Attachment
Attachment
1.1Definition of Family
In law, the concept of family could generally be understood in two senses in broad and
narrow senses.
Form wise, family may be of two kinds, namely nuclear and extended family.
Neither the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia nor the currently enacted Federal and
Regional Family Codes define the term ‘family.’
Nonetheless, we have elements of relationship here and there which could serve
as a base for a definition.
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it is clearly provided that relationships would be created by a contract of adoption.
The concept of family under our family laws is similar to the second definition,
the basic relations are emanated from blood, marriage or adoption.
A. Procreation
The family is the center of procreation/reproduction.
Ensure continuity of society
B. Socialization
Family has, through socialization, a central role in education and care for the
children.
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E. A Unit of Economic Cooperation
Family is also a unit of economic cooperation that traditionally divides the labor
along gender lines
In modern world, husband and wife, each with special skills, considering
themselves as partners contribute definite service to the marriage partnership,
which, in effect, serves as economic cooperation.
Most functions formerly performed within or by families are now shared with or
provided by other institutions or evolve due to advancement in technology.
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1.4 Family Law Reform and the Forces at the Back ground
1.4.1 General
Generally speaking, family law has undergone great changes especially since the
2nd half of 20th century
Reasons for the reforms
1. Socio-economic changes/economic independence of women
industrialization and urbanization have brought the seeds of change on the roles of
the couple within the family. The former created more jobs so that women can
work outside of homes, and the latter develops their educational and skill level.
the incomparable higher training and educational level of women has been
increased and they became equally rewarded with men based on merit than other
grounds which in the long-run facilitated their emancipation.
2. the passion for freedom, liberty and equality of the feminist struggle has also
contributed in molding the attitude of the society and there by the law.
3. Better protection for the rights of children
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The first comprehensive legal instrument in the history of hither to traditional
society of Ethiopia
This, however, does not mean that all the provisions of the Code fit in to the
objective realities of present-day Ethiopia.
the government acceded to a number of International Human Rights Instruments
The 1995 Constitution extended protection to the institution of family and
marriage, and recognized equality of sexes and spouses, and the rights of the
children as well.
Revision of the Civil Code provisions relating to family matters have been
necessitated by keeping place with the constitutional provisions and international
instruments
Not all regions have family laws
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However, family law is local in its nature and neither did the House of Federation
take a stand that family law should be uniform through out the country nor is it a
type of civil law that creates and sustains one economic community
It could be concluded that enacting family law is within the power of states.
Accordingly, it has been suggested that let the Federal Government enact a family
code for the administrative region of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and then states
adopt family laws of their own through their respective state councils using the
federal law as a model.
Each state should freely accept this approach and that such family laws should not
contravene the FDRE Constitution.
under the Civil Code, sources of family relationship, i.e, relation by way of
consanguinity, affinity and adoption were treated a separate chapter.
Since the two legal effects that arise among family members are prohibition of
marriage and the obligation to supply maintenance, it has been preferred to
include those sources & family relationship in areas dealing as to between whom
conclusion of marriage is prohibited and the obligation to supply maintenance
exists.
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Consanguineal relationship in the collateral line
Under Art 550 (2) of the 1960 Civil Code and Art. 8 (1) of the RFC, a bond of
relationship by consanguinity exists, in the direct line, between ascendants and
descendants.
Father
Mother
Or
Son
Daughter
Grandson
Grand daughter
The Ethiopian law does not specifically indicate as to how to calculate the degree
of relationship in the direct line. In European countries, however, the degree of
relationship is computed simply by counting the number of generations. That is,
the number of generations is equal to the number of degrees of relationship. There
is one generation between a father and a son or two generations between a person
and his grandson. To make the discussion clear, look at the following figure
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Ayalew
1 (First generation)
Gebeyehu
2 (Second generation )
Nadew
3 (Third generation)
Getachew
4 (Fourth generation)
Aragaw
Alemayehu
Ayenachew Gete
8
Limenih Genetu Kindu Yilma
Sara
There are two approaches in computing the degree of relationship by consanguinity in the
collateral line. These are:
The civil law approach and
The canon law approach
Canon law approach: the number of generations are counted only on one of the
lines of descent if the two sides are equal.
When the related persons are not on equal distance from their common ancestor,
only the line that has a greater number of generations is taken in to account
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Some of the judges argue that what is incorporated is the civil law approach and
others interpret this article in a way similar to canon law approach.
To avoid such confusion, the RFC avoids calculation of degree of relationship
and specifically indicated as between whom such relationship exists.
Accordingly, as per Art 8 (2) consanguinal relation in the collateral exists
between a man and his sister or aunt and a woman and her brother or uncle.
Collateral relation beyond certain point shall not produce any legal effect.
Like wise, under the Revised Family Code, consanguinal relation in the collateral
line for the purpose of prohibition of marriage is limited to the relation between a
man and his sister or his aunt and a woman and her brother or uncle.
Two categories
Direct Line
As per Art. 552 (2) of the Civil Code (CC) and Art. 9 (1) of the RFC, a bond of
affinity in the direct line exists between a person and the ascendants or
descendants of his spouse.
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produces equal legal effects no matter how the degree of the affinal relationship in
the direct line between two individuals is remote
Collateral line
Art. 552 (3) of the CC., a relation of affinity exists between a person and the
collaterals of his or her spouse.
Doesn’t have any legal consequence beyond a certain degree.
Art. 553 of the CC., affinal shall be of no effect beyond the third degree in the
collateral line.
Art. 9 of the RFC, affinity relationship is limited between a man and the sister of
his wife, and a woman and the brother of her husband.
Double affinity
As per Art. 554 (1) of the Civil Code, a bond of double affinity exists between a
person and the spouse of the person to whom he is related by affinity.
To cite one instance, a bond of double affinity exists b/n the husband and the
spouse of the brother of his wife.
It is also mentioned that such bond of double affinity shall produce the same
effect as a bond of simple affinity.
However, such type of affinity is not recognized under the RFC
Does dissolution of marriage entails the termination of affinal relation created as a result
of that particular marriage:
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bound by a preceding marriage. Therefore, while his/her marriage is pending, a
person can not conclude another marriage with another person including his
affinal relatives.
Art. 9 specifically provides that a person can not conclude marriage with affinal
relatives. But the massage of Art. 9 is not to prohibit a person from concluding
marriage with his has affinal relatives while he is bound by a preceding marriage
as this message is already covered under Art. 11. Hence, the message behind Art.
9 is that a person is prohibited from concluding marriage with his affinal relatives
even if his preceding marriage is dissolved.
1.6.3. Adoption
an artificial means of creating family tie.
Once an agreement of adoption is entered between the adopter and the adopted,
consanguinal and affinal relation shall be created between the adopted, and the
family of the adopter.
Father and mother have the right to become guardians and tutors of their minor
children (Art. 219 of the R.F.C.)
People who are related by consanguinity have a reciprocal right to succeed each
other under rules of intestate succession (Art 842 and the following of the C.C.)
Persons who are very poor and are unable to get their livelihood by their work,
have the right to require maintenance from their relatives who have a better
means. (Art. 198 of the R.F.C)
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In addition to rights, there are also obligations which are imposed on people as a result of
their being relative of other persons. Among other things:
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CHAPTER TWO
CONCLUSION OF MARRIAGE
Other writers define marriage as “a union for life and is an institution to bring about
property relations.” (Emphasis supplied).
all marriages may not create property relations between the spouses.
Still others define marriage as “a society of man and woman who join together to
perpetuate their species, to help each other through mutual assistance to bear the burden
of life and to share their common destiny.
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Once again this definition is narrow because it exclude the conclusion of marriage
between sterile individuals.
In the legal systems of states of the western civilization, and those other states whose
legal system are influenced by the former, marriage is defined as:
“… a voluntary union for life of one man and woman as
husband and wife, to the exclusion of all others, for the
discharge to each other and to the community of duties
legally incumbent up, on married person.”
This definition, though incomplete consists some basic features of marriage under
Ethiopian laws.
a ‘voluntary union’ free consent of the parties to live together as husband and
wife
The second element which distinguishes marriage from other sexual unions and
other contracts is its permanence.
The third element to be fulfilled is the element of monogamy.
Even if the Civil Code, the Revised Family Code of the Federal Government and other
Regional Family Codes fails to define marriage, The Amhara Region Family Code under
Art. 11 has provided the definition of family as follows:
“… a relationship where by a man and a woman having
attained majority, officially establish out of their own
free will and consent, with an intention to sustainably
live together united in law or “legal institution structured
as a result of this relationship there to”
So the definition of marriage under the Amhara Region Family Code has the following
important points:
1. Marriage is essentially entered between a man and a woman. This implies two things;
First, only monogamous marriages are recognized under the Amhara family law. So
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bigamous and polygamous marriage are excluded. Second, marriage concluded
between persons of the same sex, that is gay and lesbian are also excluded.
2. The spouses are required to attain the age of majority.
3. The marriage should be established officially. So any undertaking by the spouses to
conclude marriage does not have any effect if it is not made either before the officer
of civil status, or according to the formalities required by their religion or their
custom.
4. The full and free consent of the spouses is required.
5. There must be an intention to sustainably live together.
2.2. Betrothal
2.2.1. General
Betrothal is an agreement where by the future spouses or both the future spouses
and their respective families undertake that the former conclude marriage.
The term betrothal is called by different names in different legal systems. Promise
to marry, agreement to marry and engagement are some of the synonyms of
betrothal.
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However, regional family codes, such as the Tigray, Amhara, SNNP, and
Oromia Regional family Codes have retained this institution with certain
modifications.
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2.2.5. Breach of Betrothal
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The officer of civil status is an officer who registers births, deaths and marriage of
people (Art. 47 of the C.C)
For long, there was no officer of civil status in Ethiopia.
Municipalities were involved in recording the civil status by way of delegation,
until when the officer of civil status is established. (Art. 321 of the RFC.)
But we have now vital invents registration agency established at federal level with
branches at woredas/kebeles by Proc. No. 760/2012 (as amended by Proc. No.
1049/2017) and Reg. No. 278/2012
are required to personally appear before the officer of civil status at the time and
place of celebration of marriage.
How could we identify whether a certain officer of civil status is competent to celebrate a
particular marriage?
Art. 22 of the RFC
they shall inform their intention to conclude marriage not less than one month
prior to its celebration (Art. 23 of the RFC).
decide the exact date of the conclusion of marriage and publicize same by any
appropriate means (Art. 24 of the RFC). The aim of publicizing the date fixed for
celebration is to give a room for individuals who are entitled to make opposition if
the marriage is to be concluded in violation of one of the substantive requirements
of marriage.
Art. 25. … shall inform… the consequences of their declaration. marriage found
concluded in violation of the substantive requirements could be dissolved and
entail the criminal liability of the spouses, the witnesses and the officer of civil
status who celebrated such marriage.
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2.3.1.2. Religious Marriage (Art. 3)
by their religion or the religion of one of them.
Due regard to the rules or practice of celebration of marriage of that religion. Art.
26 (1)
Substantive conditions should be met Art. 26 (2)
customary marriage and the formalities thereof shall be prescribed by the custom
of the community concerned Art. 27/1
Substantive conditions should be met Art. 27/2
Conclusion
while marriage celebrations in all civil marriages follow similar procedures, the
procedures followed in religious and customary marriages vary from religion to
religion and from culture to culture.
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2.3.2. Substantive Requirements of Marriage
marriage is said to be defective, unless the essential conditions are fulfilled
substantive conditions of marriage have to do with the content of the marriage
itself
Every marriage should comply with substantive conditions of marriage.
This can be inferred from the cumulative reading of Art. 25(2), 26(2), and 27(2)
of the RFC.
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Error and violence are those two circumstances that vitiate consent under the
Revised Family Code
(b) HIV/AIDS?
22
(c) cum. Art 53 (2) of the RFC provides that the spouses shall have with one another the
sexual relations normal in marriage unless these relations involve a risk of seriously
prejudicing their health.
But such obligation can be put in to effect if and only if the two spouse have the
requisite sexual organ.
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2.3.2.2. Marriageable Age (Art. 7)
make sure that the couples are mature enough both biologically and
psychologically
The Civil Code under Art. 581 fixed marriageable age at 18 for men and 15 for
woman
Exceptionally, however, a dispensation of not more than two years may be
granted
Why the Civil Code opted for different marriageable age for men and women?
women attain puberty earlier than men;
increasing the marriageable age of women above 15 has adverse affect in that
women will be vulnerable to abduction and birth out of wedlock.
The rational behind departing from the Civil Code and raising the lower
marriageable age for women are legal, scientific and socio-economic grounds
Legal: Under Art. 299 cum. 215 of the RFC, a person performs a juridical act only
if he attains the age of majority; that is, 18 years
It can hardly be said that she can, at this stage, give her free and full consent to
marriage as required by Art. 34 (2) of the FDRE Constitution.
Setting different marriageable ages for the sexes would be against the
constitutional equality of sexes in all respects including marriage as enshrined
under Art. 25, 34 (1) and 35 (1) and (2) of the FDRE Constitution.
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Early marriage will have adverse effect on the health of the woman and the baby
particularly at the time of pregnancy and birth Early marriage may also create
obstacles on the woman to attain her education because it might be immediately
followed by birth.
Pursuant Art. 27 of the Code, the minimum marriageable age for man and a
woman is 22 and 18 respectively.
Do you think that dispensation is allowed if the woman become pregnant below
18 years?
Permission of marriage under article 7(2) results in emancipation (Arts. 311, 313
& 314)
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The degree of relationship in the collateral line under the Civil Code (7th degree)
was found out to be too long.
prohibition of marriage between collaterals in the REFC is in line with the above
(scientific) justification.
The prohibition of that marriage between consanguineal and affinal relatives is equally
applicable to filiations not established legally.
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Art. 10 of the RFC: Filiations not Established Legally
The existence of a bond of natural filiations which is commonly known to
the community is sufficient to render applicable the impediments to
marriage referred to in Articles 8 and 9, not with standing that the filiations
is not legally established.
Let us assume that a certain child is born or conceived as a result of sexual intercourse
outside of marriage and irregular union; For instance, sexual intercourse performed as a
result of rape or abduction. Let us further assume that the community knows the fact that
father of that child is a person who is engaged in the act of abduction or rape.
Furthermore, the community also is aware of the fact the rapist, as a father, covers the
food, cloth, education and other expenses of the child. Despite all these acts of this
person, the paternity is not established legally until he acknowledges the child formally or
is judicially declared to be the father of the child.
2.3.2.4. Bigamy
Bigamous marriage is void under most jurisdictions, while it is a valid type of
marriage in others.
The Civil Code under Art. 585 also outlaws bigamy.
The Revised Federal Family Code expressly outlaws
Justification: equality
But what about the right to promote and develop ones culture is recognized by the
constitution (Art. 39 (2) of the FDRE Constitution).
But it is only “… Culture and traditions that are compatible with fundamental
rights, human dignity, democratic norms and ideas and the provisions of the
Constitution” that deserve promotion and enrichment (Art. 91(1) of the
Constitution).
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2.3.2.5. Representation not Allowed (Art. 12) (1)
Applies to all forms of marriage
No delegation
Since personal appearance is more of procedural requirement; it is also indicated
under Art 2 and Art 25 (1)
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Both the ex-husband and the present husband are presumed to be the father of the
child under the eyes of the law.
The 180 days period of widowhood may some how minimize the problem.
However, it doesn’t totally avoid the problem.
In other countries, the period of widowhood is 300 days.
So, to avoid conflict of paternity, the period of widow hood should be ten months.
Exceptions:
No exhaustive
The power of dispensing the woman from observing the period of widowhood is
given to the court.
What additional reasons might be considered by the court?
For instance, if the woman is sterile and this fact is evidenced by medical
evidence??
if a menstruation flows for three consecutive months after the dissolution of
marriage??
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non-governmental organizations that work on children and women rights.
Who is entitled to make opposition if marriage is to be concluded without the free and
full consent of the spouse (s) or without observing period of widowhood? Discuss!
Per Art. 20 (2), a decision against opposition to marriage is final with no possibility of
appeal. On the other hand, a decision against celebration of marriage is appealable to
courts. What is the rationale behind to make such distinction? The decision of the
authority against celebration of marriage should not be final as it affects the right of
future spouses to marry and found a family. This constitutional right can not be deprived
of by administrative decisions and hence appeal is possible. In contrast, a decision against
opposition doesn’t have a far reaching consequence when compared to a decision against
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celebration of marriage. Even if the opposition is sustained a defective marriage may be
attacked and dissolved after the conclusion of the marriage.
2.5. Registration of Marriage
Why do you think is the power of registration of marriage is given only to the officer of
civil status? Why not to for other marriage celebrating authorities?
1. More organized
2. Some international instruments, such as Art. 16 (2) of CEDAW, make registration
of marriage compulsory
Purpose of registration
Registration is not a validity requirement to marriage
Regardless of the fact that marriage has been registered or not, it shall have effect
from the date of its conclusion (Art. 28 (3).
Hence, the purpose of registration is for evidential purpose.
Once the officer of civil status registers marriage, it shall issue a certificate of
marriage to the spouses. (Art. 25 (2).
Such certificate of marriage shall be produced to prove marriage where the
existence of a certain marriage is challenged.
To assure the establishment of the registering organ, the Federal Revised Family
Code, under Art. 321, compels the Federal Government, with in six months from
the coming in to force of the Code, to issue registration law applicable to the
Administrations where this code is to be enforced and establish the necessary
institutions.
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CHAPTER THREE
EFFECTS OF VIOLATIONS OF ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR
THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
3.1 General
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In France, for instance, if a brother and sister conclude marriage, their marriage is
void from the time of its conclusion.
it can be attacked by all affected and any interested person.
Once attached, it will become invalid for the past and for the future.
Void marriages does not require special formality to come to an end.
Nevertheless, a declaratory judgment is required to the effect that a void marriage
really is void.
the Civil Code or the newly enacted Federal and Regional family codes, adopted
only voidable marriage.
The defective marriage shall produce all legal effects of a normal marriage unless
and until it is invalidated by a court of law.
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3.2.1 Effects of Violations of Substantive Requirements of Marriage
Taking in to account the effect of their violation, substantive requirements of marriage or
impediments to marriage could be divided in to three groups. These are:
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b. Bigamous marriage;
c. Marriage concluded by a judicially interdicted person without the authorization of
the court.
d. Marriage concluded under the influence of violence; and
e. Marriage concluded due to fundamental error
Art. 31 – Age
1) Without prejudice to sub-Article (2) of Art 7 of this Code, marriage concluded by
a man or a woman under the age of eighteen years shall dissolve on the
application of any interested person or the public prosecutor.
2) It may no longer be applied for after the age required by law for marriage is
satisfied.
Art. 33 – Bigamy
1) The dissolution of a bigamous marriage shall be ordered on the application of
either of the spouses of the bigamous marriage or the public prosecutor.
2) The dissolution mentioned in sub-Article (1) of this article may no longer be
applied for where the former spouse of the bigamous marriage has died.
Is the dissolution of the former marriage due to divorce causes the validity of the
second (“bigamous”) marriage?
What if the first marriage is dissolved because of declaration of absence of the
first spouse of the bigamous spouse or non-observance of essential conditions to
marriage?
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3) An application for dissolution by the guardian may no longer be made six months
after the day on which the guardian came to know the existence of the marriage or
in any case, after the disability of the interdicted person has ceased.
The interdicted person is given six months after the termination of his disability to
request the dissolution of his marriage. The reason is that as long as he is in
disability, he is not entitled to apply for dissolution.
If the action of dissolution is brought by his guardian, on the other hand, it will
not be entertained after the date of the termination of the disability of the
interdicted person. This is because after the termination of his disability, the
interdicted person himself can apply for dissolution.
Unlike judicially interdicted person, a legally interdicted person has capacity with
regard to conclusion of marriage (Art. 386 (1) of the Civil Code).
So, the marriage concluded by him shall be valid even if it is done without the
authorization of the court.
Art. 36 – Error
1) Whosoever has concluded marriage due to fundamental error may apply to the
court to order the dissolution thereof.
2) Such an application may not be made six months after the discovery of such error,
and in any case, two years after the conclusion of the marriage.
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The two years period of limitation is set because within the two years period,
circumstances which strengthen the sustainability of the union like birth of a child
could possibly occur.
The lapse of the time stipulated under Art. 35 and 36 doesn’t totally bar the
individual from requesting dissolution on the basis of other grounds. For instance,
he/she may avail her/himself of divorce provisions.
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status who celebrated the marriage.
Does it mean that the dissolution of marriage shall be ordered if the formalities under Sub
articles (1), (2), (4) and (5) of Article 25 are not complied with? Why/why not?
CHAPTER FOUR
EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE
4.1. General
The law does not make any distinction among various types of marriage when it
comes to effects of marriage (Art. 40 (1))
Effects of marriage shall not depend on the real or presumed consummation of the
marriage (Art. 41).
The effect of marriage shall be operative as of the date of conclusion of marriage
regardless of the fact that the spouses have performed sexual inter course or not.
The effects of marriage are derivatives of either the spouses’ contractual
agreement (contract of marriage) or the legal stipulations (legal regime) or both.
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1) The spouses may before or on the date of their marriage, regulate by a contract the
pecuniary effects of their marriage
2) They may also specify in such contract their reciprocal rights and obligations in
matters concerning their personal relations
3) Such contracts shall not affect mandatory provisions of the law
1. Time
before or on the date of celebration of the marriage (Art. 42 (1)).
Possibility during marriage-Art. 73- should be approved by the court.
Does Art. 73 unduly restricts contractual freedom?
The aim is to ensure that the spouses are free from influence.
Freedom of contract gives sense when the contracting parties have equal
bargaining power.
questionable whether such kind of freedom and equality (arm’s length
transaction) exists when the husband and wife
So long as the two spouses are under the marital bond, such influence could
possibly arise
Rules that may not be set a sided by the agreement of the parties.
Different from permissive rules
Example, Art. 49 (1)
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3. form (Art. 44)
in writing and attested by four witnesses, two for the husband and two for
the wife
Even if Art. 44 is silent, we can also add the requirement of signature.
Pursuant to Art. 1676 (1) of the CC, general contract provisions are
applicable to contract of marriage.
Art. 1727 (1) of the CC, any contract required to be in writing shall be
supported by a special document signed by all parties bound by the
contract, if one of the aforementioned formality is not observed, the
contract of marriage shall remain a mere draft.
4. capacity
a judicially interdicted person (Art. 43 (1))
A legally interdicted has capacity (Art. 43 (2)).
5. Scope of obligation
The spouses shall not impose an obligation up on third parties by their
contract of marriage (Art. 46 (2)).
contracts lawfully formed shall be binding between the contracting parties.
For instance, assume that a man, who is getting married, had a child prior
to this marriage. Now this man and his marrying spouse can not agree that
only the relatives of the child on his mother’s side are responsible for the
up bringing of the child.
6. Sufficient clarity of the terms of the contract (Art. 46 (2))
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shall be of no effect where it simply refers to local custom, religion or law of a
country
it will make the obligation of the spouses undefined
simply agree to govern their personal and pecuniary relation by local custom,
religion or law of a country, it will be too general and lead to different
interpretations
Under the general contract provisions, it is given that the obligation of the parties
as stated in the contract should be ascertained with sufficient precision (Art. 1714
(2)).
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3) Where the modifications are approved by the court under sub- Article (2) of this
article, a copy of the modified contract shall be deposited in the court or with the
office of civil status.
Based on this article, the following conditions should be full filled for a modified contract
of marriage to be valid,
The modification shall be necessitated by the interest of the family.
The spouses shall consent for such modification.
Even if it is not explicitly stated, from the reading of Art. 47 (3) and Art. 1722 of
the Civil Code, such modification shall be made in writing. To that effect Art. 1722
provides that a contract made in special form shall be varied (modified) in the same
form. Since a contract of marriage is originally to be concluded in special or, it must
be modified in the same form. By the same token, the phrase “… a copy of the
modified contract shall be deposited … “under Art. 47 (3) shows the requirement of
writing for modification of contract of marriage. If it is not reduced in written form
we can not imagine depositing.
Approval of the court- justification similar to the one that is given for Art. 73.
The personal and pecuniary effect of marriage shall be regulated by law (Art. 49-73).
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The first is as a gap filling provisions. That is, the law by its provisions from Art.
49 – 73 govern the effect of marriage only where there is no contract of marriage,
or the contract of marriage is invalid
The second aspect of application of the legal regime (Arts. 49 – 73) is in their
mandatory nature
Mandatory provisions such as Arts. 49, 50 and 53 are always applicable no matter
how the spouses concluded contract of marriage.
We may consider the legal regime governing effects of marriage under two heading:
Personal effects of marriage and
Pecuniary effects of marriage.
Civil Code are in clear contradiction with the constitutional principle of equality
of sexes and equality of spouses in marital life as enshrined under Arts. 25, 34 (1)
and 35 (1) and (2) of the FDRE Constitution.
the Revised Family Code abolished this and introduced the concept of collective
leadership of family in which both the husband and the wife have equal rights and
duties over their personal relation ship. According to Art. 49 (1), an equal and
mutual obligation of support, respect and assistance applies.
The obligations under Art. 49 (1) is mandatory which cannot be set asided by
contract of marriage (Art. 49 (2)).
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Should contributing all expenses for the well-being of the house hold If the
spouses are living separately, they may discharge their obligation by supplying
maintenance for the needy spouse.
If one of the spouses is unable to pay his personal debt, the other spouse may
discharge his obligation by paying from their common property.
Art. 637 (1) of the Civil Code provides that the spouses shall cooperate, under the
guidance of the husband, in the interest of the family, to ensure the moral and
material direction of the family, to bring up the children and to prepare for their
establishment.
Though it seems the wife must be given the right to participate in these activities,
the final veto power was left in the hand of the husband.
44
In line with Art. 34 (1) of the FDRE Constitution which declares the spouses have
equal right during marriage, under the Revised Family Code, however, the
spouses shall have equal rights in the management of the family
The spouses may be at disagreement on, say the management of the family. This
may lead to a problem. Because neither of the spouses has a casting vote over
such matters as both are authorized to be equal. The Revised Family Code doesn’t
have a ready-made solution to the problem.
The casting voice has to be given to the principal family bread winner.
But since in Ethiopia, most of the time the bread winners are husbands,
advocating this proposition would be returning to the old anachronistic tradition
of husband’s dominance and the wife’s subordination.
The second and, I think, the better solution is referring the dispute to family
arbitrators.
Any party who is dissatisfied with the decision of arbitrators may appeal to the
court having jurisdiction whose decision shall be final (Art. 118 (2) and (3)).
45
student, don’t you see any apparent or real contradiction between Art. 53 (3) and
Art. 55 (1)? Read the provisions her in under.
Article 53 – cohabitation
1) The spouses are bound to live together
2) They shall have one another the sexual relations normal in marriage unless these
relations involve a risk of seriously prejudicing their health.
3) Any agreement to the contrary shall be of no effect
46
It is also a tort, for which civil action for damage may be brought. (Art. 2035 of
the Civil Code cum. Art 652 of the FDRE Penal Code)
47
Art. 59-61 – Administration of Personal Property (1) Principle
Of course, from the relevant provisions of property law, ownership is the widest right.
It includes the right to use the property (usus), the right to collect the income or fruit of
that property (fructus), and the right to dispose (abusus).
If ownership right includes all these rights, would it be logical to prohibit an owner of
personal property to collect the fruits (incomes) derived from his personal property?
Under Art. 1204 (2) of the Civil Code, such right may be restricted by law. One of the
laws that restrict such right is Art 62 (1) of the RFC.
It reasonable limitation on ownership right.
Should we expect the spouses to ask the confirmation of the judges for the contract of
agency to be valid within the meaning of Art. 61?
Some individuals argue that since the contract of agency is a contract that is to be
concluded during marriage it shall be of no effect unless approved by the court as
required under Art. 73.
Ato Mehari Redae, in his book argues that we could not. To this effect, he raised two
justifications.
If either of the parties wants to grant agency power, it must be considered no more as a
family matter. The power giver (the principal) can reclaim at any time the
representation power that he once extended. (Art. 2183 of the Civil Code) If we were to
48
ask him to seek the blessing of the court, this right of the principal, i.e., giving or
retaking the power at any time he wants would be neutralized. And this may have a
negative impact on the spouse who wants to go for representation for various reasons.
The other is that even in the Civil Procedure Code Art 58 (a), the law permits the spouses
to represent each other in bringing a claim, or defend actions. Even if this is a
representation, there must not be a requirement to get an approval of the court, and
there exists no statement in the Civil Procedure Code.
Thus, it can be concluded that Art. 61 has to be considered as an exception to Art. 73.
49
Third, the number of the co-owners. In case of owning a certain property in
common, the number could be as many as the parties want it to be. In fact for
matrimonial property the co-owners are always two, no more no less.
Salaries and wages of spouses are their incomes derived by their efforts.
The parties are not prevented from adding other properties as being common by
their contract.
Could we say there exists no prevention to exclude any of these assets as not
communal either?
For instance, can the spouses by a contract of marriage stipulate the exclusion of
salary from common property?
Possibly , two arguments may be forwarded.
The first line of argument action proposes the spouses are at liberty to exclude one
of those properties
The idea is that Art. 62 is not mandatory and hence can be set a side by contrary
intention of the parties.
Particularly, taking in to account clear provisions that outlawed any contrary acts
by the spouses, like Art. 49, 51, 52, 53, etc and the silence of Art. 62,
If we were to allow them to agree to the extent of making their wages fall under
their personal ownership, it would be very difficult to imagine the existence of “a
fiscal unit” constituting a family.
Moreover, one can sense the mandatory nature of Art. 62 though it failed to
provide prohibition on contrary and mutual agreements.
50
Borderline cases
i.Lost and Found Objects- Art. 1159- As it is a wind fall acquisition, we have to
decide in favor of the communal property
ii.Damages to Bodily Injury- This is neither a wage nor an income from the effort of
either of the spouses.
iii.Moral compensation--- due to defamatory words, physical assault, physical
restraint
Arts. 57 and 58- Either of the spouses may assert sole ownership:
f. It was owned by him or her on or before the day on which the marriage was
celebrated.
g. It was donated exclusively to him or her after the marriage was celebrated.
h. It was bequeathed exclusively to him or her after the marriage was
celebrated.
i. It was acquired by means of exchange of property which belonged to him or
her personally.
j. It was purchased with money owned by him or her personally, or,
k. It ws acquired with money derived from the alienation of property owned by
him or her personally.
51
That is, even if a certain property is registered in the name of the spouse the
legal presumption is equally applicable. This element is not included under Art.
653 of the Civil Code.
although a property is registered in one of the spouses, this cannot be a
conclusive evidence to show that the property is personal. It requires additional
evidence.
Form this we can say that the family law provisions shall prevail over
ownership certificate given by the concerned government organ.
The presumption laid down, by the law is also equally applicable to third
parties.
As a result of this presumption of the law, every one can assume any property in
the possession of the spouses as common property of the same.
52
Art. 656 (1) entrusts to the husband the power to administer the common
property of the spouses.
Article 66 – Administration of Common Property
If one of the spouses is given a power to administer common property, what will
the scope of such power?
In my opinion, Art. 67 by itself tells us the scope of the power to be exercised
by the agent when it says “the spouse who performs an act of management …”
(Emphasis supplied).
If the agency receiving spouse is conferred with an agency expressed in general
terms he/she would only be performing acts of management/ordinary
administration in relation to the common properties of the spouses. (Art. 2203 of
the Civil Code), Acts of management per the provisions of Art. 2204 are:
1. Acts done for the preservation or maintenance of property, leases not exceeding
three years, the collection of debts, the investment of income, and the discharge
of debts shall be deemed to acts of management.
2. The sale of crops, goods intended to be sold or perishable commodities shall be
deemed to be acts of management.
This argument is supported by Art 68 that requires the consent of both spouses to
perform the acts there in or extra – ordinary administration, such as alienation.
One spouse alone can not perform the transactions under Art. 68.
If the spouse conferring agency, on the other hand, is expecting the agency
receiving spouse to perform acts other than acts of management such as sale of
immovable the agency to be conferred must necessarily be special agency.
53
Special agency, as it transpires from the Code, is an agency not expressed in
general terms and that does not expressly mention the acts listed in Art. 2205 of
the Civil Code.
Incidentally, it is also important to note that for one of the spouses to peform the
activities listed under Art. 68 of the RFC, he/she needs to be conferred with a
special agency though some of the acts mentioned under Art. 68 of the RFC fall
within acts of management as listed under Art 2204 of the Civil Code.
Art. 69- effect to contracts or acts done with out securing the consent of the other
spouse as required by Art. 68.
aims at striking the balance between the interest of the spouses and family and
security of commercial transaction
fixing a shorter period of time for invalidation of such an obligation seems that
since the spouses are presumed to live together, both know what is going on their
common property or even if for one reason or another both do not know the daily
state of their property, two years is a fair period to enable the consenting spouse to
be aware of such facts and if after being aware of the circumstance such a spouse
54
kept quite for six months, the presumption is that he/she has tacitly accepted the
obligation.
If however, the non-consenting spouse didn’t come to know the existence of the
obligation within two years he/she can’t in any manner revoke it.
The remedy in such case is to claim indemnity up on divorce per Art. 87 of the
RFC provided of course, that the divorce is declared within five years since the
obligation has come to existence. This seems to prevent the non-consenting
spouse from unjustifiably benefiting from the conduct which has been tolerated
for years.
There fore, every act relating to all common property requires the consent of the
spouses.
Doesn’t it amount to redundancy to select some acts under Art. 68 and put the
requirement of both spouses to perform them.
Under the Civil Code, Art. 658 (a similar provision) is important as common
property is administered by the husband; putting some restraint against such
power is undoubtly important.
Debts
Art. 70 – Debts of spouses
Art. 71 – Debts in the Interest of Household
55
Common debt -The Amharic version of Art. 70 (2) provides that common debt
may be recovered from common property, and in the absence of such common
property, it may be recovered on the personal property of one of the spouses.
Hence if a creditor of a common debt brings a direct action against personal
property of either of the spouses, each spouse may raise the defense of benefit of
discussion (direct your request 1st from common property)
56
CHAPTER FIVE
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE AND ITS EFFECTS
To be more specific, at the end of this chapter, the student will be able to:
l. Identify causes of dissolution of marriage;
m. Explain the two ways by which divorce shall be declared;
n. Understand as to how the pecuniary relationship of the spouses shall be
liquidated.
Declaration of absence
As provided under Art. 154 (1) of the Civil Code, where a personal has
disappeared and has given no news of himself for two years, any interested party
may apply to the court to declare his absence. And it is also given that the court
shall declare the absence where the death of the absentee appears it to be
probable. (Art. 157 (1) of the (Civil Code).
Does the declaration of absence result in the automatic dissolution of the marriage of the
absentee with out any other formality or does dissolution of marriage require further
formality after the declaration of absence like making an application to the court to
dissolve the marriage?
Art. 163 (1) of the Civil Code allows the automatic dissolution of marriage of the
absentee when the judgment declaring absence becomes final.
57
5.2. Divorce as a Cause of Dissolution of Marriage
Art. 117 of the RFC provides that only the court is competent to decide on
divorce.
Rules of divorce under the revised family code are liberalized.
Without classifying causes of divorce as serious and others, it is able to get
divorce even by mutual consent of the spouses.
The Civil Code follows a fault-based divorce system Art. 665 CC provides that
divorce by mutual consent is not permitted by law.
The Code classified causes of divorce in to serious and other causes. The
existence or non-existence of serious cause is relevant in determination of the
condition on which divorce is ordered and effects of divorce.
When there is a serious cause for divorce, it shall be pronounced within one
month from the petition; however, when divorce is pronounced for other causes, it
shall be pronounced within one year from the petition for divorce (Art. 668 cum.
678 (1) of the civil code).
Moreover, the liquidation of pecuniary relations is highly affected by the
existence or non – existence of a serious case. In case where divorce is declared
due to serious cause of divorce imputable to a spouse, the spouse at fault may be
condemned to the extent of forfeiting the whole of the common property to the
other (innocent) spouse. (Art 693 (1) of the CC). Where, on the other hand, the
divorce is not ordered for a serious cause, the penalties mentioned herinabove
shall be imposed to the spouse who has made the petition for divorce (Art. 694 of
the CC).
Why the new law opted for the liberalization of divorce rules? Doesn’t it go
against the responsibility of state to maintain the stability of marriage? The
possible rational behind the reform are:
a) Marriage is a result of consensual relationship of two parties. If the consent of one
of the parties completely disappear so does the marriage. If the legislature narrows
58
down the grounds or even if the legislature wants to have causes for dissolution, it
is in a way violating right of a person to marry.
b) The belief that the test for successful marriage was its durability is found out to be
wrong. If the law stick families together, despite the fact that they run out of love, it
would have a negative effect on future spouses for they might not be motivated or
encouraged to conclude marriage.
c) The other area that provokes the legislature’s and the women’s right activists
towards the reform is the issue of children. If the law forced the spouses to live
together where there is no love, respect to each other and affection, then the
children may end up in psychological trauma and unhealthy state of mind.
Art.77- prerequisites
if the law allows divorce by mutual consent, according to Art. 77 (1), the spouses
can not end their marriage without the knowledge and approval of a court of law.
Should agree on Consequences of divorce. Liquidation of pecuniary relation,
determining the custody of children.
Art. 77 (2) shows that divorce by mutual consent is not permitted for all spouses.
….lasted for less than six months are not permitted to divorce by mutual consent,
they can avail them selves of divorce by petition.
…are not obliged to state the reason thereof (Art. 77 (3)).
59
------ is not contrary to law and morality. (Ar. 80 (1)). For instance if the
divorceagreement is procured as a result of fraud or violence, the court shall not
approve the agreement. More over, one of the spouses may intend to get divorce
while the other spouse is seriously sick or in another difficult situation,
there may not be prior knowledge as to the intention of one of the party to
institute divorce. Even if there is, there might not be consensus as to the
dissolution of the marriage by divorce and the effect thereof
the role of the court is not limited to approval of the divorce agreement.
It shall also attempt to rectify defects in the marriage by the assistance of the
spouses and arbitrators.
two points:
are not mandatorily required to state why they petition for divorce
whether divorce can be conducted through an agent?
The law is silent
whatever is not explicitly prohibited should be deemed to have been permitted
A look at Art. 82 (1) of the RFC seems not to allow representation when it
provided that the court should speak to the spouses separately or jointly with the
view to persuade
Per Art. 78 (1), the same is true for cases where the spouses submit their petition
for divorce by mutual consent.
By the same token, divorce by representation shall be allowed only in exceptional
situation when the spouses can not appear personally.
60
Role/duties of the court
Shall speak to the spouses separately or jointly with a view of persuading them to
(Art. 82 (1))
May direct the spouses to settle their dispose through arbitrators of their own
choice. If the case is referred to family arbitrators, it will be the power of the
court to accept the report of the family arbitrators and to give guidelines to the
same as envisaged under Arts. 119 – 122 of the RFC.
the court may dismiss the parties by giving them a cooling period of up to three
months. (Art. 82 (3)).
The court shall pronounce divorce within one month from the date of receipt of
the report of the arbitrators, or the end of the cooling period as the case may be
(Art. 82 (4)).
Under the Civil Code a party who requests divorce may be punished. The
punishment may be effected at the time of partition of property between the
spouses. As indicated under Art. 694 (1) of the Civil Code, a spouse who petition
for divorce on non serious causes may be penalized to the extent of losing the
whole of the common property to the other spouse. Under the Revised Family
Code too the concept of indemnity is included. But unlike the Civil Code, the
spouse who may be required to indemnify the other spouse is the one who
61
commits a misconduct which is the cause of the divorce as opposed to the spouse
who petition for divorce.
Article 84 – Indemnities
a party who claims indemnity should disclose the reason or cause of the divorce.
the damage to be made good may be moral or material damage or both.
The extent of compensation shall be resolved having regard to law of extra –
contractual liability
Material damage- 20290 and (Art 2102 (1) of CC).
Mora damage-2105 and ff
Provisions of indemnities (Art 84) is located under the section dealing with
divorce by petition.
Doesn’t it mean issues of indemnity may not arise in case where divorce is
requested by mutual consent? As its very name implies, divorce by mutual
consent of the spouses is an agreement to disagree. The source of disagreement
may also be the fault or misconduct of one of the spouses. So long as the other
spouse is able to prove the existence of damage, nothing will prohibit him from
demanding compensation.
62
Roles of family arbitrators
Under the Civil Code (Arts. 677 – 679), family arbitrators were given a number of
powers including passing decision on divorce.
Of course, contradictory views have been forwarded during discussing the draft
Revised Family Code as to whether the institution of family arbitrators should be
accorded legal recognition.
On the one hand, it has been argued that the institution of family arbitrators has to be
accorded legal recognition on the following grounds.
since members of the family arbitrators are close relatives or neighbors of the
spouses, they will exert all possible efforts to reconcile the spouses. So, in view of
the government’s policy to maintain marriage, this traditional institution of family
arbitrators should be backed by the law.
Since members of the arbitrators are the spouses close relatives or neighbors, the
parties would not be ashamed of disclosing the facts which they may not explain
to court, but which if disclosed may save the marriage from divorce.
Since adjudication of family matters by arbitrators doesn’t require representation
of lawyer, the spouses can settle their dispute with low cost.
It is a deep rooted Ethiopian culture to adjudicate cases through arbitrators and
this practice should be encouraged.
In view of the congestion of cases in regular courts, authorizing the family
arbitrators to handle family cases would help regular courts dispense justice duly.
On the other hand, against recognition of the institution, it has been argued that:
Family arbitrators intentionally delay cases for the sake of allowance which
clearly jeopardizes the interest of the spouses.
Since they have no legal knowledge required by law, leaving such institution as
marriage at the hand of these lay men would adversely affect the parties to it and
is against the constitutional protection of the institution of marriage.
Since the institution of family arbitrators takes the power of the courts its
constitutionality is questionable.
63
Under the Revised Family Code disputes are divided into two categories; namely,
disputes arising during marriage and divorce.
As per Art. 117, only the court is competent to decide on divorce, decide or approve the
effects of divorce in accordance with Art 83 of this Code.
Disputes arising during marriage, i.e., dispute short of divorce and the effect there of shall
be decided by arbitrators chosen by the spouses (Art. 118 (1).
Revised Family Code is also departed from the civil code as regards the number
and compositions of arbitrators. Under the Civil Code, family arbitrators are
appointed two from the side of the husband and two from the side of the woman.
But such composition is found out to be the source of complexity of many cases
as arbitrators from the husband side far our the husband and arbitrators from the
woman side favour the woman. To avoid this problem, under the RFC, all the
arbitrators shall be appointed by the mutual consent of the spouses. Their number
may also be less or greater than four in so far as the spouses agree on this point.
Family arbitrators still play a vital role in reconciling the spouses but not deciding
on divorce. Arbitrators, under the Revised Family Code, are responsible to
reconcile spouses who petition for divorce. (look Art. 118 above).
However, the responsibility of the arbitrators is subject to the close scrutiny of the
court.
64
Where it deems necessary, the court may also examine the progress of the
arbitration and make orders for submission of periodical reports there on (Art. 119
(3)
contract of marriage
agreement of this sort after their wedding approved by court
spouses to agree how their pecuniary relations shall be liquidated after divorce
upon the request and approval of the court. (Art. 83 (1) & (3).
There is a restriction to such contractual right, that is, the spouses, by their
agreement cannot set aside indemnity provisions (Art. 85 (1))
Indemnity/compensation provisions: Art 84, 87
65
priority right to the wife? Under the Civil Code, only the husband was authorized
to administer their common property.
2. Payment of debt, Art. 89- Since common debts are incurred in the interest of the
house hold, it is a plane fact that they shall be paid from common property before
partition (Art. 70 (2) cum Art. 71). The problem is as to whether personal debts shall
be paid from common property within the meaning of Art 89 where such debt is due
after dissolution of marriage and before partition of common property. Here, we have
two lines of arguments.
The first argument- it shall be paid from common property where the indebted spouse
doesn’t have personal property or his personal property is not sufficient to cover his
debt. (Art. 70 (1) It is also argued that Art. 89 simply says “ … such debt shall be paid
before partition of property.” (Emphasis added). Since it refers to all debts
The second argument is that Art. 89 shouldn’t be interpreted to included the payment
of personal debt from common property. Art 70 (1)…. shall be interpreted to be
applicable where the maturity date of the personal debt is before dissolution of the
marriage. The former spouses are not duty bound to support and assist each other.
How the law protects creditors where the maturity date of either personal or common
debt is after dissolution of marriage and partition of common property? Art. 93 has an
explicit answer for this question.
Article 93 – Debts of Spouses after Dissolution of the Marriage
66
CHAPTER SIX
PROOF OF MARRIAGE
admissible evidences to prove the existence of marriage
6.1. Certificate of Marriage (Art. 94)
67
However, having appreciated this problem under the Civil Code, the supreme
court had made a directive (Directive No. July 5, 1989; Ethiopian Supreme Court
on Proof of Marriage) by virtue of its power under proclamation No. 9/1987.
The Directive had made it clear that proof of marriage is the act of proving the
celebration of marriage,. The petitioner who alleges the existence of marriage and
wants to prove it by possession of status shall prove under which of the three
forms of marriage has been celebrated.
There is also another line of argument, which states that since Art. 96 is clear,
there is no need of interpretation and we should apply the law as it is.
The advocates of this argument lay their foundation on the fact that when the
legislature enacted the law it had taken into consideration the problems of getting
eye witnesses who can testify the celebration of the marriage.
68
CHAPTER SEVEN
IRREGULAR UNION
This cohabitation is known by various names under various jurisdictions
including common law marriage, defacto relationship, non–marital relationship,
cohabitation and concubine.
Thus, at the end of this chapter, the student will be able to:
Define irregular union;
Explain the justifications given to include irregular union under the RFC;
Compare and contrast marriage and irregular union;
List the effects of irregular union;
Identity the modality of proof of irregular union; and
Understand as to how irregular union may be terminated.
69
For the existence of irregular union, the behavior of the man and the woman
should be analogous to married couples though the parties need not represent
themselves to third parties as being married. (Art. 99 (1) and (2). It means that the
parties need not introduce themselves to their relatives or the community as
having concluded a formal marriage; rather it is the latter who should consider the
parties as being married from their conduct.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the constitution neither expressly
recognized nor prohibited irregular union
70
Neither does it reduces the sanctity of marriage as the law does not treat the two
on equal footing.
the practice might be against the cultural and religions norms of the society. To
deny it legal recognition is to deny the objective reality.
denying legal recognition to the union would adversely affect the interest of
particularly women and children born out of such union.
the Constitution extends legal recognition to the family irrespective of the manner
in which it is formed. (Art. 34 (1) of the FDRCE constitution)
71
Of course, even under the Civil Code, up on the termination of the union the man
may be ordered to pay to the woman an indemnity corresponding to not more than
six months maintenance (Art. 717 (2)
The law singled three years for creation of common property because it will be
difficult to ascertain the very existence of irregular union unless the partness live
at least for three years.
In this connection, it should also be borne in mind that though common property
is not created for failure to meet the three years requirement, there might be a
possibility of formation of joint ownership.
Once it is proved that the parties lived together for three years in the relationship,
the effect of common property applies retroactively and properties they acquired
even in the first year of the relationship are considered to be common property
(Art. 102 (2))..
Art. 102 (3), the credit of joint and several debtrs have different options. That is
he can demand payment either from the man or the woman individually or
collectively.
The mode of payment of a debt indicated under Art. 102 (3) is applicable where
the cohabitees did not live at least for three years.
72
If the man and the woman engaged in an irregular union have lived for not less
than three years, payment either common or personal debt shall be governed by
Art. 103, not be Art 102 (3).
73
CHAPTER EIGHT
FILIATION
exclusively to the immediate relationship of father and mother with their child
ascertainment of filiations is essential for the father, mother or their children to
avail oneself of the legal effects of filiations such as succession and maintenance.
74
The establishment of maternity is the creation of the legal bond as a result of
birth. Where as proof of maternal filiation, is a means by which a person purports
to prove an already established filiation.
By the sole fact of birth
Maternity can’t be established via acknowledgment.
The need for the voluntary declaration of paternity rests on the objective problem
of ascertaining ones actual biological father.
75
To avoid the problem in determining paternity, the law opted for enumerating all
possible ways by which paternity may be known.
Article 125 – Paternal filiation (ways of ascertaining paternity)
Arts. 126 and 130, a child in order to be protected by the legal presumption must
meet either of the two requirements. He must either be born or conceived in
wedlock. Here in under is a separate discussion of these alternatives.
A) The first alternative for the operation of the presumption of paternity is that of
being born in a legally recognized union (wedlock or irregular union).
This obviously refers to the time within which the spouses were in the status of
being married.
This begins from the time of celebration and ends when the marriage is dissolved
Ethiopian law of filiation therefore attributes paternity to the husband of the wife
if the child is born from her within this period.
proof of pre-marital conception neither destroys nor weaken the presumption.
have been done on the ground that a person marries a pregnant woman, if it is he
that impregnated her
B. The second alternative for the operation of the presumption of paternity is that of
being conceived in a legally recognized union.
Particularly, if a child is not born in wedlock
Pursuant to Art. 128 (1), a child is deemed to have conceived in wedlock if
he is born more than 180 days after the celebration of the marriage and
within 300 day after its dissolution.
Art 128 (1) simply defines the shortest and the longest period of
pregnancy which may be useful in case where paternity is to be
ascertained by judicial declaration and in case of disowning.
76
The presumption of paternity based on conception is paramount important
for those born after the dissolution of marriage.
(Art. 128 (2)). That is, the period of pregnancy can not be rebutted saying
that it is shorter or greater than the legally stipulated one.
Art 127 (1) which provides the application of the presumption what ever
the manner in which the maternal filiation of the child may have been
established (proved, i.e Art. 154 – 162).
But what is the justification to presume the husband to be the father of the child?
Even if the child is conceived or born in a legally recognized union, the husband
may not be presumed as a father if the same is declared absent within the meaning
of Art. 129.
important for children born or conceived out side of a legally recognized union
(Art. 131).
77
To avoid the possibility of having two fathers for a child, Art. 142…. no other
acknowledgement of the child by another man shall be permitted unless the first
acknowledgement has been annulled.
But what if the legally presumed father disowns the child as per Art. 167 and the
following?
The literal interpretation of Art. 131 seems exclude children that were conceived
or born in wedlock but were disowned.
However, it is more tenable to argue that where a child is disowned,
acknowledgement must be possible in as far as the law aims to avoid
fatherlessness.
The fact of declaration of the man before officer of civil status that he is the father
of the child amounts to acknowledgement seems to imply the possibility of oral
acknowledgement. However, since such declaration, though not written by the
man is reduced to writing by the said officer, it is not meant to enshrine oral
acknowledgement.
The rest elements clearly refers to the written form.
The explanatory material of the RFC categorizes documents relating to
employment contract and pension documents attested by competent authority
though the list is not exhaustive.
Owing to this open-ended provision, federal courts are recognizing documents
registered in the acts and documents office, insurance policy made by the alleged
father in favor of the child etc as documents attested by competent authority.
78
Other than those mentioned above, other personal documents such as letters and
correspondences written by the man, supplying maintainance to the child and
introducing to the child for others as his own child do not constitute
acknowledgement.
But such situations, even if they are not sufficient to show acknowledgement may
serve as a ground for judicial declaration of paternity.
---
Art. 136 (1)- In effect the mother is required to attest that such a man could
possibly be the father of a child and a person could possibly be a father if he had
sexual intercourse with the mother of the child at the time when the child could
have possibly been conceived, i.e., between 300th and 180th days before the birth
of the child.
With regard to the age of the child that will be acknowledged, the law does not
enshrine any limitation .
Nevertheless, an acknowledgement of paternity shall be of no effect unless it has
been accepted by the child himself when it is made after the latter has attained
majority. (Art. 137)
A child who has attained majority is a grown up child and he may not need some
one who cares for him. Particularly, a man who did not participate in his
upbringing upto now may acknowledge him for his own advantage. For instance,
such man may claim maintenance from the child. The child who did not accept
acknowledgement shouldn’t be imposed of such an obligation.
79
Art. 139-Why do you think the legislature prohibited the acknowledgement of
dead child?
Acknowledging an already dead child will have no any significance for the dead
child.
If the law allows such acknowledgement, persons may try to unduly acknowledge
dead children in pursuit of their own advantages (for example, to get benefits
from the succession of the child).
This is justifiable exception because the descendants of the dead child will benefit
from the acknowledgement as the right of their deceased father shall be
transferred to them.
80
8.1.2.3. Judicial Declaration of Paternity
Art. 125 (3): Conditions:
1. If the child has no presumptive father, disowned by such father and not
acknowledged.
2. Either one of the five conditions under Art. 143 are fulfilled. As indicated under
Art 145, judicial declaration of paternity shall no be demanded or made except in
specified under Art 143 of this code.
The RFC departed from the Civil Code with respect to grounds that entail judicial
declaration of paternity.
Under Art. 758 of the Civil Code, judicial declaration of paternity may be
obtained where the mother of the child has been the victim of the abduction or
rape….
.Art. 759, it is only by the mother of the child or if she is not in a position to
manifest her will, by the guardian of the child that such case is instituted.
The action can not be instituted two year after the birth of the child or after the
sentence of a criminal court in relation to the abduction or rape. However,
conviction for these crime is not a necessary condition for institution of an action
for declaration of paternity for the purpose and standard of proof of the two
actions are different.
the RFC has come up with additional grounds for judicial declaration of paternity.
the RFC doesn’t enshrine a period of limitation within which an action for judicial
declaration of paternity may be brought.
Nor does it specify a person entitled to bring an action. In the absence of clear
stipulation, one can possibly argue that the action for declaration of paternity may
be brought at any time and by any interested person.
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the mother has been the victim of abduction or rape at the time of conception
no consensus among lawyers as to the type of evidence that shall be adduced to
prove the act of abduction or rape.
Some argue that the only admissible evidence to declare paternity is the judgment
of the court showing that the alleged defendant has committed the crime of
abduction or rape.
According to this position, criminal conviction is a precondition for the civil
bench to declare that the accused is the father of the said child.
Others argue that conviction for the crime of rape or abduction is not a necessary
condition for institution of an action for declaration of paternity for the purpose
and standard of proof of evidence of the two actions are different. What the
plaintiff is required to prove is only the facts and not any more.
even if a man commits an act of rape or abduction, he may not be declared by the
court to be the father of the child if such acts are done against a married woman
because the child will have a legally presumed father within the meaning of Art.
126.
Moreover, the time of conception of the child shall coincide with the day on
which an act of rape or abduction has been committed.
how could we calculate the time of conception? In the absence of clear answer
under Art 143 (a), we may resort to Art 168 pursuant to Art 168, period of
conception is the period between the 300th and 180th day before the birth of the
child. Thus, it must be proved that the man has abducted or raped the woman
within 300th and 180th day before the birth of the child.
For instance, let us assume that the child is born on Hamle 10, 1997 E.C. In this example,
the 180th and 300th days preceding the birth of the child are Tir 10, 1997 E.C. and
Meskerem 10, 1997 E.C. If the plaintiff proves that an act of rape is committed on
Tahisas 18, 1997 E.C, his/her claim will be acceptable because this date is between the
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300th and 180th date preceding the birth of the child. Look at the following diagram to
have a better understanding.
Meskerem 10, 1997 Tir 10, 1997 the 180th date Hamle 10, 1997
The 300th date preceding birth preceding birth date of birth of the
Child
Seduction of the mother accompanied by abuse of authority, promise of marriage or any
other similar act of intentional deception
Websters Dictionary define, seduction as the act of persuading or enticing in to
partnership in sexual inter course.
A mere seduction does not suffice for declaration of paternity. In stead, the
seduction must be accompanied by those acts mentioned here in above.
It seems that the man need not be a top official to be an authority.
It suffices if there is hierarchy of authority between him and the mother of the
child which may among other things, emanate from employment contract. Even
seduction by a person whom the woman owes reverential fear could fall under
this category.
Letters or other documents written by the claimed father, which unequivocally proves
paternity
such letters and documents need not contain express declaration of the man that
the child is his.
It is not also necessary that the letters are directly addressed to the mother.
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What is important for the purpose of this provision is that these letters and other
documents should show the relationship of the mother and the father or of him
and the child which leads to a conclusion that the child is fathered by such man.
The claimed father and the mother of the child have lived together in a continuous sexual
relation
For how long should the parties live in such type of relationship so that it amounts
to “continuous sexual relationship”? In view of the fact that conception is a matter
of seconds or minutes, it appears that the period should not necessarily be counted
in terms of months, weeks or days for that matter. However, since the law aims at
identifying the biological father of the child, the continuity element is important.
If, however, the woman can conclusively prove that she didn’t have sexual
intercourse with any other person within such period, living in a sexual
relationship of even days suffices for the purpose of Art 143 (a) of the RFC.
Participation in the maintenance, care and education of the child by the alleged father
it may happen that the alleged father contributes for the maintenance of the child
but declines to acknowledge the child either because he believes that the child is
his and hence there is no further procedure required to father the child in the eyes
of the law or for fear of consequences of establishing paternity which, among
other things, gives rise to the right of inhentance and the possible opposition by
his wife, if any.
should the man cover the whole maintenance expense of the child so as to hold him father
of the child?
He should not, because from the wording of the provision it self “participation in
the maintenance of the child” .
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Art. 144. protects the alleged father from undue litigation of paternity.
a) should the court absolve such man from fathering the child for the mere fact that
the mother had sexual relation with another man also?
What is the fate of paternal filiations of the child in such cases? In as long as
the objective of the action is to search for the father of the child, if the alleged
father avails himself of the defenses provided earlier, it should be interpreted
as shifting the burden of proof that he is the father of the child. In such cases,
both or all men should be parties to the suit and one who is proved to be
sterile or can not give birth would be out of the suit. If both or all could give
birth to a child, DNA test might be used to identify the biological father.
The conflict of paternity arising in either of the aforementioned three situations has two
possible solutions.
The first solution is agreement between or among the presumed fathers, Art. 146.
no time limit for the conclusion of the agreement
Second, the law intervenes, Art, 148
a) The law doesn’t give us a solution where the mother has conceived or born the
child while she concluded two marriages or engaged in two irregular unions at the
same time
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b) The second presumption will apply only if the conflict can not get a solution
under the first presumption. The term “successfully” under Art 148 makes both
presumptions mutually exclusive. Had it not been for it, there could have existed
situations where both presumptions compete to governing the same conflict. This
is the case, for example, if we take a child born when the mother was in an
irregular union with “A” but before the 300th day after dissolution of his mothers
first marriage to “B”. The first presumption prefers the husband. Thus the child
will have B as a father. The reverse will be true if we apply the second
presumption. Thus the child will have A as a father in preference to B. The
mutually exclusive nature of the presumption has avoided such undesirable
results. Now the child will have A as a father because it is the second presumption
that is given priority. Therefore, the second presumption is applicable where the
mother terminated her first legally recognized union and engage in another
thereafter. That is, the two unions unlike case of presumption one, do not exist at
the same time. The husband or the man with whom the mother is living at the
time of birth is preferred as a father to the husband or the man with whom she was
living at the time of the conception. This is done to secure the interest of the child
and maintain the sustainability of the second union.
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Though assignment of paternity is found under the section of conflict of
paternity, it is not in reality a mechanism for solving conflict of paternity in the
strict sense.
The child is attributed to one father but such a father agrees to give up his
paternity in favour of a third person who declares to be the father but is not legally
the father of the child.
Therefore, the assignment of paternity is the possible way where by the father
short of the facts sufficient for disowning a child he thinks is born from another
man, assigns his paternal status to the person declaring to be the father, who is not
in a position of affecting acknowledgement because the child has a valid paternal
filiation by presumption of paternity.
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The term “in default” under Art 155 shall be interpreted so as to include the non-
issuance of record of birth at all or an already issued record of birth has been lost
for various reasons.
Since Art. 156 doesn’t expressly put a certain number of witnesses, one can say
that possession of status can be proved even by producing three or two witnesses
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No period of limitation
any other person that can show interest
The only valid limitation is that the action to contest filiation may not be instituted
except with the permission of the court (Art. 164 (1)).
But why the law requires permission of the court to institute the action to claim
filiation? We can cite the following two reasons.
1. On the basis of an action to contest filiations, the court may deny that the said
woman is not the mother of the child. If this is so, it may also render the child
fatherless. Because, as we have seen, maternal filiation is the base for paternal
filiation. Thus, if the child is denied his maternity, it gives rise to denial of
paternity particularly where the child is born or conceived out of a legally
recognized relationship.
2. This kind of action is brought to cancel an already established filiation. If such an
action is allowed to be instituted without the permission of the court, individuals
in bad faith would be given an opportunity to disturb stable mother child
relationship.
grant for permission to institute an action to contest the maternal filiation
Art. 164 (2), --- there are presumptions or indications resulting from concrete
facts enabling the court to grant permission.
----resulting from concrete facts that enable the court to presume a certain woman
is not the mother of a certain (child).
These indications could be at the time of birth of the child, the woman may not be
available at the place of the birth of the child. Or the woman could not be the
mother of the child due to infertility, etc.
Once the person is allowed to institute an action to contest maternal filiation, he
shall produce witnesses to obtain court declaration.
In general, he has to prove that either of the elements necessary for the
establishment of maternal filiation are missing.
Thus the person instituted an action has to show to the court either 1) that the
woman was not confined at the time when the child was born and / or 2) even if
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the woman was confined at the time when the child was born, the child whom,
she delivered is not the one whose status is in question.
Therefore, the fact that the court allows to institute an action to contest maternal
filiation is not sufficient by itself to efface all doubt and convince the court. The
proof thus commenced may be completed by the hearing of witnesses.
But the court can by no means give permission for the institution of the action if
the child whose status is contested has a filiation resulting from the record of birth
and is corroborated by a possession of status corresponding with such record of
birth (Art. 165)
8.5.2. Disowning
an action by which the husband or the man in irregular union tries to disclaim the
presumption of paternity established against him, in circumstances in which he
can not be the father.
In short, disowning is the means by which a paternal filiation is contested.
An action to disown is relevant when paternity is established by way of legal
presumption
There are two grounds, for the man who is attributed paternity, to disown a child. These
are:
1. No sexual intercourse with the mother, 168-169
2. When paternity is impossible, 170-173
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To disown a child on this ground, it suffices to show the impossibility of
paternity.
As opposed to the first ground, the action to disown based on the second ground
may not be instituted except with the permission of the court (Art. 171).
The scrutiny of the court is required to narrow the possibility of fatherlessness.
The court gives its permission when there are presumptions or serious indications
resulting from sufficient and reliable facts enabling the court to accept the action
(Art. 171 (2).
The presumptions and serious indications are those indicated under Art 172.
Art. 172 (1)- Examples of physical characteristics of the child incompatible with those of
the father could be:
o. if a white child with blonde hair and blue eyes is born of Ethiopia parents; or
p. if the blood test of the child gives a negative result.
Art 172 (2)- When the mother conceals the birth of the child or of her pregnancy
from the presumptive father, there is a strong presumption that she had sexual
relation with another person and also that the child is not that of the husband or
that of the man in an irregular union with her. This fact alone will create a doubt
as regards his paternity.
The adultery of the mother or her admission that the child has another father are
not sufficient, by themselves, to constitute serious circumstantial evidence. (Art.
173). However the commission of adultery or the admission of the mother if
followed by other corroborating facts which can put the paternity of the
presumptive father in question, the court will allow the latter to institute action to
disown. For example, if the mother’s adultery is corroborated by the fact that the
presumed father uses contraception or the conditions under Art. 172, this can be
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considered as a presumption and serious circumstantial evidence to grant
permission.
Are we to say that the above discussed circumstances are the only ones to grant
permission of the court?
There is no provision expressly excluding other grounds than the expressly given
ones.
Even the wording of Art. 172 (1) when it says “the presumptions and serious
indications may consists of …” seems to be illustrative. As a result, other
evidences
An example of this kind could be the presumptive father’s sterility.
At this juncture, it must be noted that admission of action does not necessarily
complete the action.
It is only after admission that the presumptive father will be allowed to adduce
proof of his being not the father of the child.
In this mode of disowning, as Art. 170 requires, the presumptive father must
decisively show that he is not the father of the child in the particular case.
If he is expected to show decisively his being not the father, mere doubt as
regards his paternity won’t suffice to complete the action.
For example, the exclusionary blood typing mechanisms are in some jurisdictions
taken to be conclusive to disown a child. So after admission, the presumptive
father must convince the court without a reasonable doubt as he is not the father
by any evidence at his disposal.
it is the interest of all concerned that an action for disowning shall be brought
without delay.
The law prescribes a period of limitation within which an action for disowning
shall be brought, Art. 176 (1)
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So, if the presumptive father was around at the time of birth of a child, he shall
bring an action within six months as of the date of birth of the child. If, on the
other hand, the presumptive father came to know the birth of the child some times
after the birth of the child for he was not around at the time of birth, the 6 months
period shall be calculated as of the date of his knowledge.
Once all the procedural requirements of the law are met the presumptive father
will be allowed to disown the child if he establishes the facts necessary to sustain
the action to disown.
There is, however, one instance in which case suit for disowning will not be
permitted even if the procedural as well as the substantive requirements of the law
are met.
This instance is Art. 178 which provides “disowning shall not be allowed where it
is proved that the child has been conceived by means of artificial insemination
with the written consent of the husband.”
There are two commonly used types of artificial insemination These are:
1. Artificial insemination with the husband’s semen, commonly termed as AIH
(Artificial Insemination Husband). This method is usually applied when the
presumptive father is impotent or unable to engage in sexual act.
2. Artificial insemination with the semen of a third-party donor, commonly termed
as AID (Artificial Insemination Donor). This method is performed probably due
to the presumptive father’s sterility. Although a sterile is able to engage in sexual
act he can not impregnate a woman.
Article 178 is particularly referring to the AID types because in the first situation
(AIH) the husband can not disown the child for there would be a compatibility
between the presumption and the biological fact. The father will not be in a
position to decisively prove the absolute impossibility of his paternity.
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Thus when AID is applied the semen used is the semen of third party donor. In
this case, it may arise a question of paternity. Art. 178 resolves this issue by
attributing the paternity of this child conceived as a result of artificial
insemination to the presumptive father who has consented in a written form for
the carrying out of this insemination.
CHAPTER NINE
ADOPTION
The third source of family relationship
The objectives of this unit:
Define adoption;
Explain the purpose of the institution of adoption;
Enumerate essential elements that the adoption agreement shall satisfy;
Discuss the legal consequences of adoption; and
Distinguish grounds on the basis of which adoption agreement can be revoked.
purpose of adoption
In earlier times, adoption was employed to secure to the adopter support in his old
age, or to provide him with an heir, or to prevent the extinction of his race, or to
perpetuate the performance of the family cults.
It also served to give sons to house holds which have daughters only, or daughters
to households which have son.
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In some societies, its purpose was to fill up vacancies caused by death so that the
person adopted shall take the deceased person’s place; to confer honour and
cement friendhip; to bring profit to the adoptive or natural parent, or both; to
recruit the ranks of a failing genes to tribe; and to avert ill – luck or to rick evil
spirits.
the principal purpose of adoption in early societies was to benefit the adopter and
was not viewed as an alternative means to the welfare of the adoptee.
The first half of the 20th century witnessed mass displacement of people and many
orphane children.
Where the adopter is married, an agreement of adoption may not be made unless
the two spouses conjointly adopt the child (Art. 186).
(Art. 186 (2))..because there already exists consanguineal relation
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From the adoptee side
The other party to the agreement is the guardian of the adopted child (Art. 190).
the father and the mother of the child are joint guardians of their minor children,
during their marriage.
Some times, the child may have a guardian different from his father or mother.
In such a case also the father and mother of the child are required to give their
consent to the adoption agreement, although they are not party to the agreement.
As the agreement of adoption requires the natural parents to surrender all parental
rights and duties they have over the child, it follows that the adoption may only be
valid where the natural patents, having full knowledge of the consequences…..
Sub-article 3 of Art 191… is justified where the parent has unreasonably
suspended his/her consent.
Its application is, however, doubtful where the refusing parent is capable, in every
aspect, of upbringing his child.
In other jurisdictions, there are also other circumstances which enable the courts
to dispense with the consent of natural parents.
For instance, consent of the natural parents is not required where they forfeit their
parental rights by their neglect of the child or by their misconduct towards their
child.
Perhaps the court may, in pursuit of the principle of the best interest of the child,
dispense the consent of the natural parent and approve the adoption.
Art. 192 (1) expressly stipulates that government or private orphanages may give
any child under their custody to adopters.
But this provision is not clear as to whose consent shall be given where the child
to be adopted is in the orphanage.
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Art. 190 stipulates that the agreement of adoption may be made between the
adopter and the guardian of the child
how can we apply Art 190 Vis -a-Vis article 192?
Can we say that the orphanage is the guardian of the orphaned child?
It may, however, be argued that the orphanage has, by virtue of article 192 (1),
got the capacity to enter into adoption agreement on behalf of the orphaned child
under its custody.
Currently, the government organ that has the power to follow up the well being of
children is Ministry of Women and Social Affairs
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The law does not say anything about maximum age of the adopter.
It seems that the courts will determine the maximum age of the adopter having
regarding to the circumstances of the case.
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9.2.2.4. Nationality of the Adopter
The Revised Family Code expressly stated that a foreign national may adopt a
child so long as other essential conditions of adoption are fulfilled.
But this does not mean that a special precaution is not made when the adopter is a
foreigner.
The law is much more strict in the adoption agreement, when the adopter is not an
Ethiopian and such adopter intends to take the child abroad. (Read Art. 193).
Art. 193 (1) (3) and Art 194 (3) (e) require that sufficient information should be
provided by a competent authority before the court approves the adoption.
Currently, the authority following the well being of children is the Ministry of
Women and Social Affairs.
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Thus, in accordance with the guideline a foreign applicant is eligible for adoption if
he/she is:
q. able to produce a document certifying that the applicants state law is
consistent with the legal requirements of Ethiopian adoption;
r. at least, twenty – five years of age;
s. able to produce a document from a competent and specified governmental
body certifying that he/she has an income that is sufficient to raise the child;
t. Free of any incurable and/or contagious disease and mental health problem.
u. Free from any criminal activities;
v. able to produce a marriage certificate if the applicant is married; and able to
produce a document certified by a relevant governmental body, indicating
the consent of the applicant’s spouse to adopt the child.
We can, therefore, say that the requirements set by the Ministry concerning inter
country adoptions are compatible with the requirements which the various
international conventions set.
In 2020, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Bench gave an interpretation to
the ban as not applicable to foreigners of Ethiopian origin (Wondossen Tadesse Yisma
et. al. File No 189201, March 11, 2020))
Further, in another recent decision, the Court extended the interpretation as not
applicable to foreigners who are adopting their Ethiopian spouse’s child(ren) ( W/ro.
Arsema Elias et.al case (File No 215383, May 30, 2022))
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Moreover, unless the maximum age of adoptee is restricted, his age may exceed
the age of the adopter in which case a sense of normal father /mother – child
relationship will be lost.
The adoptee shall be under guardianship.
Exceptionally, however, a person may be emancipated or be out of guardianship
administration even if he doesn’t attain the full age of 18.
There are two situations whereby a person who does not attained the age of 18
may be emancipated. Read the following articles from the Revised Family Code.
The law has not fixed the minimum age of the adoptee. A minor at any age may
be adopted.
The law even permits adoption of a merely conceived child subject to the
mother’s right of unilateral revocation within six months following the birth of the
child. (Art. 187).
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9.2.5. Approval of the Court
In other ordinary juridical acts, approval of the agreement by the court is not
essential condition of validity.
They shall be valid so long as the parties thereto agree and the agreement is
concluded in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the law.
An agreement of adoption shall be of no effect unless it is approved by the court
(Art. 194 (1)).
The court shall, in approving adoption, be guided by the principle of the “best
interest of the child” which lies at the foundation of the institution of adoption
(Art. 194 (2).
……based on their appreciation of the adopter’s personal, economic, social
condition, and other circumstances.
Should religious belief be considered as an element constituting the best interest
of the child? No doubt
Without prejudice to the general guidelines located under, Arts. 192, 193 and 194
(2) which the court shall verify before approving the agreement of adoption, the
same shall take the following in to consideration before such approval (Art. 194
(3))……
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The adoption is so complete that it severs all the relationship the adopted child has
towards his natural parents.
Incomplete adoption: the bond between the adopted child and his/her natural
family remains intact.
9.3.2.2. Rights and Duties of the Adoptive Parent and the Adopted Child
Adoption transfers the natural parents right of exclusive custody over the child to
the adoptive parent. After adoption, the adoptive parent will have custody of the
child, the right to control its education, the duty of obedience owing by the child,
and all other rights flowing from the natural parent – child relationship.
The adoptive parent shall, as of the adoption, assume the primary duty of support
of the child.
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The adopted child, too, has the same rights and duties a natural child has to wards
his natural parent.
He also owes to the adopting parent duties which he would otherwise owe to his
natural parent.
A question may, however, arise where the adopted child is not survived by the
adoptive parents but by his natural parents.
The competing claimants in this situation are the heirs and next of kin of the
already deceased adoptive parents and the natural parents of the adopted deceased
child.
Is the right of the natural parents still subordinate to the rights of the heirs of the
deceased adoptive parents?
The answer to the question again lies in Art. 183 (3).
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The term family is broad enough so as to include descendants and ascendants of
the adoptive parents.
Where the adopted parents of the deceased adopted child dies, they will be
represented for instance by their descendents to succeed the estate of the adopted
child.
The natural parents cannot claim the estate of their deceased child unless the
estate is to devolve up on the state.
The last point worth considering is the possibility of inheritance through the
adopted child; that is, by representation.
Where the adopted child dies during the life of the adopting parent leaving
descendants, whether such descendants are entitled to inherit from the estate of
the adoptive parents by way of representation is not answered in the Revised
Family Code.
It may be said that as the purpose of adoption is to create an artificial filiation
which takes after the natural bond of relationship, the descendants and spouse of
the adopted child shall be related as if they were related to the natural parents of
the adopted child.
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Where adoption fails to achieve its purpose, however, the best interest of the child
requires the adoption be revoked or terminated.
One should, however, ask as to whether adoption may be revoked on the ground
of fraud or duress where the child is comfortably placed and successfully
assimilated in the adoptive parents. The best interest of the child should guide
The revocation of adoption brings all the effect of adoption to an end. That means
the rights and obligations of the adopted and the adoptive parents towards each
other shall be extinguished.
CHAPTER TEN
OBLIGATION TO SUPPLY MAINTENANCE
one of the legal obligations which emanate from family relationship
Generally, a student who successfully complete the study of this unit will be able to:
Define the subject matter of obligation to supply maintenance;
Enumerate the persons between whom the obligation exists;
List conditions that must be fulfilled for the obligation to exist;
State the reasons why a person loses his right to be maintained; and
Elaborate as to how the obligation shall be executed.
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more persons. (Art. 820 C.C) An obligation to supply maintenance can be
included therein.
Moreover Art. 2558 of the Civil Code provides that where the worker loses half
or more of his capacity to work because of employment injury or disease, the
employer shall supply maintenance to minor children of the worker.
In rules of extra – contractual liability, the tort feasor may be obliged to supply
maintenance to the spouse and descendants of a person who died as a result of a
mortal accident (Art. 2095 C.C).
Art. 197
Art. 202 (2) provides that the amount of maintenance allowance shall also be
fixed by taking in to consideration the needs of the person claiming it and the
means of the person liable there to.
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Doe not totally arise between affinal relatives in the collateral line.
“without prejudice to the provisions of Article 49 (1) … “under Art 198 (1)
indicate? Art. 49 (1) mandatorily provides that the spouses owe each other
respect, support and assistance.
For example, while divorce proceeding is pending the court, under Art. 82 (5), is
expected to give appropriate order regarding the maintenance of the spouses.
The obligation to supply maintenance, in addition to relatives, exists between
spouses as long as the marriage is not dissolved.
exception
Art. 198 in conjunction with Art. 212 (1), the right of the adopted child is
restricted.
Art. 199
Art. 200)
In general, Art. 200 included a limitation against a creditor who in bad faith
commits or attempts to commit a crime against the debtor, his/her spouse and
relatives.
10.4. Conditions for the Existence of the Obligation and Its Execution
emanates from a legal relationship between the claimant (creditor) and the person
bound to supply maintenance (debtor) within the meaning of Art. 198.
Additional essential conditions for the obligation to exist.
We can classify the conditions for the existence of the right of maintenance into
two those attributable to the economic condition of the creditor. (Art. 201) and
those attributable to the economic position of the debtor. (Art. 202 (2)).
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Art. 201 of the RFC.. in need and not in a state of earning his livelihood by his
work
But the phrase “not in a state of earning his livelihood by his work” in Art. 201
may raise a question;
is it an actual incapacity to be engaged in whatever activity contemplated or does
it also include potential inability to work and help oneself?
By actual incapability it may mean the failure of a potentially productive and self
– helping individual in being engaged in any income earning activity for reasons
attributable not to his working ability but due to some other objective social and
economic conditions.
If the interpretation is widened so as to refer to both actual and potential ability to
work, the probability of the existence of the obligation will increase as the group
of beneficiaries may increase numerically.
A degree holder who does not have any kind of job is with full potential of
working capacity.
The claim should not threaten the economic or material well – being of the debtor.
Hence, for a creditor have a viable of maintenance against his debtor, the latter
must be economically better off.
Execution
We have two types.
Firstly, … fulfilled by means of maintenance allowance paid by the debtor to the
creditor for maintenance. (Art. 202 (1)).
It shall to the extent possible, be paid at a place convenient to the creditor (Art.
204).
Art. 203, the decision which fixed the amount of maintenance allowance or
residence of the creditor for maintenance may be reviewed….
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As the maintenance allowance is believed to be extremely necessary for the
survival of the creditor, it cannot be attached nor can it be assigned (Art. 205).
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relative up on whom the ultimate burden rests, there is an order of precedence that
we have to adhere. Read Art. 210 RFC).
The debtors for maintenance may validly agree, as regards their reciprocal
relations that maintenance shall be supplied to their common creditor by one of
them (Art. 211 (1))
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i