SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 253504. February 1, 2023.]

ROEL PABLO y PASCUAL, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

DECISION

KHO, JR., J :p

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari [1]

is the Decision [2] dated September 26, 2019 and the
Resolution [3] dated August 25, 2020 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 42285, which affirmed
the Joint Decision [4] dated July 12, 2018, of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 (RTC) in Criminal
Case Nos. R-QZN-15-08421-CR and R-QZN-15-08422-
CR, finding petitioner Roel Pablo y Pascual (petitioner),
among others, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Possession of Firearms, as defined and penalized under
Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 10591 [5] or the "Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information [6] filed

before the RTC, charging petitioner with violation of
Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e) of RA 10591,
the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 13th day of

September 2015 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control, One (1)
Smith & Wesson Magnum Caliber .22
pistol loaded with eight (8) pcs. of
ammunitions, without first having secured
the necessary license/permit issued by the
proper authorities. HTcADC

CONTRARY TO LAW. [7]

During arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused,

Alvin Teriapel y Mira (Teriapel) pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. After posting a surety bond for his
provisional release, Teriapel jumped bail. [8]

Trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution asserted

that Senior Police Officer 3 Ferdinand de Guzman, Police
Officer 1 Rey Jel Nadura (PO1 Nadura), Senior Police
Officer 2 Randy Vicente, Police Officer 3 Dennis Sano,
and Police Officer 1 Rommel Tuble (PO1 Tuble;
collectively, police officers) were conducting an anti-
criminality operation along Payapa Street, Villareal,
Barangay Gulod, Novaliches. At around 6:00 p.m. on
September 13, 2015, they flagged down two (2) male
persons riding a motorcycle without the requisite safety
helmets in violation of RA 10054 [9] or the "Motorcycle
Helmet Act of 2009." The police officers further noticed
that a piece of paper had been stuck over the last two
digits of the motorcycle's plate number so that it reads
NC68710 instead of its true plate number, NC 68782,
which constitutes tampering of such license plate in
violation of RA 4136 [10] or the "Land Transportation and
Traffic Code." The police officers asked the driver of the
motorcycle, who was later identified as herein petitioner,
to present his driver's license, but he could not present
any. The rider, who was later identified as Teriapel, could
not provide a driver's license either upon inquiry. [11]
Finding this suspicious, the police officers bodily frisked
petitioner and Teriapel. PO1 Nadura recovered a
Magnum Caliber .22 pistol, loaded with eight (8) pieces of
live ammunition from petitioner's waistline while PO1
Tuble recovered nine (9) pieces of Magnum Caliber .22
ammunition from Teriapel's right front pocket. The officers
thus placed petitioner and Teriapel under arrest and
apprised them of their constitutional rights. Thereafter,
they were brought to the police station where PO1
Nadura marked the recovered pistol and the live
ammunition recovered from petitioner as "RP" and "RP-1"
to "RP-8," respectively. The ammunition recovered from
Teriapel were also marked by PO1 Tuble as "AT-1" to
"AT-9." The recovered items were then turned over to the
Firearms Identification Division of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for
ballistic examination. [12]

Upon cross-examination, PO1 Nadura stated that

they also asked for the motorcycle's documentation prior
to conducting a search, but petitioner and Teriapel were
unable to produce such documents. [13] The officers
attempted to verify the motorcycle's registration with the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) through text message
and found that the motorcycle had no registration papers.
[14] This was not disputed by petitioner. CAIHTE

On the other hand, the defense averred that on

the night of the arrest, petitioner was at his house at No.
8 Payapa St., Barangay Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Teriapel stopped him as he was walking to the store to
ask on the whereabouts of his (Teriapel's) aunt, as she
was the live-in partner of petitioner. Just as petitioner
answered, a red van arrived, and three (3) men alighted
and introduced themselves as police officers. Two of the
officers approached Teriapel while the third officer
approached petitioner. Petitioner asserted that the gun
was found inside the compartment of the motorcycle,
which was owned by Teriapel's brother. Petitioner
maintains that no contraband items were found or
recovered from his person, but that the arresting officers
insisted that the firearm belonged to him and brought him
to the police station. While there were bystanders during
their arrest, petitioner asserted that he did not ask for
their help because he was still new to the area. [15]

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision [16] dated July 12, 2018, the

RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and accordingly, sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to eleven (11) years and four (4) months of
prision mayor, as maximum, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgement is
hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-

08421-CR, the Court finds accused Roel
Pablo y Pascual GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violating
Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e)
of Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Firearms
and Ammunition Regulation Act" and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
eight (8) years one (1) day of prision mayor
medium as minimum to eleven (11) years
and four (4) months of prision mayor
maximum as maximum; and, HTcADC

2. In Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-

08422-CR, the Court finds accused Alvin
 Teriapel y Mira GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violating Section
28(g) of Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Firearms
and Ammunition Regulation Act" and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as maximum to seven (7)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum.

Accused Roel Pablo y Pascual shall

be credited with the full period of his
preventive imprisonment, subject to the
conditions imposed under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED. [17]

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to

prove all the elements of the crime charged through: (a)
the testimonies of the police officers who identified all the
seized items in open court; and (b) the Certification [18]
dated July 13, 2017 issued by Police Superintendent
Marieta N. Garrido, Assistant Chief, FLD, Firearms and
Explosive Office, PNP, stating that both petitioner and his
co-accused are not licensed or registered firearm holders
of any kind and caliber nor were they authorized to
possess ammunition on September 13, 2015. On the
other hand, petitioner's defense of denial was ruled to be
self-serving as it was not supported by strong evidence of
nonculpability. The RTC further ruled that petitioner failed
to show any motive for the prosecution's witnesses to
falsely testify, and thus his denial could not be given more
credence than their testimony. [19]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal [20] before

the CA. In his appeal, petitioner contended that the
search conducted on him by PO1 Nadura was not
incidental to a lawful arrest; hence, the seized firearm and
ammunition are inadmissible as evidence. Petitioner
notes that the search preceded his arrest, as he was not
arrested for the traffic violation but for the illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition. [21] Petitioner
also argued that the RTC erred in ruling that his failure to
adduce evidence of the ill motive of the arresting police
officers discredits his defense of denial. Petitioner
asserted that this should not have been taken against
him, as the warrantless arrest and warrantless search
were irregular and unconstitutional. For these reasons,
petitioner asserted that his acquittal was in order. [22]

The CA Ruling

In a Decision [23] dated September 26, 2019, the

CA affirmed petitioner's conviction, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The July 12, 2018 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 88, in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-
15-08421-CR, finding the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Violation of Republic Act No. 10591
(Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act), is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. [24]
The CA held that there was enough justification for
petitioner's lawful warrantless arrest, which led to the
subsequent search and seizure of the firearm recovered
from him. The CA added that even if the circumstances
would not amount to a search incidental to a lawful arrest,
the search may still fall under the "stop and frisk rule." In
this regard, the CA explained that the various traffic
violations, taken together, may be construed as an
attempt to conceal one's identity which creates sufficient
suspicion to justify a stop and frisk search. Further, the
subject firearm and ammunition were obtained through a
pat down of petitioner's outer clothing. Hence, the CA
ruled that this was a valid stop and frisk conforming with
all the requisites. [2][5]

Finally, the CA noted that the testimonies of the

police officers carry with them a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions absent any clear
showing of ill-motive. [26]

Hence, this petition. [27]

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or

not the CA gravely erred in finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of
Firearms, as defined and penalized under Section 28 (a)
in relation to Section 28 (e) of RA 10591. DETACa

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The essential elements of Illegal Possession of

Firearm or a violation of Section 28 (a) of RA 10591 are: "
(1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that
the accused who possessed or owned the same does not
have the corresponding license for it." [28] Ownership of
the firearm is not required; mere possession is sufficient.
HEITAD

If, in addition to the above elements, any of the

circumstances under Section 28 (e) of RA 10591 is
present, a penalty of one (1) degree higher shall be
imposed. The circumstances under Section 28 (e) are as
follows:

(1) Loaded with ammunition or

inserted with a loaded magazine;

(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any

gadget used to guide the shooter to hit the
target such as thermal weapon sight
(TWS) and the like;

(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper

scopes, firearm muffler or firearm silencer;

(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel;

 and

(5) Converted to be capable of firing

full automatic bursts. (Underscoring
supplied)

In this case, the firearm and ammunition were

identified by the prosecution's witnesses in open court as
those found on petitioner's person. Further, the
prosecution provided the proper certification to show that
petitioner did not have the corresponding license for the
firearm and ammunition. It was also established by the
prosecution's witnesses that the firearm retrieved was
loaded with eight (8) pieces of live ammunition.
Verily, findings of fact of trial courts, as affirmed by
the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Court. The
Court has always accorded great weight and respect to
factual findings of trial courts, especially in their
assessment of the credibility of witnesses. [29] Mere
denial claiming a misapprehension of facts is not enough
to constitute one of the exceptions. When the findings of
fact of the trial court and the CA are borne out by the
record or are based on substantial evidence, the Court
refrains from reviewing those findings on appeal.
Appellate courts rely on the findings of trial courts as they
had the firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to
observe their conduct and demeanor during the
proceedings. [30]

In an attempt to absolve himself from any criminal

liability, petitioner questioned the legality of the seizure of
the loaded firearm and live ammunition from his person.
The Court has recognized the following as instances of
permissible warrantless searches: (1) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of evidence
in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4)
consented warrantless searches; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. [31] The CA opined that the search which
led to the seizure of the subject firearm from petitioner
may be validly deemed as: first, a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and second, a "stop-and-frisk" search, both
of which are jurisprudentially accepted instances of
warrantless searches. [32]

After a circumspect review of the circumstances of

this case, the Court holds that while the search made on
petitioner cannot be deemed as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, it may nevertheless fall under the "stop-and-
frisk" rule.
aDSIHc

Anent the search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is

axiomatic that the law requires that there must first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made. [33] The fact
that an accused failed to question the legality of his or her
arrest at the first instance and he or she participated in
the trial of the case shall only constitute as a waiver of the
objections pertaining to the defects in the arrest, and not
with regard to the inadmissibility of the evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. [34]

Here, suffice it to state that the CA erred in ruling

that petitioner's multiple traffic violations are sufficient for
the police officers to effect an arrest. In People v.
Cristobal, [3][5] the Court, through Associate Justice
Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, ruled that warrantless
arrests cannot be made for offenses penalized only by a
fine, to wit:

It also appears that, according to

City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules
of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be
issued if the information or charge was
filed for an offense penalized by a fine only.
It may be stated as a corollary that neither
can a warrantless arrest be made for such
an offense. [36]

In Polangcos v. People, [37] the Court, through

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa,
reiterated this doctrine stating the following:

In the very recent case of People v.

Cristobal (Cristobal), the driver of the
motorcycle was flagged because he was
not wearing a helmet, and he did not have
in his possession the OR and CR of the
motorcycle. The accused therein was then
frisked to search for a deadly weapon, but
the police officers did not find any. The
apprehending officer thereafter noticed that
there was a bulge in the pocket of his
pants, so the officer asked the accused to
remove the thing in his pocket. When the
accused obliged, it was then revealed that
the thing in his pocket was a small plastic
bag containing seven sachets of shabu.
The accused was then charged with Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, similar to
Polangcos in this case.

When the case reached the Court,

the accused was acquitted as the Court
found that the seized items were borne of
an illegal search. The Court similarly held
that the search was unlawful because it
was not preceded by a valid arrest. As the
violations of the accused therein were
only punishable by fine, the Court ruled
that there was no reason to arrest the
accused, and, as a consequence, no
valid arrest preceded the search
thereafter conducted. Accordingly, the
Court held that the accused therein must
be acquitted as the evidence against him
was rendered inadmissible by the
exclusionary rule provided under the
Constitution. The Court elucidated:

Thus, any item seized through an

illegal search, as in this case, cannot be
used in any prosecution against the person
 as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. As there is no longer
any evidence against Cristobal in this case,
he must perforce be acquitted. ATICcS

The case of Cristobal squarely

applies to this case. There was likewise no
valid arrest to speak of in this case — as
Polangcos' violations were also punishable
by fine only — and there could thus be no
valid "search incidental to lawful arrest."
Ultimately, Polangcos must be similarly
acquitted, as the corpus delicti of the
crime, i.e., the seized drug, is excluded
evidence, inadmissible in any proceeding,
including this one, against him. [38]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

To recall, the violations for which petitioner was

flagged are traffic violations under RA 10054 and RA
4136, particularly: (1) riding a motorcycle without the
requisite safety helmets; (2) tampering with a license
plate; and (3) driving a motorcycle without a license or the
proper registration papers. All the enumerated violations
are punishable with a fine, to wit:

Section 7. Penalties. — (a) Any

person caught not wearing the standard
protective motorcycle helmet in violation of
this Act shall be punished with a fine of
One thousand five hundred pesos
Welcome, mulawlib2! Home Help
(Php1,500.00) for the first offense; Three
thousand pesos (Php3,000.00) for the
second offense; Five thousand pesos
1
(Php5,000.00) for the third offense; and
Ten thousand pesos (Php10,000.00) plus
Separate
Decision confiscation
Opinions
of the driver's license
Synopsis for the
Syllabus Cited-In

fourth and succeeding offenses. [39]

Section 56, (b) For failure to sign driver's

license or to carry same while driving,
 twenty pesos fine. [40]

(d) Driving a motor vehicle with

delinquent, suspended or invalid
registration, or without registration or
without the proper license plate for the
current year, three hundred pesos fine. [41]

(l) For violation of any provisions of

this Act or regulations promulgated
pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore
specifically punished, a fine of not less
than ten or more than fifty pesos shall be
imposed. [42] (Underscoring supplied)

Considering the foregoing, there could have been

no valid warrantless arrest for the traffic violations.

Be that as it may, the CA correctly pointed out that

the warrantless search made on petitioner falls under the
"stop-and-frisk" exception; thus, the search was lawful.

A "stop-and-frisk" search, also known as a "Terry

search," is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband." [43] The practice serves a dual
purpose, namely: "(1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer." [44]

This dual purpose must, however, be balanced

with the constitutional right of every person to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. As American
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas cautioned in
his dissent in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio:

To give the police greater power than a

magistrate is to take a long step down the
totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is
desirable to cope with modern forms of
lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be
the deliberate choice of the people through
a constitutional amendment. [45]

Thus, it should be emphasized that "although

Terry gives police discretion to act when confronted with a
potentially dangerous situation, the suspicious actions of
the suspect are the key to triggering that discretion." [46]

In order to strike a balance between individual

rights and the interests of the state, it is clear that the
concept of "suspiciousness" is key. This was elucidated
by the Court in Comerciante v. People, [47] to wit: ETHIDa

The balance lies in the concept of

"suspiciousness" present where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may
be undoubtedly based on the experience of
the police officer. Experienced police
officers have personal experience dealing
with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to
discern — based on facts that they
themselves observe — whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading
to the suspicion of an illicit act. [48]

Thus, case law instructs that a "stop-and-frisk"

search should be allowed only when attended by the
following limited circumstances: (1) it should be allowed
only on the basis of the police officer's reasonable
suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous; (2) the search must only be a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3)
conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons which
might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the
area. [49]

In order to be considered valid, the search must

be premised on the manifest overt acts of an accused,
which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct
the search. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the standard
has been refined to less than probable cause, but more
than mere suspicion. [50] The purpose of a "stop-and-
frisk" is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the
officer to pursue the investigation without fear of violence.
[51]
As such, the genuine reason to believe required for a
"stop-and-frisk" search need not amount or equate to
probable cause, which infers that an offense is being
committed or has been committed. [52]

However, while probable cause is not required for

"stop-and-frisk" searches, the search cannot be based on
a single suspicious circumstance. The Court, in People v.
Yanson, [53] through now Senior Associate Justice Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen, emphasized that in warrantless searches:

[L]aw enforcers "must not rely on a

single suspicious circumstance." What is
required is the "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference
of criminal activity.'' Indeed, it is unlikely
that a law enforcer's suspicion is
reasonably roused at the sight of a single
activity, which may very well be innocent. It
is far more likely that there first be several,
continuous, peculiar acts of a suspect
before any law enforcer's suspicion is
roused. At every peculiar act done, a law
enforcer's suspicion is successively
confirmed and strengthened. [54]

(Underscoring supplied)
 In other words, the arresting officer should have
personally observed at least two (2) or more
suspicious circumstances, the totality of which leads
to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is
committing an illicit act. [55] This precept has been
observed by the Court in several cases. TIADCc

In Manalili v. CA, [56] the Court, through Associate

Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, upheld a stop and frisk
search after considering the following observations of the
arresting officers: (a) the accused had red eyes; and (b)
he was wobbling like drunk in a cemetery. It was not
unreasonable for the police officers to suspect that the
accused was "high" or had consumed illegal drugs.

In People v. Solayao, [57] the Court, through

Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, also found
justifiable reason to uphold the stop and frisk search due
to the presence of the following circumstances: (a) the
arresting officers witnessed the drunken actuations of the
accused and his companions; (b) the fact that accused's
companions fled when they saw the policemen; and (c)
the fact that the peace officers were on an intelligence
mission to verify reports that armed persons were
roaming the vicinity.

In Manibog v. People, [58] the combination of: (a)

the police asset's tip; and (b) the arresting officers'
observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's
shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the
arresting officers to conduct a stop-and-frisk search of the
accused.

In Palencia v. People, [59] the Court ruled that a

stop and frisk search could be upheld based on: (a) the
police officers witnessing the accused "checking out
some plastic sachets in his left hand"; (b) the accused's
act of running for the other direction upon seeing the
police; and (c) the fact that such events occurred in an
area notorious for the buying and selling of dangerous
drugs. cSEDTC
 In all these cases, the Court made a judgment
based on whether the totality of the circumstances
construed together is enough to elicit the reasonable
suspicion in an experienced police officer's mind that
something illicit was afoot. Each circumstance need not,
on its own, be suspicious or illegal. A person wobbling
like a drunk in a cemetery is not illegal or by itself
suspicious, and neither is a person with red eyes
inherently suspicious — together, however, the Court held
that they were considered enough to rouse the suspicion
of law enforcement. What is required is not multiple illegal
acts, but several, continuous, peculiar acts through which
a law enforcer's suspicion is successively confirmed and
strengthened. [60]

In the instant case, the obtaining circumstances

lead the Court to conclude that there was a genuine
reason for the police officers to conduct a "stop-and-frisk"
search on petitioner.

First, to recall, the police officers had a genuine

reason to flag down petitioner after observing that he and
Teriapel were not wearing helmets. Second, the plate
number of their motorcycle had been tampered with.
Third, upon flagging down petitioner and Teriapel, the
officers properly introduced themselves as police officers
before questioning them and asking for their driver's
licenses, which petitioner and Teriapel failed to produce.
Fourth, petitioner also failed to produce motorcycle
documentation when asked. Lastly, on the night of the
arrest, the police officers had been conducting an anti-
criminality operation.

On their own, none of the enumerated traffic

violations are inherently suspicious; taken together,
however, there is reason to believe, as the RTC noted in
its Decision, that petitioner and his co-accused were
attempting to hide their identities. This, in turn, is enough
to engender a suspicion in the mind of an experienced
police officer that something illicit was afoot.

The Court notes that aside from seemingly trying

to hide his identity, petitioner was also riding in tandem
with Teriapel. In Philippine society, the phrase "riding in
tandem" has taken on a meaning wholly different from its
plain reading. It has become shorthand for criminality,
more specifically, it has been heavily associated with
armed men. This association is so well ingrained in the
public consciousness that the phrase is now seldom used
in the media outside the context of reporting a crime. [61]

The new meaning of the phrase is so ubiquitous

that the Court itself has used it as a noun rather than as a
descriptor in more than one case. In People v. Dayrit, [62]
the Court, through Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta, ruled that "the fact that a riding in tandem
committed the crime should not automatically result in a
finding of evident premeditation especially if there are no
external acts of deliberate planning." Similarly in People
v. Quillo, [63] the Court used the phrase "the riding-in-
tandem" in its Decision. AIDSTE

The Court cannot be blind and indifferent to

current events affecting society. It must take them into
serious consideration in the adjudication of pending
cases. [64] In this connection, the Court has ruled that:

Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of

Court recognizes that the courts have
discretionary authority to take judicial
notice of matters that are of public is
knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their
judicial functions, The principle is based on
convenience and expediency in securing
and introducing evidence on matters that
are not ordinarily capable of dispute and
are not bona fide disputed. [65]

(Underscoring supplied)

Certainly, the proliferation of crimes committed by

men riding in tandem on motorcycles is a matter of public
knowledge. The Court cannot, therefore, rule on this case
purporting to be blind to the associations every Filipino
makes in relation to persons "riding in tandem." These
associations necessarily affect the mindset and discretion
of police officers when they determine and assess
whether there is a reasonable ground to suspect that a
person may be performing illicit acts.

It must be clarified and stressed, however, that the

very act of two persons riding in tandem on a motorcycle
or similar vehicles does not by itself constitute a valid
reason for a stop-and-frisk search, nor does it constitute a
valid reason for police officers to flag down motorists. On
its own, the mere act of riding in tandem should not be
seen as suspicious or worth noting by law enforcement.
However, such fact can be taken together with the totality
of the circumstances to establish that there was a
genuine reason to suspect that persons might be
performing an illicit act.

Thus, when faced with the successive

circumstances of: (1) two men riding in tandem who are
(2) unable to produce identification by way of a driver's
license, (3) who did not have their motorcycle's
documentation and (4) who tampered with said
motorcycle's plate number, any man of reasonable
caution would suspect that perhaps petitioner was armed
and/or conducting some illicit activity.

It must also be noted that in this case, the search

conducted by the police officers was not more invasive
than is proper for a "stop-and-frisk" search. To reiterate, a
"stop-and-frisk" is conducted to allow an officer to pursue
his investigation without fear of violence, and not to
discover evidence of a crime. [66] It is for this reason, it is
strictly limited to the outer clothing, or to what is
necessary for the discovery of weapons that may be used
to harm the officer of the law or others nearby. [67] As
established by the prosecution and the courts a quo, the
police officers properly limited the search to petitioner's
outer clothing.

Regarding whether the chain of custody was

properly established in this case, the Court emphasizes
that the application of the chain of custody rule under
Section 21 of RA 9165 has not been extended to other
objects seized. Where the proffered evidence is unique,
readily identifiable, and relatively resistant to change,
that foundation need only consist of testimony by a
witness with knowledge that the evidence is what the
proponent claims. [68] The chain of custody rule does not
apply to an object which is amorphous and relatively
resistant to change; a witness of the prosecution need
only identify the structured object based on personal
knowledge that the same contraband or the article is what
it purports to be and that it came from the person of the
accused. [69] Thus, a testimony showing the handling of
the firearms and ammunition upon confiscation, turnover
to the crime laboratory, and its later identification to the
court, will suffice. In this case, the prosecution
substantially complied with the foregoing rule as PO1
Nadura and PO1 Tuble were able to testify on the
handling and turnover of the firearms and ammunition
and were able to identify the same in open court. SDAaTC

Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that all

the elements of the crime charged had been established,
and that the recovery of the subject firearm and
ammunition from petitioner was a result of a validly
conducted "stop-and-frisk" search against him. As such,
there is no cogent reason for the Court not to affirm
petitioner's conviction for the crime charged.

A violation of Section 28 (a) of RA 10591 is

punishable by prision mayor in its medium period. As
earlier discussed, Section 28 (e) raises the penalty of a
violation of Section 28 (a) by one degree if any of the
circumstances enumerated therein are present. In this
case, the prosecution established through reliable
testimony that the firearm had been loaded. Thus, the
proper penalty for a violation of Section 28 (a) in relation
to Section 28 (e) of RA 10591 is prision mayor in its
maximum period.

Case law instructs that the rules for the application

of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as well as other statutory
enactments founded upon and applicable to such RPC
provisions, have suppletory effect to the penalties under
special laws that use the penalties under the RPC. [70]
Thus, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
there being no aggravating circumstances, the maximum
period which may be imposed is prision mayor maximum
in its medium period, or ten (10) years, eight (8) months
and one (l) day to eleven (11) years and four (4) months;
while the minimum period must be within the range of the
penalty next lower of what has been prescribed, in this
case, prision mayor medium or eight (8) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years. The penalty imposed by the
RTC is within the proper range, thus the Court sees no
reason to disturb it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated September 26, 2019 and the Resolution
dated August 25, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 42285 finding petitioner Roel Pablo y
Pascual GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e) of Republic Act
No. 10591 or the Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eleven (11) years and four (4) months of
prision mayor, as maximum, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Lazaro-Javier, M.V. Lopez and J.Y. Lopez, JJ.,

concur.

Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions

LEONEN, J., dissenting:

In my view, there was no reasonable suspicion or

genuine reason for the police officers to conduct a stop
and frisk search leading to the seizure of the firearm and
ammunition from Roel Pablo y Pascual (Pablo). Because
of the illegal warrantless search, the articles allegedly
confiscated from Pablo are inadmissible as evidence
against him. His acquittal should follow.AaCTcI

Pablo and Alvin Teriapel (Teriapel) were charged

with illegal possession of firearms punishable under
Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation
Act." Teriapel, after posting a bond for his provisional
release, jumped bail.

The prosecution's evidence showed that around

6:00 pm on September 13, 2015, police officers
conducting anti-criminality operations along Payapa
Street, Villareal, Barangay Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon
City flagged down Pablo and Teriapel, who were then
riding a motorcycle without the required safety helmets.
The police officers also observed that the motorcycle's
plate number was tampered with a piece of paper to
make it appear that it was NC68710 instead of NC68782.

The police officers became suspicious when the

driver of the motorcycle, Pablo, as well as his passenger,
Teriapel, failed to present their driver's licenses. Before
conducting a search, the police officers claimed to have
also asked for the pertinent documentation of the
motorcycle which both accused also failed to show. Upon
verification with the Land Transportation Office, the police
officers discovered that the motorcycle was unregistered.

Hence, Pablo and Teriapel were bodily frisked.

Police Officer 1 Rey Jel Nadura (PO1 Nadura) recovered
a Magnum Caliber .22 pistol loaded with eight pieces of
live ammunition from Pablo's waist, while Police Officer I
Rommel Tuble (PO1 Tuble) retrieved nine pieces of
Magnum caliber .22 ammunition from Teriapel's right front
pocket. Both were arrested and brought to the police
station. After marking, the articles seized were handed
over to the Firearms Identification Division of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for ballistic
examination.
 For his part, Pablo denied that there was
contraband retrieved from him. At the time of the
purported arrest, he was allegedly at his house located in
the same area. As he was walking towards the store, he
was stopped by Teriapel to ask about the latter's aunt
who was also his live-in partner. A red van suddenly
arrived from which three men, who identified themselves
as police officers, alighted. Pablo claimed that the gun
was recovered from the compartment of the motorcycle
owned by Teriapel's brother and that the police officers
only insisted that it was his. [1]

The Regional Trial Court ruled for conviction.

Compared to Pablo's bare denial, it gave more weight to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in the
absence of ill motive to falsely testify against the
accused. acEHCD

Pablo raised to the Court of Appeals the

inadmissibility of the seized items as evidence. Pablo
claims that PO1 Nadura's search on his person was not
incidental to a lawful arrest. [2]

The Court of Appeals upheld Pablo's conviction

and explained that there was enough reason for his lawful
warrantless arrest, which resulted in the consequent
search and seizure of the firearm. Even if the incidents
would not amount to a search incidental to a lawful arrest,
the Court of Appeals explained that the warrantless
search may still be justified under the rule on stop and
frisk. It noted how the various traffic infractions, when
taken collectively, may be interpreted as an attempt to
hide a person's identity, thereby creating a reasonable
suspicion that warranted a stop and frisk search. [3]

The ponencia sustained Pablo's guilt for the crime

charged. [4] Though the search cannot be deemed as
one that is incidental to a lawful arrest, [5] the ponencia
explained that the totality of the attendant circumstances
created a genuine reason for the police officers to believe
that both Pablo and Teriapel were seemingly trying to
conceal their identity warranting the conduct of a
warrantless search under the stop and frisk rule:

First, to recall, the police officers

had a genuine reason to flag down
petitioner after observing that he and
[Teriapel] were not wearing helmets.
Second, the plate number of their
motorcycle had been tampered with. Third,
upon flagging down petitioner and
[Teriapel], the officers properly introduced
themselves as police officers before
questioning them and asking liar their
driver's licenses, which petitioner and
[Teriapel] failed to produce. Fourth,
petitioner also failed to produce motorcycle
documentation when asked. Lastly, on the
night of the arrest, the police officers had
been conducting an anti-criminality
operation.

On their own, none of the

enumerated traffic violations are inherently
suspicious; taken together, however, there
is reason to believe, as the [Regional Trial
Court] noted in its decision, that petitioner
and his co-accused were attempting to
hide their identity. This, in turn, is enough
in engender a suspicion in the mind of an
experienced police officer that something
illicit was afoot. [6] (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the ponencia recognized the current

associations to persons "riding in tandem" in the
Philippine setting relative to proliferation of crimes
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 29 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. These, as explained, "necessarily affect the
mindset and discretion of police officers when they
determine and assess whether there is a reasonable
ground to suspect that a person may be performing illicit
acts." [7]

Taken together, the ponencia deduced that there

exists a genuine reason for the police officers to suppose
that Pablo was armed and/or committing an illicit action
[8]that justified the stop and frisk search. Upholding the
validity of the warrantless search which led to the
recovery of the articles from Pablo, the ponencia denied
his Petition and affirmed his conviction. [9]

I respectfully differ. EcTCAD

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

guarantees the fundamental right of the people against
unlawful searches and seizures:

Section 2. The right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Even so, it bears stressing that the protection

afforded by the Constitution only pertains to
unreasonable searches and seizures. As safeguard, a
search and seizure must be executed on account of a
warrant issued by a judge upon personal determination of
probable cause. "In the absence of a warrant, the
Constitution renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
for any purpose, in any proceeding." [10]

Notwithstanding, the indispensability of a judicial

warrant is not absolute and admits of exceptions.
Jurisprudentially, even when warrantless, the
accompanying searches and seizures in the following
instances were considered reasonable owing to the
attendant circumstances of the situation:
 1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest[;]

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view,"

the elements of which are:

a) a prior valid intrusion based on

the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their
official duties;

b) the evidence was

inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to
be where they are;

c) the evidence must be

immediately apparent; and

d) "plain view" justified mere

seizure of evidence without
further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly

regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity:

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency

Circumstances. [11] (Emphasis
supplied)

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a

reasonable search and seizure. In any circumstance,
what comprises a reasonable search is wholly a judicial
question, its determination rests on distinct factual
incidents of the case. This may entail a review on "'the
purpose of the search and seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.'" [12]

Pertinent to this case is the stop and frisk search.

SDHTEC

Stop and frisk is described "as the act of a police

officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him [or
her], and pat him [or her] for weapon(s) or contraband."
[13] Police officer's ought to "properly introduce
[themselves] and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapons." [14] The permissible extent
here only covers "'a protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.'" [15]

A stop and frisk search is conducted to avert the

commission of a crime. It is also utilized "'[w]hen dealing
with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation
in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to
secure an arrest or search warrant[.]'" [16] Notably, the
purpose behind it is two-fold:
(1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer. [17]
 Although it is evident that the conduct of a stop
and frisk search is essential to law enforcement, People
v. Cogaed [18] was explicit that it should nevertheless be
balanced with the constitutionally protected right of a
person to privacy:

"Stop and frisk" searches

(sometimes referred to as Terry searches)
are necessary for law enforcement. That is,
law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
HSAcaE

The balance lies in the concept of

"suspiciousness" present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based
on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and
criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern — based on facts that
they themselves observe — whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading
to the suspicion of an illicit act. [19]
(Emphasis supplied)

As such, law enforcers do not possess a vast

discretion in conducting stop and frisk searches. Even if
there is no need for a probable cause, this permissible
warrantless search cannot hinge on just a hunch or
suspicion. There should exist a genuine reason for law
enforcers "to believe, based on their experience and the
particular circumstances of each case, that criminal
activity may be afoot." [20]
 Dependence on only one suspicious action, or on
nothing at all, does not generate a reasonable search.
[21] Concomitantly, for a stop and frisk search to be
acceptable, "the arresting officer should have personally
observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the
totality of which would then create a reasonable inference
of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to
investigate further." [22]

Prescinding from these gauges, there was no

valid stop and frisk search in the case before us.

As to the ponencia, the confluence of traffic

violations provided the basis for police officers to believe
that petitioner and Teriapel were trying to conceal their
identity. This, the ponencia explained, suffices "to
engender a suspicion in the mind of an experienced
police officer that something illicit was afoot." [23]

I cannot agree.

Petitioner Pablo and Teriapel were flagged down

by the police officers for not wearing the required safety
helmets, and on account of the motorcycle's purportedly
tampered plate number. [24] Consequently, the police
officers asked for their respective driver's licenses which
they failed to show. It is from this point that the police
officers bodily-frisked them which, notably, led to the
seizure of a Magnum caliber .22 pistol loaded with
ammunition from petitioner's waistline. [25]

Evidently, what impelled the police officers to

become suspicious was the failure of petitioner and his
co-accused to present their driver's licenses. This, in my
view, does not constitute a genuine reason for the police
officers to believe that a criminal activity was afoot, let
alone that petitioner was in possession of a firearm.
Besides, there was no mention of any specific suspicious
behavior or conduct on the part of the petitioner that
would cause the police officers to speculate that he was
armed. Neither was there any allegation that there
existed a visible indication of the firearm in petitioner's
body, such as a bulge or contour, which warranted the
stop and frisk search for purposes of confirmation. Even
the negative connotation linked to persons riding a
motorcycle in tandem does not hold water for being a
mere stereotype. AScHCD

To stress, "the right of a person to be secured

against any unreasonable seizure of his [or her] body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one." [26] As an exception to the requirement
of a search warrant, the conduct of a stop and frisk
search should be strictly construed. [27]

All told, it is my view that an illegal search

attended petitioner's apprehension. As such, the seized
firearm and ammunition is inadmissible as evidence
against him. Petitioner must then be acquitted for lack of
evidence to sustain the charge.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

Footnotes

1. Dated November 6, 2020; rollo, pp. 12-29.

2. Id. at 33-46. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P.

Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate
Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Perpetua
Susana T. Atal-Paño.

3. Id. at 48-49.

4. Id. at 78-87. Penned by Presiding Judge Rosanna

Fe Romero-Maglaya.

5. Entitled "An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law

on Firearms and Ammunition and Providing
Penalties for Violations Thereof," approved on May
29, 2013.

6. Rollo, p. 78.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 34.

9. Entitled "An Act Mandating All Motorcycle Riders to

Wear Standard Protective Motorcycle Helmets
While Driving and Providing Penalties Therefor,"
approved on March 23, 2010.

10. Entitled "An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to

Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, to Create a
Land Transportation Commission and for Other
Purposes," approved on June 20, 1964.

11. Rollo, p. 37.

12. Id. at 37-38.

13. Id. at 81.

14. Id.

15. Id. at 39.

16. Id. at 78-87.

17. Id. at 86.

18. Not attached to the rollo.

19. Rollo, p. 85.

20. Not attached to the rollo. See id. at 40.

21. Id. at 40.

22. Id. at 40-41.

23. Id. at 33-46.

24. Id. at 45.

25. Id. at 41-44.

26. Id. at 45.

27. Id. at 12-29.

28. See Bacod v. People, G.R. No. 247401, December
5, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, Third Division] and
Evangelista v. People, 634 Phil. 207, 227 (2010)
[Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division], citation
omitted.

29. See Gatan v. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257, 273 (2017)

[Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].

30. De Jesus v. CA, 524 Phil. 633, 641 (2006) [Per J.

Tinga, Third Division].

31. Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 656 (2017) [Per

J. Leonen, Second Division]

32. See Luz v. People, 683 Phil. 399, 411 (2012) [Per
J. Sereno, Second Division].

33. See Pinga v. People, G.R. No. 245368, June 21,

2021 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

34. Vaporoso v. People, 852 Phil. 508, 516-517 (2019)

[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

35. 853 Phil. 352 (2019) [Second Division].

36. Id. at 362, citing Luz v. People, supra, at 409.

37. 862 Phil. 764 (2019) [Second Division].

38. Id. at 773-774.

39. Section 7, RA 10054.

40. Section 56 (b), RA 4136.

41. Section 56 (d), RA 4136.

42. Section 56 (l), RA 4136.

43. See Porteria v. People, 850 Phil. 259, 276 (2019)

[Per J. A. Reyes, Jr., Third Division], citing People v.
Chua, 444 Phil. 757, 773-774 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division], further citing Manalili v. CA,
345 Phil. 632, 643-644 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban,
 Third Division].

44. Esquillo v. People, 643 Phil. 577, 594 (2010) [Per

J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division], citing Malacat v.
CA, 347 Phil. 462 (1997) [Per J. Hilario-Davide, En
Banc].

45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 900, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L

Ed 2d 889 (1968).

46. Epstein, Lee & Walker, Thomas G., Constitutional

Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and
Justice, pp. 512-513, Fourth Edition, 2000, citing
Terry v. Ohio, id.: Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119
(2000); and Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).

47. 764 Phil. 627 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First

Division].

48. Comerciante v. People, supra, at 639, citing People

v. Cogaed, 740 Phil. 212, 230 (2014) [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division].

49. See People v. Sapla, 874 Phil. 240 (2020) [Per J.

Caguioa, En Banc], citing Veridiano v. People, 810
Phil. 642 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

50. See Porteria v. People, supra, at 277.

51. See Esquillo v. People, supra, at 604, citing Adams

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146, 92 S. Ct. 1921,
1922-1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972).

52. See id. at 603.

53. 858 Phil. 642 (2019) [Third Division].

54. Id. at 660, citing People v. Cogaed, supra, at 233

and Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin's dissent in
Esquillo v. People, supra note 44.

55. See Telen v. People, 864 Phil. 1103, 1117 (2019)

[Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Manibog v.
People, 850 Phil. 103, 118 (2019) [Per J. Leonen,
 Third Division].

56. 345 Phil. 632 (1997) [Third Division].

57. 330 Phil. 811 (1996) [Second Division].

58. Supra, at 120.

59. 875 Phil. 827 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third

Division].

60. See People v. Yanson, supra, at 660.

61. See Tan, Michael L., "Riding in Tandem," Philippine

Daily Inquirer, October 24, 2014,
<https://opinion.inquirer.net/79545/riding-in-tandem>
(last accessed on October 24, 2022).

62. G.R. No. 241632, October 14, 2020 [First Division].

63. 856 Phil. 123 (2019) [Per J. Carandang, First

Division]

64. See Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of

the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 827 Phil.
680, 733 (2018) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc] and
A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC (Resolution), March 13, 2018;
citing In Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the
Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases
against the Former President Joseph Estrada,
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, Cesar Sarino, Renato
Cayetano and Atty. Ricardo Romulo v. Estrada, 417
Phil. 395 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

65. Id.

66. Supra note 41.

67. Id.

68. People v. Olarte, 848 Phil. 821 (20l9) [Per C.J.

Gesmundo, First Division], at 19. This pinpoint
citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded
 to the Supreme Court website.

69. Id. at 20.

70. People v. Simon, 304 Phil. 725 (1994).

LEONEN, J., dissenting:

1. Ponencia, pp. 2-3.

2. Id. at 4.

3. Id. at 5.

4. Id. at 15.

5. Id. at 7.

6. Id. at 12.

7. Id. at 13.

8. Id. at 14.

9. Id. at 15.

10. Telen v. People, 864 Phil. 1103, 1114 (2019) [Per J.

Leonen, Third Division].

11. Id. at 1114-1115.

12. Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 657 (2017) [Per

J. Leonen, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)

13. People v. Chua, 444 Phil. 757, 773-774 (3003) [Per

J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]. (Citation
omitted)

14. Id. at 774.

15. Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 662 (2017) [Per

J. Leonen, Second Division].

16. Telen v. People, 864 Phil. 1103, 1116 (2019) [Per J

Leonen, Third Division]. (Citation omitted)
 17. Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 462, 481-
482 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

18. 740 Phil. 212 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third

Division].

19. Id. at 229-230.

20. Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 663 (2017) [Per

J. Leonen, Second Division].

21. Id.

22. Manibog v. People, 850 Phil. 103, 118 (2019) [Per

J. Leonen, Third Division].

23. Ponencia, p. 12.

24. Id.

25. See id. at 2-3.

26. People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879 (1998) [Per J.

Romero, Third Division].

27. Id.

About Us Privacy & Contact Us Terms & © 2024 CD

Cookie Conditions Technologies
Policy Asia, Inc. All
rights reserved.