Doctrine: As a rule, the word “possession” in forcible entry suits

indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or

Case Title: Anacleto C. Mangaser vs. Dionisio Ugay, GR. No.

Facts:
On Oct. 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser filed a
complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent
Dionisio Ugay. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the
registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in
Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 square
meters and covered by OCT No. RP-174; that on October 31,
2006, petitioner, discovered that respondent stealthy intruded
and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a
residential house thereon without his knowledge and consent; and
that demand letters were sent to respondent but he still refused
to vacate the premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial
remedy.
Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint
and put up the following defenses: that he had been a resident of
Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the
age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in that place
then known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this
parcel of land was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La
Union due to a survey made by the government; that he
introduced more improvements on the property by cultivating the
land, and in March 2006, he put up a “bahay kubo”; that in
October 2006, he installed a fence made of “bolo” to secure the
property; that in installing the fence, he was guided by the
concrete monuments which he knew to be indicators of the
boundaries of petitioner’s property; that while he could not locate
some of the monuments, he based the boundaries on
his recollection since he was around when these were installed;
that he knew the boundaries of the petitioner’s property because
he knew the extent of the “iron mining” activities done by a
company on the said property; that petitioner was never in actual
possession of the property occupied by him, and it was only on
October 31, 2006, when he discovered the alleged intrusion; that
it was not correct to say that he refused to vacate and surrender
the premises despite receipt of the demand letters because in his
letter- reply, he assured the petitioner that he would voluntarily
vacate the premises if he would only be shown to have intruded
into petitioner’s titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to
him; and that instead of showing the boundaries to him, petitioner
filed an action for forcible entry before the MTC.
On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor or the respondent.
It stated that the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to
prove that the lot occupied by the respondent was within his lot
titled under OCT No. RP-174(13789). It also explained that the
petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of the
subject property. The RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in
favor of the petitioner. It relied on the cases of Barba v. Court of
Appeals and Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., which held
that in ejectment cases, possession of the land did not only mean
actual or physical possession but also included the subject of the
thing to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right. The RTC stated
that petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the property
as evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13789) issued in March 1987
and tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995.
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing
Quizon v. Juan, it emphasized that petitioner must allege and
prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in
dispute. The word “possession,” as used in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in
civil law. The CA wrote that petitioner was not in physical
possession despite the presentation of the OCT No. RP-
174(13789) and his tax declarations. It reiterated that when
the law would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is
prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished
from possession de jure. What the petitioner proved was legal
possession, not his prior physical possession.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner has established prior possession
over the subject property
Held:
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is
entitled to physical or material possession of the premises, that
is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the
right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action;
evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
As a rule, the word “possession” in forcible entry suits
indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or
possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in
the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the
absence of it “is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from
the parties in an ejectment case.” The Court, however, has
consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical
possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry
cases, the dearth of merit in the respondent’s position is evident
from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation but also by the fact that a thing is subject to
the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts
to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples
of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of
public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles
and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has
to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was
able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of
these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject
property was leased to him except that he promised that he
would vacate it if the petitioner would be able to show the
boundaries of the titled lot. In the case at bench, the Court finds
that the petitioner acquired possession of the subject property by
the juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent
under CA 141 and its subsequent registration with the ROD on
March 18, 1987.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012
Decision and the December 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The August 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.