Reference Guide
Reference Guide
2
Product Introduction
Cod
Product Introduction
1
Product Introduction
DATA
ISP 1 CENTER
SATURATION
ISP
ISP 2 SATURATION SATURATION SATURATION
Firewall IPS
Load
Balancer
Target
Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
2
Product Introduction
Organized Crime
Ransom, blackmail, extortion, etc.
Hacktivists
Politics, ideology, religion, etc.
Gamers
To win, as revenge for losing, etc.
Students
Canceling exams, manipulating registration, etc.
3
Product Introduction
NETSCOUT’s solution
ISP 1
ISP
ISP 2
Firewall IPS
AED Load
Balancer
DATA
Target
CENTER
Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
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Product Introduction
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5
Product Introduction
MGT GUI
EXT INT
NETSCOUT
AED
11
• Hardware bypass ensures network connectivity is continued even when the AED is
powered off (enabled by default)
• Software and hardware bypass can be disabled via the CLI
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6
Product Introduction
View configuration of
/ services aed bypass show
hardware & software bypass
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EXT2|INT2 || EXT3|INT3
EXT INT
NETSCOUT
AED
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7
Product Introduction
AED-8100 Series
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Product Introduction
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AED-HD1000 Series
Management Interfaces:
• 2x GbE copper ports (mgt0/mgt1)
• Not used for protection
• Management IP address assigned à HTTPS & SSH Access, SNMP, Cloud-Signaling…
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9
Product Introduction
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Limitations
• No shell access
• No appliance-based
licensing
• No hardware bypass
Virtual
AED
vAED supports
• Software bypass for inline mode; enabled by default
• 2 Management Interfaces (mgt0/mgt1)
• 2 Protection Interfaces (ext0/int0)
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Product Introduction
VMware
• vAED on VMware
- VMware vSphere Hypervisor, version 5.5 or later
- Vmware vSphere Client, version 5.5 or later
• vAED Host Requirements
Low End High End
ü 2 or 4 cores ü 4 cores
ü 100 GB disk space ü 100 GB disk space
ü 6 GB RAM ü 12 GB RAM
ü Supports up to 10 Protection Groups ü Supports up to 50 Protection Groups
• vAED recommendation
– Deploy the available OVA file from the Software Download Center for AED
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VMware Specifics
• Interfaces
– Map all interfaces to different virtual switches, according to your topology
Source Network Interface Description
virtual_mgt0 mgt0 Management Interface
virtual_mgt1 mgt1 Management Interface
virtual_ext0 ext0 External Interface
virtual_int0 int0 Internal Interface
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11
Product Introduction
KVM
• vAED on KVM
- Requires a processor that supports hardware virtualization
- This command should return 1 or greater: egrep –c ‘(vmx|smv)’ /proc/cpuinfo
• vAED Host Requirements
Low End High End
ü 2 or 4 cores ü 4 cores
ü 100 GB disk space ü 100 GB disk space
ü 6 GB RAM ü 12 GB RAM
ü Supports up to 10 Protection Groups ü Supports up to 50 Protection Groups
• vAED recommendation
– Deploy the available qcow2 file from the Software Download Center for AED
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KVM Specifics
• Interfaces
– Map all interfaces to 4 different network bridges, according to your topology
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Product Introduction
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Product Introduction
Monitor Mode
Monitoring only
• Ideal for trials, proofs of concept and testing
• Interim solution to complete configuration and validation prior to final inline installation activity
• No DDOS defense possible
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Inline-Bridged
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Product Introduction
Inline-Routed Mode
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Summary
• Threats caused by DDoS attacks
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15
AED UI System Operation
Pike
• Complete the initial configuration of an AED and update general system settings
1
AED UI System Operation
AED UI Configuration
2
AED UI System Operation
Fixed page,
no submenus
Protection monitoring
and configuration System configuration
and maintenance
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AED UI System Operation
Export Information
Deployment Modes
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AED UI System Operation
Protection Level
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5
AED UI System Operation
Global Configuration
Administration > General
• General settings
– Language
– System Time Zone
– Data Retention
– Pre-Login Banner
– Top Sources and Destinations
– UI Idle Timeout
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AED UI System Operation
SMTP Relay
Administration > General
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Data Retention
Administration > General
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AED UI System Operation
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DNS Configuration
Administration > General
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8
AED UI System Operation
• AED mirrors the link status between the interfaces of a protection port pair in inline mode
• Improves failover detection if only one link from an interface pair fails (enabled by default)
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Interface Names
Administration > Interfaces
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9
AED UI System Operation
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AED UI System Operation
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AED UI System Operation
License Management
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AED UI System Operation
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AIF leverages ATLAS’s global threat intelligence to protect your network against outbound and inbound threats
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AED UI System Operation
AIF Indicators
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Malware
Location-based Threats
Domain & IP reputation of today’s active threats
Email Threats
Targeted Attacks
Mobile Threats
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14
AED UI System Operation
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15
AED UI System Operation
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AED UI System Operation
☞ Configuration synchronization
☞ Create/manage Protection Groups and Server Types
☞ Change Protection Levels and Deployment Modes
☞ Send and manage manual Cloud Signaling alerts
☞ Allow and Deny List management
☞ Summary Traffic reporting on Protection Groups and AEDs
☞ Get Attack Category statistics per Protection Group
⚠ What cannot be done with AED API:
- Access IPv6 data
- Access Profile Capture Histogram data
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API Documentation
https://aed-ip-address/api/aed/doc/v3/endpoints.html
ase
dgeB
le
Know
from
load
wn
Do
Offline-help Online-help
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AED UI System Operation
Summary
• Structures and features of the AED GUI
• AED licensing
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Lab Exercise
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18
AED UI System Operation
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise
1. Pickup your credentials
2. Access online labs
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Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 20
AED System Configuration min.
Objectives
• Introduction to the AED user interface
• Access the web UI and update general system
settings
• Apply cloud-based licensing and verify licensing
status
• Enable automatic notifications
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19
AED UI System Operation
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20
Automatic Notifications
Sea_Bream
Automatic Notifications
1
Automatic Notifications
Automatic Notifications
Automatic Notifications
Since it is often not possible to permanently monitor the AED's GUI, an automatic
forwarding of all relevant events should be configured.
AED creates alerts to inform when it detects events, conditions or errors in the
system. Notifications about these alerts should be automatically sent by the AED to
inform the appropriate channels.
ü Bandwidth ü Deployment
ü Blocked Host ü Protection
ü Change Log ü System
ü Cloud
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Automatic Notifications
Alert Types
Alert Type Causes
Bandwidth Protection Group traffic exceeded traffic thresholds, or traffic exceeded
90% of AED licensed throughput limit
Blocked Host Hosts were blocked
Change Log Change log entries are created = Audit Trail
Cloud Specific Cloud Signaling events occured
• Cloud Signaling threshold exceeded
• Communictation error with Cloud Signaling server
• …
Deployment The deployment mode has changed
Protection The Global or a Protection Group’s protection level has changed
System Hardware or system component events and other events that affect the
system’s health
Note: If Change Log type is selected along with Cloud, Protection, or Deployment – AED may send duplicate notifications
Notification Destinations
3
Automatic Notifications
Email Notifications
Administration > Notifications
SNMP-TRAP Notifications
Administration > Notifications
4
Automatic Notifications
SYSLOG Notifications
Administration > Notifications
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5
Automatic Notifications
Summary
• Notifications are important
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6
Upgrade AED
Barbel
Upgrade AED
1
Upgrade AED
Upgrade AED
2
Upgrade AED
Download Software
Go to My.NETSCOUT (a.k.a. Support Portal)
3
Upgrade AED
Be aware that the software you download is subject to export control laws and regulations
See download website for further details
4
Upgrade AED
Copy options:
Viewing system files after upload • ftp
• http[s]
/ system files directory disk:
• Scp
Directory listing of device disk: • cdrom
Filename Kbytes Date/Time Type • disk
Arbor-Edge-Defense-7.2.0.0-OEGF-x86_64 1368673 May 1 03:29 Signed package • usb
• flash
arbos-7.4-OEGF-x86_64 174088 May 1 03:28 Signed package
Free space: 8.8G of 10.0G (12% used)
10
5
Upgrade AED
Upgrade AED
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Upgrade Recommendations
• Always consult the Release Notes for new features and behavior changes
• Perform a full backup (with traffic data)
– Requires an external backup location
– Proceed only after you have ensured that the backup export completed and that all
files are present on the server
• AED upgrade requires CLI access
– Via serial console or
– Via SSH
• AED upgrade process requires two AED reboots and triggers bypass*
– Network connections will bounce
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6
Upgrade AED
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Upgrade AED
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Upgrade AED
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Important Notes
Arbor Enterprise Manager (AEM) provides a single console for the central
management of multiple AED devices
1. Connect the AED to AEM first
– Applicable configurations are copied from the device
2. AED managed by AEM
– Configuration on AEM is periodically pushed to AED and overwrites local changes
Upgrading an AED when managed by the AEM
1. Disconnect the AED from AEM before the upgrade
2. Always upgrade the AEM first
3. Then upgrade the AED
4. Reconnect the AED to AEM
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9
Upgrade AED
Lab Exercise
19
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 30
Upgrading AED Software min.
Objectives
• Perform the steps necessary to upgrade your
AED's software to a newer version
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10
Upgrade AED
Summary
• Tasks recommended to prepare an AED software upgrade
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11
Account Management
Trout
Account Management
1
Account Management
Account Management
2
Account Management
Local Accounts
Administration > User Accounts
3
Account Management
Password Complexity
To create secure and acceptable passwords, they must meet the following criteria
• Contain from 10 to 72 characters, which can include special characters, spaces, and
quotation marks
• Cannot consist of all digits
• Cannot consist of all lowercase letters or all uppercase letters
• Cannot consist of only letters followed by only digits (for example, abcd123)
• Cannot consist of only digits followed by only letters (for example, 123abcd)
4
Account Management
• Copy a group
/ services aaa groups copy <existing_group> <new_group>
For a list of the 60+ authorization keys available refer to the online Help pages or
the AED User Guide; search for “User group authorization keys”
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5
Account Management
11
• Disable an account
/ services aaa disable_account <username>
/ services aaa disable_account NE90
/ services aaa user_hist NE90
NE90|10.2.32.10|UI|-1|1612468823|-1|disabled|
• Enable an account
/ services aaa enable_account <username>
/ services aaa enable_account NE90
/ services aaa user_hist NE90
NE90|10.2.32.10|UI|0|1612468823|0|ok|
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Account Management
13
Account Management
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7
Account Management
TACACS RADIUS
VENDOR
ATTRIBUTE
Arbor 9694
Arbor-Privilege-Level (string)
Examples
service = arbor {
Examples arbor_group = system_admin
Arbor-Privilege-Level = system_admin }
Arbor-Privilege-Level = system_user service = arbor {
arbor_group = system_user
}
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/ services aaa radius server set primary 10.10.10.1 encrypted ***** 1812
/ services aaa radius server set backup 10.10.10.2 encrypted ***** 1812
/ services aaa radius accounting set primary 10.10.10.10 encrypted ***** 1813
/ services aaa radius nas_identifier set SightlineTRA1
/ services aaa radius accounting set level login
/ services aaa tacacs server set primary 10.10.10.10 49 encrypted *****
/ services aaa tacacs server set backup 10.10.10.11 49 encrypted *****
/ services aaa tacacs accounting set primary 10.10.10.10 encrypted ***** 49
/ services aaa tacacs tacpass_expiry_notify disable
/ services aaa tacacs accounting set level change
/ services aaa method set local radius tacacs
/ services aaa method exclusive enable
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8
Account Management
Authentication Methods
• Exclusive Mode – AED does not authenticate a user against all the configured
methods - it will use the first available method in the order. If the authentication
fails, the user cannot log in with any other method
/ services aaa method exclusive enable
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9
Account Management
Recommendation
19
Lab Exercise
20
10
Account Management
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 45
Creating User Accounts min.
Objectives
• Create local user accounts for each of the user
group types
• Verify the access capabilities of each user
account type
• Perform user account tasks such as displaying
user account status and managing user account
access
21
Summary
• AED supported account types
• TACACS/RADIUS authentication
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11
Account Management
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12
Data Loss Prevention
Salmon
Unit Summary
1
Data Loss Prevention
2
Data Loss Prevention
3
Data Loss Prevention
Download Selected – Download backup file from AED to another location, eg:laptop (grays
out if no backup is selected)
Backup Now
4
Data Loss Prevention
Backup Schedule
Backup Server
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5
Data Loss Prevention
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6
Data Loss Prevention
Restore Backup
If you need to restore the backup onto a new appliance, you need to first
complete the initial configuration via the console and make the system
reachable via the network…
13
• The data in AED is restored with the data in the backup that you select
• If an incremental backup is selected, AED also restores the last full backup and
all the intermediate incremental backups up to that selected incremental backup
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Data Loss Prevention
• The restore process automatically stops and restarts AED services as necessary
• While the services are stopped, AED runs in bypass mode (bypass configuration
dependent)
‒ Either - network traffic passes through the AED unaffected
‒ Or - AED is disconnected; traffic cannot pass through to the connected equipment
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Data Loss Prevention
Lab Exercise
17
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 30
Backup and Restore min.
Objectives
• Create a local backup of your NETSCOUT AED
system
• Restore the configuration of your NETSCOUT
AED with a local backup file
18
9
Data Loss Prevention
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10
Identifying Attacks
Sturgeon
Identifying Attacks
1
Identifying Attacks
Establishing UI Workflows
Identifying Attacks
Current State
AED Operational Status - Establish a common process to verify system status and
identify a potential attack
2
Identifying Attacks
Summary Page
3
Identifying Attacks
4
Identifying Attacks
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5
Identifying Attacks
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Identifying Attacks
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Identifying Attacks
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7
Identifying Attacks
ISP
ISP 2 SATURATION
Firewall IPS
AED Load
Balancer
DATA
CENTER Target
Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
• AED provides certain “out-of-the-box” protections for all types of DDoS attacks
☞ Get the best protection by ‘optimizing’ AED for your services
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Identifying Attacks
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Identifying Attacks
Summary Page
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 19 *last 60 minutes
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Identifying Attacks
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COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 22 *last 60 minutes
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11
Identifying Attacks
Attack Indicators
Protect > Inbound Protection > Protection Groups
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 23 *last 60 minutes
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Attack Categories
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Identifying Attacks
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13
Identifying Attacks
Web Crawlers
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14
Identifying Attacks
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Identifying Attacks
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15
Identifying Attacks
Mitigation
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Identifying Attacks
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Identifying Attacks
35
Attack Analysis
Medium à High
Low à Medium
More traffic is blocked, the traffic volume passing is now back to normal
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Identifying Attacks
37
Ø Even the High Protection Level still does not block the attack
Ø You still suspect more traffic should be blocked
♺ Out-of-the-box settings and current protection settings are not optimized for your
traffic
☞ Update the protection settings as required for the situation – This may required guesswork with
an increased risk of false positives
☞ Optimize thresholds values beforehand during normal operations è Test protections and
threshold values in each protection level using Inactive Mode
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19
Identifying Attacks
39
Ø AED blocks all attack traffic and only valid traffic is forwarded, but the services
are still not reachable
AED cannot mitigate the attack for reasons beyond its control
⚠ DDoS attack traffic has consumed almost all the uplink bandwidth
⚠ DDoS attack is too large and overloads routers, or the bandwidth provided in front of AED
☞ This condition requires cloud-based mitigation services
– Your local Internet Service Provider (ISP)
– A 3rd party mitigation service such as Arbor Cloud DDoS Protection Services
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20
Identifying Attacks
Security Reports
Reports > Executive Summary or ATLAS Global DDoS
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Identifying Attacks
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21
Identifying Attacks
Packet Capture
Allows you to sample packets that AED inspects and see information about packets
in real time
• Displays ~100 packets every 3 seconds
• Results may be fewer if a display filter is applied
• Capture stops automatically after 5000 packets
• Capture is only performed when viewing the Packet Capture Page
– If you leave the Packet Capture page the capture stops, and the results are cleared
43
No packets captured
until clicked
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22
Identifying Attacks
Display Filters
45
Monitoring Traffic
Optionally filter by
Passed or Dropped
condition
Start
Pause
Resume
HTTP request
White/gray
bands are
forwarded TCP flags shown when no
packets application info available
Red/pink
bands are
dropped
packets DNS query
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23
Identifying Attacks
Packet Decode
Select a packet to view
Protection for that
blocked packet Add this source to
the deny list
Packet details
47
Export Packets
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24
Identifying Attacks
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Identifying Attacks
50
25
Identifying Attacks
Per Protection
Group Statistics
Click to add to
the Allow List
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26
Identifying Attacks
Blocked hosts history is limited to 224,000 hosts and one year since last blocked
53
Example Search
Amount of blocked
hosts found with
current Filter
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27
Identifying Attacks
. xx . xx
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Lab Exercise
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28
Identifying Attacks
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 45
Blocking Unwanted Traffic min.
Objectives
• Identify unwanted traffic in your network
• Appy different NETSCOUT AED filtering
capabilities to block that unwanted traffic
57
Summary
• Best common practice UI workflow to validate AED statistics for an attack
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29
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Carp-A
1
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Security Posture
Security Philosophy
However, a mix of
both is often the best
from an operational
perspective
2
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Security-Triangle
Your design should be based on the balance between Usability,
Functionality and Security
Usability
Your Policy
3
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Recommended Workflow
1. Design Protection Groups NOK
Configure all PGs
2. Perform Profile Capture and STs based on
verify
Run Profile
apply
suggested
your services to Capture
3. Apply suggested values be protected
values
complete Configure
configuration Filters
verify
Inactive verify
Inactive verify
Inactive
& high & med & low
NOK NOK NOK
Tuning
Run AED in inactive mode for several days and tune, if necessary repeat a complete step
Protection Groups
4
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
10
5
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
• Virtual Appliances
– Up to 49 custom PGs + 1 Default PG (IPv4 only)
11
When different
Protection length prefixesProtected
Group Name of the Hosts
same network are protected
Setting by Traffic
Matched more than 1
PG, AED matches traffic to the most specific (longest) prefix
All IPv4 traffic, except for the traffic that is
IPv4 Default Protection Group 0.0.0.0/0 Matches 192.0.2.2/32
destined to 192.0.2.0/24
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6
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Protection Group 6
All IPv6 traffic, except for the traffic that is
(serving as a Default Protection ::/0
destined to fe80:22:ab00::/40
Group for IPv6 hosts)
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7
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Custom Server Type inherits the name of the assigned Protection Group
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8
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
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9
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Detailed Reporting
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Configuration Summary
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10
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
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Traffic Overview
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11
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Total Traffic
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Attack Categories
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12
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
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13
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Mouse-over shows
popup menu à Access
Blocked Hosts
• Automatically inherits:
– Selected Protection Group
– Selected Attack Category
– Selected Time Frame
27
• Verify triggering
Categories
• False positive à Click
Allow List Button to
approve blocked source
host instead
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14
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Breakdowns by embedded
URL and domains
• Hover cursor over Entry to see the
full URL as alt-text
• Copy entry to clipboard will include
hidden part of URL
• Deny List buttons available
– For all PGs
– For this PG
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Web Crawlers
30
15
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
IP Location
Traffic statistics
based on where
source IP addresses
are registered
• Click buttons to block
country sources
• IP Location
information is part of
the AIF feed
31
Protocols
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16
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Services
Radio
buttons -
change
displayed
services
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17
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Bandwidth Alerts
AED can generate bandwidth alerts when the Protection Group traffic exceed one of
the specified baseline threshold
ü Total Traffic – Total amount of data received by that Protection Group
ü Blocked Traffic – Amount of traffic blocked or dropped for this Protection Group
ü Botnet Traffic – Amount of traffic blocked by detected Botnet activity for this
Protection Group
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Global Thresholds
Administration > System Alerts > Tab: Settings
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18
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Disable if no alerting is
needed for this Protection
Group & this traffic type
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Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
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Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
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Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
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Automate the protection level and alert when traffic exceeds threshold
1. Manually define the total bps and/or pps traffic
2. Automatically changes the Protection Level from Low à High
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22
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Lab Exercise
45
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 45
Working with Protection Groups min.
Objectives
• Create Protection Groups for the server or
servers that you need to protect.
• Assign to each Protection Group a Server Type
that defines the protection settings that are used
to mitigate traffic.
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23
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part A)
Summary
• Understand the concepts of Protection Groups
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48
24
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Carp-B
1
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Server Types
Server Types
2
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
3
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Available Protections
Server Server Server Server Server Server Server Server
ATLAS Threat Categories x x x x x x x x
STIX Feeds x x x x x x x x
Application Misbehavior x x x x x x
Block Malformed DNS Traffic x x x
Block Malformed SIP Traffic x x
Botnet Prevention x x x
CDN and Proxy Support x x
Each Server Type has a set of relevant DNS Authentication
DNS NXDomain Rate Limiting
x
x
x
x
x
x
pre-defined Protections: DNS Rate Limiting
DNS Regular Expression
x
x
x
x
x
x
Sequence
Countermeasure processing
order for traffic:
External à Internal
Event Driven
Per Packet
4
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
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5
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
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Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
13
Recommended Workflow
1. Design Protection Groups NOK
Configure all PGs
2. Perform Profile Capture and STs based on
verify
Run Profile
apply
suggested
your services to Capture
3. Apply suggested values be protected
values
complete Configure
configuration Filters
verify
Inactive verify
Inactive verify
Inactive
& high & med & low
NOK NOK NOK
Tuning
Run AED in inactive mode for several days and tune, if necessary repeat a complete step
14
7
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Profile Capture
15
Supported Protections
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8
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
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9
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Click Profile
If a profile capture is already active
for a selected Protection Group,
then the Profile button is
unavailable. To access the Profile
button, deselect any Protection
Groups with active profile capture.
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20
10
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Click Start
21
22
11
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
23
Profiled Data
24
12
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Suggested Settings
25
26
13
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Alternatively use the View Profile Histogram Icon that appears next to each
protection setting, if there is available data
27
Histograms
28
14
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Histogram Scales
Y-axis
Scale
29
• Log histograms - Useful for seeing values observed from any number of hosts
– Useful for settings Low protection levels
– Helps to include all legitimate observed hosts, even those with extreme usage
• Even a single extreme legitimate client is easily seen
30
15
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
During a Profile Capture the AED is not defending the service(s) of that PG with
any rate-based protection
Do not change the Protection Level for that PG during a Profile Capture window
If an attack was experienced during the Profile Capture window, you must repeat
the process
– Profiled Captures for longer periods of time are subject to record attacks or anomalies and
therefore dilute the provided statistics
☞ Only one set of Profiled Capture results per PG is stored on the AED
31
Lab Exercise
32
16
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 20
Applying Profile Capture min.
Objectives
• Apply the suggested settings from your Profile
Capture to AED's rate-based protection settings
33
Summary
• Reviewed the concept behind Server Types
34
17
Optimize AED Visibility & Protection (Part B)
35
18
Volumetric Attack
Bass
Volumetric Attack
1
Volumetric Attack
Flooding Attacks
Volumetric Attacks
ISP g
ISP 2 in
ood
Fl AED Firewall IPS
Load
Balancer
DATA
Target
CENTER Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
2
Volumetric Attack
Flooding Attacks
3
Volumetric Attack
Invalid Packets
Volumetric Attacks
Detects and handles various forms of invalid • Takes precedence over denied and allowed
IPv4 or IPv6 TCP/IP packets hosts
• Not user-defined, non-configurable and always-on – Blocks invalid packets from whitelisted hosts
– Designed to drop really “wrong” packets • Details button to lists the reason(s) why traffic
– No changes occur as protection level increases was considered to be invalid – Will drop
packets only
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4
Volumetric Attack
• Layer 4 checks:
– Short TCP/UDP/ICMP Packet
– Bad TCP/UDP Checksum
– Invalid TCP Flags
– Invalid ACK Number
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Volumetric Attacks
10
5
Volumetric Attack
ASERT
AIF DATA
ISP 1 Reputation CENTER
Feed
ISP
ISP 2
AED IPS
Load
Balancer
Target
Attack Traffic Applications
ISP ‘n’ Good Traffic & Services
11
AIF Categories
Category Sub-Category of Threats Category Sub-Category of Threats
• Identifies DDoS attackers based upon IP address • Traffic
• Sinkholes
DDoS indicators from ATLAS
Location-Based
Anonymization
• Scanner
Reputation • Identifies DDoS targets based on indicators from ATLAS Services
Threats • Other
• HTTP Flooder • TOR
• Proxy
IP Geo- • Identify country location à sources of inbound traffic
Location • Identify country location à destinations of outbound traffic Email Threats • Spam • Phishing
• APT • Watering Hole
Web Crawler • Identify inbound connections to web services from known Campaigns and
• Hacktivism • Rootkit
Identification search engines Targeted Attacks • RAT
Command & • Peer-to-Peer • HTTP • IRC • Mobile C&C
Mobile • Spyware
• Malicious App
Control
Malware • Webshell • DDoS Bot
• Ransomware • Dropper
• RAT • Ad Fraud
• Fake Anti Virus • Worm
• Banking • Credential Theft
• Virtual Currency • Backdoor
• Spyware • Other
• Drive By • Exploit Kit
• Social Network • Point of Sale
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12
6
Volumetric Attack
Confidence Index
13
• Inbound protection for DDoS using ATLAS IP, DNS, URI, URL Reputation
• Delivered as part of ATLAS Intelligence Feed
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14
7
Volumetric Attack
Radio button
selection
15
Attack Categories
Detail View
& Statistics
16
8
Volumetric Attack
Volumetric Attacks
17
Blocked!
Target
Applications
ISP ‘n’ DATA & Services
CENTER
18
9
Volumetric Attack
STIX/TAXII
19
Anomali STAXX
20
10
Volumetric Attack
Filter Lists
Volumetric Attacks
21
Recommended Workflow
1. Design Protection Groups NOK
Configure all PGs
2. Perform Profile Capture and STs based on
verify
Run Profile
apply
suggested
your services to Capture
3. Apply suggested values be protected
values
complete Configure
configuration Filters
verify
Inactive verify
Inactive verify
Inactive
& high & med & low
NOK NOK NOK
Tuning
Run AED in inactive mode for several days and tune, if necessary repeat a complete step
22
11
Volumetric Attack
AED devices can share their global lists with the Cloud Service Provider
o Local Filter Lists are sent to Cloud Service Provider
o Local changes are automatically synchronized
☞ Allows a common Security posture (local versus cloud)
23
Can be configured:
• global (all Protection Groups)
• per Protection Group
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24
12
Volumetric Attack
DNS Regular Expression Regular expressions that search for DNS queries
(Deny Only) and responses for a specific PGs
HTTP Regular Expression Regular expressions that search HTTP queries for a
(Deny Only) specific PGs
25
Volumetric Attacks
26
13
Volumetric Attack
☞ AED begins to block (Deny List) or pass (Allow List) traffic immediately when a host was added
☞ It takes several minutes to remove a blocked item from the dynamic deny list and pass its traffic
☞ IPv4 Deny List / Allow List stores a maximum of 20,000 hosts and CIDRs
☞ IPv6 Deny List / Allow List stores a maximum of 12,000 hosts and CIDRs
27
Master Filter Lists containing drop and/or pass expressions are applied to all active
Protection Groups
28
14
Volumetric Attack
BGP
Reduce service interruptions AED
by explicitly allowing them in
the Master Filter list
29
• Each packet is tested by each of the FCAP expression rules sequentially (top à down)
– Match drop rule à dropped without any further processing
– Match pass rule à passed through without any further processing
– Packets not matching any rule are subject to further validation by protections
• Each Protection Level setting can have a different filter list (getting more restrictive)
Best Practice: Drop all unnecessary traffic globally with the Master
Filter List or specific in the Filter List of a Protection Group
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15
Volumetric Attack
Expression Reference
[src | dst] [net | host] addr Matching networks and hosts
[protocol | proto] protocol-name Matching protocols
[protocol | proto] number
{tflags | tcpflags} flags/flag-mask Matching TCP flaps
[src | dst] port {port-name | number } [ .. {port-name | number} ] Matching port or port range
bpp or bytes number [ .. number] Matching IP length or range of lengths
icmptype {icmptype | number} Matching ICMP messages
icmpcode code
tos number Matching Type of Service
ttl number Matching Time to Live
frag Matching Fragments
More information can be found in the User Guide or The Pocket Guide
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32
16
Volumetric Attack
You want to block all UDP traffic except when going to the DNS Server 1.2.3.4
WRONG CORRECT
pass dst 1.2.3.4/32 drop udp and !(dst 1.2.3.4/32)
drop udp
☣ Means you will not be able to ☞Means you drop UDP traffic except
protect host 1.2.3.4 from any attack (!=not) when it's destined to the host
1.2.3.4
33
Important
Never just copy examples, modify filter as
required based on your network’s situation:
• Mix of Services or Applications running
• Services needing protection
Do not use these examples
during our lab exercises
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34
17
Volumetric Attack
Important
Never just copy examples, modify filter as
required based on your network’s situation:
• Mix of Services or Applications running
• Services needing protection
Do not use these examples
during our lab exercises
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35
Important
Never just copy examples, modify filter as
required based on your network’s situation:
• Mix of Services or Applications running
• Services needing protection
Do not use these examples
during our lab exercises
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 36
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18
Volumetric Attack
Important
Never just copy examples, modify filter as
required based on your network’s situation:
• Mix of Services or Applications running
• Services needing protection
Do not use these examples
during our lab exercises
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 37
37
38
19
Volumetric Attack
Important
Never just copy examples, modify filter as
required based on your network’s situation:
• Mix of Services or Applications running
• Services needing protection
39
40
20
Volumetric Attack
# EXPLICIT ALLOWED
pass src host 1.2.3.4 and proto tcp and port 179 and dst host 5.6.7.8
# FILTERED IP SOURCES
drop net 0.0.0.0/0
drop net 127.0.0.0/8
drop net 10.0.0.0/8
Use Comments (#) to create sections
drop net 172.16.0.0/12
drop net 192.168.0.0/16
drop net 224.0.0.0/4
drop net 240.0.0.0/4
# FILTERED IP PROTOCOLS
drop not (proto udp or proto tcp or proto esp or proto icmp or proto gre or proto ipv6)
# DETAILED IP FILTERS
drop src port 0 and (proto udp or proto tcp)
…
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41
Volumetric Attacks
42
21
Volumetric Attack
Recommended Workflow
1. Design Protection Groups NOK
Configure all PGs
2. Perform Profile Capture and STs based on
verify
Run Profile
apply
suggested
your services to Capture
3. Apply suggested values be protected
values
complete Configure
configuration Filters
verify
Inactive verify
Inactive verify
Inactive
& high & med & low
NOK NOK NOK
Tuning
Run AED in inactive mode for several days and tune, if necessary repeat a complete step
43
44
22
Volumetric Attack
45
46
23
Volumetric Attack
☞ Attack Categories?
– Which Attack Categories are listed?
– How much traffic is affected?
– Is traffic permanent or periodically
blocked?
47
48
24
Volumetric Attack
49
Volumetric Attacks
50
25
Volumetric Attack
51
Rate-based Blocking
• One method to prevent flood, TCP SYN, and protocol attacks, as well as connection
table and request table exhaustion attacks
• AED constantly examines the bit rate and packet rate of traffic from each source host
– If traffic exceeds the bps or pps threshold à AED temporarily blocks the source IP
– Use Profile Capture to identify acceptable use thresholds
52
26
Volumetric Attack
Traffic exceeds configured ‘global’ or ‘flexible’ Rate-based Blocking Threshold (bps or pps)
53
54
27
Volumetric Attack
Volumetric Attacks
55
UDP Flooding
56
28
Volumetric Attack
57
Volumetric Attacks
58
29
Volumetric Attack
Fragmentation Flooding
Packet reassembly is CPU intensive and can only be started once all
fragment have been received, a lot of fragments chains stay incomplete
Attack Characteristic Targets Problems caused
59
Fragmentation Detection
60
30
Volumetric Attack
Volumetric Attacks
61
ICMP Flooding
62
31
Volumetric Attack
63
Volumetric Attacks
64
32
Volumetric Attack
IP Location Policing
Useful if you know the countries
PG communicating with
65
Traffic Shaping
66
33
Volumetric Attack
Lab Exercise
67
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 45
Volumetric DDoS Attacks min.
Objectives
• Use the available protections to identify and
block unwanted traffic.
• Monitor the effectiveness of the mitigation.
68
34
Volumetric Attack
Summary
• Discussed threats caused by volumetric DDOS attacks
69
35
State Exhaustion Attacks
Minnow
1
State Exhaustion Attacks
ISP 1
ISP e- n
at tio
ISP 2 St us SATURATION
ha
ExFirewall
IPS
AED Load
Balancer
DATA
Target
CENTER Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
2
State Exhaustion Attacks
3
State Exhaustion Attacks
A? K
/AC
P SYN
C
B? it ed T
olic
Uns
C?
Y?
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4
State Exhaustion Attacks
AED intercepts all TCP traffic that originates from a single source and completes the
following checks
• SYN Rate - Maximum number of TCP-SYN packets per second that a source host is
allowed to send
• SYN ACK Delta Rate - Allowable difference between the number of ACK packets and the
number of SYN packets seen per second à Delta Rate ≤ ∑SYN - ∑ACK
• Any source host that exceeds either rates is temporarily blocked (60 sec / 300 sec)
10
5
State Exhaustion Attacks
11
12
6
State Exhaustion Attacks
RST
Connection terminated
SYN/ACK
13
Caveats
14
7
State Exhaustion Attacks
Connection terminated
Retransmit
Port n SYN
Test 2*
Connection terminated
Retransmit
Port n SYN
SYN/ACK
Test 3*
Connection established
RST
Connection terminated
*Only if the previous test didn‘t authenticate the client
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15
Automation Threshold allows you to specify a rate above/below when this protection will be
automatically activated/deactivated
SYN rate to any protected host in the PG exceeds threshold à AED activates protection
SYN rate falls below threshold à AED deactivates protection again
16
8
State Exhaustion Attacks
Spoofed SYN Flood Prevention is not available in “simulation” when the AED or
Protection Group is set to inactive mode
☞ TCP SYN Flood Prevention reporting will be incorrect as the protection is unable to
validate client integrity
• Use Spoofed SYN Flood Prevention Automation to lower a potential false positive
rate in normal time
17
18
9
State Exhaustion Attacks
Source IP Source
B 45841
Target is to completely fill
C 8951
this table on Server, Firewall,
C 8952
Load-Balancer,… to prevent
… …
simultaneous open E
F
9842
42568
TCP connections
F 42570
from a single … F
F
42571
42572
F 42575
F 42578
F 42580
…
F 42590
F 42595
… …
H 23321
I 63254
? J 8952
K 12955
… ….
19
20
10
State Exhaustion Attacks
Default Values
21
22
11
State Exhaustion Attacks
No Session usage
No Session teardown ?
Bytes
TCP Session
Activity
Diagram
Session Establsihed à
Session Start à
time
23
24
12
State Exhaustion Attacks
TCP Session
Activity
Diagram
Initial
Timeout
Required
Data (bytes)
time
Established à
Start à
Modes
TCP Connection
Initial Timeout (sec.) + TCP Connection Idle
Timeout (sec.)
25
• Host is blocked if it exceeds the number of Consecutive Violations before Blocking Source
• TCP Connection Reset can protect against flood, slow HTTP post and protocol attacks
• Available Modes
Idle Timeout Initial Timeout + Initial Required Data Both
26
13
State Exhaustion Attacks
AED
HTTP
Services
• Problem: Slowloris and other slow request attack tools try to do only what is
absolutely necessary in order to remain owner of a connection and to evade idle
or initial activity monitoring.
• Solution: Countermeasure for Slowloris and other slow request attacks. Stricter
malformed header checks defeat LOIC and similar attacks
27
28
14
State Exhaustion Attacks
Default Settings
29
Recommendations
30
15
State Exhaustion Attacks
31
Lab Exercise
32
16
State Exhaustion Attacks
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 30
State-exhausting Attacks min.
Objectives
• Use AED to to identify state exhausting attacks.
• Use AED protections to block TCP-based misuse
traffic
• Monitor the effectiveness of your mitigation
33
Summary
• DDOS Attack types for a TCP stack
34
17
State Exhaustion Attacks
35
18
Application Layer Attacks
Eel
1
Application Layer Attacks
ISP 1
n
ISP at
io
ISP 2 lic er SATURATION
p y
Firewall IPS Ap La
AED Load
Balancer
DATA
Target
CENTER Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
2
Application Layer Attacks
Layer 7 Attacks
Cross Backend
Can look Stealthy Backend Large
Related System
like normal on low Systems amount of
Services à overload à
Traffic (but traffic used by outgoing
target DNS to intensive
more of it) rates Service data
kill www service SQL queries
3
Application Layer Attacks
• Mitigate all kinds of attacks where it is possible to find a unique signature common to the attack packets
• Only traffic sourced or destined for the configured TCP or UDP ports is inspected
• Each regular expression is applied separately to the packet's payload
• To add multiple regular expressions, press enter after each one
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4
Application Layer Attacks
When viewing a packet in the Packet Capture you can select information from
the Data section and add this to your Payload RegEx
Selected payload
automatically copied
to Regular Expression
10
5
Application Layer Attacks
• TCP and UDP ports must be specified in widget, not auto-filled from packet
• Manually add another Regular Expression (new line)
11
www.arbornetworks.com
*\.(arbor\.net|
mail.arbor.net arbornetworks\.com)$
12
6
Application Layer Attacks
13
14
7
Application Layer Attacks
15
16
8
Application Layer Attacks
17
• Most sensitive in High Protection Level and least sensitive in Low Protection Level
• Required also for Botnet Prevention to be enabled
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18
9
Application Layer Attacks
Botnet Prevention
19
Application Misbehavior
20
10
Application Layer Attacks
21
SYN
SYN/ACK
ACK
Connection established
Port n+x
GET / HTTP/1.1
22
11
Application Layer Attacks
SYN
SYN/ACK
ACK
Connection established
SYN
Spoofed SYN Flood SYN/ACK
Port n+y ACK
Prevention à HTTP Connection established
23
SYN
SYN/ACK
ACK
Connection established
24
12
Application Layer Attacks
25
26
13
Application Layer Attacks
27
28
14
Application Layer Attacks
Sequence
Countermeasure processing
order for WebCrawler traffic:
External à Internal in Low
Event Driven
Per Packet
29
Sequence (Cont.)
Countermeasure processing
order for WebCrawler traffic:
External à Internal in Medium
Event Driven
Per Packet
30
15
Application Layer Attacks
Sequence (Cont.)
Countermeasure processing
order for WebCrawler traffic:
External à Internal in High
Event Driven
Per Packet
31
Traffic widget for protection groups of Generic, Web, and DNS Server Types
Hover on mini-graph to
see expanded graph
32
16
Application Layer Attacks
33
34
17
Application Layer Attacks
35
TLS 1.2
(THC = “The Hacker’s Choice”)
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36
18
Application Layer Attacks
37
Default Settings
• TLS handshake settings – prevention limits get more restrictive with higher
protection levels
• Some of these values can be updated via the CLI
38
19
Application Layer Attacks
39
• Any invalid TLS 1.3 that can be detected without Key Share
“Server Hello”
decryption will be dropped Key Share, Verify
Certificate, Finished
• AED does not decrypt TLS 1.3 traffic
– Cryptographic Acceleration Module (CAM) does Exchange messages
not support TLS 1.3 (encrypted with shared secret key)
40
20
Application Layer Attacks
41
42
21
Application Layer Attacks
Query
V R • Hiding Attack traffic
behind well known IP
Direct Attack 100 Mbps addresses
(spoofed traffic)
• Using Amplification
nse Resolver
Respo Ratio: 1:20…100
V R
ps
2 Gb
Victim
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43
? NOT FOUND!
DNS Cache
DNS Server
Attacker
44
22
Application Layer Attacks
? NOT FOUND!
NX
s
Recursive DO
M
rie Name Server AIN
Q ue
S
DN ! FULL!
Attacker Cache
45
Protects against DNS attacks that attempt to exhaust the resources of DNS servers
• Traffic with destination port of UDP/53 is inspected for compliance with the RFC
specification for DNS (RFC1035)
Malformed packets are dropped
Source host is never blocked
• Ignores the EDNS version and Z flag value of the packet
– These fields cannot be used as attack vectors
– AED will allow all EDNS version and Z flag values to pass when this protection is enabled
– Use Payload Regular Expression protection to inspect EDNS version and/or the Z flag fields of a packet
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23
Application Layer Attacks
DNS Authentication
Protects against DNS attacks from sources that are not valid DNS clients
• Any source that sends UDP DNS request is forced to switch to TCP
– Uses the Truncated Bit (TC) - Indicates that only the first 512 bytes of the reply was returned.
– Source hosts that does not change from a UDP to TCP is considered invalid
Any unverified request is dropped
☞ Source host is never blocked AED in inactive mode is
unable to authenticate /
validate clients
47
48
24
Application Layer Attacks
Protects against DNS cache poisoning and dictionary attacks on DNS servers only
• AED monitors DNS response packets for sources that send requests which led to a non-
existent domain (NXDomain) response
Source hosts sending more consecutive failed DNS requests are temporarily blocked
• For this prevention to work, AED must be able to see the DNS response traffic from the
DNS server
49
Inspects DNS traffic and applies each regular expression separately to each line of
the DNS requests
• Up to five regular expressions
• Uses the OR operator for multiple regular expressions
• Use the PCRE format
50
25
Application Layer Attacks
51
52
26
Application Layer Attacks
SIP Flood
DNS
Server
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
3
DNS Query:
• Text-based protocol with a syntax like HTTP Biloxi.com
IP address of Bob’s
• Two types of messages: 2 proxy server
53
SIP Malformed
54
27
Application Layer Attacks
Prevents attacks against the VoIP infrastructure by blocking invalid or blank SIP
requests
• All traffic destined to a SIP ports is inspected
– If the payload of the packet is empty, or is not part of a SIP request
– If the headers are not properly formatted and/or do not have reasonable values
Traffic that is Malformed is dropped
Source host is temporarily blocked
55
56
28
Application Layer Attacks
57
• It is recommended that you create a separate Protection Group for each of the
services you want to protect and assign the Server Type that fits best
– Generic Server Type is the “catch-all” providing flexibility to accommodate specific server types
58
29
Application Layer Attacks
DATA
CENTER
CDN Proxy
Server Attack = IP of CDN Node n
io
cat r
i
pl ye
Firewall IPS Ap La
AED Load
Balancer
CDN Proxy
Server Attack Traffic
Good Traffic
• Proxy and Content Delivery Network (CDN) servers have special needs
– CDN server forwards content on behalf of many websites
– Proxy server forwards traffic from many user clients
• Source of attack is the CDN / Proxy server IP address
– AED blocking protections will affect all users of that CDN proxy as this source IP is blocked!
– Need a change of behavior for those blocking protections… – but how?
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59
• AED has special handling for sources that are proxies and CDN servers
– Operation is not visible in Web UI
– Separate settings for Low, Medium, and High Protection Level
• When enabled AED looks for a specific field within the HTTP header:
– X-Forwarded-For – Standard method for identifying the originating IP address of a client
connecting to a web server through an HTTP proxy or load balancer
– True-Client-IP – Akamai's method for passing source client IP
– Requires to see traffic via HTTP and not HTTPS
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30
Application Layer Attacks
61
62
31
Application Layer Attacks
Lab Exercise
63
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 45
Application Layer Attacks min.
Objectives
• View indicators of application layer-based DDoS
attacks
• Use your AED protections to block that misuse
traffic
• Monitor the effectiveness of your mitigation
64
32
Application Layer Attacks
Summary
• Identify Layer 7 Attack Characteristics
65
33
Outgoing Attacks
Whale
Outgoing Attacks
1
Outgoing Attacks
• Requires an inline
Outbound Threats deployment mode
• OTF must be enabled
to use Outbound Deny
ISP 1 and Allow List
ISP
ISP 2
Firewall IPS
AED Load
Balancer
DATA
CENTER Target
Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
SATURATIO
N
2
Outgoing Attacks
• Enabled by default
• Use “gear” button to update the configuration
• Displays blocked outbound threat traffic
– Lists protections responsible for blocking
– Lists TOP five ATLAS threat categories
3
Outgoing Attacks
Available Protections
4
Outgoing Attacks
STIX Feeds
Radio button
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 10 selection
10
5
Outgoing Attacks
11
Prevent attacks from legitimate hosts who sent DNS requests to flood DNS servers
• Maximum number of DNS queries per second that a source can send before it is blocked
– Represents what you consider to be a reasonable maximum amount of DNS traffic
Note: If you turn on DNS Rate Limiting for a Protection Group, in the packet capture the outbound
traffic may match the Protection Group instead of the Outbound Threat Filter for displaying
12
6
Outgoing Attacks
Protects against attacks that exhaust resources by sending invalid or blank HTTP
requests to a server
• Verifies that the HTTP header conforms to RFC 2616 Section 2.2 "Basic Rules“
• Exceptions to the RFC constraints on the space character are allowed
• Verifies that the entire request is in a legal and consistent format
⚠ Violating source hosts will be temporary blocked
13
14
7
Outgoing Attacks
Search for
specific host
Adding
a Host
Remove host
Hosts that have
Move host to from Outbound
already been added
Outbound Allow List Deny List
Useful Description
(hover to see complete text)
15
16
8
Outgoing Attacks
17
Packet Capture
18
9
Outgoing Attacks
19
Lab Exercise
20
10
Outgoing Attacks
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 30
Outbound Threats min.
Objectives
• View indicators of an outbound threat from within
your network
• Use the AED outbound threat filter to block the
outbound threat viewed
• Monitor the effectiveness of your mitigation
21
Summary
22
11
Outgoing Attacks
23
12
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Zander
1
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Cloud Signaling
Mitigation Attempted
2
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
ISP N
ISP 2 TIO
RA
TU
SA Firewall IPS
AED Load
Balancer
DATA
CENTER Target
Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic & Services
Good Traffic
attack…
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 6
3
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
DDoS Protection
Internet Service Provider
SATURATION
1. Service Operating
Normally
NETSCOUT 2. Attack Begins and
AED
Initially Blocked by
NETSCOUT AED
Data Center Network
4. Cloud Mitigation
Requested
Cloud Signaling Status
5. Service is re-
established!
4
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
...
x5
• AED supports Cloud Signaling to a
single Cloud Service Provider at a time AED
together
AED can send requests for the following types of cloud mitigations
☑ Global – sends mitigation request for all IPv4 prefixes on the network
☑ Targeted Prefix – sends mitigation request for those targeted prefixes
which are configured
☑ Protection Group – sends mitigation request for those IPv4
Protection Groups that are configured
10
5
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Global Mitigation - sends mitigation request for all IPv4 prefixes from the AED
• Request is sent when traffic on the appliance exceeds a global threshold
for a specified amount of time.
• Request can be sent manually via the Cloud Signaling widget on the Summary
page
11
12
6
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
13
14
7
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Cloud Signaling
15
16
8
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Handshake Requests
17
Heartbeat Requests
18
9
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
19
Prefix Updates
20
10
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Automatic Cloud Signaling Thresholds have delay timers for start and
stop of mitigations
• Start delay timer: 1 to 10 minutes (configurable)
• Stop delay timer: 10 minutes
• Preventions:
- Upstream mitigation from occurring because of spurious traffic spike
- Upstream mitigation from halting due to temporary pause in attack
- Cycling of mitigation state when traffic levels fluctuate rapidly
21
22
11
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Cloud Signaling
23
24
12
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Interval - Specify the amount of time over which the average traffic must meet the Global
Thresholds
• Automatic start delay timer is configurable from 1 to 10 min.
• Automatic stop delay timer is 10 minutes (requests to end mitigation)
25
26
13
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
27
Cloud Signaling
28
14
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
29
ext0 int0
AED
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 30
30
15
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
ext0 int0
AED
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 31
31
GRE Caveats
• Effective ≤ 1Gbit/s
- For larger traffic volumes the GRE tunnel should be terminated on another network equipment
32
16
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
33
34
17
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
35
Example 1
36
18
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Example 2
37
Example 3
38
19
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
39
Manually configured targeted prefix will be added to the mitigation request once global
traffic exceeds the defined thresholds
Add Comma-separated
IPs, CIDRs, Hostnames
(one time lookup)
Automatic added
Prefixes cannot be
manually removed
Pu
ll Do
w n
40
20
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Switch from targeted mitigation to global mitigation after prefix limit was exceeded
IP Version Prefix Limit
IPv4 227
IPv6 75
IPv4 + IPv6 varies
41
42
21
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
43
Widget Elements
Action button
Status information as appropriate
and error messages
Link to Configure
Cloud Signaling page
44
22
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Status Overview
Status Available Tasks
The settings for connecting to the Cloud Click Please Configure to go to the Configure
Signaling Server are not configured. Cloud Signaling Settings page.
Cloud Signaling is in a normal state. Click Activate to initiate Cloud Signaling manually.
Cloud Signaling requested, but mitigation To stop the mitigation requests, click Deactivate.
has not started.
An error has occurred. Message below If possible, take appropriate action to resolve the
picture describes the error. error.
45
46
23
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
47
48
24
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
49
Lab Exercise
50
25
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
Lab Exercise
Hands-on Exercise 60
Using Cloud Signaling min.
Objectives
• Configure cloud signaling for your AED
• Test and monitor cloud signaling status for your
AED
• Mitigate and monitor a volumetric attacks with
cloud signaling support
51
Summary
52
26
Engage Cloud Signaling Services
53
27
AED Administration
Orca
AED Administration
1
AED Administration
AED Administration
2
AED Administration
Login via SSH or a console connection; the default account “admin” is always
present
Welcome to ArbOS
admin@AED:/#
Password Recovery
If the administrator password is lost, you can perform the password recovery
process
3
AED Administration
The default administrator password (arbor) must be changed before you can start
the AED services
Password Criteria
4
AED Administration
The system name can be set arbitrarily and is only locally significant
10
5
AED Administration
Setting the clock is important to allow proper Syslog reporting and to support
advanced features like Cloud Signaling
• Setting the time zone must be done in the GUI, not in the CLI
• It's a good idea to set the time even when you plan to use NTP
• The clock format is MMDDhhmm[[CC]YY][.ss]
- The clock is set in the UTC timezone
11
12
6
AED Administration
13
If necessary, the speed and duplex can be set for both the management and
protection interfaces
- You must stop/start AED services
- Copper interfaces of both types are 10/100/1000
/ services AED mitigation interface media ext0 speed 1000 duplex full
Protection
Interfaces / services AED mitigation interface media int0 speed 1000 duplex full
/ start services aed
14
7
AED Administration
DNS Servers
Setting DNS in the CLI or the UI is useful to ensure the reachability of services like
AIF Updates and to provide reverse DNS lookups for the UI
15
Management Traffic
16
8
AED Administration
17
18
9
AED Administration
It is very important to ensure you have the latest code release for AED
• To find the latest version, check the Arbor Technical Assistance Center (ATAC) web
site download area
19
Every AED appliance will ship with the software pre-installed on the internal flash
file system
20
10
AED Administration
Product: ASERT
Model: AED-AIF-ADVANCED
Expires: Thu Aug 15 13:24:55 2025
Key: BBE4P-4PZGR-GX99M-B93Y5-D10B7-A0HT2-P8HEV-6KQMG-PPM82
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 21
21
Install the product and an AIF licenses once you have obtained them
/ system license set AED "AED-2800-40G" 0EZQ8-MV2N0-TP8YH-2FGRD-9NKBX-586QS-QV4SZ-
RM9LE-HCE1A
/ system license set ASERT ”AED-AIF-ADVANCED expires: 1630699268" 98765-43210-FGHIJ-
ABCDE-PQRST-KLMNO-UVWXY-Z9876-54321
• The best approach is to use copy-and-paste into the CLI using SSH
admin@AED:/# / system license show
Product: Arbor
Model: AED-2800-40G
Expires: Never
Key: 0EZQ8-MV2N0-TP8YH-2FGRD-9NKBX-586QS-QV4SZ-RM9LE-HCE1A
Product: ASERT
Model: PRA-AIF-ADVANCED
Expires: Fri Sep 03 16:01:08 2025
Key: 98765-43210-FGHIJ-ABCDE-PQRST-KLMNO-UVWXY-Z9876-54321
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 22
22
11
AED Administration
The language can also be changed in the GUI; the selection only affects GUI
• The CLI always remains in English
admin@AED:/# / services AED language show
Language: English
23
Deployment Mode
Determines whether AED needs to forwards any traffic - Setting is also shown in the
status bar of the UI
admin@AED:/# / services aed mode show
❑ Inline = forwarding Deployment mode: inline (inactive)
24
12
AED Administration
25
Starting Services
26
13
AED Administration
27
28
14
AED Administration
Save Configuration
Ensure you saved the configuration changes to make them persistent in case the
appliance
Ø restarts
Ø is rebooted
Ø is power cycled
29
…
Check system details and settings System attributes:
admin@AED:/# system show flexlic.enabled = 1
General system information: shell.enabled = 1
System name: AED Idle timeout: 0 (default)
Screen length: 0 Appliance mode: disabled
System timezone: GMT FIPS/CC mode: disabled
HSM: not present
Version: Arbor Edge Defense 7.2.0.0 (build OEGF) (arch x86_64)
Boot time: Mon Sep 16 12:28:52 2024, 17 days 23:34 ago Acknowledgement query: disabled
Load averages: 4.27, 4.33, 4.35 Acknowledgement string: Continue (Yes/No)?
BIOS Version: Core: 5.14; KMB-IXS100: 1.43.0946ABC0 Banner:
Boot Mode: UEFI Welcome to ArbOS
System Board Model: KMB-IXS100
System Model Number: CG2400
Serial Number: CG24038024LC
Processor: 2 x Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4210T CPU @ 2.30GHz (20 total
cores) (40 total threads)
Memory Device: 16384 MB NODE 1 CPU1_DIMM_A1
30
15
AED Administration
Disk Information
31
32
16
AED Administration
Logging Files
33
Logging Files
34
17
AED Administration
AED Administration
35
After the License Server has been successfully contacted you can request a Throughput Limit and an AIF Level
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 36
36
18
AED Administration
System Alerts
Summary
The Top 5 Active Alerts are always shown on the Summary Page
37
System Alerts
Administration > System Alerts
Active and expired alerts can also be found under the System Alerts menu option
38
19
AED Administration
Diagnostics
Administration > Diagnostics
If you need ATAC support, upload a Diagnostics Package to the case to accelerate
the handling of your ticket analysis
39
Manage Files
Administration > Files
Upload a new file
to the local disk
Select file(s)
to delete
Currently installed
and used by AED,
but can still be
deleted from disk
40
20
AED Administration
Download certificate
Upload new logo to from Arbor CA
be displayed instead
Upload or delete a
custom certificate for
the Web GUI
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 41
41
Backups
Administration > Backup and Restore
Create a new backup:
Protect against data loss (configuration and traffic data) • after significant changes
• before maintenance starts
Type of backup (full
or incremental)
42
21
AED Administration
Backups (cont.)
Specify the interval
and Time for Full and
Incremental backups
Administration > Backup and Restore
Define backup
location Backup Time Stamp &
description entered by
the user
43
AED Administration
44
22
AED Administration
AED Administration
45
Summary
46
23
TLS Protected Services
clownfish
1
TLS Protected Services
YouJohn Doe
need to login:
Pass123
Username: John Doe
Password: ***** send
John Doe
Pass123
Man-in-the-Middle Attack
• Reading data
• Able to alter data
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 3
YouJohn Doe
H(&!”SA
need to login:
Pass123
Username: John Doe
J(/!”SE!!”
Password: ***** send
Man-in-the-Middle Attack
• Reading data
• Able to alter data
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 4
2
TLS Protected Services
DATA
ISP 1 CENTER
ISP
ISP 2
Firewall IPS
AED Load
Encrypted Traffic Balancer
Blocked
Copy
Target
Applications
ISP ‘n’ Decrypted DoS DoS Attack & Services
Attack Traffic Detected
Good Traffic Crypto Module
3
TLS Protected Services
DATA
ISP 1 CENTER
ISP
ISP 2
Firewall IPS
AED Load
Balancer
Encrypted
Copy
Target
Applications
ISP ‘n’ Attack Traffic Decrypted OK & Services
4
TLS Protected Services
Step 3 – Authorization
The CAM must be authorized to process encrypted traffic (not required if no passphrase was configured)
/ services aed crypto authorize
10
5
TLS Protected Services
11
12
6
TLS Protected Services
CAM Authorization
/ services aed crypto authorize
13
14
7
TLS Protected Services
15
16
8
TLS Protected Services
17
18
9
TLS Protected Services
19
cert.conf
20
10
TLS Protected Services
21
CAM
22
11
TLS Protected Services
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA X ü
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA2 X ü
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ü ü
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 ü ü
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ü ü
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ü ü
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ü ü
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ü ü
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ü ü
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ü ü
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 23
23
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA2 X ü
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA2 X ü
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA2 X ü
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA2 X ü
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA X X
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 X X
TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA X X
SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA X X
24
12
TLS Protected Services
25
TLS Proxy
26
13
TLS Protected Services
TLS 1.x
TLS Proxy downstream upstream
TLS 1.x
27
28
14
TLS Protected Services
• You can enable and disable all the decryption options from the UI.
1. In the AED UI, select Administration > Decryption
2. On the Configure Decryption Settings page, select Enable TLS Inspection
3. From the list, select TLS Proxy
• CAUTION
– Interface connectivity may be impacted while services are reloading
• You can enable and disable TLS proxy from CLI as well
– AED services must be stopped prior to enabling or disabling the TLS Proxy
/ services aed crypto proxy enable|disable
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 29
29
• View the cipher suites and elliptic curves that the TLS proxy supports in the used
software release
• You can limit the cipher suites and curves for the TLS proxy
30
15
TLS Protected Services
• Optionally, the TLS Proxy supports a client certificate for the upstream* server
– Use a unique key-certificate pair and associate it with the protection group
– Before you import a key and certificate into the keystore
– To associate a key and certificate with upstream TLS connection
31
• For downstream decryption you need to import PEM-encoded RSA and EC keys
• Import key and public certificate for the upstream TLS connections, if required
• Key files
– must contain a public certificate
– must be in PKCS#1 or PKCS#8 format
32
16
TLS Protected Services
Note: The passphrase cannot be changed without deleting all imported keys
33
Managing Keys
• Importing Keys
/ services crypto keys local import keyName disk:|usb: file
- file – name of the PEM-encoded file with its extension
Ø Passphrase prompt – enter the passphrase of the keystore
• Removing Keys
/ services crypto keys local remove keyName
- keyName – name of the key
Ø Passphrase prompt – enter the passphrase of the keystore
• Zeroize Keystore
/ services crypto keys local zeroize
COPYRIGHT © 2024 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. | CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY 34
34
17
TLS Protected Services
• Associate at least one key to a protection group that protects web servers
• CAM cannot decrypt traffic for any protection groups that you associate with the
TLS proxy
35
• Listing Keys
/ services crypto keys show
• Disassociating Keys
/ services aed crypto pg disassociate keyName pgName
• keyName – name of the key to disassociate from pgName
• pgName – name of protection group that keyName is associated with
36
18
TLS Protected Services
37
The validation script may return any of the available messages about the TLS Proxy
global decryption settings which can be found in the User Guide along with
instructions how to fix the problem.
38
19
TLS Protected Services
• To improve performance and throughput when you use the TLS Proxy for
decryption
• TLS Proxy uses the fingerprints on pass lists to identify the traffic from TLS clients
that does not need to be decrypted or inspected for application layer attacks
• Two types of TLS fingerprinting
– Manual
• TLS Fingerprint Pass List - apply to all protection groups
– Dynamic
• Dynamic TLS Fingerprint Pass List - for specific protection groups at specific protection levels
• Both types of TLS fingerprinting or just one type can be configured
39
40
20
TLS Protected Services
41
nDA is an external device that decrypts the TLS traffic and then returns the traffic to
AED for inspection
• You cannot use AED with any other cryptographic module or the TLS proxy
• nDA does not provide bypass functionality
AED nDA
42
21
TLS Protected Services
• VLAN to identify traffic from nDA that does not need to be inspected
/ services aed crypto nda vlan set ID
43
UI Integration
44
22
TLS Protected Services
AED UI Configuration
45
Legend is clickable
46
23
TLS Protected Services
Packet Capture
• Decrypted URLs and domains are displayed on the View Protection Group page
(only if the relevant checkbox is selected)
• Explore à Packet Capture displays only encrypted traffic
– However, it includes the drop reason if something was found after decryption
47
Summary
48
24
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
shark
1
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
2
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
API Pre-Requisites
3
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
API Functions
• GET - Retrieves information about the system. You can obtain specific results with the
GET command by passing additional parameters, but in general it returns a large set of
information
• POST - Acts upon an operation or system component. For example, you can use a
POST command to blacklist a host, by acting on the appropriate protection group
• PUT - Replaces an existing resource with a totally new one
• PATCH - Updates only part of a given resource. For example, you can use PATCH to
update a user’s first name only, and all of the other user properties remain unmodified
• DELETE - Removes a host that has already been blacklisted
• OPTIONS - Lists the available options for a given resource
API Example
Administration > Global
curl -X GET -H "X-Arbux-APIToken:vefNeANMfwcdGVIL29iF9ZCoP2LyOHGFxo2Urvqb" –ks \
'https://10.0.1.81/api/aps/v1/general-settings/'
4
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Introduction
10
5
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Licensing
• Licenses supported
– APS-Console
– APS-Console-VM
• AEM does not support
cloud-based licenses
11
Version Compatibility
12
6
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
13
Features
• Create and manage protection groups for IPv4 and IPv6 hosts
• Assign protection groups to AED devices
• Centralized reports that aggregate data from multiple AED devices
• Configure server types and protection settings
• Manage Deny and Allow lists
• Monitor network traffic and status of the connected AED devices
• Monitor and respond to AED alerts
• Audit trail assists in monitoring system changes
• Perform profiling simultaneously across multiple AED devices
• Provides SSO for direct access to AEDs when required
14
7
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Add IP or name
of console
Add IP or name
of console
15
• Once the AED is added, AEM will import the configuration for the first time.
subsequently the configuration will be overwritten, and AEM holds the master
version
• Deny and Allow lists are NOT overwritten
• Any new changes should ONLY be performed from AEM; local AED configuration
should only be done during a failure of the console or its communication and will
be overwritten once communication is restored
16
8
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Menu Bar
17
Dashboard
• Click Dashboard in
the menu bar
• View of traffic
flowing through all
AEDs
• Active alerts
• ATLAS Threat
Categories
18
9
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Summary Page
Summary of status –
• Last AIF check
• Last Backup
• Total Devices
• System Information
Summary
• Devices with status,
uptime and version
• Audit trail
• Shows recent changes
with descriptions
• Commands performed for
both UI and CLI
• Can be exported
19
The Dashboard
Displays all traffic inspected by all AED devices in a one-hour time span
• Toggle between time ranges to narrow or expand the search
• Click on Showing to filter down traffic for specific AED devices
20
10
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Active Alerts
21
Active Alerts
Right click on the alert to connect to the AED in question to get more details about
the alert, or to suppress (ignore) the alert.
22
11
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
23
24
12
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
25
26
13
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Protection Group
Protect > Inbound Protection > Protection Groups
27
28
14
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Profile Capture
Protect > Protection Groups> Protections
29
Centralized Reporting
Reports > Configure New Report
30
15
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
31
32
16
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
Requirement
Analyzing the attacks
33
Attack Analysis
Workflow
34
17
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
35
36
18
Solutions for Managing Multiple AEDs
37
Summary
38
19
Corporate Headquarters This course material is based on
310 Little Road
Westford, MA 01886, USA
AED Release 7.2.0.0
Toll Free +1 888 357 7667
T +1 978 614 4000
Revised: 30th of October 2024
F +1 978 614 4004
www.netscout.com
Information presented in this document is subject to change without notice.
The contents of this publication may not be reproduced (in any part or as a
whole) without the permission of the publisher. Sightline is a trademark of
Copyright © 2022
NETSCOUT Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective
NETSCOUT, Inc.
All rights reserved.
owners.