MUN
MODEL UNITED NATION
Disarmament and
International
Security Committee
(DISEC)
About Committee
The United Nations General Assembly First Committee (also known as the Disarmament and
International Security Committee or DISEC or C1) is one of six main committees at the General
Assembly of the United Nations. It deals with disarmament and international security
matters.
It was created as the first of the Main Committees in the General Assembly when the charter
of the United Nations was signed in 1945 The birth of DISEC responded to the perceived need
for an international forum to discuss issues of peace and security among members of the
international community.
The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that
affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the
international security regime. It considers all disarmament and international security
matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other
organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of
international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the
regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at
strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.
Under the UN Charter, all member states and observers of the United Nations are
automatically part of the first committee of the General Assembly, and have an equal vote.
Documents drafted by this committee require a simple majority to be passed. Like the other
committees of the United Nations General Assembly, DISEC is unable to impose sanctions,
authorize armed intervention, or pass binding resolutions.4 With the increase of weapons
and growing security threats, DISEC continues to grow in importance and becomes a
significant part of resolving international crises.
In summary, DISEC cannot require that countries take a specific action. However, the
committee can make recommendations to the Security Council about what should be done on
a specific issue.
AGENDA
Preventing Non-State Actors
from Acquiring Weapons of
Mass Destruction leading to
Nuclear Proliferation.
COMPREHENDING THE TERMS
Non-State Actors
Non-state actors are organizations and individuals that while not affiliated with, directed by, or funded
through any sovereign government, often exercise significant political influence and territorial control.
Non-state actors (NSAs) typically include corporations, private financial institutions, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), paramilitary groups, armed guerrilla warfare resistance groups, and terrorist
organizations, all of which may employ violence in pursuit of their objectives.
According to different narratives on international politics, non-state actors are regarded as either heroes or
villains.
Non-state actors claim to have achieved some success in helping to achieve both national and international
development goals.
VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS
There are groups or organizations formed to pursue their goals using violence or armed struggle, as well as
unlawful and harmful conduct. They are called violent non-state actors or VNSAs. Some also refer to them as
non-state armed actors or non-state armed groups.
Examples of VNSAs vary. The most notable ones are terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic
State of Iraq and Levant, and the Resistance Army of the Lord. These VNSAs can either be considered as
militias or paramilitary groups.
Some insurgencies and social movements may be considered as terrorist organizations. Note that insurgents
use violence to wave a rebellion against a government. Some social movements also resort to violent rebellion
to advance their causes.
Other examples of VNSAs are international criminal organizations such as narcotics or cartels, illegal arms
trade dealers, and networks of human traffickers. Underground economy and black markets result from the
operation of these criminal organizations.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Nuclear proliferation is used to describe the spread of fissile material, weapons-applicable nuclear technology,
and information, to nations that are not (yet) in possession of nuclear weapons. It is feared that the
likelihood of nuclear warfare does increase with the number of nations with nuclear weapons.
Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that
more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of atomic warfare (up to and including the
so-called counter value targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons), de-stabilize international or regional
relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation-states.
HISTORY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
1938–62
The Nuclear Age Begins
Scientific discoveries in the late 1930s made nuclear weapons a possibility for the first time in history. During
World War II, the United States and its allies were afraid that their enemies would develop nuclear weapons
first. The creation and use of nuclear weapons ushered in the nuclear age, and growing tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union, both armed with nuclear weapons, during the Cold War made the threat
of nuclear war a real possibility.
First Atomic Bombs Are Dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb used in combat on Hiroshima, Japan,
killing an estimated 140,000 people. On August 9, the United States dropped the second atomic bomb on
Nagasaki, which killed more than seventy thousand people. The death toll from the blasts increased in later
years as survivors faced elevated rates of cancer linked to radiation exposure.
IAEA Is Created
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created with the mission of promoting and overseeing the
peaceful use of nuclear technology. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower said that an international agency was
needed to prevent the spread, or proliferation, of nuclear technology, warning that, if unchecked, it could
result in “the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind.”
1968–75
Nuclear Non-proliferation Goes Global
The late 1960s and early 1970s were marked by both progress and setbacks in nuclear nonproliferation
worldwide. On one hand, the United Nations established the first framework relating to nuclear weapons with
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). And the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, the United States and
the Soviet Union, took initial steps toward limiting their nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, India obtained
nuclear weapons.
First International Treaty to Prevent Spread of Nuclear Weapons Is Signed
In June 1968, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the draft text of the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and countries began signing the treaty. Under this landmark
international agreement, countries without nuclear weapons agreed to never obtain them; they can, however,
use atomic energy peacefully.
2003–Present
Progress and Threats
Though many countries have worked to limit or eliminate nuclear weapons, threats remain from countries
that continue to build arsenals, do not plan to completely disarm, or do not follow safety standards for
nuclear material. Containing nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear war remains one of the greatest
challenges facing world leaders today.
Jul 7, 2017
The United Nations Adopts Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty
At the United Nations, 122 countries adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first
legally binding treaty for nuclear disarmament in twenty years. Countries that signed the treaty, which builds
on the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, see it as an
important step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, countries that already have nuclear
weapons did not sign, so it remains to be seen how effective the treaty will be.
Why Do Non-state Actors Become Involved?
Two principle drivers could lead non-state actors to become involved in proliferation. The first is ‘profit,’
meaning financial gain and related social benefits. The second, ‘ideational motivations,’ relates to the beliefs
of those involved.
RISKS OF NUCLEUR WEAPONS
The majority of nuclear security experts identify two primary scenarios involving nuclear weapons and
non-state actors. The first scenario involves the acquisition of a nuclear device from the existing arsenals of
nuclear-armed States by terrorists or other non-state actors. The second scenario envisions the construction
of a crude nuclear bomb by non-state actors using special nuclear materials—highly enriched uranium (HEU)
or plutonium (Pu).The actualization of each of these scenarios would be very difficult, and the probability of a
successful theft and detonation of an actual nuclear weapon or manufacturing of an improvised device by
non-state actors is considered to be low. Yet, this probability is not zero.
International and national efforts of the past 15–20 years to reduce vulnerabilities and lower the risk related
to non-state actors acquiring and using nuclear weapons have yielded some tangible progress. This work,
however, is far from being finished. The security upgrades and the reductions in nuclear arsenals and stocks
have been limited, uneven, and in many instances difficult to measure due to the lack of transparency on the
part of States. At the same time, the digital age and other new and emerging technologies have opened up
new vulnerabilities and threats that can be exploited by non-state actors. Unfortunately, both the
understanding of these new risks and strategies to address them are lagging behind, adding to the
uncertainties in assessing the risk of non-state actors vis-à-vis nuclear weapons.
The developments involving the “new” nuclear-armed States perhaps represent the most alarming
possibilities for nuclear diversion, particularly in light of the regional instability and terrorist activities in
South Asia and the potential for the collapse of the DPRK. Indeed, prior nuclear history demonstrates that
political turmoil, government instability, and crisis situations put the security and control of nuclear weapons
at risk of falling into the wrong hands.
Security lapses and incidents, unfortunately, continue nowadays in both “old” and “new” nuclear-armed
States despite new treaties, resolutions, and reports on security improvements. In 2007, for example, six
nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly flown across the United States and left unguarded for 36
hours.7 In Pakistan between 2007 and 2012, several armed attacks occurred on air force bases thought to
station nuclear-capable missiles. In July 2016, during a coup attempt in Turkey, the Turkish commander of the
Incirlik Air Base, at which an estimated 50 B61 nuclear bombs are stationed by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, gave orders to allow the anti-government forces to use the base for refueling F-16s that
bombed the Turkish parliament. As the last two examples illustrate, insiders with legitimate access to
weapons or materials can pose a threat if they are sympathetic to the goals of non-state actors or decide to
assist them for any reason, including coercion.
PREVENTION
Transparency and information-sharing
Understandings of nuclear weapon risk are intimately linked to the lack of information concerning existing
nuclear weapons programs. This lack of information makes it difficult for independent, critical examination of
nuclear safety, for instance, because there is a fundamental asymmetry between knowledge held on the
inside (national military nuclear programs) and the outside (everyone else, even other parts of national
governments possessing nuclear arsenals).
Almost a quarter-century ago the scholar Scott Sagan concluded that the burden of proof for demonstrating
that nuclear weapon control systems are acceptably safe needed to shift. He said, “those who predict that
nuclear weapons can be managed safely indefinitely into the future should have to prove their case and not
simply refer back to a perfect safety record that never really existed”.7 Today, that has yet to occur, even in
the United States, which was Sagan’s main subject of investigation, and which is often the most transparent
of the nuclear-armed States.
There is no simple solution here. After all, secrecy is often a deliberate manoeuvre on the parts of
nuclear-armed States. Efforts at greater transparency can come into conflict with their national interests, or
be interpreted as an infringement on their sovereignty. And it should be recognized there has been some
progress towards greater information sharing on the part of certain nuclear-armed States, in particular
regarding weapons and materials stockpile sizes. Nevertheless, existing transparency measures appear
insufficient in the eyes of many and do not offer more than a hazy picture of contemporary nuclear weapons
records and practices.
Operational procedures
Even if the veil of secrecy can be removed, there is a limit to the impact of such transparency and
communications measures. This is especially true during times of crisis, when the warning and decision time
available decreases for pertinent individuals to process that data. Indeed, a number of instances during the
Cold War in which false alarms linked to malfunctioning sensors or misinformation brought both sides to the
brink of nuclear war. Such issues are compounded by the fact that short decision timelines have pushed
militaries to develop “rapid-reaction procedures that have the effect of biasing the process toward a decision
to launch.
Strategic doctrines
More effective means of risk reduction must move beyond operational measures and tackle the overriding
military strategies that can contribute to crisis development and escalation. This entails a reassessment of
nuclear doctrines among the nucleararmed States. For instance, the adoption of no-first-use policies could
serve as a key confidence-building measure (currently, of the nine nuclear-armed States, only China and India
have taken that stance), as could the elimination of “launch-on-warning” postures that dictate nuclear
retaliation following detection but prior to an incoming attack.
Prohibiting short-range nuclear-capable tactical missiles (currently possessed by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea(DPRK) and Pakistan but not other nuclear-armed States) would also help to undermine the
notion of a “flexible” response that does not preclude nuclear use.
Securing nuclear materials
The suspension of existing nuclear non-proliferation and security agreements between Russia and the West
has hindered efforts to deny non-state actors access to nuclear knowledge, equipment and materials.
In addition, there are measures that can and should be taken outside the realm of nuclear weapons
programmes. The strengthening of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards cultures is vital, especially for
states beginning to undertake or expand their nuclear energy programmes.
There is a particular need to address nuclear waste management and radioactive source management issues,
which are both pertinent to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. The adoption of additional regulatory
frameworks and establishment of regional and global nuclear fuel banks can provide other means to this end.
Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons
An imperative global priority must be to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons. Countries must
continue working to better protect nuclear explosive materials such as highly enriched uranium, plutonium,
neptunium, and americium from being stolen or diverted from poorly secured facilities to non-state actors
such as terrorist groups or sold on the black market by rogue private sector suppliers. Universal export
controls and better control over sensitive nuclear assets and information will remain critical to preventing
non-state actors’ procurement of additional needed nuclear assets, in addition to detecting and preventing
such efforts via intelligence methods.
Countries and international programs to better protect stocks of highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and
other fissile materials at sensitive nuclear sites remain decisive prevention measures. Given the sheer amount
of such materials in the world and the inadequate security controls over them in some countries’ facilities,
action must be continue to receive a high priority.
Illicit nuclear trade networks provide to proliferant states or non-state actors a shortcut on the path to
nuclear weapons if they can obtain the needed nuclear explosive materials through theft or diversion. So far,
it is unknown if networks have traded in these materials in any substantial manner, but they could do so in
the future, greatly magnifying the threat.
For terrorist groups, their main constraint is expected to remain for many years not having access to enough
nuclear explosive material for a crude nuclear explosive. They likely will over time overcome the challenge of
learning to make a rudimentary nuclear explosive. They will still need to accumulate via illicit procurement the
capability to make one.
What can the government do?
Continue working diligently and cooperatively to ensure that all fissile materials are well protected and under
rigorous material accounting, surveillance, and control. These efforts should also include irradiated fuel
containing plutonium and highly enriched uranium, since in the next decade a terrorist group may seek to
build a low-tech plutonium or highly enriched uranium separation plant. Moreover, personnel with access to
fissile materials should follow procedures that ensure that fissile material cannot be stolen or otherwise
diverted. In his April 2009 speech on nuclear disarmament in Prague, President Obama called for securing all
vulnerable nuclear material within four years. This goal has not yet been met.
Fully fund and expand Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), which works to secure, protect, and in some
cases remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian facilities around the world, in order to
remove origin fissile material from vulnerable overseas facilities and facilitate the removal of non origin fissile
material, contribute to upgrading security at overseas facilities, and aid in the conversion of research reactors
from the use of highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel and targets.
In order to fashion a nuclear explosive, a terrorist group would need additional nuclear assets in the form of
technology, equipment, materials, and information. A concern with smuggling networks and rogue suppliers
is that terrorists could buy from them such detailed information as nuclear weapon designs—which may
exist on the black market—easing their task of building improvised nuclear explosive devices. Armed with a
design, a terrorist group would need to acquire equipment and materials to convert the fissile material into
bomb components and construct or acquire a range of other equipment.
This effort to weaponize would likely require the procurement of a range of dual-use goods, making early
detection of such efforts and intelligence methods to stop them vital. Several of the recommendations above
will assist this effort.
Preventing terrorist groups from setting up havens in failed or quasi-failed states, where they could import
the equipment and materials to cobble together their own crude nuclear weapons, is fundamentally
important. A terrorist group would need a safe location to assemble the components and expertise to build
the nuclear explosive.
Continue monitoring lawless regions of the globe, such as some parts of Africa or Asia, for efforts that may
seek to secretly take root and pursue covert nuclear programs. Prosecuting Major Rogue Suppliers under an
International Crime against Humanity Law The transfer of the capability to develop, produce, or trade nuclear
weapons deserves international censure, because acquisition of nuclear weapons severely threatens
international security and the detonation of a single nuclear weapon can kill tens or even hundreds of
thousands of innocent people.
Work to develop the legal methods and institutions to prosecute as an international crime against humanity
individuals who transfer major and critical assistance to nuclear weapons efforts of terrorists or countries in
violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In the interim, seek to prosecute or sanction under laws those who transfer the capability to develop,
produce, or trade nuclear weapon.
SITES FO REFER FOR MORE INFORMATION
Types of non-state actors
https://www.profolus.com/topics/non-state-actors-explained-types-and-
roles/
Non-prolification
The History of Nuclear Proliferation | World101 (cfr.org)
https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/nuclear-proliferation/history-n
uclear-proliferation
UN views
Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction Only Way to Prevent Non-State
Actors from Acquiring Them, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Security
Council | UN Press
https://press.un.org/en/2016/dsgsm1035.doc.htm
DETAILED RESEARCH ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
INCLUDING CASE-BASED
Non-State-Actors-as-Proliferators-Preventing-their-Involvement.pdf
(strategictraderesearch.org)
https://strategictraderesearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Non-Stat
e-Actors-as-Proliferators-Preventing-their-Involvement.pdf
