IN THE SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2025] SGHC(I) 14

Originating Application No 10 of 2024 (Summonses No 17 and 18 of 2025)

Between

DKB
… Claimant
And

DKC
… Defendant

GROUNDS OF DECISION

[Arbitration — Stay of court proceedings — Lifting of stay — Variation of

conditions]

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1
THE EVIDENCE ................................................................................................5
DKC............................................................................................................5
DKB............................................................................................................6
THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS ............................................................................9
DKC............................................................................................................9
DKB..........................................................................................................13

CONSIDERATION........................................................................................14

ORDERS .........................................................................................................21

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 This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the
court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance
with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law
Reports.

DKB
v
DKC

[2025] SGHC(I) 14

Singapore International Commercial Court — Originating Application No 10

of 2024 (Summonses No 17 and 18 of 2025)
Thomas Bathurst IJ
22 March, 1 April 2025

2 May 2025

Thomas Bathurst IJ:

Introduction

1 By an originating application dated 21 December 2023, the Claimant,

DKB, as the assignee of a final award arising from the Swiss-seated arbitration
between [B] and the Defendant, DKC (the “Award”) sought leave to enforce the
Award pursuant to s 29 of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed)
(the “IAA”). DKB also sought orders that within 14 days after service of the
order granting leave, DKB be at liberty to enter judgment against DKC in an
amount of US$ 315,913,988.82.

2 Leave was granted on 22 December 2023. On 24 April 2024, DKC

applied to the court in HC/SUM 1177/2024 to stay the enforcement of the
Award pursuant to s 6 of the IAA. On the same day, DKC also applied in

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

HC/SUM 1133/2024 to set aside the enforcement order. I heard the stay
application on 5 February 2025.

3 On 19 February 2025, I made orders on the stay application granting a

stay of all proceedings in SIC/OA 10/2024 subject to the following conditions
(the “19 February Orders”):

(a) that the Defendant within 10 days of the making of these orders
commences an arbitration in accordance with the Rules for Expedited
Arbitration of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce pursuant to clause 6.2 of the Deed of Settlement dated
23 March 2017 between the Defendant, [C], [D] and the Applicant
seeking orders that in the events which have happened the Applicant is
not entitled to enforce the arbitration award, the subject of these
proceedings; and

(b) that the Defendant diligently prosecute the arbitration referred to

in clause (2)(a) and comply with all directions of the arbitrator or of the
Board of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce.

4 On 16 April 2025, I published my reasons for making these orders (see

DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 11, or the “Stay Grounds”). These grounds should
be read in conjunction with those reasons.

5 DKC did not comply with the condition that within ten days it
commence an arbitration (the “Stockholm arbitration”) in accordance with the
rules for expedited arbitration of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce (the “SCC Rules”). However, prior to the expiration of
the ten-day period for the commencement of such proceedings, on 26 February

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

2025, the solicitors for DKC wrote to the solicitors for DKB seeking consent to
an extension of time to commence the Stockholm arbitration by 31 March 2025.
The reason given was that Article 6 of the SCC Rules required the request for
arbitration to constitute the statement of claim in the arbitration and more time
was required to prepare such a document.

6 On 28 February 2025, the solicitors for DKB wrote to the solicitors for
DKC indicating that DKB was not prepared to consent to the extension of time
sought.

7 In that letter, DKB referred to the statement by DKC’s legal counsel,

Mr [J], in his draft affidavit of 4 February 2025 (enclosed in a covering affidavit
by solicitors for DKC) that “[DKC] was first made aware of [D’s] Arbitration
Request on 28 January 2025 and immediately sought legal advice on the same
without delay”. The reference to “[D’s] Arbitration” is a reference to the
arbitration between [D], DKC and [C] to which I have referred in [15] of the
Stay Grounds (the “[D] arbitration”).

8 The letter also asserted that DKC had been granted an extension until
21 February 2025 to file an answer to the [D] arbitration but DKC had not
“entered appearance, appointed counsel, or responded to correspondence from
the parties or the SCC”. The letter also asserted that it was likely that DKC and
[C] would retain the same legal counsel having regard to the statement in Mr
[J’s] draft affidavit of 6 March 2024 that “Branch Austin McCormick LLP
advised the Defendant and [C]”.

9 The letter also pointed to the fact that notwithstanding that the SCC
Rules provide for the request for arbitration to stand as a statement of claim,

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

Article 30 of the SCC Rules provides for supplementary written submissions

and Article 31 for amendment.

10 On 3 March 2025, the expiry date of the ten-day period to commence

the Stockholm arbitration, the solicitors for DKC wrote to the solicitors for DKB
indicating that DKC intended to make an application varying the timeline
contained in my orders after giving the requisite two days’ notice. On 6 March
2025, DKC filed a summons (SIC/SUM 17/2025, or “SUM 17”) seeking an
order that the time to commence the arbitration be extended to 14 April 2025.

11 By summons filed on 7 March 2025 (SIC/SUM 18/2025, or “SUM 18”),

DKB sought an order that the stay be lifted. On 1 April 2025, I ordered that:

(a) Order 2(a) of the orders made by me on 19 February 2025 be

varied by substituting the words “by 12 April 2025” for the words
“within 10 days of the making of these orders”.

(b) The Defendant pay the costs of SUM 17.

(c) SUM 18 is to stand over until the conclusion of the arbitration

referred to in Order 2(a) of my 19 February Orders, with liberty for the
Claimant to apply on two days’ notice.

(d) The question of costs of SUM 18 is reserved.

12 These are my grounds of decision in respect of SUM 17 and SUM 18.

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

The Evidence

DKC

13 DKC relied on two affidavits of Mr [J], the first being an affidavit in

support of the orders sought in SUM 17 and the second being in opposition to
the orders sought in SUM 18.

14 In his affidavit in support of SUM 17, Mr [J] stated that DKC had “a
genuine and reasonable need for more time to appoint and instruct counsel” in
the Stockholm arbitration and for counsel “to get up on the matter and to file the
necessary [r]equest for [a]rbitration”. He stated the parties were intending to
engage in without prejudice settlement negotiations. Mr [J] repeated the
statement made in [DKC’s] solicitor’s letter of 26 February 2025 that as the
request for arbitration constituted a statement of claim, it was “not a short form
document that [could] be prepared on short notice in a matter of days”.

15 So far as the letter from the solicitors for DKB of 28 February 2025 was
concerned, Mr [J] said that the reference to Branch Austin McCormick LLP
(“BAMC”) in his draft affidavit of 6 March 2024 was a reference to that firm
advising on the application by DKB for leave to enforce the award. He stated
that that did not automatically mean that DKC intended to engage BAMC as its
counsel in the Stockholm arbitration. He stated that before DKC was in a
position to file the necessary request for arbitration, it needed first “to obtain the
approval of the Board of [DKC] and arrange a tender process to appoint a
suitable counsel for the [c]ontemplated [a]rbitration”. He stated that the need to
take these steps was a legitimate and demonstrated need, not an excuse to delay
proceedings.

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

16 Mr [J] stated that even it were correct that the issues in the [D] arbitration
were identical to those in the Stockholm arbitration, that did not mean, as a
matter of commercial and practical reality, any counsel instructed by DKC in
the Stockholm arbitration would be able to put together the request for an
arbitration instantly, referring to the need to take instructions, go through the
documents and draft the request. He also stated that just because the SCC Rules
allow for supplementary submission and amendments did not mean that DKC
should first make an incomplete request for arbitration and seek to patch it up
later. He submitted that would not be of benefit to anyone.

17 Mr [J] stated that in the circumstances an extension of time of six weeks

from 3 March 2025 to commence the Stockholm arbitration would be a
reasonable length of time which would not cause prejudice to DKB that could
not be compensated by an order for costs. He stated that would ensure that the
Stockholm arbitration would commence with a sufficiently detailed request for
arbitration which would then minimise the need for subsequent amendments
and consequent wasted time and costs.

18 In his affidavit in opposition to the orders sought in SUM 18, Mr [J], in

addition to relying on his affidavit in SUM 17, stated that since that affidavit
was affirmed, without prejudice negotiations had progressed and that DKC
would endeavour to appoint counsel to commence the Stockholm arbitration at
its Board meeting on 27 March 2025.

DKB

19 DKB relies on two affidavits of its attorney, Mr [K], first sworn in

SUM 18 and the second in SUM 17. In his draft affidavit of 7 March 2025 filed
in SUM 18, Mr [K] noted that DKC had failed to commence the Stockholm

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

arbitration within the time frame laid down in the conditions which I ordered,
saying that was unjustifiable because DKC had all the necessary information
and time to comply with the deadline and the SCC Rules would have allowed
DKC to comply even if it was not able to finalise the request for arbitration by
that date. He essentially repeated what was contained in DKB’s solicitor’s letter
of 28 February 2025 to which I have referred at [6]−[9] above.

20 In his affidavit of 24 March 2025 filed in SUM 17, Mr [K] asserted there
was sufficient time for DKC to comply with the condition that it commence the
Stockholm arbitration within ten days. He stated that even if time was necessary
to appoint counsel, there was little reason why this could not be done before the
expiration of the deadline. He referred first to the statement of Mr [J] in his draft
affidavit of 4 February 2025 that DKC immediately sought legal advice on
becoming aware of the [D] arbitration on 28 January 2025 and, second, to
DKC’s counsel statement at the hearing of the stay application that the [D]
arbitration was dealing with identical issues to those in the present case.

21 Mr [K] also asserted that DKC could not have been surprised by the
imposition of a condition that it commence arbitration as it must have been
aware of that possibility by virtue of the submissions made by DKB on the stay
application.

22 He also stated that the tender process described in Mr [J’s] affidavit

could not in reality be described as a tender process. In that context, he pointed
to the fact that the appointment of DKC’s Singapore counsel did not appear to
involve a genuine tender process. He referred in that context to paragraph 29 of
Mr [J’s] affidavit of 21 May 2024 filed in HC/SUM 621/2024 which stated that
BAMC was instructed to appoint Singapore lawyers and Allen & Gledhill LLP
was appointed on 4 March 2024. He stated that these facts showed that DKC

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

already had an engagement with BAMC, which is [C’s] counsel on record in

the [D] arbitration. Mr [K] opined that in these circumstances, the tender
process was likely an exaggeration of a straightforward instruction by DKC
appointing counsel. He further referred to the Articles of Association of DKC
which he stated did not provide for a tender process for the appointment of
solicitors or counsel.

23 Mr [K] next opined that DKC could have reasonably commenced the
Stockholm arbitration within the deadline set in the conditions. He stated that
even if the tender process could only have commenced on 19 February 2025,
which was the date of publication of my orders, it was arguable that DKC’s
counsel for the Stockholm arbitration would have all the information and time
to commence the arbitration within the specified deadline. He pointed again to
the fact that DKC’s counsel at the hearing of the stay application stated the issue
in the [D] arbitration was identical to that in the stay proceedings. He also
pointed to the speed with which DKC’s Singapore counsel were able to prepare
and file an affidavit in support of DKC’s application for an extension of time in
HC/SUM 621/2024.

24 Mr [K] also referred to the statement by DKC’s counsel at the hearing

of the stay application to the effect that DKC was going to participate in the [D]
arbitration and was making the necessary preparations.

25 Mr [K] next stated that the extension was not reasonable and would be
prejudicial to DKB. He stated that the [D] arbitration had advanced with the
appointment of an arbitrator and the case would soon be transferred to the
arbitrator for determination. He stated this could result in a situation where the
Stockholm arbitration would not be consolidated or joined with the [D]
arbitration which he submitted would place DKB in a disadvantageous position.

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

26 Mr [K] expressed the view that DKC had acted in bad faith. He stated
that DKC had disregarded the [D] arbitration, failed to enter an appearance or
appoint counsel in that arbitration, and rather than making an earlier request for
an extension of the deadline, it continued to delay the process. Finally, he stated
that if the stay was to be continued and an extension of time to commence the
arbitration granted, it should be on the basis that DKC commence the arbitration
by 28 March 2025 and provide security in the sum of US$ 15m.

The parties’ submissions

DKC

27 DKC submitted that the power to extend time is discretionary and is

generally governed by four factors, first, the length of the extension sought,
second, the reason why more time is needed, third, the chances of the defaulting
party succeeding in the relevant action or proceeding should the extension be
granted and, fourth, the degree of prejudice that the counterparty would suffer,
if any. It referred in that context to the decision of the Singapore International
Commercial Court (“SICC”) in Navayo International AG v Ministry of Defence,
Government of Indonesia [2024] 6 SLR 1 (“Navayo”). DKC, however,
submitted that the overall picture should be considered in balancing the
competing interests of the parties and arriving at a just outcome.

28 In dealing with the first and second factors referred to in Navayo, DKC
submitted that the six weeks’ extension sought was reasonable and justifiable
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, in particular, the fact that the
parties were engaged in without prejudice negotiations.

29 In that context, DKC referred to the evidence of Mr [J] to that effect. I

have referred to that evidence at [14] and [18] above. It submitted there was no

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DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14

credible denial of that evidence and submitted that in the absence of such a
denial, DKC’s evidence should be accepted by the court.

30 DKC also submitted that the evidence of Mr [J] established that DKC
genuinely required more time to commence the arbitration. It referred to
Mr [J’s] evidence as to the need for a tender process stating that would involve
identifying suitable firms with the relevant expertise, approaching those firms
to clear conflict, and render their fee quotes and finally establishing a positive
response from those firms. It submitted that the evidence also established that
following the tender process, Board approval for the appointment of counsel
was required and the appointed counsel would need time to take instructions
and review the documentation. It pointed to Mr [J’s] evidence that DKC would
seek to appoint counsel on 27 March 2025. It submitted that in those
circumstances it could not be said that DKC was sitting idly by and ignoring the
court order.

31 DKC also submitted that the submission of DKB that DKC should not
have required so much time to appoint counsel was misplaced. It stated the mere
fact that DKB had sought a condition that DKC commence arbitration within
14 days after any stay had been granted did not mean that DKC should have
pre-emptively appointed solicitors.

32 DKC also submitted that the fact that BAMC had been instructed to
assist in the appointment of DKC’s Singapore counsel in the present case, and
to assist [C] in the [D] arbitration had no bearing on DKC’s appointment of
solicitors in the Stockholm arbitration. It submitted that DKC had the right to
appoint lawyers best suited to protect its interests. It submitted that contrary to
the suggestion by DKB that DKC’s appointed solicitors should promptly file
the statement of claim, rushing the process risked procedural inefficiencies

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which could complicate and extend the delay rather than expedite the
arbitration. It submitted that in all the circumstances, the reality was that DKC
had acted in accordance with internal governance procedures and had been
undertaking the necessary steps to ensure that the Stockholm arbitration was
properly commenced.

33 In dealing with the third factor in Navayo, DKC accepted that for the
limited purpose of considering whether to grant an extension of time, the court
is entitled to assess the prospects of success in the Stockholm arbitration.
However, DKC submitted that the court should assess this question in light of
the fact that the parties had agreed that the dispute should be resolved by
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of clause 6.2 of the Settlement
Deed. DKC submitted that the evidence of Mr Ng Jern-Fei KC to which I have
referred in paragraphs [28]−[33] of the Stay Grounds, demonstrated that the
defence raised by it had at least arguable prospects of success.

34 In relation to the fourth factor in Navayo, DKC submitted that DKB’s

contention that it would find itself in a disadvantageous position because an
arbitrator had already been appointed in the [D] arbitration, fell far short of the
degree of prejudice necessary to outweigh the first three factors. It submitted it
was never a given that the [D] arbitration and the Stockholm arbitration would
be consolidated.

35 It also submitted that if the stay was lifted, DKC and DKB would be
compelled to litigate whether DKB is a sanctioned entity by reason of Mr [H’s]
indirect controlling interest in it (see [13] of the Stay Grounds) and whether in
the circumstances, enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy
under s 31(4)(b) of the IAA.

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36 DKC submitted that weighing up these factors, the extension sought was
justified.

37 DKC also submitted that security should not be ordered. It submitted

that as a matter of general principle, where an applicant is able to demonstrate
that the balance falls in favour of granting an extension, it should be granted
without conditions unless there are special circumstances justifying the
imposition of further conditions.

38 DKC submitted that whilst the court’s discretion to impose conditions

in s 6 is unfettered, the discretionary power must be exercised judiciously with
great caution and the courts should generally be slow to interfere in the
arbitration process. It submitted there must be proper justification for the
imposition of any condition.

39 DKC submitted the fact that it had not taken any steps in the [D]
arbitration and the fact the application for the extension was made two days
before the deadline of 3 March 2025 did not justify the onerous condition that
security be provided. It submitted that if the arbitration was not commenced
within any extended time, certain consequences would follow, none of which
required forfeiture of a substantial sum of money. It submitted that the
submission of DKB did not make clear what would happen to the security if
DKC did not commence the Stockholm arbitration by the extended date.

40 DKC submitted that in exercising the discretionary power, the court

must have regard to settled law in respect of established forms of relief such as
freezing injunctions, security for costs, security for claims or preservation of
property. It referred by way of analogy to the provisions of ss 7(1) and 7(2) of
the IAA which provide that where a court stays proceedings under s 6, the court

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may, if “property has been arrested or bail or other security has been given to
prevent or obtain relief from arrest”, order that the stay be conditional on the
provision of equivalent security and in such circumstances “the same law and
practice apply in relation to property retained pursuant to an order under this
section as would apply if it were held for the purpose of proceedings in the court
which made the order”. DKC submitted it would not be appropriate to impose
conditions on the mandatory stay if “the court has an unbridled power to impose
conditions in the form of reliefs which would ordinarily only be granted if the
tests governing such reliefs are met”.

DKB

41 DKB submitted that I had power to lift the stay if the conditions I
imposed were not met. I did not understand this to be in dispute.

42 In its submissions, DKB repeated what was said by Mr [K] in his

affidavit as to the prejudice it would suffer if the extension sought was granted
(see [25] above). DKB emphasised that it had the benefit of a valid and binding
arbitral award, which it should not be left unable to enforce.

43 DKB further submitted that DKC had both the time and information
needed to commence the Stockholm arbitration well before the expiration of the
3 March 2025 deadline. It repeated in effect what was said by Mr [K] in his
affidavit to which I have referred at [20]−[21] above. As asserted by Mr [K] in
his affidavit, DKB submitted that the tender process referred to by DKC was an
exaggeration of a straightforward appointment of counsel. DKB’s submissions
also repeated the fact that DKC’s counsel had stated at the hearing of 5 February
2025 that the issues were identical to those in the [D] arbitration. It submitted
that DKC had completely disregarded the [D] arbitration.

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44 So far as security was concerned, DKB submitted that security in the

amount of US$ 15m should be provided. It stated that this was premised on the
fact that DKB had incurred significant legal costs in excess of US$ 15m in
seeking to enforce the arbitral award in multiple jurisdictions and DKC had
engaged in delaying tactics to frustrate enforcement.

45 DKB submitted in this context that the security should be sufficient to

compel DKC to comply with the conditions. It submitted the authorities
established that unreasonable delay brought about by a party is a ground for the
imposition of security. It should be noted that the authorities relied upon by
DKB in this context were in respect of applications for security for costs.

46 DKB also submitted that in Mr [J’s] third affidavit of 21 May 2024 filed
in HC/SUM 1177/2024, he described DKC as being the state-owned aluminium
smelter of [country F], one of the largest aluminium producers in its region. In
these circumstances, it submitted that security of US$ 15m would impose no
great burden on DKC.

Consideration

47 Prior to considering the factors set out in Navayo, it is convenient to

summarise the chronology leading to the application for an extension. The
chronology demonstrates, in my opinion, that there was little justification for
the submission of DKC that it required a little in excess of seven weeks to
commence the Stockholm arbitration proceedings.

48 So far as the period before 19 February 2025 is concerned, the following

should be noted:

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(a) The evidence showed that DKC was aware of the [D] arbitration
on 28 January 2025. As I pointed out in the Stay Grounds, the request
for arbitration anticipated the Sanctions Defence (see [15] of the Stay
Grounds). It would have been apparent to DKC by that time that should
it wish to defend against [D’s] claim, it would be necessary for it to plead
and prove the Sanctions Defence.

(b) As DKB pointed out, counsel for DKC in the stay application
stated that the issues in the [D] arbitration and those in the Stockholm
arbitration proceedings between DKB and DKC were substantially the
same.

(c) The SCC Rules state in Article 9 that the Secretariat is to provide
a time for the making of an answer to a request for arbitration. Although
there is no direct evidence of any time limit imposed, counsel for DKC
in the stay application stated that the answer was supposed to be given
on 13 February 2025. Whatever the position may be, the evidence of
Mr [K] that DKC has completely disregarded the [D] arbitration, failed
to enter an appearance, appoint counsel and respond to correspondence
from the Stockholm Institute was not disputed.

(d) In his affidavit of 21 May 2024 filed in HC/SUM 621/2024,

Mr [J] set out in some detail the basis of the Sanctions Defence including
the facts relied on in support of it (see paragraphs [16]−[24] of the
affidavit). He also contended in that affidavit that the dispute should be
submitted to arbitration under clause 6.2 of the Settlement Deed.

(e) In support of its application for a stay, DKC filed the expert
report of Mr Ng Jern-Fei KC. That report dated 27 February 2024 again

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set out the basis of the Sanctions Defence (see paragraph 12 of the
report).

(f) In a draft affidavit filed by Mr [J] of 4 February 2025, he

deposed that DKC was first made aware of [D’s] request for arbitration
on 28 January 2025 and sought legal advice without delay (see
paragraph [6] of the affidavit). This statement sat somewhat
uncomfortably with the fact that DKC had taken no steps in the [D]
arbitration and with the need for the significant extension of time in the
present case.

49 The events following the making of the 19 February Orders may be

summarised briefly.

50 On 26 February 2025, the solicitors for DKC wrote to the solicitors for
DKB seeking an extension of time to commence the arbitration until 31 March
2025. This was rejected on 28 February 2025.

51 On 6 March 2025, DKC filed an application seeking an extension of

time up to 14 April 2025 to file a request for arbitration. No reason was given
as to why an additional 14 days was required compared to the request made to
DKB in DKC’s solicitor’s letter of 26 February 2025.

52 The reasons given by DKC for requesting an extension must be

considered in that context.

53 DKC relied first on without prejudice negotiations which it said were

taking place between it and DKB. The extent of such negotiations was not set
out in Mr [J’s] affidavit. In any event, absent any evidence that DKB either
expressly or impliedly agreed to an extension while such negotiations were

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progressing, the mere existence of such negotiations seems to me to be

irrelevant to the question of whether an extension can be granted.

54 DKC also relied on what might be described as its governance

procedures concerning the appointment of lawyers. It may be accepted that there
are such procedures but such procedures do not permit a corporation to ignore
court orders setting out time limits merely to implement a process it considers
appropriate. Mr [J’s] statement in his draft affidavit of 17 March 2025 that DKC
would endeavour to appoint counsel at its upcoming Board meeting of 27 March
2025 involved a delay of some five weeks between the date of my orders and
the date of appointment of counsel. I did not think that could be considered
reasonable.

55 I accept that DKC is entitled to choose the lawyers to represent it and

that the lawyers who are eventually chosen may not be ones to whom it has
previously given instructions. However, the fact that DKC was entitled to
choose its lawyers did not mean that it could ignore time limits imposed by the
court on the taking of any action.

56 DKC next submitted that as the matter was complex, counsel would
need reasonable time to take instructions, review the documents and draft the
request for arbitration. That would seem to me to depend to a large extent on
whether or not DKC retained lawyers who had previously advised it. If it
retained the lawyers who had previously advised it on the issue, the drafting of
the statement of claim would not seem to me to involve a lengthy process.
However, whatever time it would take for counsel to draft the statement of
claim, the period between the orders which I made and the time before which
counsel was retained cannot be justified.

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57 In those circumstances, I did not think that DKC had provided any real
justification for the delay which had occurred.

58 DKC submitted that the relevant principles in determining whether to

grant a stay are generally governed by the four factors referred to in Navayo. So
far as the first and the second factors were concerned, namely the length of the
extension sought and the reason more time is needed, I have concluded that the
matters raised by DKC did not justify the length of the extension sought nor did
DKC provide adequate reasons as to why an extension was necessary.

59 So far as the third factor was concerned, namely the chances of the
defaulting party succeeding in the arbitration, I accept, as DKC contended, that
this is a matter which would usually be decided in the course of the arbitration
and as a consequence, I have not formed a firm view on the matter. It is
sufficient to note that it is not disputed that DKC had failed to make the
payments required by clause 3.8 of the Settlement Deed and the onus will be on
it to demonstrate that the Sanctions Defence provides a justification for non-
payment. However, I have treated that as a neutral factor in determining whether
an extension should be granted.

60 So far as the fourth factor, namely prejudice to DKB, is concerned, the

only prejudice that DKB can point to apart from the inevitable delay in the
enforcement proceedings is that it may not be possible to have the Stockholm
arbitration consolidated with the [D] arbitration. Although that could well lead
to some delay and the incurring of additional costs, the prejudice could hardly
be described as overwhelming. Further, it was always open to DKB to
commence the Stockholm arbitration should it have wished to do so.

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61 Ultimately, as was pointed out in Navayo at [164], the exercise of the

court’s discretion is guided by the justice of the case and the overall position
must be considered in balancing the competing interests of the parties.
Notwithstanding the fact that DKC could not point to any real justification for
the delay, having regard to the quantum of the claim, the fact that the parties
intended such disputes to be resolved by arbitration and the limited prejudice
occasioned to DKB, I thought DKC should be granted a final opportunity to
raise its allegations in the arbitration proceedings. Whilst I say a final
opportunity, I accept that it would be open to DKC to make a further application
but as presently advised, it would take very compelling reasons for me to grant
a further extension.

62 There remained the question of security. In its submissions, DKB sought

US$ 15m security, first, on the basis that that is what it had spent in seeking to
enforce the award and, second, on the basis that a sum in that amount was
necessary to compel DKC to comply with the conditions.

63 As I indicated in the Stay Grounds, the general power to impose

conditions in s 6 of the IAA would include the requirement for security in an
appropriate case (see [78] of the Stay Grounds). However, as DKC submitted,
that power should only be exercised with great caution. Having regard to the
fact that s 6 of the IAA gives the court no discretion but to refer the matter to
arbitration if the relevant dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement, I
agreed that in these circumstances, conditions generally should only be imposed
to facilitate the conduct of the arbitration and in respect of security, only to
protect property which was liable to be divested or wrongly dealt with during
the course of the arbitration. It was not submitted that this had occurred or was
likely to have occurred in the present case.

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64 In these circumstances, it did not seem to me to be an appropriate

exercise of my discretion to order security to in effect protect DKB in respect
of previously expended amounts in enforcing the award particularly when the
evidence is silent as to the amount of such expenditure or the circumstances in
which it was incurred. Nor was it appropriate to impose security as in effect a
mechanism to compel DKC to commence the arbitration.

65 In those circumstances, I made the orders sought by DKC that the time
for commencement of the Stockholm arbitration be extended, albeit only up to
12 April 2025. I stood SUM 18 over to the conclusion of that arbitration with
liberty to DKB to apply on two business days’ notice. So far as costs were
concerned, DKC was seeking an indulgence and DKB was fully justified in
opposing it. I ordered that DKC pay the costs of SUM 17 and reserved the costs
of SUM 18.

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Orders

66 In the result, I made the following orders:

(a) Order 2(a) of the orders made by me on 19 February 2025 be

varied by substituting the words “by 12 April 2025” for the words
“within 10 days of the making of these orders”.

(b) Order that the Defendant pay the costs of SUM 17.

(c) Stand over SUM 18 until the conclusion of the arbitration

referred to in paragraph 2(a) of my orders of 19 February 2025 with
liberty for the Claimant to apply on two days’ notice.

(d) Reserve the question of costs of SUM 18.

Thomas Bathurst
International Judge

Ang Cheng Ann Alfonso and James Ch’ng Chin Leong (A.Ang, Seah
& Hoe) for the claimant;
Chong Yee Leong, KarLuis Quek, Liew Pei Jun Annette and Ng
Ying Ning Theodora (Allen & Gledhill LLP) for the defendant.

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