In Re Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1995 (SC)

FACTS

M/s Bansal Forgings Ltd. took loan from U. P. Financial Corporation and it made default in payment of
instalment of the same. The Corporation proceeded against the Company and the Company filed a civil suit
against the Corporation and it has also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction. The trial court
passed an order on the said date that the Corporation will not seize the factory of the Company, the Company
shall pay the amount of instalment and it will furnish also security for the disputed amount. Against said order of
the trial court, an appeal was filed. On 10 March 1994, Justice S. K. Keshote of the Allahabad HC addressed a
letter to the Acting Chief Justice of that Court narrating how advocate V. C. Mishra had misbehaved during the
hearing. When the judge had put a question to the advocate, the advocate started to shout and said that no
question could be put to him, that the advocate will get the judge transferred or see that impeachment motion is
brought against the judge in Parliament and asked the judge to follow the practice of “this court”. Justice S. K.
Keshote stated the act to be an insult to the institution and its dignity. In case dignity of the judiciary is not
restored, it would become difficult for the judges to discharge their judicial function without fear and favour.

The said letter was forwarded to the CJI and a bench was constituted to hear the contempt proceedings. On 7
October 1994, the contemnor advocate tendered an unconditional apology, but the court did not accept it.

ARGUMENTS OF V. C. MISHRA

When the matter was called on Board, the Applicant judge took charge of the court proceedings and virtually
foreclosed attempts made by the Senior Judge to intervene. The Applicant inquired as to under what law the
impugned order was passed to which the advocate replied that it was under various rules of Order 39 CPC. The
Applicant therefore conveyed that he was going to set aside the entire order, against a portion of which the
appeal had been filed because the lower court was not competent to pass such an order as Order 39.

The advocate politely brought to the notice of the Applicant that being the appellant, the advocate had the
dominion over the case and it could not be made worse, just because it had come to HC. The Applicant then lost
his temper and told the advocate in no unconcealed term that he would set aside the order in toto, disregarding
whatever the advocate had said. Being upset over the same, what the advocate felt was an arbitrary approach to
judicial process, the advocate got emotionally perturbed and his professional and institutional sensitivity got
deeply wounded. The advocate told the Applicant that it was not the practice in this Court to dismiss cases
without hearing or to upset judgments or portions of judgments, which have not been appealed against.
Unfortunately the Applicant Judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost his temper and directed the
stenographer to take down the order for setting aside of the whole order. The advocate denied referring to
impeachment and was unjustly “roughed” by the Applicant and was being punished for taking a “fearless and
non-servile stand”.

ARGUMENTS OF APPLICANT

Justice Keshote denied that he took charge of the court proceedings and virtually foreclosed the attempts made
by the Senior Judge to intervene, as was alleged by the contemner advocate. He stated that being a member of
the Bench, he put a question to the contemner as to under which provision, the order under appeal had been
passed by the trial court, and upon that the contemner started shouting and said that he would get him
transferred or see to it that impeachment motion was brought against him in Parliament. The contemner created
a scene which made it difficult to continue the court proceedings and ultimately when it became difficult to hear
all the slogans, insulting words and threats, he requested his learned brother on the Bench to list that case before
another Bench and to retire to the chamber. Accordingly, the order was made by the other learned member of the
Bench and both of them retired to their chambers.

ISSUE
Whether the SC can take cognizance of contempt of HC?

Whether the contemnor advocate is guilty of contempt of court?

DECISION

The contemnor argued that Article 129 vests with SC the power to punish only for the contempt of itself and not
of the HC. Further, the HC is another court of record vested with identical and independent power of punishing
for contempt of itself. However, the contention ignores that the SC is the highest court of record and under
various provisions of the Constitution is charged with the duties and responsibilities of correcting the lower
courts and tribunals and of protecting them from those whose misconduct tends to prevent the due performance
of their duties. The latter functions and powers of this Court are independent of Article 129 of the Constitution.
Therefore, Article 129 vests SC with the powers of the court of record including the power to punish for
contempt of itself, it vests such powers in SC in its capacity as the highest court of record and also as a court
charged with the appellate, supervisory and superintending powers over the lower courts and tribunals as
detailed in the Constitution. It is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the power. To discharge this
obligation, SC has to take cognizance of the deviation from the path of justice in the tribunals, and also of
attempts to cause such deviations and obstruct the course of justice. To hold otherwise would mean that although
SC is charged with the duties and responsibilities enumerated in the Constitution, it is not equipped with the
power to discharge them.

In Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, 1991 it was held that the SC has wide power to interfere and
correct the judgment and orders passed by any court or tribunal in the country. In addition to the appellate
power, the SC has special residuary power to entertain appeal against any order of any court in the country.
Article 129 provides that SC shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 contains similar provision in respect of HC. Both the SC
as well as HC are courts of record having powers to punish for contempt including the power to punish for
contempt of itself

Next, under the common law, contempt of court is defined as an act or omission calculated to interfere with the
due administration of justice. This covers criminal contempt (that is, acts which so threaten the administration of
justice that they require punishment) and civil contempt (disobedience of an order made in a civil cause).
Section 2(a), (b) and (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 defines the contempt of court, civil contempt and
criminal contempt respectively.

Normally, no Judge takes action for in facie curiae contempt against the lawyer unless he is impelled to do so.
No one expects a lawyer to be subservient to the Court while presenting his case and not to put forward his
arguments merely because the Court is against him. In fact, that is the moment when he is expected to put forth
his best effort to persuade the Court. However, if, in spite of it, the lawyer finds that the court is against him, he
is not expected to be discourteous to the court or to fling hot words or epithets or use disrespectful, derogatory
or threatening language or exhibit temper which has the effect of overbearing the court. The remedy of the
losing lawyer or the litigant is to prefer an appeal against the decision and not to indulge in a running battle of
words with the court. The advocate is not entitled to indulge in unbecoming conduct either by showing his
temper or using unbecoming language.

Thus, the contemnor was found guilty of the offence of the criminal contempt of the Court for having interfered
with and obstructed the course of justice by trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using
insulting, disrespectful and threatening language, and convict him of the said offence. Since the contemner is a
senior member of the Bar and also adorns the high offices such as those of the Chairman of the Bar Council of
India, the President of the U. P. High Court Bar Association, Allahabad and others, his conduct is bound to infect
the members of the Bar all over the country. Therefore, exemplary punishment has to be meted out to him. The
contemner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks. However, in the
circumstances of the case, the sentence will remain suspended for a period of four years and may be activated in
case the contemner is convicted for any other offence of contempt of court within the said period. The
contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an advocate for a period of three years with the consequence
that all elective and nominated offices/posts at present held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand
vacated by him forthwith.

In Re Prashant Bhushan, 2020 (SC)

FACTS

Advocate Prashant Bhushan made two tweets in June 2020 critical of the Indian judiciary. In one tweet,
Bhushan commented on a photograph of CJI Sharad Arvind Bobde riding a motorcycle without a helmet during
the COVID-19 lockdown. In the other tweet, Bhushan criticised the role of the judiciary in the past six years,
particularly with regard to its handling of political matters. In response to these tweets, an advocate named
Mahek Maheshwari filed a contempt petition against Bhushan. The SC took suo motu cognizance of the matter
and initiated contempt of court proceedings against Bhushan. Bhushan was charged with criminal contempt
under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. The charges alleged that his tweets had scandalised the
court and undermined the authority of the judiciary.

ISSUES

Whether Bhushan’s tweets qualified as a fair criticism of the system made in good faith for the sake of the
greater good under Article 19(1) of the Constitution?

Whether Bhushan’s tweets fall under Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act as being in contempt of
court?

Whether the intermediary Twitter can be held liable for contempt as per the facts of the case?

ARGUMENTS OF BHUSHAN

Bhushan defended his tweets as an exercise of his right to free speech and as legitimate criticism of the
judiciary’s actions and inactions. He argued that his tweets were not intended to scandalise the court but to
express genuine concerns about the state of the judiciary. The case sparked a nationwide debate on the balance
between freedom of speech and the need to protect the reputation and authority of the judiciary. He added that
his goal in posting the image of the CJI riding a bike was to draw attention to the paradox of the situation: while
he was conducting court proceedings virtually out of concern for the deadly COVID-19, he was also stepping
outside and riding a bike worth 50 lakhs in a public setting, and that too without any hesitancy.

DECISION

The contempt of court is an act that stems from any disparaging or slanderous remarks made by a person that
seeks to reduce the authority of the judicial institution. The violation is justified by the likelihood that such a
remark will undermine the judges’ reputations as well as the authority and dignity of the legal system,
potentially diminishing their standing in the eyes of the general public.

By Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and the High Court are given the authority to
penalise for its contempt. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, which was created in response to the Sanyal
Committee’s recommendations and serves as the basic legislative framework for contempt of courts in India,
supplements these articles. Section 2 of the Act distinguishes between civil and criminal contempt, with Section
2(b) addressing civil contempt and 2(c) addressing criminal contempt. Wilful defiance of a court’s ruling,
decree, or order is referred to as civil contempt. Criminal contempt addresses any behaviours that defames the
court, affects any legal proceedings, or obstructs the administration of justice.
The SC found Bhushan guilty of contempt of court. The court held that his tweets were derogatory and had the
potential to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. It sentenced Bhushan to a fine of one rupee as a
symbolic punishment. He was also given the option to undergo a three-month jail term and suspension from
practicing law for three years if he failed to pay the fine. Bhushan chose to pay the fine, and the case concluded
with the payment of the fine.

ANALYSIS

Regarding the boundaries of free speech and the ability to criticise public institutions, especially the court, the
case posed significant issues. The court’s decision to find Bhushan in contempt was criticised as having a legal
flaw since it could have interfered with his basic right to free speech. It was stated that people should be free to
express their views on government institutions’ operations without worrying about legal ramifications. The case
ultimately triggered a substantial discussion on how to balance free speech and judicial disobedience in India,
underlining the necessity for a strong and complex legal system that upholds both individual liberties and the
sacredness of judicial institutions.

The case further emphasises the role of public discourse and accountability in a democratic society. Citizens
have a right and a responsibility to engage in open and constructive discussions about the functioning of public
institutions, including the judiciary. At the same time, such discussions must be carried out responsibly and
within the bounds of the law. The case also serves as an example of how legal standards change as society does.
Legal frameworks must change to address new issues as cultural norms and technology advance, such as how
social media affects public discourse and the sharing of information.

In Re Arundhati Roy, 2002 (SC)

FACTS

During the course of a WP by Narmada Bachao Andolan, the SC addressed issues of environmental damage and
displacement of marginalised communities due to the development of a reservoir dam on the river Narmada.
Following an SC order that allowed for the height of the dam to be increased, the Respondent, Arundhati Roy, a
Booker-prize winning author wrote an article criticising this decision. Subsequently, protests were staged in
front of the gates of SC by Narmada Bachao Andolan and the Respondent. This led to contempt proceedings
based on a complaint lodged with the police. During the proceedings, all Respondents denied the allegations
concerning specific slogans and banners and the proceedings were dropped. However, along with her denial,
Roy’s response to the show cause notice criticised the SC for issuing proceedings in the first place. She stated
that: “On the grounds that judges of the SC were too busy, the CJI refused to allow a sitting judge to head the
judicial enquiry into the Tehelka scandal, even though it involves matters of national security and corruption in
the highest places. Yet when it comes to an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition in which all the
three respondents happen to be people who have publicly […..] questioned the policies of the government and
severely criticised a recent judgment of SC, the Court displays a disturbing willingness to issue notice. It
indicates a disquieting inclination on the part of the court to silence criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and
intimidate those who disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on an FIR [First Information Report] that
even a local police station does not see fit to act upon, SC is doing its own reputation and credibility
considerable harm.”

On the basis of the above averments, suo moto contempt proceedings were initiated against the Respondent for
imputing motives to the SC. In her reply affidavit to the contempt notice, the author reiterated her stance and
stressed her continuous dissent against the decision of the SC. She further noted that she believed this to be a
matter of her right to express her opinions as a citizen as well as a writer.

ISSUE
Whether the Respondent had committed contempt of court?

DECISION

The SC stated that freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution are subject to reasonable
restrictions imposed by law, one of these being the contempt of courts which, amongst other objectives, is
directed at maintaining the dignity and the integrity of the courts and the judiciary. The Respondent’s argument
that the issue of whether truth could be pleaded as a defence to contempt proceedings was dismissed by the SC
as irrelevant. It observed that contempt proceedings were initiated against the Respondent on the basis of the
offending and contemptuous part of the reply affidavit making wild allegations against the court and thereby
scandalised its authority. There is no point or fact in those proceedings which requires to be defended by
pleading the truth.

It is a generally accepted practice in legal circles that one cannot use the court’s proceedings to criticise the
court. The purpose of contempt proceedings was not to preserve an individual judge’s reputation but to maintain
public confidence in the judicial system. Judicial criticism must not be based on a gross misstatement and must
not be directed at lowering the reputation of the judiciary. In order to be considered fair criticism, the statement
must be made in good faith and in the public interest, which is to be gauged by the surrounding circumstances
including the person responsible for the comments, his/her knowledge in the field regarding which the
comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved.

The Respondent’s statement was not based on any understanding of the law or the judicial system. Accordingly,
the SC found the Respondent guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her to symbolic imprisonment of one
day and imposed a fine of Rs. 2000 with the proviso that if she failed to pay the fine she would be imprisoned
for three months.

P. N. Duda v. P Shiv Shankar, 1988 (SC)

FACTS

The Respondent, who was formerly HC Judge and at the relevant time was Minister for Law, Justice and
Company Affairs, delivered a speech at a seminar on “Accountability of the Legislature, Executive and
Judiciary under the Constitution of India” organised by the Bar Council of Hyderabad on 28 November 1987.
The Respondent stated in his speech that the SC was composed of elements from the elite class; that because the
judges had their “unconcealed sympathy for the haves” they interpreted the expression “compensation” in the
manner they did; that because of this the word “compensation” in Article 31 was interpreted contrary to the
spirit and the intendment of the Constitution and that the Constitution therefore had to be amended by the 1 st,
14th and 17th Amendments to remove this “oligarchic” approach of SC with little or no help. The Respondent
also referred to Holmes Alexander’s column entitled “9 Men of Terror Squad” making a frontal attack on the
functions of the U.S. Supreme Court and posed a question “how true Holmes Alexander was in the Indian
context?”. According to the Respondent twenty years of valuable time was lost in this confrontation presented
by the judiciary in introducing and implementing basic agrarian reforms for removal of poverty but “what is the
ultimate result”.

The removal of the Maharajas and Rajas and privy purses were criticised because of the view taken by the SC
which according to the Respondent was contrary to the whole national upsurge. Then he made reference to
Kesavananda Bharati and Golaknath cases and observed that a representative of the elitist culture of this
country, ably supported by industrialists and beneficiaries of independence, got higher compensation by
intervention of the SC in R C Cooper case. The respondent observed: “The anti-social elements i.e. FERA
violators, bride burners and whole horde of reactionaries have found their haven in the SC”.

The petitioner, who is an advocate practising in the SC, wrote a letter suggesting that the
Attorney-General/Solicitor-General might feel embarrassed in giving consent for the prosecution as the person
sought to be charged happened to be the Minister “who effectively hires and fires law officers and for all
purposes at whose pleasure they hold their office”. He also expressed his apprehensions about the possible
outcome of his request. In reply the Attorney-Genera1/Solicitor-General stated that the allegations made against
them “are calculated to ensure that in whichever way we exercise our function, justice will not be seen to be
done. Therefore, we feel that in the circumstances no useful purpose will be served in exercising our function at
all”. Thereupon, the Petitioner made an application for initiation of contempt. The petitioner stated that in the
speech Respondent 1 made statements against the Supreme Court which are derogatory to the dignity of the SC,
attributing the Court with partiality towards economically affluent sections of the people and has used language
which is extremely intemperate, undignified, and unbecoming of a person of his stature and position.

ISSUES

Whether contempt proceedings could be initiated against the Respondent?

Whether the petitioner simultaneously seeking the consent of the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General
was improper or illegal?

DECISION

The initiation of the contempt proceedings under Section 15(1)(a) and (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971
read with Rule 3(a), (a) and (c) of the Supreme Court Contempt of Court Rules, 1975 was declined.

The SC observed that the administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny.
Judges have their accountability to the society. But the criticism must be fair and reasonable. Any criticism
about the judicial system or the judges which hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in
the objective approach of judges and brings administration of justice into ridicule must be prevented. The
contempt of court proceedings arise out of that attempt. This is how courts should approach the powers vested in
them as judges to punish a person for an alleged contempt, be it by taking notice of the matter suo motu or at the
behest of the litigant or a lawyer.

In a study of accountability if class composition of the people manning the institution is analysed, it cannot be
said that an expression or view or propagation of that view hampers the dignity of the courts or impairs the
administration of justice. Faith in the administration of justice is not shaken by such criticism. In this case the
speech of the Minister has to be read in its entirety. The Minister was making a study of the attitude of SC. Such
a study perhaps is important for the understanding of the evolution of the constitutional development. Whether
the criticism made in the speech against SC was right or wrong is another matter but such criticism is
permissible in a free society. In some portions of the speech the language used could have been avoided by the
Minister having the background of being a former Judge of HC. The Minister perhaps could have achieved his
purpose by making his language mild but his facts deadly. But the speech read in its proper perspective, did not
bring the administration of justice into disrepute or impair administration of justice. In that view it must be held
that the Minister was not guilty of contempt of SC.

There are three different channels for initiating criminal contempt proceeding namely, (1) the court taking
cognizance on its own motion; (2) on the motion by the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General; and (3) by
any other person with the consent in writing of the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General. Though
cognizance could be taken suo motu by the court but members of the public have also the right to move the
court. That right of bringing to the notice of the court is dependent upon consent being given either by the
Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General and if that consent is withheld without reasons or without
consideration of that right granted to any other person under Section 15 of the Act that could be investigated in
an application made to the court.

The procedure followed by the petitioner simultaneously seeking the consent of the Attorney-General and the
Solicitor-General was not improper or illegal. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case and the allegations of bias which were made against the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, it
appears that the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General acted properly in declining to deal with the matter
and the Court could deal with the matter on attention being drawn to it.
 Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal, 2010 (SC)

FACTS

Mehfil-e-Wukala is a cultural and literally group/association of lawyers practicing in SC. The main object as
claimed by the said organisation has been to promote art, culture and literature amongst the members of the Bar.
The said group of lawyers also claims that the Mehfil provides the members of legal fraternity a chance to break
away from the busy schedule to pursue their talents in the fields of art, culture and literature. The members of
the Mehfil decided to hold an annual function and to invite more members of the Bar and also the judges of SC
and Delhi HC to participate in the activities of the Mehfil. A souvenir on the said occasion would also be
released, which would contain brief account of the activities of the Mehfil, messages, articles, etc to be
contributed to by the judges and senior members of the Bar.

In the year 1995, the annual function was held on the scheduled date and the souvenir was published. It is
claimed by Mr. Suresh C. Gupta, learned counsel practicing in the SC that articles and messages were sent by
the CJI and other judges of SC. Mr. Kapil Sibal, a Senior Advocate, also sent a message to be published in the
souvenir. In his message Mr. Sibal expressed concern about the plight of junior members of the Bar and also
about falling standards of the legal fraternity. The message was not released to the press nor the souvenir was
made available for sale but was circulated to its members and other members of the Bar. Initially, the message
sent by Mr. Sibal did not invite any controversy whatsoever for about a month. When Mr. Sibal decided to
contest for the post of President of Supreme Court Bar Association and filed his nomination, a news item was
published wherein certain excerpts from the message which was published in the souvenir of the Mehfil, were
reported which suggested that Mr. Sibal had made a frontal attack on the judiciary.

The Petitioner Nos.1 to 5 are practicing advocates in the Punjab and Haryana HC and their claim is that by
sending a message which was published in the souvenir of the Mehfil, Mr. Sibal committed a criminal contempt
of the court. The said petition was filed under Article 215 of the Constitution. The matter was pending before the
Punjab and Haryana HC since 1997 after which the SC took over the case.

ISSUE

Whether sufficient case is made out by the Petitioners to initiate contempt proceedings against the Respondent?

ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS

The Petitioners were of the view that real prejudice, which can be regarded as substantial interference in the
administration of justice, was caused because of the calculated and keenly studied attempt by Sibal to denigrate
the institution of judiciary. The remarks made by Sibal against the judges amounted to an unignorable and
unpardonable mischief which had the tendency to shake the faith of the people of the country in the judiciary.
Sibal had entered into a conspiracy to bring the administration of justice into disrespect which amounted to
deliberate interference in the administration of justice and as he had imputed unsubstantiated charges of
corruption against the judges. Hence, Sibal was liable to be hauled up for contempt of Court.

DECISION

A fair analysis of the message sent by Sibal makes it clear that he was concerned with the public image of the
legal community which according to him was at its nadir. Sibal was of the view that influx of large numbers into
the profession, deterioration of moral standards of the legal community, questionable integrity of some of those
who were in judiciary and the sheer economic cost of starting as a professional and sustaining one’s self had
contributed to these falling standards. Sibal expressed his firm opinion that judiciary despite the above, provided
a glimmer of hope for the common man and though there were tainted judges, the institution had not yet lost all
credibility. He called upon all concerned to unite together to refurbish the image of the legal fraternity.

To make out his point Sibal first of all concentrated on the plight of junior members of the Bar. After
emphasising that senior colleagues owe it to the profession to bring up the junior Bar and that the junior
members of the Bar must have access to the chambers of the senior lawyers, he appealed to the members of the
Bar to devise a Voluntary Access Scheme in terms of which the SC Bar Association would rotate junior
members of the Bar amongst the chambers of Senior lawyers who voluntarily want to participate in the Scheme.
Sibal was of the view that access should be provided to at least one if not two junior members of the bar to each
senior on the basis of rotation for at least six months which according to him was likely to give the junior
members the advantage of having worked with a variety of seniors. He also emphasised that a minimum
payment schedule to the junior members of the Bar must be part of this Scheme. He called upon those
concerned to draw up a Code of Conduct applicable to the members of the bar which would lay down norms not
only in relation to their conduct with each other but also with reference to their conduct qua the Bench. He was
of the opinion that lawyers must refrain from shouting at each other, speaking in anger, threatening judges,
threatening colleagues and the like and expressed his strong feeling by stating that procedures must be devised
to ensure adherence to these norms.

In his Message, he noted with pain that judiciary had failed in its efforts to eradicate the phenomenon of
corruption which included receiving monetary benefits for judicial pronouncements, rendering blatantly
dishonest, judgments, towing with political personalities and favouring the Government and thereby losing
sense of objectivity. Sibal had noticed that legal community was assailing and belittling the judicial system
publicly , which was harmful. Therefore, he urged the legal community to desist from criticising the judicial
system and asked them to come forward with proposed legislation to deal with this issue and advised a
Committee to be set up by the SC Bar Association to look into the modalities of bringing about such legislation
in the context of then prevalent constitutional framework which according to him provided complete protection
to the judiciary.

Now, only a part of message was published in the newspaper wherein sentences were torn out of context and an
impression was given that Sibal had made a frontal attack on the judiciary. A fair reading of the message makes
it explicit that the sending and/or publication of the message in the Mehfil did not scandalise or tend to
scandalise, or lower or tend to lower the authority of any court nor prejudiced, or interfered or tended to
interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings; or interfered or tended to interfere with or obstructed
or tended to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner, within the meaning of criminal contempt
as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. Hence, this was not a fit case where a formal
proceedings for contempt should be drawn up and the petition is dismissed.

In Re Vijay Kurle, 2020 (SC)

FACTS

A Bench of SC while dealing with suo motu contempt petition took note of letter dated 23 March 2019 sent by,
the President of Bombay Bar Association and the President of Bombay Incorporated Law Society alleging that
Contemnor 1 Vijay Kurle, State President of Maharashtra and Goa Unit of Indian Bar Association and
Contemnor 2 Rashid Khan Pathan, National Secretary of the Human Rights Security Council had made highly
disrespectful, scandalous and scurrilous allegations against two judges of the SC. Notices were issued to alleged
Contemnors 1, 2, 3 (Nilesh Ojha, President of Indian Bar Association) and 4 (Matthews Nedumpara). A Bench
was constituted to hear the matter.

ISSUES

Whether the instant Bench could not have taken cognizance of case because case was not assigned to them by
CJI and both the judges had acted as judge in their own cause?

Whether the Bench had not suo motu taken notice of contempt and therefore Registry cannot treat it as suo motu
petition?

Whether the consent of the Attorney General was necessary in suo motu proceedings?
DECISION

A bare reading of Article 129 of the Constitution clearly shows that SC being a court of record shall have all
powers of such a court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a constitutional
power which cannot be taken away or be abridged by statute in any manner. Article 142 of the Constitution, on
the other hand provides that SC can punish any person for contempt of itself which is subject to the provisions
of any law made by Parliament. Thus, a comparison of provisions of Article 129 and Article 142(2) of the
Constitution clearly show that whereas the powers under Article 142(2) could be subject to any law made by
Parliament, there was no such restriction as far as Article 129 was concerned. The power under Article 142(2) is
not the primary source of power of the court of record which is Article 129 and there is no such restriction in
Article 129. The HC also, enjoys similar powers like the SC under Article 215.

The main argument of the alleged contemnors that notice should have been issued in terms of provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, any violation thereof would vitiate entire proceedings is liable to be rejected since
power to punish for contempt of itself is a constitutional power vested in the SC which cannot be abridged or
taken away by legislative enactment. The SC framed Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the
Supreme Court, 1975 in exercise of powers under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Rule 3
thereof envisages three ways of initiating contempt proceedings. The first is suo motu, the second is on a
petition made by AG or SG, and third is on basis of petition made by any person and where criminal contempt is
involved then the consent of the AG or SG is necessary.

In exercise of powers under Schedule VII List I Entry 77 and Schedule VII List II Entry 14 of the Constitution,
the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 was enacted by Parliament. Section 15 deals with cognizance of criminal
contempt which clearly provides that the SC or the HC may take action: (i) suo motu, (i) on a motion moved by
the Advocate General in case of HC or Attorney General/Solicitor General in the case of SC, and (iii) on a
petition by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General/Attorney General/Solicitor
General, as the case may be. Section 17 lays down the procedure to be followed when action is taken on a
motion moved by the Advocate General/Attorney General/Solicitor General or on the basis of their consent.
Section 17(2)(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act will not apply to suo motu petitions because that deals with the
proceedings moved on a motion and not suo motu proceedings. Section 17(2)(b) deals with contempt initiated
on a reference made by the subordinate court. It is only in these cases that the notice is required to be issued
along with a copy of the motion.

The correctness of the judgment in In Re Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1995 was considered by the Constitution
Bench of SC in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v UOI, 1998. A careful analysis of the latter decision leaves no manner
of doubt that Section 15 of the 1971 Act is not a substantive provision conferring contempt jurisdiction but is
only a procedural section especially insofar as suo motu contempt is concerned. It is thus clear that the powers
of the SC to punish for contempt committed of itself is a power not subject to the provisions of the Act.
Therefore, the only requirement is to follow a procedure which is just, fair and in accordance with the rules
framed by the SC.

The alleged contemnors filed applications for discharge primarily on ground that notice sent was not in
accordance with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only requirement of the Rules and the form
is that the brief nature of the contempt is to be stated in the form. A perusal of the order whereby contempt
proceedings were initiated clearly shows that the grounds for initiating contempt were reflected in the order
itself. This order was admittedly sent to the alleged contemnors. Therefore, the notice was strictly in accordance
with Form 1. Once the order was attached to the notice, that became part and parcel of the notice itself. In any
event, non-supply of any document would only be an irregularity and not an illegality going to the root of the
matter.

The next contention of the alleged contemnors is that the proceedings in the present case were not suo motu
proceedings and, therefore should not have been entertained without the consent of the AG or SG. The order
passed by SC clearly shows that SC after taking note of the letter sent by the President of Bombay Bar
Association and the President of Bombay Incorporated Law Society, the annexures attached to this letter and
after specifically noting the prayers made in the complaints along with the allegations made in both the
complaints was of the view that the allegations levelled against the Members of the Bench were scandalous in
nature and therefore, notice was issued to the alleged contemnors. The fact that the order did not use the word
suo motu was inconsequential since when the order is read as a whole it is more than obvious that the Court
itself took cognizance of the complaints and the documents thereto as well as the allegations levelled therein.

Contempt is basically a matter between the court and the contemnor. Any person can inform the court of the
contempt committed. In the present case, the Court on the basis of the information itself took suo motu note of
the contempt and the matter was then placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for listing it before the
appropriate Bench. The matter has been listed as a suo motu contempt petition right from the beginning and
dealt with as such.

There can be no manner of doubt that every citizen is entitled to criticise the judgments of this Court and Article
19 of the Constitution which guarantees the right of free speech to every citizen of the country must be given the
exalted status which it deserves. However, at the same time, we must remember that clause (2) of Article 19 of
the Constitution also makes it clear that the right to freedom of speech is subject to existing laws for imposing
reasonable restrictions as far as such law relates to contempt of court. The purpose of having a law of contempt
is not to prevent fair criticism but to ensure that the respect and confidence which the people of this country
repose in the judicial system is not undermined in any manner whatsoever. If the confidence of the citizenry in
the institution of justice is shattered then not only the judiciary, but democracy itself will be under threat.

Both the complaints are ex facie contemptuous. Highly scurrilous and scandalous allegations have been lead
against the two judges of SC which amount to contempt.

Supreme Court Bar Association v. UOI, 1998

FACTS

For interfering with and obstructing the process of justice by attempting to frighten, overawe, and overbear the
court by using rude, contemptuous, and threatening words, the contemner – an attorney – was found guilty of
criminal contempt of court. He received a six-year sentence of ordinary imprisonment along with a three-year
ban from advocating. During the four years that the sentence of confinement was suspended, it would become
effective if he was found guilty of any other acts of contempt of court.

The Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Indian Constitution, expressing dissatisfaction with the decision to prohibit the defendant from practicing as an
advocate for three years. The petition sought a suitable writ, directive, or declaration stating that the Bar
Councils’ disciplinary committees, which were established under the Advocates Act 1961, are the only bodies
with the power to look into, suspend, or prohibit an advocate from practicing law for professional or other
misconduct stemming from a contempt of court or other punishment, and a declaration that no HC or the SC,
acting in the course of its inherent jurisdiction, has original jurisdiction, power, or authority in this matter.

ISSUES

Whether when an advocate engages in professional misconduct, the SC may decide to suspend or debar them
from practice before the Court?

Does the Advocates Act 1961 give the Bar Councils the only authority to impose discipline on advocates?

ARGUMENT BY PETITIONER

The powers granted to SC by Article 142 are extremely broad, but they can only be used to do complete justice
in any case or cause pending before it. Since the issue of “professional misconduct” is not one of the “any
causes” that this court is considering while handling a contempt of court case, it is not permitted to use Article
142 or 129 to issue an order suspending an advocate’s license, for which there are other statutory provisions
providing a punishment.
ARGUMENT BY RESPONDENT

Articles 129 and 142 state that neither SC nor any other body can create “jurisdiction” or “punishment” that is
not otherwise authorized by law. Since the Advocates Act’s statutory body is the only entity with the authority to
suspend an advocate’s license for “professional misconduct,” this court is not permitted to exercise its
jurisdiction under either Article 142 or 129 or even Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Following the
enactment of the Advocates Act 1961, the Bar Council of India and the relevant State Bar Councils have the
exclusive authority to punish an advocate for “professional misconduct.” The Act includes a comprehensive
procedure for suspending or cancelling an advocate’s license due to “professional misconduct.” The
requirements must be closely read since the suspension or revocation of an advocate’s license has both civil and
criminal ramifications, with the punishment taking the form of a penalty. An advocate may only be punished by
having their license suspended by the appropriate statutory body upon the establishment of the charge against
them in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

DECISION

The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an act
adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course or tends to shake public
confidence in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of
adversely affects the majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold
the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. A case of contempt of court is not stricto sensu a cause or a matter
between the parties inter se. It is a matter between the court and the contemner. It is not, strictly speaking, tried
as an adversarial litigation. The party, which brings the contumacious conduct of the contemner to the notice of
the court, whether a private person or the subordinate court, is only an informant and does not have the status of
a litigant in the contempt of court case.

Article 129 vests the SC with all the powers of a court of record including the power to punish for contempt of
itself. A court of record is a court, the records of which are admitted to be of evidentiary value and are not to be
questioned when produced before any court. The power that courts of record enjoy to punish for contempt is a
part of their inherent jurisdiction and is essential to enable the courts to administer justice according to law in a
regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent interference in the due
administration of justice.

Besides Article 129, the power to punish for contempt is also vested in SC by virtue of Article 142(2), subject to
the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament by Article 142(2). However, the power to punish for
contempt being inherent in a court of record, it follows that no act of Parliament can take away that inherent
jurisdiction of the court of record to punish for contempt and Parliament’s power of legislation on the subject
cannot, therefore, be so exercised as to stultify the status and dignity of the SC and/or the HC, though such a
legislation may serve as a guide for the determination of the nature of punishment which the SC may impose in
the case of established contempt. The Contempt of Courts Act does not deal with the powers of SC to try or
punish a contemner for committing contempt of SC or the courts subordinate to it. Therefore, the Supreme Court
exercises the power to investigate and punish for contempt of itself by virtue of the powers vested in it under
Articles 129 and 142(2).

The nature of punishment prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 may act as a guide of SC but the
extent of punishment as prescribed under that Act can apply only to the HC, because the 1971 Act ipso facto
does not deal with the contempt jurisdiction of the SC, except that Section 15 of the Act prescribes procedural
mode for taking cognizance of criminal contempt by the Supreme Court also. Section 15, however, is not a
substantive provision conferring contempt jurisdiction.

The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of court, though quite wide, is yet limited and cannot
be expanded to include the power to determine whether an advocate is also guilty of “professional misconduct”
in a summary manner, giving a go-by to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act. The power to do
complete justice under Article 142 is in a way, corrective power, which gives preference to equity over law but it
cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due process contained in the Advocates Act, 1961 by
suspending his licence to practise in a summary manner while dealing with a case of contempt of court. In a
given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt of court may also be guilty of committing
“professional misconduct”, depending upon the gravity or nature of his contumacious conduct, but the two
jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct
procedures. The power to punish an advocate by suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll
of the State Bar Council for proven professional misconduct vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created
under the Advocates Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of court vests
exclusively in the courts.

In In Re Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1995, the Bench relied upon its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the
Advocates Act to support its order of suspending the licence of the contemner. The SC is indeed the final
appellate authority under Section 38 of the Act but it is not possible to agree with the view that the SC can in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act impose one of the punishments prescribed under
that Act while punishing a contemner advocate in a contempt case. Professional misconduct of the advocate
concerned is not a matter directly in issue in the contempt of court case. While dealing with a contempt of court
case, the SC is obliged to examine whether the conduct complained of amounts to contempt of court and if the
answer is in the affirmative, then to sentence the contemner for contempt of court by imposing any of the
recognised and accepted punishments for committing contempt of court.

Keeping in view the elaborate procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Rules framed
thereunder it follows that a complaint of professional misconduct is required to be tried by the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council, like the trial of a criminal case by a court of law and an advocate may be
punished on the basis of evidence led before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council after being afforded
an opportunity of hearing. It is therefore, not permissible for the Supreme Court to punish an advocate for
“professional misconduct” in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by converting itself as the statutory body
exercising “original jurisdiction”.

In an appropriate case, the Supreme Court may consider the exercise of appellate jurisdiction even suo motu
provided there is some cause pending before the Bar Council concerned, and the Bar Council does not act or
fails to act, by sending for the record of that cause and pass appropriate orders. However, the exercise of powers
under the contempt jurisdiction cannot be confused with the appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act.
The two jurisdictions are separate and distinct. It is, therefore, not possible to subscribe to the contrary view
expressed by the Bench in the case of Vinay Chandra Mishra because in that case the Bar Council had not
declined to deal with the matter and take appropriate action against the advocate concerned. It is overruled.

Kunal Kamra, 2020 (SC - Ongoing)

On 12 November 2020, Kamra had posted a series of tweets criticising the SC for granting interim bail to
Republic TV Editor-in-Chief Arnab Goswami in a suicide abetment case. Not only Kamra’s tweets received
mixed responses from netizens but also a few people found it problematic to the extent that they were persuaded
to seek consent of the Attorney-General K. K. Venugopal for initiating contempt proceedings
against Kunal Kamra. While granting consent, the AG wrote a letter to the complainant where he specifically
pointed out certain statements from Kamra’s tweets — “honour has left the building (SC) long back” and “SC of
the country is the most Supreme joke of the country”. The AG noted that apart from these comments, Kamra had
also posted a picture of the SC dressed in saffron colour with the flag of the ruling party, the BJP, which, the AG
opined is a gross insinuation against the entirety of the SC that the SC is not an independent and impartial
institution and so too its judges but on the other hand is a Court of the ruling party, the BJP, existing for the
BJP’s benefit. All this in the AG’s opinion constitutes criminal contempt of court.

Kunal Kamra, in his defence, emphasised on not having any ill-intention to malign the judiciary, and stated that
the suggestion that his tweets could shake the foundations of the most powerful court in the world is an over-
estimation of his abilities. The SC should also trust the public not to form its opinions of the Court on the basis
of few jokes on Twitter. The public’s faith in the judiciary is founded on the institution’s own actions, and not on
any criticism or commentary about it.

Aditya Kashyap v. Rachita Taneja, 2020 (SC – Ongoing)

A petition was filed against cartoonist Rachita Taneja for criminal contempt proceedings following the
publication of cartoons on her Twitter account. The complaint concerns three cartoons published on 7 August, 11
and 12 November 2020 on the artist’s Twitter account “Sanitary Panels”. One of them represented PM Narendra
Modi in a deal with former CJI Rajan Gogoi, and the other two commented on the lawsuit against journalist
Arnab Goswami. The petition was filed by Aditya Kashyap, an international law student and member of BJP,
alleging that Rachita Taneja’s cartoons suggest that the SC has shown bias against the ruling party. The
Petitioner filed the contempt petition after obtaining consent of the learned Attorney General.

According to Article 14, Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, defines criminal contempt “as any
publication that scandalises, lowers or tends to lower the authority of the court”, or “which obstructs the due
course of any judicial proceedings or administration of justice”. Under section 15, anyone can launch contempt
proceedings after receiving the AG’s consent.

In response, the collective Drawing Resistance, gathering 659 artists, cartoonists and members of the creative
community, has issued a statement asking SC to drop the proceeding against Taneja. They stated that the SC
should protect the rights of citizens instead of creating an atmosphere of fear in which anything can be deemed
contempt of court. In their view, this procedure is part of a broader pattern that reveals a desire to censor those
who speak out openly.

Sambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry, 2001 (SC)

FACTS

A complaint was filed by the Appellant against the Respondent advocate before the Bar Council of Rajasthan.
The complaint stated that the Respondent, while appearing as a counsel in a suit pending in a civil court wrote a
letter to Mahant Rajgiri, his client inter-alia stating that another client of his had told him that the judge
concerned accepts bribe and he had obtained several favourable orders from him in favour; if he can influence
the judge through some other gentleman, then it is a different thing, otherwise he should send to him a sum of
Rs 10,000 so that through the said client the suit gets decided in Mahant Rajgiri’s favour. The letter further
stated that if Mahant can personally win over the judge on his side then there is no need to spend money. The
matter was referred to the Disciplinary Committee. In reply to the complaint, the Respondent pleaded that the
services of the presiding judge were terminated on account of illegal gratification and he had followed the norms
of professional ethics and brought these facts to the knowledge of his client to protect his interest and the money
was not sent by his client to him. Under these circumstances it was urged that the Respondent had not
committed any professional misconduct.

The State Bar Council noting that the Respondent had admitted the contents of the letter came to the conclusion
that it constitutes misconduct and found the Respondent guilty under Section 35 of the Advocates Act 1961,
suspending him from practice for a period of two years. The Respondent challenged this order before the BCI,
however, the BCI enhanced the punishment and directed that the name of the Respondent be struck off from the
roll of advocates, thus debarring him permanently from the practice. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a review
petition under Section 44 of the Advocates Act which was allowed and the earlier order modified by substituting
the punishment already awarded permanently debarring him with one of reprimanding him. This was done while
noting that the Respondent had only replied to query of client via a letter and not offered bribe, this letter was
ignored in previous hearing. Against this, appeal was filed to SC.

ISSUE

Whether the power of review exercised by the review committee did not comply with well-settled principles of
law?

DECISION
The power of review has not been exercised by applying well-settled principles governing the exercise of such
power. It is not in dispute that the Respondent had not produced the letter received from his client. Hence, the
SC found it difficult to understand how the review committee came to the conclusion that any vital point in
regard to the letter had been ignored at the time of the passing of the BCI’s order. There is no evidence to
support the conclusion that the Respondent had no intention to take bribe. There is nothing on the record to
suggest it. The earlier order had taken into consideration all relevant factors for coming to the conclusion that
the advocate was totally unfit to be a lawyer having written such a letter and punishment lesser than debarring
him permanently cannot be imposed. The exercise of power of review does not empower a Disciplinary
Committee to modify the earlier order passed by another Disciplinary Committee taking a different view of the
same set of facts.

The Respondent was guilty of serious misconduct by writing to his client the letter. Members of the legal
profession are officers of the court. Besides courts, they also owe a duty to the society which has a vital public
interest in the due administration of justice. The said public interest is required to be protected by those on
whom the power has been entrusted to take disciplinary action. The disciplinary bodies are guardians of the due
administration of justice. They have requisite power and rather a duty while supervising the conduct of the
members of the legal profession, to inflict appropriate penalty when members are found to be guilty of
misconduct. Considering the nature of the misconduct, the penalty of permanent debarment had been imposed
on the Respondent which without any valid ground has been modified in exercise of power of review. It is the
duty of the Bar Councils to ensure that lawyers adhere to the required standards and on failure, to take
appropriate action against them. Thus, the order of the BCI was restored.

Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M V Dabholkar, 1975 (SC)

FACTS

The Respondents were advocates practicing in Bombay. The Respondents positioned themselves at the entrance
of the Magistrate’s Courts watching for the arrival of potential clients. When clients came, they ran and created
an ugly scene for snatching the briefs and resorted to physical fight, made pleas of less fees, and at times took
the clients to Bar library and solicited work. On a complaint, the Disciplinary Committee constituted by the
State Bar Council found the advocates guilty of professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act
1961 and suspended them from practice for a period of three years. The Respondents appealed to the BCI which
formed a Disciplinary Committee under Section 37 of the Advocates Act. The Disciplinary Committee of BCI
absolved the Respondents of professional misconduct.

It held that under Rule 36 of the Rules framed under Section 49(c) of the Advocates Act in order to be amenable
to the disciplinary jurisdiction the advocates must have: (i) solicited work; (ii) from a particular person; and (iii)
with respect to a case. Unless the three elements were satisfied it could not be said that an advocate had acted
beyond the standard or professional conduct and etiquette. Aggrieved, the State Bar Council filed an appeal to
SC.

ISSUE

Whether the Respondents are guilty of professional misconduct?

ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS

The State Bar Council is not an aggrieved party to be allowed to maintain an appeal against the decision of BCI.
The State Bar Council has not suffered any legal grievance. Even if the order of BCI is wrongful, it does not
give the State Bar Council any reason to raised appeal. It is not the duty of the State Bar Council to attempt to
set right any alleged error of the Disciplinary Committee of BCI. The order of BCI does not cause any prejudice
to the State Bar Council.
DECISION

If, in fact, there has been snatching and fighting and solicitation like exercises indulged in by the Respondents,
such conduct is in gross breach of professional behaviour and invites punishment. Rule 36 of the BCI on
Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette states that an advocate shall not solicit work or advertise either
directly, or indirectly whether by circular, advertisements, touts, personal communications, interviews not
warranted by personal relations, furnishing newspaper comments or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with cases in which he has been engaged or concerned. In order to be amendable to disciplinary
jurisdiction, the advocate must have (i) solicited work (ii) from a particular person (iii) with respect to a case.
Unless all the three elements are satisfied, it cannot be said that an advocate has acted beyond the standard of
professional conduct and etiquette.

The conduct of the Respondents did not conform to the standards of the legal profession. It has been universally
understood, wherever there is an organised bar assisting in administering justice, that an attorney solicitor,
barrister or advocate will be suspended or disbarred for soliciting legal business. Professional misconduct
prescribed by Section 35 has to be understood in the setting of high morals. Therefore, the application of Rule
36 was misplaced. Its interpretation of Rule 36 was overly restrictive, failing to consider the broader ethical
implications of behaviours such as snatching briefs and engaging in physical altercations for client acquisition.
Such actions, by their very nature, undermine public trust and the nobility of the legal profession, thereby
constituting professional misconduct irrespective of the technical fulfilment of all rule elements.

Further, the State Bar Council represents the Bar of a State. It is the keeper of the conscience and the guardian of
the interests of members of the Bar. It acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession. Its
functions in relation to disciplinary proceedings, is to entertain complaints against advocates, and, when there is
a prima facie case of misconduct, to initiate proceedings by sending the complaint to its Disciplinary
Committee. It has an interest in seeing that correct decisions are given upon matters involving allegations of
misconduct against members of the Bar of the State. Hence, the conviction of the Respondents were restored.

State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, 1992 (SC)

FACTS

Ram Singh, employed as a gunman for the Deputy Commissioner of Police in Ropar, was dismissed for being
heavily drunk while on duty and roaming around the bus stand wearing his service revolver, which contravened
Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab Police Manual of 1934. When a constable brought him to a doctor, Ram Singh
quarrelled with the doctor and abused him. An enquiry conducted later found Ram Singh in contravention of
Rule 16.2(1) and the appeals went in favour of the department. Thereafter, Ram Singh filed suit for a declaration
that the order of dismissal as confirmed in the departmental appeals was null and void, unconstitutional, illegal,
ultra vires and opposed to the principles of natural justice, and sought reinstatement of service with all
consequential benefits. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal it was affirmed by the HC holding that taking
drink is a single act and it is not a gravest act which envisages dismissal. Aggrieved, the State appealed to SC.

ISSUE

Whether the conduct of the Respondent is gravest misconduct within the meaning of Rule 16.2(1) of the Rules?

Rule 16.2(1) reads: “Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative
effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service, in making such
an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension.”

ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT

Taking alcoholic drink as such is not a misconduct. The solitary act of drinking alcohol per se is not gravest
misconduct. The respondent had put in seventeen years unblemished record of service. Had he not been
dismissed from service within two or three years, he would have qualified for pension; without taking these
factors into consideration, the disciplinary authority or the appellate authorities have violated the mandatory
requirements. Therefore, awarding the punishment of dismissal from service is vitiated by manifest error of law
violating Rules 16.2(1) of the Rules.

DECISION

Misconduct is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “a transgression of some established an definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong
behaviour.” The word misconduct receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance
and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or
wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and
definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in
performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be
construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the
scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it
requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect
in the maintenance of law and order.

Rule 16.2(1) consists of two parts. The first part refers to gravest acts of misconduct which entails awarding an
order of dismissal. Undoubtedly, there is distinction between gravest misconduct and grave misconduct. Before
awarding an order of dismissal it shall be mandatory that dismissal order should be made only when there are
gravest acts of misconduct since it impinges upon the pensionary rights of the delinquent after putting long
length of service. Take for instance the delinquent that put in twenty-nine years of continuous service and had
unblemished record; in the thirtieth year he commits defalcation of public money or fabricates false records to
conceal misappropriation, but only does it once. Does it mean that he should not be inflicted with the
punishment of dismissal but allowed to continue service for that year to enable him to get full pension? No.

The second part of the rule connotes the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and
complete unfitness of police service and that the length of service of the offender and his claim for pension
should be taken into account in an appropriate case. The contention that both parts must be read together appears
to be illogical. Second part is referable to a misconduct of minor in character which does not by itself warrant an
order of dismissal but due to continued acts of misconduct would have insidious cumulative effect on service
morale may be a ground to take lenient view of giving an opportunity to reform. The second part of the rule
operates in that area. It may also be made clear that the very order of dismissal from service for gravest
misconduct may entail forfeiture of all pensionary benefits. Therefore, the word “or” cannot be read as “and”. It
must be disjunctive and independent.

Taking to drink by itself may not be a misconduct. However, the Respondent after having had heavy drink, was
seen roaming or wandering in the market with service revolver, and later abused the doctor which shows his
depravity or delinquency due to his drinking habit. Thus, it would constitute gravest misconduct warranting
dismissal from service. Hence, appeal allowed.