Quasi-delict Art.
2176 (Culpa Aquiliana)
  - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
    being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
    done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
    contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
    and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
  - Liability of employer is principal, under article 2180
    (vicarious liability)
REQUISITES OF ART 2176:
  - Act or omission
  - Presence of fault or negligence
  - Damage done to another
  - Causal connection between the fault or negligence and the
    damage.
Culpa Criminal - negligence arising from a criminal act which is
punishable under the revised penal code
  - Under article 100 of Revised Penal Code provides that every
     person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This
     negligence resulting in the commission of a crime, in connection
     with article 3 and 365 of Revised Penal Code.
  - Liability of the employer is subsidiary
Culpa Contractual - Under article 1172 of New Civil Code which
provides that the responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such
liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.
6 kinds of damages (w/short definition) (MENTAL)
M - Moral damages
   - Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
      anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
      wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
      injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
      damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
      the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
   -
E - Exemplary damages AKA CORRECTIVE DAMAGES
   - Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed,
      by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
      to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
   -
N - Nominal damages
   - Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
       right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
       defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
       purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
       him.
T - Temperate damages AKA MODERATE DAMAGES
   - Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are
       more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
       be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
       been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the
       case, be provided with certainty.
A - Actual damages
   - Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
       entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
       loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation
       is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
L - liquidated damages
   - Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by
       the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Difference between culpa aquiliana and culpa criminal
Culpa criminal refers to negligence arising from a criminal act, while culpa
aquiliana refers to civil damages due to negligence. Culpa criminal affects public
interest and punishes criminal acts, while culpa aquiliana repairs private
damages through indemnification.
What is Culpa Contractual?
Culpa contractual establishes liability based on contractual relations between the
party. It is enough that there is contractual relationship between the parties and
negligence is mere incidental to the breach thereof.
What are the 6 kinds of damages?
   1. Moral damages - These are awarded in cases involving psychological
      suffering, mental anguish, or besmirched reputation.
   2. Exemplary damages - otherwise known as punitive damages which is
      awarded as a form of punishment and to deter future wrongdoings.
   3. Nominal damages - this is awarded when a right has been violated, but no
      substantial injury or loss has been inflicted.
   4. Temperate damages - given for a loss that has been suffered but cannot
      be proven with certainty.
   5. Actual or Compensatory damages - awarded to compensate for a proven
      loss or injury. Supporting evidence, such as receipts or invoices are
      required to substantiate such losses.
   6. Liquidated damages - damages stipulated in a contract and can be
      claimed in case of breach.
5 sources of obligation (Art.1157)
   -   LAW
   -   CONTRACTS
   -   QUASI-CONTRACTS
   -   ACTS OR OMISSION PUNISHABLE BY LAW
   -   QUASI-DELICTS
Proximate Cause
  - It is that adequate and efficient cause which in the natural order
     of events, and under the particular circumstances surrounding
     the case, would naturally produce the event.
  - RAMOS VS CA - the dominant, moving or producing cause
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
  - The doctrine of “last clear chance” is to the effect that even if
     the injured party was originally at fault (as when he was on the
     wrong side of a street) still if the person who fi nally caused the
     accident had the “last clear opportunity” to avoid striking him, he
     who could have prevented the injury is still liable if he did not
     take advantage of such opportunity or chance.
   - Other names for the doctrine of “last clear chance” include
     “doctrine of discovered peril”; “doctrine of supervening
     negligence”; “the humanitarian doctrine.”
Doctrine of Supervening Negligence - other name of last clear
chance
Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
  - Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
     immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
     damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
     immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
     defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
     but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Vicarious Liability (Art.2180)
   - Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
      demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
      for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
       The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
       are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
       who live in their company.
     Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
     incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
     their company.
     The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
     are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
     employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
     employed or on the occasion of their functions.
     Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
     employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
     their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
     in any business or industry.
     The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
     special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
     the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
     case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
     Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
     shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
     or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
     The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
     persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
     diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
     (1903a)
Volenti Non Fit Injuria - consented to be exposed to injury, cannot
claim damages
   - NIKKO HOTEL CASE - The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to
      which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" )
      refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
      precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
      and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
      negligent in doing so.
Air France vs Carrascoso - the act that breaks the contract is quasi
delict
Liability in Animal-related injuries (Art.2183)
   - Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may
      make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
      may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
      responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come
      from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
      suffered damage.
Validity of Waiver in school field trips
Elements of a Valid Waiver
   - Valderama v. Macalde reiterated the three (3) essential
      elements of a valid waiver, thus:
      (a) existence of a right;
      (b) at the knowledge of the existence thereof; and,
      (c) an intention to relinquish such right."
Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
   - VOLENTE NON FIT INJURIA does not find application to the
     case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the
     risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles
     19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to
     treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary
     ridicule and shame.
Abuse of Rights Principle (Art.19)
  - Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
    in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
    his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
      ARTICLE 19 - PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS:
      (1) There is a legal right or duty;
      (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
      (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
   - Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
     negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
     for the same.
     > Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law
   - Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
     another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
     public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
      > ARTICLE 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
      following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
      which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
      policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring - Res ipsa loquitor applies since
the bridge is stationary, therefore the negligence is presumed to be
on the part of the corporation who towed the barge.
   - Force majure or caso fortuito applies only as stated “It is,
     therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
     foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it
     must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere
     difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to
     foresee the same:”
Res Ipsa Loquitor - However, since negligence may in some cases
be hard to prove, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA
LOQUITOR (the thing speaks for itself). This means that in certain
instances, the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the
injury clearly indicate negligence on the part of the defendant — as
when the defendants was on the WRONG side of the street.
   - res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It is the rule
     that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
     surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
     presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie
     case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with
     an explanation.
   - where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the
     injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the
     injury is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such
     control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
     absence of explanation that the injury arose from the
     defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to
     him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur are:
(1) the occurrence of an injury;
(2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and
management of the defendant;
(3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things,
would not have happened if those who had control or management
used proper care; and
(4) the absence of explanation by the defendant.
** Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control
and management of the thing which caused the injury
PSI vs Agana (GR 126297)
  - Was Dr. Ampil liable?
     > The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken
     together, as specified by the Court of Appeals, directly point to
     Dr. Ampil as the negligent party,
     Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces
     of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was
     experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation.
     Had he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the
     immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the
     gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of
     negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful
     act of deceiving his patient.
     This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more
     appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this
     kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care
     provider either failed to do something which a reasonably
     prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did
     something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
     done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.11
     Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate
     causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to
     remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s
     body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
     was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached
     both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad,
     necessitating her further examination by American doctors and
     another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate
     cause12 of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of
     closing the incision despite the information given by the
     attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing.
     That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina
     established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and
     the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his
     deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the
     knowledge of Natividad and her family.
  - Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving Dr.
    Fuentes of any Liability or was he liable under Res ipsa
    loquitor?
> In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere
evidentiary rule.17 In other words, mere invocation and
application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was
proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr.
Fuentes.
> From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for
the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the
occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury
was under the control and management of the defendant; (3)
the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things,
would not have happened if those who had control or
management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the
most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing
which caused the injury."
We find the element of "control and management of the thing
which caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon
during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance
of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr.
Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had
spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and
thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter
examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr.
Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed
operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure
when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of
gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the
misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that
the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes
was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the
hospital.
> CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP RULE APPLIES IN THE CASE
   - Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating
     surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery
           room and all personnel connected with the operation.
           Their duty is to obey his orders.16 As stated before, Dr.
           Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the
           "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is
           evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes
           to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr.
           Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’
           permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the
           incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering the
           closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of
           gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to
           Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and management of
           the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr.
           Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
         - In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
           substantive law, hence, does not per se create or
           constitute an independent or separate ground of liability,
           being a mere evidentiary rule.17 In other words, mere
           invocation and application of the doctrine does not
           dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
           Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed
           by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
Doctrine of Ostensible Agency
  - This doctrine imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a
     contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a
     principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into
     believing that the relationship or the authority exists. (Irving v.
     Doctors Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (1982),
     quoting Arthur v. St. Peters Hospital, 169 N.J. 575, 405 A 2d
     443 (1979)). The concept is essentially one of estoppel.
  - Doctrine of apparent authority or the holding out theory; or
     doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel
PSI CASE on apparent authority
  - Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of
     apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of
     corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the
     determination of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health
     professionals. The present case serves as a perfect platform to
     test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
     jurisprudence.
- Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the
  "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency
  by estoppel,29 has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes
  liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual
  relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or
  an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing
  that the relationship or the authority exists.30 The concept is
  essentially one of estoppel and has been explained in this
  manner: "The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with
  the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to
  assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as
  possessing. The question in every case is whether the principal
  has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation
  that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business
  usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in
  presuming that such agent has authority to perform the
  particular act in question.