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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment delivered on: 05.08.2025

+ CS(COMM) 549/2021
VINAY KUMAR DATT .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sandeep Bajaj, Mr. Soayib
Qureshi and Mr. Rishabh Dua, Advs.
versus
SHRI SUDHIR SACHDEVA & ORS. .....Defendants
Through: Mr. Hemant Chaudhri and Ms.
Ranjan Vyas, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT

I.A. 15508/2022 (under Order XIII-A of the Commercial Courts Act

and/or under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC for
dismissal of the suit)

1. The present application has been filed by the defendants under Order
XIII-A read with Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
2. The brief facts as noted from the amended plaint are that the plaintiff
no.l is a senior citizen and landlord of the property being 29, South Patel
Nagar, New Delhi – 110008 [hereinafter, ‗suit premises‘]. It is averred in
the plaint that father of the plaintiff no.1 had let out the suit premises to late
Trilok Nath Sachdeva and Surendra Kumar Sachdeva vide lease agreement
dated 10.12.1968 on a monthly rent of Rs.1450/-.
3. It is further averred that the said premises was let out for the purpose
of running a college. It is the case of the plaintiffs that since May 2020 the

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 defendant no.1 has failed to pay the rent. Thus, the arrears of rent as on date
of filing of the present suit comes to Rs.14,99,994/-.
4. It is stated that when the suit premises was let out to the defendants, it
was without unauthorized construction, encroachment and alteration.
However, the defendants have altered the suit premises without intimation to
the plaintiffs. Resultantly, L&DO had marked and recorded the
misuse/unauthorized construction and claimed dues payable from the
plaintiffs.
5. In order to save the suit premises, the plaintiffs cleared the
outstanding dues payable to L&DO to the tune of Rs.1,17,93,538/-.
Therefore, it is averred that the defendants are liable to pay the said charges
to the plaintiffs.
6. It is because of the aforesaid disputes which have arisen between the
plaintiffs and the defendants, the plaintiffs have filed the present suit seeking
eviction and possession of the suit premises; arrears of rent amounting to
Rs.14,99,994/-; amount of Rs.1,17,93,538/- towards unpaid L&DO charges;
permanent injunction restraining the defendants from creating any third
party interest in the suit premises and mesne profits @ Rs.10,000/- per day
towards unauthorized occupation by the defendants qua the suit premises, or
in the alternative direction to the defendants to pay enhanced rent @ Rs.
4,00,000/-per month.
7. During pendency of the present suit, the defendants have filed the
present application seeking following reliefs:
“a. Pass a summary judgment in favour of the Defendants and against

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 the Plaintiffs thereby dismissing the suit; and / or
b. Pass a judgment thereby rejecting the Plaint as being barred under
law.”
8. As set out in the application, the defendants have stated the following
facts to show that the plaintiffs have no real prospect of succeeding on the
claim made in the suit:
i. The plaintiffs have not paid the requisite court fee and not
properly valued the suit;
ii. There is no valuation of the suit for the purpose of possession
and eviction;
iii. The dispute does not come within the definition of commercial
dispute as contemplated under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 [hereinafter, ‗the Act‘];
iv. Suit is liable to be dismissed being barred under the provisions
of Delhi Rent Control Act,1958 [hereinafter, ‗DRC Act‘];
v. Entire amended plaint contains vague and legally untenable
pleadings and lacks material particulars; and
vi. In para 25 of the amended plaint, though the plaintiffs assert
that they have given details of amount recoverable from the
defendants in Schedule A attached to the plaint, however, in the
entire pleadings and documents supplied by the plaintiffs, the
defendants have not come across any such Schedule, therefore,
the amount claimed is not ascertainable as required under Order
VII Rule 2 CPC.
9. Mr. Hemant Chaudhri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
defendants submits that as per the provision of Section 7 of the Courts-Fees
Act, 1870 [hereinafter ‗Court-Fees Act‘] the value of the relief for the
purpose of recovery of possession from a tenant is the amount of rent of the
immovable property to which the suit refers payable for the year next before

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 the date of presenting the plaint. In the present case, no valuation for the
purpose of possession and eviction has been stated in the amended plaint.
Accordingly, no court fee has been paid thereupon.
10. He submits that the dispute involved is not a commercial dispute as
the suit premises was a residential property at the time it was let out and it is
the case of the plaintiffs themselves that a portion of the suit property is
being occupied by the family members of the plaintiffs for their residence
and the plaintiffs also wish to reside in the suit premises alongwith their
family members. Reliance in this regard has been placed on decision of this
Court in Soni Dave & Ors. v. Trans Asian Industries Expositions Pvt. Ltd.,
AIR 2016 Delhi 186.
11. He further places reliance on decision of the High Court of Calcutta in
Sri Sandip Bazaz HUF v. Armstrong Investment Private Limited, C.O. No.
765/2021, to contend that the disputes arising out of refusal to comply with
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 [hereinafter, ‗Act of
1882‘] do not come under the purview of the Act. He submits that the said
decision of High Court of Calcutta was challenged by one of the respondents
therein by preferring SLP (C) No. 11418/2021 titled as Armstrong
Investment Private Limited v. Sri Sandip Bazaz HUF, which was
eventually withdrawn, therefore, the view of High Court of Calcutta has
remained undisturbed.
12. He submits that as averred in the plaint, the suit premises had been
initially let out at a monthly rent of Rs.1450/-, which as per the plaintiffs,
was enhanced to Rs.2000/- per month in the year 1990. There is no written

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 agreement, document or any other proof to substantiate the assertion of the
plaintiffs that the current rent of the suit premises is Rs.1,66,666/- per
month, therefore, tenancy of the defendant no.1 is protected under the
provisions of DRC Act, and the suit is liable to be dismissed.
13. He submits that the entire amended plaint contains vague and
untenable pleadings and also lacks material particulars because of the
following reasons:
i. In paras 1 and 2A of the amended plaint, the plaintiffs have
asserted that the plaintiff no. l is the landlord of the suit premises
and the same had been let out to the defendant no.1 for the
purpose of running the college, whereas, in para 9 of the plaint,
the plaintiffs assert that what had been let out to the defendants
was 4 bedrooms, 1 dinning and drawing hall, basement, kitchen,
pantry, 3 WC‘s and bath, combined verandah on front and back
excluding garage and annexe;
ii. In paras 10 and 11 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have averred that the
defendants have altered the suit premises and committed misuse /
unauthorized construction / encroachment on the government
land. However, no specification of the alleged misuse /
unauthorized constructions / encroachment has been given;
iii. There is no specification as to how much and which portion/floor
of the suit premises is under the occupation of the defendants;
14. Per contra, Mr. Sandeep Bajaj, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of plaintiffs submits that the defendants have failed to establish that their

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 case falls within either Order XIII-A CPC for passing of summary judgment
or under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
15. He submits that the plaintiffs have valued the reliefs properly and
have paid the requisite court fee with respect to prayer (i) and (ii), which is
for eviction and possession.
16. He submits that the present dispute is a commercial dispute and
comes within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act, inasmuch as,
the suit premises is admittedly being used by the defendants for running a
college, which demonstrates that the premises is being used for commercial
exploitation. He submits that only test which is required to be satisfied is
whether the immovable property is being utilized for the purposes of trade
or commerce. He further submits that it is not the case of defendants that the
suit premises has not been put to commercial use, rather from the time of its
possession, the defendants have used the suit premises for commercial use.
This is clear from the contents of the lease agreement dated 10.12.1968
which states that the suit premises would be used for the purpose of running
a college and publication. Thus, the suit premises is admittedly being used to
run a college.
17. In respect of defendants/applicants‘ submission that the suit is barred
under the provisions of DRC Act, Mr. Bajaj submits that rent of the
premises admittedly exceeds the upper limit set forth for applicability of said
Act. He invites attention of the Court to an order dated 21.09.2022 passed in
this case, where defendants‘ counsel has admitted that the rent being paid by
the defendants to the plaintiff was to the tune of Rs. 1,66,666/. He submits

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 that the bank statements and the TDS certificates which have been placed on
record as additional documents by the plaintiffs clearly reflects that the
defendants had been paying rent until April, 2020.
18. He submits that the plaintiffs have relied upon L&DO report which
clearly specifies the location and details of the illegal alterations /
unauthorized construction on the suit premises. Further, it is submitted that
the lease deed clearly states that only the ground floor of the suit premises
was leased out to the defendants, whereas the family members of the
plaintiffs were residing on the first floor. Therefore, it is clearly evident
from the lease deed about the details of the portion of the ground floor
which was under the occupation of the defendants for which the plaintiffs
are seeking a decree of eviction and possession. Further, from the site plan
filed with the plaint, it is evident that the suit premises is the ground floor of
the property. He thus, contends that there are valid and substantial pleadings
in the plaint along with evidence to support the case of the plaintiffs with a
real prospect of successfully defending the objections.
19. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through
material on record.
20. There is an apparent contradiction in the application. On one hand, the
applicants/defendants are praying for summary judgment in terms of Order
XIII-A CPC, as applicable to the commercial disputes, whereas on the other
hand, an objection has been taken that the dispute which is subject matter of
the suit is not a ‗commercial dispute‘ within the meaning of Section
2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act. Therefore, to resolve the conundrum, at the outset it

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 would be apposite to deal with the controversy as to whether the dispute
involved in the present suit is a commercial dispute or not.
21. In support of the contention that the dispute involved in the present
suit is not a ‗commercial dispute‘, the applicants / defendants have placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in Soni Dave and Ors.1 (supra). A
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the said decision has observed that where
property‘s prescribed user as per law is residential even if it is let out for use
exclusively in trade or commerce, or when without being so let out, it is
used exclusively in trade or commerce, the same would still not qualify as
an immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act. The reasoning given by the Court
behind such an observation was that the legislature could not have intended
to bring disputes arising out of the transaction relating to immoveable
property illegally used exclusively in trade or commerce, within the ambit of
commercial disputes.
22. Notably, the Division Bench of this Court in a subsequent decision in
Jagmohan Behl vs. State Bank of Indore, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 107062,
while interpreting Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act, held that immoveable
property must be used exclusively for trade or business and it is not material
whether renting of immoveable property was the trade or business activity
carried on by the landlord. Use of the property as for trade and business is
determinative. The relevant excerpts from the decision reads thus:

1
Decided on 19.07.2016.
2
Decided on 22.09.2017.

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 “11. Clause (c) defines the “commercial dispute” in the Act to
mean a dispute arising out of different sub-clauses. The expression
“arising out of” in the context of clause (vii) refers to an agreement
in relation to an immoveable property. The expressions “arising out
of” and “in relation to immoveable property”1 have to be given
their natural and general contours. These are wide and expansive
expressions and are not to be given a narrow and restricted
meaning. The expressions would include all matters relating to all
agreements in connection with immoveable properties. The
immoveable property should form the dominant purpose of the
agreement out of which the dispute arises. There is another
significant stipulation in clause (vii) relating to immoveable
property, i.e., the property should be used exclusively in trade or
commerce. The natural and grammatical meaning of clause (vii)
is that all disputes arising out of agreements relating to
immoveable property when the immoveable property is exclusively
used for trade and commerce would qualify as a commercial
dispute. The immoveable property must be used exclusively for
trade or business and it is not material whether renting of
immoveable property was the trade or business activity carried on
by the landlord. Use of the property as for trade and business is
determinative. Properties which are not exclusively used for trade
or commerce would be excluded.
12. The explanation stipulates that a commercial dispute shall not
cease to be a commercial dispute merely because it involves
recovery of immoveable property, or is for realisation of money out
of immoveable property given as security or involves any other
relief pertaining to immoveable property, and would be a
commercial dispute as defined in sub-clause (vii) to clause (c). The
expression “shall not cease”, it could be asserted, has been used so
as to not unnecessarily expand the ambit and scope of sub-clause
(vii) to clause (c), albeit it is a clarificatory in nature. The
expression seeks to clarify that the immoveable property should be
exclusively used in trade or commerce, and when the said
condition is satisfied, disputes arising out of agreements relating
to immoveable property involving action for recovery of

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 immoveable property, realization of money out of immoveable
property given as security or any other relief pertaining to
immoveable property would be a commercial dispute. The
expression “any other relief pertaining to immoveable property” is
significant and wide. The contours are broad and should not be
made otiose while reading the explanation and sub-clause (vii) to
clause (c) which defines the expression “commercial dispute”. Any
other interpretation would make the expression “any other relief
pertaining to immoveable property” exclusively used in trade or
commerce as nugatory and redundant.
13. Harmonious reading of the explanation with sub-clause (vii)
to clause (c) would include all disputes arising out of agreements
relating to immoveable property when used exclusively for trade
and commerce, be it an action for recovery of immoveable
property or realization of money given in the form of security or
any other relief pertaining to immoveable property.
14. In the context of the present case, it is not disputed that the
immoveable property was being used exclusively in trade and
commerce. The said issue does not arise for consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Thereafter, Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises
Ltd. vs. K. S. Infraspace LLP and Anr., (2020) 15 SCC 585, in unequivocal
terms held as under:
“37. A dispute relating to immovable property per se may not be a
commercial dispute. But it becomes a commercial dispute, if it falls
under sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act viz. “the
agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in
trade or commerce”. The words “used exclusively in trade or
commerce” are to be interpreted purposefully. The word “used”
denotes “actually used” and it cannot be either “ready for use” or
“likely to be used” or “to be used”. It should be “actually used”.
Such a wide interpretation would defeat the objects of the Act and
the fast tracking procedure discussed above.”

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 (emphasis supplied)
24. Reference in this regard may advantageously be had to yet another
decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Brij Mohan Sarna v. Sushma
Chawla, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5718, wherein it was observed that the
nature of property, whether residential or commercial, is not relevant for
deciding that the dispute fall within the definition of ―commercial dispute‖.
For the purpose of determining whether the dispute falls within the
definition of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act, the requirement is that the
immoveable property is exclusively used in trade or commerce. The relevant
portion of the decision reads as under:
“5. Mr. Dutt, on the issue that the suit is not a commercial suit as
the suit property is a residential property, and even otherwise even
if the suit property is situated in a mixed land use, without there
being conversion charges, the nature of property continues to be
residential, and usage according to the respondent is commercial
still the same being a contrary law, shall not fall within the
definition of “Commercial dispute” defined under Section 2 (1)
(c) (vii) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 („The Act of 2015‟, for
short). In support of this submission, Mr. Dutt has relied upon the
judgment in the case of Mrs. Soni Dave v. Trans Asian Industries
Expositions Pvt. Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4282.
6. We are not impressed by the said submission of Mr. Dutt for the
reason that, Section 2 (1) (c) (vii) clearly contemplates that,
commercial dispute means a dispute arising out of agreement
relating to immovable property being used exclusively in trade or
commerce. The finding of the Commercial Court, in this regard is
in paragraph 9 of the impugned order, which we reproduce as
under:—
xxxx xxxx xxxx

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 7. For the purpose of determining whether the dispute falls within
the definition of Section 2 (1) (c) (vii) of the Act of 2015, the
requirement is that the immoveable property is exclusively used in
trade or commerce. The relevant evidence placed on record; do
indicate that the suit property is exclusively being used for
commercial purpose, as the appellant is running a shop in the
name and style of M/s. Pawan Motors. No evidence has been
placed by the appellant to show otherwise.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Likewise, a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Jairaj Developers LLP
through its partner Mr. Ankur Arora v. Mrs. Fauzia Sultana & Anr.,
[Date of Decision 08.02.2023 in CS(COMM) 543/2020], held that the fact
whether the immoveable property is used or utilized for the purposes of
trade or commerce would be the correct test to apply while answering the
question whether the dispute is a ‗commercial dispute‘. The relevant
excerpts from the decision are as under:
“6. Both Bucon and Toshiaki hold that Section 2(1)(c)(vii) cannot
be conferred a restricted meaning and merely because an
immoveable property may form subject matter of a suit, that in itself
would not be sufficient to hold that it does not relate to a
commercial dispute. As was noted in those decisions, if clause (vii)
were to be interpreted otherwise, it would remove from its ambit
disputes that may arise from large scale construction contracts or
development projects that may be undertaken over immoveable
property. What needs to be emphasized is that the test of whether
the subject matter of a suit constitutes a commercial dispute
cannot be answered in the negative merely because the
immoveable property is residential, a submission which was
advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. It must also be
borne in mind that clause (vii) reads as “agreements relating to
immoveable property used exclusively in trade or commerce.” It is
thus manifest that disputes arising out of agreements relating to

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 immoveable property are not per se excluded from the ambit of the
2015 Act. In the considered opinion of this Court, the fact whether
the immoveable property is used or utilized for the purposes of
trade or commerce would be the correct test to apply while
answering the question whether the suit falls within the scope of
clause (vii). The Court would thus be called upon to consider
whether the dispute pertains to immoveable property which is used
for commercial or trade purposes.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. In view of the above enunciation of law, it is no more res integra that
it is the actual user, rather legally permissible user, of immovable property
which will be the determining factor for ascertaining whether it is a
commercial dispute or not.
27. A conjoint reading of plaint and written statement suggests that the
suit premises was let out for commercial purpose, and even at the time of
filing of present suit, it was being used by defendants for the purpose of
running the college. In the plaint, plaintiffs have averred to the effect that
defendant no.1 to the knowledge of the plaintiffs is running a college at the
suit premises through defendant nos. 2 and 3. Likewise, defendants in their
written statement have also taken a categorical stand that the suit premises
was given by the plaintiffs to the defendants for running a college to impart
coaching to students aspiring to clear various competitive examinations.
Moreover, the resolution filed by the defendants with the written statement
to institute or defend the suit, is on the letter head of defendant no.3 i.e.
Sachdeva College Limited, which fortifies the position that the suit premises
was being used for commercial purpose.

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 28. Besides that, defendants in unequivocally terms have stated in the
written statement that suit premises which is situated on the main road has
already been declared as mixed land use/commercial road.
29. The relevant excerpts from the written statement are reproduced
herein-below for ready reference:
“8. That the correct facts of the case are as under:
i. That a portion of the suit premises i.e. property bearing No.29,
South Patel Nagar, New Delhi had been let out by the father of
the Plaintiff No.1 to the predecessors in interest of the Defendant
No.1 at a monthly rent of Rs.1,450 for running a College by
giving coaching to students aspiring to clear various competitive
exams.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
iv. That the premises is situated on a Main Road around 60
meters wide and the entire Road has already been declared a
mixed land use /commercial Road by the MCD (Municipal
Corporation of Delhi) I Government Authorities and therefore
there was no question of any penalty being levied for use of the
suit premises for Commercial purposes. In the immediate
adjoining row of houses, various commercial buildings are
legally operating. Earlier also the L&DO vide a notification
office order had permitted running of teaching/ coaching classes
in the suit premises. As such, running of the College for
coaching classes, was permissible and could not be treated as a
breach by the L&DO.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. The expression used by the defendants in the written statement that
„entire road has already been declared as mixed land use/commercial road
by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi/Government Authorities‟ and „in the
immediate adjoining row of houses, various commercial buildings are

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 legally operating‟ indubitably suggests that even legally prescribed user of
suit property was commercial at the time of filing of the suit.
31. The above discussion leaves no manner doubt that present is a case of
‗commercial dispute‘ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act.
32. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Chaudhri on decision in Sri Sandip
Bazaz HUF (supra). In the said decision the High Court of Calcutta has
held that dispute arising out of refusal of lessee to comply with notice issued
by lessor under Section 106 of the Act of 1882, does not have direct nexus
with the lease agreements in respect of the immovable property, therefore,
the precondition of the applicability of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act, that
is, the emanation of the dispute is out of the lease agreement, is not satisfied.
33. The reliance placed on Sri Sandip Bazaz HUF (supra) is misplaced
since the controversy in the present case arises out of a lease, which in not in
dispute. The lease could either be oral or in writing. The expression
‗agreements‘ in Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act would also include oral
agreements. Further, in Jagmohan Behl (supra), a Division Bench of this
Court has held that explanation3 to Section 2(1)(c) of the Act stipulates that
a commercial dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute merely
because it involves recovery of immovable property. The Division Bench
further observed as under:

3
Explanation.––A commercial dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute merely because—
(a) it also involves action for recovery of immovable property or for realisation of monies out of
immovable property given as security or involves any other relief pertaining to immovable
property;
(b) one of the contracting parties is the State or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or a private
body carrying out public functions;

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 “13. Harmonious reading of the explanation with sub-clause
(vii) to clause (c) would include all disputes arising out of
agreements relating to immoveable property when used
exclusively for trade and commerce, be it an action for recovery
of immoveable property or realization of money given in the
form of security or any other relief pertaining to immoveable
property.”
xxx xxx xxx
“18…. Noticeably, sub-clause (vii) to clause (c) in Section 2 of
the Act does not qualify the word “agreements” as referring to
only written agreements. It would include oral agreements as
well. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act deal with the
effect of non-payment of rent, effect of holding over and most
importantly the determination of the leases or their termination.
It cannot be disputed that action for recovery of immoveable
property would be covered under sub-clause (vii) to clause (c)
when the immoveable property is exclusively used in trade or
commerce……..”

(emphasis supplied)

34. Insofar as the defendants‘ prayer for passing a summary judgment in

their favour is concerned, the same is predicated on various grounds
mentioned in para 2 of the application. However, such grounds as noted in
para 8 above make amply clear that the same are, in fact, the grounds
available for seeking rejection of plaint in terms of Order VII Rule 11 CPC,
and not for seeking summary judgment. For passing a summary judgment
the application must meet the twin test laid down in Order XIII-A Rule 3 of
CPC which provides that the Court may give a summary judgment against
the plaintiff or defendant on a claim if it considers that– (a) the plaintiff has
no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or the defendant has no real

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 prospect of successfully defending the claim, as the case may be, and; (b)
there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of
before recording of oral evidence.
35. The defendants in the application have though averred that the
plaintiffs have no real prospect of succeeding on the claim for the reasons
enumerated in para 2 of the application, but it has not been spelt out in the
application that there is no other compelling reason why claim should not be
disposed of before recording of oral evidence. Neither in the application nor
during the course of arguments defendants have elaborated as to why the
suit should be disposed of without recording of oral evidence, rather from
the perusal of pleadings it appears that the disputed questions of fact are
involved which give rise to issues like:
(i) whether notice under Section 106 of Act of 1882 was validly
served upon the defendants leading to determination of
tenancy?
(ii) whether the defendants are tenants or unauthorized occupants
of the premises?
(iii) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profit as prayed?
(iv) whether the defendants have carried out any unauthorized
construction in the suit property making them liable to pay
damages as claimed by the plaintiffs?
36. All above issues in the considered opinion of this Court are triable
and contentious for which recording of oral evidence is imperative. In that
view of the matter, the prayer of applicants/defendants for passing of
summary judgment is rejected.

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By:DEEPAK SINGH
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 37. Now coming to the prayer made by the applicants/defendants for
rejection of plaint. One of the grounds pleaded for the same is that the
averments made in the plaint are vague inasmuch as in the prayer seeking
decree of possession, plaintiff has claimed possession of the entire property
i.e. 29, South Patel Nagar, New Delhi, whereas in para 9 of the plaint, the
averment made is that four bed rooms, one dinning and drawing hall,
basement, kitchen, pantry, three WC‘s and bath, combined verandah on
front and back, excluding garage and annexe were let out. Likewise, in para
26, it is asserted that some of the family members of plaintiffs are residing at
first floor of the suit premises. Therefore, there is no specification as to
which portion of the suit premises is under the occupation of the defendants
for which the plaintiffs are seeking a decree of eviction and possession. To
buttress this contention, Mr. Chaudhri has placed reliance on the decision of
the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary and
Ors., (2024) 3 SCC 224, as well as decision of High Court of Madhya
Pradesh in Laxman Singh v. Jagannath, 1999 SCC OnLine MP 271 and of
this Court in Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3788.
38. Though it is true that in the plaint, the suit property has not been
described in clear terms, however, if the averments made in the plaint are
read in conjunction with the site plan as well as a copy of the lease deed
which has been filed along with the plaint, it becomes luminously clear that
the suit premises comprises of four bedrooms, one dining and drawing hall,
basement, kitchen, pantry, three WCs and baths, combined verandah on
front and back on the ground floor, excluding garage and annexe.

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 39. The law is well settled that all documents filed along with the plaint
are part of the plaint. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of
this Court in K. K. Manchanda v. S.D. Technical Service (P) Ltd., 2009
SCC OnLine Del 1732 wherein it was held “…that all annexures attached
to the plaint or written statement become part of the pleadings. In order to
bring on record the pleadings of a party in another case, it is not necessary
that the annexures should have been exhibited or proved. A document filed
by a party as a part of plaint can always be read against the party even if it
is not proved.‖
40. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the property in question has
a municipal number. The only objection raised by the applicants/defendants
is that property lacks material particulars. As noted above, the property can
be clearly identified on the basis of the averments made in the plaint read
with lease deed as well as site plan.
41. The decision in Mary Pushpam (supra) is not applicable to the facts
of the present case. In the said decision, the property was not identifiable,
and in this factual backdrop the Hon‘ble Supreme Court observed that a suit
for possession has to describe the property in question with accuracy, failing
which the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of its identifiability,
but such is not the case here.
42. Likewise, decisions in Laxman Singh (supra) and Saroj Salkan
(supra), are also not applicable as suit property in the present case is clearly
identifiable.

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 43. In regard to the objection of the applicants/defendants to the effect
that suit has not been properly valued and requisite court fee has not been
paid, following needs to be noted:
(i) the plaintiffs have prayed for a decree of eviction as well as
possession, which in effect is a prayer for possession. In terms
of Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court-Fees Act, for the relief of
possession in case of tenanted premises post determination of
tenancy, the court fee has to be affixed on the rent payable for
the year next before the date of presenting the plaint, and the
relief has to be valued accordingly. As per the averment made
in the plaint, monthly rent of the suit premises at the time of
filing of plaint has been stated as Rs.1,66,666/-. Therefore,
relief is to be valued at Rs. 19,99,992/- and the court fee
payable as per the schedule to the Court Fees Act, comes to
Rs.21,864/- approx.
(ii) Another relief sought is for a decree of payment of arrears of
rent amounting to Rs.14,99,994/- with interest. Accordingly,
court fee payable on the said amount is Rs.16,984/-.
(iii) Further, a decree for a sum of Rs. 1,17,93,538/- with interest
has been prayed on account of L&DO charges and the court fee
computed on the said amount comes to Rs.1,17,512/-.
(iv) The fourth prayer is for permanent injunction and the said relief
has been valued at Rs.200/- on which fee of Rs.20/- would be
payable.

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 (v) The fifth relief sought is for pendente lite and mesne profits, on
which court fee payable will be decided after the said relief is
decreed.
44. Therefore, the total court fee payable on the reliefs sought comes to
Rs.1,56,380/-. Whereas, the plaintiff has paid composite court fee of
Rs.2,38,000/-. In the prayer clause (iv) yet another figure of
Rs.2,27,46,846/- has been mentioned without elaborating on the same.
However, there is no decree prayed for the said amount, therefore, the same
is being ignored for the time being. Even if the said figure is taken as total
claim made by the plaintiffs, the court fee payable on the same would be
Rs.2,24,394/-. Still the composite court fee of Rs.2,38,000/- paid by the
plaintiff is on the higher side. Therefore, the valuation done is proper and
there is no deficiency in the court fee affixed.
45. As regards Mr. Chaudhary‘s submission that the plaint does not state
the precise amount claimed in terms Order VII Rule 2 CPC, suffice it to
observe that in the plaint the plaintiffs have claimed precise amount as is
evident from the prayer clause.
46. Lastly, it had been argued by Mr. Chaudhary that the plaint is liable to
be rejected as the suit is barred by the provisions of DRC Act. The
contention is that the suit premises was let out on a monthly rent of
Rs.1,450/- in 1968. The said rent was enhanced in the year 1990 by an
amount of Rs.2,000/- per month. Accordingly, monthly rent is Rs.3,450/-,
therefore, the rent being less than Rs.3,500/-, the provisions of DRC Act are

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 applicable to the suit premises and the present suit for possession before this
Court is barred under the DRC Act.
47. For the purpose of deciding the objection under Order VII Rule 11(d)
CPC4, the averments made in the plaint have to be seen. A perusal of the
plaint shows that the plaintiffs have alleged in no uncertain terms that the
monthly rent of the suit premises at the time of filing of the suit was
Rs.1,66,666/-. Even this Court in its order dated 21.09.2022 has recorded the
statement of learned counsel for the defendants that the rent being paid by
the defendants to the plaintiff was to the tune of Rs.1,66,666/-. Therefore,
there is no substance in the contention that the suit is barred by the
provisions of DRC Act.
48. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the application.
The same is accordingly dismissed.

VIKAS MAHAJAN, J

AUGUST 05, 2025/N.S. ASWAL/jg

4
Order VII Rule 11(d) – Rejection of plaint. - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: —
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

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By:DEEPAK SINGH
Signing Date:06.08.2025
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