would eventually lose.21
Apart from issues of Islamic brotherhood and anti-British
sentiment, largely welcomed by the Egyptians, Indonesian
propagandists in Egypt also approached representatives of foreign
countries. While the world talked incessantly about establishing
peace, Indonesian propagandists in Egypt incorporated this into their
messages. As early as 5 September, 1945, an Indonesian organization
for Indonesians living in Cairo, the Indonesian Union, had expressed
its concern about the urgency regarding global acceptance of
Indonesia as a new legitimate country, with, inevitably, a role to play in
establishing world peace. The Union sent a letter to the governments
of the UK, the US, France, China, Russia, Switzerland, Sweden,
Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. Copies of this letter also reached
Indonesians living in Australia. By quoting Indonesians suffering
under the Japanese occupation and at the end of the Second World

21
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, p. 84-85.

258
War, the Union asserted that, as an independent state, Indonesia
would make a great difference to the world:
The Great Powers should look at Indonesia now from a new angle if they
really desire a sincere world peace; in fact they think it best that Indonesia
be given complete independence (Self-government) in accordance with
the Atlantic Charter, as this is the only way, in their opinion [the Union’s
opinion], for the prosperity of Indonesia and everlasting peace in the
Pacific.22 (sic)

The Union also raised its three main demands:

1) total independence for Indonesia, 2) the integrity of all Indonesia as it
was before its occupation by foreign powers, and 3) the representation of
Indonesia by a native in the coming peace conference (and [in] any other
conference which concerns Indonesia)

In the middle of January, 1946, the Indonesian case had yet

to be addressed by the Security Council of the UNO. To try to
move this along, the PKI of Cairo sent telegrams to representatives
of potentially symphatetic countries, including China, the Ukraine
and Egypt. The most important tool used in approaching them
was discovering and exploiting similarities between Indonesia and
these countries. A feeling of solidarity could be engendered, which
eventually led to a belief that the conflict in Indonesia was a common
problem. Three shared identities were identified and presented:
solidarity among Eastern peoples, camaraderie of Socialist
countries, and Islamic brotherhood. A PKI telegram to the Chinese
representative asserted, for example, that China’s delegates were ‘the
real supporters of the Eastern peoples’ independence’. Help from
the Ukraine was, similarly, needed because the Ukraine’s delegate

22
Self-government here is a synonim for a complete independence. See Letter
from Bahroedin Ali, President of ‘Indonesian Union’ in Cairo to the governments
of UK, US, France, China, Russia, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Egypt, Syria and
Lebanon: ANRI, Mohammad Bondan 1945-1968, Nr. 501.

259
was ‘the real supporter of the Socialist countries’ independence’.
And Egypt’s aid was required because, unsurprisingly, the Egyptians
and other Arab delegates were ‘the real supporters of Muslim
countries’ independence’.23
Throughout 1946, PKI branches in Cairo and other parts of
the Arab world, which attentively followed public opinion in their
respective countries and developments regarding the Indonesian case
in international debate, lobbied continuously for discussion of the
Indonesian Republic’s case in the UNO, both through telegraphs
to foreign delegates in the UNO and by influencing public opinion,
particularly in Egypt. Their main aim was to put the Indonesian case
to the Security Council in a way which focused on the illegality of the
Dutch presence in Indonesia and on the ability of the Indonesian
authorities to run their own country. The PKI always included a copy
of a book written by a Republican minister, A.A. Maramis, entitled
No More Legal Power of the Netherlands in Indonesia. In this book
Maramis, a graduate of the Law Faculty of Leiden University in the
Netherlands, argued that from the point of view of the constitution of
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Indonesia had already been independent
since 1940, when the Dutch government fled to London to escape
the German invasion. Maramis argued that the Dutch constitution
did not permit the government to move abroad. Maramis, and the
PKI, concluded that the exile of the Dutch Queen and her ministers
meant the end of legitimate Dutch power in Indonesia. The presence
of the Japanese, the Dutch and the British consequently represented
intervention in an independent state.24

23
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 98-99.
Account about Maramis’ book can be found in M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi
24

Revolusi, pp. 106-110. This reasoning would also imply that the Queen and the
government lost the legitimacy of ruling over the Netherlands. Yet this legal point
was challenged. See for example Cees Fasseur, Wilhelmina: Krijgshaftig in een
Vormeloze Jas, Druk 2 (Amsterdam: Balans, 2001).

260
Approaching the Pilgrims
One of the most striking propaganda-related activities of the PKI
was aimed at Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca. After a hiatus because of
the Second World War, Indonesians could as of 1946 again perform
pilgrimages, aided by the NICA which provided ships and other
facilities. This aid was extended primarily to those in East Indonesia,
where the Dutch-founded federalist state Negara Indonesia Timur
(The State of East Indonesia, NIT) allowed a strong Dutch grip in the
region.25 Considering that the only way Indonesian Muslims could
perform their pilgrimage to Mecca during the revolution was to take
ships provided by the Dutch, the PKI’s key propaganda method was
to reproach the Muslims who did this. The PKI disseminated the view
that performing pilgrimage via facilities provided by the NICA was,
when looked at from the viewpoint of Islamic law, ‘forbidden’ (haram).
The PKI started this anti-Dutch campaign in 1946, when it
learned about the Dutch pilgrimage ships. This succeeded in a
number of cases; some Indonesian pilgrims even burned their Dutch
passports.26 In 1947 the PKI published a booklet of religious attitudes
regarding pilgrimage under the Dutch. According to Zein Hassan, the
PKI in Cairo, feeling that the Dutch pilgrimage ships would increase

25
‘Soal pergi hadji ke Mekkah’, Pandji Ra’kjat, 28 March 1946; ‘Kapal hadji
NICA telah tiba di Djeddah’, Merdeka, 25 October 1946. The NIT was initiated by
the Dutch. It was preceded by the Dutch-initiated conferences (Malino Conference,
16-22 July 1946 and Denpasar Conference, 7-24 December 1946) at which the
Dutch gathered representatives of the eastern parts of the Indonesian archipelago
and minority groups to establish a state wherein the Dutch could effectively exercise
control. The NIT consisted of Sulawesi, Bali, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and the
Moluccas. It had considerable support from local kings (rajas). It was headed by
Tjokorda Gde Raka Soekawati, a raja in Bali, and lasted from 24 December, 1946,
to 17 August, 1950. Singaraja (Bali) was its capital. For discussion about the NIT and
other Dutch efforts to rule east Indonesia, see A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of
Federal Indonesia (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955).
26
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from S. van Hulst, the Secretary
of the Dutch Consulate General in Singapore to Head (Onderhoofd) of General
Recherche in Batavia entitled ‘inz. rep. propaganda te Mekka’, 12 January, 1948.

261
the dependency of Indonesians Muslims on the Dutch, sought a
fatwa (religious interpretation or advice on Islamic law from Islamic
scholars) from the mufti (Islamic scholars qualified to issue the fatwa)
of Al Azhar University, who supported Indonesian independence.
The fatwa requested by the PKI was about the status of Muslims
who performed their pilgrimage with the help of a heathen nation
which was at the time waging war on the pilgrims’ homeland.27 The
fatwa-commission of Al Azhar, after explaining the importance of
pilgrimage for every Muslim who is able to perform it, stated that
there were several exceptions, situations in which pilgrimage was
not recommended or was even forbidden. The general guideline
was that something was forbidden if it did more harm than good.
Considering this, the fatwa-commission declared that it was haram
to perform the pilgrimage if it ‘would cause defamation or weakness
and conflict, which would cause destruction and disrupt in the
solidarity, and generate chaos among the people they leave behind
[in their country]’.28 Muslims who sided with the enemy were labeled
hypocrites. Those Muslims who received money from the enemy,
who ‘wanted to disunite Muslims’, for the pilgrimage were also
declared to have committed ‘a sin with major consequence, and an
extremely bad mistake’.29
A report of an investigation into this, addressed to the Dutch
ambassador in Jeddah, claimed that this fatwa actually followed
on from another one issued by the fatwa-commission of Al Azhar
University in 1946, when the commission was asked about the status

27
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 173.
28
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from the Dutch ambassador in
Cairo, Egypt, to the Head of Far Eastern Board of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Batavia, 10 February, 1948.
29
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from the Dutch ambassador in
Cairo, Egypt, to the Head of Far Eastern Board of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Batavia, 10 February, 1948.

262
of pilgrims from North Africa traveling under the supervision of
French authorities.30 Those who already knew about this fatwa but
continued to perform pilgrimage with the facilities provided by the
heathen nation were deemed infidels. This fatwa was translated
into Indonesian, copied, and sent to Mecca to be distributed to
Indonesian pilgrims there.31 It was entitled Haram Naik Hadji Djika
Menjebabkan Fitnah dan Perpetjahan Dikalangan Kaum Muslimin
(It is forbidden to perform pilgrimage if it causes defamation and
disunity among Muslims). It was spread in Mecca in particular from
the beginning of 1947 until September of the same year, close to the
peak of pilgrim season (October, 1947).
In another part of the pamphlet, the PKI listed the history of
support by Arabic countries for the newly born Republic of Indonesia.
Entitled Perhubungan antara Republik Indonesia dan Negara-negara
Arab (The relationship between the Republic of Indonesia and Arab
countries), it explained that all Arab states should support and aid
the Indonesian nation’s struggle. It listed sympathetic assistance
from various parties in the Arab world after November, 1946,
when the Arab League ‘advised its members to acknowledge the
Republic of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state’. It also
mentioned those Arab states which had already acknowledged the
Republic by September 1947, namely Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon

30
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. ‘Republikeinse propaganda in Mekka’,
an investigation report addressed to the Dutch ambassador in Jeddah, June, 1948.
31
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 169-171. It was not known
whether this booklet was ever distributed to Indonesia. Both Indonesian and Dutch
sources did not mention its spread in Indonesia, but it seems that the booklet was
only disseminated in Mecca. The PKI had hardly any opportunities to circulate
it to Indonesia. They heavily depended on returning pilgrims, whereas every
Indonesian pilgrim using Dutch ships was obligated to report to Dutch Consulate
in Jeddah before returning home. This was the opportunity for the Dutch to search
Indonesian pilgrims and confiscate any material the consulate found dangerous.
Some PKI propaganda materials, including the booklet, were seized in such
searches.

263
and Afghanistan. This acknowledgment led the PKI to announce
that ‘despite many obstacles put before us by the colonizer, each
Arab and Islamic country has been made aware that the Republic
of Indonesia is the only legitimate government of the Indonesian
nation, beloved and obeyed’. The pamphlet closed with two undated
photographs showing the Arab world’s support to the Republic, the
first of representatives of the Indonesian government, including A.R.
Baswedan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Agoes Salim, who were
received by Arab League officials in Cairo, and the second depicting
Agoes Salim shaking hand with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Al Amir Faisal ala Su’ud, in the same city.32
There were both useful and dangerous consequences to the
publication of this pamphlet; a number of pilgrims who read
the fatwa visited the PKI of Mecca to express their loyalty to the
Republican government, but at the same time, the Dutch consulate’s
counterpropaganda, which styled the PKI as anti-pilgrimage (disliked
by the Saudi government, who opposed any political propaganda
and depended financially on the coming of the pilgrims) led to the
imprisonment of a PKI leader by Saudi police.33 The PKI planned
to request that King Ibn Saud rebuff pilgrims from the eastern part of
Indonesia, which was occupied by the Dutch. Convincing Ibn Saud
to do this was difficult, however: he believed that Mecca was open to
all Muslims, regardless of their political views or nationality.34
The PKI conducted propaganda throughout the entire pilgrimage
season, doing everything from spreading a Haram Naik Hadji

32
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from the Dutch ambassador in
Cairo, Egypt, to the Head of Far Eastern Board of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Batavia, 10 February, 1948.
33
M. Zein Hassan, Diplomasi Revolusi, pp. 173. See also NL-HaNA, 2.10.14.
inv. Nmr. 3411.
34
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from S. van Hulst, the Secretary
of the Dutch Consulate General in Singapore to Head (Onderhoofd) of General
Recherche in Batavia entitled ‘inz. rep. propaganda te Mekka’, 12 January, 1948.

264
pamphlet at the beginning of hajj season to distributing pamphlets
to Indonesian Muslims who had finished their pilgrimage and
were preparing to return home. The PKI distributed pamphlets in
Indonesian pilgrims’ encampments near the pilgrimage sites.35
Several Indonesian pilgrims were personally approached by the
PKI. These pilgrims were not only given the pamphlet Haram Naik
Hadji, but also letters from the PKI to be forwarded to influential local
leaders in Indonesia. As previously noted, most of the pilgrims were
from East Indonesia. Via several supportive pilgrims, the PKI delivered
the pamphlet Haram Naik Hadji and the letter to local aristocrats and
other notable leaders in Makassar, the capital of the Dutch-founded
State of East Indonesia (see picture 4.1.). In December, 1947, Hadji
Sjahadat Dg. Sitoedjoe, a Muslim merchant from Makassar who had
just returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca, brought with him at least
seven copies of letters directed to various persons in his city, including
himself, the King of Gowa Andi Idjo, a Makassar merchant named
Idries Dg. Pulie, a member of City Council of Makassar called Andi
Manapijang, a former district head of Binamu (South Sulawesi) named
Hadji Mattawekkang, a local Muhammadiyah leader, and another
local official. Their respective backgrounds showed that the PKI
wanted representation with virtually all important groups in the city:
merchants, local aristocrats, and officials from both the Dutch-founded
local government and Islamic organizations.36
The letters called on these well-respected people to support
the Republic, each person receiving a different, tailored approach.

35
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from H.W. Felderhof, the
Attorney General of of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies in Batavia to
the Head of Board of Far East (DIRVO) in Batavia entitled ‘Republ. propaganda
onder Mekkagangers’, 7 January, 1948.
36
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from W.M. Remeeus,
the Resident of South Sulawesi, to the Minister of Interior of the State of East
Indonesia in Makassar entitled ‘Door Mekkagangers medegenomen republikeinse
propaganda-lectuur’, 30 December, 1947.

265
In approaching the King of Gowa, for instance, the PKI respected
his elevated position in his society, and expressed that the king must
have noted the increasing support for the Republic both within
Indonesia and abroad. The PKI alluded to various kingdoms abroad,
in particular in Arab world, which had expressed a pro-Republic
stance, suggesting that the Kingdom of Gowa should also follow
this path. The PKI then requested Idjo to ‘bolster and intensify
the propaganda of the Republic of Indonesia in your area’. Dutch
propaganda criticizing the Republic was, the PKI stated, ‘all lies’. The
PKI stressed that in the international world, the Republic’s efforts to
gain support were successful whereas those by the Dutch had failed.
Evidence included the reception of Indonesian representatives at the
UNO and the refusal to allow a representative of the Dutch to the
UNO and Soekawati, the president of the State of East Indonesia,
into Arab countries. The PKI also told Idjo that the Republic was
warmly received by Indonesians abroad: ‘The Indonesian nation
spread abroad, consisting of people from the Republic of Indonesia,
Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Lesser Sunda Islands, stands 100 %
behind the Republic of Indonesia’.37 These letters, nevertheless,
failed to reach the intended recipients due to Dutch confiscation after
a search of Hadji Sjahadat’s house in late December, 1947.

37
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from M. Nuri Entik, the
clerk of PKI branch Saudi Arabia, to Andi Idjo, the King of Goa, South Sulawesi,
entitled ‘menjampaikan usul dan amanat’ (conveying suggestions and mandates),
10 November, 1947.

266
 Picture 4.1.
The first page of the letter from the PKI to the King of Gowa, Andi Idjo.38

The Dutch recognized and were concerned by the influence

of the PKI’s propaganda on Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca. The
PKI was dubbed by the Dutch Embassy’s Director of the Far East
at the Dutch Consulate in Jeddah, H.F. Eschauzier, ‘a Republican

38
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. nmr. 3411. A letter from M. Nuri Entik, the
clerk of PKI branch Saudi Arabia, to Andi Idjo, the King of Goa, South Sulawesi,
entitled ‘menjampaikan usul dan amanat’ (conveying suggestion, and mandate,), 10
November ,1947.

267
propaganda institution’ (een republikeins propagandainstituut) and
by the Dutch Consulate General in Singapore as ‘a Republican
propaganda body’ (een republikeins propagandalichaam).39 The
burning of Dutch passports by Indonesian pilgrims was considered
by the Secretary of the Dutch Consulate in Singapore, S. van Hulst,
to have been caused by ‘the influence of the then [1946] Republican
propaganda [in the Arab world]’.40
Dutch authorities took measures to counter pro-Republic
propaganda in Mecca and in Indonesia. In Mecca, they employed
Abdoel Rachman Almasawa, an Indonesia of Arab descent who had
been a pro-Dutch propagandist when he cooperated with the Indies-
in-exile government in Australia in 1944. The exact nature of his
propaganda activities there remained relatively obscure, but according
to internal communications among Dutch officials in Jeddah he
‘managed to reduce the influence of Republican propaganda [among
Indonesians in Mecca]’.41 As mentioned earlier, the Dutch authorities
also took a hard line toward the spread of pro-Republic propaganda
among the pilgrims, including searches and the confiscation of
Republican propaganda materials upon departure in Jeddah.
Republican authorities combined both Islam and nationalism in
their messages. At the beginning of 1949, they produced a booklet
entitled Kenang-kenangan untuk Djema’ah Hadji Indonesia (A Gift for

39
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. Nmr. 3411. A letter from the Dutch Embassy’s
Director of Far East in the Dutch in Jeddah, H.F. Eschauzier, to H.H. Dingemans,
the Dutch Ambassador in Jeddah, 17 February, 1948; NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv.
Nmr. 3411. A letter from S. van Hulst, the Secretary of the Dutch Consulate
General in Singapore to Head (Onderhoofd) of General Recherche in Batavia
entitled ‘inz. rep. propaganda te Mekka’, 12 January, 1948.
40
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. Nmr. 3411. A letter from S. van Hulst, the Secretary
of the Dutch Consulate General in Singapore to Head (Onderhoofd) of General
Recherche in Batavia entitled ‘inz. rep. propaganda te Mekka’, 12 January, 1948.
41
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14. inv. Nmr. 3411. ‘Republikeinse propaganda in Mekka’,
an investigation report addressed to the Dutch ambassador in Jeddah, June, 1948.

268
Indonesian Pilgrims).42 This 64-page book was addressed to Indonesian
pilgrims in Mecca, obviously aimed in particular at those pilgrims
who arrived on the Dutch ships. Opening with both the Indonesian
greeting of ‘Merdeka’ and the Islamic greeting ‘Assalamualaikum’
(peace be upon you), this book was touted as a gift for Muslims who
had performed the pilgrimage, the most important element in Islamic
ritual (see picture 4.2., 4.3., and 4.4.). The book consisted mainly of
pictures whose messages addressed three main issues: the importance
of pilgrimage for Indonesian Muslims, depictions of the help the
Indonesians had received from the Arab world in maintaining their
independence, and a plea to Indonesian pilgrims to return home and
fight for independence after they finished their pilgrimage. On page 4
and 5, a picture of President Soekarno was placed side-by-side with a
picture of King Ibnu Saud, the leader of Saudi Arabia, signifying that
now the two countries were now equal and that these two were the most
important leaders for Indonesian Muslims. Other pictures depicted the
friendly stance shown by Arab leaders to Indonesian delegates seeking
their sympathy. One picture showed how the Republican government
had been developing Indonesia. There were also several pictures
displaying mountains and trees, the beautiful landscape of Indonesia,
in an effort to foster feelings of love for the homeland.43
Included also was a picture of Soekarno writing on a blackboard
before a crowd, accompanied by text clearly satirizing Dutch colonialism:
It was said that the Dutch task in Indonesia was to ‘educate’ the Indonesian
nation. After three and a half centuries, 93% of Indonesians still could
not differentiate between alif [the first letter in Arabic, which looks like an

42
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 908. A letter from H.W. Felderhof, the
Attorney General of the Supreme Court of Indonesia, to the High Representative
of the Dutch Crown in Indonesia and Head of DIRVO and Head of RVD, Batavia,
entitled ‘Propaganda in het Midden-Oosten’, 9 February, 1949. The booklet is
attached into this letter.
43
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 908. A letter from H.W. Felderhof, 9
February 1949.

269
 ‘I’ in Latin] and a pole (meaning they were still illiterate). The Republic
of Indonesia, as the government established solely for the sake of the
Indonesian people, feels the eradication of illiteracy, which was inherited
from the colonizer, is its utmost priority. Therefore, all energy is devoted
[to performing this task]; even His Majesty President Soekarno takes his
part at the forefront, to teach people to write and read.44

Picture 4.2.

A booklet entitled Kenang-kenangan untuk Djema’ah Hadji Indonesia, aimed at

Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca45

44
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 908. A letter from H.W. Felderhof, 9
February, 1949.
45
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 908. A letter from H.W. Felderhof, 9

270
 Picture 4.3.
Page 55 of the Kenang-kenangan untuk Djema’ah Hadji Indonesia booklet46

Picture 4.4.
Page 61 of the Kenang-kenangan untuk Djema’ah Hadji Indonesia booklet47

February, 1949.
46
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 908. A letter from H.W. Felderhof, 9 February, 1949.
47
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 908. A letter from H.W. Felderhof, 9
February, 1949. English translation by myself.

271
Indonesian Propaganda in Australia and the CENKIM
From June 1943, the Dutch transported hundreds of native political
prisoners from Digul in Dutch New Guinea to Australia, simultaneous
with their effort to establish the Dutch Indies government-in-exile there
after the Japanese took over the Indies a year before.48 By 1945, there
were thousands of Indonesians living in Australia, mainly members of
the Dutch army and navy, former Heiho members captured by the
Allies and transported to Australia, Indonesians working in Dutch
offices and shipping companies in Australia, and political prisoners
from Digul. These prisoners were former members of main political
parties in the Indies in the 1920’s and 1930’s, parties such as PKI, PNI,
Partindo and Permi, which aspired to a democratic and independent
Indonesia.49 The Japanese capitulation in August, 1945, changed the
situation drastically because a large number of Indonesians in Australia
were repatriated by the Australian government the following month.
The rest remained for a variety of reasons, such as family matters:
some Indonesian men had married Australian women.50

48
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi di Luar Negeri (Jakarta: Kawal,
1971), p. 1. See also Harry A. Poeze, ‘From Foe to Partner to Foe Again: The
Strange Alliance of the Dutch Authorities and Digoel Exiles in Australia, 1943-
1945’, in Indonesia, No. 94 (October 2012), pp. 57-84 and Rupert Lockwood,
‘The Indonesian Exiles in Australia, 1942-1947’, in Indonesia, No. 10 (October
1970), pp. 37-56. Digul, also known as Boven Digoel, is a mass internment camp
built by the Dutch Indies government shortly after the failed coup by the Indies
communists in 1926. It was located several thousand kilometers away from the
much more developed Java Island, deep in the jungle of New Guinea where
malaria was rife. As of 1927, all political internees were taken to Digul. According
to Takashi Shiraisi, the Digul camp was neither a penal camp nor a concentration
camp, as its main purpose of it was not physical punishment but an administrative
measure to compel inmates ‘to live a normal life under abnormal conditions’ and
‘let inmates die, go insane, or be broken’. See Takashi Shiraishi ‘The Phantom
World of Digoel’, Indonesia, Volume 61 (April 1996), pp. 93-94.
49
‘250 orang Indonesia ditoeroenkan dari kapal Belanda’, Soeara Rakjat,
24 October 1945; ‘Sedjak tanggal 8 Maret 1942, Sang Merah-Poetih berkibar di
Australia’, Soeara Merdeka, 6 November,1945.
50
Mohammad Bondan, Secretary of the CENKIM in Brisbane to Fenner

272
 News about Indonesian independence was delivered to
Indonesians in Australia via a radio broadcast in Arabic, broadcast
by an Indonesian radio station in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, as early
as 18 August, 1945. Neither news of Indonesian independence nor
of the recent situation in Java were mentioned in the Australian press
and radio because of strict Allied censorship of radio broadcasts
from Japan-held territories. In September, 1945, some former Digul
prisoners in Brisbane formed the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KIM,
the Committee of Indonesian Independence), later the CENKIM
(CEN stands for Central, meaning the headquarters of all Australia).
It was led by Djamaluddin Tamin, a West-Sumatra-born communist
who was captured in 1932 by the British authority in Singapore,
accusing him of establishing a communist network in Southeast
Asia. He was later exiled to Digul and eventually to Australia.
Another founder was Mohamad Bondan, a former member of the
Mohammad Hatta-founded nationalist organization Pendidikan
Nasional Indonesia (PNI-Baru), exiled to Digul in 1935 along with
Hatta and Sjahrir. In June, 1943, he, along with other Indonesian
prisoners, was transported to Australia. In conjunction with NICA’s
move from Melbourne to Brisbane, the Indonesians, including
Bondan, were also transported to Brisbane. In Wacol, near Brisbane,
Bondan approached Indonesian prisoners in the Dutch-established
Camp Columbia, where Dutch civilians and military personnel were
stationed during the war.
The CENKIM also forged a link with the Indonesian Seamen’s
Union, an organization for Indonesian seamen in Australia which
went on strike in September, 1945, backed by the Australian Trade
Union Movement, in protest against Dutch ships believed to be
taking weapons to Indonesia. Communication was also established
with organizations and individuals linked with the ruling Labor

Brockway in London, 13 October, 1946: ANRI, Nr. 348; Mohamad Bondan,

Genderang Proklamasi, pp. 9-17.

273
Party.51 The main task of the CENKIM was to propagate Indonesian
independence in Australia in three main ways: speeches, writing and
direct approaches to Australian politicians.52
CENKIM’s biggest challenge was the lack of qualified manpower
to run the organization, caused largely by the significant reduction
in the numbers of Indonesians in Australia. The CENKIM
operated amidst the repatriation of most of the Indonesians living in
Australia, particularly in 1945-1947. By the end of 1946, thousands
of Indonesians had been repatriated using ships provided by the
Australian government, 600 were still in the Dutch camps, dozens
had chosen to cooperate with the Dutch, and those remaining were
deemed unsuitable for the CENKIM’s needs.53 Branches of the
CENKIM were opened in Sydney and Melbourne, but the Sydney
branch was ineffective as its members consisted mostly of Indonesian
seamen, unused to administration and mobilization jobs.54 Another
branch was established in cooperation with former political activists in
Merauke, Dutch Nieuw Guinea. Their main aspiration was, however,
not to campaign for the independence but to seek CENKIM’s help
in lobbying the Australian government to repatriate Indonesians
stranded in Merauke to Java.55

51
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, p. 2-4.
52
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, p. 19.
53
Mohammad Bondan, Secretary of the CENKIM in Brisbane to Fenner
Brockway in London, 13 October, 1946: ANRI, Nr. 348
54
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, pp. 18-19.
55
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, p. 44. CENKIM’s initial aim
of propagating Indonesian independence in Australia was overwhelmed by a more
urgent task, namely repatriation. The CENKIM was requested by the Australian
authorities to help arrange repatriation of Indonesians with ships provided by
them. Thus, in addition to the dissemination of news about the independence,
early on after its establishment the theme the CENKIM promoted consisted also
of convincing Indonesians to return to their homeland soon instead of remaining
in Australia. The CENKIM was also preoccupied with matters concerning the ill-
treated Indonesians in the Dutch camp, and with whether the Australian wives

274
 In early days of the independence, the Indies-in-exile authorities
in Australia, as mentioned earlier, accused Soekarno of being a
Japanese collaborator, which to European ears might call to mind
Vidkun Quisling, Minister President of Nazi-occupied Norway,
considered a traitor to his homeland by the Allies because he
collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War.56 Quisling
himself was finally sentenced to death in October, 1945. CENKIM’s
initial propagandistic focus, like Soekarno and Hatta’s propaganda
shortly after the proclamation, dealt with purifying the image of
Indonesians who had collaborated with the Japanese. The slogan
‘Soekarno was not Quisling’ was propagated via various means, but
most importantly was spread by mouth to Australians in the streets,
houses and universities.57
CENKIM’s key source of information was radio broadcasts
from Indonesian stations. Its members frequently monitored events
in Indonesia via an English language program produced by the RRI
in Yogyakarta, The Voice of Free Indonesia. The information they
received was published as a weekly bulletin, subsequently spread to
the sympathetic supporters of the Republic, such as the Independence
Committees in other Australian cities, Australia’s trade unions and
the Australian press, and supportive parties abroad. The effectiveness
of this kind of propaganda was proven when the Dutch launched
their first military offensive on 21 July, 1947. Receiving radio

of Indonesians returning to Indonesia should be allowed to follow them to a

completely new country. In a retrospective view of Bondan, despite the fact that
this committe was established for propagating Indonesian independence abroad,
‘gradually this committee turned into a public service department [...] Matters related
to migration, labor social security for the Australian wives, and even certificates of
marriage were being taken care of [by the committee]’. See Mohamad Bondan,
Genderang Proklamasi, p 17, 28-32 and 56.
56
For further reading concerning Vidkun Quisling and his collaborationist
government see Hans Fredrik Dahl, Quisling: A Study in Treachery (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
57
‘Australia dan perdjoeangan Indonesia’, Minggoean Merdeka, 29 June, 1946.

275
broadcasts about this attack on the same day enabled CENKIM to
forward this news, apparently from Indonesia’s point of view, directly
to several newspapers in Brisbane. As a result, the next day this attack
headlined in the Australian press.58 It was very likely that CENKIM
was itself the source of information from the Republican side for the
Newcastle (New South Wales)-based newspaper, Newcastle Morning
Herald & Miners’ Advocate, which on 22 July, 1947, published the
military action as its headliner under the title ‘Dutch Aircraft attack
Java Airfields. Truce in Indonesia Ended’. The title clearly indicated
who infringed upon the armistice. This article depicted various Dutch
attacks on Java’s key cities and their impacts on the Indonesians,
including Indonesian victims of Dutch shootings and the evacuation
of men, women and children from the heavily bombed territories.59
CENKIM celebrated the endurance of the Republic
during months of heavy struggle by publishing and distributing
commemorative booklets. When the Republic commemorated its
6-month anniversary, CENKIM published a booklet entitled The
Republic of Indonesia, which displayed symbolic representations
of the Republic, such as a red-and-white drawing and a portrait of
President Soekarno. It also contained an article about the history
of Indonesia’s struggle for independence, and a quotation from
the Constitution. Also included were Vice President Hatta’s
thoughts about Indonesia’s aims and ideals, including a request to
help Indonesia gain international recognition, a request specifically
addressed to his old friends in Europe, such as those who had attended
the International Democratic Congress for Peace at Bierville, France,
in August, 1926, and the Anti-Colonial League Congress in Brussels,
Belgium, in February, 1927. As before, CENKIM distributed copies

58
Molly Bondan, Spanning a Revolution: The Story of Mohamad Bondan
and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1992), pp. 220.
59
‘Dutch aircrafts attack Java airfields. Truce in Indonesia Ended’, Newcastle
Morning Herald & Miners’ Advocate, 22 July, 1947.

276
of the booklet to independence committees and other sympathetic
organizations all over Australia and abroad.
This type of propaganda was utilized again in celebrating the
first year of the Republic on 17 August, 1946. Another English-
language booklet, entitled Merdeka, was published, containing
sympathetic messages from high-ranking Australian leaders with
diverse backgrounds (see picture 4.5.). The booklet’s cover
depicted a strong bull breaking chains attached to his feet, which
represented the determination of the Indonesian people to be free
from colonization.60 In the introduction, the CENKIM emphasized
the de facto authority of the Republican government, the Republic’s
contribution to the world, and the challenge it still faced from the
ones the CENKIM called ‘the aggressor’: the Dutch. The CENKIM
published what it cited as proof of the efficacy of the Republic, in
particular ‘the ability of the Republic to send 500,000 tons of rice
to India’. It also emphasized the ‘tremendous support given to the
Republic by the mass of the Labor Movement throughout the world,
which needs no comment from us to make it known’.61

60
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 842. A letter from S. van Hulst, the Secretary
of the Dutch Consulate General in Singapore to the Head (Onderhoofd) of
General Recherche in Batavia, entitled ‘inz. het boekje “Merdeka”’, 12 September,
1947. The booklet was attached in the letter.
61
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 842. A letter from S. van Hulst, 12
September, 1947.

277
 Picture 4.5.
A booklet, published by the CENKIM to commemorate the first anniversary of
the Republic in Australia62

62
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 842. A letter from S. van Hulst, 12 September, 1947.

278
 The booklet opened with views from Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir
and Amir Sjarifoeddin, who defended Indonesia’s right to self-
determination, promoting a peaceful solution concerning the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict, and demanding that the Indonesian people unite
behind the Republican government. The booklet listed a number
of Dutch negative actions resulting from the Dutch government’s
conservative views and ignorance of the realities of Indonesian
independence, which included the imprisonment—without trial—of
Indonesian officials. The latter was regarded by the Republic as a
reinstatement of the former colonial power’s repressive laws and an
infringement on the UNO chapter covering support to a free political
institution. Supportive comments from high-ranking Australian
officials, including Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Herbert Vere
Evatt, were presented, indicating that Australia endorsed cooperation
with Indonesians who aspired to independence. Almost every one
of the booklet’s 36 pages was complemented with photographs of
prominent Indonesian and Australian leaders, political and military
events in Java, and pro-Republic popular support in Indonesia and
abroad.63 In addition to the previous recipients, copies of this booklet
were sent to all UNO members.64
The CENKIM’s propaganda was not aimed exclusively at the
Indonesians stranded in Australia because of the Japanese occupation,
whose number decreased gradually due to repatriation, but also at
Indonesians who had been in Australia since long before the Second
World War began. A small number of Indonesians had been working
as pearl divers on the northern coast of Western Australia. There
was also an Indonesian community in New Caledonia, a French
colony in the Pacific Ocean, the residents of which had since years
before the war had been employed as contract laborers and domestic

63
NL-HaNA, 2.10.17, inv. nmr. 842. A letter from S. van Hulst 12 September, 1947.
64
Molly Bondan, Spanning a Revolution, pp. 221-223.

279
workers. Reciprocal correspondence was established between the
CENKIM and these Indonesians, and the CENKIM regularly sent
them propaganda materials about Indonesian independence.65The
CENKIM was approached, moreover, by pro-Indonesian Dutch
individuals who had mastered propaganda techniques and had
wide international networks such as Joris Ivens, a renowned Dutch
filmmaker. According to Ivens’s biographer, Hans Schoots, the
US intelligence service the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
classified Ivens as a ‘dangerous Communist’, as he was a suspected
Soviet espionage agent and propagandist, especially in the field of
motion pictures.66 The film producer made documentary films in a
number of countries, including the US and China, and in the 1940’s
was based in Australia. He worked there as Film Commissioner for the
Indies government. He was once appointed by the Indies government
to produce a film entitled Rehabilitation of the Netherlands Indies,
but he refused to continue when he became aware that the Dutch
intended to restore the colonial government in Indonesia. Concerning
his refusal, he said, in comments later published by the Australian
press, ‘As an artist I decline to produce the film, which runs counter
to my principles and convictions’.67
Ivens was subsequently approached by the head of the
CENKIM, Mohammad Bondan, and he agreed to cooperate with the
Indonesians to help develop a film industry in Indonesia. In 1945-
1946 he made a black and white documentary film about Indonesia,
entitled Indonesia Calling. Produced secretly in Sydney to avoid
police surveillance, this film was shown successfully in Indonesia,
Australia and the United States. It portrayed the struggle Indonesian

65
Molly Bondan, Spanning a Revolution, pp. 218-219.
66
Hans Schoots, Living Dangerously: A Biography of Joris Ivens (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2000), p. 189.
67
‘Indonesia film made here showing in Java’, The Argus, 11 December, 1946.

280
seamen had faced in promoting Indonesian independence via their
strikes and marches in Australia’s harbors. Stories about this movie
spread to the Committees of Indonesian Independences (KIMs)
outside Australia, including the KIM in the United States, which
then planned to import the film. Liberal members of the Australian
parliament tried to ban it from export.68 According to an Australian
newspaper, the ban was based on the grounds that ‘it contained
propaganda against the Dutch’.69 The ban failed miserably: the export
permit was initially denied, but this decision was later annulled.70
The Indonesia Calling film was shown at the Stanley Theatre in
the famed theatre district of Broadway, New York, on 2 December,
1947. The screening was warmly welcomed by the US press, which
meant extensive publicity for pro-Republic nationalist activists
at one of the most popular art hubs in the US. The New York
Times, for instance, wrote, ‘Apparently a fragmentary report, the
offering presents nevertheless some interesting footage not yet
seen here publicly on a post-war crisis’. The Daily Worker, the
official publication of the Communist Party of the USA, described
the film as a ‘superb movie, with mature political understanding’.
Commentary in another US leftist newspaper, PM, was perhaps
the highest compliment and brightest spotlight the film received
in the US, which undoubtedly encouraged Americans to find
similarities between the Indonesians’ cause and their national ideal:
‘deeply moving, inspiring, and informative. It seems the Australian,
Chinese, Indian, and Indonesian workers took the Atlantic Charter
at its words’.71

68
‘Film by famous Dutch producer’, News, 2 August, 1947.
69
‘Indonesia film made here showing in Java’, The Argus, 11 December, 1946.
70
‘Screen here and abroad lawsuit holds up Mason: Plans’, The Mail, 16
August, 1947.
71
‘New York sees “Indonesia Calling” film’, The Sidney Morning Herald, 2
December, 1947.

281
 Copies of Indonesia Calling were transported successfully by
repatriated Indonesians. Pro-Republic newspapers in Indonesia
published the positive responses the film had garnered in Australia.
The movie itself, according to Merdeka newspaper, was dubbed
by Australian audiences ‘among the best documentary movies in
the world’.72 It was even said to have been of higher quality than
the more-well-known political documentary Spanish Earth, a film
made in 1937 (also by Ivens) about the anti-monarchists who tried
to establish the so-called Second Spanish Republic. The Indonesia
Calling movie was later shown several times in Yogyakarta, the
capital of the Republic. About this film, cinema scholars Khoo,
Smail and Yue wrote, ‘it is arguably Australia’s most noteworthy
and controversial film of the 1940’s’.73
Propaganda targeting the Australian government and people
was also spread by the Republican government and the Indonesian
press in Java. This can be seen in the case of the Indonesian
seamen’s strikes and in other supportive acts by Australians, and in
how the Republican government interpreted these. Starting on 21
September, 1945, Indonesians working on the Dutch ships harboring
in Australia were on strike. This was widely reported in Australian
newspapers, raising public awareness. Near the end of September,
it had become known that several Dutch-operated ships which were
transporting medicine and food for prisoners of war and internees
in Indonesia were in fact loaded with military goods, including rifles
and ammunition. This instigated the strike.74 Concerned that this
strike might encourage more Indonesians to leave the Dutch ships,

72
‘Film “Indonesia Calling”’, Merdeka, 30 October, 1946.
73
On Joris Ivens and his Indonesia Calling, see Mohamad Bondan,
Genderang Proklamasi di Luar Negeri, pp. 20-21 and pp. 116-117; Olivia Khoo,
Belinda Smaill, Audrey Yue, Transnational Australian Cinema: Ethics in the Asian
Diaspora (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), p.59.
74
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, p. 6.

282
the Dutch-backed Indonesian-language newspaper in Australia,
Penjoeloeh, launched Dutch counter-propaganda. It expressed the
concerns of the Indies officials in Australia and published a call to
stop the strike. The newspaper refuted the accusations about the
nature of the cargo and stressed the ships’ beneficial mission, not
just for the Dutch but also for Indonesians. It warned that such a
strike could delay the arrival of Dutch ships in Indonesia and would
lead only to ‘the deaths of thousands of people of many nationalities’
because the cargo ‘consisted of medicine, food, clothes and other
assistance for both Europeans and Indonesians, who suffered long
under Japanese suppression’.75 Penjoeloeh’s editor even suspected
that the mastermind behind this strike was not Indonesians, but
‘an Australian party’ (clearly referring to the Australian leftists who
supported the Republic), and that all matters related to Indonesia
should be resolved ‘between our government and us, the Indonesian
nation’, without involving third parties.76
The Indonesian government approved of the strike and
appreciated both the Indonesians and the Australians involved in it.
On 29 September, 1945, the government announced in the newspaper
that ‘The Republic of Indonesia happily welcomed the strike carried
out by Indonesian seamen in Australia as a refusal to take part in the
transportation of Dutch troops to reestablish the Dutch [East Indies]
government in Indonesia.’ The government also thanked Australian
laborers for their help related to the strike.77
Another appeal was made by Republican authorities and the
Indonesian press, this time focusing on the geographical proximity
between Indonesia and the countries in the Pacific Ocean, in particular

75
‘Akibat pemogokan’, Penjoeloeh, 27 September, 1945.
76
‘Pemogokan bangsa Indonesia di Australia’, Penjoeloeh, 4 October, 1945.
77
‘Pemogokan pelaoet kita disamboet oleh Pemerintah Republik Indonesia’,
Warta Indonesia, 29 September, 1945.

283
Australia and New Zealand. The Indonesian authorities viewed
Australia positively. Actions which they interpreted as support included
Australia’s act of returning Indonesians to Indonesia, an Australian
broadcast in which it was stated that Australia preferred to live with tens
of million of Indonesians rather than tens of former Dutch colonial
administrators, and the news that in several cities in Kalimantan,
Indonesians and Australians had cooperated in fighting the Dutch who
had tried to take control of the island.78 The KNI, on 26 November,
1945, announced publicly that the Indonesian authorities thanked the
Australian people and government, as well as the Australian laborers,
and ‘asked the Australian people and government to continue to
provide physical and spiritual support to the Indonesian nation
which was struggling to defend an independent country and which
harbored dreams of establishing the best possible relationship with the
surrounding countries in general and with Australia and New Zealand

78
Stories about good cooperation between Indonesians and Australians in
Kalimantan were Indonesian propagandists interpretation’s of the political situation
in Kalimantan after August, 1945. Unlike in Surabaya, relationship between pro-
Republic elements in Kalimantan and the Australian troops who were posted on the
island to disarm Japanese soldiers were relatively good. Australian troops arrived
in Kalimantan in October, 1945, and were welcomed by Indonesians sympathetic
to the Republic. There were no anti-Allies incidents in Kalimantan, whereas anti-
NICA actions immediately appeared among nationalist youth. The Australian
troops, according to Indonesians, acknowledged the existence of the Republic of
Indonesia in Kalimantan and were indifferent to the NICA. In one incident in
Pontianak, West Kalimantan, in October, 1945, the NICA told the city’s Chinese
population that the Republic was a continuation of the Japanese regime, which
meant that the Chinese would continue to suffer. This propaganda led to violence
between the Chinese and the natives. After a meeting between representatives of
both the Chinese and the natives, a peace agreement was reached. Indonesian
nationalists and Australian troops visited Pontianak City and surrounding areas
together to inform the population about the agreement. This implied that the
Dutch were provocateurs and trouble-makers, while Indonesian nationalists and
Australian troops were partners in freeing Kalimantan from Dutch provocation.
The story mentioned above and other similar stories were used by Indonesian
propagandists as evidence of cooperation between the Republic and Australian
troops in Kalimantan in fighting the Dutch. See Pasifikus Ahok, et. al., Sejarah
Revolusi Kemerdekaan (1945-1949) Daerah Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak: Kanwil
Depdikbud Provinsi Kalimantan Barat, 1992), pp. 44-52.

284
in particular’.79 The implication was that the stability of the region
required an independent and sovereign Indonesia.
Looking to the Pacific Ocean was relatively new for Indonesians,
having previously only had dealings with the Indian Ocean, the Arab
world and Europe, but the immediate support of the Australians had
led them to realize that they had a potential friend in the south. This
new way of thinking was reinforced in pro-Republic newspapers,
including Minggoean Merdeka. In an article in the newspaper, a writer
stressed that ‘even though Australia is small in terms of population,
I believe that Australia deserves the most fragrant name within our
nation’. He added that Australia ‘now becomes our friend, or in
Communist terms of friendship, our “comrade”’.80

The CENKIM’s International Propaganda

Living outside Indonesia carried an added benefit for
Indonesians sympathetic to and supportive of the Republic: it made
Indonesians more aware of international politics and allowed contact
with well-known figures and organizations abroad, backed by the
availability of advanced communication media. Just like the PKI of
Cairo, which sent letters to various countries throughout the world,
the CENKIM, as of January, 1946, took a similar path shortly after
the heaviest British bombardment in Surabaya. It sent telegrams
to such politically influential countries as the US, China, Russia,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as well as to small countries in Central
America, including Haiti and Guatemala. They subsequently sent a
telegram to the General Assembly of the UNO in London, asking
for the UNO’s support for Indonesian independence.81 It should

‘Resoloesi II. Terima kasih pada Australia’, Berita Repoeblik Indonesia, 1

79

December, 1945.
80
‘Australia dan perdjoeangan Indonesia’, Minggoean Merdeka, 22 June, 1946.
81
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, pp. 66-67

285
be stressed once again that the CENKIM was not a branch of the
Indonesian government.
A close relationship had been established between the CENKIM
and organizations with similar missions all over the globe. The
CENKIM had established contact with the American Committee for
Indonesian Independence, headquartered in New York and led by
Dirk Jan Struik, a Dutch Marxist and a lecturer of mathematics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.82 The CENKIM sent various
printed materials, mainly leaflets, covering recent events concerning
the Dutch-Indonesian conflict for the American Committee, which
in turn attempted to open the Indonesian question at the Security
Council of the UNO as ‘the longer the British, Dutch and Japanese
troops remain in Indonesia, the more of our people are killed for
imperialist greed as they take our homeland away from us’. The
American Committee also tried to mobilize public opinion in the
US, including toward the American press, which scarcely reported
on the conflict in Indonesia. The Committee believed that ‘only
mass pressure will achieve a correct American foreign policy
towards the Far East’. Apart from print materials like leaflets, the
American Committee requested that the CENKIM send them
copies of Merdeka newspaper, so as to gain more understand of the
occurrences in Indonesia from a firsthand source.83
The CENKIM also cooperated with the American Committee
branch in Los Angeles by supplying information about events
in Indonesia through letters, leaflets and other materials. This
cooperation was not only in the interests of Indonesian independence,
but also for the sake of Indonesian seamen who were in January, 1947,

82
R.S. Cohen (ed.), For Dirk Struik: Scientific, Historical and Political Essays
in Honor of Dirk J. Struik (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), pp. xiv-xvii.
83
Charles Bieden, American Committee for Indonesian Independence, to
Mohamad Bondan, Central Committee of Indonesian Independence in Brisbane,
7 May, 1946: ANRI, Mohammad Bondan 1945-1968, Nr. 285.

286
stranded in the US, possibly facing deportation. Following intensive
communication with the CENKIM, the committee requested that
the US government let these men remain. The committee organized
letters to the delegates of the UNO and members of Congress,
and drafted a plan for a mass demonstration in front of the Dutch
Consulate in Los Angeles.84
The CENKIM approached Fenner Brockway, the anti-war and
anti-colonialism leader of the British Independent Labor Party (ILP),
who was well-known in the UK for his sympathy to the independence
struggles of colonized nations in Asia. In one of its letters to Brockway
in early 1946, the CENKIM praised him highly for his vocal
support of Indonesian independence: ‘your name will always live in
Indonesia, and in the hearts of freedom-loving people everywhere’. In
order to provide Brockway with information and opinions from the
Indonesian side, the CENKIM enclosed a number of printed items,
including its Merdeka booklet, reprints of Indonesian newspapers,
and transcripts or synopses of Indonesian radio broadcasts. The
CENKIM dubbed the booklet ‘a small token of our esteem and very
sincere appreciation for all you have done’.85
Similar points of appeal and the same booklet were sent to the
British Centre Against Imperialism in London. This organization
devoted itself to ending colonialism and imperialism throughout
the world and was closely linked with the ILP and Brockway.86
Subsequently, the organizing secretary of the Centre, M. Ali, sent a

84
Ede Kemnitzer, Secretary of American Committee for Indonesian
Independence in Los Angeles to the CENKIM in Brisbane, 23 January 1947:
ANRI, Mohammad Bondan 1945-1968, Nr. 326.
85
Mohammad Bondan, Secretary of the CENKIM in Brisbane to Fenner
Brockway, Political Secretary of Independent Labor Party in London, 12 August,
1946: ANRI, Mohammad Bondan, 1945-1968, Nr. 342.
86
Mohammad Bondan, Secretary of the CENKIM in Brisbane to the
Organizing Secretary of British Centre against Imperialism in London, 12 August,
1946: ANRI, Mohammad Bondan, 1945-1968, Nr. 348.

287
letter to Tom Driberg, a British journalist who published regularly
in the British newspaper Reynolds and was a member of British
parliament representing the Labor Party. In his letter to Driberg, Ali
included the English language pro-Republic magazine, The Voice of
Free Indonesia. Ali referred in particular to articles on page 7 of the
magazine which described Indonesia’s export products and requested,
‘Will you kindly cause to reproduce the article in the Reynolds and
other papers, which will surely serve as valuable information for the
general public in this country’.87

The CENKIM and the Indonesian Authorities

With regard to pro-Republic propaganda in Australia, CENKIM
was affiliated to both the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Information (Kempen).88 The CENKIM informed
the Republic, particularly the ministry of foreign affairs, about the
contemporaneous Australian political landscape, and it gauged
Australia’s public opinion regarding Indonesian matters. In return, the
Kempen provided the CENKIM with printed propaganda materials
containing information about the political situation in Indonesia.

87
M. Ali, Organizing Committee of the British Centre Against Imperialism
to Tom Driberg, Member of Parliament, The House of Commons in London, 2
December, 1946: ANRI, Mohammad Bondan, 1945-1968, Nr. 348.
88
There were several efforts to establish connections between Indonesian
authorities and the CENKIM, in particular to deal with three main issues: 1)
repatriation-related matters, 2) the establishment of trade relations between
Indonesia and Australia, and 3) pro-Republic propaganda in Australia. In late
1945 and 1946, the CENKIM had twice attempted to establish contact with the
Indonesian authority in Jakarta, and later in 1946 in Yogyakarta, but without
response. It was only when Australia’s sympathetic acts became widely known in
Indonesia and when Australian businessmen began to seek trade opportunities
with Indonesian merchants that connection and cooperation were established
between the CENKIM and the Republican authorities. In Australia, the CENKIM
helped connect Australian businessmen seeking to export goods to Indonesia with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi,
pp. 118-119.

288
 In practice, however, the Republican government and the
committee were not equal partners. The Kempen, for instance,
instructed the CENKIM to put solid emphasis on specific issues
in Australia. One instance is about the progress of the negotiations
between Sjahrir and Van Mook about Indonesian authority in Java
and Sumatra and Dutch power outside these two islands. Minister
of Information Mohammad Natsir sent a booklet to the CENKIM
in which he stressed that the Dutch authorities lacked the good
intention to consider the Republic’s demand. What the Dutch
had done, according to the minister, constituted an ‘aggression’
intended to extend the areas they occupied, and could lead to a
colonial war. Natsir expected the CENKIM to emphasize this
‘actual situation’ in its propaganda activities. He told the CENKIM
that from an international perspective, the position of the Dutch
was unacceptable because the Dutch had violated the spirit of the
Atlantic Charter, which addressed the right of freedom of any
nation, claiming that they only wanted to negotiate based on ‘their
obsolete constitution, maintaining formality and closing their eyes
to all reality’.89
Cooperation between the CENKIM and the Kempen continued
when the Kempen asked the CENKIM to produce propaganda for
Australia. The Kempen asked for the CENKIM’s help in producing
27 copies of a phonograph record of the Indonesian national anthem,
the plan being distribute them to the RRI all over Indonesia.90 In
turn, the Kempen supplied the CENKIM with materials, including
propagandistic ones, from Indonesia, such as Indonesian currency,
stamps, and other printed materials. The CENKIM then distributed
these materials to committees of Indonesian independence all over the

89
Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, pp. 65, 72-76 and 139.
90
It was neither known whether the CENKIM managed to produce such a
phonograph record nor whether the record, if it ever existed, was eventually spread
to RRI branches. The main RRI office in Jakarta has no copy of this record.

289
world. The paper currency, a symbol of the economic independence of
Indonesia, was sent as far as London, Cairo, Bombay and New York.
In order to make the Indonesians in Australia, and the Australian
public in general, aware of the latest political situation in Indonesia,
the CENKIM disseminated copies of Indonesian newspapers.
The English-language Republican publication The Voice of Free
Indonesia was particularly preferred by the CENKIM, as it was
already in English.91

In Enemy Land: Perhimpunan Indonesia Campaign in the

Netherlands
The presence of people from the Indonesian archipelago in
the Netherlands could be traced back to the 17th Century, but an
increasing number of Indonesians came to the Netherlands at the
beginning of the 20th century when hundreds of Indonesian students
pursued higher education at the various universities and academies
in the Netherlands.92 A small but influential number of Indonesian
students in the first three decades of the 20th century propagated
Indonesian nationalism through nationalist organizations,
especially the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association,
PI).93 Several PI members returned to Indonesia after finishing

91
Yet, according to Bondan, its translation of Dutch terms was sometimes
incorrect. Bondan gave an example: an article in the magazine consisted of the
term ‘vol bloed’ (sic) (full blooded), which referred to a purebred Dutch person or
a ‘Belanda totok’. This term was inaccurately translated by the Indonesian author
into ‘full bloody’ (violent Dutch) instead of ‘full blooded’. Yet, this translation
perhaps indicated that a widespread negative sentiment toward the Dutch among
the Indonesians had unconsciously reproduced hatred against the Dutch in various
ways. See Mohamad Bondan, Genderang Proklamasi, p. 60 and 77-79.
92
See Harry Poeze et al., In het land van de overheerser: Indonesiërs in
Nederland (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986).
93
See John Ingleson, Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement,
1927-1934 (Singapore: ASAA-Heinemann, 1979).

290
their studies and, during the revolution, became the Republic of
Indonesia’s top leaders, including Vice President Mohammad
Hatta, who led the PI in 1926-1930. The rest remained in the
Netherlands and faced Nazi occupation, taking part in clandestine
anti-Nazi movements.
At the time, Indonesians in the Netherlands consisted of
noblemen, intellectuals, students and temporary domestic servants.94
They mainly joined religious and political organizations. After the
end of Nazi occupation in the Netherlands, the main organization for
intellectual Indonesians in the Netherlands remained the PI, whose
members were primarily nationalists and communists who had
established contact with various groups in Dutch society, especially
the Dutch communists.95
Indonesians in the Netherlands had been able to receive news
from Indonesia only with difficulty. According to Parlindoengan

94
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’ in Harry Poeze
et al., In het land van de overheerser, p. 334.
95
During Nazi occupation the PI cooperated with the independent left-
wing resistance paper Vrij Nederland (VN). This cooperation continued after the
occupation; one of PI’s leaders even became a weekly editor of the VN. See Inge
van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949’, p. 331. Membership in PI increased after the end
of World War 2 in May, 1945, both because of the popularity of PI as an anti-
Nazi underground force during the occupation and because the PI had coupons
for food distribution. Moreover, many Indonesians were now stranded in the
Netherlands and they had to cooperate with each other to stay alive. After the
Indonesian independence became widely known to Indonesians in the Netherlands
in October, 1945, many wanted to return home, but the Dutch government would
only repatriate them if they declared themselves citizens of the Indies. This
requirement, however, was refused by the Indonesians, so they could not return
home. See Parlindoengan Loebis, Orang Indonesia di Kamp Konsentrasi Nazi:
Otobiografi Parlindoengan Loebis (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2006), p. 248 and
251. Preventing Indonesians from returning home, especially the nationalists, was
actually a concern for the Dutch government. According to Parlindoengan Loebis,
then a PI member, Minister of the Colony J.H.A. Logemann once stated that
‘We are not stupid enough to return you all to Indonesia. With more intellectuals
there, their struggle would absolutely become stronger’. See Parlindoengan Loebis,
Orang Indonesia di Kamp Konsentrasi Nazi, p. 253. Only at the end of 1946 did
the Dutch government arrange to repatriate Indonesians to Indonesia.

291
Loebis, a PI member, the Indonesians were not convinced about the
reality of Indonesian independence until October, 1945. Moreover,
Indonesians were suspicious of the Dutch. Only specific persons were
trusted, such as the pro-independence Professor Willem Frederik
Wertheim, an expert on Southeast Asia who in 1936-1942 was a
lecturer at a law school in Batavia, and taught at the University of
Amsterdam from 1946. When he returned to the Netherlands at the
end of 1945, he told his Indonesian circle in the Netherlands about
the drastic changes in Indonesia compared to the situation before the
coming of the Japanese.96
When news of Indonesian independence reached the
Netherlands, these nationalists became the foremost pro-
independence propagandists there. Some challenges hindered rapid
spread of pro-independence sentiments, especially in the first months
of the revolution. Written communication between Indonesians
in the Netherlands and those in Australia, who by then were
internationally known for their contribution via strikes against Dutch
ships in Australia’s harbors, became increasingly difficult because
the Dutch censored letters from abroad if they were addressed to
Indonesian nationalist activists. Therefore the only plausible means
of getting letters and other printed materials from such countries as
Indonesia and Australia was by addressing them to Dutch persons
who supported the Indonesian national movement. In addition,
open meetings and mass rallies voicing support for the Republic were
forbidden in the Netherlands.
Inge van der Meulen states that public opinion among the Dutch
in the Netherlands in the spring of 1945 favored the restoration of
colonial administration but with necessary adaptations to the current

96
Parlindoengan Loebis, Orang Indonesia di Kamp Konsentrasi Nazi, pp.
249-250. See also Wim Wertheim and Hetty Wertheim-Gijse Weenink, Vier
Wendingen in Ons Bestaan: Indië Verloren, Indonesië Geboren (Breda: De
Geus, 1991), pp. 287-342.

292
situation, or in other words, ‘restoration and renewal’.97 This was
only partially accepted by many nationalist Indonesians, in particular
the PI. According to the PI, cooperation was necessary, but the
continuation of colonialism unacceptable. The PI had publicly
announced their vision about postwar Indonesia while the Dutch
celebrated their freedom from Nazi occupation on 5 May, 1945,
in Amsterdam. One of PI’s representatives, F. Harahap, was given
the opportunity to deliver a speech. By taking Dutch freedom as
inspiration, and referencing the involvement of Indonesians in the
anti-Nazi movement in the Netherlands, he requested that ‘the Dutch
people in the future also contribute to freeing Indonesia from its
ruler, and that in the future Indonesia and the Netherlands, just like
now, stand side by side’.98
The conservatism of the Dutch people’s ideas about Indonesia
was the PI’s main criticism. An anonymous author wrote in the PI’s
official mouthpiece, the Dutch-language magazine Indonesia, in July,
1945, that the root of such conservatism was because ‘the Netherlands
has a centuries-long colonial tradition’ and ‘the influence of pre-war
colonial propaganda is still strong’. As an example of this enduring
Dutch conservatism the author referred to a brochure in which
Indonesians were underrated and humiliated in typical colonial
wording. According to the PI Indonesians ‘like other peoples of the
world also dream of justice and independence.’99
The PI did not only use newspapers to disseminate their views; it
also organized political activities. Inge van der Meulen listed a number

97
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 331. Another
important book on the matter of how the Dutch viewed Indonesian independence
during the Second World War is Jennifer L. Foray, Visions of Empire in the Nazi-
Occupied Netherlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Here,
Foray examines how Nazi occupation brought impact to the rethinking of Dutch
colonial practices in Indonesia.
98
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 337-338.
99
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 337.

293
of meetings with high ranking Dutch officials, popular gatherings, and
celebrations, particularly during May, 1945, when the Netherlands was
finally liberated from the Nazis. In that month PI leaders met with the
Dutch Prime Minister, Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, and Interior Minister
Louis Joseph Maria Beel in Amsterdam. In Leiden, Indonesian
nationalist activists organized the commemoration of 20 May, the
day of birth of Boedi Oetomo (BO), an emancipatory organization
in Java, as ‘Indonesian national day’. A well-informed audience might
wonder at this since the BO aspired to the emancipation of Javanese
aristocrats rather than the political independence of the Dutch Indies’
native population. However, the majority of the politically-conscious
Indonesians in the Netherlands at the time were indeed aristocratic
Javanese. Nationalist slogans were displayed on banners, as were
excerpts from Queen Wilhelmina’s 7 December, 1942, speech
about the plan to hold a conference with representatives of the Dutch
colonies to discuss the creation of a Dutch commonwealth. Other
events included public meetings in Amsterdam and Den Haag, and art
nights in Amsterdam, Utrecht and Den Haag. On these occasions, PI
leaders delivered their speeches, concentrating on the importance of
the Netherlands to Indonesian people.100
The PI’s manifesto of August, 1945, reiterated its demand for
a discontinuation of colonial ties between the Netherlands and
Indonesia. The PI sought a new and better world in which the
independence and equality of all mankind must be core foundations.
It demanded a round-table conference at which representatives of
the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam, and Curacao would participate
in discussing the establishment of the commonwealth. The PI called
for solidarity among all Indonesians with its entreaty to Indonesian
organizations to form ‘an Indonesian national front’. In order to
ensure the purity of the new Indonesian leadership, and perhaps also

100
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 338.

294
to impress the anti-Japanese Dutch, the PI championed the complete
removal of all traces of Japanese fascism in Indonesia.
Continuing this line of thought, the PI’s Indonesia likened
Soekarno, Hatta and other Japanese collaborators with Wang Ching
Wei, a Chinese leader in mainland China who had cooperated with
the Japanese during the war. Mochtar, the author, acknowledged
that these Indonesian collaborators had been truly nationalist and
democratic, but had subsequently ‘deviated’ by becoming ‘Japanese
henchmen’. Mochtar also acknowledged, however, that at the
beginning of the Japanese occupation, cooperation with the Japanese
was unavoidable, even acceptable. He blamed the pre-war colonial
ties for preventing a close relationship between the ruled and the
ruler, a rift later successfully exploited by the Japanese.101
The PI halfheartedly welcomed the proclamation of Indonesian
independence. On one occasion they claimed:
During their occupation of Indonesia, the Japanese appointed Ir.
Soekarno as the chief of the advisory board for Java, thus making him a
suitable figure to become ‘president’ of a Japanese-inspired ‘independent
Indonesia’. Previously, at Japanese instigation, an Independence
Committee was established in Java. In this light and in the light of
Japanese capitulation, wanting to save their ‘honor’ with respect to the
Indonesians, it is no wonder that Soekarno’s action [to proclaim the
independence] is a continuation of his pro-Japanese politics during the
occupation.102

The PI’s harsh stance toward former Japanese collaborators

lasted less than one month. During late September and early October,

101
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 339. The
PI seemed to be connected to the wide spread anti-collaboration sentiment in the
Netherlands itself, directed against those who had collaborated with the Germans.
In this mood, they compared Sukarno to Mussert, the Dutch Nazi leader, and that
analogy was used to help them explain what was going on in Indonesia.
102
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 339.

295
1945, the PI received telegrams from Indonesian nationalists, likely
from the Committees of Independent Indonesia in Australia, the US,
and Egypt, which fundamentally changed the PI’s point of view. They
all declared their support to the Republic. For the PI, such telegrams
were a confirmation that despite the collaborationist background
of many Republican leaders, within two months they had garnered
wide-reaching support among other nationalists as well as from the
people at large. In Indonesia, published on 6 October, 1945, the PI
acknowledged that despite its anti-fascist stance, it realized that ‘it is
now clear that the authority of Soekarno is uncontested, and other
democratic groups stand behind him!’. In addition, the PI called on
the Dutch people to immediately make a decision about whether
to remain conservative and reactionary or to accept Soekarno’s
Republic. The Netherlands should take action soon, in particular
in realizing Queen Wilhelmina’s speech, or, ‘the Netherlands will,
perhaps forever, lose its opportunity’.103
The PI’s campaign focused its policy on three issues: 1) calling
upon Indonesians in the Netherlands to return home and take part
in the independence struggle, 2) stressing a preference for negotiation
over armed confrontation because it believed that comitting violence
against the supporters of independence would lead to retribution,
and 3) stating that British troops should be deployed to Indonesia
instead of Dutch troops, not just because this was the task Britain had
been assigned to after the war ended but also because the British had
very little vested interest in Indonesia as compared to the Dutch.104
The PI conducted propaganda meetings with various groups in the
Netherlands, such as Indonesians of Chinese descent and Indonesian
seamen working in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Toward the seamen,
the PI reviewed the latest developments in Indonesia and called on

103
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 340.
104
Parlindoengan Loebis, Orang Indonesia di Kamp Konsentrasi Nazi, p. 249.

296
them to refuse to work on ships bringing Dutch troops and weapons
to Indonesia.105

Propaganda of Vereniging Nederland-Indonesië

Another pro-Republican organization was the Vereniging
Nederland-Indonesië (The Netherlands-Indonesia Association,
VNI), established in August, 1945, and consisting primarily of
members of the PI’s and Dutch people symphatetic to Indonesian
independence. Membership included some of the PI’s main
members such as Suripno, Maruto Darusman, Sunito and Setiajit.
Among these was the member of Dutch Parliament for the Labour
Party (PvdA), Lambertus Nicodemus Palar, who later became an
Indonesian representative at the UN. Sympathetic Dutch members
included Professor J.P.B. Josselin de Jong from Leiden University
and former advisor for native affairs in the Indies, E. Gobée.
The main aim of the VNI was the liquidation of colonialism in
the Indies, based on the Dutch Queen’s speech in December, 1942,
on a vaguely formulated promise for more self-determination within
an imperial context. It also promoted a peaceful solution rather
than armed conflict. The VNI cooperated with the PI and various
other groups in Dutch society, including political parties and labor
unions. They disseminated their view through pamphlets in which
they promoted their organization as the one for progressive people,
in contrast with the conservatives who supported the continuation
of the colonial order.106 The VNI even sent representatives to
attend the World Federation of Democratic Youth congress held
by Czechoslovakian government. Despite various objections by
Dutch authorities, they arrived in Prague, where they were given the

105
Parlindoengan Loebis, Orang Indonesia di Kamp Konsentrasi Nazi, p. 254.
106
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 332.

297
opportunity to speak about the existence of the Republic and stress
their position as representatives of Indonesia. They spread their views
further through various talks with leading Czechoslovakian politicians
and newspaper editors they met during the congress.107
In October, 1945, the VNI sent an open letter to the Dutch
government, in which it expressed appreciation for the government’s
policies of equality and volunteerism regarding Indonesia. It
criticized, however, the government’s serious lack of commitment
in executing its promises. The VNI suggested four critical points to
be carried out at the time:
a. Appointing representatives from the national movement in Indonesia,
as well as representatives of other social groups, such as Indonesian
Chinese and Indo-Europeans, as members of the Indies Government,
b. With negotiation and with the help of Indonesians, reestablish authority
in Indonesia,
c. Stipulating that at the Round Table Conference to be held soon, the
nationalist movement be represented by democratic leaders that it
chooses,
d. Providing facilities to the PI delegation as the representative of the
nationalist democratic movement to fly to Indonesia within the coming
days, in order to observe the situation in Indonesia and make contact
with the leaders of the National Movement.108
The rise of Sjahrir, well-known for his refusal to collaborate
with the Japanese, as Indonesian Prime Minister in November,
1945, was warmly welcomed by the VNI as evidence of a democratic
Indonesia. The VNI therefore reminded the Netherlands to open
diplomatic talks with him soon. In a manifesto titled Aan het
Nederlandsche volk…Aan het Indonesische volk (To the Dutch
people…To the Indonesian people) dated 26 January, 1946, the

107
Parlindoengan Loebis, Orang Indonesia di Kamp Konsentrasi Nazi, pp.
257-259.
108
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 341-342.

298
VNI asked the Dutch government to avoid violence and to instead
negotiate with the Indonesian government. It too demanded an
unconditional acknowledgment of the right to self-determination of
the Indonesians. In return, it should also be ensured, it said, that
the current Indonesian authority was free from Japanese influence.
By adhering to these stipulations, a definite result could be expected
from the Round Table Conference. Copies of this manifesto, signed
by leading Dutch and Indonesian figures, were forwarded by the VNI
to the Dutch press.109
In April, 1946, the VNI started publishing a monthly magazine
De Brug-Djambatan (The Bridge), in which the idea of Dutch-
Indonesian cooperation was constantly reinforced. Headquartered
on Keizergracht, Amsterdam, this magazine was distributed both in
the Netherlands and in Indonesia.110 The picture on its cover was a
bridge connecting a typical European tree on one bank of a river to a
coconut tree from the tropical islands on the other (see picture 4.6.).
According to VNI chairman Josselin de Jong in his introduction in
the first edition of the magazine, his organization chose this picture
because it symbolized ‘a bridge between two countries, two peoples’.
These two peoples ‘have been connected for centuries’ but now the
connection was likely to be broken. The VNI called on all Dutch and
Indonesian people to together create ‘a new, reciprocal, treasured
bond of friendship and cooperation between the Netherlands and
Indonesia’ (nieuwe, beiderzijds gewenste band van vriendschap en
samenwerking tussen Nederland and Indonesië).111

109
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 353.
110
De Brug-Djambatan, 1st edition, 1st year, April, 1946.
111
De Brug-Djambatan, 1st edition, 1st year, April, 1946.

299
 Picture 4.6.
First edition of De Brug-Djambatan, the monthly magazine of VNI112

In connection to the VNI’s call for negotiation instead of violence,

one of the VNI’s most striking propaganda activities was a mass
gathering held in Markthallen, Amsterdam, on Saturday, 2 February,
1946. The VNI claimed that 20,000 attended. The Nieuwsblad van het
Noorden newspaper, circulated in the northeast of the Netherlands,

112
De Brug-Djambatan, 1st edition, 1st year, April, 1946.

300
reported positively that ‘There was great enthusiasm among the
attendees’.113 In his address, G.E. Poetiray from the PI entreated the
Dutch people, ‘who had to fight for five years for their freedom, and
now stand closer to the Indonesian people than ever’. Gerrit Jan van
Heuven Goedhart, the head of the VNI and former Minister of Justice
of the Dutch government-in-exile in London, as well as chief editor of
Het Parool, seconded Poetiray’s call in his speech. He believed that
mutual need and cooperation would end the conflict:
He, who says, “Indië lost, adversity born” cannot keep pace with the
tempo of this time. The Netherlands, without the power of a state [zonder
beinvloeding der staatsmacht] have built ports and transported goods all
over the world, simply because it is really good at this. Why should we
lose the Indies when we can give a price to the state power in the old
form? This way we can win friendship from all [Indonesian] people, who
understand that they could not live without western organization.114

The meeting resulted in several resolutions, including the

intention to solve the Dutch-Indonesian problem not with ‘armed
violence’ (gewapend geweld) but with ‘peaceful consultation’
(vreedzaam overleg) with the Sjahrir government, the recognition of
Indonesia’s right to self-determination, and voluntary cooperation
between the two countries. This was the only solution, according to
the VNI, which could avoid ‘a war between a people and another
people’. These resolutions were then sent by telegram to Premier
Schermerhorn, Minister of Overseas territories J.H.A. Logemann,
Van Mook and Sjahrir.115 The 2 February public gathering had
attracted such a great number of attendees that it was widely reported

113
‘Indonesische manifestatie: 20.000 menschen in de Amsterdamsche
Markthallen’, Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 4 February 1946.
114
‘Clark Kerr ontmoet Sjahrir: Amerika bij de besprekingen?’, De Tijd:
godsdienstig-staatkundig dagblad, 4 February 1946.
115
‘Clark Kerr ontmoet Sjahrir: Amerika bij de besprekingen?’; ‘Voor
zelfbestuur in Indonesië’, De Waarheid, 4 February, 1946.

301
in the Dutch media, which increased exposure and thus the chance
of more popular support for the Republic in the Netherlands. In
addition to radio broadcasts, the main Dutch newspapers, especially
the leftist ones such as Het Parool, Het Vrije Volk and De Waarheid,
also reported on the gathering.116
The VNI believed in the power of the masses to influence public
opinion and apply pressure to the Dutch government and parliament.
Less than one year after it managed to gather thousands of people
together in Amsterdam, it drafted a petition which was then signed
by more than ten times the number of people who had attended the
gathering. The petition, said to be signed by 233,408 people, was
drafted by activists from mixed backgrounds: the chairman of the
VNI Van Heuven Goedhart, secretary Riemens, and the Indonesian
vice chairman of the organization Soehito. It was sent to high-ranking
Dutch officials such as the premier, the Presidents of the Eerste
and Tweede Kamer (the houses of parliament), and the Minister of
Overseas Territories, and to the Dutch news service Aneta. This was
made shortly after the draft of Linggardjati Agreement was signed by
representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia on 15 November,
1946; in that agreement, the Netherlands acknowledged the de facto
authority of the Republic of Indonesia in Java, Sumatra and Madura.
Although the petition said nothing about the agreement, it, as before,
endorsed negotiations with the Republic.117

116
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 352.
Nevertheless, van der Meulen is doubtful that 20,000 was the correct number, as a
large number of entrance tickets were actually not sold. Yet she stresses that there
is no other assessment available with respect to the correct number of attendees.
117
It stated: ‘Undersigned wish an agreement with the equal Indonesia, in
which the essential elements of democracy are guaranteed and Indonesia’s wish of
freedom is satisfied. They request the government and people’s representatives to
take all measures which could lead to the making of an agreement, and immediately
urge a delegation of trusted men to be sent to Indonesia with full authority.’ See
‘Petitionnement’, Het Dagblad, 19 November, 1946.

302
Pro-Republic Dutch Figures: The Case of Frans Goedhart
The issue about how Indonesia should be reorganized after the
Second World War had been publicly discussed in the Netherlands
during the Nazi occupation. The discourse about the future of
Indonesia appeared most notably in one of leading resistance
newspapers during the occupation, Het Parool. According to his
biographer, the historian Madelon de Keizer, Frans Goedhart, founder
of this leftist newspaper, had campaigned since before the war for
maintaining a political relationship between the Netherlands and the
Dutch Indies under the Kingdom of the Netherlands. He reminded
the Dutch, however, that self-government was a requirement.118
When the Republic was declared and this became known in
the Netherlands, Goedhart’s view toward Indonesia was largely
influenced by his newspaper’s correspondent in Java, Jacques de
Kadt, who had been interned in a Japanese camp for civil internees
during the occupation. De Kadt himself had a good relationship
with Soetan Sjahrir, who guaranteed his safety after he was released
from the camp. De Kadt was apparently impressed by this socialist
politician who was not tainted by collaboration with the Japanese.
De Kadt believed that in the middle of the chaos during the bersiap
period Sjahrir had appeared to be a capable leader, well able to handle
the situation.119 His support to the revolution and the Republic of
Indonesia was seconded by Goedhart. When the socialist Partij van
de Arbeid (PvdA) was established in February, 1946, and he became
a member, Goedhart underlined that the party should make it its

118
Madelon de Keizer, Frans Goedhart: journalist en politicus (1904-1990),
een biografie (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2012), p. 169.
119
The Bersiap or ‘get ready’ period was the most violent phase for the Dutch
in the Revolution, lasting from August, 1945 to December, 1946. See William H.
Frederick, ‘The Killing of Dutch and Eurasians in Indonesia’s National Revolution
(1945-49): A “Brief” Genocide Reconsidered’, in Journal of Genocide Research,
Volume 14, Issue 3-4, 2012, pp. 359-380.

303
utmost concern the solution to the Dutch-Indonesian problem. He
also countered views widely spread in Dutch public opinion—in
particular through the press—which claimed that the Indonesians
were anti-Netherlands, that the Republic was made in Japan, and that
Java was in a state of extreme chaos.120
It was through Frans Goedhart and other Het Parool journalists
that constructive aspects of Indonesian nationalism were spread to the
Dutch public amidst the rife associations of Indonesian nationalism
and the Fascist Japanese. The proximity between Het Parool and the
Amsterdam-based weekly newspaper De Baanbreker enabled the
dissemination of a good image of the Republic, as represented by
one primary figure: Prime Minister Sjahrir.121 In December, 1945,
De Baanbreker published a picture of Sjahrir along with quotations
from his letters written from pre-war exile in Dutch Nieuw Guinea.
Sjahrir’s background as a former law student in Leiden (just like Frans
Goedhart), his socialist sentiments, and his anti-Japanese image, or in
short his extreme contrast with President Soekarno who was regarded
as a Japanese collaborator and anti-Western figure, strengthened
his image as someone with whom the Dutch could speak about the
future of Indonesia. Sjahrir was also well-connected to Dutch Prime
Minister Schermerhorn.
Still in December, 1945, a complete version of Sjahrir’s letters
from exile was published by De Bezige Bij, a publishing company in
Amsterdam founded in the anti-Nazi resistance. The PI reinforced
the positive image of Sjahrir by translating Sjahrir’s influential booklet,
Perdjoeangan Kita (Onze Strijd in the Dutch version) in cooperation
with Vrij Nederland122 into Dutch and publishing 9,000 copies . This

120
Madelon de Keizer, Frans Goedhart, p. 170.
121
Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Southeast
Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994), pp. 291-292.
122
During the German occupation of the Netherlands (1940-1945),the Vrij
Nederland (Free Netherlands) newspaper played an important role as one of

304
booklet apparently caught the Dutch public’s interest, as, in February,
1946, about 17,000 more copies were printed. According to Sjahrir’s
biographer, Rudolf Mrázek, 17,000 copies was ‘an unusually high
number for the time’.123
The Dutch public received Sjahrir’s thoughts with interest. A
reviewer named K.A.H. Midding, in Uitzicht on 5 and 13 February,
1946, praised Sjahrir when he claimed that Sjahrir could potentially
‘make the Indonesian people conscious of themselves, might lead the
Indonesians towards the position of equivalence with other peoples’.124
Meanwhile, another commentator, L. de Bourbon, in his article
‘Indonesische Overpeinzingen’, published in Vrij Nederland on 23
February, 1946, praised Sjahrir’s booklet as a piece written by a ‘very
talented man, who had studied and learned much’.125
Since 1946 Frans Goedhart had been a member of the Dutch
House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal) for
the PvdA party. In this capacity he promoted negotiation with the
Republic rather than armed action. When several Tweede Kamer
members urged the need to fight what they saw as Indonesian
nationalists pursuing totalitarianism (according to De Waarheid
newspaper, the parliament members thought that ‘De eisen van
de nationalisten zijn “totalitair”’), Goedhart countered by stressing

the leading resistance presses, along with the newspaper operated by the Dutch
Communist Party, De Waarheid (The Truth), and the newspaper published by
the Dutch Labour Party, Het Parool (The Password). Orthodox Christians had
published Vrij Nederland since 31 August, 1940. Its anti-Nazi ideas led the arrest
of its members by the Nazi police, the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police). See
Jeroen Dewulf, Spirit of Resistance: Dutch Clandestine Literature during the Nazi
Occupation (New York: Camden House, 2010), pp. 70-71. And, once again,
Jennifer Foray’s Visions of Empire.
123
Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir, p. 292.
124
Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir, p. 293. English translation of the Dutch quotation
is from Mrázek.
125
Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir, p. 293. English translation of the Dutch quotation
is from Mrázek.

305
that ‘overleg’ (consultation) should be used first. He criticized the
Dutch troops preparing to deploy to Indonesia as having no spirit of
consultation and being instead consumed by the idea of fighting the
Indonesians, as promoted by the Dutch Minister of War, Johannes
Meynen.126 He demanded more understanding from the Dutch people
as he saw that nationalism in Indonesia was ‘always underestimated’
and that the nationalists’ demands were ‘not unreasonable’.127 These
views, along with the debate in parliament about the Indonesian
question, were reported widely by the Dutch press in the Netherlands
and the Dutch-language press in Jakarta, extending the reach of the
views of these sympathetic Dutch.128 It was even reported as far as
Surinam, another Dutch colony.129
On 15 June, 1946, Goedhart flew to Indonesia as a reporter for
Het Parool with the mission to collect firsthand information about
what actually happened in Indonesia. He also intended to counter
the position taken by a majority in Dutch Parliament that Indonesia
would remain under the Kingdom of the Netherlands while a degree
of autonomy would be granted. This of course largely represented
the aspiration of colonial officials and not of the Indonesian
republican leadership, Goedhart’s interpretation of events in Jakarta
was reinforced by his contacts, mainly Republican officials, including
Premier Sjahrir and Minister of Information Natsir. He also spoke
with Dutch persons sympathetic to the Republic who in 1946 had
established a group called Progressieve Groep van Nederlanders,

126
‘Indonesië in de Tweede Kamer: reactie dreigt met “inmenging” in
regeringsbeleid’, De Waarheid, 16 January 1946.
127
‘Indië in de Kamer: slechte voorlichting gecritiseerd’, Het Dagblad: Uitgave
van de Nederlandsche Dagblaadpers te Batavia, 18 January, 1946.
128
‘Indië in de Tweede Kamer’, Het Nieuws: Algemeen Dagblaad, 17
January, 1946; ‘Indië in de Kamer’, Het Dagblaad: Uitgave van de Nederlandsche
Dagblaadpers te Batavia, 17 January, 1946.
129
‘Indië in de Tweede Kamer’, De West: Nieuwsblad uit en voor Suriname,
18 January, 1946; ‘Debatten over Indië’, Amigoe di Curacao, 18 January, 1946.

306
consisting mainly of pro-Republic Dutch officials and scholars,
including the well-known lecturer W.F. Wertheim.130
Goedhart’s presence in Java raised concern among the Dutch
authorities in Indonesia because of his leftist tendencies. Nevertheless
he was able to attend as a journalist a Dutch-initiated conference
which had invited representatives of East Indonesia to discuss the
formation of a federal state. This was the Malino Conference, in
South Sulawesi. He was one of two Dutch newspapermen there; the
other was L.F. Tymstra from the Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau
(ANP).131 On 2 August his interview with the representative of
Sulawesi, Nadjamoeddin, appeared in Het Parool.132 A shorter
version of the interview was later published in an Indonesian language
newspaper, Soember Penerangan, on 21 August, 1946. Goedhart’s
interview focused on Nadjamoeddin’s idea about the relationship
between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Nadjamoeddin, according
to Goedhart, preferred an alliance between the countries in which
matters were mutually handled and where both people’s position was
equal, ‘like friends’.133
According to De Keizer, upon his return to the Netherlands in
September, 1946, at a press conference at Schiphol Airport, Goedhart
emphasized the contrasting public opinions in Indonesia and in the
Netherlands. Whereas he saw willingness to cooperate in solving
the conflict among Indonesians, he could not find the same thing in
the Netherlands. He felt that two things he had observed during his
travels in Indonesia should be exploited by the Dutch in negotiating
their interests with the Indonesians. The first one was the Indonesian

130
Madelon de Keizer, Frans Goedhart, pp. 171-3.
131
‘Ratoe-ratoe doenia dikirim ke Malino’, Flores, 3 July, 1946.
132
Madelon de Keizer, Frans Goedhart, p. 173.
133
‘Perhoeboengan baroe dengan orang2 Indonesia’, Soember Penerangan,
21 August, 1946.

307
people’s love for the Netherlands and the second was their need of
the Dutch expertise.
He stated that the Republic was able to accept criticism. Goedhart
himself pointed at his own criticism of the strong influence of the
Japanese character on the Indonesian nationalist movement. According
to him the Republican official he talked to accepted this assessment.134
Frans Goedhart rewrote nine articles; under the pseudonym of
Pieter ‘t Hoen, he had published previously in Het Parool about his
experiences in Indonesia. He added new material to create a 126-page
book entitled Terug uit Djokja (Return from Yogyakarta), published
in January, 1947 (see picture 4.7.). According to De Keizer, the main
point of the book was to eliminate misunderstanding between the
Netherlands and Indonesian nationalists, in particular after the failure
of Hoge Veluwe conference in April, 1946, at which the Netherlands
had demanded that the Republic remain a part of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, a proposal definitively refused by the Republic. De
Keizer mentioned that there were several key issues which Goedhart
brought to the Dutch public which should have been considered by
the Dutch, including that Indonesian leaders such as Sjahrir, Hatta
and Sjarifoeddin had been able to coordinate the politics and had
avoided violent side effects of the revolution—and that establishing a
state under the Kingdom of the Netherlands was unrealistic.
Frans Goedhart convinced his fellow countrymen that the idea
that Indonesia was in complete chaos was totally false. He mentioned
a talk with several Dutch officials, who had been in Indonesia for
dozens of years, in Hotel des Indies in Dutch-occupied Jakarta.
They had expressed surprise hearing Goedhart’s plan to travel to the
Republic’s capital, Yogyakarta. That place for them was ‘the center of
the Republic, the fascist Republic, the castle of extremists and terrorists,
the Japanese accomplices, the robbers and arsonists, the white haters,

134
Madelon de Keizer, Frans Goedhart, pp. 180

308
who would push all Hollanders to the sea, if we let them go their
way’.135 They felt that a Dutchman who would go there must be ‘een
halve krankzinnige’ (half mad). But in Terug uit Djokja, Goedhart
refuted these claims. He told the readers that these Dutchmen were
simply ‘victims of delusions of an untrusted propaganda, which is not
only trying to intoxicate Batavia but the whole of the Netherlands’
(het slachtoffer van waanvoorstellingen van een onbetrouwbare
propaganda, die niet alleen Batavia, maar geheel Nederland heeft
pogen te vergiftigen). Goedhart saw that these people listened only
to stories spread by those whose contacts with the Republican side
took place on the battlefield, and were characterized by atrocities and
revenge. They, according to Goedhart, ‘had apparently never had
contact with Indonesian intellectuals’. Goedhart was sure that meeting
with these Indonesian intellectuals, who now ran the country, would
completely destroy the perception of the Republic as total mess. He
had met dozens of the Republic’s leaders, and he, in contrast to the
negative pictures about the Republic drawn by many Dutch people in
Java, saw them as ‘wise, reasonable and nice people’.136

135
See Pieter ‘t Hoen, Terug uit Djokja (Amsterdam: Uitgave stichting ‘Het
Parool’ Amsterdam, 1947), pp. 5.
136
Pieter ‘t Hoen, Terug uit Djokja, pp. 5-7.

309
 Picture 4.7.
Cover of Terug uit Djokja, by Frans Goedhart137

The book reached both the Dutch and the Indonesian public.
Goedhart sent 500 copies to the representative of the Progressieve
Groep in Jakarta and one copy to President Soekarno. The book

137
Pieter ‘t Hoen, Terug uit Djokja (Amsterdam: Uitgave stichting ‘Het
Parool’ Amsterdam, 1947).

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had a strong impact, which for Goedhart himself also had a negative
aspect. He received abusive letters full of insinuations and threats. He
felt that these critical voices equated him—with his unpopular claims
that the Republic-held territories were not in complete chaos—with a
Bolshevik, a fascist, even a traitor.138

Dutch Violence and Indonesian Students’ Propaganda

Late 1946 saw a significant decrease in the Indonesian
nationalists’ propaganda in the Netherlands due to the repatriation
of the majority of Indonesians to their homeland. One consequence
was the cessation of Indonesia magazine, whose contributors chose
to return home. Nationalist propaganda in the Netherlands arose
again in 1948, though, as it was led by the remaining PI activists.139
The Dutch decided to launch a second military offensive on 19
December, 1948. The action, known as Operatie Kraai or Operation
Crow, generated a sharp response from Indonesians, not only
in Indonesia but also in the Netherlands, who interpreted this as
irrefutable proof of Dutch wrongdoing in Indonesia. Associations
of Indonesians in the Netherlands in Amsterdam, Leiden and
Den Haag, under the leadership of the PI, established Gaboengan
Perkoempoelan Perkoempoelan Indonesia (The Association of
Indonesian Organizations, GPPI). In January, 1949, the GPPI held a
mass gathering, attended by 150 Indonesians, in Den Haag. Speakers
criticized the Dutch offensive in Indonesia, stating that Republic of

138
Madelon de Keizer, Frans Goedhart, pp. 180-1.
139
In addition to the Indonesian independence, one other thing that drew
the attention of most Indonesians in the Netherlands was their repatriation to
their homeland. As a response to the increasing demand from Indonesians in the
Netherlands to be returned to Indonesia after the war ended, the Dutch government
in October, 1946, promised a ship named Weltevreden to repatriate 900 Indonesians
and ‘de in Indië gowertelden’ (those rooted in the Indies, or those who felt a special
tie with the Indies). Almost all Indonesians welcomed and used this opportunity. See
Inge van der Meulen, ‘1945-1949: Geleidelijke verwijdering’, p. 360.

311
Indonesia had been ‘raped’. A resolution was taken pleading for
breaking off of all relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands.
A telegram was sent to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New
Delhi, where he was hosting an all-Asia conference. The message
stressed that ‘All Indonesian organizations in the Netherlands are
of the opinion that Dutch aggression has rendered every political
relationship within the Netherlands-Indonesian Union completely
unacceptable. May Asian solidarity be expressed at the conference in
New Delhi’. This point of view was also to be disseminated to the UN
and sympathetic countries.140
Some Indonesian students at Dutch universities responded to
the Dutch military operation by announcing in February, 1949, their
refusal to accept scholarships from the Dutch government. They
discontinued their studies in the Netherlands. This strike was made
public by the students and the pro-Republic Indonesian organizations,
in particular the GPPI and the sympathetic committee Hulp aan
Indonesië (Help for Indonesia). The striking students contacted the
press, and the Leidse Dagblad, a newspaper in Leiden, reported on
this strike in one edition. The committee Hulp aan Indonesië, in the
meantime, dubbed these students ‘Indonesian victims’ (Indonesische
slachtoffers), implying that they were the injured party and the Dutch
government was the perpetrator. It also called for material and moral
support from the people, including Dutch society. At one of its public
meetings, the GPPI announced that it had ‘great sympathy’ for the
students’ decision and announced its willingness to ‘grant all possible
help’ to them. It even called on its members to strike by taking no
courses at any university or academy in the Netherlands for a week,
starting on 18 February, 1949, ‘in order to give concrete form to

140
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14, inv. nmr. 2654. A letter from L. Einthoven, the Head
of the Central Security Service in Den Haag, to the Dutch Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Overseas Territories, entitled ‘Gaboengan
Perkoempoelan Perkoempoelan Indonesia (G.P.P.I).’, 11 Januray, 1949.

312
this expression of sympathy and in order to protest the still ongoing
colonial war waged by the Netherlands’. 141
Relationships among students and ideological closeness between
them seemed to have surpassed the limits of nationality. The Pericles,
a Dutch student organization with a leftist orientation, was approached
by the committee Hulp aan Indonesië, whose members were mainly
communists. The Amsterdam student organization Pericles then
announced their support for the strike undertaken by the Indonesian
students through an announcement in De Waarheid, the newspaper of
the Communistische Partij van Nederland (Dutch Communist Party,
CPN). Pericles stated that it supported a week-long strike of Indonesian
students and called on students in Amsterdam to ‘attend no lecture
this week’. It also tried to approach the University of Amsterdam’s
professors to ask them to cease giving lectures that week. It announced
various support stratagems, and called for financial contributions for
the Indonesian students. It further invited students to a meeting to
discuss this matter at Café De Kroon in Amsterdam.142
The largest propagandistic activity related to this was perhaps
the Indonesian Art Night held by the GPPI on 6 March, 1949, in
the building Amicitia in Den Haag. More than 350 people were in
attendance, including 70 Dutch people, a relatively large proportion.
Despite its title as an art night, the only art performances presented
were kroncong (a musical style combining Indonesian and Western
musical instruments) and Javanese dance; most of the occasion

NL-HaNA, 2.10.14, inv. nmr. 2654. A letter from L. Einthoven, the Head
141

of Central Security Service in Den Haag to Dutch Prime Minister, Minister of

Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Overseas Territories, entitled ‘Telegram G.P.P.I.’,
28 January, 1949.
142
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14, inv. nmr. 2654. A letter from J. Hazenberg on behalf
of the Head of Central Security Service in Den Haag to Dutch Prime Minister,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Overseas Territories, entitled ‘Stakende
Indonesische Studenten’, 22 February, 1949, including a copy of an article in De
Waarheid newspaper, entitled ‘Actie van “Pericles” voor Indonesische Studenten:
7 Dagen Staking aan Universiteit’, 19 February, 1949.

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was taken up by political messages which symbolized an ultimate
political rally to consolidate the opinions of Indonesian students all
over the Netherlands.
At this time, speeches were delivered which criticized the
Dutch military’s aggression. An Indonesian speaker, Zain Nasution,
called upon all attendees to sing ‘Indonesia Raya’ together. Another
speaker, Soenan Hamzah from the PI, called on the attendees to
dig deeply into their pockets to support the students. Sumabrata, a
student from Utrecht who had been involved in the strike, was the
most strident speaker. He condemned the Dutch military offensive
and accused the Dutch of violating the Linggardjati and Renville
Agreements and of continued colonial exploitation. In his words it
now was ‘impossible’ for Indonesians to trust the Dutch. Sumabrata
said that ‘the Dutch government has committed inhuman misdeeds
toward the Indonesian population’. He finally called for solidarity
among Indonesian students in the Netherlands, stressing that those
who did not take part in this action ‘shall bear the consequences in
the near future’ and would no longer be trusted. In other words,
inactive Indonesian students would be excluded from the Indonesian
communities in the Netherlands.143

Conclusion
Pro-Republic propaganda abroad was crucial to the existence of
the Republic of Indonesia in its efforts to garner essential support from
the international world. Moreover, it was important because it was
independently begun and carried out by nationalist Indonesians living
abroad, rather than strategically planned and extensively sponsored by
Republican authorities in Indonesia. These volunteers were basically

143
NL-HaNA, 2.10.14, inv. nmr. 2654. A letter from L. Einthoven, the Head
of Central Security Service in Den Haag to Dutch Minister of Overseas Territories,
entitled ‘Indonesische Kuntsavond van de G.P.P.I.’, 12 March, 1949.

314
on their own and had to provide for everything themselves. Financial
support from the Republican authorities was largely nonexistent
and the same applied to the provision of propaganda materials and
media professionals. Consequently, the propaganda to support the
new-born state abroad did not necessarily mean that the state backed
such efforts in any concrete way. Impromptu Indonesian propaganda
abroad was not under state control. Communications and relationships
developed between the Republic and the Indonesian nationalists
abroad, but they were not hierarchical and occurred intermittently.
Given these shortcomings, in the period of the struggle as a whole
the primary source of direction concerning propaganda was not
from the Republican authorities, but the self-initiative of the already
pro-independence Indonesians living in foreign countries, largely
backed by sympathetic opinion-makers in the respective countries,
particularly party heads (leftist parties in the case of Australia and
the Netherlands), leaders of worker organization, religious gurus,
progressive intellectuals and media editors. Some development is
evident, such as the propagandists’ effort to gain instructions from
the Republican leadership. This was, however, rare.
Pro-Republic propaganda abroad was determined by shared
ideals concerning Indonesian independence and a solidarity which
had flourished among the nationalist activists in Indonesia, the
Netherlands and the Arab world since long before the proclamation.
The Second World War in Europe and the Pacific War in Asia
became catalysts which strengthened this nationalistic view despite
the lack of communication caused by these wars. The Soekarno-
proclaimed Republic of Indonesia met with mixed reactions among
Indonesians abroad, from firm refusal by the Indonesian nationalists
in the Netherlands because of Soekarno’s collaborator background to
immediate support from the nationalists in Australia, who were able
to follow and understand the war situation in Indonesia more closely.
Intercontinental communication between these nationalists proved

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an effective way to ensure that the Republic obtained increasing
support abroad.
Political dynamics in Indonesia, the Netherlands, Australia and the
Arab world also contributed to the increasingly positive light in which
Indonesians abroad saw the Republic. In Australia, the Dutch act of
loading ships intended as bringers of humanitarian help to Indonesia
with weapons sparked severe opposition from the Indonesian wharf
workers, a situation immediately utilized by Indonesian nationalists
in the country to add weight to their opposition to a Dutch return to
Indonesia. Meanwhile, although Dutch society in the Netherlands
endorsed cooperation with the Indonesians to determine their postwar
future, the Dutch government was unwilling to share responsibility.
The Dutch parliament’s hesitancy at a time when popular backing
for the Republic was rampantly gathering speed (although the Dutch
government was even more prepared to negotiate than large parts
of the public were) triggered a radical change of opinion among
Indonesian nationalists in the PI, from anti-Soekarno to pro-
Soekarno and his declared Republic. In Egypt, existing anti-British
sentiment made the locals receptive to the Republic. Overall, one
can see by correlating the prevalent public opinions in each country
that pro-Republic propaganda abroad succeeded, to a large extent,
in raising international awareness, understanding, and recognition of
and sympathy for the Republic and its supporters.
Republican authorities neither initiated nor financially backed
Indonesian propaganda abroad, due to many hampering factors, so
it was remarkable that it was so successful. The Dutch, meanwhile,
prevented the Republic from finding much support abroad in any way
they could, employing sea blockades, monopolizing communications,
even resorting to searches and confiscation. The Dutch wanted to
create the impression that what happened in Indonesia was a Dutch
internal affair which they would be able to solve without involving
foreign countries. Through pro-Republic propaganda abroad, carried

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out voluntarily by Indonesian nationalists, the Republic, despite
its extremely limited role, managed nonetheless to overcome this
obstacle and to garner international support.
The impact of this support is tremendous as it changed attitudes
abroad. In the beginning of the struggle, there was a belief outside
Indonesia that the Republic of Indonesia was identical with the
Japanese collaborators, as depicted in Dutch propaganda. With the
intensification of pro-Republic propaganda abroad, there appeared
within several months various supportive speeches, written works, and
actions by foreigners as well as Indonesians overseas. In Indonesia,
such international support boosted the confidence of the Republican
leadership and other nationalists (e.g., journalists) as they believed
that their struggle were now internationally backed. This can be seen
from a variety of references to international support to the Republic
in, among others, Republican leaders’ addresses and newspapers’
articles. In a short period of time, propaganda abroad turned the
barely-known ‘Indonesian people’ into ‘the Republic of Indonesia’,
and their aspiration to be independent became well-known, gaining
support among foreign populations, political bodies and politicians,
and the mass media.

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