Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 1 of 84

1 Mark A. Hutchison (4639)

Shannon R. Wilson (9933)
2 Ramez Ghally (15225)
HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC
3
Peccole Professional Park
4 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200
Las Vegas, NV 89145
5 Tel: (702) 385-2500
Fax: (702) 385-2086
6 mhutchison@hutchlegal.com
swilson@hutchlegal.com
7
rghally@hutchlegal.com
8
Paul D. Clement (Virginia Bar No. 37195) (Pro Hac Vice Pending)
9 CLEMENT & MURPHY, PLLC
706 Duke Street
10 Alexandria, VA 22314
11 Tel.: (202) 742-8900
paul.clement@clementmurphy.com
12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
13
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
14

15 GREATER LAS VEGAS SHORT-TERM Case No.:

16 RENTAL ASSOCIATION; JACQUELINE
FLORES; LOUIS KOORNDYK; ESTRELITA
17 KOORNDYK; HAAN’S PROPERTIES LLC;
LK’S PROPERTIES LLC; THOMAS M. COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
18 MCKANNON, DEBRA HANSEN; JOHN AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
HANSEN, TROY UEHLING; PHILIP
19
JOHNSON; SAMUEL HANKINS; LISA
20 HANKINS; 5402 PALM MESA LLC; and
AIRBNB, INC.;
21

22 Plaintiffs,

23 v.

24 CLARK COUNTY, a political subdivision of

the State of Nevada, and AARON D. FORD, in
25 his official capacity as Attorney General for the
State of Nevada,
26
Defendants.
27

28
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 2 of 84

1 Plaintiffs Greater Las Vegas Short-Term Rental Association, Jacqueline Flores, Louis

2 Koorndyk, Estrelita Koorndyk, Thomas M. McKannon, Debra Hansen, John Hansen, Troy

3
Uehling, Philip Johnson, Samuel Hankins, Lisa Hankins, and Airbnb, Inc. file this complaint
4
against Defendants Clark County, Nevada Aaron D. Ford in his official capacity as Attorney
5
General for the State of Nevada, and allege as follows:
6
1 NATURE OF THE CASE
7

8 1. This suit challenges provisions of Clark County’s short-term rental regulatory

9 scheme and Nevada’s Assembly Bill 363 (“AB 363”) (codified in NRS 244.3531, et seq.) together,

10 the “Challenged Provisions”) on the basis that they unconstitutionally burden Plaintiffs’ property

11
and liberty rights guaranteed by U.S. and Nevada law.
12
2. By imposing such burdens, the Challenged Provisions upend the Country’s and
13
Nevada’s centuries-old commitment to property rights. To the founding generation, property was
14
the bedrock upon which economic and personal liberties were built. The Framers understood that
15

16 strong property rights served as a bulwark for individual liberty by providing a sanctuary within

17 which Americans would be free from the prying eyes of government officials. And they provided

18 a mechanism, building upon America’s essential entrepreneurial spirit, for citizens to seek

19
economic freedom by putting their property to productive uses.
20
3. These principles are at the foundation of our enduring practice of short-term
21
leasing. For centuries, Americans have leased their property to guests in search of a temporary
22

23 abode for work, for leisure, or for the expression of constitutional liberties. This practice is borne

24 out in case law describing a robust practice of leasing, but also historical and cultural studies that

25 describe a vibrant practice of hosting and including guests in one’s home on a short-term basis

26 through short-term leases.

27

28
2
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 3 of 84

1 4. The Challenged Provisions burden these fundamental rights and upend this

2 enduring tradition by making it unduly burdensome, and in some cases impossible, for Plaintiffs

3
and similarly situated Nevadans to operate their property as short-term rentals. They impose these
4
burdens through an arbitrary and onerous labyrinth of interlocking regulations. For example, the
5
Challenged Provisions:
6
● Appropriate property owners’ fundamental rights to lease and to include others on
7

8 their properties by enacting a byzantine licensing scheme that commences with a

9 random lottery system and then effectively bans the majority of all residents from
10 the opportunity to put their property to use as a short-term rental based on arbitrary
11
requirements including any property governed by a home owner association unless
12
the use is expressly permitted and limiting the number of licensees allowed to one
13
percent of the total number of housing units within an established unincorporated
14

15 area of the County;

16 ● Require property owners to obtain a separate business license, in addition to a short-

17 term rental license, and comply with an array of burdensome regulatory

18 requirements, including stifling occupancy restrictions;
19
● Impose arbitrary limitations on how close short-term rental units—defined as
20
residential lodging leased for thirty consecutive days or less, Clark County Code
21
§ 7.100.020(r)—can be to one another and ban any short-term rental within 2,500
22

23 feet of a resort hotel;

24 ● Provide arbitrary exemptions for hotel-operated short-term rentals in residential

25 properties, id. § 7.100.040(a)-(c);

26
● Empower local officials to engage in warrantless searches of short-term rentals; and
27

28
3
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 4 of 84

1 ● Permit officials to impose excessive and selectively enforced fines for violations of

2 these ordinances.
3
5. The Challenged Provisions further encumber Plaintiffs’ rights by imposing
4
unlawful and burdensome requirements on platforms, such as Airbnb, that assist residents in
5
getting their properties to the short term rental market. While these requirements are directed at
6
platforms, they also serve to further hamper individual property rights by throwing sand in the
7

8 gears of the short-term rental market. Under Clark County’s short-term rental regime, Airbnb is

9 forced to obtain a license in order to list properties in Clark County, and to agree to abide by a

10 series of “duties” in order to obtain the license. These require Airbnb to, for example, share

11
sensitive and confidential information regarding all Clark County listings and hosts, on a monthly
12
basis without appropriate legal process; and screen and monitor listings for short-term rental
13
licenses, and delete listings whose license cannot be verified as valid.
14

15 6. Individually, each Challenged Provision makes operating a short-term rental in

16 Clark County unduly burdensome—and thereby independently infringe on property owners’

17 rights. Together, they constitute an all-sides attack on the property and liberty guarantees protected

18 by Nevada and U.S. law. Indeed, for many Clark County residents, the Challenged Provisions will

19
make operating a short-term rental impossible altogether.
20
7. As a result, the Challenged Provisions strip Plaintiffs of their core property rights
21
to lease and to include others on their properties without just compensation; violate Plaintiffs’
22

23 deeply rooted fundamental right to operate their homes on a short-term basis; and ignore an array

24 of other constitutional and statutory guarantees including the rights to be free from unreasonable

25 searches and seizures and excessive fines.

26

27

28
4
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 5 of 84

1 8. In this way, the Challenged Provisions do not further legitimate land-use concerns

2 but instead appear motivated by concerns that do not trump the constitutional rights violated by

3
the regulation. The County proclaimed it adopted its unconstitutional regulatory framework
4
because “[t]he increasing number of short-term rental units in Clark County has diverted a
5
noticeable portion of transient lodging away from traditional transient lodging establishments and
6
has negatively impacted the revenue derived from such rentals to local governments and other
7

8 agencies and beneficiaries of transient lodging taxes.” Id. § 7.100.010(c). This brand of economic

9 protectionism is constitutionally suspect. See Allied Concrete & Supply Co. v. Baker, 904 F.3d

10 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018).

11
9. Because the Challenged Provisions impose unjustified and unconstitutional
12
burdens on fundamental property and liberty interests, and do so for illegitimate, arbitrary, and
13
irrational reasons, they violate both U.S. and Nevada law.
14

15 2 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16 10. Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation, under

17 color of state law, of rights secured by the United States Constitution and under self-executing

18 clauses of the Nevada Constitution to redress deprivations of the rights that it protects. See Mack

19
v. Williams, 522 P.3d 434, 441–42 (Nev. 2022).
20
11. This Court has original jurisdiction over this action because the matters in
21
controversy arise under the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court also has original
22

23 jurisdiction because this action seeks redress from the deprivation, under color of state law, of a

24 right secured by a provision of the U.S. Constitution providing for equal rights of U.S. citizens. Id.

25 § 1343. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the alleged state law claims because they so

26 relate to the federal claims in the action of which the Court has original jurisdiction that they form

27
part of the same case or controversy. Id. § 1367(a).
28
5
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 6 of 84

1 12. Venue is proper in the District of Nevada under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a

2 substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this action occurred in this District and

3
the properties at issue in this matter are located within the District.
4
13. This Court has the authority to enter declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
5
§§ 2201 and 2202. It has the authority to enter injunctive relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
6
Procedure 65.
7

8 3 PARTIES

9 14. Plaintiff Greater Las Vegas Short-Term Rental Association (“GLVSTRA”) is a

10 community-driven non-profit advocacy group that represents the interests of owners and patrons

11
of short-term rental homes throughout the greater Las Vegas area, including unincorporated Clark
12
County. The organization engages in tireless advocacy, community engagement efforts, and
13
targeted litigation to ensure short-term rental regulations in Nevada are fair and constitutional.
14
15. GLVSTRA has countless members who have standing to sue in their own right
15

16 because they are injured by the burdensome requirements of Clark County’s short-term rental

17 ordinance and, by extension, Assembly Bill 363. First, GLVSTRA has members whose license

18 applications have been denied or who are ineligible for licenses due to Clark County and Assembly

19
Bill 363’s unconstitutional restrictions. These members are therefore barred from using their
20
properties as short-term rentals—stripping them of their fundamental rights. Second, GLVSTRA
21
has members, such as Plaintiffs Jacqueline Flores and the Koorndyks, who have been granted
22

23 licenses and therefore were and are subject to the law’s onerous regulatory requirements. For

24 example, Flores and the Koorndyks have been forced to submit to warrantless searches and

25 physical incursions of their property and are under imminent threat of future warrantless searches.

26 16. GLVSTRA’s members have derived substantial benefits from serving as hosts. The
27
practice of short-term renting allowed the Association’s members to generate essential income
28
6
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 7 of 84

1 from their property, which in turn has allowed them to remain in their homes despite rising

2 homeownership costs. In doing so, they have strengthened the local economy, which is heavily

3
dependent on tourism, and generated both jobs and substantial tax revenue for the region.
4
17. The interests GLVSTRA seeks to protect through this litigation—the constitutional
5
property rights associated with short-term rentals—are central to the organization’s core mission.
6
And the claims and relief sought by GLVSTRA do not require participation by its absent members.
7

8 18. GLVSTRA is also itself injured by the burdensome requirements of Clark County’s

9 short-term rental ordinance and, by extension, Assembly Bill 363. GLVSTRA has suffered a

10 reduction in membership and, as consequence, its operating budget.

11
19. Plaintiff Jacqueline Flores (“Flores”) has lived in Nevada for almost twenty years
12
and serves as President and Director of GLVSTRA. She is highly engaged in issues affecting short-
13
term rentals in Nevada and advocates for the rights and freedoms of property owners throughout
14

15 Clark County. As President and Director, Flores works with public officials and community

16 members on relevant public policy issues related to short-term rentals.

17 20. Flores applied for and currently maintains an active license to operate a short-term
18 rental in Clark County. In or about September 2022, Flores submitted her pre-application to use

19
the home she owns at 8493 Moondance Cellars Court, Las Vegas, Nevada as a short-term rental.
20
This got her into the lottery. It took her roughly forty hours to pull together all the documentation
21
necessary to draft and finalize her short-term rental application. Without knowing whether she
22

23 would ultimately receive approval, she was nevertheless required to and did obtain and maintain -

24 - for the two years her application was pending -- an annual state business license, specialized and

25 higher-cost short-term rental insurance, surveillance cameras, noise monitoring devices, notarized

26
documents, and complied with still other code requirements, which cost her more than $5,000
27

28
7
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 8 of 84

1 during which time she had neither short-term rental income to offset the costs nor any guarantee

2 she would ever receive such a license even if she complied with every requirement within her

3
control. The County did not issue Flores a license until September 17, 2024, approximately two
4
years after she had submitted her application, and only then after the County forced Flores to
5
submit to a warrantless search of her home. Upon approval of her application, Flores paid $1,700
6
to receive the license. In all, the process cost her in excess of $7,000.
7

8 21. Flores engages in short-term leasing to earn supplemental income, which she needs

9 to afford her mortgage and to continue to live in Clark County. But Flores lives in fear that the

10 County will rescind her short-term rental license pursuant to any number of the burdensome

11
provisions imposed by the County and State. And she lives under the threat of random warrantless
12
searches and invasions of privacy that the Challenged Provisions permit.
13
22. Flores has been, and continues to be, injured by the burdensome requirements of
14

15 Clark County’s short-term rental ordinance and, by extension, AB 363. Indeed, to obtain her

16 license, Flores was forced to comply with Clark County’s onerous application requirements to

17 operate a short-term rental and remains subject to the laws’ burdensome regulatory requirements.

18 Moreover, she was forced to submit to a warrantless search of her property and remains under

19
imminent threat of random additional warrantless searches.
20
23. Plaintiffs Louis and Estrellita Koorndyk (the “Koorndyks”) are married Nevadans
21
who have lived in Clark County for forty-five years. Louis is a retired veteran of the United States
22

23 Navy. Estrelita is an executive assistant. Like Plaintiff Flores, the Koorndyks are both deeply

24 involved in GLVSTRA: Louis is the organization’s Treasurer, and Estrelita is its Secretary. They

25 assist in organizing the group’s meetings, communicating with group members and the public

26

27

28
8
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 9 of 84

1 about issues relating to short-term rentals, and advocate for fair and reasonable policies and

2 regulations for short-term rentals in the region.

3
24. The Koorndyks jointly acquired two properties located in unincorporated Clark
4
County. Historically, they relied on short-term rental income to cover the cost of Louis’ parents’
5
assisted living facility and other critical needs. When the County deemed short-term rentals
6
‘illegal,’ the Koorndyks were not just deprived of that income, they were fined more than $60,000
7

8 for operating a short-term rental. Alternative, inferior, living arrangements were made for Louis’

9 parents, but they were the only arrangement the family could afford. Just a few months later,

10 Louis’ mother suffered a fall and she died; shortly thereafter, Louis’ father, who suffered from

11
dementia, also died. Now, the family needs to supplement Louis’s limited retirement income to
12
pay for his own cancer treatment and to plan for Estrellita’s care for when Louis is gone (his cancer
13
is terminal, and Esrtrellita has Crohn’s disease). They would like to leave something behind for
14

15 their only child.

16 25. One of the Koorndyks’ homes is located at 7373 Bermuda Island Street (the

17 “Bermuda Island Street Property”). The Koorndyks purchased this property in April 2018 as an

18 investment property they could use to operate as a short-term rental.

19
26. Haan’s Properties LLC (hereinafter, “Hann’s Properties”) is a Nevada limited
20
liability company, formed November 6, 2021, whose principal place of business is Clark County,
21
Nevada. The Koorndyks originally took ownership of the Bermuda Island Street Property in their
22

23 individual names, but transferred the property to Haan’s Properties on September 7, 2023. Louis

24 Koorndyk is the sole member of Haan’s Properties. Haan’s Properties began the process of

25 obtaining a short-term rental license for the property soon after the County adopted its regulatory

26
framework. The Koorndyks submitted a pre-application shortly after that process opened on
27

28
9
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 10 of 84

1 September 13, 2022. They timely submitted their full application. It was more than two years

2 following the pre-application, on September 17, 2024, that Haan’s Properties received a short-term

3
rental license for this property.
4
27. The application process was expensive and onerous. Haan’s Properties spent more
5
than $6,500 in the application process, including a business license (to be renewed annually),
6
inspection fees, additional emergency equipment, security cameras, and noise recording devices
7

8 and special insurance as required by the Challenged Provisions.

9 28. The Challenged Provisions have been costly in other ways too. The Bermuda Island
10 Street Property has five bedrooms, but, due to the arbitrary occupancy limitations imposed by the

11
Challenged Provisions, the Koorndyks have had to turn away several bookings seeking to take
12
advantage of the home’s large capacity, costing them thousands of dollars in lost income.
13
Moreover, they remain under constant, imminent threat of random warrantless searches.
14

15 29. The Koorndyks’ second property is located at 3370 Red Rock Street (the “Red Rock

16 Street Property”). They purchased this property in March 2018 as an investment, hoping to use the

17 Red Rock Street Property as a short-term rental as well.

18 30. LK’s Properties LLC (hereinafter, “LK’s Properties”) is a Nevada limited liability
19
company, formed November 6, 2021, whose principal place of business is Clark County, Nevada.
20
The Koorndyks originally took ownership of the Red Rock Street Property in their individual
21
names but transferred the property to LK’s Properties on September 7, 2023. Louis Koorndyk is
22

23 the sole member of LK’s Properties.

24 31. LK’s Properties, submitted its pre-application when the process opened and their

25 full license application shortly thereafter. LK’s Properties has paid more than $5,000 for

26
application and licensing fees, insurance, and installing equipment and devices to bring their
27

28
10
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 11 of 84

1 property into compliance with the Challenged Provisions. Nearly three years after the pre-

2 application process opened, this application remains pending per the County’s on-line business

3
license search. However, the Challenged Provisions bar residents from holding more than one
4
short-term rental license at a time, which means their application for the Red Rock Street Property
5
will certainly be denied.
6
32. The Koorndyks have been and continue to be injured by the burdensome
7

8 requirements of Clark County’s short-term rental ordinance and, by extension, AB 363. To obtain

9 the license for the Bermuda Island Street Property, they had to spend thousands of dollars on fees

10 and alterations to their home. They also remain subject to the laws’ burdensome regulatory

11
environment, which, among other things, prohibits them from operating their second investment
12
property as a short-term rental in violation of their fundamental ownership rights to lease and to
13
include others on this property.
14

15 33. Plaintiff Thomas McKannon (“McKannon”) is a retired business executive and

16 veteran of the United States Air Force who resides in Virginia and plans to move to Nevada in

17 summer 2025. McKannon is a member of GLVSTRA. In October 2022, he and his wife purchased

18 an investment property located at 352 Echo Road in Mount Charleston, Nevada (the “Echo Road

19
Property”) in unincorporated Clark County with the intention of renting the property out on both
20
a short- and long-term basis. While McKannon wishes to obtain a license to operate his Echo Road
21
Property as a short term rental, he is barred from doing so because the property is located in Mount
22

23 Charleston, which is subject to a total ban on short-term rentals under the Challenged Provisions.

24 He therefore did not apply for a license, as doing so would have been futile.

25 34. Indeed, the County’s online pre-application system prevents applicants from
26
submitting an application if the entered address is in one of the unincorporated areas that bans
27

28
11
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 12 of 84

1 STRs (like Mt. Charleston) or is within 2,500 of a resort hotel. The on-line system prevented the

2 applicant from proceeding further with the application process.

3
35. The Challenged Provisions have forced McKannon to rent his home on a long-term
4
basis only. Doing so has sharply limited the number of potential guests to whom he and his wife
5
can rent and decreased the profits they can derive from their property, as the property is better
6
situated for short-term rental opportunities. In this way, McKannon has been and continues to be
7

8 injured by the burdensome Challenged Provisions, which have stripped McKannon of his

9 fundamental ownership rights to lease and to include others on his property.

10 36. Plaintiffs Debra and John Hansen (the “Hansens”) are a married couple living in
11
Nevada and members of GLVSTRA. The Hansens have jointly owned a residence located in
12
unincorporated Clark County since 1980. They have owned property located at 2225 Duneville
13
Street in Las Vegas (the “Duneville Street Property”) since 2010. Since 2011, the Hansens have
14

15 rented their Duneville Street Property on a long-term basis as a means of generating income, first

16 to support the special education costs and needs of their grandchildren and now to support their

17 retirement and rising healthcare costs, including for their respective cancer treatments. But renting

18 out their property on a long-term basis has been difficult and sharply limits the income they can

19
generate from their property. For example, long-term tenants are sometimes late to pay or do not
20
pay at all, which then requires eviction and the costs and complexities associated therewith. The
21
Hansens are diligent owners who have strict policies and a vested interest in ensuring they rent to
22

23 individuals who will treat their home and neighborhood as if it were the renter’s own.

24 37. The Hansens submitted an application for a short-term rental license for their

25 property in unincorporated Clark County, which has been pending for nearly three years and

26
remains pending as of this filing. They need to increase the income they can generate from their
27

28
12
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 13 of 84

1 property to support their continued retirement and medical care. They spent about forty-eight hours

2 putting together all the documentation necessary to draft and finalize their short-term rental

3
application. They also spent roughly $2,000 on making the necessary alterations to their home to
4
comply with the Challenged Provisions, including the installation of noise monitoring and video
5
surveillance devices. Despite the Hansens’ substantial investments of time and money in their
6
application, the County is almost certain to deny it because their property is located within 1,000
7

8 feet of another property which, as a result of the County’s random number generator application

9 process, is first in line to obtain a license.

10 38. The Hansens have been and continue to be injured by the burdensome requirements
11
of Clark County’s short-term rental ordinance and, by extension, AB 363. The Challenged
12
Provisions’ arbitrary and onerous licensing scheme prevents the Hansens from exercising their
13
fundamental right to lease out their property on a short-term basis and to include others on their
14

15 property. As a result, the Hansens have suffered constitutional injuries and significant financial

16 loss.

17 39. Plaintiffs Samuel and Lisa Hankins are a married couple of 31 years who reside in
18 Hawaii and purchased a property to supplement their retirement savings. Samuel is a

19
schoolteacher and Lisa works in accounting for an insurance company. The Hankinses ensured
20
that they satisfied all applicable requirements when they submitted their application to obtain a
21
short-term rental license for 5435 Chestnut Street (hereinafter, the “Chestnut Street Property”).
22

23 Nonetheless, by notice dated March 24, 2025, their application was denied under Clark County

24 Code § 7.100.080(f)(2) because another applicant received a short-term rental license for a

25 property located within 1,000 feet of the Chestnut Street property. The same notice also stated,

26
“Please be advised that your application is denied based on deficiencies identified in the
27

28
13
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 14 of 84

1 application materials . . . . The reasons for denial checked above are not exhaustive and additional

2 reasons for denial may be identified upon physical inspection and continued investigation.” They

3
have never been advised of any other violation or deficiency. The Hankinses requested an
4
administrative appeal; during that hearing they did not contest that their property is within 1,000
5
feet of the property identified in the denial letter; following that hearing, the denial was sustained
6
on May 20, 2025.
7

8 40. The Hankinses have been, and continue to be, injured by the arbitrary and

9 burdensome requirements of Clark County’s short-term rental ordinance and, by extension, AB

10 363. The Challenged Provisions prevent the Hankinses from operating a short-term rental and

11
exercising their fundamental ownership rights to lease and to include others on their property. As
12
a result, they have suffered constitutional injuries and significant financial loss as well as damage
13
to their investment-backed expectations when purchasing the property.
14

15 41. Plaintiff Troy Uehling (“Uehling”) is a self-employed father of four children who

16 lives in Colorado. Uehling is a member of GLVSTRA. He owns a home located at 4600 University

17 Center Drive, Unit 260 (the “University Drive Property”) in unincorporated Clark County. He has

18 never lived in Nevada but invested in the University Drive Property to generate income from short-

19
term rental arrangements. Nevertheless, Uehling is barred from obtaining a short term rental
20
license under the Challenged Provisions because his property is located within 2,500 feet of a
21
hotel.
22

23 42. Uehling attempted to complete the County’s short-term rental pre-application

24 process, but when he entered his property address into the system, it flagged the property as being

25 within 2,500 feet of a resort hotel, and the system would not allow him to proceed further. There

26
was no opportunity for appeal.
27

28
14
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 15 of 84

1 43. Uehling’s property is a few feet from the boundary of a resort hotel on the strip and

2 surrounded by other commercial businesses.

3
44. Uehling has been, and continues to be, injured by the burdensome requirements of
4
Clark County’s short-term rental ordinance and, by extension, AB 363. The Challenged Provisions
5
prevent Uehling from operating a short-term rental and exercising his fundamental ownership
6
rights to lease and to include others on his property. As a result, he has suffered constitutional
7

8 injuries and significant financial loss as well as damage to his investment-backed expectations

9 when purchasing the property.

10 45. Plaintiff Philip Johnson (“Johnson”) is a Nevada resident and member of

11
GLVSTRA. Johnson, a real estate owner and transportation planner, acquired property located at
12
4502 Palm Mesa Drive (hereinafter, the “Palm Mesa Property”) in January 2022.
13
46. 4502 Palm Mesa LLC (hereinafter, “Palm Mesa LLC”) is a Nevada limited liability
14

15 company whose principal place of business is Clark County, Nevada. Johnson originally acquired

16 the Palm Mesa Property in his individual name but transferred the property to Palm Mesa LLC on

17 June 10, 2024. Philip Johnson is the sole member of Palm Mesa LLC.

18 47. Like the other Plaintiffs, Johnson submitted a pre-application and incurred costs,
19
estimated in excess of $6,000, to comply with the application process. Johnson received a place
20
in the lottery system. However, Johnson and Palm Mesa LLC, collectively, received three separate
21
fines for alleged violations of the Code. He paid the first two fines of $850 and $1,500, issued to
22

23 Johnson on May 4, 2024 and May 11, 2024 for violations of County Code § 30.03.01(C)(3). The

24 third fine of $44,500, issued to Palm Mesa LLC on September 27, 2024 for violation of County

25 Code § 7.100.030, he could neither afford to pay nor challenge because to appeal a citation the

26

27

28
15
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 16 of 84

1 recipient must remit, as a deposit, the amount of the fine along with their request for hearing. Clark

2 County Code § 1.14.070. These fines are excessive, totaling more than $45,000.

3
48. Johnson cannot get confirmation of the status of his application. There are no other
4
applicants within 1,000 feet of the Palm Mesa Property, nor is there any resort hotel property within
5
2,500 feet. Johnson is informed and believes he met all requirements for a license. Yet, the
6
County’s system shows conflicting information. On the one hand, the Code Enforcement
7

8 Department lists the application as “Failed – Rejected,” and on the other hand the Business License

9 Department, Short-Term Rental page lists it as “Pending.”

10 49. Johnson is informed and believes the County intends to make these fines a Special
11
Assessment which will be placed on the tax rolls, subjecting his property to foreclosure.
12
50. Johnson has been and continues to be injured by the burdensome requirements of
13
Clark County’s short-term rental ordinance and, by extension, AB 363. The Challenged Provisions
14

15 prevent Johnson from operating a short-term rental and exercising his fundamental rights to lease

16 and to include others on his property. Moreover, Defendants’ fine provisions have foisted excessive

17 fines for more than $45,000 on Johnson that, in addition to exacting a significant financial penalty,

18 bar him from operating a short term rental—a fundamental and longstanding property use that has

19
existed since at least the founding. Johnson has accordingly suffered grievous constitutional
20
injuries and significant financial loss because he cannot operate a short-term rental.
21
51. Plaintiff Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”) maintains a website and mobile applications that
22

23 provide access to an online marketplace for people to list, explore, and book both short-term and

24 long-term accommodations. With an Airbnb account, a host seeking to rent their property may

25 create a listing for rent, and a guest seeking a rental may request to book a property. Guests and

26
hosts may communicate with each other on Airbnb, including through direct messages. When
27

28
16
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 17 of 84

1 guests and hosts access their profiles on Airbnb, they are able to access a variety of data stored by

2 Airbnb on their behalf, including information about past and upcoming bookings, old and current

3
messaging threads, and user reviews.
4
52. Airbnb allows hosts like its co-plaintiffs to share their homes with travelers from
5
around the world, and provides those travelers with a diverse array of options for accommodations,
6
to the benefit of hosts, travelers, and Nevada itself. For example, in 2024, Airbnb contributed $1.8
7

8 billion to Nevada’s GDP, supported 17,900 jobs in the state, and generated $470 million in tax

9 revenue. See Airbnb, Inc., Guest spending boosts US economy by a record $90 billion in 2024

10 (May 29, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/2npnb77b. And many hosts in Clark County depend on the

11
extra income they earn from hosting to make ends meet. According to a 2024 survey of Airbnb
12
hosts in Clark County, nearly 50% confirm hosting on Airbnb has helped them stay in their home
13
and 63% say hosting on Airbnb allows them to meet rising costs of living.
14

15 53. Defendant Clark County is a political subdivision of the state of Nevada, organized

16 under the Clark County Code, created by and operating under the laws of the State of Nevada and

17 pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12.105. Clark County, under AB 363, is tasked with “adopt[ing]

18 and enforc[ing]” the ordinances that make up the Challenged Provisions. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.

19
§ 244.353545(1).
20
54. Defendant Aaron D. Ford is the Attorney General of the State of Nevada and is sued
21
in his official capacity. He is charged with the statutory authority to enforce Nevada law, including
22

23 AB 363, through his authority to commence and defend suits “to protect and secure the interest of

24 the State.” Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 228.170(1).

25 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND LAW

26 I. Americans have been operating short-term rentals from the very founding.
27
55. The right to lease one’s home has long been a core property right. Indeed, the
28
17
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 18 of 84

1 practice of leasing one’s property to others predates the founding of this country. Roman law

2 recognized leasing as part of a property owner’s right to make productive use of their land. See

3
Sally Brown Richardson, Reframing Ameliorative Waste, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 335, 348 (2017).
4
And under the common law, property owners sold each other “uses,” allowing owners to convey
5
property temporarily to another person who would care for and manage it. Avisheh Avini, The
6
Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 Tulane L. Rev. 1139, 1140 (1996).
7

8 56. The modern practice of leasing to guests on a short-term basis is simply the latest

9 iteration of this long-standing tradition that has been around for as long as property rights have

10 been recognized. Therefore, Plaintiffs seek to vindicate rights that would have been, and are,

11
deeply familiar to the founding generation and the many generations of Americans since.
12
A. Property rights stand as a bulwark for individual liberty
13
57. Property rights were central to the guarantees the founding generation sought to
14
protect by ratifying the Constitution. The historical record makes clear that what motivated early
15

16 Americans on this score was not just a desire to protect individuals’ economic freedom—though

17 that was critical—but also an appreciation that a strong conception of property rights was essential

18 to the guarantee of individual liberty.

19
58. As one academic has put it:
20
We know that private property was a central institution of the European civil law
21 tradition that started with the Roman law of Justinian, and of the English common-
law tradition that started with the Norman Conquest. We know that the protection
22 of private property from the Crown was a major purpose of the Magna Carta as
23 early as 1215 . . . And we know that centuries later, the key writers who set the
intellectual framework for our Constitution—John Locke, David Hume, William
24 Blackstone, Adam Smith, and James Madison—all treated private property as a
bulwark of the individual against the arbitrary power of the state.
25
Richard Epstein, Supreme Neglect: How to Revive Constitutional Protection for Private Property,
26
5–6 (2008). Or as a British jurist, influential to the Framers, put it more simply “a man’s house is
27

28
18
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 19 of 84

1 his castle.” Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 161–62

2 (1644).

3
59. Indeed, the Framers and the legal philosophers and scholars who preceded them,
4
conceived of property rights as a “bundle of sticks—a collection of individual rights which, in
5
certain combinations, constitute property.” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002)
6
(internal quotation marks omitted). These rights implicated by property ownership include both
7

8 traditional property-based prerogatives, such as the authority to put one’s property to productive

9 uses and to include and exclude others from one’s land, and corollary liberty interests associated

10 with property ownership, such as the rights to privacy and of association.

11
60. As to the bundle of rights comprising property itself, our legal tradition has long
12
recognized that it includes “the right to use, lease and dispose of [property] for lawful purposes.”
13
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
14

15 England 134 (1765) (“[P]roperty . . . consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his

16 acquisitions . . . .”). Judicial decisions roughly contemporaneous with the founding and ratification

17 of the Fourteenth Amendment bear out this nationwide consensus. See, e.g., Pelletreau v. Jackson

18 ex dem. Varick, 11 Wend. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (discussing rental property let to tenants

19
beginning around 1782 or 1783); Herbert v. Wren, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 370 (1813) (describing rents
20
earned from property leased in 1794); Alexander v. Harris, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 299 (1808)
21
(pertaining to a landlord’s action to recover rent); Faw v. Marsteller, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 10 (1804)
22

23 (adjudicating a debt action to recover rent under a 1779 lease); City of New York v. Hill, 13 How.

24 Pr. 280, 281 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (City of New York had right to lease because it had “the right of

25 possession and enjoyment” over the property); Kimball v. Yates, 14 Ill. 464, 465–66 (Ill. 1853)

26
(recognizing “right to exclude the public, or any portion of the public, from the privilege of passing
27

28
19
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 20 of 84

1 over his premises”). So too does the common law, under which property owners sold each other

2 “uses,” allowing owners to convey property temporarily to another person who would care for and

3
manage it. Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 Tulane L. Rev.
4
1139, 1140 (1996). As scholars have concluded, the right to control how and on what terms people
5
enter one’s property is a practice “ubiquitous across cultures,” which “[a]nthropologists and
6
ethnographers have documented . . . all over the world and throughout history.” Daniel B. Kelly,
7

8 The Right to Include, 63 Emory L.J. 857, 871 (2014).

9 61. The Framers enshrined these property rights in our Constitutional structure.
10 Evidence from the founding era demonstrates that it was almost certainly the right to lease and its

11
accompanying property rights that the Framers had in mind when drafting protections for “private
12
property” in the Takings Clause. See Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 638 (2023) (courts
13
“draw[] on existing rules or understandings about property rights” when interpreting and applying
14

15 the Takings Clause, such as “traditional property law principles” and “historical practice.” (internal

16 quotation marks omitted)); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 149 (2021) (“The right

17 to exclude is ‘one of the most treasured’ rights of property ownership.” (quoting Loretto

18 v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982))).

19
62. Protection of the “bundle of sticks” that comprises property rights also furthers the
20
protection of individual liberties implicated by a robust conception of property rights. The
21
founding generation held a strong appreciation for the connection between protecting property
22

23 rights and the ability to safeguard individuals’ privacy, free association, and autonomy, as they

24 experienced firsthand the effects of the British Crown’s trampling of such rights. See Payton v.

25 New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (observing that “[t]he overriding respect for the sanctity of

26
the home” traces back to the “origins of the Republic”).
27

28
20
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 21 of 84

1 63. Indeed, by the time the First Congress convened in 1789, the freedom to associate

2 guaranteed by the First Amendment, the ban on the forced quartering of soldiers protected by the

3
Third Amendment, and the prohibition on unreasonable incursions on one’s privacy protected by
4
the Fourth Amendment were all firmly fixed in our constitutional order as a means of further
5
facilitating the protections of private property from government intrusion.
6
64. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this tradition in its constitutional
7

8 jurisprudence. Over and again, the Court has made clear that the home serves as a place “where

9 privacy expectations are most heightened,” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986), and

10 as a space where Americans are free to engage with, learn from, and order their lives around

11
whomever they choose, and where owners and guests are similarly entitled to “reasonable
12
expectation[s] of privacy,” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013). Justice Ginsburg perhaps
13
put it best when she eloquently observed that the Court’s “decisions indicate that people have a
14

15 reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes in part because they have the prerogative to

16 exclude others. The power to exclude implies the power to include.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.

17 83, 106 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)); see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,

18 95–100 (1990).

19
65. In short, America’s legal tradition speaks clearly: from the very founding, the
20
Framers and early jurists understood the Constitution to guarantee the property rights of
21
individuals, including their right to lease and the right to include others on the owner’s property,
22

23 even on a short-term basis, as a means of unlocking the full value of their land. And they

24 understood that the Constitution would equally safeguard a host of individual liberties that could

25 not be exercised without a robust conception of one’s control over one’s property.

26

27

28
21
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 22 of 84

1 B. Americans have long exercised their right to lease their property on a short-term
basis.
2
66. Consistent with this legal tradition, short-term leasing arrangements have been a
3

4 feature of American life from the founding.

5 67. The practice of taking in boarders and temporary lodgers was so widely practiced

6 throughout our history, that the practice of temporary letting was regularly referred to by its

7 opponents as an “American institution.” Wendy Gamber, Tarnished Labor: The Home, The

8
Market, and the Boardinghouse in Antebellum America, 22 J. of the Early Republic, 177, 178
9
(2002)
10
68. This history begins with the Constitution itself. Gouverneur Morris, known as the
11

12 “penman” of the United States Constitution because he wrote much of its text, stayed at a boarding

13 house operated by Morris Dalley while drafting parts of the Constitution. Morris was not alone—

14 receipts from this period show that he was joined at Ms. Dalley’s boardinghouse by other Framers

15
seeking temporary lodging, including Samuel Adams.
16
69. Leasing arrangements of all sorts have had a prominent role in the nation’s political
17
life. During the early years of the Republic, short-term rentals emerged as the residency of choice
18
in Washington, D.C. for politicians who principally resided elsewhere. Many of those officials
19

20 shared space in boarding houses, which fostered interactions that helped bridge partisan divisions.

21 Indeed, so deeply embedded was the tradition of home-sharing in our nation’s culture and

22 conception of community that, when faced with deepening divisions within the fledgling Supreme

23
Court, Chief Justice John Marshall conceived a simple plan to forge consensus: he directed all the
24
justices to share living quarters at the same boardinghouse in Washington at a rate of $15 per week.
25
70. And abolitionists, depending upon the nation’s traditional legal guarantee that one’s
26

27 home remains free from prying eyes and official interference, operated boardinghouses throughout

28
22
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 23 of 84

1 the antebellum era. In fact, after the Civil War, Harriet Tubman continued this tradition of boarding

2 travelers seeking more hopeful lands by operating a boarding house in Auburn, New York. All told,

3
historians estimate that by the end of the nineteenth century between 20% and 33% of households
4

5 took in boarders. Another scholar estimates that in 1900, roughly 25% of U.S. households

6 contained a lodger and almost “as many more took one in at some point in the life of the

7
household.” Richard Harris, The Flexible House: The Housing Backlog and the Persistence of
8
Lodging, 1891-1951, 18 Soc. Sci. Hist. 31, 31 (1994).
9

10 71. This ubiquitous practice was not confined to a specific socioeconomic class or

11 demographic. To the contrary, boarding houses were run and used by people from every walk of

12 life.

13 72. But there’s no avoiding that short-term rental opportunities were and are especially
14
useful for those for whom “[r]enting out extra space was a necessity . . . to make ends meet, and
15
the scarcity of housing options made boarding a realistic option.” Emily M. Speier, Comment,
16
Embracing Airbnb: How Cities Can Champion Private Property Rights Without Compromising
17

18 the Health and Welfare of the Community, 44 Pepp. L. Rev. 387, 392 (2017). Indeed, this early

19 practice of Americans leasing their homes reflected the reality that property owners could reap

20 substantial economic benefits by treating their “living space as a[] [valuable] exchange

21
commodity.” David Faflik, Boarding Out: Inhabiting the American Literary Imagination 1840-60,
22
40 (2012). And “many households increasingly [took] to board[ing] as an added (and sometimes
23
necessary) source of revenue. It was simple supply and demand: independent householder . . . had
24
domestic space to let; the homeless needed homes.” Id. Indeed, this practice became a crucial
25

26 steppingstone for immigrants seeking to build a life in a new land. See Susan L. Richards, Making

27

28
23
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 24 of 84

1 Home Pay: Italian and Scottish Boardinghouse Keepers in Barre, 1880-1910, 74 Vt. Hist. 48, 51–

2 52 (2006); Gamber, supra, at 178.

3
73. The practice of leasing one’s home continued deep into the 20th century. As one
4
scholar put it, “boarding and lodging . . . pervaded American family life . . . throughout the
5
nineteenth and early twentieth century.” Paul Groth, Living Downtown: The History of Residential
6
Hotels in the United States. 92 (1994).
7

8 74. The law recognized this reality. Judicial decisions and statutory law from the

9 Founding era and the mid-19th century bear out this lived experience by depicting a vibrant use of

10 boarding houses as a natural aspect of life. See, e.g., Curley v. Dean, 4 Conn. 259 (1822)

11
(discussing a weekly tenancy); Jackson ex dem. Russell v. Rowland, 6 Wend. 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
12
1831) (noting that a dwelling-house tenant held a weekly tenancy); Pelletreau, 11 Wend. at 110
13
(discussing a rental property that had been let to tenants beginning around 1782 or 1783); Reeves
14

15 v. Dougherty, 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 222 (1834) (noting that a building lease also boarded with the

16 defendants via a weekly tenancy); President, Dirs. & Co. of Bank of U.S. v. Hatch, 31 U.S. 250,

17 254 (1832) (finding notice properly provided at boarding house); Rafferty v. New Brunswick Fire

18 Ins. Co., 18 N.J.L. 480, 484–85 (N.J. 1842) (finding insurance agreement remained valid after

19
dwelling was used as a boarding house); see also Bayley v. Merrill, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 360, 360–
20
61 (Mass. 1865) (interpreting statute concerning liens boarding house keepers could place on
21
baggage in their houses); Smedes v. Wild, 7 How. Pr. 309, 310–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) (usury
22

23 dispute concerning boarding house).

24 75. Given this longstanding historical practice, it would have been obvious to

25 Americans of the 19th and 20th centuries that banning or unduly restricting temporary rentals,

26
including short-term rentals, would impose unfamiliar and unconstitutional burdens on property,
27

28
24
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 25 of 84

1 privacy, and associational rights. Short-term leasing thus served as a primary means by which

2 Americans of all walks of life could exercise their freedoms that helped bind the nation together,

3
ensuring a freer flow of travel and commerce.
4
II. Nevada Has a Proud Tradition of Protecting Property Rights
5
76. Nevada is home to the same robust history and tradition of protecting fundamental
6
property rights.
7

8 77. Before Nevada was even a state, the promise of economic prosperity and the

9 acquisition of public land through various land acts drew farmers and ranchers intent on improving

10 the land in exchange for entitlement to the property. From this dependence and reverence for the

11
land and its resources came a deep respect for, and protection of, individual property. Thus, the
12
first article in Nevada’s Constitution—unanimously agreed to by the otherwise fractious delegates
13
of Nevada’s Constitutional Convention—promises the “Inalienable right[]” of “Acquiring,
14
Possessing and Protecting property.” Nev. Const. art. 1, § 1. As the Nevada Supreme Court has
15

16 explained, “the protection of a landowner’s inalienable rights to acquire, possess and protect

17 private property” is the very “first right established in the Nevada Constitution’s declaration of

18 rights,” for which there is “no corollary provision in the United States Constitution.” McCarran

19
Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1126 (Nev. 2006). And modern-day Nevadans voted
20
overwhelmingly, twice (once in 2006 and again in 2008), to amend the state constitution to increase
21
protections for private property owners and limit the government’s power to exercise eminent
22

23 domain. Nev. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 22.

24 78. It is therefore unsurprising that Nevada “enjoys a rich history of protecting private

25 property owners against government takings” and “contemplates expansive property rights in the

26 context of takings claims.” Id. at 1126–27. And these broad protections extend to “all

27
[fundamental] rights inherent in ownership, including the right to possess, use, and enjoy
28
25
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 26 of 84

1 property,” as well as the “right[s] to control and dispose of property,” which necessarily encompass

2 the fundamental rights to lease and to include others on one’s property. Hamm v. Arrowcreek

3
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 183 P.3d 895, 902 (Nev. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Saticoy Bay,
4
LLC v. Peccole Ranch Cmty. Ass’n, 495 P.3d 492 (Nev. 2021); accord Jones v. Ghadiri, 546 P.3d
5
831, 835 (Nev. 2024) (“The holder of valid title is vested with all property rights, including the
6
right to exclusively control the property . . . .”).
7

8 79. Nevada’s rich history adds to the background tradition in which the state was born,

9 making abundantly clear the state’s commitment to property rights and the personal liberties they

10 ensure.

11
III. The Benefits of Short-Term Rentals
12
80. It is no surprise that the Country’s short-term leasing practice has endured for so
13
long—short-term rentals are a tremendous boon for property owners, guests, and local
14
communities alike.
15

16 81. First, short-term leasing arrangements allow property owners to put their land to

17 productive use and to unlock the full value of their property, creating opportunities for

18 homeownership and economic freedom that would otherwise be unreachable for countless people.

19
82. Second, by facilitating tourism and creating local jobs, short-term rentals stimulate
20
local economies. This is especially important for Nevada and Clark County, whose economies
21
depend mightily on tourism. And unlike hotels, which tend to be clustered in a handful of
22

23 neighborhoods, short term rental listings are located in a wide range of neighborhoods, including

24 those that would not otherwise benefit from tourism, which broadens the number of communities

25 that can enjoy in these benefits.

26 83. Third, short-term rentals support state and local governments by generating tax and
27

28
26
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 27 of 84

1 fee revenue.1

2 84. Fourth, short-term hosting benefits consumers by providing low-cost lodging

3
options—supporting consumer choice, affordability, and competition. This benefit is especially
4
important for those in need of flexible housing such as those facing life transitions, families whose
5
relatives are in health care facilities, disaster victims, and essential workers. Short-term rentals also
6
provide important “surge capacity” for special events that significantly contribute to Clark County
7

8 and Nevada’s economy. A recent article estimated that in ten major U.S. cities, “consumer surplus,”

9 that is, the improvement in consumer welfare from having more options at lower prices, “would

10 decrease by $305 million” in one year without Airbnb. Chirara Farronato & Andrey Fradkin, The

11
Welfare Effects of Peer Entry: The Case of Airbnb and the Accommodation Industry, 112 Am.
12
Econ. Rev. 1782, 1785 (June 2022).
13
85. Fifth, by making travel easier and more accessible short-term leasing supports
14

15 America’s enduring interest in binding together a geographically and ideologically diverse country.

16 This is especially true for Americans who have historically faced exclusion from desirable

17 destinations for whom short-term rentals have provided opportunities for travel that were

18 previously non-existent. See, e.g., Speier, Embracing Airbnb, supra, at 392 (emphasizing the

19
importance of short-term boarding as a “realistic option” for low-income guests and workers); Paul
20
Groth, Living Downtown, supra, at 94 (same for Black Americans who were “excluded” from
21
“most hotels” at the time).
22

23

24

25

26 1
See Short-Term Rental Unit, FAQs, Clark County,
27 https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/business/doing_business_with_clark_county/divisions/regulated_business/short_ter
m_rentals/frequently_asked_questions.php#collapse391626b2.
28
27
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 28 of 84

1 IV. Nevada and Clark County Upends this Historical Tradition

2 86. For decades, Clark County—Nevada’s most populous county and home to the Las
3 Vegas Strip—unconstitutionally prohibited short-term rentals in its unincorporated territory.

4
87. Instead of cracking down on Clark County’s ban as a clear violation of federal and
5
state constitutional protections, which it was, the Nevada Legislature passed Assembly Bill 363 in
6
2021, a law that while prohibiting Clark County from outright banning short-term rentals, imbues
7

8 the County with the broad authority to adopt protectionist measures meant to render operating a

9 short term rental within the County’s borders difficult and in some cases impossible.

10 88. Like the County, the motivations of the legislation’s sponsors were clear: economic
11
protectionism. During debate on AB 363, the President of the Nevada Resorts Association, who
12
originally had hoped to continue the ban on short-term rentals,2 “participate[d] in presenting” the
13
bill and testified that legislation was necessary to recoup “millions of dollars in lost tax revenue”
14
from hotel room taxes.3 The state legislature responded accordingly: Assemblywoman Nguyen,
15

16 Assembly Bill 363’s primary architect, stated to the Committee on Revenue in an April 2021

17 meeting that the law seeks to “protect our resorts and neighborhood gaming companies.”4 The new

18 law proposed to do just that by, among other things, creating a minimum distance requirement of

19
2,500 feet between any short-term rental and a resort hotel—essentially banning short-term rentals
20
in large swaths of Clark County—and by excluding short-term rentals in residential properties that
21
are owned and operated by hotels from the law’s grasp.
22

23
2
24 Minutes of the Meeting of the Senate Committee on Revenue and Economic Development, 13 (May 29, 2021),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/81st2021/Minutes/Senate/RED/Final/1434.pdf.
25 3
Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Revenue, 7–8 (Apr. 29, 2021)
26 https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/81st2021/Minutes/Assembly/REV/Final/1078.pdf.
4
27 Id. at 6.

28
28
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 29 of 84

1 89. But not all legislators saw things the same way. Assemblyman David Orentlicher,

2 for example, questioned the rationality of a buffer requirement between short-term rentals and

3
resorts. He “underst[ood] why resorts do not like the competition” but simply could not see a
4
legitimate purpose for the distance requirement—indeed Nevada lets “restaurants spring up nearby
5
resort hotels and that is competition for the in-house restaurants.”5
6
90. Ultimately, these concerns were dismissed, and the final version of the law included
7

8 a number of measures meant to shield the state’s hotel industry, including the 2,500-foot minimum

9 distance requirement between any short-term rental “and a resort hotel.” See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.

10 § 244.353545(2)(f)(2). The law also provides that Clark County must require its residents to obtain

11
a license before operating a short-term rental, mandates a minimum distance of 660 feet between
12
any two short-term rentals, imposes a two-night minimum rental period for non-owner-occupied
13
rentals, and requires that short-term rentals have a “local representative” available at all times. Id.
14

15 §§ 244.353545(2)(b), (e)(2), (f)(1), (k); 244.35356(5)(c). AB 363 did not, in the President of the

16 Resorts Association’s words, “create[] a level playing field.”6 It inscribed into law a permanent

17 advantage to resort hotels and casinos over ordinary Nevada property owners.

18 91. But AB 363 did not impose these limitations uniformly on all STRs. Nevada
19
provided a special exemption for short-term rentals owned by hotels and casinos. See NRS
20
244.35351(2). Everyday Nevadans, including Plaintiffs, who wish to operate the very same short-
21
term rentals, are subject to the full brunt of the law.
22

23

24

25

26 5
Id. at 14.
27 6
Id. at 8.
28
29
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 30 of 84

1 92. Following the state legislature’s cue, Clark County, forced by Assembly Bill 363 to

2 lift its complete short-term rental ban, capitulated in name only. On June 21, 2022, the County

3
adopted Chapters 7.100 and 7.110, a complex short-term rental regulatory framework.
4
93. The final regulatory scheme adopted by the County, discussed in more detail below,
5
imposes sweeping burdens on residents who wish to offer short-term rentals. For some, the
6
Challenged Provisions constitute a flat prohibition on their ability to exercise their fundamental
7

8 property rights. For others, they impose an undue burden on their ability to freely exercise their

9 right to lease. But just like the state, the County took care to exempt the hotel and casino industry

10 from its regulatory reach. Timeshares and vacation homes, some of which are operated by hotels,

11
are exempted under the County ordinance. Clark County Code § 7.100.040(a)-(c). In other words,
12
Clark County has impermissibly and unconstitutionally appropriated the fundamental property
13
rights of a significant proportion of owners’ property rights.
14

15 94. To add insult to injury, Clark County has slow-rolled the processing of short-term

16 rental licenses applications—delaying compliance with Assembly Bill 363. The County began its

17 preapplication process in September of 2022.7 But as of August 2024, more than two years after

18 Clark County overturned its ban, the County had issued only three short-term rental licenses.8 As

19
of October 2024, hundreds of applications remained unprocessed.9 On information and belief, as
20

21
7
22 Short-Term Rental Unit Pre-Application Process,
https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/business/doing_business_with_clark_county/divisions/regulated_business/short_ter
23 m_rentals/preapplication.php.

8
24 Jaclyn Schultz, Clark County issues a handful of short-term rental licenses, hundreds still waiting, FOX5 (Aug. 21,
2024) https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/08/21/clark-county-issues-handful-short-term-rental-licenses-hundreds-
25 still-waiting/.

9
26 Christopher Alvarez, With 10,000 short-term rentals, most in Las Vegas are operating illegally, Nevada Pub. Radio
(Oct. 3, 2024) https://knpr.org/show/knprs-state-of-nevada/2024-10-03/with-10-000-short-term-rentals-most-in-las-
27 vegas-are-operating-illegally.

28
30
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 31 of 84

1 of the filing of this Complaint, fewer than 200 short-term rental licenses have been issued by Clark

2 County.

3
IV. Greater Las Vegas Short-Term Rental Association I Litigation
4
95. Soon after Chapter 7.100 was enacted, GLVSTRA challenged the constitutionality
5
of the law in Nevada state court and sought a preliminary injunction ordering the County to cease
6
efforts to enforce the law.
7

8 96. In February 2023, the Nevada trial court partially granted the preliminary

9 injunction, enjoining the enforcement of eleven provisions of Chapter 7.100 on the grounds that

10 those components were unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. In doing so, the court recognized

11
that the relationship between host and guest implicates a range of constitutionally protected
12
freedoms, including due process, the right to privacy, freedom against unreasonable searches and
13
seizures, and freedom of association. The County subsequently appealed.
14
97. After the trial court issued its decision, but before the matter was decided on appeal,
15

16 Clark County enacted a new ordinance amending nine out of the eleven provisions that had been

17 declared unconstitutional.10 The County, however, left in place the same essential unconstitutional

18 regulatory structure of its first ordinance, as required by AB 363.

19
98. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed GLVSTRA’s lawsuit for lack of
20
standing; importantly, the Court did not reach the merits of GLVSTRA’s claims. As a practical
21
matter, this means that the entirety of amended Chapter 7.100 remains in full effect.
22

23 V. The Challenged Provisions

24 99. This lawsuit seeks to enjoin, individually and collectively, the provisions that

25 comprise amended Chapter 7.100, Clark County Code § 7.100.010 et seq., and Chapter 7.110,

26

27 10
It left untouched only two of those provisions, both of which related to fines for short-term rental violations.
28
31
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 32 of 84

1 Clark County Code § 7.110.010 et seq., as well as the parts of AB 363 that require the County to

2 adopt those regulations, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.35351 et seq. The Challenged Provisions

3
require property owners to submit their fundamental ownership rights to arbitrary eligibility
4
criteria that bans whole swaths of the County from exercising their fundamental rights to lease and
5
to include others on their properties on a short-term basis, imposes strict buffer requirements
6
preventing property owners who live too close to each other from exercising their fundamental
7

8 property rights as well as their constitutional liberties, forces Nevadans to submit to warrantless

9 searches, imposes arbitrary and selectively assessed fines for violations of these provisions, and,

10 to add insult to injury, exempts hotels entirely from these restrictions. Moreover, these provisions

11
impose unlawful demands on Airbnb and similar platforms, which ultimately result in additional
12
burdens on individuals’ constitutional rights. These include the requirements to divulge sensitive
13
and confidential information without the provision of legal process and to verify the licensing
14

15 status of short-term rentals prior to publishing a listing or facilitating a booking. These burdens are

16 unjustified, deviate from the long-standing practice of owners engaging in short-term lease

17 arrangements, appropriate fundamental property rights, and encroach upon fundamental

18 constitutional liberties and statutory law.

19
A. Arbitrary Eligibility Limitations
20
100. First, the Challenged Provisions flatly deny large classes of Clark County residents
21
their fundamental ownership rights to lease and to include others on a short-term basis by barring
22

23 them from applying for a license because of where they live or the type of home they own. For

24 example, residents living in the Town of Mt. Charleston (as well as several other listed townships)

25 are barred from operating short-term rentals no matter their ability to otherwise comply with

26 Defendants’ regulatory scheme. Clark County Code § 7.100.080(c)(1).

27

28
32
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 33 of 84

1 101. Moreover, Defendants bar short-term rentals from operating in a multi-family

2 dwelling if doing so will result “in more than ten percent of the residential units in the multifamily

3
dwelling being rented for the purposes of transient lodging,” prohibit anyone from operating a
4
short-term rental in a dwelling that is not lawfully connected to a municipal wastewater system,
5
and ban short-term rentals in common-interest communities, “unless the governing documents of
6
the community expressly authorize the rental of a residential unit for the purpose of transient
7

8 lodging.” Id. § 7.100.080(d), (e); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 244.353545(2)(d); (2)(h). In

9 other words, by default, residents who live in communities governed by a homeowners’ association

10 are banned from operating short-term rentals unless their respective associations decide to

11
affirmatively permit short-term rentals within the community, despite the long-standing and well-
12
established fundamental right of property owners to create short-term leases if they so choose.
13
102. Even if a potential host happens to live in the right kind of home in the right kind
14

15 of place, they may yet still be barred from leasing their homes on a short-term basis because the

16 Buffer Requirements further limit which property owners may hold a license. Specifically,

17 property owners may not lease their properties on a short-term basis if they are “within 1,000 feet

18 of any [other] short-term rental unit” or within 2,500 feet of a resort hotel. Clark County Code

19
§ 7.100.080(f).
20
103. Finally, only 1% of the County’s total number of housing units may be operated as
21
a short-term rental at a given time, Clark County Code § 7.100.050, sharply limiting residents’
22

23 eligibility. In other words, the County has decreed by legislative fiat that owners cannot exercise

24 their fundamental ownership right to lease and to include others on a short-term basis in more than

25 1% of the housing units throughout the county. This massive destruction of fundamental property

26
rights is as constitutionally problematic as it is unprecedented.
27

28
33
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 34 of 84

1 B. Licensing Scheme

2 104. If a would-be host manages to survive the Challenged Provisions’ onerous

3 eligibility requirements, they must then navigate Defendants’ labyrinthine double licensing

4
scheme—all to exercise rights that inhere in their ownership of their properties. To operate a short-
5
term rental in Clark County, a property owner must obtain (and maintain through annual renewals)
6
a valid short-term rental license. Clark County Code §§ 7.100.030; 7.100.130; see also Nev. Rev.
7

8 Stat. Ann. §§ 244.35355(1)(a); 244.35356. Under the Code only “those natural persons, business

9 entities, or personal or family trusts identified as the owner(s) of the residential unit” may apply

10 for and obtain a license. Id. § 7.100.060. And once licensed, the Code sharply limits the ability

11
for residents to sell or transfer their property. The Challenged Provisions prohibit residents from
12
transferring ownership of their short-term rentals except in circumstances of marriage, divorce, or
13
death. Id. at § 7.100.150.
14
105. Assuming they fall within the list of persons eligible for a license, a resident must
15

16 then submit an application, just for approval to exercise fundamental rights incident to their

17 ownership of property. A complete application requires a resident to identify a raft of personal

18 information, including the address of the residential unit, the number of bedrooms it contains, the

19
name, date of birth, mailing address, telephone number and email address of each owner of the
20
residential unit, the name of all rental platforms that will be used to advertise the short-term rental,
21
the name and contact information of a local representative responsible for the short-term rental,
22

23 and finally provide a notarized signature. Id. § 7.100.090(b). Upon receipt of the application, the

24 County may “screen applications for completeness,” but the County is not required to notify an

25 applicant their application is deemed incomplete. § 7.100.100(f) Each application must be

26 accompanied by a $45 fee. Id. § 7.100.090(c).

27

28
34
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 35 of 84

1 106. In addition to satisfying these requirements, a person who wishes to operate a short-

2 term rental must pay an annual licensing fee of $750 for units with three or fewer bedrooms and

3
$1,500 for units with more than three bedrooms. Id. § 7.100.120. And a County resident cannot be
4
issued more than one short-term rental license no matter how many eligible properties they own,
5
thereby barring property owners from exercising their fundamental ownership rights at all of their
6
properties. Id. § 7.100.070(a).
7

8 107. Finally, without regard for the size of the home, the Challenged Provisions limit the

9 “maximum occupancy” of short-term rentals to be “the lesser of two person per bedroom or ten

10 persons per residential unit,” sharply stifling Plaintiffs’ ability to freely associate within the

11
protected privacy of their properties. Id. § 7.100.160(a). They also impose a two-night minimum
12
stay on short-term rentals even though no such limitations exist for hotels and casinos, id.
13
§ 7.100.160(b) (“The licensee must not accept bookings of fewer than two nights per booking.”);
14

15 but see Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.353545(2)(e) (permits owner-occupied rentals of one night or

16 more; requires non-owner occupied rentals be a minimum of two nights), and they restrict licensees

17 from accepting more than one booking for a residential unit during the same booking period, no

18 matter how many rooms the residential unit possesses, Clark County Code § 7.100.160(c).

19
108. Short-term rental operators also are required to “designate a local representative
20
responsible for the rental and available to respond to the short-term rental unit within thirty minutes
21
during all times that the property is rented or used on a transient basis.” Id. §§ 7.100.170(d);
22

23 7.100.190(b); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.35356(5)(c). Licensees must “make available to

24 the department a local twenty-four hour phone number that provides the capabilities of producing

25 a response to complaints” and the local representative must respond within thirty minutes to a

26
complaint and must address the complaint within “sixty minutes.” Id. §§ 7.100.170(e);
27

28
35
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 36 of 84

1 7.100.190(c). Defendants’ regulatory reach extends even to insurance. It provides that each

2 “licensee must maintain general liability insurance coverage with limits of not less than five

3
hundred thousand dollars per occurrence.” Id. § 7.100.170(c); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
4
§ 244.35356(5)(b). And even after complying with these requirements, a licensee must obtain a
5
separate business license issued by the State of Nevada, which is subject to its own regulatory
6
scheme, before being issued a short-term rental license by Clark County. Id. § 7.100.170(1); see
7

8 also Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.35355(1)(b). In other words, residents must be licensed not once

9 but twice before operating a short-term rental.

10 109. The burdens imposed by the Challenged Provisions’ array of interlocking

11
regulatory hurdles is exacerbated by the County’s implementation of a lottery system. Clark
12
County Code § 7.100.100(g). License applications are not reviewed on a first-come basis. Rather
13
they are placed in a random order of priority by a number generator.11 Accordingly, whether an
14

15 applicant is barred from exercising their fundamental property rights comes down to chance. If,

16 for example, a would-be host’s application is reviewed after the application of a short-term rental

17 within 1,000 feet of their short-term rental or after the County hits its 1% cap on short-term rentals,

18 they will be prohibited from leasing their home on a short-term basis, even if they are otherwise

19
eligible.
20
110. In other words, Clark County has created an entirely arbitrary system for deciding
21
who may exercise their fundamental property rights.
22

23

24

25

26

27 11
https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/news_detail_T28_R753.php.
28
36
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 37 of 84

1 C. Surveillance Provisions

2 111. In addition to constraints on who can operate a short-term rental, the Challenged
3 Provisions include a collection of ordinances designed to surveil short-term rental operators and

4
their guests.
5
112. Prior to the issuance of a short-term rental license, an owner must submit upon 48-
6
hour notice “to inspection or code compliance review by any county agency or department to
7

8 ensure the residential unit’s compliance.” Clark County Code § 7.100.100(h). Short-term rental

9 operators remain subject to random inspections at the whim of county officials even after obtaining

10 a license conditioned on the same 48-hour notice and inspections each year as part of their license

11
renewal process. Id. §§ 7.100.200(b), 7.100.170(i)(2), 7.100.130(c).
12
113. On top of these inspections, each “licensee must maintain adequate and accurate
13
books and records that provide a true accounting of all financial transactions for the three preceding
14
years, which must remain open to inspection by the department during normal business hours or
15

16 made available to the department at a location within the county for the purpose of ascertaining

17 compliance with” the code. Id. § 7.100.170(p). And unless provided by a hosting platform, see

18 infra ¶105, each licensee must submit a monthly report that includes: (1) the number of bookings,

19
listings, and lessees for the month; (2) the average number of bookings per listing; (3) current year-
20
to-date booking value; (4) current year-to-date revenue collected; (5) the average length of a rental;
21
(6) booking value per rental; (7) actual length of stay per address per rental transaction; and (8)
22

23 the names of all platforms used to list the rental unit. Id. § 7.100.170(f). Moreover, the Code also

24 permits officials to (1) “[d]emand that the licensee produce or make available all records required

25 by this chapter during normal business hours or at a location within the county; and (2) [c]onduct

26 an audit of the financial statements and operations of the business.” Id. § 7.100.200(c).

27

28
37
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 38 of 84

1 114. The Code also demands that short-term rental operators install invasive surveillance

2 devices on their property. The County demands that each licensee “install a functional street-facing

3
security camera capable of recording video surveillance” the footage of which must be provided
4
to the county or any law enforcement agency upon request within 48 hours. Id. § 7.100.170(o).
5
115. Similarly, the scheme requires licensees to “install noise monitoring devices at each
6
property line in both the front and rear yard of the short-term rental unit, as well as in the vicinity
7

8 of any outdoor pool or spa” and the noise level data captured by the device must be provided to

9 the County or any law enforcement agency upon request within 48 hours. Id. § 7.100.170(r).

10 116. Not only do both of these provisions compel the property owners to suffer physical
11
intrusions on their properties, but they also foist obligations on private parties to collect and share
12
information with government officials to facilitate their law-enforcement efforts.
13
D. Fine Provisions and Selective Enforcement
14
117. Further, the Challenged Provisions impose excessive penalties for violations of its
15

16 terms. Operating a short-term rental without a valid permit is subject to a steep fine of between

17 $1,000 and $10,000 which “shall be determined only after taking into account, without limitation,

18 the severity of the violation, whether the person who committed the violation acted in good faith,

19
and any history of previous violations.” Id. § 7.100.230(d)(1)(I).
20
118. For all other violations, “a fine equivalent to the nightly rental value” or $500 for
21
the first violation and $1,000 for each subsequent violation can be levied, whichever is greater. Id.
22

23 § 7.100.230(d)(1)(II).

24 119. These fines are substantial on their own. But the Code provides “that penalties and

25 remedies shall be cumulative,” and citations must assess a “daily fine amount for each day the

26 violation continues.” Id. §§ 7.100.230(b); (d)(1); (e)(1). Moreover, the County presumes “that a

27
residential unit or room within a residential unit is being operated as a short-term rental unit for
28
38
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 39 of 84

1 each day that the residential unit or room within the residential unit is listed, advertised, brokered,

2 or offered for the purpose of transient lodging.” Id. § 7.100.230(e)(3).

3
120. Together, these provisions allow Defendants to impose eye-watering fines. And
4
they use those excessive fines to gatekeep residents’ access to administrative review. The
5
Challenged Provisions bar residents from appealing an adverse enforcement action without first
6
providing an “advanced deposit of the fine.” Id. § 1.14.070. Accordingly, residents subject to
7

8 Defendants’ excessive fines are barred from receiving their due process before acquiescing to

9 Defendants’ unconstitutional penalties.

10 More serious still is the threat of foreclosure. Section 7.100.220 declares that short-term
11
rentals – licensed or unlicensed – found to be in violation of the Code are a public nuisance. Id.
12
§ 700.100.220(a-b). Section 7.100.230(f)(4) gives the County the right to abate violations of the
13
code as a public nuisance or chronic nuisance. By declaring violations a public nuisance, the
14

15 County can then use NRS Chapter 244 to levy a “special assessment” against the property. NRS

16 244.3605(5). Special assessments are ultimately placed on the tax rolls and delinquency subjects

17 the owner to foreclosure. See, NRS 244.360(4).

18 121. The fines are made worse still by Defendants’ selective and arbitrary enforcement
19
of the Challenged Provisions as alleged in the foregoing statement of facts, and by Section
20
7.100.230(f)(1) of the Code, which provides that violations of the County Code could subject hosts
21
and guests to the “issuance of a misdemeanor citation,” transforming the Code into a penal
22

23 regulation that was neither contemplated nor authorized by AB 363. See, NRS 244.353545(2)(n);

24 see also NRS 244.353545(8).

25 * * *
26 122. The Code is not limited to the deficiencies discussed above and on which this suit
27
rests. As a few illustrative examples, the Code: provides that Clark County may “determine[]”
28
39
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 40 of 84

1 when licenses are available, without imposing any objective criteria for this determination, §

2 7.100.100(a); requires license applicants to “cooperate fully with any inspection,” while leaving

3
the determination of whether an applicant has done so to Clark County’s unfettered discretion, §
4
7.100.110(a)(3); prohibits the residence from being used for “any purpose other than for dwelling,
5
lodging, or sleeping and for activities that are incidental to its use for dwelling, lodging or
6
sleeping,” § 7.100.180(a); restricts rentals to individuals “within the same family or group,” §
7

8 7.100.160(1)(c), and prohibits “a gathering of people with [sic] that exceeds the maximum

9 occupancy of the residential unit established by this chapter and listed on the short-term rental

10 license,” without defining the term “gathering,” §§ 7.100.180(b); 7.100.020(n); see also NRS

11
244.353545(2)(k); requires that a placard be affixed to the exterior of the property, at least eight
12
by eleven inches in size and display in at least seventy-two (72) point font the complaint hotline
13
number, the unit’s maximum occupancy, and both the business and short-term rental license
14

15 numbers, § 7.100.170(q); sets an arbitrary one percent (1%) cap on available short-term rental

16 licenses in Clark County, § 7.100.150; and requires a short-term rental licensee to designate a Clark

17 County resident as a local representative who can be available and physically present at the

18 property within thirty (30) minutes notice, day or night, § 7.100.170(d). In these and other ways

19
outlined in this suit, the Code unduly imposes onerous restrictions on short-term rentals and
20
deprives hosts of their constitutional rights.
21
E. Platform Requirements
22

23 123. Finally, the Challenged Provisions further burden property owners’ rights by

24 imposing unlawful requirements on short-term rental platforms such as Airbnb, leveraging those

25 platforms to enforce the County’s unconstitutional laws.

26

27

28
40
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 41 of 84

1 124. The Code, pursuant to AB 363, prohibits any person from operating as an

2 “accommodations facilitator”—defined to include “hosting platform[s]”12—without first

3
obtaining a business license, with a price tag of up to $75,000 per year. Id. § 7.110.030, 060.
4
Without a license, Airbnb is prohibited from engaging in its business in Clark County, and its co-
5
plaintiffs are cut off from Airbnb’s platform. To obtain a license, the platform must agree to “abide
6
by” the burdensome and unlawful “duties and requirements” set forth in Chapter 7.110 of the Code.
7

8 Id. §§ 7.110.040.

9 125. First, the Code demands that Airbnb divulge troves of sensitive and confidential
10 data to the County on a monthly basis (the “Monthly Report Requirement”). This requirement

11
demands data about each and every listing in Clark County, including, for example, the owner’s
12
name and address, the “booking value per rental,” and “any other information as the department
13
may deem necessary.” Id. § 7.110.080(e) (emphasis added). Platforms must also provide
14

15 confidential information about listing and booking activity in the County, including, for example,

16 the “current year-to-date booking value for the county,” the “current year-to-date revenue collected

17 through the licensee from all rentals in the county, disaggregated by owner or lessee,” and “any

18 other information as the department may deem necessary.” Id. § 7.110.080(f) (emphasis added).

19
In practice, the County has issued document subpoenas pursuant to NRS 244.4545(4)(6) and Code
20
sections 7.100.200 and 7.110.100, that demand all advertising, web site listings including but not
21
limited to license reservations, occupancy, payment history, business records, and communications
22

23 between host and guests.

24

25
12
26 “‘Accommodations facilitator’ means a person, other than the owner, lessee or other lawful occupant of a residential
unit, or a manager of a residential unit, who, for a fee or other charge, brokers, coordinates, makes available or
27 otherwise arranges for the rental of a short-term rental unit. The term includes, without limitation, a hosting platform.”
Id. § 7.100.020(a).
28
41
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 42 of 84

1 126. Plaintiffs consider the Monthly Report and property owner data to be private.

2 Plaintiffs currently do, or will if they are able, list short-term rental properties on Airbnb. For

3
them, this data includes their personal identifying information, the level of activity in their homes,
4
and their livelihoods. For Airbnb, it reflects non-public and competitively sensitive information
5
that drives key investment, marketing, and other business decisions within the company.
6
127. Second, the Code requires Airbnb to monitor, delete, and refrain from publishing
7

8 listings for unlicensed short-term rentals. This mandate comes in the form of several obligations

9 imposed on platforms under the Code (collectively the “Verification Requirements”):

10 ● “Before listing or advertising” a short-term rental, platforms must “verify” that the
11
property “has been issued a valid unexpired short-term rental license,” prohibiting
12
platforms from publishing un-verifiable properties, id. § 7.110.080(a);
13
● Platforms must “[d]eactive all listings which lack a valid state or county business
14

15 license number,” effectively mandating the deletion of such listings, id. §

16 7.110.080(c); and

17 ● Platforms cannot “accept or facilitate the payment” of an unlicensed short-term

18 rental, again effectively demanding the deletion of unlicensed listings, id. §
19
7.110.090.
20
128. These and other requirements imposed on platforms under Chapter 7.110 of the
21
Code amount to unreasonable and unlawful impositions on Airbnb, and in turn on persons seeking
22

23 to rent their property on a short-term basis. The consequences of violating these onerous

24 requirements are significant: The Code provides for steep fines of $500 for the first infraction and

25 $1,000 thereafter, to be assessed separately for each violation and daily for continuing violations.

26

27

28
42
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 43 of 84

1 Id. § 7.110.120(c)(3). Moreover, the County may suspend or revoke a platform’s license for any

2 violation of the Code. Id. § 7.110.110.

3
129. At bottom, the demands imposed on platforms like Airbnb will make it even more
4
difficult for Plaintiffs—and all other property owners in the County—to exercise their rights and
5
liberties guaranteed by the U.S. and Nevada constitutions. While Chapter 7.110 was adopted in
6
June 2022, it could not be enforced to date given the dysfunction plaguing the County’s issuance
7

8 of short-term rental licenses. On April 23, 2025, the Department of Business License notified

9 Airbnb by letter that it intends to enforce the platform requirements in Chapter 7.110 beginning

10 September 1, 2025.

11
* * *
12
130. Individually and collectively, these restrictions severely burden and
13
unconstitutionally impinge on Plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their fundamental ownership rights to
14
lease their properties on a short-term basis. First, Plaintiffs must navigate complicated and
15

16 sweeping eligibility requirements that outright ban short-term rentals in large swaths of the County,

17 including in common-interest communities whose governing documents do not expressly allow

18 for short-term rentals—all requirements that contravene property owners’ constitutional rights by

19
blatantly disregarding that leasing is a fundamental right inherent in property ownership. If they
20
are fortunate enough to manage those restrictions, then they must negotiate not only Defendants’
21
licensing scheme, which imposes a dizzying array of regulatory hurdles, but also the State’s
22

23 separate business licensing framework. And even if they satisfy both gatekeeping regimes,

24 Plaintiffs are then subject to a random lottery system that conditions their right to operate a short-

25 term rental on chance and must pay substantial sums to meet the requirements of the application

26 process with no guarantee they will get a license to offset the expense. Along the way, Plaintiffs

27
must submit to warrantless searches and physical intrusions on their land, collect information to
28
43
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 44 of 84

1 facilitate law enforcement efforts, comply with stifling occupancy limitations, and make

2 themselves vulnerable to excessive fines that are selectively assessed. These restrictions, to which

3
the County and State have offered the hotel industry arbitrary exemptions, constitute gross
4
infringements upon Plaintiffs’ constitutional guarantees. On top of that, the County imposes
5
burdensome and unlawful requirements on platforms like Airbnb, with an eye toward using these
6
platforms to enforce the County’s law. The effect is to further hamper property owners’ liberties
7

8 and rights guaranteed by the U.S. and Nevada constitutions.

9 5 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

10 COUNT I
Per Se Taking of Property Without Just Compensation
11
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
12 By all Plaintiffs against all Defendants

13 131. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

14 set forth herein.

15
132. The Fifth Amendment provides that “private property” shall not “be taken for
16
public use, without just compensation.” U.S. const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition
17
on taking private property for public use without just compensation applies to the States through
18
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
19

20 133. This clause reflects the Founders’ recognition “that the protection of private

21 property indispensable to the promotion of individual freedom.” Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S. at

22 147. As the Supreme Court has long explained, “[b]y requiring the government to pay for what it

23
takes, the Takings Clause saves individual property owners from bearing ‘public burdens which,
24
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” Sheetz v. Cnty. of El Dorado,
25
601 U.S. 267, 273–74 (2024) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
26

27

28
44
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 45 of 84

1 134. The Takings Clause’s protections are triggered by per se takings and regulatory

2 takings. Per se takings occur whenever government interference with property effects “a direct

3
government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
4
544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). For per se takings, “the Takings Clause imposes a clear and categorical
5
obligation to provide the owner with just compensation.” Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S. at 147.
6
135. The test in the regulatory-takings context, by contrast, involves balancing several
7

8 “factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-

9 backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” Id. at 148. But this balancing

10 test, first announced in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,

11
124 (1978), has “no place” when the government “appropriates for the enjoyment of third parties”
12
“a fundamental element of the [owners’] property right,” id. at 149, or “otherwise interfere[s] with
13
[such fundamental] right[s],” Sheetz, 601 U.S. at 274. “That sort of intrusion on property rights is
14

15 a per se taking” that automatically “trigger[s]” the “right to compensation.” Id.

16 136. The Challenged Provisions constitute per se takings, as they appropriate

17 fundamental property rights owners hold by virtue of their property ownership: the right to lease

18 their property and the right to include others on the property on a short-term basis. Over a century

19
ago, the Supreme Court emphasized that “the Constitution protects” “the right to . . . lease,” as an
20
“essential attribute[] of property.” Terrace, 263 U.S. at 215, and is one of the “fundamental rights
21
which are the essence of civil freedom,” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883). This accords
22

23 with the expansive property protections Nevada law affords to “all [fundamental] rights inherent

24 in ownership, including the right to possess, use, and enjoy property,” as well as the “right[s] to

25 control and dispose of property,” which necessarily encompass the fundamental rights to lease.

26
Hamm, 183 P.3d at 902; accord Calcasieu Lumber Co. v. Harris, 13 S.W. 453, 454 (Tex. 1890)
27

28
45
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 46 of 84

1 (“The ownership of land, when the estate is a fee, carries with it the right to use the land in any

2 manner not hurtful to others; and the right to lease it to others, and therefore derive profit, is an

3
incident of such ownership.”).
4
137. For this reason, the government cannot appropriate the right to lease without an
5
award of just compensation. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)
6
(formal condemnation action in which the United States sought to utilize a leased building for
7

8 three years thereby taking the lessee’s entire leasehold interest); United States v. Gen. Motors

9 Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380 (1945) (formal condemnation action in which the United States sought

10 to take occupancy for the remainder of the lessee’s lease term); see also Kohl v. United States, 91

11
U.S. 367, 377–78 (1875) (noting that, in a lessee’s challenge to a federal condemnation action
12
taking a parcel of land for a courthouse, all owners of estates or interests in the land could seek
13
recovery for the appropriation of their property, but that the court would ascertain the value in one
14

15 trial proceeding).

16 138. In other words, like other “essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly

17 characterized as property,” the right to lease—a fundamental incident of ownership in its own

18 right—merits the Takings Clause’s protections. See, Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S. at 150.

19
139. The Challenged Provisions therefore effect per se takings by denying certain
20
unlicensed property owners, like Plaintiffs McKannon, the Hansens, and Uehling, as well as many
21
of GLVSTRA’s members, the right to lease their own properties. And they effect per se takings by
22

23 preventing property owners, like Plaintiffs the Koorndyks, from exercising their fundamental right

24 to lease not only their first, but all their properties on a short-term basis, because the Challenged

25 Provisions unconstitutionally prohibit property owners’ from using more than one property to offer

26
short-term rentals.
27

28
46
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 47 of 84

1 140. Plaintiffs intend to lease their properties in Clark County to short-term guests but

2 cannot do so due to the Challenged Provisions’ various restrictions on which property owners can

3
offer short-term leaseholds—i.e., these short-term leaseholds are barred because (1) the owner’s
4
property is physically located too close to (a) another short-term rental (like Plaintiffs the Hansens)
5
or (b) a hotel, (2) the County has issued enough licenses to hit the 1% density cap, (3) the owners
6
have property in (a) the Town of Mt. Charleston (like Plaintiff McKannon) or (b) the other
7

8 prohibited townships, (4) the owners own another property already being used as a short-term

9 rental (like Plaintiffs the Koorndyks), or (5) the County has cited the owner for violating the

10 Challenged Provisions and has thereby stripped the owner of the ability to seek a license.

11
141. In this way, Defendants have stepped into Plaintiffs’ shoes as property owners to
12
dictate what leasehold interests they may create in their own land and has prevented them from
13
offering the short-term interests they would otherwise have decided to create.
14

15 142. By commandeering the right to lease and by defining the duration of acceptable

16 leaseholds, Defendants have plainly appropriated the right to lease and effected a per se taking,

17 which triggers the Takings Clause’s protections. See Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S. at 149–50; see

18 also, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

19
(explaining that the government effected a per se physical taking of the owner’s water rights by
20
directing it to construct a fish ladder and by commandeering the water’s flow and diverting it
21
toward the fish ladder); Va. Hosp. & Healthcare Ass’n v. Roberts, 671 F. Supp. 3d 633, 651 (E.D.
22

23 Va. 2023) (“[T]he government cannot commandeer a professional’s service and time for public use

24 without providing just compensation.”).

25 143. In addition to appropriating Plaintiffs’ right to lease, Defendants have appropriated

26
Plaintiffs’ right to include—a corollary of the right to exclude. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp.
27

28
47
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 48 of 84

1 v. Alexander, 679 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tenn. 1984) (explaining that the fundamental “rights

2 associated with the ownership of property” include the core rights and their corollaries—i.e., “the

3
right to refuse to do any of the[m]”). The right to exclude has received renewed attention in takings
4
jurisprudence, as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cedar Point Nursery underscored that
5
the “[t]he right to exclude” is “one of the most treasured rights of property ownership.” 594 U.S.
6
at 149 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 742–
7

8 43 (1998)). And the Court has reaffirmed that government regulations that “interfere” with a

9 property owner’s exclusion right constitutes a per se physical taking—entitling the property owner

10 to just compensation. Sheetz, 601 U.S. at 274.

11
144. Cedar Point Nursery’s reasoning extends just the same to the right to include, the
12
direct corollary of the right to exclude. Both the right to include and the right to exclude are
13
necessary for property owners to act as gatekeepers of their properties and are thus inseparable
14

15 from one another. See, e.g., Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra, at 742–43 (“[T]he

16 right to exclude must encompass . . . the owner’s right to include others.”). After all, to say that

17 property owners have a right to “exclude” others from their property is just another way of saying

18 that they have a right to decide which individuals to “include” by granting access to the property.

19
See id. at 740 n.37 (explaining that the right to exclude is “more precise[ly]” understood as a
20
“gatekeeper power” involving “the right to determine who has access to particular resources and
21
on what terms”).
22

23 145. Thus, just as government interference with the right to exclude effects a per se

24 appropriation of a fundamental property right warranting an award of just compensation under the

25 Takings Clause, government interference with the right to include equally constitutes a per se

26
taking that also categorically entitles the property owner to just compensation. See Dolan, 512
27

28
48
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 49 of 84

1 U.S. at 394 (noting that a government-mandated easement across the owner’s property would

2 interfere with her right to include by causing her to “lose all [her] rights to regulate the time in

3
which the public entered onto the greenway,” while simultaneously causing “[h]er right to
4
exclude . . . [to] be eviscerated”).
5
146. The Challenged Provisions infringe on Plaintiffs’ inclusion rights by prohibiting
6
them from hosting guests on their property—the paradigmatic example of exercising the right to
7

8 include. As a result, Defendants have destroyed fundamental elements of the vast majority of

9 property owners’ rights to include others on their property through the use of the lease—all in

10 contravention of well-established historical practice. Defendants owe just compensation for

11
appropriating this essential stick in Plaintiffs’ property rights bundle and thereby effecting a per se
12
physical taking.
13
147. In short, for at least two reasons, the Challenged Provisions unquestionably effect
14

15 per se takings of Plaintiffs’ properties in violation of the Takings Clause. Through those provisions,

16 Defendants have violated the bedrock rule of takings jurisprudence that they may not “extinguish

17 a property interest that it recognizes everywhere else to avoid paying just compensation when it is

18 the one doing the taking.” Tyler, 598 U.S. at 645. This includes Plaintiff Flores. Although she is

19
not currently barred from exercising her fundamental rights, she is entitled to do so whether or not
20
she holds a license, and free of the more onerous restrictions imposed on those precious few upon
21
whom a license is conferred, and thus she too and other GLVSTRA members are entitled to
22

23 injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from taking her property in the future by requiring her to

24 continue to hold a license to exercise her fundamental rights incident to property ownership.

25 Defendants therefore have a categorical duty to provide just compensation to Plaintiffs.

26

27

28
49
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 50 of 84

1 COUNT II
Regulatory Taking
2 U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
By All Plaintiffs against all Defendants
3

4 148. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

5 set forth herein.

6 149. The Challenged Provisions also effect a regulatory taking. As noted above, to
7
determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred, courts balance the factors set forth in Penn
8
Central: (1) “The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;” (2) “the extent to which the
9
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;” and (3) “the character of
10

11 the governmental action.” 438 U.S. at 124.

12 150. Plaintiffs the Koorndyks, McKannon, and Uehling, as well as GLVSTRA’s

13 members, have suffered a regulatory taking under this standard. First, they purchased the properties

14 in question with certain investment-backed expectations, prior to the enactment of the Challenged

15
Provisions. Considering the well-established historical pedigree for property owners’ leasing their
16
property on a short-term basis and that the right to lease is grounded in Nevada property law, these
17
property owners reasonably would not expect Defendants to destroy this longstanding use of one’s
18

19 property by legislative fiat, as it has done here. After all, the Supreme Court has made clear that

20 jurisdictions cannot “manipulate[]” or “extinguish a property interest that it recognizes everywhere

21 else to avoid paying just compensation when it is the one doing the taking.” Tyler, 598 U.S. at 645.

22
151. Second, the Challenged Provisions substantially diminish Plaintiffs’ property
23
values and income-earning potential. As explained above, the Challenged Provisions grossly
24
impede, and in some cases entirely destroy, the ability for County residents to put their homes to
25
economic uses. This accords with the general experience of property owners, who offer short-term
26

27 rentals precisely because it serves as the principal mechanism for unlocking the full value of their

28
50
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 51 of 84

1 properties. See AirDNA, 2023 Short-Term Rental Statistics You Need to Know (Jan. 28, 2024),

2 https://tinyurl.com/erchybnp (noting that short-term rentals generated approximately $26,000 in

3
revenue per listing in 2023); see Ron Bekkerman, et al., Research: Restricting Airbnb Rentals
4
Reduces Development, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Nov. 17, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/he7uh6we (finding
5
that, of the sample of properties surveyed, those that could offer short-term rentals “sold for an
6
average 38% more than those” that could not, in part because owners were incentivized to invest
7

8 in improvements).

9 152. Third, the government’s action is most naturally characterized as effecting a

10 physical invasion of owners’ property. As detailed above, Defendants’ action fits comfortably

11
within the per se takings framework precisely because the Challenged Provisions appropriate
12
Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to lease and to include others on the property on a short-term basis,
13
the corollary of the right to exclude. And the Challenged Provisions are of a particularly sordid
14

15 character because they encroach upon a fundamental property right that has long been a part of our

16 nation’s history and tradition.

17 153. Defendants have thus effected a regulatory taking through these Challenged
18 provisions, for which Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of just compensation.

19
154. However, if the Challenged Provisions somehow pass muster under the Penn
20
Central test, the Supreme Court would have no choice but to revisit that test, which is not actually
21
“ground[ed] . . . in the Constitution as it was originally understood.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S.
22

23 383, 419 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Haw. Land Use

24 Comm’n, 141 S. Ct. 731, 731 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); First Eng.

25 Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J.,

26
dissenting).
27

28
51
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 52 of 84

1 COUNT III
Per Se Taking of Property Without Just Compensation
2 Article 1, Section 8(3) of the Nevada Constitution
By all Plaintiffs against the County Defendants
3

4 155. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

5 set forth herein.

6 156. Nevada’s analogue to the federal Takings Clause mirrors its federal counterpart and
7
reflects the state’s “rich history of protecting private property owners against government takings.”
8
Sisolak, 137 P.3d at 1127.
9
157. As further explained in Count I, a “[p]er se” takings occur whenever government
10

11 interference with property effects “a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of

12 private property.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. at 537; see also City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land

13 Co., LLC, 546 P.3d 1239, 1249 (Nev. 2024). For per se takings, “the Takings Clause imposes a

14 clear and categorical obligation to provide the owner with just compensation.” Cedar Point

15
Nursery, 594 U.S. at 147.
16
158. The Challenged Provisions effect “per se” takings because they prevent large
17
categories of Clark County residents, including but not limited to Plaintiffs Flores, the Koorndyks
18

19 (at their second property), McKannon, the Hansens, and Uehling (as well as many of Short-Term

20 Rental Association’s members), from exercising their fundamental property rights to lease and to

21 include others on their properties, a corollary of the right to exclude. As fundamental “stick[s] in

22
the bundle of property rights,” the right to lease and the right include others are cognizable property
23
interests that support a takings claim under the Nevada Constitution. 180 Land Co., 564 P.3d at
24
1249; see Cnty. of Clark v. Sun State Properties, Ltd., 72 P.3d 954, 958 (Nev. 2003) (analyzing the
25
proper method for calculating the value of a leasehold interest that was part of the property the
26

27 County had condemned). Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Cedar Point

28
52
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 53 of 84

1 Nursery, “[t]he right to exclude” implicates an owner’s physical control of their property and is

2 therefore “one of the most treasured rights of property ownership.” Id. That reasoning extends just

3
the same protections to the right to include, the exclusion right’s direct corollary.
4
159. Through the destruction of Plaintiffs’ rights to lease and to include others, the
5
County has eviscerated their ability as property owners to serve as the gatekeepers of their
6
properties. And by coopting Plaintiffs’ ability to control a key physical aspect of their properties,
7

8 the County has effected per se takings, for which Plaintiffs are owed just compensation. This

9 includes Plaintiff Flores. Although she is not currently barred from exercising her fundamental

10 rights, she is entitled to do so whether or not she holds a license and thus is entitled to injunctive

11
relief to prevent the County from taking her property in the future by requiring her to continue to
12
hold a license to exercise her fundamental rights incident to property ownership. In this way, the
13
County Defendants have violated Article I, Section 8(3) of the Nevada Constitution.
14

15 COUNT IV
Regulatory Taking
16 Article 1, Section 8(3) of the Nevada Constitution
By All Plaintiffs against the County Defendants
17
160. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
18

19 set forth herein.

20 161. The Challenged Provisions also constitute an unlawful regulatory taking under

21 Nevada law. As further explained in Count II, to evaluate whether a government has effected a

22
regulatory taking, Nevada courts consider several factors “such as the economic impact of the
23
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of
24
the government action.” Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S. at 148 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
25
124); see also Sisolak, 137 P.3d at 1122–23.
26

27

28
53
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 54 of 84

1 162. Plaintiffs Flores, the Koorndyks, McKannon, and Uehling, as well as GLVSTRA’s

2 members, have suffered a regulatory taking under this standard. First, they purchased the properties

3
in question, with certain investment-backed expectations, prior to the enactment of the Challenged
4
Provisions. Second, the Challenged Provisions impose a severe economic impact on Plaintiffs’
5
property. As explained above, the Challenged Provisions grossly impede, and in some cases
6
entirely destroys, the ability for County residents to put their homes to economic use. Third, these
7

8 harms are most naturally characterized as effecting a physical invasion of owners’ property, which

9 is particularly pernicious given they encroach upon fundamental ownership rights that played a

10 fundamental role in our nation’s history.

11
163. Despite these takings, the County Defendants have offered no just compensation to
12
Plaintiffs. In this way, the County Defendants have violated Article I, Section 8(3) of the Nevada
13
Constitution.
14

15 Count V
Per Se Taking of Property Without Just Compensation
16 U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
By All Plaintiffs against All Defendants
17
164. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
18
set forth herein.
19

20 165. The Challenged Provisions also effect per se takings because they force licensees,

21 property owners who lease their properties on a short-term basis, to suffer physical incursions on

22 their properties, including but not limited to the following provisions.

23
166. In particular, the Challenged Provisions compel short-term rental license holders
24
and applicants, including many of GLVSTRA’s members, to “install a functional street-facing
25
security camera” as well as “noise monitoring devices” in several locations on their properties.
26

27 Clark County Code § 7.100.170(o), (r).

28
54
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 55 of 84

1 167. The Supreme Court has already determined that physical occupations such as these

2 constitute per se takings that warrant just compensation.

3
168. In Loretto, a property owner challenged a state law that authorized a cable television
4
company to install a half-inch diameter cable and two one-and-a-half cubic-foot boxes on her roof.
5
458 U.S. at 424. As the Court explained, because the state-authorized “installation involved a direct
6
physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building,” it “appropriate[d]
7

8 [the owner’s] property”—a quintessential physical per se takings. Id. at 439. As the Court

9 observed, when government action results in a “physical occupation of property, [its] cases

10 uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action

11
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.” Id. at
12
434–45. It did not matter that the occupation was quite small and spatially limited: “constitutional
13
protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area
14

15 permanently occupied,” id. at 436—the size of the incursion “bears only on the amount of

16 compensation,” Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S. at 153.

17 169. A straightforward application of Loretto here compels the conclusion that the
18 security-camera and noise-device installation requirements constitute per se takings. Defendants

19
have forced property owners, like Plaintiffs, to suffer (at their own expense and personal effort)
20
the physical intrusion of security cameras and noise devices. Indeed, these devices are physically
21
installed on the property under government threat to deny them their fundamental rights to lease
22

23 and to include others on their properties on a short-term basis. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512

24 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (holding that compelling a property owner to dedicate an easement for public

25 use would constitute a taking).

26

27

28
55
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 56 of 84

1 170. And it is no answer for Defendants to say that such installations are supported by

2 the exercise of their police powers. As the Court made clear, “physical occupation authorized by

3
government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.” Loretto, 458 U.S.
4
at 426. And the Clark County Code identifies already extant nuisance regulations that short-term
5
rentals must follow. See Clark County § 7.100.180(c)-(f). The County has provided no explanation
6
for why it must foist additional restrictions that cause unwanted physical invasions of owners’
7

8 property, who simply want to exercise their fundamental property rights by virtue of their

9 ownership, when the County can simply enforce its existing nuisance rules as warranted. Rather,

10 it reflects a singular effort to shoulder property owners who wish to lease their properties on a

11
short-term basis to shoulder “public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
12
the public as a whole.” Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
13
171. As a result, the compelled installation of security cameras and noise-devices are
14

15 plain physical occupations, for which Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of just compensation under

16 the Takings Clause.

17 COUNT VI
Violation of the Fundamental Right to Lease
18 U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
19 By All Plaintiffs against All Defendants

20 172. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

21 set forth herein.

22
173. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any
23
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
24
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. const.
25
amend. XIV.
26

27

28
56
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 57 of 84

1 174. The Fourteenth Amendment protects “more than fair process: It also ‘provides

2 heightened protection’ against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty

3
interests.” Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 910 (2024). Courts identify those rights and
4
liberties first by carefully describing “the asserted fundamental liberty interest” before assessing
5
whether that right is “objectively deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” See
6
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
7

8 175. Once a fundamental right is recognized, governments may only burden that right

9 “by narrowly tailored means that serve a compelling state interest.” Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 910.

10 Although not quite “fatal in fact,” most, if not all, regulations subject to this level of review will

11
be struck down as constitutionally invalid. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
12
237 (1995).
13
176. The right of property owners to lease their own property, for any time period, to
14

15 guests as a temporary place of abode is one such fundamental right protected by substantive due

16 process. As the survey Plaintiffs provide above reveals, this right is deeply rooted in the Nation’s

17 legal, political, and social history and traditions. The Supreme Court recognized as much in

18 decisions stretching back over 140 years, when it described the right to “lease” as one of the

19
“fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.
20
177. The very founding of this country was predicated upon the strongly held belief that
21
property rights were critical to securing precious personal freedoms from an arbitrary or tyrannical
22

23 government. Accordingly, the Framers of the Constitution strove to enshrine within the

24 constellation of rights held by the people traditional property rights—including the rights to

25 include, exclude, and lease—as well as notions of privacy, autonomy, and association necessary to

26
a robust civil society that would remain free from the stifling hand of official intervention of the
27

28
57
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 58 of 84

1 type suffered by our revolutionary forebearers. This right is protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth

2 Amendments and is supported by the right to free association protected by the First Amendment,

3
and the right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
4
178. Historical practice bears out this traditional understanding. The nation’s very birth
5
owes a debt to the early American hosts who provided temporary shelter to the drafters of the
6
Constitution as they hashed out their differences; to an early Supreme Court struggling to find its
7

8 way; and to politicians working the country’s first Congresses who by exposure in early short-term

9 rentals were able to bridge an ideological divide that seems increasingly impossible today. That

10 exercise of the fundamental right to lease continues straight through until today.

11
179. The Challenged Provisions, both individually and collectively, burden this
12
fundamental right by making its exercise difficult, in many cases impossible, and ultimately a
13
matter of chance. For some Plaintiffs, this means financial losses and impediments to their exercise
14

15 of other liberties like privacy and the freedom of association. For others, it will mean, in addition,

16 a complete prohibition on their ability to exercise their right to lease, sometimes for no reason

17 other than the fact that they happen to own property located within an arbitrary distance to an

18 incumbent hotel.

19
180. As a result of these burdens, the Challenged Provisions are subject to strict scrutiny
20
and may only survive if Defendants muster compelling interests to support a narrowly tailored law.
21
But this they cannot do. The Challenged Provisions reflect Defendants’ naked effort to protect
22

23 Nevada’s hotel industry at the expense of the constitutional rights of its residents. And even if

24 Defendants could identify a legitimate interest in the laws, it certainly cannot identify compelling

25 ones and will be unable to reasonable claim that the Challenged Provisions, which impose

26
sweeping obligations and restrictions on its residents, are narrowly tailored to achieve those aims.
27

28
58
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 59 of 84

1 181. The Challenged Provisions accordingly violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the

2 United States Constitution.

3
COUNT VII
4 Violation of the Fundamental Right to Lease
Article 1, Section 8(5) of the Nevada Constitution
5 By All Plaintiffs against the County Defendants
6 182. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
7
set forth herein.
8
183. Like the United States Constitution, the Nevada Constitution “prohibits the State
9
from depriving ‘any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Doe v. State
10

11 ex rel. Legislature of 77th Sess., 406 P.3d 482, 484 (Nev. 2017) (quoting Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8(5)).

12 The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the substantive due process afforded by this provision

13 to be coextensive with federal substantive due process. Accordingly, it identifies fundamental

14 rights enshrined in this provision through the same two-step test identified by the U.S. Supreme

15
Court. See id. at 484–85.
16
184. The right of property owners to lease their own property, for any time period, to
17
guests as a temporary place of abode is one such fundamental right protected by this provision. As
18

19 the survey Plaintiffs provide above reveals, this right is deeply rooted in the Nation’s legal,

20 political, and social history and traditions.

21 185. The very founding of this Country was predicated upon the strongly held belief that
22
property rights were critical to securing precious personal freedoms from an arbitrary or tyrannical
23
government. Accordingly, the Framers of the Constitution strove to enshrine within the
24
constellation of rights held by the people traditional property rights—including the rights to
25
include, exclude, and lease—as well notions of privacy, autonomy, and association necessary to a
26

27

28
59
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 60 of 84

1 robust civil society that would remain free from the stifling hand of official intervention of the

2 type suffered by our revolutionary forebearers.

3
186. This legal tradition adds up to a fundamental right to lease—defined as the right of
4
property owners to lease their own property, for any time period, to guests as a temporary place of
5
abode.
6
187. Historical practice bears out this traditional understanding. The nation’s very birth
7

8 owes a debt to the early American hosts who provided temporary shelter to the drafters of the

9 Constitution as they hashed out their differences; to an early Supreme Court struggling to find its

10 way; and to politicians working in the country’s first congresses who by exposure in early short

11
term rentals were able to bridge an ideological divide that seems increasingly impossible today.
12
That exercise of the fundamental right to lease continues straight through until today.
13
188. The Challenged Provisions, both individually and collectively, burden this
14

15 fundamental right by making its exercise difficult, in many cases impossible, and ultimately a

16 matter of chance. For some Plaintiffs, this means financial losses and impediments to their exercise

17 of other liberties like privacy and the freedom of association. For others, it will mean, in addition,

18 a complete prohibition on their ability to exercise their right to lease.

19
189. As a result of these burdens, the Challenged Provisions are subject to strict scrutiny
20
and may only survive if the County Defendants muster compelling interests to support a narrowly
21
tailored law. But this they cannot do. The Challenged Provisions reflect an express effort by the
22

23 County to protect Nevada’s hotel industry and at the expense of the constitutional rights of its

24 residents. And even if the County could identify a legitimate interest in the laws, it certainly cannot

25 identify compelling ones and will be unable to reasonably claim that the Challenged Provisions,

26

27

28
60
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 61 of 84

1 which impose sweeping obligations and restrictions on its residents, are narrowly tailored to

2 achieve those aims.

3
190. The Challenged Provisions accordingly violate Article 1, Section 8(5) of the
4
Nevada Constitution.
5
COUNT VIII
6 Arbitrary and Irrational Restriction on Liberty Interests
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
7
By All Plaintiffs against All Defendants
8
191. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
9
set forth herein.
10

11 192. Beyond guaranteeing fundamental rights, the Fourteenth Amendment bars

12 governments from arbitrarily and irrationally burdening liberty interests. See Merrifield v. Lockyer,

13 547 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2008).

14 193. The Challenged Provisions run afoul this constitutional requirement.

15
194. As explained above, the Challenged Provisions impose severe burdens on
16
Plaintiffs’ liberty interests. These burdens at least include financial losses, stemming from
17
Plaintiffs’ inability or burdened ability to operate a short-term rental and from impediments to their
18

19 exercise of other liberties like privacy and the freedom of association.

20 195. Defendants have no legitimate basis for imposing these burdens. Indeed, as the

21 legislative history and enactments demonstrate, the Challenged Provisions are motivated by an

22
interest in economic protectionism—the Challenged Provisions exist to protect the state’s hotel
23
industry from competition. That much is obvious from the arbitrary exemptions they provide to
24
hotels and casinos who wish to operate short-term rentals. But economic protectionism is a per se
25
illegitimate and irrational basis for imposing burdens on protectable economic interests. See Allied
26

27 Concrete & Supply Co. v. Baker, 904 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that “bare economic

28
61
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 62 of 84

1 protectionism is not a valid justification for discriminatory treatment” under the Equal Protection

2 Clause).

3
196. Defendants’ favoritism toward the hotel industry is also irrational. Chapter 7.100
4
explains that the County adopted its protectionist framework because “[t]he increasing number of
5
short-term rental units in Clark County has diverted a noticeable portion of transient lodging away
6
from traditional transient lodging establishments and has negatively impacted the revenue derived
7

8 from such rentals to local governments and other agencies and beneficiaries of transient lodging

9 taxes.” Id. § 7.100.010(c). But short-term rentals are taxed the same transient lodging tax as hotels.

10 As a result, Defendants’ severe restrictions on short-term letting by non-hotel owners—in other

11
words, its decision to favor hotels over hosts—is arbitrary and irrational.
12
197. Even if Defendants were able to identify an interest aside from protecting the State’s
13
hotel industry--which they have tried, but failed to do--they still will not be able to offer a rational
14

15 basis to support the severe burdens imposed by the Challenged Provisions. Indeed, not even an

16 appeal to health and safety can save Defendants, who cannot arbitrarily impose restrictions that

17 encroach upon constitutional liberties of short-term rental operators that are not borne by other

18 similarly situated property owners.

19
198. Moreover, many of the Challenged Provisions are inherently arbitrary, irrational
20
and capricious or otherwise violations of substantive or procedural due process, including
21
provisions already identified—the 1,000-foot and 2,500-foot buffer—but also: (a) restricting the
22

23 total units allowed for short term rentals to 1% of housing units in the area (County Code §

24 7.100.050), (b) a random lottery system to determine the order in which applications received are

25 processed, as opposed to first, come first served (id. § 7.100.100(g)); (c) discretionary review of

26
applications for completeness without notice if an application is deemed incomplete (id. §
27

28
62
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 63 of 84

1 7.100.100(f)); (d) apparently random inspections without cause by any county agency or

2 department for compliance with a raft of potential interlocking regulations (§§7.100. 170(j)); (e)

3
occupancy and other booking restrictions that bear no relation to the size or configuration of an
4
individual property or the demographic of the prospective guest(s) (id. § 7.100.160(a)); (f)
5
prohibitions on otherwise permitted or even constitutionally protected gatherings (id. §
6
7.100.180(b)); and (g) the declaration that the operation of “[a]ny residential unit or room within
7

8 a residential unit which is operated as a short-term rental unit and which does not comply with the

9 provisions of this chapter constitutes a public nuisance” (id. § 7.100.220(b)).

10 199. Accordingly, the Challenged Provisions violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the
11
United States Constitution.
12
COUNT IX
13 Arbitrary and Irrational Restriction on Liberty Interests
Article 1, Section 8(2) of the Nevada Constitution
14 By All Plaintiffs against the County Defendants
15
200. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
16
set forth herein.
17
201. Like its federal counterpart, the Nevada Constitution instructs courts to strike down
18

19 laws that are not “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” Peck v. Zipf, 407 P.3d

20 775, 895 (Nev. 2017).

21 202. The Challenged Provisions run afoul this constitutional requirement.

22
203. As explained above, the Challenged Provisions impose severe burdens on
23
Plaintiffs’ liberty interests. These burdens at least include financial losses, stemming from
24
Plaintiffs’ inability or burdened ability to operate a short-term rental and from impediments to their
25
exercise of other liberties like privacy and the freedom of association.
26

27

28
63
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 64 of 84

1 204. The County Defendants have no rational basis for imposing these burdens. Indeed,

2 as the legislative history and enactments demonstrate, the Challenged Provisions are motivated by

3
an interest in economic protectionism—the Challenged Provisions exist to protect the state’s hotel
4
industry from competition. But economic protectionism is a per se illegitimate and irrational basis
5
for imposing burdens on protectable economic interests. Even if Defendants were able to identify
6
an interest aside from protecting the State’s hotel industry--which they have tried, but failed to do-
7

8 -they still will not be able to offer a rational basis to support the severe burdens imposed by the

9 Challenged Provisions. Indeed, not even an appeal to health and safety can save the County. The

10 County cannot arbitrarily impose restrictions that encroach upon constitutional liberties of short-

11
term rental operators that are not borne by other similarly situated property owners.
12
205. Accordingly, the Challenged Provisions violate Article 1, Section 8(5) of the
13
Nevada Constitution.
14

15 COUNT X
Unlawful Warrantless Searches
16 U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
By All Plaintiffs against All Defendants
17
206. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
18

19 set forth herein.

20 207. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

21 persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” City of Los

22
Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419 (2015).
23
208. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “searches conducted
24
outside the judicial process, without proper approval by a judge or a magistrate judge, are per se
25
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
26

27

28
64
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 65 of 84

1 Id. (cleaned up). “This rule applies to commercial premises as well as to homes.” Id. at 419–20

2 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).

3
209. Nevertheless, one of the exceptions to the bar on warrantless searches are so-called
4
“administrative searches,” Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967),
5
searches “distinguishable from the general interest in crime control” used to ensure regulatory
6
compliance, Patel, 576 U.S. at 420. But still, “in order for an administrative search to be
7

8 constitutional, the subject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance

9 review” of the search “before a neutral decisionmaker.” Id.

10 210. The Surveillance Provisions, Clark County Code §§ 7.100.100(h), 7.100.130(c),

11
7.100.170(i)(2), 7.100.200(b), violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by authorizing
12
warrantless administrative searches without offering Plaintiffs an opportunity for precompliance
13
review.
14

15 211. Specifically, the Surveillance Provisions authorize County officials to conduct

16 “[r]andom [i]nspections . . . at any time,” with no opportunity for the host to challenge the

17 legitimacy of the inspection before its execution as long as forty-eight hours’ notice is provided.

18 Id. § 7.100.200(b). That search can reach not only Plaintiffs’ books and records, id.

19
§ 7.100.200(c)(1), but also the most sensitive parts of their homes, including “bedrooms,
20
bathrooms, [the] kitchen, dining area, living room, garage and yard,” id. § 7.100.100(h).
21
212. In other words, the Surveillance Provisions authorize warrantless searches of places
22

23 where reasonable expectations of privacy are at their zenith. And while Defendants may claim

24 those warrantless searches fall within the Supreme Court’s “administrative search” exception to

25 the warrant requirement, that argument will fail. Neither provision offers individuals subject to

26
these searches an opportunity for precompliance review of the search.
27

28
65
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 66 of 84

1 213. Plaintiffs Flores and the Koorndyks, as well as GLVSTRA’s members, have been

2 and will continue to be injured by the Surveillance Provisions because they have been forced to

3
submit to warrantless searches of their property without an opportunity for pre-compliance review.
4
The Surveillance Provisions continue to injure Flores and the Koorndyks, as well as GLVSTRA’s
5
members, because they create an imminent threat of random additional warrantless searches and
6
will force Plaintiffs to submit to warrantless searches each year during the renewal process, without
7

8 ever providing an opportunity for pre-compliance review.

9 214. Further, the Surveillance Provisions, and in particular those provisions compelling
10 owners to collect information via compulsory security cameras and noise-devices, raise additional

11
Fourth Amendment concerns. There is no precedent for forcing private property owners to install
12
data collection devices on their properties and then gather information that they would not
13
otherwise choose to obtain and then supply that information, whenever requested, to the
14

15 government to facilitate its law-enforcement efforts.

16 215. By enlisting private property owners and compelling them to assist with law-

17 enforcement efforts, the Surveillance Provisions further violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

18 rights.

19
216. Accordingly, these provisions are unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth
20
Amendments.
21
COUNT XI
22
Unlawful Warrantless Searches
23 Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution
By All Plaintiffs against the County Defendants
24
217. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
25
set forth herein.
26

27

28
66
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 67 of 84

1 218. Like its federal counterpart, the Nevada Constitution provides “[t]he right of the

2 people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and

3
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause.” Nev. Const. Art.
4
I § 18. The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted Section 18 to largely mirror the Fourth
5
Amendment. Accordingly, under Nevada law “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable . . .
6
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Lloyd, 312
7

8 P.3d 467, 469 (Nev. 2013). That includes administrative searches to the extent that they do not

9 provide for pre-compliance review. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 420.

10 219. As explained above with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the Surveillance
11
Provisions, Clark County Code §§ 7.100.100(h), 7.100.130(c), 7.100.170(i)(2), 7.100.200(b),
12
violate Article I, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution by authorizing warrantless searches
13
without offering Plaintiffs an opportunity for precompliance review. Specifically, the Surveillance
14

15 Provisions authorize County officials to conduct “[r]andom [i]nspections . . . at any time,” with no

16 opportunity for the host to challenge the legitimacy of the inspection before its execution as long

17 as forty-eight hours’ notice is provided. Clark County Code § 7.100.200(b). That search can reach

18 not only Plaintiffs’ books and records, id. § 7.100.200(c)(1), but also the most sensitive parts of

19
their homes, including “bedrooms, bathrooms, [the] kitchen, dining area, living room, garage and
20
yard,” id. § 7.100.100(h).
21
220. In other words, the Surveillance Provisions authorize warrantless searches of places
22

23 where reasonable expectations of privacy are at their zenith. And while the County Defendants

24 may claim those warrantless searches fall within the Supreme Court’s “administrative search”

25 exception to the warrant requirement, that argument will fail. Neither provision offers individuals

26
subject to these searches an opportunity for precompliance review of the search.
27

28
67
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 68 of 84

1 221. Plaintiffs Flores and the Koorndyks, as well as GLVSTRA’s members, have been
2 and will continue to be injured by the Surveillance Provisions because they have been forced to

3
submit to warrantless searches of their property without an opportunity for pre-compliance review.
4
The Surveillance Provisions continue to injure Plaintiffs Flores and the Koorndyks, as well as
5
GLVSTRA’s members, because they create an imminent threat of random additional warrantless
6

7 searches and will force Plaintiffs to submit to warrantless searches each year during the renewal

8 process, without ever providing an opportunity for pre-compliance review.

9 222. Further, the Surveillance Provisions, and in particular those provisions compelling
10
owners to collect information via compulsory security cameras and noise-devices, raise additional
11
Fourth Amendment concerns. By enlisting private property owners and compelling them to assist
12
with law-enforcement efforts, the Surveillance Provisions further violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth
13
Amendment rights.
14

15 223. Accordingly, these provisions are unconstitutional under Article I, Section 18 of the

16 Nevada Constitution.

17 COUNT XII
Equal Protection Violation
18
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
19 By All Plaintiffs against All Defendants

20 224. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
21 set forth herein.

22
225. The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
23
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
24
226. The Supreme Court has held that this clause protects individuals who “ha[ve] been
25

26 intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated” by the government with respect to

27 their fundamental rights, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982), or when “there is no

28
68
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 69 of 84

1 rational basis for the difference in treatment,” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

2 (2000); see Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904 (1986) (“Whenever a state law

3
infringes a constitutionally protected right, we undertake intensified equal protection scrutiny of
4
that law.”); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (explaining that, in the equal-
5
protection context, regulations that “affect fundamental rights” trigger more than rational-basis
6
review). “[U]nless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes
7

8 exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic,

9 the Equal Protection Clause requires . . . that the classification rationally further a legitimate state

10 interest.” Id.

11
227. The Challenged Provisions violate the federal Equal Protection Clause. The
12
Challenged Provisions provide short-term rental owners a 1,000-foot protective buffer from other
13
short-term rentals, unjustifiably barring some property owners from exercising their fundamental
14

15 property rights while others are doing so. Clark County Code § 7.100.080(f); see also Nev. Rev.

16 Stat. Ann. § 244.353545(f). Moreover, the Challenged Provisions severely burden, and in some

17 cases outright bar, Plaintiffs’ exercise of their fundament property rights to lease and to include

18 others on their properties on a short-term basis, while providing exemption to hotels operating

19
short-term rentals in residential properties in precisely the same way. Clark County Code
20
§ 7.100.040(a)-(c).
21
228. In this way, short-term rentals operated by Clark County residents are arbitrarily
22

23 and irrationally classified for reduced protections as compared to short-term rentals in residential

24 properties that just happen to be operated by hotels, even though such property owners are

25 similarly-situated for the purposes of the Challenged Provisions. That difference in treatment is as

26
intentional as it gets, and it implicates the fundamental rights to lease and to include others on
27

28
69
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 70 of 84

1 one’s property. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.15 (explaining that, when seeking to establish

2 whether a right is fundamental, courts “look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its

3
source, explicitly or implicitly, therein”); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22 (holding that the “right
4
to . . . lease” is one of “those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom”). Cedar
5
Point, 594 U.S. at 149-50 (holding that the right to exclude, the corollary of the right to include, is
6
a fundamental element of property ownership that merits protection under the Takings Clause).
7

8 229. The Challenged Provisions are particularly objectionable because they represent a

9 self-evident attempt at economic protectionism. Namely, Defendants treat these similarly situated

10 individuals, who all intend to lease their properties on a short-term basis to others, disparately as

11
a means of protecting the County and State’s hotel industry. Allied Concrete & Supply Co. v. Baker,
12
904 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that “bare economic protectionism is not a valid
13
justification for discriminatory treatment” under the Equal Protection Clause).
14

15 230. Moreover, it is no answer for Defendants to claim that the government may treat

16 categories of property differently in some circumstances. As the Supreme Court has admonished,

17 the government “may divide different kinds of property into classes” and regulate them differently

18 only “so long as those divisions and burdens are reasonable.” Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.

19
v. Cnty. Comm’n of Webster Cnty., 488 U.S. 336, 346 (1989). And to qualify as reasonable within
20
the meaning of Allegheny Pittsburgh, a jurisdiction cannot explain a regulation only with a
21
rationale that contradicts fundamental constitutional values.
22

23 231. As a result of the Challenged Provisions’ arbitrary provisions and exemptions,

24 Plaintiffs and GLVSTRA’s members have suffered severe restrictions on their fundamental

25 property interests and have thereby been prevented from unlocking the economic value of their

26
property.
27

28
70
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 71 of 84

1 232. Because there is no rational basis for these restrictions and exemptions, the

2 Challenged Provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

3
COUNT XIII
4 Equal Protection Violation
Article 4, Section 21 of the Nevada Constitution
5 By All Plaintiffs against All Defendants
6 233. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all allegations in this Complaint, as if set forth
7
fully herein.
8
234. Article 4, Section 21 of the Nevada Constitution guarantees equal protection of the
9
laws. “At the heart of the Equal Protection Clauses is the idea that all people similarly situated are
10

11 entitled to equal protection of the law.” Vickers v. Dzurenda, 433 P.3d 306, 308 (Nev. App. 2018).

12 “Thus, the threshold question is whether a statute treats similarly situated people disparately.” Id.

13 “[T]he standard of the Equal Protection Clause of the Nevada Constitution [is] the same as the

14 federal standard.” Id.

15
235. The Challenged Provisions violate Nevada’s Equal Protection Clause. In particular,
16
the Challenged Provisions provide short-term rental owners a 1,000-foot protective buffer from
17
other short-term rentals, unjustifiably barring some property owners from exercising their
18

19 fundamental property rights while others are doing so. Clark County Code § 7.100.080(f). AB 363

20 requires a protective buffer of 660-feet. NRS 244.353545(2)(f)(1). Moreover, the Challenged

21 Provisions severely burden, and in some cases outright bar, Plaintiffs’ exercise of their fundament

22
property rights to lease and to include others on their properties on a short-term basis, while
23
providing exemption to hotels operating short-term rentals in residential properties in precisely the
24
same way. Id. § 7.100.040(a)-(c).
25
236. The Challenged Provisions’ disparate treatment of these similarly situated
26

27 individuals is not supported by a rational motivation. It does not help preserve neighborhood

28
71
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 72 of 84

1 character or keep guests and residents safe. Rather it is designed to protect the County and State’s

2 hotel industry and encroaches upon Plaintiffs’ fundamental property rights.

3
237. Because there is no rational basis for these restrictions and exemptions, the
4
requirement violates the Article 4, Section 21 of the Nevada Constitution.
5
COUNT XIV
6 As-Applied Challenge to Fine Provisions
U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
7
By Plaintiff Philip Johnson and GLVSTRA Members Similarly Situated
8 against all Defendants

9
238. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
10
set forth herein.
11

12 239. The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor

13 excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The Eighth Amendment is

14 incorporated against the states and local governments under the Due Process Clause of the

15
Fourteenth Amendment. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 150 (2019).
16
240. A fine is covered by the Excessive Fines Clause if it effects a “punishment.” Austin
17
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993). And a fine is excessive “if it is grossly
18
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 341,
19

20 334 (1998).

21 241. The Fine Provisions violate the federal constitution as applied to Plaintiff Philip
22 Johnson. Defendants have punished Johnson for exercising his fundamental property rights by

23
imposing upon him fines in excess of $45,000 for engaging in the short-term rental of his property.
24
That fine is grossly disproportionate by any measure. But it adds insult to constitutional injury
25
that the only basis for Defendants’ imposition of the fine is Johnson’s constitutionally protected
26

27 activity.

28
72
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 73 of 84

1 242. Because Johnson’s fines exceeding $45,000 constitute punishment and is grossly

2 disproportionate to the gravity of Johnson’s alleged offense (all for exercising his constitutionally

3
protected, fundamental property rights), the Fine Provisions plainly violate the Eighth
4
Amendment.
5
COUNT XV
6 As-Applied Challenge to Fine Provisions
Article 1, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution
7
By Plaintiff Philip Johnson and GLVSTRA Members Similarly Situated
8 against the County Defendants

9 243. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
10 set forth herein.

11
244. Article I, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall
12
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted,
13
nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.” In assessing whether a fine is excessive, Nevada
14

15 courts apply the same legal standard as the federal courts do with respect to the Eighth Amendment.

16 See Air Flandes, LLC v. Clark Cnty. Pub. Resp. Off., No. 86140-COA, 2024 WL 750138, at *4

17 (Nev. App. Feb. 22, 2024).

18 245. The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
19
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” A fine is covered by the
20
federal Excessive Fines Clause if it effects a “punishment.” Austin, 509 U.S. at 609–10. And a fine
21
is excessive “if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Bajakajian,
22

23 524 U.S. at 334. Accordingly, if the fine effects a punishment and is disproportionate to the gravity

24 of the offense, the fine also violates Article I, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution. The Fine

25 Provisions violate the Nevada constitution as applied to Plaintiff Philip Johnson. Defendants have

26
punished Johnson for exercising his fundamental property rights by imposing upon him fines
27

28
73
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 74 of 84

1 exceeding $45,000. Those fines are grossly disproportionate by any measure, but it is especially

2 repugnant given that the only basis for Defendants’ imposition of the fine is Johnson’s

3
constitutionally protected activity.
4
246. Because Johnson’s fines of more than $45,000 constitutes punishment and is
5
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Johnson’s alleged offense (all for exercising his
6
constitutionally protected, fundamental property rights), the Fine Provisions plainly violate Article
7

8 I, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution.

9 COUNT XVI
Unlawful Warrantless Searches
10 U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
11 By All Plaintiffs against All Defendants

12 247. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

13 set forth herein.

14 248. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
15
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Patel, 576 U.S.
16
at 419.
17
249. The Monthly Report Requirement violates the Fourth Amendment by demanding
18

19 that platforms like Airbnb issue monthly reports to the County, divulging troves of highly sensitive

20 and confidential information about every single short-term rental listing in Clark County and the

21 listing and booking activity in the County. Clark County Code § 7.110.080(e)-(f). This information

22
includes, for example, personal identifying information of hosts, detailed financial information,
23
and “any other information as the [Department of Business License] may deem necessary” at its
24
unfettered discretion. Id.
25
250. Airbnb’s users—including Plaintiffs—have privacy interests in the non-public
26

27 confidential records maintained by Airbnb concerning their short-term rental property and personal

28
74
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 75 of 84

1 information. Airbnb, too, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the highly confidential and

2 sensitive information demanded by the Monthly Report Requirement—a privacy interest already

3
recognized by several courts that have struck down similar data disclosure provisions. See Airbnb,
4
Inc. v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (Airbnb has “privacy interests
5
in [its] user-related records that are more than sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment protection”);
6
Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston, 386 F. Supp. 3d 113, 125 (D. Mass. 2019) [Airbnb Boston]. As these
7

8 courts recognized, the conclusion that Airbnb’s records are protected by the Fourth Amendment is

9 dictated by the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, which held that a hotel

10 had a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in its confidential guest records. 576 U.S. at 414.

11
251. Because the Monthly Report Requirement implicates the Fourth Amendment, this
12
provision must be reasonable, meaning it must (i) allow an opportunity for pre-compliance review
13
before a neutral decisionmaker before compliance comes due; and (ii) be appropriately tailored.
14

15 See Patel, 576 U.S. at 410; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967). The Monthly Report

16 Requirement fails on both counts: as with the other provisions of the Code that violate the Fourth

17 Amendment, there is no mechanism for platforms to challenge the requirement without first

18 violating the Code and risking severe sanctions. And the requirement is in no way tailored—

19
indeed, it includes catch-all provisions that allow the County to request any information from
20
platforms, with no guardrails or limitations, embodying the very definition of a completely
21
untailored demand for information.
22

23 252. The Verification Requirements similarly raise Fourth Amendment problems. As

24 detailed above, the Verification Requirements shift the County’s law enforcement role onto Airbnb,

25 by compelling it to affirmatively verify the legal eligibility of each short-term rental booking and

26

27

28
75
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 76 of 84

1 to enforce the law for the County by removing listings Airbnb itself has found to be in non-

2 compliance.

3
253. In essence, these provisions allow the County to shirk its own responsibility to
4
enforce its laws, instead deputizing Airbnb and platforms like it to conduct those policing
5
obligations for the County unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment. There is no precedent for
6
allowing the government to avoid the Fourth Amendment by forcing a private party to act as its
7

8 law enforcement, while it sits on the sidelines. Indeed, the Supreme Court has clearly established

9 that the Fourth Amendment applies to private actors acting under government compulsion, just the

10 same as it limits governmental searches and seizures. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 489

11
U.S. 602, 614 (1989); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
12
254. So by foisting the County’s law enforcement responsibilities on Airbnb and other
13
platforms, the Verification Requirements have further violated Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment rights.
14

15 255. Accordingly, both the Monthly Report Requirement and the Verification

16 Requirements are unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

17 COUNT XVII
Unlawful Warrantless Searches
18 Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution
19 By All Plaintiffs against the County Defendants

20 256. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

21 set forth herein.

22
257. Like its federal counterpart, the Nevada Constitution provides “[t]he right of the
23
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and
24
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause.” Nev. Const. Art.
25
I § 18. The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted Section 18 to largely mirror the Fourth
26

27 Amendment.

28
76
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 77 of 84

1 258. The Monthly Report Requirement violates Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution

2 by requiring Airbnb to disclose confidential and sensitive information to the County, which

3
Plaintiffs consider to be private. It does so without providing Plaintiffs with an opportunity for
4
precompliance review prior to a violation, and without appropriately tailoring the demand.
5
259. Accordingly, these provisions are unconstitutional under Article I, Section 18 of the
6
Nevada Constitution.
7

8 COUNT XVIII
Violation of and Preemption by the Stored Communications Act
9 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
By Airbnb against All Defendants
10

11 260. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

12 set forth herein.

13 261. Under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), “a provider of remote computing
14 service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or

15
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any governmental
16
entity,” without appropriate legal process. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3).
17
262. Under the SCA, a subpoena, court order, or search warrant is required to obtain
18

19 non-content information about a user absent the user’s consent. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (describing

20 the circumstances under which a governmental entity may compel the disclosure of “a record or

21 other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the

22
contents of communications . . . )”).
23
263. Airbnb is a provider of an electronic communication service within the meaning of
24
the SCA, because it provides its users with “the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
25
communications,” by, among other things, allowing hosts and guests to privately and securely
26

27 message each other through the service. Id. § 2510(15). Airbnb also is a provider of a remote

28
77
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 78 of 84

1 computing service within the meaning of the SCA, because it provides its users “computer storage

2 or processing services by means of an electronic communications system,” by, among other things,

3
allowing users to create listings and store photographs, documents, and correspondence. Id. §
4
2711(2).
5
264. Defendants are “governmental entities” under the SCA. Id. § 2711(4).
6
265. The Monthly Report Requirement violates and conflicts with the SCA because it
7

8 requires Airbnb to “divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer

9 of such service” to a “governmental entity” without appropriate legal process. Namely, it requires

10 Airbnb to disclose on a monthly basis—with no legal process—information such as the names of

11
hosts, addresses of hosts, and income of hosts, along with any other information about hosts and
12
their listings that the County demands. Under the SCA, this type of data can only be disclosed in
13
compliance with a subpoena, court order, or search warrant.
14

15 266. For the foregoing reasons, the Monthly Report Requirement violates and is

16 preempted by the SCA.

17 COUNT XIX
Impermissible Compelled Speech
18 U.S. Const. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
19 By Airbnb against All Defendants

20 267. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully

21 set forth herein.

22
268. The First Amendment “guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily
23
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind
24
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988). Supreme Court precedent interpreting the First
25
Amendment “distinguish[es] between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.”
26

27 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755, 766 (2018). “Content-based

28
78
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 79 of 84

1 regulations ‘target speech based on its communicative content,’” and, “[a]s a general matter, such

2 laws ‘are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that

3
they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’” Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of
4
Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015)).
5
269. Accordingly, when the government “compel[s] individuals to speak a particular
6
message” over their objection, “such notices alter the content of their speech” and therefore trigger
7

8 heightened scrutiny. Id. at 782 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 303

9 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 586-87 (2023) (“Nor does it matter whether the government

10 seeks to compel a person to speak its message when he would prefer to remain silent or to force

11
an individual to include other ideas with his own speech that he would prefer not to include. All
12
that offends the First Amendment just the same.” (citations omitted)).
13
270. The Monthly Report Requirement impermissibly compels Airbnb’s speech by
14

15 requiring it to create and submit monthly reports divulging sensitive business data. This is not

16 commercial speech. As the Supreme Court has explained, commercial speech is “speech which

17 does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463

18 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). The sensitive information that Airbnb is

19
required to disclose does not propose commercial transactions.
20
271. The Monthly Report Requirement is a content-based regulation because it obligates
21
covered entities to speak on particular topics—i.e., the ten monthly disclosure categories, plus any
22

23 other data the County demands at its discretion—but not others.

24 272. Accordingly, the Monthly Report Requirement is subject to strict scrutiny, and

25 cannot meet that exacting standard. It is not justified by a compelling government interest, nor is

26
it narrowly drawn to serve any such interest. No compelling government interest can be served by
27

28
79
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 80 of 84

1 requiring Airbnb to divulge, on a monthly basis, each of the ten categories of information covered

2 by the Monthly Report Requirement on all Clark County listings, plus whatever other data the

3
County decides to demand. And even if the Defendants could identify a compelling interest, there
4
are undoubtedly less restrictive means they could employ to serve that interest.
5
COUNT XX
6 Violation of and Preemption by Section 230 of the Communications Act
47 U.S.C. § 230; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
7
By Airbnb against All Defendants
8
273. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs, as though fully
9
set forth herein.
10

11 274. In enacting Section 230 of the Communications Act, Congress sought to protect

12 and nurture the internet as a forum for communication, expression, and e-commerce. Section 230

13 prohibits treating websites that host or distribute third-party content, like Airbnb, “as the publisher

14 or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. §

15
230(c)(1). Section 230 also preempts incompatible state and local laws that would seek to assign
16
liability to platforms. Id. § 230(e)(3).
17
275. Airbnb is a provider of an “interactive computer service” protected by Section 230,
18

19 because it provides computer access by multiple users to a computer server through its

20 maintenance of the Airbnb platform. Id. § 230(f)(2). Third-party hosts on the Airbnb platform are

21 “information content providers” within the meaning of Section 230, because they alone are

22
responsible for the creation of listings on Airbnb. Id. § 230(f)(3). Hosts and guests alone, not
23
Airbnb, decide whether and on what terms to enter into transactions.
24
276. The Verification Requirements violate and conflict with Section 230. These
25
provisions demand that Airbnb (1) “verify” that each short-term rental “has been issued a valid
26

27 unexpired short-term rental license” “[b]efore listing or advertising the property,” prohibiting the

28
80
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 81 of 84

1 publication of unlicensed properties and requiring Airbnb to confirm the validity of licenses, (2)

2 “[d]eactivate all listings which lack a valid state or county business license number,” effectively

3
mandating the deletion of such listings, and (3) refrain from “accept[ing] or facilitat[ing] the
4
payment” of an unlicensed short-term rental, again effectively demanding the deletion of
5
unlicensed listings. See Clark County Code §§ 7.110.080(a), (c), 7.110.090. Moreover, the Code,
6
pursuant to AB 363, further requires that Airbnb “deactivate” any listing upon the County’s request
7

8 that it “remove” any listing. Id. § 7.110.080(c).

9 277. By forcing Airbnb to engage in decisions relating to publishing, monitoring, and

10 deleting listings created by third-party hosts, the Verification Requirements and other deactivation

11
demands treat Airbnb as a publisher of this content, in violation of Section 230. HomeAway.com,
12
Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2019) (regulations that “necessarily
13
require an internet company to monitor third-party content” or “otherwise affect[s] how [it]
14

15 publishes or monitors user content” implicate Section 230 (citation omitted)); Doe v. Internet

16 Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (demanding a website to remove third-party

17 content “would treat the website as the publisher of user content because removing content is

18 something publishers do” and “to permit liability for such conduct necessarily involves treating

19
the liable party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove” (citation omitted)).
20
278. The Challenged Provisions constitute “State or local law[s] that [are] inconsistent
21
with” Section 230, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3), and therefore the enforcement of the
22

23 Challenged Provisions against Airbnb violates and is preempted by Section 230.

24 ///

25

26

27

28
81
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 82 of 84

1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment:

3
1. Declaring that the Challenged Provisions constitute a taking in violation of the Fifth
4
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, entitling Plaintiffs to an award of
5
just compensation;
6
2. Declaring that the Challenged Provisions constitute a taking in violation of Article
7

8 1, Section 8(3) of the Nevada Constitution, entitling Plaintiffs to an award of just compensation;

9 3. Declaring that Clark County Code § 7.100.170(o) constitutes a taking in violation

10 of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, entitling Plaintiffs to

11
an award of just compensation;
12
4. Declaring that Clark County Code § 7.100.170(r) constitutes a taking in violation
13
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, entitling Plaintiffs to
14

15 an award of just compensation;

16 5. Declaring that the Challenged Provisions violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the

17 United States Constitution;

18 6. Declaring that the Challenged Provisions violate Article 1, Section 8(5) of the
19
Nevada Constitution;
20
7. Declaring that the Surveillance Provisions violate the Fourth Amendment to the
21
United States Constitution;
22

23 8. Declaring that the Surveillance Provisions violate Article 1, Section 18 of the

24 Nevada Constitution;

25 9. Declaring that the Challenged Provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
26
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
27

28
82
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 83 of 84

1 10. Declaring that the Buffer Provisions violate Article 4, Section 21 of the Nevada

2 Constitution;

3
11. Declaring that the Fine Provisions violate the Eighth Amendment to the United
4
States Constitution;
5
12. Declaring that the Fine Provisions violate Article I, Section 6 of the Nevada
6
Constitution;
7

8 13. Declaring that the Monthly Report Requirement violates the Fourth Amendment to

9 the United States Constitution;

10 14. Declaring that the Monthly Report Requirement violates Article 1, Section 18 of
11
the Nevada Constitution;
12
15. Declaring that the Monthly Report Requirement violates and is preempted by the
13
Stored Communications Act;
14

15 16. Declaring that the Monthly Report Requirement violates the First Amendment;

16 17. Declaring that the Verification Requirements violate the Fourth Amendment to the

17 United States Constitution;

18 18. Declaring the Verification Requirements and other deactivation requirements

19
violate and are preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Act;
20
19. Enjoining Defendants, their agents, officers, employees, and successors, and all
21
persons acting in concert with him, from enforcing any of the Challenged Provisions;
22

23 20. Awarding Plaintiffs their costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant

24 to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other applicable laws; and

25 ///

26

27

28
83
 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW Document 1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 84 of 84

3
21. Granting any such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
4
Dated this 30th day of June, 2025.
5
HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC
6

7
/s/Shannon R. Wilson
8 Mark A. Hutchison (4639)
Shannon R. Wilson (9933)
9 Ramez Ghally (15225)
Peccole Professional Park
10 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200
11 Las Vegas, NV 89145
Tel: (702) 385-2500
12 Fax: (702) 385-2086
mhutchison@hutchlegal.com
13 swilson@hutchlegal.com
rghally@hutchlegal.com
14

15 Paul D. Clement (Virginia Bar No. 37915)

Pro Hac Vice Pending
16 CLEMENT & MURPHY, PLLC
706 Duke Street
17 Alexandria, VA 22314
Tel: (202) 742-8900
18 paul.clement@clementmurphy.com
19
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
84
JS 44 (Rev. 10/20) CIVIL COVER
Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW SHEET
Document 1-1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 1 of 2
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS
Greater Las Vegas Short-Term Rental Association, et al. Clark County, et al.
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Clark County, NV County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Clark County, NV
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)

Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC, 10080 W. Alta Dr., Ste. 200,

Las Vegas, NV 89145 702-385-2500
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
1 U.S. Government ✘ 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State 1 1 Incorporated or Principal Place 4 ✘ 4
of Business In This State

2 U.S. Government 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State 2 2 Incorporated and Principal Place 5 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State

Citizen or Subject of a 3 3 Foreign Nation 6 6

Foreign Country
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only) Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.
CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES
110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY 625 Drug Related Seizure 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 375 False Claims Act
120 Marine 310 Airplane 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 423 Withdrawal 376 Qui Tam (31 USC
130 Miller Act 315 Airplane Product Product Liability 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a))
140 Negotiable Instrument Liability 367 Health Care/ 400 State Reapportionment
150 Recovery of Overpayment 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS 410 Antitrust
& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury 820 Copyrights 430 Banks and Banking
151 Medicare Act 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability 830 Patent 450 Commerce
152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability 368 Asbestos Personal 835 Patent - Abbreviated 460 Deportation
Student Loans 340 Marine Injury Product New Drug Application 470 Racketeer Influenced and
(Excludes Veterans) 345 Marine Product Liability 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations
153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY LABOR 880 Defend Trade Secrets 480 Consumer Credit
of Veteran’s Benefits 350 Motor Vehicle 370 Other Fraud 710 Fair Labor Standards Act of 2016 (15 USC 1681 or 1692)
160 Stockholders’ Suits 355 Motor Vehicle 371 Truth in Lending Act 485 Telephone Consumer
190 Other Contract Product Liability 380 Other Personal 720 Labor/Management SOCIAL SECURITY Protection Act
195 Contract Product Liability 360 Other Personal Property Damage Relations 861 HIA (1395ff) 490 Cable/Sat TV
196 Franchise Injury 385 Property Damage 740 Railway Labor Act 862 Black Lung (923) 850 Securities/Commodities/
362 Personal Injury - Product Liability 751 Family and Medical 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) Exchange
Medical Malpractice Leave Act 864 SSID Title XVI 890 Other Statutory Actions
REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS PRISONER PETITIONS 790 Other Labor Litigation 865 RSI (405(g)) 891 Agricultural Acts
210 Land Condemnation 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: 791 Employee Retirement 893 Environmental Matters
220 Foreclosure 441 Voting 463 Alien Detainee Income Security Act FEDERAL TAX SUITS 895 Freedom of Information
230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 442 Employment 510 Motions to Vacate 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff Act
240 Torts to Land 443 Housing/ Sentence or Defendant) 896 Arbitration
245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations 530 General 871 IRS—Third Party 899 Administrative Procedure
290 All Other Real Property 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION 26 USC 7609 Act/Review or Appeal of
Employment Other: 462 Naturalization Application Agency Decision
446 Amer. w/Disabilities - 540 Mandamus & Other 465 Other Immigration ✘ 950 Constitutionality of
Other 550 Civil Rights Actions State Statutes
448 Education 555 Prison Condition
560 Civil Detainee -
Conditions of
Confinement
V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
✘ 1 Original 2 Removed from 3 Remanded from 4 Reinstated or 5 Transferred from 6 Multidistrict 8 Multidistrict
Proceeding State Court Appellate Court Reopened Another District Litigation - Litigation -
(specify) Transfer Direct File
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
28 USC 2201; 28 USC 2202
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Constitutional challenge to Nevada statutes and Clark County code provisions governing short term rentals; both abridge liberty and property rights
VII. REQUESTED IN CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
COMPLAINT: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. JURY DEMAND: Yes ✘ No
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
(See instructions):
IF ANY JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
Jun 30, 2025 Shannon R. Wilson
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

 Case 2:25-cv-01173-MMD-BNW
JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 10/20) Document 1-1 Filed 06/30/25 Page 2 of 2
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44
Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as
required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is
required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of
Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use
only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then
the official, giving both name and title.
(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the
time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land
condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting
in this section "(see attachment)".

II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X"
in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.
United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment
to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes
precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the
citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity
cases.)

III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this
section for each principal party.

IV. Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If there are multiple nature of suit codes associated with the case, pick the nature of suit code
that is most applicable. Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.

V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.

Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.
Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing
date.
Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or
multidistrict litigation transfers.
Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C.
Section 1407.
Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket.
PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to
changes in statue.

VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional
statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service.

VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.

VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket
numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.