UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON TRANSFORMING

THE PROCESS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA

A SINGH

2014
THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON TRANSFORMING
THE PROCESS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA

A SINGH

A thesis in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of the Doctor of
Philosophy in the School of Law,

University of KwaZulu-Natal

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR GE DEVENISH

CO-SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR K GOVENDER

College of Law & Management Studies

University of KwaZulu-Natal

December 2014
 CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is, unless specifically
indicated to the contrary in text, my own original work which has not been submitted before
in whole or in part at any other University for a degree.

SIGNED ON THIS 12th DAY OF DECEMBER 2014 AT DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA

_______________

A SINGH
 DECLARATION

I, ANNETTE SINGH declare that:

(i) The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated,
is my original research.

(ii) This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at
any university.

(iii) This thesis does not contain other person’s data, pictures, graphs or
other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced
from other persons.

(iv) This thesis does not contain other persons’ writing unless specifically
acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other
written sources have been quoted, then:
a) their words have been re-written but the general information
attributed to them has been referenced;
b) where their exact words have been used, their writing has been
placed inside quotation marks, and referenced.

(v) Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am author, co-

author or editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the
publication was actually written by myself alone and have fully
referenced such publications.

(vi) This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted
from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source
being detailed in the thesis and in the Reference sections.

Signed: …………………………………………………..
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors for their guidance and support
in enabling me to complete my PhD.

I am eternally grateful to my family for their encouragement, understanding and

patience with what at times seemed insurmountable.

I am also thankful to my Maker, without whose intervention, this journey with its
joys, trials and tribulations, would not have been possible.

During the past three years and the hundreds of hours of engaging intensely with the
rules, theories, techniques and maxims on the complex, yet fascinating subject of
Interpretation of Law, I was often bemused by the remark that:

‘Making innumerable statutes, men merely confuse what God achieved in ten.’

- Humbert Wolfe
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background

1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………...1
1.2 Research Problem and Hypothesis ............................................................... 3
1.3 Aims/Objectives ............................................................................................ 3
1.4 Background/Overview .................................................................................. 4
1.5 Chapter Breakdown .................................................................................... 15
1.6 Definition of Terms and Concepts ………………………………………...17
1.7 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………25

Chapter 2 – An Examination of the Traditional Theories of Statutory

Interpretation Applied in South African Courts

2.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………….27

2.2 The Literal Theory ...................................................................................... 30
2.3 The Contextual Theory …………………………………………………….41
2.4 The Purposive Theory ................................................................................. 47
2.5 The Teleological Theory …………………………………………………..51
2.6 The Subjective Theory or the Intention Theory .......................................... 57
2.7 The Objective Theory ................................................................................. 59
2.8 The Judicial Theory .................................................................................... 61
2.9 An Appraisal of the Theories Presented ..................................................... 63
2.10 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 66

I
Chapter 3 – The South African Constitution – Its Role, Significance and Influence
on Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation

3.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………..68

3.2 The Constitution as a Founding Document ................................................ 69

3.3 The Differences and Similarities Between Constitutional Interpretation

and Ordinary Statutory Interpretation …………………………………….75

3.4 Reading-in, Reading-down, Severance and Reading in Conformity with

the Constitution ……………………………………………………………79

3.5 An Observation about the Constitutional Remedies ………………………84

3.6 The Canon-Guided Reading Strategies ……………………………………85

3.7 Some Points to Consider in the Implementation of the Adapted Von

Savignian Model as Presented Above …………………………………….95

3.8 The Principles that Underlie Constitutional Interpretation ......................... 99

3.9 The Interpretation and Application of Section 39 ………………………..111

3.10 An Examination of the Seminal Constitutional Court Cases that

Illustrate the Emerging Jurisprudence of Transformation – Reflecting
Deontic Interpretation ……………………………………………………114

3.11 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………..125

Chapter 4 – The Relevance of the Common - Law Presumptions of Interpretation

in the Current Democratic Constitutional Era in South Africa

4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………127

4.2 The State is not Bound by its own Legislation …………………………...129

4.3 Legislation Does Not Oust or Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Courts ……135

4.4 Statutes Do Not Contain Invalid or Purposeless Provisions ……………..144

4.5 The Legislature Does Not Intend that which is Harsh, Unjust or
Unreasonable ……………………………………………………………..152

4.6 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………..158

II
Chapter 5 – The Relevance of the Canons and Maxims of Interpretation in a
System of Constitutional Democracy in SA

5.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………160

5.2 The Role of the Judge in the Realm of Judicial Law-Making ……………162

5.3 Techniques of Restrictive Interpretation ................................................... 170

5.4 Techniques of Extensive Interpretation and the Maxims Related to

Such Interpretation ……………………………………………………….177

5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 185

Chapter 6 – The Influence of International Law and Foreign Law on South African
Law

6.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………188

6.2 Comparative Law ………………………………………………………...190

6.3 A Consideration of the Features of Selected Constitutional States and

their Influence on South African Law ……………………………………194

6.4 The Position Adopted by South African Courts to International Law

before 1994 ............................................................................................... 199

6.5 The Position Adopted by South African Courts to International Law

and Foreign Law in the New Constitutional Order ................................... 202

6.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 214

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

7.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………...217

7.2 A Summary of the Observations and Findings of the Study .................... 218

7.3 The Formulation of a New Theory Involving Deontic Reasoning ........... 224

7.4 Prognosis and Conclusion ......................................................................... 228

III
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………231
Table of Cases ............................................................................................................. 238

IV
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

In reflecting on the subject of statutory interpretation, William Eskridge describes the

field as the ‘Cinderella of legal scholarship’,1 but adds further that:

‘Once scorned and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the
ballroom. Although the interpretation of statutes has been an ongoing topic
of interest since the colonial period, only since the 1980’s have American
legal academics become intensely excited about statutory interpretation as an
object of theoretical interest.’2

Although the author in his examination of the subject, refers to the state of the discipline
in the United States of America – the description quite aptly mirrors the state of the
discipline in South Africa prior to the new constitutional dispensation.3

For a good many years, the attitude to statutory interpretation was haphazard and
fragmented, and generally ‘not regarded as a subject meriting thorough research, or
serious academic exposition.’4 As the subject itself is concerned primarily with rules and
principles, it was unfortunate that during the apartheid era and particularly as a result of
the system of parliamentary sovereignty, a number of these rules and principles could be

1
Eskridge Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 1.
2
Ibid.
3
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Prolegomenon at x.
4
Bennion Statutory Interpretation xxvii.

1
easily rebutted by the legislature. The result was that a number of important libertarian
rules and principles were disregarded and relegated to a third-rate status by the courts.5

The position changed significantly with the advent of the new constitutional
dispensation, first by the Interim Constitution in 1994 and thereafter by the Final
Constitution in 19966, which heralded a new era of constitutionalism and a paradigmatic
shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy. Cameron J succinctly
summed up the impact of the Constitution in a single statement:

‘The Constitution has changed the “context” of all legal thought and
decision-making in South Africa.’7

Almost instantaneously, everything changed forever – all law and conduct, all traditions,
dogmas, perceptions, rules and procedures, and all theories, canons and maxims of
interpretation were all subject to and influenced by the Constitution.8 This essentially
encapsulates the basis of this thesis, which is poised at the crossroads of statutory
interpretation and constitutional law. It is significant for two reasons:

Firstly, it elucidates the effect of the impact of the Constitution9 on the process of
statutory interpretation;10 and

5
Botha Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 50. Botha has subsequently updated his book,
however in an earlier edition of the book, 2nd edition, he makes the point that in a system of
parliamentary sovereignty that the common-law rules and principles could be easily rebutted by
legislation.
6
In this thesis reference to the Constitution, or the ‘new’ Constitution refers to the Final
Constitution of RSA of 1996, unless otherwise indicated.
7
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W).
8
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 100.
9
While reference is made to a number of constitutional provisions, for purposes of this thesis the
following constitutional provisions, for example, section 1, section 2, section 7, section 35(2),
section 39, section 232(2) and section 172, are examined more closely. Even though reference is
made to the Constitution throughout the thesis, Chapter 3 specifically examines the principles
which underlie constitutional interpretation.
10
Reference to the ‘process of interpretation’ involves an examination of case-law as a result of the
impact of section 39 on the various rules, canons and maxims of interpretation.

2
Secondly, it attempts through judicial precedents to establish how the Constitution has
transformed the theory and methodology of statutory interpretation in South Africa.11

1.2 Research Problem and Hypothesis

The Research Problem may be stated as follows:

 Whether the Constitution, and in particular section 39, has

transformed the process of interpretation and if so how has this
influenced statutory interpretation in South Africa?

As a Hypothesis therefore, this would translate into:

 The Constitution has transformed the process of statutory

interpretation in South Africa and there has been an emerging
jurisprudence that mandates a new methodology. This therefore
requires a new theory for statutory interpretation in the era of
constitutionalism.

The above hypothesis necessitates a careful consideration of the aims and objectives set
out below.

1.3 Aims/Objectives

(i) To establish what are the commonly accepted theories of statutory

interpretation, that have been used by South African courts, and that
have underpinned judicial reasoning in South Africa in the past.
(ii) To examine the relevant constitutional provisions, and in particular
section 39, to determine how the application thereof has transformed the
approach to statutory interpretation and the way legislation is interpreted
in contemporary South Africa.

11
From an examination of relevant case-law, the emerging jurisprudence in the current
constitutional era is analysed, to ascertain if there are notable key features that can be identified.

3
 (iii) To examine the influence of the Constitution on the rules, canons,
maxims and presumptions of interpretation – in order to assess their
relevance and significance in the democratic constitutional era.
(iv) To determine how international law and foreign law are applied, and
why they have to be considered in the process of interpretation.
(v) To evaluate the emerging jurisprudence in contemporary South Africa
from an examination of judicial precedents, in order to determine
whether the traditional theories of interpretation are adequate.
(vi) To propose and explain a ‘new’ theory of interpretation, with its own
particular modus operandi – for a transformative South African legal
system.

1.4 Background/Overview

In order to understand the relevance of the research undertaken, it is necessary to trace

the development of the field of statutory interpretation in South Africa. An examination
of some of the ideas of jurists and leading experts, and their contributions to the field of
statutory interpretation-are presented.

Cross defines statutory interpretation as the ‘process by which the courts determine the
meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to the situation before
them.’12 The interpretative process as articulated is therefore two-fold:

(i) Firstly, it involves the determination of meaning, which is a cognitive

function (this is an act of recognition or discovery); and
(ii) Secondly, the application of the meaning to a particular factual situation,
which is a judicially creative function.13

12
Cross Statutory Interpretation at 40. Cross in referring to Gray’s definition of interpretation,
submits that Gray’s definition calls for some revision. The definition according to Gray is as
follows: ‘the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who has
occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from the words of a statute- book a
meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to
it.’

4
According to Devenish, the subject involves a ‘kindred triology of phenomena’:14

(i) Firstly, it is concerned with linguistics, which in turn concerns itself

with semantics, syntax and the rules of logic;
(ii) Secondly, it involves not only statute law, but also the common law; and
(iii) Finally it is inextricably intertwined with jurisprudence or the
philosophy of law.15

While from the above definition of the subject, one might gain the impression that the
interpretation of statutes is concerned mainly with rules and procedures, Devenish
hastens to add ‘that the interpretation of statutes is not merely a technical procedure but
also involves a psychological and imaginative procedure using value judgments.’16

De Ville submits that in order to understand something, we first have to interpret it. He
is emphatic that ‘no understanding is possible without interpretation.’17 Texts do not
have a meaning in and of themselves. They only have a meaning in and through the act
of interpretation.18 Understanding is therefore described as a temporary moment when
the interpreter decides on the meaning of the text.19 It is interesting that De Ville makes
the point that interpretation is therefore a ‘conversation between the current perspective
of the interpreter and the textual and historical perspective of the statute.’20 The

13
Dickerson The Interpretation and Application of Statutes at 21-22.
14
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 2.
15
Cowen ‘Prologemenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation’
(1976)Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 136 contends that ‘the interpretation of statutes
finds a place in the books on general jurisprudence because it raises basic questions concerning
the nature of the judicial process and the relation between the legislature and the judiciary.’
(Emphasis Added)
16
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 2. Devenish’s reference to value-judgments cannot be
more relevant than in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, which requires one to consider
the ‘values’ that underlie an open and democratic society.
17
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 3.
18
Ibid at 4. See also Du Plessis Re-Interpretation at 116. Du Plessis shares De Ville’s sentiment
and makes the point that the purpose or object cannot be known prior to interpretation, but has to
be established through interpretation. (Emphasis Added)
19
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 4.
20
Ibid.

5
underlying argument therefore is that every understanding is preceded by ‘pre-
understanding.’21 Gadamer, whose scholarly works have dominated the field of
hermeneutics,22 refers to this pre-understanding as ‘prejudices’23 or ‘biases’, as a result
of being situated in a communal tradition or interpretive community.24As a result of
being inextricably situated in a historical and linguistic reality shapes our experience of
the world. In other words, when we interpret a text, we are already influenced by our
culture and legal tradition.25

The following key elements form the gravamen of De Ville’s argument:

(i) no text has a meaning of its own or can be understood without

interpretation;
(ii) the interpretation is always situated within a community of interpreters;
(iii) legal tradition is contingent and therefore subject to change;
(iv) prejudices (including the methods of interpretation) should be critically
reflected on;
(v) the context – including the social, political and economic context and
context of the case at hand – are important for understanding, as
understanding cannot take place in the abstract; and

21
Ibid. De Ville supports his statement with the idea that: ‘when we interpret a text we are already
influenced by (a specific understanding of) our culture and legal tradition.’
22
‘Hermeneutics’ is derived from the Greek word hermeneuein which means ‘to interpret.’
Hermeneuein is in turn derived from the name Hermes, the messenger god of ancient Greece,
who had to explain the messages of the Gods to the mortals of earth. Hermeneutics is therefore a
very old discipline, used by the Greeks. Aristotle addressed the science of interpretation in his
discourses. Throughout history, it became an important and useful tool in both Christian theology
and jurisprudence. Biblical hermeneutics (scriptural exegesis) and legal hermeneutics
(interpretation of statutes) developed as separate fields, although they had a great deal in
common, since both had very strong normative characteristics. See discussion in Botha Statutory
Interpretation (5th edition) at 83-84.
23
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 4.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.

6
 (vi) interpretation is a conversation or dialogue between the interpreter and
the text.26

According to Baxter, the science of hermeneutics is concerned with the understanding

and explanation, but more specifically it deals with the interpretation of texts, in order to
reveal their meaning. He describes contemporary hermeneutics as a synthesis of ideas
which have their origins in cognate disciplines such as the philosophy of language,
linguistic philosophy, structuralism and semiology.27 The science of hermeneutics makes
it clear that words, phrases and sentences – and even texts – can never have intrinsic
meanings, since in the process of interpretation the context of the language and the
persons involved are always relevant.28 However, what must be emphasized is that
hermeneutics is not merely a technical discipline, but is essentially concerned with
values.29 The fact is that the science of understanding is not a mechanical exercise, but
one that involves value judgments, applied by the interpreter during the interpretation
process.30Baxter points out that an understanding of the science of hermeneutics and the
insights provided by the hermeneutic tradition are ‘of profound importance for an
understanding of the process of interpretation.’31 Nevertheless, Du Plessis explains the
relevance of hermeneutics for interpretation of legislation – by drawing an analogy to a
circle, or, more accurately, a ‘hermeneutic circle,’32where:

26
Ibid at 7-8.
27
Baxter Administrative Law at 315-316.
28
Goodrich Reading the Law 135.
29
Ibid at 144.
30
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 85. The value judgments that are referred to also
find expression in section 39, which contains a mandate that judges must promote the values that
underlie a democracy. Judges are therefore under a moral obligation to ensure that interpretation
is in keeping with constitutional values.
31
Baxter Administrative Law at 318.
32
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 85.

7
 ‘…every part of a text must be understood in terms of the whole, and in turn,
the whole in terms of its parts. This is a continuous process during which
both the whole and the parts are progressively explained.’33

While the contributions made by various authors are by no means an exhaustive

examination of the subject of statutory interpretation, they are nevertheless presented
here as a starting point of the discussion. What is evident from an analysis of these views
and submissions, is that the process of interpretation requires that the interpreter engage
with the text. A text cannot be understood without according meaning to the words and
the language that is used.34 Therefore the process of interpretation is intricately linked to
words and language. Language, in other words, is a medium through which meaning is
communicated.35

The very nature of words and language is, however, problematic. Even though words
may be regarded as ‘symbols of meaning’, they cannot attain quantitative precision, as is
the case with mathematical symbols.36 It is also difficult to express ideas in words with
complete accuracy. Furthermore, the more complex the idea, the greater the difficulty.37
This problem appears to be compounded with the drafting of statutes.38 It is often found

33
Ibid. The idea encapsulated in the quotation is in keeping with that of ‘holism.’ Holism in general
terms (whether in science, sociology, economics, linguistics or philosophy), is the idea that all the
properties of a given system cannot be determined or explained by its component parts alone, but
the system as a whole determines in an important way how the parts behave. Semantic Holism is
a doctrine in the Philosophy of Language to the effect that a certain part of language (for
examples, a term or a complete sentence) can only be understood through its relations to a
(previously understood) larger segment of language. http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch-
holism. html (Accessed on October 2013)
34
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 3-4.
35
Ibid at 8.
36
See discussion in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 2-3.
37
Ibid at 3-4. See also Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910 at 913: ‘… [N]o matter how carefully words are
chosen there is a difficulty in selecting language which, while on the face of it expressing
generally the idea of the framer of the measure, will not, when applied under certain
circumstances go beyond it, and when applied under other circumstances fall short of it.’
38
Staksy Legislative Analysis and Drafting (2nd edition) at 14-15. ‘In short, whether statutory
language is broad or precise, the courts can rarely, if ever, be reduced to a mechanical role…
Further complicating the picture is the nature of the legislative process itself. Most legislatures

8
that even when statutes are drafted with meticulous legal and linguistic insight, there
will always be situations that the draftsman could not have anticipated – and for which
the statute does not make provision.39

Prior to the new democratic dispensation, the most pervasive theory of interpretation in
South Africa was the literal theory, or that which Botha refers to as the ‘orthodox text-
based approach.’40 In terms of this theory, the interpreter focused primarily on the literal
meaning of the provision. Basically, therefore, the methodology or the modus operandi
was applied as follows – if the meaning of the text was clear, that was the meaning to be
used, irrespective of the consequences.41It was rather unfortunate, that over a period of
time, that the courts began to regard the clear, literal meaning of the words as being
identical to what the legislature intended.42 As a result, only ‘lip-service’ was paid to the
principle of legislative intent, because courts automatically equated the so-called ‘clear
and unambiguous meaning of the words’ to the ‘intention of the legislature.’43

Since the intention of the legislature was to be deduced from the words that were used, it
was not surprising that most scholars were critical of the judiciary during apartheid.
Cameron J’s most vehement criticism of the role of judges during apartheid was that due
to the fact that judges were constrained to apply the law, this often provided them with

consist of hundreds of elected officials who operate in a highly political environment. It is not
uncommon for legislation to be passed in a crisis atmosphere where few legislators have the time,
interest, or expertise to read and understand everything that they are voting for. Hence, there is no
such thing as a collective legislative mind which has a readily identifiable intent accompanying
every statute that is passed.’
39
Bell and Engle Cross Statutory Interpretation at 2-3.
40
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 91.
41
Ibid at 93.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid. See also Phillips Lawyers Language – How and Why Legal Language is Different at 107-
108, where it is expounded that: ‘The phrase “intention of Parliament,” is not in itself clear cut.
The initial complication is that the actual author, the legislature, is collective. In the case of
legislation, as with deed, intention is equated with consensus. Therefore it is to be sought in the
words which issue forth and not in the statements of individuals. The exclusion of the legislative
history conforms to the logic of collective intention. Once “intention of Parliament” becomes
“legislative intention,” or “intent” or “import,” a subtle charge of significance takes place. The
site of the intention then switches from the actual to the hypothetical author.’

9
the opportunity not only to criticize the proliferation of policies and legislation that were
reflective of the apartheid regime, but they were quite well poised to curtail these laws
and policies as well. He therefore submits that not only judges but all lawyers who
participated in the apartheid system ‘legitimated’ it. He is therefore quite emphatic that
all lawyers and judges irrespective of their personal beliefs and extent of their
participation were complicit during apartheid.44 David Dyzenhaus in his analysis of the
contentious subject, comments quite perceptively, that where there was an attempt to
mount the challenge to oppose the government’s unpalatable and abhorrent apartheid
legislation, it was often argued before courts by lawyers that judges should read statutes
in light of the common-law presumptions.45 In the absence of a Bill of Rights during
apartheid, the common-law presumptions which were based on what was fair and just
could have easily operated as a surrogate for the Bill of Rights, to protect individual
rights and liberty. Unfortunately however this did not materialize as one would have
envisaged.46 Cora Hoexter, a strong proponent for transformation of the judiciary notes
that the problem was further compounded by the fact that South Africa’s highest court
was for the most part ‘stocked’ with a small minority of judges who were all white and
who subscribed to the policies of the prevailing National Party government. In limited
instances when matters could actually be challenged and taken up on review on grounds
of bad faith, bias and irrationality, almost inevitably the decisions of the lower court
judges were overruled by the Appellate Division.47 Apart from Edwin Cameron, David

44
Cameron ‘Submission on the role of the Judiciary Under Apartheid’ (1998) South African Law
Journal at 436. Cameron justifies his submission that such lawyers were not only lawyers who
supported apartheid and acted for government, but also those lawyers who considered themselves
‘politically neutral’ and who pursued their commercial and other activities under the apartheid
framework.
45
Dyzenhaus ‘The Pasts and Future of the Rule of Law in South Africa’ (2008) 124 South African
Law Journal at 734.
46
The Role of Presumptions is examined more fully in Chapter 4.
47
Hoexter ‘The Principle of Legality in South African Administrative Law’ (2004) Macquarie Law
Journal at 165. Due to the limitation inherent in the literal theory or with the enquiry for the so-
called ‘intention of the legislature’, courts were bound by the ordinary grammatical meaning of
the word. Courts were therefore restricted to the limited grounds of review as provided for in
terms of legislation which included bad faith, bias and irrationality. Theses grounds could not be
extended under any circumstances. The literal theory must be compared to the purposive theory
which focuses on the purpose for the promulgation of the Act. A purposive methodology is more

10
Dyzenhaus and Cora Hoexter, John Dugard and Hugh Corder, were also ‘unflattering’
on the tendency of judges to only refer to the so-called ‘will’ or ‘intention of the
legislature’ – particularly in respect of harsh, unjust apartheid laws.48 However, it was
only with the advent of the new democratic constitutional dispensation, and in particular
section 39, that there was an upsurge in interest in the role of the judiciary in the process
of interpretation.

In terms of section 39 – the interpretation provision in the Constitution – it is provided:

(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum

(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.

(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.

What is manifest from examination of section 39, is the unmistakable directive that
courts and judges in ‘promoting the values that underlie an open and democratic society’
–to assume a far more creative role in the interpretation process.49 There has been a
paradigmatic shift in emphasis from the literal approach with its focus merely on words,
to a more purposive or teleological mode of interpretation, resulting in an emphasis on
those seminal values suited to a constitutional democracy.

suited to advance the aims of a transformative constitutional system. An in-depth analysis of the
Theories of Interpretation is dealt with in Chapter 2.
48
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Prolegmenon at xi. See also Dugard ‘Courts and the
Poor in South Africa: A Critique of Systematic Judicial Failures to Advance Transformative
Justice’ (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights at 214
49
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 160-161.

11
There have been a number of academics who have been instrumental in transforming the
notion of purposive interpretation to that of teleological interpretation.50 Etienne
Mureinik promoted a value-coherent interpretation as one that aspires to the higher
ethical coherence of a common law legal system as a whole.51 Devenish has argued
emphatically in favour of a value-laden teleological approach to statutory
interpretation.52 Christo Botha expounded the merit of a teleological approach to
interpretation in the new constitutional era.53

While the transition and shift in emphasis from the literal approach to a more purposive
methodology has occurred, it nevertheless still begs the question as to whether the
teleological theory is the most appropriate in the current constitutional order in South
Africa. From an examination of the field of statutory interpretation – through the eyes of
scholarly experts on the subject – what emerges is that ‘the approach of the courts varies
according to the judges’ perception of their constitutional role at any given period.’54
This perception undoubtedly influences the theory of interpretation that gains dominance
in a particular legal system.55 What is expected of judges in the current constitutional
order, is that they should engage in a moral evaluation of the legislative text. Lord
Denning declared that judges should actually believe that they are involved in a moral
activity.56 It is therefore postulated that the most appropriate theory in interpretation in
the South African context, is one that incorporates ethical and moral considerations in
the process of reasoning. Such a theory would be deontic in nature and therefore
referred to as the deontic theory.

50
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Prolegomenon at xii.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 23.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid at 10.

12
Law as a social science is a discourse that is infused with value judgments.57 Such a
value-coherent approach is specifically mandated by the Constitution and in particular
section 39(2), which requires that in the process of interpretation that one has to consider
the values that underlie an open and democratic society. Legal reasoning does not only
involve purely rational arguments but also an evaluation of conflicting ethical interests
and the making of value judgments.58

In actual fact, a solution to a particular legal problem will require both inductive and
deductive reasoning.59 However, because legal reasoning requires a more complex and
specialized reasoning than reasoning in general, legal reasoning in its entirety is not
reducible to merely a species of inductive and deductive reasoning, but is in fact a
synthesis of inter alia, inductive, deductive, deontic logic which involves moral and
ethical principles.60 The elements identified above which include ethics and morality
form the basis of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. It is therefore

57
Black The Behaviour of Law at 3-4.
58
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 265-266, for that which comprises reasoning. In
quoting Greenwood, he describes ‘reasoning as a process which is one of a passing from certain
propositions already known or assumed to be true… and that all forms of reasoning are reducible
to one or the other of the two fundamental processes of reasoning, namely deduction and
induction.’
59
Ibid at 266. Deductive reasoning – A syllogism is an example of deductive reasoning. In
deductive reasoning, the conclusion must follow from the premises, as a matter of logical
necessity. If one accepts the premises, then one must accept the conclusion, as a logical follow-
up or consequence as a result of accepting the premises. So for example, to use the syllogism
that: All men are mortal – major premise. Socrates is a man – minor premise. Therefore it can be
inferred deductively that :Socrates is mortal - conclusion
In applying the syllogism to a legal problem, means that the legal rule is the major premise and
the determination of the facts is a minor premise. A legal consequence can therefore be inferred
deductively from the major and minor premise.
Inductive Reasoning – In a broader sense, it encompasses all kinds of reasoning in which the
premises support but do not compel the result or conclusion. An apt illustration or example of
such inductive reasoning is proffered by Morris about the eighteenth-century physician Edward
Jenner who discovered the cure for smallpox. Jenner found that while nearly all milkmaids
contracted cowpox, they very seldom were affected by smallpox, as they were apparently
immune to the smallpox germ. As a result of this finding and by applying inductive reasoning, he
proceeded to develop and find a vaccine for smallpox.
Likewise a lawyer will have to examine a number of cases, before he can arrive at a finding,
based on the major premise which underlies all the cases examined. This form of reasoning and
analysis is referred to as inductive reasoning.
60
Ibid at 276. See also Gottlieb The Logic of Choice at 32.

13
maintained that the most appropriate theory of interpretation for the current
constitutional order, is one that:

 involves deductive and inductive legal reasoning;

 encapsulates ethics and morality; and
 is applied in a pro-active manner.

It is therefore submitted that a theory of interpretation that incorporates all of the above
elements, would be most suited to achieve social and economic justice in South Africa.

An exemplary precedent of the pro-active approach is found in the recent Constitutional

Court decision of the MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary
School.61 While the case essentially revolved around the admission of a Grade 1 learner,
the issue that the court had to decide on, was who had the ultimate authority to decide on
matters of capacity of public schools- is it the School Governing Body, the officials
from the Provincial Department of Education or should the dispute in actual fact be
resolved by a combination of the two, working in co-operation with each other?

The Constitutional Court held that although in terms of the Schools Act,62 the School
Governing Body may determine the capacity of the school as an important part of the
admission policy, the Department always has ultimate control over the implementation.
The position maintained by the court was clear that in casu, the parties were required to
uphold the principles of co-operative government, to attempt to resolve the dispute so as
to avoid litigation, in terms of section 40(2)63and section 41(1)(h)(vi)64of the
Constitution. The court therefore emphasized that ‘co-operation’ is pivotal to resolving
disputes between the school Governing Body and the Department – and in matters of a

61
2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC).
62
84 of 1996.
63
Section 40(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘All spheres of government must observe and adhere
to the principles of this chapter.’
64
Section 41(1) (h) (vi) of the Constitution provides: ‘All spheres of government …must co-operate
in mutual trust and good faith by, avoiding legal proceedings…’ (Emphasis Added)

14
similar nature that the parties are urged to ‘co-operate’ in an attempt to resolve the
matter, to avoid litigation.

While the minority judgment is based on a minimalistic approach,65 the majority on the
other hand, in giving expression to section 39(2), maintained a more innovative and
undoubtedly a more pro-active position on the matter.66

It is therefore submitted that a close examination of the field of statutory interpretation

has revealed that the most workable theory of interpretation in the democratic era, is a
theory which has its genesis in section 39, is based on deontic reasoning, with particular
emphasis on ethical and moral considerations, and which must be applied pro-actively.
The proposed deontic theory of interpretation and the modus operandi that underpins its
application, is a theme that pervades the thesis. From an examination of seminal case-
law, exactly how the proposed deontic theory of interpretation would apply with regard
to the rules of interpretation, the canons, the maxims and the presumptions of
interpretation, will be explored.

1.5 Chapter Breakdown

The thesis is structured so that each identified important aspect of statutory

interpretation, is dealt with in seriatim in the respective chapters.

Chapter 1 – is the basic introduction. It provides an overview of the field of statutory

interpretation in South Africa and the motivation for undertaking the research.

Chapter 2 – interrogates the commonly accepted theories of statutory interpretation.

Each of the theories is critically examined to determine their significance and to assess

65
See Woolman The Selfless Constitution – Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of
South Africa’s Basic Law at 580-581, for a discussion on Minimalism vs Judicious Avoidance. A
pro-active approach must be contrasted to a minimalistic approach. While pro-active reasoning,
would enable a court to make a decision for the future, a minimalist court because it seeks to
decide on cases on narrow grounds, would settle a case, but would leave many things undecided.
66
In giving expression to section 39 (2), of the Constitution, the court had applied a ‘value-based’
approach. The Rivonia Primary School case, as well as other relevant cases will be examined in
more detail in subsequent chapters to shed light on the meaning of pro-activism.

15
how much emphasis courts have placed on them in the process of statutory
interpretation.

Chapter 3 – focuses on the Constitution. As suggested by the title, the Constitution is the
basis of the thesis. For this reason, the various aspects of the Constitution, which include
(but are not restricted to) an understanding of the concept of constitutionalism, a
comparison of constitutional law and ordinary statutory law, as well as the relevant
statutory provisions – are fully examined. This is to determine firstly, the extent of the
influence of the Constitution and secondly, to assess how it has transformed the process
of interpretation in South Africa.

Chapter 4 – has at its core the common-law presumptions of interpretation. As it is

submitted that a detailed examination of all the common-law presumptions is not
necessary for purposes of the research, only a selected number of the common-law
presumptions are discussed. In keeping with the approach adopted with regard to the
examination of other aspects of interpretation, the chapter essentially seeks to establish
the significance of the common-law generally, as outlined in section 39, and specifically
in relation to the operation of the presumptions.

Chapter 5 – examines the more popular canons and maxims of interpretations. From an
examination of judicial precedents, the relevance and significance of the canons and
maxims in the current constitutional era are highlighted.

Chapter 6 – emphasizes the importance of international law and foreign law in the
process of interpretation. Because there is a constitutional imperative in terms of section
39 (2) – that international law and foreign law have to be considered in the process of
interpretation – this has changed the way legislation is interpreted in South Africa.

Chapter 7 – from a detailed examination of the various aspects of statutory

interpretation, as outlined above, the thesis supports the hypothesis that the Constitution
has transformed the process of interpretation and has resulted in a jurisprudence that

16
requires a ‘new’ theory of interpretation. The proposed theory is referred to as a deontic
theory of interpretation.

1.6 Definition of Terms and Concepts

The terms and concepts that form part of the glossary are intended to provide clarity on
their meaning and to emphasize their significance to the research.

1.6.1 Theory

A theory is defined as a set of reasoned ideas to explain facts or events.67 The theories of
interpretation are both explanatory and justificatory at the same time.68 While the
theories of interpretation are also referred to as theoretical or interpretive approaches, or
theoretical schools of thought, the most commonly accepted term used by authors, is the
word ‘theory’.69

Generally, South African courts have favoured the more traditional theories of
interpretation, with the emphasis and preference prior to the new democratic
constitutional dispensation being on the literal theory or the text-based approach, and
with a shift in preference subsequent to the Constitution to the purposive theory which
requires a value-orientated approach.70 It has been argued, however, that subsequent to
the Constitution, the teleological theory or value-based method of interpretation with its
emphasis on values, has been regarded as the most legitimate theory of choice amongst
judicial officers.71 Nevertheless, apart from the traditional theories, a number of modern

67
The definition of the word ‘theory’ is indicated as per the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
(4th edition) at 1330.
68
See Chapter 2, for a closer examination of the various theories of interpretation.
69
Authors generally prefer the use of the word ‘theory.’ See Botha Statutory Interpretation at 91,
and Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 25.
70
A more detailed examination of the traditional theories of interpretation and their modus
operandi is found in Chapter 2.
71
The following cases illustrate an application of the teleological theory of interpretation: Qozeleni
v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) BCLR 735 CC; Baloro v University of

17
theoretical schools or post-modern theories have emerged that examine the law together
with other disciplines – for example, economics, political science, linguistics, and
philosophy. These theoretical schools of thought must be understood in the spirit of
post-modernism72 and a rejection of a meta-narrative or an all encompassing narrative.

Post-modernism is not a school of thought, but rather an intellectual style, a condition or

a spirit of the times. Post-modernism accepts that everything is relative, and in the
process it welcomes problems, paradoxes and contradictions. In terms of it’s application
therefore, it defies a complete definition, because post-modernism rejects preconceived
ideas, definitions and categories.73

This therefore raises the question on what forms the theoretical basis of a deontic theory
– which is postulated as a ‘new’ perspective for understanding statutory interpretation.
The ensuing discussion will attempt to address these concerns.

1.6.2 Deontic Theory

Deontology is broadly defined as the ‘science of duty or moral obligation.’74 The word
deontology has its roots in the Greek word deon, which means science. Thus deontology
is the ‘science of duty.’ Key questions which deontological ethical systems ask include:

 What is my moral duty?

 What are my moral obligations?
 How do I weigh one moral duty against another?75

Bophuthatswana 1995 8 BCLR 1018(CC) and Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen

Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC).
72
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 87.
73
Ibid. Postmodernism is described as a late 20th century style and content in the arts, architecture,
and criticism which represents a departure from modernism and is characterized by the self-
conscious use of earlier styles and conventions, a mixing of different artistic styles and media,
and a general distrust of theories. See definition –
http://www:oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/postmodernism (Accessed on October
2014)
74
See definition of ‘deontology’ as per Shorters Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edition) at 482-483.

18
The modern development of deontic logic was first initiated in the early 1950’s by GH
van Wright who coined the term based on the Greek Seov, meaning – ‘as it should be’ or
‘duly’.76 Deontic logic is the logic of normative concepts which includes morality and
ethics. Its major application outside of ethics has been to the philosophy of law.77

Due to the fact that law is dynamic in nature and is infused with the value judgments,78
it is particularly relevant in the current constitutional order. Horovitz, therefore in
looking at the inter-relationship between law, theory, deontic and inductive logic
provides that:

‘Because law is socially directive and co-ordinate, it is dependent upon

theoretical psycho-sociology and calls for a deontic and inductive logic.’79

However, Devenish asserts that legal reasoning in its entirety is not reducible to merely a
species of inductive and deductive reasoning, but is in fact a synthesis of inter alia
deductive, inductive, and deontic logic – which involves moral and ethical
principles.80He submits further, in agreement with Gottlieb, that the operation of this
kind of reasoning in relation to law and the interpretation of statutes, is essentially ‘to
tell sound arguments from unsound ones…’.81

The task and role of a judge as an interpreter and adjudicator finds expression in the
words of the judicial oath – that they have to:

‘administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice’82

75
http://atheism.about.com/od/ethicalsystem/a/Deontological.htm (Accessed on August 2013)
76
Lee, Nguyen and Pagnoni ‘Securing Uniqueness of Rights e-Documents: A Deontic Process
Perspective’ (2008) 3 Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronics Commerce Research at 19.
77
Ibid at 4.
78
Black The Behaviour of Law at3-4.
79
Horovitz Law and Logic at 1.
80
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 278.
81
Gottlieb The Logic of Choice at 31.
82
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 10.

19
Lord Denning observes that as far as the interpretive function of the judiciary is
concerned, in respect of the judicial oath, judges should assume the position that they are
engaged in a moral activity.83 It is submitted that Denning’s view about the role of the
judiciary and the application of the law, forms an important component of a deontic
theory, which is proposed as the ‘new’ theory of interpretation in the current
constitutional order. A value-based theory of interpretation – the teleological theory of
interpretation – has been most favourably received in the era of constitutional
democracy, and highlights the ‘values’ that are required in an open and democratic
society,84while the proposed deontic theory takes heed of the conceptual inadequacy of
the teleological theory and reinforces the directive that in the process of interpretation,
judges are to engage in an ethical and moral evaluation.

1.6.3 Method/Methodology

A method is defined as a way of doing.85 While the theories and theoretical approaches,
as discussed above, may be regarded as being synonymous, the method or the
methodology – as a result of applying a particular theory – may also be described as the
way one would go about applying a theory. This also can be referred to as the modus
operandi – which basically describes the way in which a thing, in this case a theory,
operates.86

In effect the method is influenced by the theory. To explain further – a literal theory
would result in a qualified contextual or text-based methodology.87 The modus operandi

83
Ibid.
84
In terms of section 39 (2) of the Constitution, it is mandated that the process of interpretation is
consistent with a ‘value-coherent’ approach to interpretation.
85
See definition as per the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (4th edition) at 780.
86
Ibid at 799.
87
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 92-93.

20
or method to be followed in applying the literal theory, proceeds along the following
lines:88

(i) The primary rule of interpretation, is that if the meaning of the text is
clear, the plain meaning should be applied;
(ii) If the ‘plain meaning’ of the words is ambiguous, vague or misleading,
the wider context or surrounding circumstances are considered, giving
rise to the mischief rule.
(iii) If a strict literal interpretation would result in absurd results, then the
court may deviate from the literal meaning to avoid such an absurdity.
This is known as the golden rule of interpretation.
(iv) The court will then turn to the so-called ‘secondary aids’89 to
interpretation, in order to find the intention of the legislature; and
(v) Only when the ‘secondary aids’ to interpretation prove insufficient to
ascertain intention, will the courts have recourse to the so-called
‘tertiary aids’90 to construction.

A purposive or a teleological theory, on the other hand, requires a text-in-context or an

unqualified contextual methodology.91 As the text-in-context approach provides that the
purpose or object of the legislation is the prevailing factor in interpretation, the modus
operandi therefore requires a search for the purpose of legislation – which recognizes
the contextual framework of the legislation right from the outset even when the text is
clear and not only in cases where a literal or text-based approach has failed.92 Likewise,
in applying the proposed deontic theory, as postulated above, it would be necessary to
follow a method or modus operandi that is unique to the theory as presented. The basis

88
Ibid at 91-92.
89
The secondary aids to interpretation include for example, the long title, the short title, headings,
marginal notes, the preamble, sections, sub-sections, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs.
90
Tertiary aids refers to the common law presumptions of interpretation.
91
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 97.
92
Ibid at 97-98.

21
of the method of application of a deontic theory is an ‘eclectic method’ or eclecticism.
Exactly what an ‘eclectic method’ or ‘eclecticism’ entails is discussed more fully below.

1.6.4 Eclecticism

In earlier decades of behavioural sciences, there was a tendency in many disciplines to

identify with only one theoretical position. However, as various theories appeared to
come into competition with one another, many behavioural scientists became more and
more uncomfortable about the idea of simply ‘allying themselves with a single
perspective’93 as an exhaustive theory. The tendency in recent years, therefore, has seen
substantial support for the idea of refraining to endorse only one theory as correct, or
even as the best theory of human behaviour. The procedure that developed in response
thereto was to ‘select in all what appears to be true and good and consequently
everlasting.’ Such a school of thought has been described as eclecticism.94 It is felt that
the optimal ‘strategy’ for understanding human behaviour is to borrow ideas or
constructs from all reputable theories.95To illustrate further, by way of example:

In attempting to explain love, or interpersonal attraction, a psychologist might say that

psychodynamic theory explains some phenomena of attraction, because people do have
a strong sexual instinct that they have to gratify. He/she might also believe that people
are sometimes conditioned by reinforcements to be attracted to some people and not to
others. Further, the psychologist might believe that some, but not all conditioning,
occurs automatically, and that sometimes cognitive processes intervene to determine just
how stimuli and information produce attraction responses. Finally, the same
psychologist might believe that people are also motivated in their loving and attraction
by a need or desire for self-actualisation.96

93
Slife and Williams What’s behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the
Behavioral Sciences at 45.
94
Kelley ‘Eclecticism and the History of Ideas’ (2001) 62 Journal of the History of Ideas at 577.
95
Slife and Williams What’s behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the
Behavioral Sciences at 45.
96
Ibid at 46.

22
What we find is that all of the above-mentioned theories may seem to be in operation at
the same time (or in particular persons in particular situations).This approach is referred
to as eclectic.97 Due to the fact that eclecticism allows one to find value or merit in all
theories, as alluded to, and therefore to embrace all the positions (or parts of them), it is
not surprising that eclecticism has been described as a sort of ‘higher plagiarism.’98
What is suggested for its application therefore is an enlightened eclecticism, which
requires that all schools borrow from them what they possess of the true and neglect
what in them is false.99 An eclectic theory however is not new as the counter-narrative
indicates.100 It has been here all along, however it is only over the past few decades that
there has been an increase in its popularity and use.101

With regard to the proposed deontic theory, it is suggested that an eclectic method or
approach would best suit the modus operandi. In terms of its application, therefore, one
would initially start the process with the literal approach, and an examination of the text

97
The word ‘eclectic’ means that which is composed of elements drawn from various sources.
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/eclectic ‘Eclecticism’, also referred to
above, is a conceptual approach that does not hold rigidly to a single paradigm or set of
assumptions, but instead draws upon multiple theories, styles or ideas to gain complementary
insights into a subject, or applies different theories in particular cases. Eclecticism was first
recorded to have been practiced by a group of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers who
attached themselves to no real system, but selected from existing philosophical beliefs whose
doctrines seemed most reasonable to them. Out of this collected material, they constructed their
new system of philosophy. http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Electicism (Accessed on August 2013)
98
Kelley ‘Eclecticism and the History of Ideas’ (2001) 62 Journal of the History of Ideas at 579-
580. The locus classicus of eclecticism was provided by the second century doxographer,
Diogenes Laertius, whose unreflective and gossip-ridden Lives and Opinions of Imminent
Philosophers defined an intellectual cannon which came to be known as the history of
philosophy. Eclecticism became especially entangled in religious thought. The strength of
eclecticism was that it tried to accommodate the entire agenda; its weakness was its less-than-
critical faith that these goals were in keeping with reason, the new science, and Christian religion.
99
Ibid.
100
Lake ‘Theory is dead, long live theory: The End of the Great Debates and the rise of Eclecticism
in International Relations’ (2014) European Journal of Human Relations at 572. Lake states that
an eclectic theory is the source of some of the most progressive research in our discipline. It
represents the future of international relations- not a new future, since it already has a long
history, but the future nonetheless.
101
Slife and Williams What’s behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the
Behavioral Sciences at 46. One of the reasons that the authors suggest for the popularity in the
eclectic approach, is because eclecticism allows one to believe in all the positions (or embrace
parts of them) and thus not run the risk of missing some truth or value they may have.

23
to ascertain the ipsissima verba, or the exact meaning of the words that are used. The
process would thereafter require an examination of the context or the background, which
is reflective of the contextual theory. Nevertheless, the process should always seek to
find the purpose of the legislation. This is the prevailing factor and is central to the
purposive theory. Next it is necessary to determine whether interpretation is compatible
with the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, which is compliant with
teleological theory. The process however does not end here. The proposed deontic
theory for interpretation incorporates reasoning that is ethical and moral in nature, and in
the words of the preamble to the Constitution:

‘ heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights… to improve the quality
of life of all citizens…’102

What is pivotal to the operation of the proposed theory, is that it has to be applied pro-
actively, mindful of the above considerations, so as to achieve social transformation. A
pro-active approach must be compared to a minimalistic approach adopted by courts.
While pro-active reasoning, would result in an outcome or decision which would be
more favourable to what is to be decided for the future, a minimalist court, because it
seeks to decide cases on narrow grounds and aims to settle the case before it, leaves
many issues undecided.103 Therefore a pro-active approach is advocated for application
in a transformative democratic state.

The amalgamation of the theoretical positions as indicated above, is clearly an

illustration of the eclectic approach that is used and applied in a number of other
disciplines. The reason for the choice of an eclectic approach as an interpretive strategy
of the proposed deontic theory is based largely on the idea that no single formula can

102
Reference to the Preamble of the Constitution.
103
Woolman The Selfless Constitution – Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of South
Africa’s Basic Law at 28-30.

24
capture everything.104 The eclectic method is therefore ‘borrowed’ from contemporary
behavioural science and adapted as a model for statutory interpretation. It is presented
as a strategy to provide an explanation for the operation of the proposed deontic theory.

1.7 Conclusion

Du Plessis states resoundingly, that:

‘The Constitution determines and shapes statutory interpretation in an all-

pervading manner.’105

Chapter 1 conceptualises exactly what this means in a democratic constitutional era in

South Africa. The background sets the scene, and basically describes the essence of
statutory interpretation, and how the process differed prior to and subsequent to the
Constitution. The chapter also highlights the motivation for the study and articulates
how this will be achieved through the aims and objectives of the research. In
acknowledging that the Constitution has indeed influenced the process of interpretation
in South Africa, the thesis is structured so as to assess how each component of the
statutory process is influenced by the application of section 39. The chapter breakdown
is clearly indicative of the key elements that form the basis of this thesis. An
examination of judicial precedents will reveal the unfolding of the subject, to prove the
hypothesis that the Constitution has transformed the process of interpretation in South
Africa, and therefore requires a new theory and methodology for the interpretation of
legislation in the current constitutional era.

Since the advent of constitutionalism, ‘there is always room for a transformation of

conventional ideas on justice,’106 to those appropriate for a society reflecting social and

104
Tebbe ‘Eclecticism’ (2008-2009) 25 Constitutional Commentary at 317. In his article on
Eclecticism, Tebbe argues that a sound interpretive strategy begins by looking at ground-level
conflicts and extrapolating- as far as possible, to more general guidelines.
105
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Prolegomenon at viii.
106
Ibid at xvii.

25
economic justice. This is the mindset that informs the rationale for the study and which
underpins the research undertaken.

26
 CHAPTER 2
AN EXAMINATION OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION APPLIED IN SOUTH
AFRICAN COURTS

2.1 Introduction

In the field of statutory interpretation, there are a number of ‘theories’, as they are
referred to, that inform the subject. In this chapter, it is intended:

a) to examine these ‘theories’ more critically to determine their significance;

and

b) to assess their relevance to statutory interpretation in the democratic

constitutional era in South Africa.

While an attempt is made to explore these theories fully, it is submitted that this list
is by no means exhaustive. The more commonly or widely used theories of statutory
interpretation applied in South African courts will form the basis of this chapter.

The word ‘theory’ appears to be used somewhat loosely in the legal parlance.1 In
some instances it is used to describe a ‘rule’ or a ‘precept’. For example, the
‘expedition theory’ in the law of contract is in fact a rule which stipulates ‘that a
contract concluded by mail comes into existence the moment that the written
acceptance of an offer is posted.’2 In a more conventional sense, a ‘theory’ may on
the one hand really be an ‘explanation’ or an ‘explication’, and on the other hand,3 it
is further submitted that a theory can be an idea accounting for a situation, and

1
Woolman, Roux Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa
(2nd edition) at 32-28.
2
Hosten, Edwards, Bosman and Church Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory
(2ndedition) at 704 - 705.
3
For example, a consensus theory in the law of contract, explains that a contract is based on a
concursus animorum of the parties. On the other hand, a theory can also be an idea
accounting for a situation and as a resultjustity a certain course of action. See discussion in
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-29.

27
justifying a certain course of action. The theory would then advance a principle or
principles on which the practise of an activity is based.4

The theories of statutory interpretation are both explanatory and justificatory at the
same time, and may also be referred to as ‘interpretive approaches’.5 Michelman
speaks of such ‘interpretive approaches’ or ‘methods’ (to use yet additional
terminology), which he states a judge either chooses (or perhaps just falls into).6 In
choosing one of these available ‘interpretive approaches’, the judicial officer would
have to resign himself to the consequences that follow as a result of the choice.7
While the terms ‘theory’ and ‘approach’ appear to be used interchangeably, the term
‘theory’, it is observed, is more popular and more widely used amongst legal
scholars.8 Some of the more ‘acknowledged’ theories of statutory interpretation that
have been identified and applied by courts, whilst not necessarily always
consistently, include the:9

4
Ibid at 32-29.
5
Michelman ‘A Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman’ (1995) 11
South African Journal on Human Rights at 482. In his article, Michelman concedes that the
terminology used is generally not fixed but recognises following as a standard list of
interpretive approaches or methods that are available, namely, Literalism, Intentionalism,
Purposivism, Instrumentalism and Moralism. Literalism is applying the text to the case
according to the ordinary meaning of the words. Intentionalism is applying the clause judges
the writer of it would have done. Purposivism is applying the clause in the way that one
judges will best accomplish the lawmakers primary or higher or transcendent purpose.
Instrumentalism is determining the sense of a legal text’s or doctrine’s application to a
particular cases by first comparing the predicted social consequences of applying it in one or
the other sense, and then preferring the sense that has preferred consequences, as measured
by a kind of ad hoc or pragmatic common sense. Moralism is determining concrete
applications by reference to a high-level, substantive moral theory supposed to be
instantiated by the constitution as a whole.
6
Ibid. The ‘interpretative approaches’ that Michelman refers to bears striking similarity to
some of the more commonly accepted theories in South Africa. For example, Literalism
compares quite favourably with the literal theory and purposivism and the purposive theory
also display a commonality.
7
Ibid.
8
Seefor example, Botha Statutory Interpretation (5thedition)at 91and Devenish Interpretation
of Statutes at 25, where the authors show preference for the term theory.
9
See discussion in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 25-56 and Du Plessis Re-
Interpretation of Statutes at 89-119 for the more commonly accepted theories of statutory
interpretation.

28
 1) Literal Theory
2) Contextual Theory
3) Purposive Theory
4) Teleological Theory
5) Intention Theory
6) Objective Theory; and
7) Judicial Theory.

Cowen postulates that each theory of statutory interpretation is characterised by a

specific viewpoint on one or more of the following seminal aspects of interpretation:

a) the nature and functions of language;

b) the relevance and meaning of the intention of the legislature;
c) the role of the judiciary, which refers to the extent of judicial discretion; and
d) the time frame within which statutes operate.10

What is also significant is that each of the theories tend to operate in terms of their
own modus operandi. This is unique to a particular theory and is the distinctive
feature of a theory that distinguishes it from another. With regard to the manner in
which they operate, it is noted that ‘some are conflicting, others are complementary
but all tend to overlap to some extent.’11 Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that
‘courts tend to use these theories in a capricious way,’12 favouring certain theories
above others, the obvious ‘degree of merit’13 in each of them cannot be overlooked.
This will be interrogated more fully in the discussion below, to determine their
relevance and significance in the constitutional democracy found in South Africa.

10
Cowen ‘Prolegomenon to the Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ 1976
Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 150.
11
See discussion in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 25, where it is further submitted that
without an articulated modus operandi, anchored in a jurisprudentially sound theory, the
courts may arrive at inconsistent conclusions. A sound jurisprudential theory will enhance
predictability.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.

29
2.2 The Literal Theory

According to this theory, in its ‘crude, unqualified form’, the true meaning of the
provisions of the statute can be ascertained from the ipsissima verba, or the actual
words used by the legislature.14 Essentially, therefore, in terms of the application of
the theory, words should generally be accorded the meaning which the normal
speaker of the English language would understand and use.15 While Devenish refers
to this as the ‘literal or ordinary meaning rule’,16 Botha explains that words are to be
given a literal or grammatical meaning, as part of the ‘plain meaning’ approach.17

The case of Ebrahim v Minister of Interior18 has been quoted as an ‘exemplary’

application of the literal theory.19 In terms of section 15 of the South African
Citizenship Act20, it was provided that a South African citizen would lose his
nationality if he acquired a foreign nationality ‘whilst outside the Union’. The
majority held that Ebrahim, a South African seaman, who had applied for British
citizenship in order to secure employment, did not forfeit his South African
citizenship. He had falsely claimed to be resident in the United Kingdom, when he
was actually living in Durban. However, on the date when British nationality was

14
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 93. Du Plessis makes the point that in its crude
and unqualified form, the meaning of a statutory provision can (and must) be retrieved from
the ipsissima verba in which it is couched, regardless of manifestly unjust or even absurd
consequences.
15
Cross Statutory Interpretationat 1.
16
See comments by Devenish as indicated in the Interpretation of Statutes at 26, where it is
submitted that the clear that the ordinary or the literal meaning of the word is in fact common
to all theories of interpretation. The reason offered in support of this, is that the modus
operandi must always start with the actual words used.
17
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 193. Botha acknowledges that the ‘plain
meaning rule’ is an orthodox application of literalism. See also a Chapter 3 3.6 The Canon-
Guided Reading Strategies for a discussion on Grammatical Interpretation. The obvious
overlaps with the Literal Theory and the Grammatical Interpretation, a component of a Von
Savigny Quarter are noted. It is stressed however that while there are similarities, a reading
strategy does not qualify as a theory.
18
1977 (1) SA 665 A.
19
The application of the literal theory in Ebrahim’s case, has been described as an ‘exemplary
contemporary application’ of the literal theory. See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 27.
20
Act 49 of 1949.

30
conferred on him, he was coincidentally on a ship within South African territorial
waters. In giving effect to the literal theory, Joubert JA maintained that if the words
of a statute are ‘clear and unambiguous it is the function of a Court of law to give
effect thereto.’21

Nonetheless, literalism is almost always closely associated with the ordinary

meaning rule of statutory interpretation.22 The primary rule that words are to be
given their ordinary, grammatical or natural meaning, is the first step in the
interpretation process. According to the literal theory, the primary rule may only be
deviated from:

(i) Where it would lead to obscurity or a result which is unjust,

unreasonable or inconsistent with the other provisions or repugnant
to the general object, tenor or policy of the statute.

This is – in essence – a description of the golden rule.23

Du Plessis posits that the application of the golden rule is justified in instances where
the interpretative result is so absurd and repugnant to ‘common sense’, that the
legislature could hardly have intended the outcome.24 Driedger explains further that
the absurdity required must be an obvious absurdity. It must be extracted from the

21
See discussion of the case in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 27 - 28. See judge’s
comments on the findings of Ebrahim case at 680 A. Further support for the literal approach
is clearly evidenced in Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 A 520
at 534 where the stance of the court was clear that - ‘Prima facie the intention of the
legislature is to be deduced from the words which it has used ...’
See also Union Government v Mack 1971 AD 713 at 750 where the court held that: ‘We
should first of all consider ... what the legislature has actually said in words .’
22
While the comment is made that literalism is closely associated with the ordinary-meaning
rule, Du Plessis clarifies this statement that ordinary language is not characteristically always
clear and unambiguous. See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 93.
23
For an illustration of the application of the golden rule, see decisions of Venter v Rex 1907
TS 910 at 913 and Grey v Pearson [1843 – 60] All ER Rep 21 (HL) 36.
24
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutesat 93 - 94. A classical exposition of the golden rule of
interpretation can be found in Lord Wensleydale’s dictum in Grey v Pearson [1843-60] All
ER Rep 21 (HL) 36 where it was held that ‘The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no
farther.’

31
whole instrument and must lie in the words of the statute, rather than in the
consequences of the application of the statute to a particular case.25A criticism that
has been levelled at the application of the golden rule, is ‘what seems an absurdity to
one man might not necessarily seem absurd to another.’26 Du Plessis advances the
argument with a series of questions, for example who and what would determine
what an absurdity is and when is an absurdity sufficiently glaring to allow the golden
rule to kick in?27 The determination of the exact meaning of the other criteria
contained in the golden rule – which include injustice, unreasonableness and
inconsistency with the other provisions or repugnancy to the general object of the
statute – is also problematic, since ‘they are manifestly open to arbitrary
application.’28 The comment that the golden rule is meant to be ‘literalism’s lifeway,
not its critical companion’,29 is an interesting one. It is meant to qualify literalism in
order to salvage it, not to criticise it.30

The primary rule may also be departed from:

(ii) where words are ambiguous. Here it is permissible to have recourse

to outside sources for the purpose of discovering the true meaning.

25
Driedger The Construction of Statutes at 48. The point that is made is that the absurdity must
be objective or absolute rather than relative.
26
See Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicolson Judgment- Jacob Zuma v The
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54N’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 786 –
787.
27
See discussion by Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 105, where Du Plessis raises
several pertinent question about the unreliability of language in its literal sense. First, what
criteria can be trusted to show up an unreliability of language in its literal sense? Second,
following from the first question, who or what determines what an absurdity is and when is
an absurdity sufficiently glaring to allow the golden rule to kick in? An absurdity is
nonsensical and cannot but be glaring. How much nonsense should an interpreter then be
expected to stomach before (s)he concludes that an absurdity is ‘utterly glaring’? Finally
when the intention of the legislature is brought into the picture, a petition principia mars the
golden rule. The intention of the legislature can be gleaned from the (clear and unambiguous)
language of the provision. How can it happen that an intention contrary to the intention of the
legislature can be gleaned from the very language which this supposed to be the fans etorigo
of the intention of the legislature?
28
See discussion by Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 29, where it is maintained that the
distinction between what is absurd and utterly absurd, is, by its very nature, arbitrary.
29
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 94. It is submitted that the operation of the golden
rule is not meant to criticise nor to contradict the application of the literal rule.
30
Ibid at 94.

32
 This is the third rule of the literal theory, referred to as the mischief
rule and is to be applied in instances of ambiguity.31

In terms of the application of the mischief rule, the interpreter has to heed the
situation prior to and during the passing of the Act – to interpret an obscure or
ambiguous provision. First expounded in the old English case of Heydon,32 the rule
was articulated as follows:

‘That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general ...
four things are to be discerned and considered:
(i) What was the common-law before the passing of the Act;
(ii) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide;
(iii) What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the Commonwealth; and
(iv) The true reason of the remedy.
And then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.’

33
In the landmark case of Hleka v Johannesburg City Council, Van den Heever JA
set out the above rules, and called on history to show what facts existed to bring
about the relevant statute – namely the War Measure Act.34 To remedy the situation,
a number of War Measures were passed, which were amended on a number of
occasions.35 With regard to the question of what amounts to ambiguity, from Ex

31
See application of the mischief rule in Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation – Jacob Zuma v
The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54 N’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 787.
32
Heydon (1584) 3 Co Rep 7aat 7b. The Heydon case was the first case that employed the
mischief rule. In terms of the rule, it allows for an examination of the historical
circumstances of the statues, from which the purpose of the legislation can be inferred.
33
1949(1)SA 842at852.
34
18 of 1947.
35
From the findings of Hleka’s case, the War Measure Act 18 of 1947 was enacted to ensure
that persons who were removed to any place (in accordance with War Measure Act 31 of
1944), could again be removed from that place, if the magistrate or native commissioner was
satisfied ‘that the said place provides no suitable accommodation elsewhere, or that they have
no proper employment within a reasonable distance from that place.’

33
Parte Slater, Walker Securities (SA) Ltd,36 the court described ambiguity as that
which ‘would appear to include lack of clarity or uncertainty.’37 It has to be
conceded that what may be ‘clear or reasonable to one person may be obscure or
absurd to another’.38 Therefore, in practice, the application of the golden and
mischief rules have been criticised in that ‘they appear to be capricious’39 and are
bound to result in uncertainty. Although generally when applying the three rules of
the literal theory, the proponents of literalism tend to apply the literal rule first,
followed by the golden and mischief rules thereafter, this is somewhat artificial and
unnatural since the process of interpretation is not hierarchical, but integrated and
complementary.40

2.2.1 The Introduction of the Literal Approach into the South

African Legal System

The doctrine of legal positivism influenced the adoption of the literal approach in
England. The positivistic ideology expounded by John Austen that the essence of the
law is to be found in the ‘command or decree’ established by a ‘sovereign’ – gained
prominence, especially in the 19th Century.41 The literal theory (more specifically
the plain meaning approach and golden rule) came to be introduced into the South
African legal system in a ‘roundabout way from English law’.42

36
1974(4) SA 657(W).
37
Ibid. In the case Ex Parte Slater, Walker Securities (SA) Ltd, there was a difficulty
experienced in interpretation of sufficient magnitude to warrant reference to the history of the
section(in dispute)in aid of construction.
38
See the discussion in Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgment –
Jacob Zuma v The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009], All SA 54 N’ (2009) 30
Obiter at 786 – 787, for the criticisms that have been levelled against the golden rule and the
mischief.
39
Ibid.
40
Pearce Statutory Interpretation in Australia at 14. According to Pearce, in the ascertainment
of the meaning of legislation, courts have chosen to break up the process of comprehension
into components, commonly known as the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule.
To say the least, this has been unfortunate because it has often resulted in the use of only one
of the elements of comprehension instead of it being recognized that they are all part of a
process.
41
Johnson, Pete and Du Plessis Jurisprudence - A South African Perspective at 72 - 75.
42
See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5thedition) at 92 - 93.

34
In De Villiers v Cape Divisional Council,43 Chief Justice de Villiers made a
controversial decision with far-reaching consequences – which was that legislation
adopted after the British had taken over the Cape, should be interpreted in
accordance with the English rules of statutory interpretation.44 This decision
manifestly affected all legal jurisprudence in the realm of judicial law-making for
more than a hundred years. In terms of English law, a conquered territory continued
to apply its own legal system.45 In the case of the Cape, the prevailing system was
Roman-Dutch law even after the British seizure of the Cape. As a result of De
Villiers’ decision, the Roman-Dutch law which was more purposive approach was
replaced by the literal approach of English law.46

The literal approach, as a result was applied rather mechanically by courts. In

construing the meaning of the statute, courts automatically equated the ordinary or
literal meaning as being identical to what the legislature intended.47 In the earlier
reported decisions of Union Gort v Mack48 and Farrar’s Estate v CIR,49the court
erroneously held that the intention of the legislature was equivalent to the words used
in the legislation. More recent cases have mirrored this position, for example Ensor v
Rensco Motors (Pty) Ltd50 and Engels v Allied Chemical Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd,51
where the approach of the court was that if the legislature had a specific intention, it

43
1875 Buch at 50.
44
See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5thedition) at 92.
45
Campbell & Hall (1774) 1 Cowp.204, 98E.R. 1045 (KB). The island of Grenada was taken
by the British arms, in open war from the French King. In accordance with the articles of
capitulation, the island of Grenada surrendered, was by reference to the capitulation upon
which the island of Martinique had before surrendered. It was further held:- A country
conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in the right of his crown; and,
therefore, necessarily subject to the Legislature, the Parliament of Great Britian.
46
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 92.
47
Ibid. The reason that the courts automatically equated the ordinary or the literal meaning as
being identical to what the legislature intended, is due to the ‘pre-dominance of the word,’
and the intention of the legislature was demoted to the status of the literal meaning of the
text.
48
1917 AD 731.
49
1926 TPD 501.
50
1981(1)SA 815(A).
51
1993(4)SA 45(NM)160.

35
would be reflected in the clear and unambiguous words of the text.52 The result of the
application of the literal theory in the afore-mentioned manner, meant that where the
language was clear and unambiguous one had to give effect to it irrespective of how
harsh or unjust the outcome of the literal interpretation. This had prejudicial
consequences in South Africa during the pre-democratic constitutional era. In
accordance with the iudicis est ius dicere sed non dare rule, which, when translated,
means that it is the province of judges to expound the law and not to make it,53 the
courts declared that they had no choice or discretion but to give effect to harsh,
unjust and abhorrent apartheid legislation.54 This position is clearly reflected in the
dictum of R v Sachs,55 where Centlivres CJ made the point that:

‘Courts of law do scrutinise such statutes with the greatest care but where
the statute under consideration in clear terms confers on the executive
autocratic powers over individuals, courts of law have no option but to give
effect to the will of the legislature as expressed in the statute.’

This has been described as being ‘par excellence the position in South Africa’ during
the apartheid era – where courts adopted the view that they had no choice but were
‘obliged to give effect to notorious racial and draconian security legislation.’56

It was only the advent of the new democratic era that ushered in a marked
paradigmatic shift away from the literal approach – towards a more purpose-
orientated approach.57 In spite of this transition, some courts have nevertheless still

52
See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition)at 93.
53
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 39. In keeping with the maxim of the iudicis est
ius dicere sed non dare, it is usually said that … ‘judges proceed to give meticulous effect to
what they regard to be the will, and wishes of the legislature.’
54
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 28. The point is made that where the language is
clear, irrespective how harsh the interpretation may be, the courts had no choice or discretion
but to apply it.
55
1953(1) SA 392(A). See Also Volschenk v Volschenk 1946 TPD 487 at 487 – where it was
held that ‘The cardinal rule of construction is that words must be given their ordinary, literal,
grammatical meaning.’ Further, in Ebrahim v Minister of Interior 1977 (1) SA 665 (AD),
Joubert AJA commented at 678 A, that ‘if the words (of a statute) are clear and unambiguous,
then effect should be given to their ordinary … literal and grammatical meaning.’
56
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 162.
57
The purpose-orientated methodology is discussed in more detail in this chapter. Refer to 2.4
The Purposive Theory, for an analysis of the purposivism.

36
continued to apply the literal approach. In Public Carriers Association v Toll Road
Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd,58 Smalberger JA in giving effect to the intention of the
legislature, maintained that:

'it must be accepted that the literal interpretation principle is firmly

entrenched in our law and I do not seek to challenge it’.

Further support for the literal school of thought can be seen in a more recent
judgment of Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council,59 where it was provided that:

‘The rules of statutory (exegesis) are intended as aids in resolving any

doubts as to the Legislature’s true intention’.

Such an intention-based approach to statutory interpretation is favoured by Ekins

who advocates that the notion of the legislature’s intention is to be propounded as a
proper standard of statutory interpretation. In ascertaining the ‘intention of the
legislature’, Ekins argues that the legislative process does not constitute merely
aggregations of intentions of individual legislators but that the process is more aptly
described as determining the collective intentions which are structured so as to
further its legislative purpose.60 Nevertheless despite the robust defence of the
intention-based approach to statutory interpretation in some quarters, such a
mechanical approach to statutory interpretation in Kalla v The
Master,61Commissioner SARS v Executor Friths Estate62 and Geyser v Msunduzi
Municipality63 has attracted much criticism.64 The application of the literal approach

58
1990(1)SA 925(A).
59
1994(3)SA 789(A).
60
Ekins The Nature of Legislative Intent at 219. Ekins develops his account of legislative intent
in three stages. First, he argues that the intention of the legislature need not be
understood, as it standardly is, as the aggregate or sum of the intentions of individual
legislators. Instead, it should be seen as the joint intention of a rational group agent.
Second, he offers an account of how a well‐formed legislature would operate. Finally, he
defends a concept of legislative intent with the aim of showing both why it is the proper
standard of statutory interpretation and how it avoids standard objections to intentionalist
theories.
61
1995(1)SA 261(T) at 269 C - G.
62
2001(2)SA 261(SCA)273.
63
2003(5)SA 19(N)32 D - E.

37
by courts, clearly reveals the limitations inherent in the approach. The submission
that the ‘intention theory is a denial of the creative role which the judiciary can and
ought to play’ is well received.65 In respect of the above cases, we note that in
applying the literal theory, not only do judges give effect to an outmoded and
discredited approach to interpretation, but the theory of literalism is clearly in
conflict with section 39(2) – the interpretation clause of the Constitution.66

2.2.2 Criticisms of the Literal Theory

In examining the literal theory, the defects inherent in the theory become obvious.
One of the main criticisms of the literal approach is that the modus operandi with
regard to the application of the theory is flawed. This is because words do not have
‘intrinsic meaning in language,’ since ‘their meaning is invariably determined by a
concatenation of contextual factors.’67 Therefore placing too much emphasis on the
preponderance of the word only is problematic, in that the ‘crucial role of the context
of the legislative text’ is ignored or minimised – in that it is ‘reduced to a mere
inanity.’68 As a result, the internal and external aids which are normally used to
determine the contextual meaning, do not apply. Furthermore, the significance of the
common-law presumptions during the interpretation process is also undermined –
and reduced to a ‘last resort’ aid to interpretation, to be applied only if the text is

64
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 104 – 105. Botha is critical of the approach
adopted with regard to the above-mentioned cases, namely, Kalla v The Master,
Commissioner SARS v Executor Friths Estate and Geyser v Msunduzi Municipality, that the
traditional rules of statutory interpretation still form part of the law. Contrary to the demands
of the Constitution, the court nevertheless still applied the primary rule of interpretation and
gave effect to the ordinary or the grammatical meaning of legislation.
65
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 36. Du Plessis makes the point that a judge
should not merely be ‘his masters voice,’ charged with carrying out and giving effect to the
wishes of the legislature. This sentiment is shared by Dugard and re-iterated in his article
entitled,‘The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty’ 1971 South African Law Journal
at 182-183 and 186–187.
66
See Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgment – Jacob Zuma v The
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] All SA 54 N ’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 788 – 789,
where the author is critical of the application of the literal theory, on the basis that it is in
conflict with section 39(2) of the Constitution.
67
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 26. Devenish qualifies his statement that words do not
have intrinsic meaning with the submission that the relationship between words and their
meaning is not mathematical or quantitative but is variable.
68
Botha Statutory Interpretation (3rdedition) at 30 - 31.

38
ambiguous.69 The point here is that the context and presumptions are given some
prominence and become a ‘necessary’ part of the process of statutory interpretation
only when the text seems ambiguous.70 While generally a good dictionary often
provides an exhaustive list of possible meanings of words,71 it certainly is not
sufficient, particularly when regard has to be made to the context or the background
of the enacted text – for the purposes of interpretation. This stance was reflected in
the dictum of Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd,72 where the
position of the court was clear, that:

‘The task of interpretation is not always fulfilled by recourse to a dictionary

definition, for what must be ascertained is the meaning of the word in its
particular context in the enactment.’

The case of Jaga v Dönges,73 was a landmark case in the interpretation of statutes in
South Africa, where the dissenting judgment of Schreiner JA – as early as the 1950’s
– was seen to move beyond the literal meaning of the word to embrace the wider
context of the legislation. Nevertheless, in spite of this, the transition proved to be

69
Ibid at 30.
70
Ibid. (Emphasis Added)
71
In the Minister of Interior v Machadodorp Investments1957(2)SA 395(AD)at 402, Steyn JA
referred to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and to The Standard Dictionary of the
English Language to interpret the meaning of the word ‘tribe.’ In Association of Amusement
and Novelty Machine Operators and Another v Minister of Justice and Another 1980 (2) SA
636 (AD), the appellants owned ‘pinball machines,’ which they claimed were not prohibited
in terms of the Gambling Act 51 of 1965. In court, the parties on each side resorted to
unconventional methods to establish the meaning of ‘pin-tables’ and ‘pinball machines.’ The
appellants for example tendered the evidence of persons who ‘professionally engaged’ in the
‘amusement machine business’ and of a person who ‘habitually plays on the apparatus
concerned.’ The opinion evidence of a language expert was tendered on each side. The
researchers of each embraced a number of dictionaries. See Cockram The Interpretation of
Statutes (3rd edition) at 37-39.
72
1984 (3) SA (WLD) at 846 G. A similar stance was maintained by the Court in the case of
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd 1962(1)SA 458(AD)at
476, where it was maintained that: ‘It is the duty of the court to read the Section of the Act
which requires interpretation sensibly, that is with due regard, on the other hand to the
meaning which permitted grammatical usage assigns to the words used in the section in
question, and on the other hand, to, the contextual sense …’ See Cockram The Interpretation
of Statutes (3rd edition) at 40-41.
73
1950(4) SA 653(AD)at 662 - 664.

39
painstakingly slow – with the advent of the ‘new’ constitutional dispensation
marking the first real paradigmatic shift from literalism to purposivism.74

Arguably, the most well-known criticisms of the literal approach in academia have to
be those of Davis,75 in his analysis of the decision of S v Mhlungu.76 This essentially
revolved around the question of the interpretation of section 241(8) of the interim
Constitution. The section that was subject to scrutiny, provided that:

‘All proceedings which immediately before the commencement of the

Constitution were pending before any court of the law […], exercising
jurisdiction in accordance with the law then in force, shall be dealt with as if
this Constitution had not been passed.’

What emerged in the interpretation of the afore-mentioned section, saw the

Constitutional Court sharply divided on the issue of whether Mhlungu was entitled to
the protection offered by the Constitution. While the dissenting (advocated by
Chaskalson and Kentridge J) maintained that the Constitution and the protection it
afforded did not apply to Mhlungu, the majority court (advocated by Mahomed J),
was clearly not in agreement. The Court’s interpretation and analysis of section
241(8) meant that although the old apartheid courts should complete the cases before
them, it did not mean that the substantive law that had to be applied in these cases
after 27 April 1994, was unaffected by the Constitution. As a result the Constitution
had to be applied to Mhlungu, and the evidence against him had to be excluded.

What is clear is the stark contrast between the approaches of the minority and
majority judgments in the case. While the support for the literal approach was clearly
reflected by the minority judgment and the noticeable adherence to the Westminster
approach to the interpretation of statutes, 77 the stance of the majority court seems to

74
An analysis of the contextual, the purposive and the teleological theories is conducted in this
chapter. See discussion in 2.3 The Contextual, 2.4 The Purposive Theory and 2.5 The
Teleological Theory.
75
Davis ‘The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans: Please Sir May I Have Some More
Literalism!’ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights at 541.
76
1995 (3) SA 867 (CC).
77
Davis ‘The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans: Please Sir May I Have Some More
Literalism!’ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights at 509

40
extend beyond purposivism. The view adopted by the majority court was that the
rules of interpretation – which should inform the process of interpretation – are a
result of a ‘new grundnorm’78 heralded by the new constitutional order, such that it
might develop a jurisprudence that represents a ringing break from the past.79 The
judgment in Mhlungu, not only represents a clash between two forms of legal
communication,80 but also speaks directly to the traditional theories of interpretation.
The point was soundly made that the advent of the new constitutional era promised
the creation of a new legal community – for ‘constitutionalism is a far more
challenging enterprise than that required of ordinary legislative interpretation.’81
Indeed, what is required, therefore, in the process of interpretation in the democratic
era, accentuates the role of judges so that they think ‘in ways beyond the ordinary
meaning of the words’82 and fulfil a moral or ethical function.

2.3 The Contextual Theory

Contextualism – or the contextual approach – basically means that the meaning of a

provision is determined either by reading its words, language or the provision itself –
in context.83 To put it another way, contextualism is a theory of statutory
interpretation which in essence provides that the meaning of an enacted provision
and its words and language, can only be determined in light of its context or
‘background conditions.’84 In examining the principles of contextualism from case-
law, the obvious overlaps with purposivism are unmistakable. From the dictum of

78
Ibid at 508.
79
Ibid at 512.
80
Ibid at 509. The two forms of legal communication that Davis refers to in his article
essentially deals with the literal and the purposive theory.
81
Ibid at 508.
82
Ibid.
83
The contextual approach was applied in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey 1980 (1) SA
472 (A) at 478 A-B, where it was stated that for purposes of ascertaining the meaning of the
words in a legal document like a contract, a will or a statute, the words will have to be
examined in their contextual setting. See also S v Motshari 2001 (2) All SA 207 (NC) par 8.
84
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-32.The contextual
approach has been affirmed in plethora of more recent cases. See for example, Ferreira v
Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell 1996(1)SA 984(CC) and S v Makwanyane 1995 (6)BCLR
665(CC).

41
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey,85 there is support for the idea that
contextualism and purposivism often go ‘hand in hand.’86

Rumpff CJ stated that:

‘For purposes of ascertaining the meaning of words in a legal document like

a contract, a will or a statute, a court never looks at the words in stark
isolation. It looks at words in their setting, and the context in which the
words are used and at the purpose for which the words are intended.’

It is not surprising, therefore, that the terms ‘contextualism’ and ‘purposivism’ are
often used interchangeably – even though the use of the terms may not be entirely
accurate or appropriate. Nevertheless, even though both are considered as ‘post-
literalist approaches’,87 it has to be emphasized that the purposive theory must be
understood as a concept separate to that of contextualism. The case of Jaga v
Dönges88 is one of the first cases in South African jurisprudence that applied the
contextual approach. It is also regarded as one of the first manifest efforts to
acknowledge the wider context, and to attempt to move away from the plain-meaning
approach of the literal theory.89
The dissenting judge Schreiner JA maintained that:

85
1980 (1) SA 472 (A) 478 A-B.
86
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 111. Du Plessis draws from the dictum of the
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey 1980 (1) SA 472 (A) to support the idea that
contextualism and purposivism go ‘hand in hand.’
87
Ibid at 112.
88
1950(4)SA 653(A).In casu, the court had to decide what meaning was to be accorded to the
term ‘sentenced to imprisonment.’ The reason that the term was brought into contention was
because Jaga had received a suspended prison sentence and the question had arisen was
whether he could be deported on the grounds that he had been ‘sentenced to imprisonment.’
The majority court adopted a textual method of interpretation and were of the view that a
suspended sentence was a sentence of imprisonment and that Jaga was to be deported. The
view of the minority court, was influenced by a contextual method of interpretation and
therefore concluded that a suspended sentence was not a sentence of imprisonment and that
Jaga could not be deported. From the findings of the case however, Jaga was ordered to leave
South Africa permanently. The case is significant because it highlights the implications of the
far-reaching consequences of the court electing to adopt a literal approach instead of a
contextual approach.
89
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 98. Botha succinctly sets out the guidelines that
were identified by Schreiner JA in the application of a contextual approach.

42
 ‘Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words
and expressions used in a statute must be interpreted according to their
ordinary meaning is the statement that must be interpreted in light of their
context. But it may be useful to stress two points in relation to the
application of the principle. The first is that ‘the context’, as used here, is not
limited to the language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of
a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of more importance is
the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits,
its background. The second point is that the approach to the work of
interpreting may be along either of two lines. Either one may split the
inquiry into two parts and concentrate, in the first instance, on finding out
whether the meaning confining a consideration of the context only to cases
where the language appears to admit of more than one meaning; or one may
from the beginning consider the context and the language to be interpreted
together.’
From an analysis of the approach applied in the above-mentioned case, the guidelines
that ought to steer the interpretive process can be articulated as follows:

(i) Right from the outset, the interpreter has to consider the wider
context of the provision (in other words, its ambit and purpose);
(ii) Irrespective of how clear or unambiguous the grammatical meaning
of the legislative text, the relevant ‘contextual’ factors – which
include the history or background –must be heeded;
(iii) This wider context may even be more important than the legislative
text; and
(iv) Once the meaning of the text and the context is ascertained, it must
be applied.
(v) This meaning has to be accorded, irrespective of one’s opinion
regarding the legislature’s intention.90

In his analysis of the judgment and findings in the Jaga case, Du Plessis is perceptive
in that while the first way or approach mentioned by Schreiner JA supra has qualified

90
Ibid.

43
regard for the context, the second way or approach always requires simultaneous
consideration of language and context. The end results of the two approaches
therefore only always coincide, if one is prepared to accept that the ‘clear language’
always dominates.91 He is therefore critical of the ‘literalist assumption’ underlying
the approach. Because both the ‘context and the language enjoy equal status, his
description of the court’s approach in maintaining a stance that is ‘post-literalist’
without being ‘anti-literalist’ is therefore quite apt.92 Nevertheless, the minority
judgment in Jaga’s case did have a certain ‘appeal’ among judges – who were keen
to go beyond the ordinary meaning of the word.93 It is observed that the
Constitutional Court has emphasized the importance of the ‘context’, requiring that
when considering legislation, due regard is to be given to the history and background
of the legislation.94 In examining South African case-law, it is observed that the
contextual approach has been met with approval in a host of decisions.95 In
University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council,96 the approach of Rabie JA – in
examining all the contextual factors in ascertaining the intention of the legislature –
irrespective of whether the words of the provision were clear or not, is unmistakably
an application of the contextual approach.97 Further support for the approach is
evident in Mjuqu v Johannesburg City Council,98 where Jansen JA gives due
recognition to the entire spectrum of available aids and surrounding circumstances –

91
See Du Plessis’s analysis about the findings of the courts decision with respect to Jaga’s case
in the Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 114.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
Jaga’s case has been relied on by a number of judgments decided subsequently. See for
example – S v Radebe 1988 (1) SA 772 (A), University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council
1986 (4) SA 903 (A) and Thoroughbred Breeders Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 (4)
SA 551.
95
Cases that have applied the contextual approach include - S v Makwangane and Another
1995(6) BCLR 655 (CC); Ferreira v Levin NO 1996(1)SA 984 (CC) and Soobramoney v
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1)SA 765(CC).
96
1986 (4) SA 903 A.
97
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 98.
98
1973(3)SA 421 A.

44
to determine the purpose of the legislation under consideration. This has been
described as a ‘model of the contextual approach.’99

Because South Africa’s political history has affected every aspect of South African
society,100 its importance of the interpretation of the Constitution and ordinary
legislation cannot be disregarded. The use of the historical context is therefore well
illustrated in case-law.101 In Brink v Kitshoff,102 the position suggested by the
Constitutional Court was that:

‘... The deep scars of this appalling programme are still visible in our
society. It is in light of that history and the enduring legacy that it
bequeathed that the equality clause needs to be interpreted.’

What is therefore evident is that the context or the determination of the context is
‘crucial’ for the interpretation of any text – whether this is a contract or the
provisions of the statute, or the Constitution.103 Contextual interpretation has also
been compared to as ‘systematic interpretation’.104 This gives due recognition to the
fact that the Constitution is a document as a whole and therefore cannot be read as if
it consists merely of a series of individual provisions read in isolation.105 Its

99
See commentary on the application of the contextual approach in the Mjugu’s case, in an
earlier edition of Botha’s book. See Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 52.
100
De Waal and Currie The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 141. The authors describe
the Constitution as a consequence and a reaction to South Africa’s history.
101
In the following cases the court acknowledged the significance of the historical background
when construing legislation - S v Mhlungu 1995(3) SA 391(CC); and Shabalala v Attorney
General of the Transvaal 1996(1)SA 725(CC)
102
1996(4) SA 197 (CC).
103
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 143-144. The authors submit that
in keeping with the idea of systematic interpretation, that there is a duty to read the
provisions against the context of the Constitution, and to harmonise the various provisions
and to give effect to them. In United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of
South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC), it was held that ‘where there was tension, the courts
must do their best to harmonise the relevant provisions and give effect to all of them.’
104
See also Chapter 3-3.6.2 Systematic or Contextual Interpretation and 3.6.4 Historical
Interpretation for a discussion of the Canon-Guided Strategies. A Contextual Theory as
presented, with a consideration of the contextual framework or historical context compares
quite favourably with Systematic and Historical Interpretation which comprises the Von
Savigny Quarter. While the similarities are noted, it is provided that a reading strategy is not
the equivalent of a theory of interpretation.
105
Ibid. The fact that the constitution (and in fact all legislation) cannot be read in isolation is an
interesting idea is raised by the authors. In philosophy, the principle of Holism, was

45
application in the decision of Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal,106
has been described as one of the ‘most controversial’ use of the contextual
interpretation.107 In casu, the Constitutional Court held that the right to life (section
11),108 did not impose a positive obligation on the State to provide life-saving
treatment to a critically ill patient. The Court’s findings, in a nutshell, were that the
positive obligations of the State to provide medical treatment were expressly spelled
out in section 27,109 and that the court could not interpret the right to life to impose
additional obligations that were inconsistent with section 27.110

2.3.1 Criticisms of the Contextual Approach

Even though contextual interpretation has proven to be beneficial in the process of

interpretation – shown by the courts’ application of the methodology in the array of
cases discussed above – it has to be used with caution.111

The first danger is that courts tend to use contextualism to limit rights instead of
interpreting them.112 Another danger is that contextual interpretation may be used as

described by Aristotle as ‘The whole is more, than the sum of its parts.’ It had its origin in
Greek meaning ‘holos’, ‘all’ or ‘total.’ The term ‘holism’ was only introduced into language
by the South African statesman Jan Smuts in 1926. In essence what is provided, is that
language can only be understood through its relations with the larger segment of language. In
1884, GottlobFrege formulated his Contextual Principle, according to which – it is only
within the context of a proposition or sentence that a word acquires its meaning.
http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch - holism.html (last accessed October 2013)
106
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
107
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 145.
108
Section 11 of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to life.’
109
Section 27 of the Constitution, is the right to health care, food, water and social security and
provides that:
‘(1)Everyone has the right to have access to -
(a)health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b)sufficient food and water; and
(c)social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants
with appropriate social assistance,
(2)The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3)No-one may be refused emergency medical treatment.’
110
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 145. See also the cases of S v
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC) and Ferreira v Levin NO and Others
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), where the court made extensive use of contextual interpretation.
111
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition)at 145.

46
a shortcut to eliminate ‘irrelevant’ fundamental rights. Contextual interpretation
should not be used to identify and focus on ‘the most relevant right’.113 The more
important consideration should be the attainment of social justice. In giving effect to
what is fair and just would obviate some of the concerns highlighted above in terms
of applying the contextual approach.

2.4 The Purposive Theory

In terms of the purposive theory, the focus is not dependent exclusively on the literal
meaning of the words; it requires that the interpreter move beyond the manifested
intention of the legislation.114 While the quest for the subjective intention of the
legislature is said to be elusive, and may perhaps even be regarded as being ‘a
fiction’ because it is unascertainable,115 the search for the purpose or the object of a
statute is considered as being a very real exercise.116 The determination of the
purpose of the legislation requires a purpose-orientated approach, which gives due
consideration to the contextual framework right from the outset, and not only in

112
Ibid. See also for example Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751(CC). In considering the right
to privacy meant that it only applied to the inner sanctum of a person, his or her family life,
sexual preference and home environment.
113
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 145. See also Osman and Another
v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1998 (4) SA (CC). Due to the fact that the appellants did not
rely on a specific fundamental right in the High Court, it was not open to them to raise it
before the Constitutional Court.
114
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 36. According to the purposive methodology, the
interpreter has to endeavour to infer the design or purpose which lies behind the legislation.
In order to do so, the interpreter has to make use of an unqualified contextual approach,
which allows an unconditional examination of all internal and external sources. See also S v
Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 916, where Sachs J in quoting Lord Denning
stated that ‘… Judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words or by the grammatical
structure of the sentence. They go by the design or purpose which lies behind it. When they
come upon a situation which is to their minds within the spirit – but not the letter – of the
legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and purpose of the legislature – at
the effect it was sought to achieve. They then interpret the legislation so as to produce the
desired effect. This means that they fill in the gaps, quite unashamedly, without hesitation.
They ask simply: what is the sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect to
the presumed purpose of the legislation…’
115
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 96. According to Du Plessis, ‘fiction’ is meant
somewhat negatively, because it stands for what is unreal. However, he explains further that
in the legal discourse, fictions as ‘accepted untruths’ often help explain complex phenomena.
116
Driedger Construction of Statutes at 252.

47
cases where the literal approach has failed.117 In terms of such a purpose-orientated
(or-text-in-context) approach, the purpose or object of the legislation is the
overriding consideration.118 It seems appropriate then to describe the legislative
function as a ‘purposive activity’.119

The question that arises when analysing the purposive methodology, is how does one
ascertain the ‘purpose’ of legislation?120 According to the classical version of
purposivism in the common-law tradition, the prime purpose of enacted law is to
suppress the mischief.121 The mischief rule which was first expounded in the
Heydon’s case, comprises an enquiry of four questions to be answered in interpreting
a provision.122 In Hleka v Johannesburg City Council, 123 Van den Heever JAset out
the rules articulated in Heydon’s case and then proceeded to discuss what the law
124
was before the Act in contention – the War Measure Act – was passed and how
the legislature sought to remedy the existent problematic state of affairs.125 In more
recent case-law, it is evident that purposivism seems to be fast becoming a substitute
for ordinary language or ‘clear language’ as the primary consideration in
constitutional interpretation.126 In Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order,127 the court

117
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 97-98. Botha also refers to this approach as the
text-in-context approach. In terms of the text-in-context approach, there has to be a balance
of the grammatical and the contextual meaning.
118
Ibid at 97.
119
Ibid. See also Chapter 3-3.6.3 Teleological Interpretation of Purposive Interpretation for
a discussion of Canon Guided Reading Strategies. The similarities of a purposive theory
with a focus on the search for the purpose or the object of the statute and Purposive
Interpretation, which is an element of the Von Savigny Quarter are noted. It has to be
emphasised however that a reading strategy does not qualify as a theory of interpretation.
120
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 96.
121
Ibid.
122
See discussion at 2.2. Literal Theory in this chapter, for an analysis of the four-tiered test
expounded in Heydons case.
123
1949 (1) SA 842 A.
124
18 of 1947.
125
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 130 – 131, for the application of the mischief rule
in Heydons case and Hleka’s case. Some of the other reported cases that have illustrated the
use of the mischief rule, include, for example, S v Conifer (Pty) Ltd 1974(1)SA 651(A), Reek
NO v Registrateur Van Aktes Transvaal 1969 (1) SA 589 (T) and Glen Anil Development
Corporation Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1974 (4) SA 715(A).
126
Woolman et alConstitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-37. There are a plethora
of cases that have applied a more purposive approach to interpretation since the advent of the
democratic order. See for example, Matiso v Commanding officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and

48
held that ‘the previous constitutional system of this country was the fundamental
“mischief” to be remedied by the application of the Constitution’. The argument was
that the ‘Constitution is a remedial measure that must be construed generously in
favour of redressing the mischief of the past and advancing its own objectives for the
present and the future.’128 Nevertheless, in spite of its popularity in more recent case-
law,129 a note of caution is to be heeded – that purposive interpretation is not to be
regarded as the ‘Open Sesame!’130 or the end all and be all with regard to the
approach to statutory interpretation.

2.4.1 Criticisms of the Purposive Approach

A criticism of the purposive interpretation is that sometimes the purpose of a statute

may not be easily and clearly discernible.131 This is usually the case where the
purpose or reason for the Act itself is the subject of controversy. This may result in
difficulty in ascertaining the true meaning of the provision.132

Mureinik notes further that ‘if the policy of a statute is iniquitous, a purposive
interpretation may well foster iniquity’.133 This was indeed the position in South
Africa during the apartheid era when courts were reluctant to challenge harsh, unjust
and discriminatory legislation.134 As alluded to, what is evident from an examination
of case-law, is that purposiveness seems to be replacing the ordinary language or

Another 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental
Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); and Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head, Department of
Education, Mpumalanga and Others 2009 (3) SA 422 (SCA).
127
1994 (3) SA 625 (E).
128
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 117 - 118.
129
See the courts clear endorsement of the purposive approach with regard to - Potgieter v
Kilian1995 11 BCLR 1498 (N) at 1515 B - F; In Re: Former Highlands Residents: Sonny v
Department of Land Affairs 2000 (2) SA 351(LCC) and Sefalana Employee Benefits
Organisation v Haslam 2000 (2) SA 415 (SCA).
130
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 116.
131
Dickerson The Interpretation and Application of Statutes at 91.
132
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 38.
133
Mureinik ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ (1986) 103 South African Law Journal at
624.
134
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 38.

49
‘clear language’ approach to statutory interpretation.135 This applies to both
constitutional and non-constitutional legislation. Nevertheless, in spite of its appeal
amongst judges – particularly in the current constitutional era136 – a cautionary note
is sounded, that purposive interpretation is not to be regarded as the ‘the panacea for
ills of the literalist-cum-intentionalist’.137

In terms of its application, purposive interpretation in the abstract, and by itself, can
even be counter-productive.138 Hence, the suggestion that ‘purposiveness and
contextualism best go hand in hand,’ makes sense.139 There is a danger in assuming
that the interpretive process is to start off as an exercise in giving expression to the
purpose or the object of a statutory provision. The reason is that the purpose or the
object cannot possibly be known prior to interpretation. This can only be established
‘through’ interpretation.140 If not so, Du Plessis argues that this could open wide the
door to surmise and conjecture.141 Eskridge also emphasises that purposivism cannot
be accepted as a general theory to statutory interpretation, since it neglects critically
important values.142

Generally, a teleological theory which is a more value-coherent approach, is regarded

as a theory which embraces the values that the purposive theory tends to neglect or
even negate. Nevertheless, its application will be tested to determine its relevance in
the democratic era in South Africa.

135
See Davis Cheadle and Hayson Fundamental Rights in the Constitution at 11 - 13.
136
See Derby Lewis v Chairman, Amnesty Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation
Committee 2001 (3) SA 1033 (C) at 1055 H - I where the court applied the purposive
methodology and distinguished between legislative purpose and legislative intent.
137
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 247.
138
See discussion in Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological Interpretation Par Excellence –
Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC),’
(2009) 72 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at at 342-343, for a critique of the
purposive approach.
139
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 247.
140
Ibid.
141
Ibid.
142
Eskridge and Frickey ‘Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning’ Stanford Law Review
at 337.

50
2.5 The Teleological Theory

The teleological theory is also described as a value-coherent, value-orientated or a

value-activating method of interpretation. This theory reflects Aristotle’s teachings
‘that all laws … must be tempered by equity’. 143 Even though some authors refer to
the teleological method of interpretation as purposive,144 this is not entirely accurate,
since in terms of its application, teleological interpretation ‘seeks to proceed beyond
ad hoc purposivism.’145 It also needs to be stressed that the modus operandi is not
‘merely purposive’ – but what is central to its operation, is the element of equity or
fairness.146
Crawford acknowledges the philosophical component to the teleological theory:147

‘Under the equitable or philosophical theory of interpretation, the bounds of

“genuine interpretation” are considerably extended.’

It is appropriate that the teleological theory has also been referred to in some quarters
as ‘philosophical interpretation.’148 However, the American scholar, Singer,
qualifies the concept of equity used here. Singer draws attention to the fact that in
this context, equity is unrelated to fairness or the historic division of judicial power
between law and equity. Instead, it is submitted that it is more or less equated with or
synonymous with that which is referred to as the ‘spirit’ or ‘principle’.149 This
comment is particularly interesting when analysing section 39, the interpretation
clause of the Constitution. What is clear, is that the section ‘demands’150 an

143
Corry ‘Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes’ 1937 University of Toronto
Law Journal at 294.
144
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (3rd edition) at 119. In the earlier edition of their
book, the authors have submitted that: ‘The Constitutional Court has on several occasions
committed itself to an interpretation of the Bill of Rights which is usually referred to
as“purposive” but sometimes also as“value-orientated” or “teleological”.’
145
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 119.
146
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 39-40.
147
Crawford The Construction of Statutes at 243.
148
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 41 - 42.
149
Ibid at 42.
150
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 146. It is interesting that the
authors prefer the use of the word ‘demands,’ since in an earlier edition of their book, see De
Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (5th edition), they use the ‘requires,’ but revert to the

51
interpretation that promotes the ‘values’ or 'principles’ which underlie an open and
democratic society, and mandates that in the process of interpretation the courts must
promote the 'spirit’, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.151 It should be noted
that the wording is undoubtedly pro-active. This, in essence, encapsulates a
teleological or a value-coherent method of interpretation. Denning, a strong
protagonist of the teleological approach, explains the modus operandi of the
approach as follows, ‘Whenever there is a choice, choose the meaning which accords
with reason and justice.’152 Dugard – who advocated support for a value-orientated
method of interpretation – describes this as a ‘realist-cum-value-oriented
approach’.153 It is suggested that Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation is
also in essence teleological, and is based on his perception of ‘law as integrity’.154 Of
all the above-mentioned protagonists, Mureinik has endeavoured to go further than
merely identifying a teleological or a value-coherent method of interpretation as a
‘superior conception of interpretation’.155 In South Africa during the apartheid era,
the rights and liberties of individuals were severely curtailed by harsh discriminatory
legislation. Mureinik’s bold and perceptive assertion was that, in apartheid South

use of the word ‘demands’ in the later edition of their book. The word ‘demands’ is more in-
keeping with the idea of a moral obligation that is imposed on judges to give expression to
the values of the Constitution.
151
Section 39 of the Constitution provides that: -
‘(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum -
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law;and
(c) may consider foreign law
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights.’
152
Denning The Discipline of Law at 22.
153
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 400. Dugards asserts that even
though the realists and those who belong to the school of natural law are seen as
irreconcilation enemies, the two schools do in fact have much in common. He quotes Harry
W Jones in this regard: ‘In leeway situations, the positive law is not a command but, at most,
an authorization of alternative decisions. The choice between alternatives, the selection of the
path to be pursued, cannot but be influenced by the decision – makers ought to be. Legal
realism, with its emphasis on the inevitability of choice and discretion in the life of the law,
casts its vote – though for very different reasons – with the tradition of natural law, and
against Austin and the positivists, on the old issue of the complete analytical separateness of
the law that is from the law that ought to be.’
154
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 46.
155
Mureinik ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ (1983) 3 South African Law Journal at 623.

52
Africa that a value-coherent approach to interpretation was to be regarded as the
judge’s chief weapon against legislative injustice.156 It is indeed quite remarkable
that even before the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, he foresaw the
merits of a value-coherent method of interpretation.

While generally prior to the current constitutional era, courts were reluctant to apply
the teleological method of interpretation, however, the guidelines contained in
section 39 of the Constitution have changed this position dramatically. This is
succinctly summed up in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers,157 as follows:

‘The Constitution has changed the “context” of all legal thought and
decision-making in South Africa.’

Since the inception of the new constitutional dispensation, a myriad of case-law has
surfaced that has shown a decisive inclination by courts to adopt either a purposive
or a value-based approach.158 The court’s application of a value-coherent
methodology in Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty)
Ltd,159 is undoubtedly an illustration of teleological interpretation par-excellence. In
this case, the court had to ascertain whether the Popela community - all former
tenants of the land of Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits – were a ‘community’
dispossessed of a right in land as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices. The land in issue was the farm Boomplaats, which had been subsequently
consolidated into the farm Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd. The applicant’s
contention that they formed a community formed the crux of the dispute. They
therefore sought to achieve the constitutional aims of land restitution and land
reform. The respondent in the matter opposed the claim.

156
Ibid at 623 -624.
157
1996 (2) SA 588 (W).
158
See cases for example Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E); Baloro v
University of Bophuthatswana 1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (B) and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v
Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) BCLR 687 (CC).
159
2007 (6) SA 199 (CC).

53
In deciding on whether the Popela community constituted a ‘community’ for the
purposes of the Act,160 Moseneke DCJ reasoned that ‘a generous notion of what
constitutes a community fits well with the wide scope of the rights in land.’161 As a
result of employing a broad, purposive or a teleological method of interpretation in
his jurisprudential analysis, Moseneke DCJ deduced that the Popela community were
undoubtedly a community at the time they had been dispossessed.162 What is
observed is that a value-coherent interpretation which requires that the purpose of
legislation must be measured against the values of the Constitution, forms the
underlying basis of Moseneke DCJ’s jurisprudential analysis.163

With regard to whether the individual claimants were dispossessed ‘as a result of’
past discriminatory laws and practices, Moseneke DCJ maintained that the term ‘as a
result of’ was to be interpreted to mean no more than ‘as a consequence of’ and not
‘solely as a consequence of.’ According to this interpretation, Moseneke DCJ
maintained that there had to be a reasonable connection with the discriminatory laws
and practices on the one hand, and dispossession on the other. As a result, it was
necessary to consider the context and historical background of the legislation.164

In applying a value-orientated method of interpretation which is founded on a ‘moral

evaluation’165 of the circumstances and the plight of the claimants, the judge – in
attaching ‘less than the usual weight to linguistic and purposive considerations and
more than the usual weight to general legal values’166 – found in favour of the
applicants and awarded them restitution in terms of the Restitution Act.167 It is noted

160
A ‘Community’ in terms of the Definition Section of the Restitution of the Land Rights Act
22 of 1994 is - ‘unless the context indicates otherwise ... any group of persons whose rights
in land are derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such
group and indicates part of any such group.’
161
2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) at para 41.
162
See Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological Interpretation Par Excellence – Department of
Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC),’ (2009) 72
Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at 339 – 340 for an examination of the term
‘community’ as provided in terms of the Restitution of the Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.
163
Ibid at 344.
164
Ibid at 341.
165
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 47.
166
Mureinik ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ (1983) 3 South African Law Journal at 624.
167
22 of 1994.

54
that a moral evaluation, as embarked on by Moseneke J, was at the heart of the
decision-making. In adopting this stance, Moseneke J was able to fulfil the aims of
social justice sought in the case. It is stressed, therefore, that an ethical and moral
assessment of the factors, has to form the central or core consideration by courts.

The case of the African Christian Democratic Party v the Electoral Commission168 is
also relevant. In this case, the Constitutional Court was called upon to determine
whether the African Christian Democratic Party (hereinafter referred to as ACDP),
the applicant in the matter, had complied with sections 14 and 17 of the Local Govt:
Municipal Electoral Act.169 In terms of these provisions, it was specifically required
of parties that ward candidates who intended to contest an election, lodge with the
Electoral Commission a deposit as prescribed by legislation, together with a notice of
intention to contest the election.170 While the applicant had lodged an application
clearly indicating its intention to oppose, it had, however, not lodged a separate
deposit in respect of the Cape Metropolitan area. The view of the Electoral
Commission was that the applicant had not complied with the provisions of the
statute, and, as a result, this disqualified the ACDP from participating in elections.
Because the Electoral Court upheld the decision of the Electoral Commission, the
ACDP sought relief from the Constitutional Court.171

The view of the Constitutional Court differed from that espoused by the Electoral
Court. While the Electoral Court maintained that the ACDP had not complied with
the relevant provisions, O’ Regan J was of the view that the ACDP had, in fact, met
the registration requirements of the Electoral Act.172

168
2006 (5) BCLR 579 (CC). See also discussion by Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological
Interpretation Par Excellence – Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits
(Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC)’ (2009) 72 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at
340 on the rationale and findings of the Constitutional court in the African Christian
Democratic Party case.
169
27 of 2000.
170
Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological Interpretation Par Excellence – Department of Land
Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC)’ (2009) 72 Journal of
Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at 340-341.
171
Ibid.
172
Ibid.

55
It is evident from the judgment, that O’ Regan J’s reasoning and findings were as a
result of construing the provisions in ‘light of their purpose’173 This view reflects ‘the
general trend away from the strict legalistic to the substantive’.174 What is therefore
quite clear from the judgment, is that O’ Regan J’s approach to statutory
interpretation was unmistakably ‘purposive and value-based rather than literal’,175
and may indeed be regarded – as submitted by Le Roux – as being an ‘emphatic
example of the teleological approach to statutory interpretation’.176

2.5.1 Criticisms of the Teleological Theory

One of the criticisms of the teleological approach, is that it leads to unpredictability.

However, exponents of the teleological theory claim that the approach is much more
objective than the literal approach.177 Another inherent problem with the approach is
that as an individual’s perception of what is just and fair would differ from that of
others, and so too would a particular judge’s perception of justice.178

De Waal et al are of the view that a purposive or teleological interpretation is indeed

quite helpful, in that it acknowledges that the interpretation of the Bill of Rights
involves value judgments. However, the authors are critical that it does not prescribe
how such a value judgement is to be made.179 This submission, however, is not
entirely correct, since the guidelines for the interpretation of the Bill of Rights are
explicitly articulated in section 39 of the Constitution. Section 39(1) clearly

173
Devenish ‘African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission: The New
Methodology and Theory of Statutory. Interpretation’ 2006 123 South African Law Journal
at 403.
174
Le Roux ‘Directory Provisions - Section 39 (2) of the Constitution and the ontology of
Statutory law - African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission 2006 (3) SA 305
(CC)’ (2006) 21 South African Public Law at 388.
175
Devenish ‘African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission: The New
Methodology and Theory of Statutory. Interpretation’ 2006 123 South African Law Journal
at 402.
176
Le Roux ‘Directory Provisions - Section 39 (2) of the Constitution and the ontology of
Statutory law - African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission 2006 (3) SA 305
(CC)’ (2006) 21 South African Public Law at 400.
177
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 47.
178
Ibid.
179
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 138. The point is made that value
judgments are central to the exercise of interpreting the Bill of Rights.

56
prescribes that for purposes of interpretation, a court must promote ‘values’ which
underlie an open and democratic society, which is based on freedom and equality.
From the plethora of cases that have been decided subsequent to the adoption of the
interim Constitution, it is obvious that the application of section 39 by our courts has
resulted in findings that are certainly much more than purposive.180 Of all the
theories that have been applied, it seems that the teleological theory with a value-
based methodology or modus operandi, offers the most jurisprudentially sound
option thus far. However, it begs the question whether the theory is adequate for
addressing the needs of social transformation.

2.6 The Subjective Theory or Intention Theory

Steyn, a strong proponent of the intention theory, postulates that the determination of
the real intention of the legislature is of paramount importance in the process of
statutory interpretation, and that once discerned, it must be given effect to.181 While
overlaps with this theory are noted, the point of departure is that while the literal
theory focuses on the ordinary, literal and grammatical meaning of the word, the
intention theory draws a distinction between the language on the one hand and ideas
and thought on the other.182 In South Africa, it would appear that the particular
version of the intention theory that developed has its origin in literal theory
reasoning.183

Because the theory does not equate the ‘expressed intention’ to the ‘authentic
intention’ of the legislature (as does the literal theory), it is submitted that the
intention theory is actually ‘intellectually and jurisprudentially more sound’.184
Given that ascertainment of the ‘intention of the legislature’ is a highly subjective

180
See for example S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) and S v Zuma 1995
(4) BCLR 401 for the application of section 39 - the interpretation provision of the
Constitution.
181
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 94.
182
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 33.
183
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 95.
184
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 33.

57
enquiry, it makes sense that the intention theory has been referred to, and is often
described as, the subjective theory.185

2.6.1 Criticisms of the Intention Theory

Steyn’s advocacy and support of the intention theory is based on the idea that the
intention of the law is a reconstruction of the thinking inherent in it.186 The problem
with the application of this theory, as presented above, is with the question of
‘locating’ the intention of the legislature.187 In terms of the legislative processes,
there are a number of factors that come into play. For example, the persons who draft
legislation and who pass legislation are not the same, the draft legislation is also
extensively debated and there is sometimes widespread disagreement about the final
legislation – which is usually a product of compromise. This questions whose
thinking is demonstrated in the expressed intention of the legislature.188

Another criticism of the subjective and intention theories is that the determination of
the ‘intention of the legislature’ – which is central to the theory – is in itself elusive
and problematic. As a result, most commentators and jurists who resort to using the
phrase, ‘intention of the legislature’ do so without being able to furnish a complete or
detailed explanation of exactly what it means.189 The effect of the application of the
intention theory, in practice, has been literalism in the guise of intentionalism.190
What has resulted, is an amalgam of the literal and the subjective theories – referred
to as intentionalism-cum-literalism. 191

Even though the application of the theory in the manner described is discredited the
‘integrity and merit’ of a purely subjective theory,192 that has emerged in South

185
Ibid.
186
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 94.
187
Ibid.
188
Ibid.
189
In Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 925 (A),
the ‘intention of the legislature’ was emphasized as the primary rule of interpretation.
190
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 31.
191
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-31.
192
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 35.

58
African law, particularly prior to the current constitutional dispensation, has been a
predilection of the courts to use this particular combined methodology.193 Generally,
South African courts appear to have previously accepted the underlying basis of the
intention theory and it is observed that it has been applied in case-law ‘with little, if
any, sensitivity to its numerous pitfalls’.194

With the paradigmatic shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional

supremacy, ‘the legislative will of parliament can no longer be sovereign’,195 as it is
now subject to the Constitution and its values. The resultant effect of this, is that the
intention theory – which was very popular prior to the era of constitutional
supremacy – ‘can no longer be the paramount rule of statutory interpretation’.196

2.7 The Objective Theory

The objective theory is regarded as an antidote to the subjectivism of the intention

theory.197 According to the way the theory works, it is provided that once a statute
has been promulgated, it brings to an end the task of the legislature – and the
legislative text assumes an existence of its own.198 This theory is also known as the
delegation theory – a name that was probably derived when considering the role of
the courts in the process of interpretation. In carrying out their function, courts are
said to be ‘acting as the legislature’s delegates’.199 The American scholar Curtis
makes the point that when construing legislation, the words in a statute are to be

193
The following cases have affirmed adherence to the intention theory - S v Weinberg 1979 (3)
SA 89 A at 98 - 99; S v Ngwenya1979 (2) SA 96 (A) at 100 – 101; and S v Yolelo1981 (1) SA
1002 A at 1011.
194
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 35. According to Du Plessis to list all South
African precedents in which this approach has been used, recognized or referred to, would
require quite an extensive table of cases.
195
See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 95-96, for a criticism of the intention theory.
The problem with focusing on the ‘intension of the legislature,’ is whose thinking constitutes
the ‘intention of the legislature’? The idea that is created, may be alleviated by arguing that
the ‘intention of the legislature’ is not what the legislature actually had in mind, but rather
what it meant to say.
196
Ibid.
197
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-37.
198
Cowen ‘Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ (1976)
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg at 157.
199
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 98.

59
regarded as ‘delegations’ to the courts to interpret ‘within their authority’.200 He
explains further that ‘the more imprecise the words are, the greater is the
delegation.’201

In terms of the modus operandi of the theory, it is submitted that when interpreting
legislation, the interpreter has to do so – being mindful of the time frame within
which they function.202 This process would therefore require the interpreter to
consider the policies that existed at the time a statute became law – as well as
changes that might have occurred as a result of implementation of such policies.203

2.7.1 Criticisms of the Objective Theory

The obvious flaw inherent in the objective theory is that statutory interpretation does
not only involve an acknowledgement of the ‘past intention’ of the legislature.204 It is
a ‘continuous process’, in terms of which the ‘present realization’ is just as, if not
more relevant, when interpreting a text.205 Du Toit is vehemently opposed to the
application of the objective theory. He bases his argument on what he calls
‘dimension of futurity in law.’206 It is maintained that ‘past meaning’ must be
transposed into present terms, and the consideration of ‘present meaning’ opens up
vistas of futurity bearing in mind that the law as a social science is a dynamic

200
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 50.
201
Ibid. Curtis explains his theory as follows: ‘Words in legal documents are simply delegations
to others of authority to be given them meaning by applying them to particular things or
occasions … Words mean not what their author intended them to mean, or even what
meaning he intended, or expected reasonably or not, others gave to them. They mean, in the
first instance what the person to whom they are addressed makes them mean.’
202
Dias Jurisprudence (5th edition) at 170.
203
Ibid. The author describes ‘application’ as a continuing process and the ‘application of a
provision’ in a particular case is only one step in a journey.
204
Du Toit ‘The Dimension of Futurity in the Law: Towards a Renewal of the Theory of
Interpretation’ (1977) Journal for Juridical Science at 11.
205
Ibid at 16.
206
Ibid at 11.

60
phenomenon and not static.207 It is understandable why objectivism has not met with
approval in South African courts.208

When considering the interpretive guidelines outlined in section 39 of the

Constitution, which require that courts, tribunals and forums promote the values that
underlie an open and democratic society, as well as give due consideration to
international law and foreign law, it is submitted that this analysis is a far cry from
the application of the theory, as discussed above. Our courts are now specifically
mandated to consider both past and present legislation and make a value-judgment
with respect to the matter under consideration. In its pristine form, therefore, the
objective theory does not have relevance in the current South African legal system.

2.8 The Judicial Theory

The judicial or ‘free theory’, as it is termed, basically recognizes the creative role
played by the judiciary in the process of interpretation and application of the law.209
It acknowledges the ‘freedom’ that judges have in choosing one rule of interpretation
over another.210 The theory – as presented above – can be perceived as being a
reaction to primitive literalism, since it has at its core the ‘element of subjectivity’

207
Ibid at 16-19.
208
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 98.
209
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 34.See also Dugard Human Rights and the South
African Legal Order at 382, where Dugard recognizes the creative powers of judges in the
process of interpretation: ‘Once there is a clear recognition of the creative powers of the
judiciary in the interpretation of statutes, it will be easier for judges to be guided by accepted
legal values, rather than by subconscious preferences, in their law-making task. Of course,
…judges should be guided by legal values and policy… The legal principles should be
employed to guide judicial policy… and to form part of the South African legal heritage.’ At
the time that Dugard made the above submission, South Africa did not have a democratic
Constitution and a justiciable Bill of Rights. With the advent of the current democratic
dispensation, the role of judges has changed substantially. Judges are now mandated and
obliged to give effect to the fundamental values which forms the basis of the democratic
order. It is therefore submitted that judges are under a moral obligation to give effect to the
values and principles of the Constitution.
210
Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 49. See also Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v
Chawanda1991 (2) SA 825 (ZSC) at 832 H-I, where the position of the court was that: ‘…
judges have a certain amount of freedom or latitude in the process of interpretation and
application of the law.’

61
which judges adopt when interpreting legislation.211 This, in essence, supports the
more radical form of the theory. The moderates however contend that in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature, judges are only able to make sense of a particular
enactment by filling in the gaps where necessary.212 Their role, therefore, might also
extend to ‘remedying’ defects’ in statutes and deficiencies that sometimes arise in
practice.213

The impression created in the exposition of this theory, as provided above, that ‘the
law of statutory interpretation has become a bag of tricks from which courts can pull
respectable sounding rules to justify any possible result the judge desires’,214 is a
gross distortion of the judicial theory and of the role of the judiciary in the process of
interpretation.

2.8.1 Criticisms of the Judicial Theory

While there is merit in the argument that a judge’s character, upbringing and
education play a role in the decision-making process,215 this is where the level of
subjectivity starts and ends. It has to be understood that the process of interpretation
involves a ‘rule-bound evaluation’216 that is guided by ‘objective’ canons of
construction.217 It is not simply a ‘capricious choice’,218 but an ‘evaluation’ which

211
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 49.
212
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 97. Du Plessis uses an interesting term to describe
the judicial or the free theory. He refers to the judicial theory as ‘judicial activism.’
213
Ibid.
214
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 48 - 49.
215
See Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 379-380, where the author
quotes FN Broome, Judge President of Natal from 1951 to 1960, shortly after his retirement :
‘The judges mental make-up must necessarily influence his judgement, and the influence is
of course nearly always subconscious. Nearly every judge who has anything of a judicial
personality … may be placed in one or other of two categories which are difficult to describe
preciselybut which may be broadly called the conservative and the liberal …’
216
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 49.
217
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 98, where it is maintained that while the canons of
construction are used to justify the interpretive result, the outcome is actually predetermined
by the interpreting judge’s pre-understanding. De Ville is also in agreement with the idea of
a judge’s pre-understanding in the interpretive process. See De Ville Constitutional and
Statutory Interpretation at 6, where he submits that: ‘Only by being aware of one’s
prejudices can they be critically reflected on. A judge who holds that “the text is clear” can

62
involves ‘both linguistic and non-linguistic considerations’.219 What is evident in the
interpretation and application of section 39(2), is that not only does the section
mandate a purposive methodology, but it also undoubtedly unlocks the creative
powers of judges. While the parameters of the functions of judges extend outside the
scope of the research undertaken, it is quite clear that the application of section 39
(2) implores that judges in their interpretation and application of legislation, fulfil the
role of ‘guardians of constitutional values’.220 Put another way, in the current
constitutional order, it is fundamental that judges heed the ethical and moral
considerations as part of the process of interpretation and decision-making. A
judicial theory and the possibilities that it holds for the new constitutional order,
must – in light of the above submissions – be revisited.

2.9 An Appraisal of the Theories Presented

An analysis of the theories of statutory interpretation, precipitates some interesting

results. While the South African courts have applied in one way or other almost all
the theories examined, there has certainly not been a ‘consistent approach’ to the
interpretation of statutes.221 However, with the advent of the new constitutional era,
this position is notably different. Subsequent to the Constitution, it is apparent that
there has been a distinct shift from literalism to purposivism.222 In spite of this, it is
unfortunate, however, that even though the Constitution clearly mandates a value-

hardly be said to have reflected on her prejudices. That the text is clear is a finding a judge
can only make after having interpreted the text. Such a finding is usually made without
justification and thus without critically reflecting, on one’s pre-understanding.’
218
Frankfurter ‘Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes’ (1963) Essays on Jurisprudence
from the Columbia Law Review at 50.
219
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 49.
220
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 102-103. In terms of the official oath of judicial
officers (Item 6 (1) of Schedule 2 of the Constitution, judges are under an obligation to
uphold and protect the Constitution and the human rights in it. This means that judges will
have to make value-judgments based on morality.
221
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 52.
222
The case-law examined indicate a distinct shift away from literalism to purposivism. Some of
these cases include for example: S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); S v Zuma 1995
(4) BCLR 401 SA; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism and Others 2004 (7) BCLR at 687 (CC); and S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA
867 (CC).

63
based approach to the process of interpretation, some courts and judges have been
slow to embrace this challenge – with the result that a number of judges still apply an
outmoded literal approach to interpretation.223 While, perhaps, the ‘exigencies of
each case’ and the ‘measure of latitude’ accorded to judges may result in a particular
theoretical position being favoured by a particular judge, this does not detract from
the role and the responsibility of judges in the current constitutional order. As
illustrated, what is expected of judges in a transitional constitutional democracy, is
that they give expression to the values that underlie an open and democratic society,
and conduct an ethical and moral evaluation of all of the factors under consideration.
It is therefore submitted that while some of the more popular theories – for example
the purposive and the teleological theory – tend to embrace external factors, there is
no theory that explicitly requires that the interpreter give expression to a moral code
and reasoning and embodies pro-activism as part of its modus operandi. A deontic
theory of interpretation, which is based on ethics and morality, involves reasoning
other than inductive and deductive reasoning and an analysis that is consistent with
the emerging jurisprudence in South Africa, in that it is to be applied in a pro-active
manner, is proposed in response to all of the inadequacies or shortfalls identified in
the theories that have been examined.

The question that emerges following examination of the theories of statutory

interpretation, is whether a particular approach or approaches can be singled out to as
a ‘one size fits all’ solution when deciding on issues of statutory or constitutional
interpretation. This is indeed a vexatious question, and one that has plagued scholars
well versed in the field of statutory interpretation, for many a year.

Cowen has suggested that the following factors are to be taken into consideration in
the process of interpretation, which are the:

223
See Davis and Klare ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary
Law’ (2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights at 403. The authors argue that as a
consequence of judges and legal practioners applying old methodologies to interpretation,
three problems have resulted include;-
1) A reluctance to interrogate the distributive consequences of private law rules on lived
experiences;
2) The emergence of a neo-liberal strand in the application of the Constitution; and
3) The lack of critical sharpness when it comes to issues related to the separation of
powers.

64
 (i) literal text;
(ii) subject matter of the statute;
(iii) general historical context;
(iv) legal history of the enactment;
(v) purpose of the enactment, and its mischief;
(vi) practical consequences of the various interpretations, bearing in
mind that the legislature must be presumed to have intended a
sensible, fair and workable result; and
(vii) common law expressed in the presumptions.224

While the clarity of the language in the literal text must be taken into account in the
process of interpretation, the approach requires that due consideration must also be
given to the context. Cowen, however, does not refer to the methodology outlined
above, by name – for example, a purposive or a contextual approach. What is
apparent though, is that the theory or the approach suggested – which requires a
‘weighing-up’ of all of the elements enumerated225 – is akin to a teleological
evaluation. Even before the advent of constitutional democracy, Devenish postulated
the need for a justiciable Bill of Rights with a provision ‘authorizing’ or prescribing
a teleological method or theory of interpretation,226 which involved an unqualified
contextual weighing up of linguistic, legal and jurisprudential consideration, and
which would place the process of interpretation on a ‘sounder jurisprudential
footing’.227

Du Plessis, in his attempt to present the most appropriate method of interpretation,

has propounded what has been referred to as a ‘practically inclusive method of
interpretation’. Initially suggested as a technique for constitutional interpretation, Du
Plessis suggested that the methodology is suitable and can be applied to statutory
interpretation as well.228 The five ‘reading strategies’ that are central to the approach,

224
Cowen “Prolegomenon to a Re-Statement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ (1976)
Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 159 - 160.
225
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 53.
226
Ibid at 54-55.
227
Ibid.
228
Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights at 73 - 74.

65
include grammatical interpretation, systematic (or contextual interpretation),
teleological interpretation, historical interpretation, and comparative interpretation.229
The modus operandi of the methodology is that the above-mentioned reading
strategies are complementary and inter-related, and should be applied in conjunction
with one another.230 The operation of the different reading strategies working in
conjunction with one another – which is endorsed by Du Plessis – compares
favourably with an eclectric methodology proposed as the modus operandi for the
operation of a deontic theory of interpretation. Basically, what is suggested, is that a
deontic theory of interpretation, would require an amalgamation of the
methodologies of the various theories of interpretation, and is to be applied pro-
actively, to give effect to the constitutional aims of transformation and restoration.

2.10 Conclusion

What is evident is that the advent of the new constitutional era and the application of
section 39 in particular, mandates the process of interpretation of legislation. The
Constitution reinforces the values that have to be given expression to – which include
liberal values and socio-economic values. The emerging jurisprudence, therefore, in
giving expression to and upholding the values that underpin the democratic order, is
notably one that requires a methodology for a transformative constitutional order.
With the shift away from literalism to purposivism, our jurisprudence is also
evolving. The emerging jurisprudence, which is a distinct move away from
positivism, appears to be akin to natural law – with the Constitution as the supreme
law. Therefore, the way one would approach the process of interpretation subsequent
to the adoption of the interim Constitution, is different. The emerging jurisprudence
requires a ‘new’ theory, and a new theory requires a ‘new’ methodology.

The proposed deontic theory, which has its genesis in section 39, suggests that the
most decisive way that courts and judges can give expression to the values of the
Constitution, is by conducting an ethical and moral evaluation of the provision under

229
See Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 192-195 for a discussion of the five
techniques of interpretation.
230
Ibid at 58. A more detailed analysis of the five techniques identified above or the ‘reading
strategies,’ as they are also referred to, will be conducted in Chapter 3.

66
consideration. Such reasoning and analysis is consistent with deontic reasoning that
forms the basis of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. With its own
particular modus operandi, which requires an eclectic methodology, and a pro-active
approach to the interpretation and application of legislation, it is maintained, that for
the reasons submitted, a deontic theory of interpretation – which embraces all of the
elements identified above, provides a more holistic approach231 to the process of
interpretation.

231
Kim Statutory Interpretation – General Principles and Recent Trends at 1-2. The author
shows support for the holistic approach alluded to. The point made is that: ‘A cardinal rule of
construction is that a statute should be read as a harmonious whole, with its various parts
being interpreted within their broader statutory context in the manner that furthers statutory
purposes. Justice Scalia, who has been in the vanguard of efforts to re-direct statutory text …
has aptly characterized this general approach – as follows “statutory construction … is a
holistic endeavor.’

67
 CHAPTER 3

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION – ITS ROLE,

SIGNIFICANCE AND INFLUENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

3.1 Introduction

Since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, the Constitution has
manifestly affected every aspect of South African life and also influenced the
development of law.1 The emerging jurisprudence as a result of the Constitution has
seen a paradigmatic shift away from positivism to that which may be considered as
being akin to natural law. The aim of Chapter 3 is intended to explore fully how the
Constitution has influenced both constitutional interpretation and statutory
interpretation and to determine the nature of the emerging jurisprudence in the
constitutional era in South Africa. For this reason, the approach with regard to the
examination of the subject in this chapter is to carefully consider;

a) the principles that underlie constitutional interpretation; and

b) the relevant constitutional provisions, which include, section 1, section 2,

section 39, and section 172,2 that inform the process of interpretation in the
current constitutional order.

1
See Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors
(Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para
21, where Langa DP explains that: ‘Section 39 (2) of the Constitution means that all statutes
must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights … As such, the process of
interpreting the context in which we find ourselves and the Constitution’s goal of a society
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. The spirit of
transition and transformation characterizes the constitutional enterprise as a whole.’
2
It is submitted that while Chapter 3 focuses mainly on the sections referred to, the other
chapters of the thesis also make reference to and discuss other relevant sections of the
Constitution, where necessary.

68
3.2 The Constitution as a Founding Document

Since the inception of the new democratic era in 1994,3 the Constitution has become
‘the frame of reference within which everything must function, and against which all
actions must be tested’.4 Gaining its authority from the supremacy provision set out
in section 2, which provides that:

‘The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Republic; law or conduct

inconsistent with it in invalid,’5

it affirms that the Constitution is not merely another legislative instrument, but the
supreme law of the land or the lex fundamentalis.6 A constitutional state with a
supreme constitution has two essential components that form the basis of the
structure. This includes a formal element (including aspects such as the separation of
powers, checks and balances on government and the principle of legality), and a
material or a substantive element – which refers to a state bound by a system of
fundamental values such as inter alia justice and equality.7
The Constitution declares its own supremacy – that operates in a manner that can be
described as being two-fold. Firstly, in terms of section 1 (c), the Republic of South
Africa is said to be founded on the values of the supremacy of the Constitution. In
essence, therefore, the founding statement affirms that this ‘value status’ is
guaranteed and is expected to pervade all law in the legal system.8

3
This refers to the situation initially with the Interim Constitution of 1993 and thereafter with
the Final Constitution of 1996.
4
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 184.See also Investigating Directorate Serious
Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit2001 (1) SA 545 (CC).
5
Section 2 of the Constitution provides that: ‘The Constitution is the Supreme law of the
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it
must be fulfilled.’
6
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 185. A supreme Constitution is not merely
another legislative document, but the supreme law or the lex fundamentalis of the land.
7
Ibid.
8
Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa
(2nd edition) 32-97. In Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592
(SE), at 597 G-H, Froneman J explained that: ‘The interpretation of the Constitution will be
directed at ascertaining the foundational values inherent in the Constitution…’

69
Secondly, in terms of section 2 of the Constitution, it is stated that the Constitution
‘is the Supreme law of the Republic’ and that ‘law or conduct inconsistent with it, is
invalid.’ This ‘trumping sense’9 supremacy of the Constitution, basically means that
if any law conflicts with a constitutional provision, the constitutional provision will
take precedence. The resultant effect of the operation of a Constitution is that the
Constitution has a ‘decisive impact on the conventional hierarchy and status of all
legal rules and legislation in South Africa.’10 The most distinctive feature of South
Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional system, is that of constitutional supremacy,11
and the decision to make the Constitution supreme has had far-reaching
implications.12 Section 1 is of profound importance, as it sets out some of the most
important values on which the South African Constitution is founded.13 Section 1
provides:

‘The Republic of South Africa is a one sovereign, democratic state founded

on the following values -
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of
human rights and freedoms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a rational common voters roll, regular
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.’

The Constitution does not only set out the values, processes and structures that place
a limit on governmental power, but the Constitution also expresses the ideal to
which, as a society, most South Africans aspire to. The idea that South African
society should be based on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom has
resulted in a value-based democratic order.14 The theory of interpretation that seems

9
Ibid.
10
Ibid. (Emphasis Added)
11
De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context at 54.
12
Ibid at 55.
13
Ibid at 57.
14
Ibid at 58.

70
to most favour a value-based methodology is a broad purposive or a teleological
theory of interpretation. Even though recent Constitutional Court decisions have
shown an inclination to favour a value-based methodology or a teleological theory of
interpretation,15 it begs the question about the applicability of the teleological theory
in the new constitutional dispensation, in South Africa.

It is submitted that the Constitution as a memorial ‘serves to remind the nation of

their pledge (and provides them with the appropriate legal means) to achieve social
justice’.16 It is described as both a memorial (which commemorates) and a monument
(which celebrates).While the difference in meanings is subtle, the terms are not,
however, synonymous.17 According to Du Plessis, while heroes and achievements
are generally celebrated, the same does not apply to anti-heroes and disasters. It is
provided that while they may be remembered, they can hardly be celebrated. An
appropriate term, therefore, would be to ‘commemorate’ or to ‘remember’ the
incident or perhaps the victims involved.18

Additional popular imagery used by academics to capture the ‘special status’19

ascribed to the supremacy of the Constitution, has been the bridge metaphor. While
Mureinik describes the Constitution as forming ‘a bridge in a divided society,’20 Van
der Walt argues that the bridge metaphor allows for another interpretation whereby
‘the bridge is not simply an instrument for getting out of one place and into another,

15
Ibid at 59.
16
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-76.
17
See Snyman ‘Interpretation and the Politics of Memory’ (1998) Acta Juridica at 317-321.
18
See Du Plessis ‘The South African Constitution As Memory and Promise’ (2000) 3
Stellenbosch Law Review at 385-386, where the author distinguishes between the terms
‘celebrate’ and ‘commemorate.’ He draws a comparison with the German words Denkmal
and Mahnmal and explains that while a Denkmal can celebrate (and may even
commemorate), a Mahnmal on the other hand warns, and may even castigate.
19
Botha Statutory Interpretation, (5th edition) at 187.
20
Mureinik ‘A Bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights (1994) South African
Journal on Human Rights at 32. In-keeping with the bridge metaphor, Mureinik submits that:
‘If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must
be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of
power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the
cogency of the case offered of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command.
The new order must be built on persuasion, not coercion.’

71
but an edifice that is inherently related to the abyss which it spans.’21 Le Roux adds
that ‘it is not the bridge itself that is significant, but the act of bridging, of linking the
past and the future, reality and imagination, in order to create new ideas in the
present’.22 Commenting on the metaphorical bridge that both Van der Walt and Le
Roux describe, Michael Bishop refers to such a bridge as a ‘transformative bridge’.23
He maintains that such a ‘transformative bridge envisions constant change and re-
evaluation’ rather than a ‘move from one point to another.’24 In keeping with the
analogy, he makes the point that ‘the transitional bridge is a path, while the
transformative bridge is a space’.25

In drawing on this analysis, it would seem that such a bridge has indeed paved the
way for transformative constitutionalism. Specific features of the transformative
South African Constitution have been identified as ‘the attainment of inter alia
substantive equality, the infusion of the private sphere with human rights and a
culture of justification in public law interactions’.26 To determine how the
transformative nature of the Constitution has the potential to ‘profoundly and
comprehensively’27 affect constitutional interpretation, will be explored more fully in
this and subsequent chapters.

3.2.1 Understanding the Transformative Nature of the

Constitution

It is submitted that the South African Constitution has often been aptly described as a
‘transformative Constitution’. De Vos et al have attempted to unpack what this
means by contextualizing the South African Constitution. The authors submit that the

21
Van der Walt ‘Dancing with Codes – Protecting, Developing and Deconstructing Property
Rights in a Constitutional State’ (2001) 118 South African Law Journal at 258.
22
Le Roux ‘Bridges, Clearings, Labyrinths: The Architecture of Post-Apartheid
Constitutionalism’ (2004) South African Public Law: Public Law in Transformation at 634.
23
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) 32-80.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Pieterse ‘What do We Mean When We Talk about Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2005)
20 South African Public Law at 161.
27
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) 32-80.

72
Constitution was written in response to the urgent need for social, economic, legal
and political transformation.28 Davis further explains that South African
constitutionalism therefore should transform South African society from a deeply
divided legacy of a racist and unequal past into a society based on democratic
principles of social justice, equality, dignity and freedom.29 In elucidating the idea of
‘transformative constitutionalism’, the former Chief Justice Pius Langa stressed that
the objective of transformative constitutionalism was to create a truly equal society
and ‘to heal the wounds of the past and to guide us to a better future’.30 Langa, in a
legal sense, therefore describes ‘transformation’ as:

‘…a social and an economic revolution … The provision of services to all

and the leveling of economic playing fields that were so drastically skewed
by the apartheid system must be absolutely central to any concept of
transformative constitutionalism’.31

It is not surprising, therefore, that the idea of a transformative Constitution, has been
reflected in a plethora of Constitutional Court judgments.32 In furthering the agenda
of social transformation, the Court in S v Makwanyane and Another held that the
Constitution attempts to provide ‘a transition from these grossly unacceptable
features of the past to a conspicuously contrasting future’.33 In Mhlungu the
Constitutional Court was adamant that ‘the new constitutional order might develop a
jurisprudence that represents a ringing break from the past’.34 In Du Plessis and

28
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 27.
29
Davis Democracy and Deliberation: Transformation and the South African Legal Order at
44. (Emphasis Added)
30
Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ Prestige Lecture delivered at Stellenbosch
University on 9 October 2006.
31
Ibid.
32
See for example Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (2) BCLR
150 (CC) at para 81 and Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu Natal) 1997 (12)
BCLR 1696 at para 80, amongst others.
33
S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 at para 262.
34
Davis ‘The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans : Please Sir May I Have Some More
Literalism!’(1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights at 507. In S v Mhlungu 1995
(3) SA 867, Mohamed DP is quite emphatic in his assertions that : ‘… the new Constitution
represented a ringing break with the past which perpetuated inequality and irrational
discrimination and arbitrary governmental and executive action.’

73
others v De Klerk, the Court went further and asserted that the Constitution ‘is a
document that seeks to transform the status quo ante into a new order’.35 What can be
garnered from an examination of case-law, is that the process of interpretation of a
transformative Constitution in South Africa, requires looking both backward and
forward.36 It is necessary to look backward at the history of South Africa to
determine which negative aspects of the past the Constitution as a document seeks to
redress and transform. At the same time, the process of interpretation has to be
‘forward-looking’ to improve the prevailing situation – to achieve economic,
political and social transformation.37

A new South African jurisprudence that has emerged has been described as post-
liberal and transformative in nature.38 It therefore raises the question about the role of
judges in interpreting the constitutional text. While the earlier discussions on the
theories of interpretation39 have revealed a definite shift from literalism to
purposivism with regard to ordinary statutory interpretation, it is safe to say that the
courts have indeed also recognized the significance of a value-based system with
regard to constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, in spite of this, it would seem
that even though the notion of establishing an ‘objective normative value system’
would appear to be important to the process of constitutional interpretation, the
subject has unfortunately not received sufficient attention from the courts and
judges.40 In Carmichele and Geldenhuys v Minister of Safety and Security, the court
affirmed that the content of this normative system does not only depend on an
abstract philosophical inquiry, but rather also upon an understanding that the
Constitution mandates that ‘our constitutional dispensation had to be instilled with a

35
1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at para 157.
36
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 28.
37
Ibid. See also De Vos ‘A Bridge Too Far? History as context in the Interpretation of the
South African Constitution’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights at 1-33.
38
Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal
on Human Rights at 146.
39
See Chapter 2 for an indepth analysis of the theories of interpretation.
40
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 59.

74
new operational vision based on foundational values of our constitutional system’.41
This reflects a pro-active methodology which brings about social justice.

The dictum above has to be considered in light of the earlier submissions made,42
that the difficulty in establishing an ‘objective normative value-system’ relates
directly to the fact that the theories of interpretation, as presented, are inadequate. It
is submitted that the emerging jurisprudence – as a result of the transformative nature
of the Constitution – requires a ‘new operational vision based on foundational
values’.43 It is submitted that the proposed deontic theory which requires that judges
– in the process of interpretation – provide a more philosophical enquiry by giving
due consideration to the moral and ethical dimension in the process of legal
reasoning and in so doing, to achieve the vision of a transformative Constitution that
is holistic in nature.

3.3 The Differences and Similarities Between Constitutional

Interpretation and Ordinary Statutory Interpretation

3.3.1 Similarities

Acknowledging that there are both similarities and differences between constitutional
and ‘ordinary’ statutory interpretation, it is acknowledged that the similarities are not
to be under-estimated and that the differences are not to be over-emphasised.44

Structurally, it has been observed that the Constitution and ‘ordinary’ statutes have
many similar features.45 As enacted law texts, they are both subject to what is

41
In Carmichele and Geldenhys v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2002 (4) SA 719
(CC) at 728 G-I, the court maintained that the ‘objective normative value system seeks to
establish a society based on human dignity, equality and freedom …’
42
See discussion and submissions made in Chapter 2 relating to the theories of interpretation.
43
The position has been affirmed in Carmichelle and Geldenhys v Minister of Safety and
Security and Another 2002 (4) SA 719 at 728, where it was maintained that the development
of South African society required a new operational vision based on foundational values of
our constitutional system.
44
Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights at 88.
45
Some of the structural similar features include for example preambles, headings, sections,
sub-sections, paragraphs and schedules, which are clearly evident when examining both
legislative texts.

75
referred to as ‘legal interpretation’.46 Because ‘text genre co-constitutes textual
meaning and therefore co-determines the manner in which the text is to be read and
understood’47 or put in another way that ‘both are members of the same broad
interpretive family’,48 it is to that extent that the similarities are important.
De Ville also shows support for this contention. He maintains that:

‘The constitutional theory which inspires the interpretation of the

Constitution should ... also inform statutory interpretation.’49

From an analysis of section 39(2),50 which clearly mandates a broad value-based

purposive interpretation of the Constitution, it follows that this value-based or value-
orientated methodology should also guide the process of ‘ordinary’ statutory
interpretation.51 Because the Constitution and ‘ordinary’ statutes have similarities in
both the ‘formal and operational style’,52 it allows for both to depend on similar
reading strategies53 for interpretation. In his analysis of these reading strategies of
interpretation, Du Plessis submits that in constitutional interpretation, such strategies
can be overridden by ‘more pressing constitutional concern’,54 which also re-inforces
the idea of the supremacy of the Constitution.

46
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-109.
47
Ibid.
48
Botha Statutory Interpretations (5th edition) at 184.
49
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 60. Support for this approach can be
found in both constitutional as well as judgments of the Land Claims Court. See for example
Minister of Land Affairs and Another v Slamdien and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 413 (LCC); and
Dulabh and Another v Department of Land Affairs 1997 (4) SA 1108 (LCC).
50
Section 39 (2) provides:-
‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law,
every court tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.’
51
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 184.
52
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 123-128.
53
The reading strategies that are referred to are the conventional canons of statutory
interpretation, which are examined in greater detail in this chapter. See 3.6 Canon-Guided
Reading Strategies.
54
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-111.

76
3.3.2 Differences

While the debate between the similarity and the dissimilarity continues, the idea of
the distinctiveness of constitutional interpretation among South African scholars is a
popular topic. In drawing attention to the unique features of the Constitution, Du
Plessis also highlights the differences between constitutional and statutory
interpretation.55 In essence therefore, it is noted:

 The Constitution, as supreme law, is a long-lasting, enacted law-text

at the highest point or the ‘apex’ of all legal norms within the legal
order;
 The Constitution provides for justiciable laws and therefore
mandates a standard for assessment of the validity for both ‘law’ and
‘conduct’;
 The Constitution verbalizes characteristically broad, inclusive and
open-ended language values and beliefs that are consistent with a
democracy within a constitutional state; and
 The Constitution is a product resulting from a culmination of intense
negotiation and encapsulates the ideological aspirations of the
democratic society.

What is evident in identifying the above-mentioned features, is that the main reason
for the distinctiveness between constitutional interpretation and ‘ordinary’ statutory
interpretation – can be attributed to the supremacy of the Constitution. A direct
consequence of constitutional supremacy, is the obligation to declare invalid law or
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution. The relevant provision in this
regard is section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, which basically provides that:

‘a court must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the
constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.’

55
Ibid.

77
When it is alleged that a statutory provision is prima facie constitutionally invalid, a
court will first attempt to interpret the impugned provision, so as to make it
constitutionally valid. This is generally known as a reading-down process.56 If
reading-down is not possible, the court will have to declare a law invalid. However,
to prevent a law from being declared completely invalid, a court may attempt to
‘limit the substantive impact of the declaration’, by either severing the offending
words, or reading in new words to ‘cure’ the constitutional defect.57 This is also
referred to as ‘modifying’ or ‘adapting’ legislation to keep it constitutional and
‘alive.’58The Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another,59 is an
excellent illustration of the stance of the Constitutional Court in effecting the
reading-in of words into legislation to make it constitutionally valid. The Fourie
Court found that the common-law and section 30(1) of the Marriage Act60 were
inconsistent with section 9 of the Constitution, in that they made no provision for
same sex persons to enjoy the same status as heterosexual persons. As a result of the
incompatibility of the common-law and the Marriage Act with the Constitution, O’
Regan J’s approach to resolving the matter was exemplary. She makes the
submission that:

‘Before I conclude this judgment I must stress that it has dealt solely with
the issues directly before the court. I leave open for appropriate future
legislative consideration or judicial determination the effect, if any of this
judgment on decisions this court has made in the past concerning same-sex
life partners who did not have the option to marry. Similarly, this judgment
does not pre-empt in any way appropriate legislative intervention to regulate
the relationships (and in particular, to safeguard the interests of vulnerable
parties of those living in conjugal or non-conjugal family units, whether
heterosexual or gay or lesbian, not at present receiving legal protection…
What ever comprehensive legislation governing all domestic partnerships
may be envisaged for the future, the applicants have established the
56
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 394.
57
Ibid.
58
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 195.
59
2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC).
60
25 of 1961.

78
 existence of clearly identified infringements of their rights, and are entitled
to specific appropriate relief.

In keeping with this approach it is necessary that the orders of this Court,
read together, make it clear that if Parliament fails to cure the defect within
twelve months, the words “or spouse” will automatically be read into
section 30(1) of the Marriage Act. In this event the Marriage Act will,
without more, become the legal vehicle to enable same-sex couples to
achieve the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities which it
presently makes available to heterosexual couples.’61

O’Regan J’s submission where it is provided that ‘…I leave open for appropriate
future legislative consideration…’ and ‘… whatever comprehensive legislation
governing all domestic partnerships may be envisaged for the future …’, is clearly
reflective of a more innovative and pro-active approach in dealing with the matter of
same-sex persons wishing to enter into marriage.
Reading-down, reading-in, and severance are discussed more fully hereunder.

3.4 Reading-in, Reading-down, Severance and Reading in

Conformity with the Constitution

3.4.1 Reading-Down

While the Interim Constitution – in terms of section 35(2) and section 232(2) –
explicitly authorized the reading-down of legislation which was unconstitutional, the
1996 Constitution does not contain a similar provision.62 Nevertheless, reading-down
and reading-in techniques are a valid and necessary part of constitutional review.63

A good illustration of reading-down of a statutory provision in order to prevent it

from being unconstitutional, is evident in Govender v Minister of Safety and

61
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) at 414
para 160.
62
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 195.
63
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-139.

79
Security.64 The provision in contention was section 49(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Act,65 which basically provided:

‘If any person authorized … to arrest or to assist in arresting another,

attempts to arrest such a person and such person –
(a) resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the use of force;
(b) flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, or
resists such an attempt and flees;
the person so authorized may, in order to effect the arrest, use such
force as may in the circumstances be reasonably necessary to
overcome the resistance or to prevent the person concerned from
fleeing’66

As a result of the reading-down of section 49(2), the Supreme Court of Appeal

maintained that the use of a firearm or similar weapon to effect an arrest may be
warranted, only if the person authorized to carry out the arrest has reason to believe
that the suspect:

1) poses an immediate threat to him or her, or a threat of harm to members of the

public; or
2) has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
bodily harm.67
In respect of the afore-mentioned decision, Olivier JA provided that the criteria that
have to be considered by courts during the reading-down process, to keep legislation
constitutional, are:

‘(a) to examine the objects and purport of the Act or the Section under
consideration;
(b) to examine the ambit and meaning of the rights protected by the
Constitution;

64
2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA).
65
51 of 1977.
66
The provision in dispute was section 49(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
67
See Du Plessis’ comments about Govender’s case in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of
South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-140.

80
 (c) to ascertain whether it is reasonably possible to interpret the Act or
Section under consideration in such a manner that it conforms with the
Constitution, i.e. by protecting the rights therein protected;
(d) if such interpretation is possible, to give effect to it, and
(e) if it is not possible, to initiate the steps leading to a declaration of
constitutional invalidity’68

What is therefore evident from the above dictum, and is often the case in practice, is
that reading-down is not always possible. A court can only read-down a legislative
provision if the provision is reasonably capable of a constitutional interpretation.69
Reading-down is therefore strictly speaking not a remedy, as is reading-in and
severance, but has been described as a mandatory rule of interpretation which is used
to avoid the invalidity of a provision.70 Reading-down must therefore be
distinguished from reading-in. While reading-in is applied only where a court has
made a finding of invalidity, with reading-down the finding of invalidity is prevented
as a result of reading-down the impugned provision.71 It has far reaching
consequences. It necessitates that a judge has a moral function to fulfill in the
interpretation of the law. Reading-down reflects deontic reasoning in that it is a
technique involving moral reasoning rather than merely inductive or deductive
reasoning, which would normally apply. Once again this is an example of deontic
reasoning.

3.4.2 Reading-In

With regard to reading-in, words are literally read into an unconstitutional legislative
provision in order to salvage it or to render it constitutional.72 Reading-in is a more
drastic measure used by courts to change legislation – in order to render it

68
In Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others : In Re- S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 613
(CC), the Constitutional Court endorsed the Supreme Court of Appeals approach in
Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA).
69
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 396.
70
Ibid at 395.
71
Ibid at 396.
72
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 197.

81
constitutionally alive.73 In such circumstances, the court will effectively ‘read’ or
insert something into a provision in order to ensure its validity. Because a court does
actually ‘change the legislation’ in question, the reading-in process is to be applied
with caution.74 Therefore, before words are read into a statute, a court has to ensure:

 first, that the newly created provision to which words have been
added is consistent with the Constitution; and
 second, that the result achieved would interfere with the laws
adapted by the legislature as little as possible.75
It is noted that reading-in is the opposite of severance.76 While severance allows for
the impugned parts of the legislation to be severed or cut-out from the rest of the
legislation, reading-in refers to the insertion of words or phrases to the affected
legislative provision to ensure that it is in keeping with the Constitution.77

3.4.3 Severance

The term severance basically refers to the process which allows for the severing or
cutting out of the parts of the provision that are unconstitutional. The test used to
effect severance is whether ‘the good is not dependent on the bad’ and whether the
inconsistency can be separated from the rest of the statute.78 The manner in which the
court would apply severance, therefore, is to determine whether, after the parts have
been cut-off due to invalidity, the part remaining will still be able to give effect to the
object of the statute. The test therefore has two parts – to determine:

73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 399.
76
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-141.
77
Ibid. Reading-in must also be distinguished from reading-up. Reading-up occurs when there
is more than one possible reading of the legislative text, and as a result a more extensive
reading is adopted to keep the legislation constitutional. In Daniels v Campbell 2004 (5) SA
331 (CC), the court held that a person who is a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage
does not qualify as a ‘spouse’ in terms of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 and the
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. In order to avoid unconstitutionally of the
legislation, the court applied a more extensive or broad interpretation, so as to include
persons married according to Muslim rites.
78
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 396.

82
  first, whether it is possible to sever or cut-off the invalid provisions,
and
 second, if so, does what remains give effect to the purpose of the
legislation?
What has been observed, however, is that it may not always be possible to separate
the good from the bad and still give effect to the purpose of the impugned provision.
Where this occurs, the court has no option but to declare the provision as a whole
invalid.79 Severance, however, must be distinguished from notional severance. While
similar to severance, it allows for the unconstitutional parts to be removed, leaving
certain parts unaffected. The difference, however, is that the section is given a
particular meaning, which would only apply to certain cases or in certain
circumstances.80

In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs,81 the
Constitutional Court maintained that the following principles are to be applied with
regard to reading-in or severance:

 The results of the reading-in or severance must be consistent with the

Constitution and its values;
 The result achieved must interfere with the existing law as little as
possible;
 The courts must be able to define – with sufficient precision – how
the legislative meaning ought to be modified to comply with the
Constitution; and
 The remedy of reading-on ought not to be granted where this would
result in an unsupportable budgetary intrusion.82

79
Ibid at 396-397.
80
A good illustration of notional severance was evident in Islamic Unity Convention v
Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 (5) BCLR 433. The Constitutional
Court found that a regulation which prohibited the broadcasting of material that was ‘likely to
prejudice relations between sections of the population.’ The Court declined to strike down the
relevant portion quoted above, because ‘a dangerous gap would result.’ As a result thereof,
the Court decided that national severance was the only just remedy.
81
2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).
82
See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 195-196, for the factors that
the Court will take into consideration to effect reading- in or severance.

83
3.5 An Observation about the Constitutional Remedies

Unlike reading-in and severance which are generally regarded as constitutional

remedies granted to litigants who successfully raise a constitutional complaint,
reading-down as explained above is a method of statutory interpretation that is
mandated by section 39(2). The process of reading-down or reading statutes ‘in
conformity with the constitution’, basically means that:

‘…all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights.
[and] All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with the
Constitution’.83

Therefore, in giving effect to the values of the Bill of Rights in the process of
interpretation, requires that:

‘judicial officers must prefer interpretations of legislation that fall within

constitutional bounds over those that do not …’.84

In so doing, judges are expected to embrace the challenge to effect economic,

political and social justice for transformation– by reading-down legislation in
conformity with the Constitution. This would therefore require that judges – in-
keeping with section 39(2) which mandates a value-orientated approach to
interpretation – give particular consideration to morality and ethics in the process of
reasoning. Such reasoning is therefore not only concerned with inductive and
deductive techniques but with moral and ethical considerations. This process
resonates with deontic reasoning and is central to the deontic theory of interpretation
that is postulated.85 The mechanism of reading-down has changed the nature of
statutory interpretation. All statutes must be interpreted and applied to ensure that

83
The constitutional foundation for the new methodology to statutory interpretation, was
explained by Langa DP in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 21.
84
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 395.
85
A deontic theory which is proposed as a new theory for interpretation, has its origin in the
classical philosophy of ethics. Deontology is therefore defined as the ‘science of duty or
moral obligation.’ See discussion of a deontic theory presented in Chapter 1, 1.6.2 Deontic
Theory.

84
substantive justice is done in each case. This involves deontic reasoning, where
moral and ethical values are used as a method of legal reasoning.

3.6 The Canon-Guided Reading Strategies

First propounded by Von Savigny, these ‘methods of interpretation’ commonly

referred to as the ‘Von Savigny Quartet’, have also been adapted for use by
Labuschagne who describes the methods or modes of interpretation as invalshoeke or
angles of approach.86 Originally suggested for constitutional interpretation, these
methods or modes of interpretation have also been applied for statutory
interpretation.87 While these canon-guided reading strategies seem to have received
a ‘reasonably positive’ response among South African academics,88 a closer
inspection of the quartet is necessary in order to assess its relevance for constitutional
interpretation. Because these canon-guided reading strategies encompass
grammatical interpretation, teleological interpretation, historical interpretation, and
comparative interpretation – each of which is discussed in detail hereunder – it is not
surprising that the term that has been coined to describe this technique for
constitutional interpretation as a ‘practical inclusive method of interpretation’,89
which facilitates an eclectic methodology. Although this method incorporates what
was to some extent discussed under theories, it is the synthesis involved in the
‘practical inclusive method’ that deserves attention.

86
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-)Systematization of the Canons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretation’
(2005) South African Law Journal at 600.
87
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 192.
88
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-159.
89
See Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 58-60, where the author uses the term
‘practical inclusive method of interpretation.’ In the later edition, Botha refer to this approach
as a ‘comprehensive methodology.’ See Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 192-
195.

85
3.6.1 Grammatical Interpretation

This aspect of the quartet acknowledges the importance of the role of the language of
the legislative text.90 The focus is on the linguistic and grammatical meaning of the
words, phrases, sentences and other structural components of the text, and also the
rules of syntax. It is, however, emphasized that grammatical interpretation does not
require of the interpreter to focus exclusively on the literal theory and the orthodox
‘ordinary or plain meaning of word’ approach. It merely reveals the importance of
the legislative text in the complex process of interpretation.91

In examining the Constitution, what is evident is that the language of the

Constitution is expansive and open-ended and can hardly be ‘expressed categorically
or conclusively’.92 There is a convincing reason for this. The Constitution is intended
to be a long-lasting text and its provisions are expansively formulated so as to allow
for an inestimable number of unpredictable situations. Therefore, it is obvious that
the Constitution – by its very nature – defies the assumption of clear and
unambiguous language. What is apparent, therefore, is that the canons of
grammatical interpretation, in not placing emphasis on the ordinary or plain meaning
of the word rule, cannot be regarded as ‘incarnations of the literalist-cum-
intentionalist’ approach.93

In heeding the conventions in the use of language, what is obvious is that the canons
of and aids to grammatical interpretation tend to limit the plethora of possible
meanings that the language of a legislative instrument can generate. Examples of
such conventions are that the legislature will use ordinary language, which is in
keeping with the rule that the language should be read in its ordinary sense, and that
technical language is meant to have a technical connotation, and that the same word
or phrase is meant to mean the same throughout one and the same statutory text.94 It

90
Ibid at 192.
91
Ibid.
92
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-161.
93
Ibid at 32-161.
94
Ibid.

86
is therefore evident that the Interpretation Act95 and the definition clauses contained
in legislative texts and interpretive precepts of the Constitution, even though they are
worded in expansive and open-ended language, fulfill the limiting function outlined
above.96

As already alluded to, as with other classifications of the canons of construction, in

accordance with the Savignian model, this categorization is not watertight and the
overlapping is inevitable – as is the case with grammatical interpretation and
systematic and purposive interpretation.97 Language is always relevant. The critical
issue, is the extent to which it influences meaning.

3.6.2 Systematic Interpretation (or Contextual Interpretation)

Systematic interpretation amounts to contextualization98 which facilitates the

ascertainment of the meaning of a particular legislative provision in relation to the
legislative text as a whole. Therefore the emphasis is on the ‘wholeness’ of the text.99
This process may be described as being two-fold. Firstly, it must be emphasized that
in principle, words, phrases and as a result provisions, cannot be read in isolation.
The provision has to be understood in relation to and in light of the other components
of the legislative text of which it forms part. This therefore requires a drawing on the

95
33 of 1957 (As Amended).
96
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-161 – 32-162.
97
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretation’
(2005) South African Law Journal at 603.
98
Ibid.
99
In Ferreira v Levin 1996 (2) SA 984 (CC), the Constitutional Court used the structure of the
Interim Constitution, as well as the formulation of the fundamental rights, to interpret the
right to freedom of the person. In philosophy, any doctrine that emphasizes the priority of a
whole over its parts is holism. Alternatively, a ‘holistic’ definition of holism denies the
necessity of a division between the function of separate parts and workings of the ‘whole.’
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/holism (Accessed on October 2013) The idea of ‘holism’ which
is discussed throughout the thesis, is used to illustrate the basis of the deontic theory and the
eclectic methodology that underpins its operation. The emphasis is on the idea that the
various theories of interpretation would operate in conjunction with each other to facilitate
the operation of the eclectic methodology. An eclectic methodology embraces the various
theories of interpretation, working together holistically, to interpret the legislative text.

87
‘system’ or ‘logic’ or the ‘scheme’ of the text as a whole – hence the reference to this
particular method as systematic interpretation.100

A systematic interpretation also requires that the macro-text is considered in the

process. The focus is not only restricted to the other provisions and parts of
legislation, but also requires extra-textual or contextual considerations to be taken
into account in a holistic manner.101 Such considerations are, for example, the social
and political environments in respect of which the legislation operates.102 Von
Savigny asserts that the very task of systematic interpretation is to forge links with
this ‘extra’ or ‘macro-text’.103

Intra-textual, systematic interpretation overlaps with grammatical interpretation, in

so far as a systematic reading of the text causes the meaning attributed to linguistic
signifiers – in, for example, a definition clause – to be spread throughout the text.104
Extra-textual contextualization takes place with reference to meaning-generative
signifiers (also texts) in the textual environment.105 In statutory interpretation, as far
as the signifiers are concerned, the focus is firstly on other legal precepts and
institutions and on the legal system as a whole. Legislative enactments (and the
Constitution) are always construed as forming part of a wider network of legislation
– in which the Interpretation Act,106 holds a particular position for interpretive
purposes and other law-texts such as precedents.

In respect of the political and constitutional order (referred to above), society and its
legally recognized interests and the international legal order are all consciously taken
account of in respect of both constitutional and statutory interpretation. This requires
100
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-162.
101
See Janse van Rensburg v the Master 2001 (3) SA 519 (W) at para 7; and Richtersveld
Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 (3) SA 1293 (LCC) at para 88, for the courts recognition of
systematic interpretation. See also Smuts Holism and Evolution where Smuts defines holism
as: ‘the tendency in nature to form wholes that are greater than the sum of the parts through
creative evolution.’ See also the critique by Mowatt on ‘Holism and the Law’ (1991) 108
South African Law Journal at 343.
102
Botha ‘Statutory Interpretation’ (5th edition) at 193.
103
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-162.
104
Ibid at 32-166.
105
Ibid.
106
33 of 1957 (As Amended).

88
cognizance of the macro-text and the existing common-law canons of construction.
The logic that flows from the above, therefore, is that it is impossible to separate the
text and the macro-text, especially since the macro-text tends to provide the ‘source
of concrete situations’ – without which statutory interpretation is impossible.107

In the case of Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South
Africa,108 the court highlighted the process of the systematic (contextual)
interpretation in constitutional interpretation, as follows:

‘The process of constitutional interpretation must therefore be context-

sensitive. In construing the provisions of the Constitution it is not sufficient
to focus only on the ordinary or textual meaning of the phrase. The proper
approach to constitutional interpretation involves a combination of textual
and structural approaches. Any construction of a provision in a constitution
must be consistent with the structure or scheme of the Constitution. This
provides the context within which a provision in the Constitution must be
construed.’

The overlaps between systematic and purposive (or teleological) interpretation are
confirmed in case-law.109 It is clear that the preamble and long title of a legislative
text play a distinctive role in the interpretation of its individual provisions. This is
because a systematic reading of individual provisions, in the context of the text as a
whole, requires the broadest possible spectrum of textual elements to be taken into
account.110 A purposive interpretation is conducted through a systematic reading of a
provision to be construed in the context of the instrument as a whole, and (thereby)
in interaction with the provisions whose ‘purposive potential’ is to be ascertained.111
This purposive or teleological interpretation is examined more closely below.

107
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretation’
(2005) South African Law Journal at 606.
108
2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC) at para 36- para 37.
109
See for example Executive Council of the Western Cape v Minister of Provincial Affairs and
Constitutional Development of RSA 2000 (1) SA 661 (CC).
110
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretations’
(2005) South African Law Journal at 605.
111
Ibid at 605.

89
3.6.3 Teleological Interpretation or Purposive Interpretation

Teleological interpretation has been described as purposive interpretation attributing

meaning to a provision – mindful both of its (possible) objective(s) or ratio, and of
the aspirational values of the legal system as a whole.112 This method of
interpretation emphasizes fundamental constitutional values and is often referred to
as ‘value-coherent’, ‘value-orientated’ or ‘value-activating’.113 The emphasis on
values – more specifically constitutional values – emanates from section 39(2), in
respect of which it is established that for purposes of interpretation, the values that
underlie a democracy must be heeded.114 It is therefore mandated that the aim and
purpose of legislation must be ascertained against the background of these
fundamental values. This purposefulness or purpose-consciousness is identified as
the key in both statutory and constitutional interpretation, and is necessary to ‘honour
the operational intent (or effect-directedness) of the enacted law’.115 However,
purposive interpretation in the abstract and by itself can in fact be counter-productive
as explained supra. It has to be understood that the interpretive process cannot start
off (and proceed) as an exercise giving effect to the purpose or objects of a provision,
for the simple reason that the purpose or object cannot be known prior to
interpretation. It has to be established and determined ‘through interpretation’.116

It is cautioned that if this process is not followed in the said manner, it would cause
the interpreter to surmise and ‘conjecture in the process of interpretation to be wide
open’.117 The interpreter of the enacted provision has to start off with the assumption

112
Ibid at 608.
113
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 119. A good illustration of teleological
interpretation can be seen in Matiso v Commanding officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4)
SA 592 (SE), at para 46, where Sachs J explains the teleological approach as follows: ‘The
values that must suffuse the whole process are defined from the concept of an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality … The notion of an open and democratic
society is thus not merely aspirational or decorative, it is normative, furnishing the matrix of
ideals within which we work, the source from which we derive the principles and rules we
apply, and the final measure we use for testing the legitimacy of impugned norms and
conduct …’
114
Botha Statutory Interpretations (5th edition) at 193.
115
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-168.
116
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 247.
117
Ibid.

90
that the provision has a purpose (or ratio legis) that will surface in the course of
interpretation. In so doing, the interpreter attributes meaning to a provision. It is
submitted that this purpose has to be taken seriously and would effectually be
realized in giving effect to the ‘intention of the legislature’ as it were. The ratio legis
that emerges as interpretation proceeds, can eventually be developed into a response
to the contingencies of an actual or hypothetical concrete situation.118 As discussed
under the heading ‘Systematic Interpretation’, the merged effect of the systematic
interpretation together with teleological or purposive interpretation reveals how the
process of interpretation and application emerges as the ratio legis.119

From his analysis of the decision in African Christian Democratic Party v the
Electoral Commission and Others,120 Wessel Le Roux sets out the guidelines for
teleological interpretation, as follows:

‘(a) establish, through recognized procedures of interpretation, the

central purpose of the provision in question;
(b) establish whether the purpose would be obstructed by a literal
interpretation of the provision, and if so
(c) opt rather for an alternative interpretation of the provision that
‘understands’ or promotes its central purpose;
(d) ensure that the purposive reading of the constitutional provision also
promotes the object, purport and spirit of the Bill of Rights.’121

The interpretation of the Constitution in the afore-mentioned manner, is another way

of saying that the Constitution ought to be interpreted – mindful of the time-frame in

118
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretations’
(2005) South African Law Journal at 608.
119
Ibid. See also discussion above in 3.6.2 Systematic Interpretation. Moseneke DCJ’s
reasoning and analysis in Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits 2007
(6) SA 199 (CC), is an exemplary application of a teleological evaluation. In order to
determine whether the Popela Community were entitled to restitution in terms of Restitution
of the Land Rights Act 22 of 1996, Moseneke DCJ engages in a moral evaluation of the
discriminatory legislation identified, namely, the Native Land Act of 1913, the Land and
Trust Act of 1936, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 and the Bantu Laws
Amendment Act.
120
2006 (3) SA 305 (CC).
121
Le Roux ‘Directory provisions – Section 39 (2) of the Constitution and the Ontology of
Statutory Law – African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission’ (2006) 21
South African Public Law at 386.

91
respect of which it has bearing.122 This characterization is also a general way of
restating the mischief rule.123 According to the mischief rule as set out in Hleka v
Johannesburg City Council,124 what is evident is that the purpose of interpretation is
to suppress the mischief and to promote the remedy designed for it’s elimination.125

The logic that underlies the mischief rule has also found relevance in constitutional
interpretation, and basically sees ‘the previous constitutional system’ of the country
as the mischief to be remedied by the operation of the new Constitution. In terms of
this reasoning, the Constitution is regarded as a ‘remedial measure that must be
construed generously in favour of redressing the mischief of the past and advancing
its own objectives for the present and the future’.126 Teleological interpretation is
therefore described as a ‘forward-looking interpretation based on what can be learnt
from past experiences’.127

3.6.4 Historical Interpretation

Historical interpretation refers to the use of the ‘historical context’ of legislation.128

Such historical context includes factors such as circumstances which gave rise to the
adoption of legislation (mischief rule) and the legislative history (prior to legislation
and preceding discussions).129 Du Plessis qualifies this further in providing that
precepts pertaining to the genesis and demise (i.e. the arrangements regarding the

122
Dias Jurisprudence (5th edition) at 170. See also Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 51,
where the author in referring to the objective theory makes the point that one has to take into
account the continuous time frame or the dimension of futurity within which all statutes
should operate.
123
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretation’
(2005) South African Law Journal at 609. See also discussion of the application of the
Mischief Rule in Chapter 2,2.2 Literal Theory.
124
1949 (1) SA 842. The mischief rule was explained in Hlekas case as follows:-
‘To arrive at the real meaning we have……to consider,
(1) what was the law before the measure was passed;
(2) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided;
(3) what remedy the Legislator had appointed;
(4) the reason of the remedy’
125
Du Plessis The (Re-) Interpretation of Statutes at 117.
126
Ibid at 117-118.
127
Ibid at 249.
128
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 194.
129
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 59.

92
historical classification) of statute law are all part of what can be used in historical
interpretation.130 According to Von Savigny, historical interpretation requires the
interpreter to enter ‘into and identify’ with the historical situation from which a law
emerged. The ‘spirit of this history’ is regarded as being more significant than the
‘historical facts’ – particularly in respect of ascertaining the ratio legis.131

There is merit in the argument that teleological interpretation without a historical

foundation, is, in fact, ‘empty’.132 While some authors have preferred the use of the
word ‘empty’, it is submitted that it is more accurate to describe a teleological
evaluation without a historical analysis, as being incomplete.133 Nevertheless, this
thinking has not always been favourably received. While the Constitutional Court in
S v Makwanyane and Another134 allowed the clear, undisputed and relevant reports of
a technical committee (which advised the drafters of the Interim Constitution) as
evidence of why no specific reference to capital punishment was included in the
Interim Constitution, the High Court in De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis,135
rejected the drafting history of the Interim Constitution on the basis that it was
irrelevant to its interpretation.

De Vos is also critical that when considering the recent history of South Africa’s
transition (from apartheid to constitutional democracy), one must avoid an
‘exclusivity’ that results in an overtly narrow reading of the Constitution.136 What is
therefore clear, is that while this particular component of interpretation is important,
it cannot be used exclusively,137 or decisively,138 on its own.

130
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and the Aids to Interpretation’ (2005)
South African Law Journal at 610.
131
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-170.
132
Ibid.
133
Own submission. (Emphasis Added)
134
1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC).
135
1995 (2) SA 40 (T).
136
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-171.
137
Ibid.
138
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 59.

93
3.6.5 Comparative Interpretation

In examining the classical Von Savigny model, it is evident that Von Savigny did not
include comparative interpretation as one of the methods of legal interpretation.
However, in South Africa, comparative interpretation has been mandated as part and
parcel of the process of constitutional interpretation.139

A closer inspection of section 39(1) provides that:

‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ...

must consider international law and may consider foreign law,’140

and confirms that the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole are located in
what is referred to as a ‘transnational constitutional reality’,141 which basically assists
in determining the meaning of the provision in a local or domestic reality.142 An
illustration of such a ‘transnational evaluation’ is seen in the case of S v Makwanyane
and Another,143 when the court – in considering the constitutionality of capital
punishment – had to heed the significance of such transnational sources.144 In
considering the role of international and foreign law in constitutional interpretation,
Chaskalson P laid down the following guidelines:

‘The international and foreign authorities are of value because they analyse
arguments for and against the death sentence and show how courts of other
jurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue.’145

139
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and the Aids to Interpretation’ (2005)
South African Law Journal at 610.
140
Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides:-
‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
(a) Must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity and freedom;
(b) Must consider international law; and
(c) May consider foreign law.’
141
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-171.
142
Ibid.
143
1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
144
Ibid at para 19.
145
Ibid at para 34.

94
Further to this, he maintains:

‘In dealing with comparative law we are required to construe the South
African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the Constitution
of some foreign country, and this has to be done with due regard to our legal
system, our history and circumstances, and the structure and language of our
own Constitution ... We can derive assistance from public international law
and foreign case-law, but we are in no way bound to follow it.’146

The stance maintained by the court in Makwanyane, that in the interpretation of the
Constitution the structure and language or transnational authorities must be relied on
with regard to the uniqueness of our Constitution, our history and circumstances have
been adopted and reflected in subsequent case-law.147 A notable flaw in Chaskalson
P’s assertion, that even though assistance may be derived from both international and
foreign law, a court is in no way bound to follow such law, reveals the critical
distinction between foreign law and international law – that foreign law may be
considered and that international law must be considered, and in practice appears to
be ignored for purposes of constitutional interpretation.148 The influence of
international and foreign authorities will be discussed fully in Chapter 6.

3.7 Some Points to Consider in the Implementation of the Adapted

Von Savignian Model as Presented Above

3.7.1 The Von Savignian Model that is adapted by Du Plessis – encourages and
pre-supposes reliance on a multiple strategy of interpretation. It recognizes
the grammatical, contextual, purposive and historical modes of
interpretation, as being equally significant. In effect the strategy that
emerges is an eclectic one.

In the process of interpretation, the grammatical, systematic, teleological,

historical and comparative considerations must be weighed against one

146
Ibid at para 39.
147
See for example, Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1997 (12) BCLR 1675 (CC).
148
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-173.

95
 another to decide on an outcome without, however, attributing a superior
status to any of these considerations. While no reading strategy or particular
mode of interpretation can ensure a ‘ready-made’ answer, what the
classification as outlined above, provides the interpreter with, is a more
complete or ‘fuller reading’ of a provision.

3.7.2 Another argument in support of the systematization of the canons and aids
to construction in accordance with the Von Savigny Quartet, is that the
proposed model has stood the test of time in that it is historically credible
and legitimate.

Because the Von Savignian model accommodates existing common law

canons of construction, it quite easily forges links in the areas of statutory
and constitutional interpretation.

3.7.3 The proposed systematization also serves a classificatory function. The

practical significance of this can be appreciated by those teaching as well as
being involved in the day-to-day construction of statutes and the
Constitution.

3.7.4 The proposed classification also emphasizes the similarities between

statutory and constitutional interpretation – clearly indicating that they can
be used to invoke similar reading strategies. This means that statutory
interpretation can benefit from developments in constitutional
interpretation.149

In terms of the application of the five ‘techniques’ or ‘reading strategies’ outlined in

the discussion on the canon-guided reading strategies above, even though they were
initially intended to apply to constitutional interpretation, their relevance and
application with regard to ordinary statutory interpretation is apparent.150 Botha
describes this mode of interpretation as a practical, inclusive method of
interpretation. He submits that the components of a practical methodology are

149
Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and the Aids to Interpretation’ (2005)
South African Law Journal at 611-613.
150
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 107.

96
‘complementary and interrelated’, and ‘should be applied in conjunction with one
another.151

With a transformative Constitution, it is expected of judges when interpreting it – to

be mindful of what the Constitution seeks to achieve. In the South African context
therefore, judges have to consider South Africa’s unique history and to understand
that the Constitution was drafted to ensure that the atrocities of apartheid are never
repeated.152 Judges are therefore required to give due consideration to the social,
economic and political context within which the Constitution operates, before
proceeding to give an interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.153 The duty
to fulfill socio-economic rights requires the state to adopt appropriate legislative,
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures. With regard to
the implementation of the duties imposed by socio-economic rights, the state must
not only act affirmatively to realise these rights, but there is also the requirement that
the state must act reasonably to meet its obligations.154 As a result thereof, the
Constitutional Court has used a reasonable standard of scrutiny which has been
applied in the cases of Soobramoney,155 Grootboom,156 Treatment Action
Campaign,157 Khosa158 and Mazibuko.159 From an examination of the courts
reasoning and analysis with regard to case-law, what is evident is that the
Constitutional Court has not been explicit about which factors determine the
strictness of its scrutiny.160 Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the methodology of

151
Ibid.
152
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 32.
153
Ibid at 32.
154
Ibid at 708.
155
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
156
Grootboom v Oostenburg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (CC).
157
Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T).
158
Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).
159
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
160
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 709. See comments about the
application of the reasonableness standard of scrutiny in the following cases. In
Soobramoney, the court refused to grant an order instructing the Addington State Hospital to
provide dialysis treatment to the applicant. The grounds for this decision were that the
guidelines according to which the hospital decided whether to provide treatment were not
unreasonable. In Grootboom, the respondent applied for an order declaring the state’s

97
interpretation reflected in the above case-law, illustrates a value-based methodology,
which includes the balancing, harmonization and prioritization, the Constitutional
Court has not ‘developed a clear and unambiguous justification to the interpretation
of the Constitution.’161

Notwithstanding that the courts have applied the teleological, the purposive and the
contextual theories of interpretation,162 it is submitted that none of the theories seem
to offer an in-depth analysis of the statutory provision, as does the proposed deontic
theory. The deontic theory of interpretation – which requires a judge to reflect on the
ethical and moral legal reasoning, goes beyond merely placing the right in its context
and conducting a value-based enquiry. It requires a careful consideration of all of the
factors that determine the strictness of scrutiny that have to be considered to achieve
social economic and social justice. In order to give effect to the considerations
outlined, the proposed deontic theory for interpretation would operate in accordance
with an eclectic methodology, that would be applied pro-actively.163 As illustrated,
the modus operandi would require an amalgamation of the literal meaning, an
examination of the context, ascertaining the purpose of the legislation, and testing all
of the above against the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution. An
eclectic methodology or the modus operandi for the operation of the proposed

housing programme to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed section 26 (1)

which guarantees everyone the right of access to adequate housing. The Constitutional Court
granted the order. In the Treatment Action Campaign (No 2), the respondent applied for an
order declaring the state’s mother to child transmission (MTCT) of HIV at birth prevention
programme to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed section 27 (1) which
guarantees everyone the right of access to health services. The Constitutional Court granted
the order. In Khosa, the applicant applied for an order declaring sections of the Social
Assistance Act, which excluded permanent residents from access to social grants, to be
unconstitutional on the grounds that they infringed section 27 (1) (cc) which guarantees the
right of everyone to have access to social security. The Constitutional Court granted the
order. In Mazibuko, the applicant applied for an order declaring the City of Johannesburg’s
free water policy which provided each household with 6 kilolitres of free water per month to
be unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed section 27 (1) (b) which guarantees
everyone the right of access to sufficient water. The Constitutional Court refused to grant the
order.
161
Ibid at 31.
162
See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive analysis of the various theories of statutory interpretation
applied in South African Courts.
163
See MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR
1365 (CC), for an illustration of an approach to interpretation which was clearly pro-active
application of the law.

98
deontic theory of interpretation, compares favourably with the practically inclusive
method of interpretation164 discussed above.

3.8 The Principles that Underlie Constitutional Interpretation

A comparison between statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation

yields some interesting results as will be explained in the discussion that follows.
While the examination has indicated obvious overlaps between ordinary statutory
interpretation and constitutional interpretation, it is maintained that the Constitution
is not an ‘ordinary’ statute.165 As a result, it warrants special consideration. What
emerges is that as ‘an exceptional form of statute’, special rules and techniques of
construction must apply when interpreting the Constitution.166 In a comparative
study between ordinary statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation, it
was revealed that the following principles of statutory interpretation must apply to
constitutional interpretation:
1) Every word must be given its true and legitimate meaning and in construction
it is improper to omit any word which has a reasonable and proper place in it,
or to refrain from giving effect to it meaning.
2) That words should not be taken out of their context in the construction of
Constitutions, as is also the position with statutes.
However, what is apparent, is that unlike ordinary statutes, most of the rights as
contained in the Constitution – and in particular Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights – are
couched in broad and open-ended language, which may even be described as abstract
language. Dworkin provides that:

‘because the Bill of Rights consists of broad and abstract principles of

political morality, (the) ... correct application of these principles depends on
moral sense, not linguistic rules’.167

164
See Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 92-95, for a discussion of a more
comprehensive method and which has been referred to as a practically inclusive method of
statutory interpretation.
165
Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 585.
166
Ibid at 598.
.
167
Ibid at 591.

99
This submission is particularly relevant when determining the principles that ought to
apply to constitutional interpretation. While the normal rules or principles of
construction with regard to statutory interpretation would apply, they have to be
employed in a ‘more flexible, imaginative and subtle way’168 in constitutional
interpretation. It is not without justification that in its interpretation and application
with regard to the rights in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, special rules have
evolved with regard to constitutional interpretation. The transformative nature of the
Constitution has resulted in a new jurisprudence which requires a new methodology
for the process of interpretation. section 39(2) of the Constitution – which clearly
mandates a value-based methodology – has been largely instrumental in determining
what these rules ought to be. With a transformative Constitution therefore, the role of
the judge needs to be more nuanced. In order to achieve social, economic and
political justice, these rules and principles must embody moral and ethical
considerations and obligations inherent in deontic reasoning. The proposed deontic
theory for interpretation, which embraces such elements and requires a pro-active
approach by the courts to the process of interpretation,169 is suggested as a model for
both constitutional interpretation and ordinary statutory interpretation.

3.8.1 A Constitution must be interpreted Broadly and Liberally170

In examining section 39(2) – which provides that one ought to ‘promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’171 – it is evident is that the section clearly
illustrates a decisive shift away from the literal theory.

168
Ibid at 598.
169
See for example Moseneke DCJ’s reasoning and analysis in Department of Land Affairs v
Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (cc) to the approach to
interpretation, which may be regarded as pro-active interpretation.
170
The principle as discussed by Devenish is referred to as: ‘Constitutions must be Interpreted in
a Liberal Spirit.’ See Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 598.
This has modified for purposes of the research to ‘Constitutions must be Interpreted Broadly
and Liberally.’
171
See Section 39(2) of the Constitution which provides that :-
‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law,
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.’

100
It is however submitted that ‘purposivism’ should not be accepted as a general theory
of interpretation172 in the place of literalism – because the acceptance of purposivism
as a general theory may result in certain critically important values and principles not
being given due consideration in the process of interpretation. The words ‘spirit’,
‘purport’ and ‘objects’ indicate that the method of interpretation extends beyond a
mere purposive approach.173 What is therefore required, is a value-activating
interpretation, which is reflective of the teleological theory involving deontic
reasoning over and above inductive and deductive reasoning. Nevertheless, it is
questionable whether the teleological theory operating on its own is capable of
achieving the goals of social transformation. The research undertaken seems to
suggest otherwise. In order to be able to effectively protect fundamental rights such
as life, liberty and property and to promote a ‘liberal spirit’174 – requires an
amalgamation of methodologies. Such an amalgamation of methodologies resulting
in the eclectic methodology that characterizes the proposed deontic theory for
interpretation.

3.8.2 Context and the Importance of Language175

Language alone cannot be used to determine the interpretation and application of a

provision in a supreme Constitution having a Bill of Rights. A Constitution has to be
always interpreted within a context, or more specifically ‘in accordance with its
semantic and jurisprudential context,176 Support for this view is reflected in S v
Zuma:177

‘Respect must be paid to the language which has been used and to the
traditions and usages which gave meaning to the language.’

172
Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 600.
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid at 599.
175
Ibid at 608.The principle as discussed by Devenish which reads : ‘Context and clarity of
language;’ has been modified for purposes of the research to ‘Context and the Importance of
Language.’
176
Ibid. (Emphasis Added)
177
S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA.

101
This language, particularly with regard to the Constitution, is generally framed in a
broad and open-ended manner, which raises the question of the clarity of language.

According to Du Plessis, clear and unambiguous language is a fiction. It quite simply

does not exist. His submission that the language of a statute can ... only be said to be
clear once its meaning is ascertained from its intra and extra-textual structure,178
reinforces the idea that the interpretation of the language requires an examination of
the contextual setting. This was the pertinent issue in S v Mhlungu,179 where the
minority judgment (as per Kentridge J) maintained that when the meaning of the
language was clear, the adoption of alternative meaning when considering the broad
context of the Constitution placed a strain on the words. The majority judgment (as
per Mahomed DP) reflected such interpretation. In its analysis, the Constitutional
Court reasoned that if the clear, literal meaning of language gave rise to an
acceptable and unjust anomaly, and consequently an alternative interpretive
interpretation, was more in-keeping with the values of the Constitution – should be
adopted.180 This is holistic interpretation.

What is obvious from an examination of this case, therefore, is that while the
minority regarded the clarity of the language as determinant of the correct meaning,
the majority held the view that the language in effect is but ‘one’ of the factors that
has to be considered in the process of interpretation.181 It is submitted that the
reasoning underpinning the majority judgment in Mhlungu compares favourably with
an eclectic methodology, as propounded. In giving expression to section 39 (2) of the
Constitution which requires the ‘promotion of the values of the Constitution’, it is
imperative that courts promote the values and principles that inform the thirteen
chapters of the Constitution.’182 Bishop and Brickhill describe the process as a
‘Herculean task’ which our Constitutional Court has struggled with. In analyzing

178
See discussion in Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 96.
179
S v Mhlungu1995 (3) SA 867 (CC).
180
Ibid.
181
Ibid.
182
Bishop and Brickhill ‘In the Beginning was the Word: The Role of the Text in the
Interpretation of Statutes’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal at 685.

102
five constitutional court judgments namely South African Police Service v Public
Servants Association,183 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others,184 Bertie Van Zyl (Pty)
Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security,185 African National Congress v Chief Electoral
Officer of the Independent Electoral Commission186 and Van Vuren v Minister of
Correctional Services,187 They are critical about the approach to statutory
interpretation adopted by each of the courts. While the decision in respect of each of
the above mentioned cases, is clearly indicative of a more purposive approach, the
authors express their disapproval with the position expounded by the courts which in
their opinion ‘leans too far away from the text’188. In fact the authors go so far as to
assert that when construing the relevant statutory provisions the Constitutional Court
should have applied a more ‘textually plausible interpretation’.189

It is submitted that consideration of the text or language is only partly instrumental in

assigning a meaning to a provision. The language or the text must be considered
with regard to the statute in its entirety – which includes the surrounding
circumstances and the universal values of justice and fairness. This idea resonates
with the proposed deontic theory of interpretation which identifies the literal or text-
based approach as being but only one element in the process of interpretation. A
purposive or contextual interpretation with its consideration of the constitutional
framework which is specifically mandated by section 39 (2) of the Constitution, is
better suited to meet the constitutional aims of a transformative constitution. Such a
‘holistic’ consideration of the factors that entails an evaluation of the text, an
examination of the context of the legislative framework, with a focus on morality and
ethics comprise the elements of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. The
submission by Bishop and Brickhill that statutory interpretation as a discourse must

183
2007 (3) SA 521 (CC).
184
2008 (4) SA 367 (CC).
185
2010 (2) SA 181 (CC).
186
2010 (5) SA 487 (CC).
187
2012 (1) SACR 103 (CC).
188
Bishop and Brickhill ‘In the Beginning was the Word: The Role of the Text in the
Interpretation of Statutes’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal at 701.
189
Ibid at 694.

103
place more emphasis on the language of the text is a return to ‘arid literalism’190
which is associated with the literal theory, and cannot be supported as it does not
conform with the process of interpretation that is mandated by section 39 (2) of the
Constitution. It is the antithesis of the proposed deontic theory necessary for a
transformative constitutional order.

3.8.3 Legislative History and Background191

Legislative history has been found to be used extensively in countries like the United
States, France and Germany. The travaux preporatoires, as they are referred to, are
also used extensively for the interpretation of international treaties. In countries such
as Germany, Canada, India and the United States, as well as the European Court of
Human Rights and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, it has been
observed that legislative history can also be consulted as an aid to interpretation as
far as the Constitution is concerned.192

A good illustration of a court having regard to the history and background to

determine the interpretation of the Constitution, is in S v Makwanyane.193
The court stated that:

‘The multi-party negotiating process was advised by technical committees,

and the reports of these committees or the drafts are the equivalent of the
travaux preparatoires, relied upon by the international tribunals. Such
background materials can provide a context for the interpretation of the
Constitution, and where it serves that purpose, I can see no reason why such
evidence should be excluded. The precise nature of the evidence, and the
purpose for which it may be tendered, will determine the weight to be given
to it.’194

190
Ibid at 682.
191
See Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 611, where the principle
which is discussed by Devenish reads - ‘Legislative History.’ This has been modified for
purposes of the research to ‘Legislative History and Background.’
192
Ibid.
193
1995 (6) BCLR (CC) at 679.
194
Ibid at paras 17 and 18.

104
The court then referred to certain background materials which included the reports of
various Technical Committees. Provided they were clear and not in dispute, the
reports were used to show why particular provisions were either included or
excluded in the interim Constitution. In Makwanyane, the materials were used to
show that – by deliberately allowing the right to life as provided for in terms of the
Constitution as, unqualified – those instrumental in drafting the Constitution intended
to leave the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty up to the
Constitutional Court to decide upon.195 Yet another controversial decision, where the
court had to give due consideration to the historical context and background, was that
in the Soobramoney case.196 The case highlighted that in interpreting the provisions
of the Constitution, the court had to have an ‘acute awareness’197 of what factors
prevailed. Therefore, a consideration of the factors which included, for example,
unemployment, inadequate social security and access to clean water and health
services,198 was essential to the interpretation of the right to health care as provided
for in terms of the Constitution.

The idea of placing a right in its context by giving due consideration to the factors
that prevailed prior to the Constitution, is fundamental in interpretation of a
transformative Constitution. It also speaks directly to the role of judges in the process
of interpretation in the current constitutional era. In order to achieve the aims of
social transformation and to ‘address the needs of the most vulnerable and
marginalized’199 would require an evaluation of all the ethical and moral
considerations and a pro-active stance to the process of interpretation when
deliberating – as was evidenced in both Makwanyane and Soobramoney. This is the
operation of a proposed deontic theory of interpretation, which has relevance to both
statutory and constitutional interpretation. This theory is also holistic in nature,
where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Holism as a philosophy has a

195
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 142-143.
196
Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
197
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 33.
198
Ibid.
199
Ibid.

105
peculiarly South African connection, having been expounded by South Africa’s
philosopher statesman JC Smuts in his book on the subject.200

3.8.4 Interpretation Favouring the Liberty of the Individual201

Generally, the approach adopted by the courts in instances of ambiguity in the

interpretation of a provision, where the fundamental rights of the individual are at
stake, is that a provision must be interpreted in a manner that favours the liberty of
the individual. This is the well known maxim known as in favorem libertatis.202

Further, where there is a vagueness and flexibility of language, the courts were able
to employ greater creativity in the interpretation process. It is therefore interesting
that even in relatively early jurisprudence, as reflected in the judgment of Bhyat v
Commissioner for Immigration,203 the approach of the Court was that – apart from
absurdity, repugnancy, anomaly and inconsistency which are the normal
circumstances that would yield an interpretation more favourable to the individual –
hardship was also to be considered as factor to be considered. However, it is
unfortunate that, in spite of this, our courts in the past under the old order have used
this particular criterion as a determining factor with notable reluctance, when an
individual’s fundamental rights were brought into question.

Nevertheless, as a result of section 39(2) which mandates a value-coherent method of

interpretation when individual rights are involved,204 it is clear that the maxim in

200
General Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950) the fourth Prime Minister of South Africa and a
British Commonwealth military leader, statesman and philosopher in his book Holism and
Evolution (1926) described ‘holism’ as: ‘The tendency in nature to form wholes that are
greater than the sum of the parts through creative evolution. This factor called “holism” in
the sequel underlies the systematic tendency in the universe, and is the principle which makes
for the origin and progress of “wholes” in the universe…this whole-making or holistic
tendency is fundamental in nature, that it has a well-marked ascertainable character and that
Evolution is nothing but the gradual development of progressive series of wholes, stretching
from inorganic beginnings to the highest levels of spiritual creation.’
201
See Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 612, where the principle
‘Ambiguity and the in favorem libertatis principle’ is discussed. This has been modified to
‘Interpretation favouring the Liberty of the Individual,’ for purposes of the research.
202
Ibid.
203
1932 AD 125 at 129.
204
Section 39 (2) provides that :

106
favorem libertatis would automatically apply. It is observed that even though quite
early in our jurisprudence there was an attempt by courts to delineate and
determinate what factors were significant and therefore required to be considered
where an individual’s fundamental rights were at stake, this is no longer necessary.
An examination of the provisions of the Bill of Rights clearly supports interpretation
in favorem libertatis.

However, it has to be mentioned that the rights and individual’s liberties, as provided
in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, are subject to section 36 – the limitation clause. In
terms of section 36 (1), ‘rights must be limited only in terms of the law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all the relevant factors, including the:

a) The nature of the right;

b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation;
c) The nature and extent of the limitation;
d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
e) The less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’205

What this in effect means, is that in order to determine whether there has been a
violation of a provision of the Bill of Rights, both the section which encapsulates the
fundamental right and section 36, must be examined together. The process therefore
ensures that in its application – which involves a ‘judicious weighting up of
competing societal and ethical values’206 – confirms that the maxim in favorem
libertatis would be applied in a manner so as to ensure that the rights of the
individual would not be compromised.

‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law,
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.’
205
Section 36 of the Constitution deals with the limitation of rights and is referred to as the
Limitation Clause.
206
Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 548.

107
3.8.5 Reading-down Interpretation In Conformity with the
Constitution207

Devenish describes the process which requires reading-down as a process of

interpretation conforming with the Constitution, as constituting a ‘presumption of
constitutionality’. This presumption arises where a rigid Constitution makes
provision for a bill or draft legislation to be scrutinized by a particular statutory body
in order to determine its legal compatibility with the Constitution.208 What this means
in a constitutional dispensation involving a testing right, is that courts of law will not
lightly invalidate an Act of parliament, but instead attempt to interpret a provision in
a way that is compatible with the Constitution.209

According to Hogg,210 in terms of Canadian constitutional law there are three

consequences of the presumption of constitutionality:

(i) In choosing competing, plausible characteristics of the law, the court

should normally choose that one which would support the validity of
the law;
(ii) A finding of fact need not be strictly proved by the government, it is
sufficient that there should be a rational basis for the finding; and
(iii) Where the language of a statute is equally capable of two
constructions, one of which would be in conflict with the
Constitution and the other compatible with it, the latter should be
preferred. This interpretational technique is known as reading-down.
The processes – as articulated by Hogg – clearly comprises the reading-down as
interpreting in conformity with the Constitution, explained above.211

207
Ibid. The principle as discussed by Devenish, namely, ‘The Presumption of
Constitutionality,’ has been modified for purposes of the research to ‘Reading in Conformity
with the Constitution.’
208
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 210.
209
Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 601.
210
Ibid.
211
See discussion in Chapter 3.4 Reading-in, Reading-down, Severance and Reading in
Conformity with the Constitution.

108
To re-iterate the position in terms of current South African law, where one of two
conflicting interpretations of a statutory provision clearly promotes the spirit, purport
and objects of the Bill of Rights – then that particular one is preferred over the one
that does not do so.212 Because the Constitution is a value-laden document, it means
that the values ‘must be promoted and nurtured and applied’.213 The promotion and
implementation of a rights culture in South Africa, is without a doubt a ‘crucial
constitutional function of the judiciary’.214 Reading-down or interpretation in
conformity with the Constitution, which requires that all laws must be seen through
the prism of the Bill of Rights, is consistent with deontic reasoning215 and favours the
operation of the proposed deontic theory. It is not surprising, therefore, that in terms
of both the Interim and the Final Constitution, the reading-down interpretation in
conformity with the Constitution is regarded as a fundamentally important technique
of interpretation.

3.8.6 Value-Based Interpretation216

As already discussed in this and other chapters in this thesis, an examination of

section 39 reveals that the methodology of interpretation mandated by this section is
a purposive or value-based method of interpretation.217 As the supreme law of the
land, the Constitution does not only contain provisions that ensure inter alia formal
checks and balances on state power, but first and foremost, it is a value-laden
document. It is underpinned by a number of either express or implied values and
norms.218

212
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-139.
213
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 200.
214
Ibid at 201.
215
See Chapter 1 for a definition of the terms and a discussion of the origins of Deontology and
Deontic Reasoning.
216
A value-based methodology is pivotal to the operation of the teleological theory of
interpretation. See discussion at 2.5 and 2.5.1 in Chapter 2, for an examination of the merits
and demerits of the teleological theory.
217
This is more aptly referred to as the teleological theory of interpretation.
218
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 200.

109
In reflecting on the role of judges, Dworkin asserts that judges are bound when
delivering judgment to adjudicate in accordance with the principles derived from
political morality, that are ‘presupposed by the laws and institutions of the
community’.219 He therefore argues that the only ‘acceptable grounds’ are the
‘principles embedded in the body of settled law’.220 He explains further that when
interpreting the provisions of a statute, the statute has to be ‘read against a
background of common-law principles’.221 The South African Constitution with its
justifiable Bill of Rights and the underlying values and principles can indeed be
regarded as providing this background standard, referred to above.

This position is affirmed in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd,222 where the Court –
in referring to the interpretation clause of the Constitution – maintained that it is:

‘not merely an interpretive directive, but a force that informs all legal
institutions and decisions with the new power of constitutional values’.

These constitutional values and principles do not only provide the ideals and goals to
which South African society aspires, but they form the articulated set of guidelines or
the ‘yard stick against which everything is viewed and reviewed’.223 It therefore
raises the question about how to give effect to the ‘values’ of the Constitution –
particularly in a diverse society like South Africa, which has a history of oppression,
racism, sexism and discrimination. Tully’s succinct response to the problem is clear
– ‘to continue to inform the language of constitutionalism in which the demands are
taken up and adjudicated’.224 In a transformative Constitution, therefore, judges need
to embrace this challenge through interpretive discourse, in order to speak for the
weak and marginalized groups in South Africa. While the constitutional processes
exist, the ‘new’ challenge for constitutional interpretation is not only to give effect to
the fundamental constitutional values, but to meet the demands for social

219
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 47.
220
Ibid.
221
Ibid.
222
1996 (2) SA 588 (W).
223
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 102.
224
Ibid at 201.

110
transformation.225 What is needed is a theory of interpretation that requires one to
look beyond the fundamental constitutional values, in order to meet this challenge. It
is submitted that the proposed deontic theory which requires an evaluation of ethical
and moral considerations including the need for social and economic equality in the
interpretation and the pro-active application of the law, is postulated as the theory
that would be most suited to meet the ‘new’ challenge in a democratic era.

3.9 The Interpretation and Application of Section 39226

The ambit of section 39 is not restricted to the interpretation of Chapter 2 of the

Constitution but applies to all law.227 The use of both international law and foreign
law is ‘inevitable and sanctioned.’228 In respect of the process of interpretation,
therefore, reference to both international and foreign authorities is necessary. The
reference to sources outside of South Africa should be regarded as beneficial for the
development of South African law, and should undoubtedly influence our emerging
jurisprudence.

Nevertheless, while the obvious benefits or advantages of referring to international

and foreign law is apparent in case-law,229 it must be been emphasized that such
comparison has to be done ‘with due regard to the uniqueness of our Constitution,
our history and our circumstances’.230 This sentiment is also shared by scholars that

225
Ibid at 204.
226
Section 39 of the Constitution provides:-
‘ (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
(a) Must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) Must consider international law; and
(c) May consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights.
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are
recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that
they are consistent with the Bill.’
227
Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 620.
228
Ibid at 617.
229
See for example S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA and S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391
(CC).
230
S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 39.

111
while American jurisprudence, for example, can prove to be beneficial and
interesting, one has to be aware that the circumstances in South Africa and the
United States of America differ considerably, and one should be mindful of this if
such a comparison has to be made.231

Section 39(2) also deals with the interpretation of legislation other than the Bill of
Rights. An examination of the contents of the section reveals that it does expressly
prescribe a purposive or a teleological method of interpretation. Therefore, the fact
that this section requires that all courts, tribunals or forums must fulfill the aim and
purpose of legislation in light of the Bill of Rights, and therefore ‘authorises a
departure from literalism in the interpretation of law.232 This section allows for courts
to abandon their stale, positivist style of interpretation and employ a ‘value-
orientated method of interpretation’.233 A case that is worth reflecting on in respect
of this, is Jacob Zuma v The National Director of Public Prosecutions.234

Nicholson J’s judgment, is fraught with inconsistencies, incongruities and

controversy. While the judgment raises a plethora of political and legal issues, it is
not the intention of the writer to venture into a political discourse – but rather to use
an analysis of the approach adopted to statutory interpretation which influenced the
court’s decision.235 In considering the relevant provisions, namely section 22(2) (c)
of the National Prosecuting Authority Act,236 Nicholson J found that it was
necessary to focus on the ‘intention of the legislature’ (para 76 and para 77). What is
obvious from these paragraphs of the judgment, is that Nicholson J adopts an
unmistakable literal analysis of the legislation in question. Unfortunately, the

231
Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 618.
232
Ibid at 621.
233
Ibid.
234
2009 (1) All SA 54 N.
235
Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgment – Jacob Zuma v The
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54 N’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 784.
236
32 of 1998. Section 22 (2) (C) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 mirrors
section 179 (5) (d) of the Constitution.

112
approach of the judge to interpretation reflects a literal theory of interpretation which
is not only jurisprudentially unsound, but also inherently flawed.237

Nevertheless, while the judge’s approach in respect of para 76 and para 77 has been
criticized on the basis that it reflects a qualified contextual approach, a more careful
analysis of the judgment of Nicholson J reveals an ambivalence on the part of the
judge as he also supports a purposive or an unqualified contextual approach to
interpretation.238 In referring to section 39, a value-orientated method of
interpretation is given expression to:

‘If it is clear that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court must promote
the values that underlie an open and democratic society that is based on
human dignity, equality and freedom. The provision of the right to make
representations to an accused would pay appropriate tribute to his right to
human dignity, given the opprobrium that is normally attendant upon a
criminal trial’.

The approach employed in the above paragraph is clearly in keeping with that
mandated by the Constitution. It is unclear, therefore, why the judge chose to also
support the literal method of interpretation – in other parts of the judgment. The use
of the literal theory in the Nicholson judgment is incorrect, on the basis that it gives
credence to a discredited and archaic system. With the advent of the new
constitutional democracy, South African jurisprudence made a paradigmatic shift
away from a system based on parliamentary sovereignty, to a purposive or value-
based methodology of interpretation.239 Nevertheless, notwithstanding that a
purposive or a teleological approach is mandated by the Constitution, what can be
garnered from an examination of case-law240 is that there are still a number of recent

237
Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgment – Jacob Zuma v The
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54 N’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 786.
238
Ibid at 788.
239
Ibid at 789-790.
240
See for example, Adampal (Pty) Ltd v Administrator 1989 (3) SA 800; RPM Bricks (Pty) Ltd
v City Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2007 9 BCLR (TPD); and Swanepoel v JHB City
Council 1994 (3) SA 789 (A).

113
cases where courts have invoked the orthodox primary rule of interpretation – which
reflects a literal theory of interpretation.241

Because section 39(2) is a peremptory provision, it means that the section mandates
or obliges the interpreter to promote the values and objects of the Bill of Rights.242
As a result, the interpreter is required to consider factors outside the legislation. A
consideration of the context is regarded as being an inevitable part of the process of
interpretation. It enables the right in question to be put in perspective. The
interpretation of statutes must always start with the Constitution and not with the
legislative text.243 This position is affirmed by Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty)
Ltd v Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism – who declared that ‘the starting
point in interpreting any legislation is the Constitution’.244 What is evident from an
examination of case-law, is that South Africa’s history is regarded as being integral
to the process of interpretation, since it provides the context for understanding the
various provisions in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court therefore attempts to
use South Africa’s history as a ‘grand narrative’ to justify its interpretations.245 In so
doing, in applying a ‘forward-looking’ approach to interpretation, and giving effect
to social transformation, the intention is to ‘prevent a recurrence of the injustices of
the past’.246 Indeed, such an approach to interpretation is characteristic of a
transformative constitution.

3.10 An Examination of the Seminal Constitutional Court

Cases that Illustrate the Emerging Jurisprudence of
Transformation – Reflecting Deontic Interpretation
Many of the cases that are discussed below are referred to in this chapter as well as
others throughout the thesis. They are expounded in greater detail below to show

241
Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgment – Jacob Zuma v The
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54 N’ 2009 30 Obiter at 790.
242
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 101.
243
Ibid.
244
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at paras 72, 80 and 90.
245
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 32.
246
Ibid.

114
that they reflect the emerging jurisprudence of transformation that supports a deontic
theory of interpretation.

In taking their directive from section 39 (2) – to ‘promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights,’ what is evident is that courts are mandated to interpret
legislation to give effect to the values and norms that underlie a democratic
constitutional order. While there is no exact meaning of what the phrase entails – the
interpretation and application of section 39 (2) has seen our courts promote values
such as democracy, independence, accountability, responsiveness and openness as
well as a ‘myriad of other structural values that inform the Constitution.’ 247

Taking its cue from the Canadian case – of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd that:

‘The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is to be

ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be
understood in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to
protect. In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken and the purpose of the
right or freedom in question is to be sought, by reference to the character and
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the
specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined,
and where applicable to the meaning and purpose of the other rights and
freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter.’248

the landmark decision of S v Makwanyane and Another249 emulates this position.

Mahomed J perceptively highlights the factors that ought to inform the process of
statutory interpretation. He asserts that:

‘South African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is
defensible and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of,
that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and
repressive and a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic,

247
Bishop and Brickhill ‘In the Beginning was the Word: The Role of the Text in the
Interpretation of Statutes’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal at 685.
248
1985 18 DLR (4th) 321 at 395 – 6.
249
1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).

115
 universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos, expressly
articulated in the Constitution.’250

The notable shift in emphasis from a literal interpretation with its focus on the
ordinary grammatical meaning of the word, to a more encompassing or teleological
interpretation with due consideration of the wider context and purpose for the
promulgation of legislation, has been favoured by our Constitutional Court for
statutory and constitutional interpretation in the current open and democratic
constitutional dispensation. From the above dictum, it is emphasised that while
literal or ordinary grammatical meaning must be taken into account, it is not
necessarily conclusive. The literal meaning is but one consideration – and it will
only be accepted if it accords with a ‘purposive’ or ‘generous’ interpretation – that
‘gives expression to the values of the Constitution.’251 In S v Mhlungu,252 which is
perhaps one of the most controversial cases to have applied the generous or
purposive approach to interpretation, the majority judgment (as per Mahomed)
identifies the language as one of the factors in the process of interpretation. This
idea that language has to be considered collectively with other factors, which
includes an amalgamation of the various methodologies of interpretation, finds
resonance with an eclectic methodology which supports the operation of the
proposed deontic theory of interpretation.

In Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai

Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO
and Others253 the Constitutional Court had to consider whether section 29 (2) of the
National Prosecuting Authority Act254 – constituted a limitation to privacy – and to
determine further whether the limitation is constitutionally justifiable in terms of the

250
Ibid at para 262.
251
Ibid at para 9.
252
1995 (3) SA 867 (CC).The case is discussed more fully in Chapter 2 at 2.2.2 Criticisms of
the Literal Theory.
253
2001 (1) SA 545 (CC).
254
Section 29 (2) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act provides: ‘Any entry upon or search
of any premises in terms of this section shall be conducted with strict regard to decency and
order, including – a) a person’s right to, respect for and the protection of his or her dignity;
b) the right of a person to freedom and security; and c) the right of a person to his or her
personal privacy.’

116
provisions of section 36 (1) of the Constitution. In his ground breaking judgment
Langa DP, in reflecting on the proper approach to statutory interpretation as provided
in terms of section 39 (2) states that:

‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law
and customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights,’

that all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights. In
essence therefore all law making authority must be exercised in accordance with the
Constitution. The Constitution is located in history which involves a transition from
a society based on division, injustice and exclusion – as such the process must
recognise the context in which we find ourselves.255 In the process of interpretation
therefore, regard has to be given to the foundational values that underpin the
constitutional democracy. Some of these values include – human dignity, the
achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, and non-
racialism and non-sexism. What this in effect means in the process of interpretation
is that in construing the relevant section 29 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act
that the search and seizure of property had to be carried out in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.256

This position is affirmed by Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 257 who makes a resounding statement
that interpretation starts with the Constitution. The interpretation of the Bill of
Rights has seen the cardinal values such as human dignity, equality and freedom
being applied to specific situations. Exemplary in this regard is the case of Bato Star
which related to the allocation of quotas in the fishing industry. The amount of fish
that could be caught for commercial purposes was restricted by a quota system. The
relevant legislation that had to be interpreted was section 2 of the Marine Living

255
Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO and Others
2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 21.
256
Ibid at para 39.
257
2004 (7) BCLR 687(CC).

117
Resources Act258 - which provided that the Minister ‘must have regard to’, the
objectives and principles as provided for in terms of the section when making
allocations in terms of the Act. The case therefore depended on the interpretation
and application of the phrase ‘have regard to.’ The interpretation of the phrase by the
Supreme Court of Appeal gave the words their ordinary grammatical meaning. This
meant that the question of equity had to be considered with other factors as it was not
necessarily of special concern. The Constitutional Court however, maintained a
contrary view point. In applying a purposive methodology the question of
interpretation required that equity should be considered as an overriding
consideration – and not simply as an element in the process as was decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeal.

Ngcobo J articulated his position as follows: -

‘I accept that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “to have regard to” has in
the past been construed by the Courts to mean “bear in mind” or “ do not
overlook”. However the meaning of that phrase must be determined by the
context in which it occurs. In this case that context is the statutory
commitment to redressing the imbalances of the past, and more importantly,
the constitutional commitment to the achievement of equality. And this
means that the phrase as it relates to section 2 must be construed purposively
to “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. That object
is “the achievement of equality”, a foundational value that is affirmed in
section 9 (2) of the Constitution.’

Such a purposive value-based methodology was also clearly evidenced in United

Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa259 which
concerned the constitutionality of four pieces of legislation described as a ‘package’
of legislation.260 In construing the relevant legislation, consideration was given to

258
18 of 1998.
259
2003 (1) SA 495 (CC).
260
The four Acts that comprised the ‘package’ were namely: - the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Amendment Act 18 of 2002; the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Second Amendment Act 21 of 2002; the Local Government: Municipal Structures
Amendment Act 20 of 2002; and the Loss of Retention of Membership of National and
Provincial Legislatures Act 22 of 2002.

118
the founding values of the Constitution – which are provided for in section 1. The
Court therefore read the provisions of the legislation against the context of the
Constitution – as a whole. In giving effect to a contextual or purposive methodology
– which is epitomised by section 39 (2), the approach that was adopted was that:

‘A court must endeavour to give effect to all the provisions of the

Constitution. It would be extraordinary to conclude that a provision of the
Constitution cannot be enforced because of an irreconcilable tension with
another provision. When there is tension, the courts must do their best to
harmonise the relevant provisions, and give effect to all of them.’261

The directive that section 39 (2) must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights – is slightly more nuanced in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty)
Ltd262.where the Constitutional Court took the approach that section 39 (2) requires
an interpretation that ‘better’ promotes this spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights263. Therefore in the Agricultural Land Act264, which had to be construed, the
Constitutional Court criticised the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal that a
literal or textual reading was to be attributed to the Act.265 The notion of the
‘legislators intention’ which supports a literal methodology was also challenged on
the basis that in trying to establish the ‘intention of the legislature’ the question that
arises is for how long was it intended that the position would continue? The enquiry
therefore highlights the obvious flaws inherent in the literal theory.266 The position
that was maintained was that statutory interpretation must be determined in the
context of the statute which includes its purpose and must be read in its entirety,267
which is reflective of teleological interpretation. In light of this meaning, the

261
United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2003
(1) SA 495 (CC) at para 83.
262
2009 (1) SA 337 (CC).
263
Ibid at para 46. The author acknowledges reference made to the unpublished chapter – by
Govender on: ‘Operating the Bill of Rights’.
264
70 of 1970.
265
Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 (1) SA 337 (CC) at para 65.
266
See discussion in Chapter 2, 2.2 The Literal Theory.
267
Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 (1) SA 337 (CC) at para 61. The author
acknowledges reference made to the unpublished chapter – by Govender on: ‘Operating the
Bill of Rights’.

119
purpose of the Agricultural Land Act- included the authority accorded to the Minister
to exercise the powers anticipated for future acquisition by a provincial government
to assume responsibility for the administration of laws falling within the functional
area of agriculture.268 Therefore as illustrated in the above mentioned case, the
courts are required to adopt an interpretation that best promotes or advances the
totality of the rights and values entrenched in the Bill of Rights. This is pro-active
interpretation.

In applying the principle that our courts must give expression to the values of human
dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights there must be regard to far-
reaching consequences in the development and evolution of South African
jurisprudence. This has not been more prevalent than in the education sector which
has resulted in a plethora of cases being decided by the Constitutional Court on an
array of matters pertaining to education. The resultant effect thereof has seen the
interpretation, application and enforcement of rights being guided by the
constitutional values and principles. The Höerskool Ermelo269 case provides an
example of the application of these principles. The case dealt with the right to
receive education in the official language of ones choice in a public educational
system. The medium of instruction at the Höerskool Ermelo was Afrikaans. The
main issue before court was whether the HoD may lawfully revoke the function of
the governing body at a public school – to determine its language policy and to
confer the function on an interim committee appointed by him. The relevant
legislation required the interpretation of section 22 and section 25 of the Schools Act.

The approach and values of the High Court mirrored that of Minster of Education,
Western Cape, and Others v Governing Body, Mikro Primary School and Another270,
where the position of the Supreme Court of Appeal was that section 22 of the
Schools Act entitled the HoD to revoke the school’s language policy and the power
of the functions of the school governing body. The HoD was therefore entitled to

268
Ibid.
269
Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education and Others v Hoerskool Ermelo
2009 (ZACC) 32.
270
2006 (1) SA 1 (SCA): 2005 (10) BCLR 973 (SCA).

120
revoke the power to determine the language policy and to confer the power to an
interim committee271. The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the
High Court and found that the HoD had no power whatsoever to revoke the
competence of the school to determine the language policy.272 The decision of the
Constitutional Court differed markedly from the lower courts. In placing the right in
its context, it was maintained that the right to education and to be educated in the
language of one’s choice, was explicitly provided for in terms of section 29 (2) of the
Constitution. In interpreting the Schools Act therefore it was necessary to place the
right to education in its context. This required that one had to consider the broader
constitutional scheme that education was to be made progressively available and
accessible to everyone.273 In deciding what was fair in the circumstances, it was
necessary to take heed of the South African legacy of apartheid and the inequalities
and disparities in the education sector.274 It was therefore emphasised that a key
consideration and one which should have been given more focus and emphasis was
the ‘need to ensure that the stranded learners were provided with a school to
attend.’275 The basis of the reasoning and analysis of the Constitutional Court was
unmistakably a broad purposive or more accurately a teleological method of
interpretation.

The MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School,276 is a
further illustration of teleological interpretation applied by the courts. A closer
examination of what transpired requires consideration. According to the facts of the
case, the Rivonia Primary School refused to admit a Grade 1 learner on the basis that
it had reached its maximum capacity of 120 Grade 1 learners. The mother of the
child, complained firstly to the Department of Education and thereafter to the MEC
of the province. The Department overturned the refusal and instructed the principal

271
Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education and Others v Hoerskool Ermelo
2009 (ZACC) at para 30 and 31.
272
Ibid at para 35.
273
Ibid at para 61.
274
Ibid at para 2.
275
Ibid at para 8.
276
2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC).

121
to admit the learner. In February 2011, when the mother brought the child back to
school, they still refused to admit the child. What followed thereafter was a
controversial sequence of events, to say the least. As a result of the principal not
admitting the child, the HoD proceeded to withdraw the principal’s admission
function, and delegated it to another it to another official. The officials from the
Department, thereafter arrived at the school and physically placed the child in a
Grade 1 classroom. The fate of the principal was that she was subjected to a
disciplinary hearing, for a failure to comply, was given a final warning and had a
month’s salary deducted.277

The High Court was satisfied that the Department had acted fairly and reasonably.
The Supreme Court of Appeal however, overturned the decision, on the basis that the
Department did not have the legal power to override the school’s admission policy.
On having lost in the SCA, the MEC appealed to the Constitutional Court – that had
to decide on the contentious issue of how a conflict between the School’s Governing
Body and the Provincial Education Department was to be resolved.

The Constitutional Court held that although in terms of the Schools Act,278 the
School Governing Body may determine the capacity of the school as an important
part of it’s admission policy, the Department always had ultimate control over the
implementation of this policy.279 Nevertheless, the manner in which the HoD had
exercised his power was not procedurally fair. The court referred to the cases of
Head of Department, Department of education Free State Province v Harmony High
School and Another280 and Head of Department of Mpumalanga Department of
Education and Another v Höerskool Ermelo281in this regard, where it was noted that

277
Ibid at para 15.
278
84 of 1996.
279
MEC for Education v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR 1365
(CC) at para 81.
280
2013 (9) BCLR 989.
281
2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) at para 56, the Constitutional Court clearly set out what was
expected of the relevant role-players in terms of the Schools Act 84 of 1996, as follows:
‘An overarching design of the Act is that public schools are run by three crucial partners. The
national government is represented by the Minister of Education whose primary role is to set
uniform norms and standards for public schools. The provincial government acts through the
MEC for Education who bears the obligation to establish and provide public schools and
together with the Head of Provincial Department of Education, exercises executive control

122
the ‘parties had failed to engage with each other in good faith to uphold principles of
co-operative government, and comply with their concomitant duty to avoid
litigation.’282 The Court referred to section 40(2) and section 41(h) (vi) of the
Constitution, which basically highlights co-operation as being integral to resolving
disputes of this nature. The respective sections provide that:-

‘All spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles of this
Chapter’;

and

‘All sphere of government…must co-operate in mutual trust and good faith

by, avoiding legal proceedings…’

What is obvious from the above provisions, is that co-operation is pivotal in

resolving disputes between school governing bodies and national or provincial
government. Unfortunately, from the facts of the case, this did not materialize. This
is clearly reflected in the following paragraph where it was asserted that :

‘This case illustrates the damage that results when some functionaries fail to
take general obligation to act in partnership and co-operation seriously. In
the early stages of the tussle there was some engagement between the
parties, albeit tense. The value of that engagement was demonstrated by the
understanding between the school and the Department at the end of
November 2010.

By contrast, the manner in which the Gauteng HoD thereafter exercised his
powers completely upended the process. The heavy-handed approach he
used when making his decision raised the spectre that the Department would
use its powers to deal with systematic capacity problems in the province
with regard to the role of governing in the Schools Act’s carefully crafted

over public schools through principals. Parents of learners and members of the community in
which the school is located are represented in the school governing body which exercises
defined autonomy over some domestic affairs of the school.’
282
MEC for Education v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR 1365
(CC) at para 62.

123
 model. It caused antagonism and mistrust, causing the Rivonia Governing
Body to recoil.’283

What is apparent from the case is that all the relevant role players had to make a
concerted effort by co-operation to resolve the matter. Such co-operation is not only
optional, but is in fact mandatory. Therefore, in giving effect to section 39(2) which
mandates a value-based methodology, the approach of the Court is clearly
teleological. However, the stance adopted by the majority in the Constitutional
Court as reflected in the above case as well as others discussed above may be
described as being pro-active. In NK v Minister of Safety and Security284 where the
applicant sought damages in delict from the Minister of Safety and Security on the
basis that she was raped by three uniformed on-duty policemen, the Constitutional
Court had to consider the scope of vicarious liability of the Minister of Safety and
Security under the law. The Constitutional Court focused on the mandate to develop
the common law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The
Court referred to S v Thebus and Another285 where Moseneke J identified the need to
develop the common law in at least two instances:

‘The first would be when the rule of the common law is inconsistent with a
constitutional provision. Repugnancy of this kind would compel an
adaptation of the common law top resolve the inconsistency. The second
possibility arises even when a rule of the common law is not inconsistent
with a specific constitutional provision but may fall short of its spirit, purport
and objects. Then, the common law must be adapted so that it grows in
harmony with the “objective normative value system” found in the
Constitution.’286

The Court further affirmed the persuasive normative effect of our Constitution that
was acknowledged by the court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and

283
Ibid at para 74 and para 75.
284
2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC).
285
2003 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) at para 28.
286
2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) at para 16.

124
Another287. The Constitutional Court was unwavering in its assertion that the
common law had to be infused with the values of the Constitution – and that such a
‘normative influence of the Constitution – had to be felt throughout the common
law.’288 This is clearly a methodology that transcends a teleological evaluation. In a
transformative constitution like that in South Africa the overarching consideration is
that the ‘spirit of transition and transformation should characterize the constitutional
enterprise as a whole.’289 In a transformative constitutional order as is reflective of
South Africa presently, the traditional or more commonly accepted theories of
interpretation that have been used by South African courts, are not adequate to meet
the challenges of an emerging democracy. It is therefore submitted that a deontic
theory of interpretation which is based on ethical and moral considerations and
incorporates inductive and deductive reasoning and which is to be applied pro-
actively – is most appropriate in a transformative society. The element of pro-
activism as is highlighted in the Constitutional Court’s approach above, is pivotal to
the operation of the proposed deontic theory.

3.11 Conclusion

With its far-reaching consequences, the Constitution has to be regarded as being

singularly the most important legal instrument in South African history. This has
certain important consequences.

First and foremost, a comparison between the Constitution and ordinary statutes,
reveals a striking commonness or commonality.290 This does not, however, come as
a surprise, since both ordinary statutes and the Constitution are enacted law texts,
which means they actually belong to the same text genre(s). As a result, the logic that

287
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) at para 54. The author acknowledges
reference made to the unpublished chapter – by Govender on: ‘Operating the Bill of Rights’.
288
2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) at para 15.
289
Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO and Others
2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 51.
290
See 3.2 Differences and Similarities Between Constitutional Interpretation and
Ordinary Statutory Interpretation, in Chapter 3.

125
follows is that the strategies and justifications for their interpretation will also have
much in common. 291

Nevertheless, as emphasized, statutes and the Constitution are ‘significantly and

consequently different’ in certain respects, and this also applies to both statutory and
constitutional interpretation.292 Due to its proclamation of supremacy (in terms of
section 2), and the interpretation provision (section 39) clearly mandate the
purposive or teleological method.

In reflecting on what is needed in a transformative society, it is emphasized that the

role of judges needs to more focused on facilitating social justice. It therefore begs
the question – what theory of interpretation should underpin the process of
interpretation? What is apparent from an examination of case-law, is that simply
focusing on a particular theory of interpretation is inadequate. In a transformative
Constitution, it is necessary to give effect to the combined operation of the theories
and to amalgamate their respective methodologies to be able to fulfil the aims of
social justice. It is for this reason that a deontic theory and reasoning through
creative and pro-active interpretation with an eclectic methodology is proposed for
both constitutional and statutory interpretation in South Africa.

291
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 15.
292
Ibid. See comments by Du Plessis in the Prolegomenon at vii.

126
 CHAPTER 4

THE RELEVANCE OF THE COMMON - LAW PRESUMPTIONS

OF INTERPRETATION IN THE CURRENT DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONAL ERA IN SOUTH AFRICA*

4.1 Introduction

The focus of Chapter 4 is on an examination of the common-law presumptions of

interpretation. The purpose in examining the presumptions of interpretation is:

a) to assess their significance prior to and subsequent to the current

constitutional era in South Africa; and

b) to determine if in their role as ‘verbalization of values vital to the sustenance

of a just and effective legal order,’1 whether they will continue to contribute
to the emerging jurisprudence in South Africa.

As principles of common-law, the presumptions encapsulate fundamental values and

inherent principles of justice. Prior to the new constitutional dispensation, the
common-law presumptions were in effect a surrogate for the Bill of Rights. The
advent of a supreme Constitution has brought about a significant change to the
perception and attitude of the traditional role of presumptions.

* In terms of the University Rule DR 8 Submission of Thesis: Every student for a Doctoral
degree shall be required to submit:-
(i) a thesis embodying the results of their research, together with (ii) one (1) published
paper or an unpublished manuscript that has been submitted to an accredited journal,
arising from the doctoral research…’
To meet the requirements of the above rule, Chapter 4 has been modified and submitted for
publication. The article in its published form appears as Singh ‘A Re-Evaluation of the
Common-Law Presumptions of Interpretation in Light of the Constitution’ (2012) 75
Journal on Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at79-100. For this reason the similarities
with the contents of Chapter 4 and the above-mentioned article are noted.
1
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 151. It is noted that all presumptions, even
the most technical ones are verbalisations of values. Some of these diverse values are
identified as equity, reasonableness equality (before the law and otherwise), legality, legal
certainty and public interest.

127
In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, there is a constitutional imperative to
develop the common-law. This sentiment resonates in the Constitutional Court
decision of Carmichelle v Minister of Safety and Security, 2where there is an
obligation on courts to develop the common-law. The Court goes so far as to assert
that this obligation is mandated and necessary to ensure that the common-law is
developed to bring it in line with constitutional values. A failure to do so would not
only be contrary to the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, but could
possibly contribute to the diminished status of presumptions and eventually also see
the demise of very important principles of statutory interpretation.

Since the inception of the new order, most common-law presumptions have been
subsumed into the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Those that are not subsumed are
complementary and must be developed in accordance with constitutional principles.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the transformative constitutional era has revealed a
new classification of presumptions. There are three subdivisions that comprise this
categorization. These are presumptions that:

(i) Have been (or seem to be) subsumed under the Constitution;
(ii) Seem to be incompatible or inconsistent with the Constitution; and
(iii) Seem to have been left unaffected by the Constitution.3

In order to achieve the aims as outlined in this chapter, which is to assess the
relevance of the common-law presumptions and their role in the constitutional era, it
is neither necessary nor practical to examine all of the common-law presumptions
that are used.4 For purposes of the research, the following presumptions – the state

2
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) par 39: ‘It needs to be stressed that the obligation of Courts to develop
the common law, in the context of the S 39 (2) objectives, is not purely discretionary. On the
contrary, it is implicit in S 39 (2) read with S 173 that where the common law as it stands is
deficient in promoting the S 39 (2) objectives, the Courts are under a general obligation to
develop it appropriately.’
3
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 153. The classification as presented by Du
Plessis is not to be regarded as a rigid classification as presumptions may fulfill more than
one value-regulative function.
4
Among the host of commonly used presumptions are for example 1) The legislature does not
intend to alter the existing law more than is necessary; 2) The legislature does not intend
absurd or anomalous results; 3) The legislature intends to promote public good; 4) The
presumption applies to general and not to particular instances.

128
is not bound by its own legislation, legislation does not oust or restrict the
jurisdiction of the courts, statutes do not contain invalid or purposeless provisions,
and the legislature does not intend that which is harsh, unjust or unreasonable – form
the basis of the discussion set out below.

The above-mentioned presumptions are discussed in seriatim, below.

4.2 The State is Not Bound by its Own Legislation

One of the reasons that this presumption is generally regarded as more contentious
than most of the others, is that the prima facie– it appears to allow for ‘unbridled
lawlessness by governmental agencies’.5 This is obviously a misconception about the
understanding and the operation of the presumption. This is, in fact, created by the
manner in which the presumption is worded, which is that ‘the state is not bound by
statute’. The formulation of this presumption that the formula that ‘the state is not
presumed to be bound’, is ‘highly problematic and misleading’ in that ‘it flies in the
face of state liability’. It is therefore submitted that the presumption should not be
applied in a purely mechanical way.6

A closer analysis of the presumption, however, reveals that what the principle allows
public officials who are responsible for carrying out their duties are not to be
hampered or hindered in any way. Hahlo and Khan explain that:

‘An enactment does not apply to the state or its executive arm or to a
provincial council, local authority or other public body from which it
emanates.’7

The above immediately begs the question then – what is meant by ‘state’? It applies
to the executive which is tasked with the administrative functions of the state.8 In his
illustration of examples of practical scenarios revealing instances when the
presumption can be invoked, Botha notes that while the driver of a fire engine en

5
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 90.
6
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 202.
7
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 139. (Emphasis Added)
8
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 77.

129
route to a fire may disregard a red traffic light9 and an agricultural official who
combats stock diseases is not bound by statutory requirements regarding hunting
permits,10 a security official on the other hand – who contravenes a statutory
provision outside the scope of his duties – cannot invoke the presumption in his
defence.11

The circumstances expressed above are in keeping with Steyn’s viewpoint that the
presumption applies to both original and subordinate legislation.12 Nevertheless, this
view was criticised in Raats Röntgen and Vermeulen (Pty) Ltd v Administrator,
Cape, and Others,13 where Van Deventer AJ expounded the view that ‘provisional
administrations are bound by laws of Parliament’.14 This view is actually
preferable.15 What is abundantly clear, therefore, is that whether or not the state is
bound, is dependant not only on the legislation in question, but also on the particular
circumstances or instances that have to be decided on in light of the prevailing
legislation.16 The suggestion by Labuschagne that the state might be bound by one
provision of the legislation but not by another, is echoed by Du Plessis – who
submits that this is possible even if the binding and non-binding provisions appear in
the same section of the Act.17

In terms of the application of the presumption, it is interesting that Devenish explains

that the presumption should involve a ‘teleological evaluation’. He maintains that a

9
See S v Labuschagne 1979 (3) SA 1320 T.
10
The case of S v Huysen 1968 (3) SA 490 (GW) being the case in point.
11
See S v Reed 1972 (2) SA 34 (RA).
12
Botha Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 60-61. It has been necessary to refer to earlier
additions of Botha’s book to gain a more insightful understanding of the application of the
law. This has been such an instance.
13
1991 (1) SA 827 (C).
14
Ibid.
15
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 204.
16
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 140.
17
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 174. Further authority for this contention can
be found in R v Thomas 1954 (1) SA 185 (SWA) at 187 B-C. See also De Ville
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 188, where the author drives the point that the
fact that the legislative activities of the state prima facie relate to a relationship where the
state is placed ‘as against’ its subjects and ‘not next’ to them. It is therefore not based on a
specific right the state has.

130
‘concatenation of factors’ are required to be present before the ‘presumption
becomes operative’.18 Such a teleological evaluation is also highlighted by Du
Plessis, who submits that the express or implied rebuttal of the presumption can be
inferred not only from the language of the provision in question, but also from its
nature, and, with a view to surrounding circumstances, its objects and
consequences.19

4.2.1 The Application of the Presumption

It is interesting to note that even prior to the new constitutional dispensation,

Wiechers suggested that the reversal of the wording of the presumption would more
aptly reflect the optimal operation of the presumption.20 According to Wiechers,
therefore, the position is more accurately reflected as follows: the state should always
be bound by its own legislation, except in instances where it would be hampered or
impeded in the execution of its governmental functions.21 Van Deventer AJ’s
advocacy for Wiechers’ view is reflected in the judgment in the Raats Röntgen case22
– where it was endorsed that:

‘there is much to be said for Wiechers’ view ... that the presumption should
be reversed and that the state should presumably be bound by all its laws

18
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 202.
19
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 174. The presumption was relied on in several
cases. The leading ones being Union Government v Tonkin 1918 AD 533; SAR & H v Smith
Coasters (Prop) Ltd 1931 AD 113 and Evans v Schoeman 1949 (1) SA 571 (A).
20
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 202.
21
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 139. ‘The presumption is first and foremost a
functional means to the end of ensuring that the execution of the typical functions of
government – in so far as they are aimed at enhancing the public good and welfare – is not
unduly hampered.’
22
1991 (1) SA 827 (C). The Appellate Division listed the considerations to be taken into
account when considering the application of the presumption which was summarized as
follows at 262: ‘a) The court may take various factors into account in determining whether
the presumption is excluded in a particular case, example the language of the enactment, the
surrounding circumstances at the time when the statute was passed, the objects of the acts,
the mischief it is aimed at preventing, the consequences if the state were exempted or bound
(i.e. considerations of public policy) and other common-law presumptions. b) The mere fact
that a statute was passed for the public benefit is not a sufficient consideration to conclude
that the state was intended to be bound. Before it can be held that the state is bound by an
enactment (where it is not expressly provided for), it must be shown that if the state were not
bound, the purpose sought to be achieved by the enactment would be frustrated.

131
 except those which, if the state were to obey them at all times, would
impede the proper execution of its functions.’23

The cases of S v De Bruin24 and R v De Beer25 are particularly relevant to the

discussion and the understanding of the presumption. Devenish cites the case of S v
De Bruin as an exemplary of a case where one could ‘justifiably’ invoke the
presumption.26 In this case, the court had to construe the ambit of the speed
regulations Act.27 It was maintained that speed regulations should not bind the state.
As a result, the accused – De Bruin – a policeman who had contravened the speed
limit because he was running late for an on-site inspection on the state’s behalf, was
found not to be in contravention of the legislation in question. The court held that the
relevant speed restrictions would have hampered the carrying out of his duties, and,
on appeal, he had his conviction set aside.

While the court in the case of S v De Bruin found in favour of the appellant, a
policeman, the court in R v De Beer that had to consider the predicament of a
postman who had disregarded the speed regulations – but did not arrive at the same
outcome. It was felt that the circumstances did not ‘rationally justify’ the operation
of the presumption, and therefore the court did not ‘exonerate’ the accused ‘from
compliance with the provisions’.28

4.2.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current

Constitutional Dispensation

In reflecting on the classification propounded by Du Plessis,29 the question whether

the presumption that the state is not bound by its own legislation, is compatible with

23
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 203.
24
1975 (3) SA 56 T.
25
1929 TPD 104.
26
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 203 for a critique of the cases of De Bruin and De
Beer.
27
89 of 1970.
28
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 204.
29
See classification as per Du Plessis in Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 153.

132
the Constitution arises. From an examination of the relevant sections of the
Constitution, it is obvious that the presumption can no longer be justified.

In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution – which provides that the rules of
common law have to be developed in light of the fundamental rights of the
Constitution30 – the operation of this particular presumption would be problematic.
In terms of section 2,31 the supremacy clause of the Constitution, it is expressly
provided that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. It is therefore
required that the Constitution should be a yardstick against which all law and
conduct must be measured. It is noted that government conduct is certainly not
precluded from such scrutiny. Accountability by governmental organs is further
endorsed by section 8, which provides that:

‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.’32

The logical conclusion emanating from the above provision is that accountability is
mandatory. Botha therefore quite correctly states that it would be ‘illogical and
absurd’ if government organs were bound by the Constitution but at the same time
not be bound by their ‘own’ legislation, which he reasons, in any event, is
subordinate to the Constitution.33

In upholding the values of the current democratic order – which is based on

freedom,34 equality35 and human dignity36 – it is maintained that it is imperative that
in a transformative constitutional state or “Rechsstaat” as it is referred to, one should

30
Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’
31
Section 2 provides: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’
32
(Emphasis Added).
33
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 92.
34
Section 12 of the Constitution.
35
Section 9 of the Constitution.
36
Section 10 of the Constitution.

133
be ‘heedful of the principle of legality’.37 The basic principle of legality and the
presumption that the state is not bound by its own legislation, is ‘inherently
incompatible’.38

There is further support for this contention in the dictum of Fedsure Life Assurance
Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,39 where the
Constitutional Court maintained:

‘It seems central to the conception of our constitutional order that the
Legislature and Executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle
that they may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that
conferred by law. At least in this sense, then, the principle of legality is
implied within the terms of the interim Constitution.’

Even prior to the new constitutional dispensation, Wiechers was opposed to the
application of the presumption as formulated in the common-law. His opposition was
voiced about a decade ago and clearly reflected his ‘misgivings about the consistency
of the presumption with the value of legality’.40 Wiechers points out further, that as
with the rules of common-law, presumptions have always operated in tandem with
existing legislation – to ensure adherence to the principle of legality.

Giving due consideration to the fact that in practice, the state could be hampered in
carrying out its functions if it were bound by legislation, Wiechers correctly
suggested that the presumption should be applied ‘the other way round’.41 It is not
surprising that – with the current ‘constitutional demand for accountability of the
public administration’42 – Wiechers’ viewpoint has in fact been vindicated.43 As part

37
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 177. The author describes a Rechsstaat as a:
‘Democratic state founded on the... values of supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of
law.’ See also Müller ‘Basic Questions of Constitution Concretization’ (1999) 3 Stellenbosch
Law Review at 274.
38
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 176.
39
1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) par 58.
40
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 175.
41
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 142.
42
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 177.
43
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 142.

134
of the common-law rules, the principles of justice and fairness that embody the
presumptions of statutory interpretation have always been part of our law. Now that
most of the principles underlying the common law presumptions have been
entrenched in the Constitution, it will be interesting to observe the jurisprudential
development of this common-law presumption – to bring it in line with constitutional
principles. In spite of this however, it is rather unfortunate that even though the
Constitution encapsulates the values that underpin the common-law presumptions,
one might find less and less application of some presumptions – to the point that they
could possibly also even ‘disappear’ as a result of disuse.44

4.3 Legislation Does Not Oust or Restrict the Jurisdiction of the

Courts

It is interesting that Steyn suggested that this presumption is an extension of the

presumption that statutes do not bind the state. The premise for his argument flows
from the fact that while the presumption that the state is not bound by its own
legislation pertains mainly to the executive, the presumption that an enactment is not
aimed at interfering with or ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, obviously applies
to the judiciary. The principle of trias politica is used to enunciate this argument.45
The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the legislature, the executive, and
the judiciary, operate to a greater extent separately of each other. In accordance with
the principle underlying this presumption, the legislature has to respect the ‘desired
state of affairs’ and not interfere with or oust the jurisdiction of the judiciary (the
courts). By the same token, the executive is also expected to maintain a similar
‘attitude’ to the courts. The advent of the 1996 Constitution with a democratically
elected government ensures that the principles and values of the doctrine of
separation of powers are developed. The Constitution is therefore framed in a
manner that establishes a system of checks and balances when dealing with the roles
of the legislature, executive and the judiciary. At the same time the system of checks

44
Botha Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 52-53. Botha submits that: ‘It is ironic that the
supreme Constitution should emphasize and entrench the values underpinning the common
law presumptions, but at the same time should diminish their importance in future.’
45
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 73.

135
and balances also affirms the limited power of the legislative and executive
authorities which appears to be confined within the constraints of constitutional
values and principles.46 The Constitution therefore clearly presents an ideal of a
democratic society – that is, society in which democracy operates. In order for that
ideal society to exist and operate, it specifically requires that the necessary blocks or
‘basic institutional arrangements for a representative/participatory democracy,’ be
established and monitored. These include for example, regular elections,
democratically elected legislatures at national, provincial and local level and
structures, institutions and processes to facilitate participation in decision-making
outside these institutions and in between elections.47 In Merafong Demarcation
Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa48 Skweyiya J maintained that the
majority view that the new democratic dispensation provided voters with ‘powerful
methods’ for voters to hold politicians accountable through regular free elections.
He makes a resounding statement in support of his contention that:

‘courts deal with bad law but that voters must deal with bad politics. The
doctrine of separation of powers to which our democracy subscribes does
not allow this court, or any other court, to interfere in the power exercise of
powers by the legislature.’49

Nevertheless it still begs the question about whether our courts would be acting
within their power to grant orders that determine policy. This brings into focus the
question of deference. Brand describes the process that courts have through the
judicial strategy of deference as that which in effect results in the deferring to other
branches of government those questions that they feel that they are incapable of
deciding on or where they feel would require of them to violate the principles of

46
Ntlama ‘The “Deference” of Judicial Authority to the State’ (2012) Obiter at 135.
47
Brand ‘Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa’
(2011) Stellenbosch Law Review at 623.
48
2008 (10) BCLR 968.
49
Ibid at para 308.

136
separation of powers.50 In Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg51 deference operated in
the formulation of the reasonableness test which focused on procedural or structural
rather than substantive terms. The court reasoned that the question of providing
social measures should be left to other branches of government – as the role of the
court was limited to the process of interpretation only.52 In the Minister of Health v
Treatment Action Campaign53 the court maintained a contrary viewpoint that
notwithstanding the fact that all arms of government should respect the doctrine of
separation of powers, did not mean that courts could not make orders that impact on
policy. Jowell and Steyn provide that, there is no formula to identify the scope of the
decision-making body’s discretion. The court must consider whether the context and
circumstances of the case require the court to defer on a specific issue. They further
submit that courts should repudiate any presumptions that matters of public interest
that fall outside their competence. Lenta however, differs from Jowell and Steyn on
the basis that courts should be sensitive to legitimate exercises of judgment by other
branches, and that judges should allow the elected branches considerable latitude for
policy making within constraints of the Constitution.54

There is much support for the view that a court should only interfere when it is
absolutely necessary to avoid likely irreparable harm and only in the least intrusive
manner possible with regard to the interests of others who might be affected by the
legislation in question.55 From the case of RJR MacDonald v Canada56 a cautionary
note is sounded about how far the notion of deference may be extended. It was
provided that:
‘Care must be taken not to extend the notion of deference too far. Deference
must not be carried to the point of relieving the government of the burden

50
Brand ‘Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa’
(2011) Stellenbosch Law Review at 618.
51
2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 63- para 65.
52
Ibid at para 65 – para 67.
53
2002 (10) BCLR 1075.
54
Lenta ‘Judicial Deference and Rights’ (2006) Tydskrif vir Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 460.
55
Mclean ‘Towards a Framework for Understanding Constitutional Deference’ (2010) 25
South African Public Law at 466.
56
(1995) 3 SCR 199.

137
 which the Constitution places upon it of demonstrating that the limits it has
imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable. Parliament has
its role: to choose the appropriate response to social problems within the
limiting framework of the Constitution. But the courts also have a role: to
determine objectively and impartially, whether Parliament’s choice falls
within the limiting framework of the Constitution.’57

As the individual’s right to access justice in a court of law can be regarded as ‘one of
the cornerstones of institutional justice’, political powers by way of the legislature
and the executive are not expected to infringe or violate this right in any way.58

It is therefore provided – that unless expressly stated or implied in legislation – it is

presumed that the legislature does not wish to exclude or restrict the courts’
jurisdiction. What this in effect means, is that if it is the intention of the legislature to
restrict or oust the jurisdiction of the courts, this must be clearly indicated in the
language of the statute being considered. This ‘well-recognised rule’ in the
interpretation of statutes was applied in the case of De Wet v Deetleefs,59 where
Solomon CJ maintained that:

‘... in order to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law, it must be clear that
such was the intention of the legislature.’

Further support for the rule is observed in the dictum of R v Padsha, where Innes CJ
boldly affirmed that where the rights of an aggrieved person are restricted or
inhibited – it has to be done ‘in the clearest language’.60 Devenish is adamant that
the power to oust the jurisdiction of the courts must be done in ‘unequivocal
language and with unmistakable purpose’. He maintains that where the ousting is
‘indirect and elliptical’, courts would be more reluctant to give effect to it.61 The case

57
See Edwards comment on deference in RJR MacDonald v Canada in The Modern Law
Review 2002 65(6) at 859.
58
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 93. The submissions which are made by Botha
are not repeated in the later editions of his book.
59
1928 AD 286 at 290.
60
1923 AD 281 at 304.
61
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 196.

138
of Mathope and Others v Soweto Council is a case in point.62 The court found that
section 12 of the Community Councils Act63, did not exclude the jurisdiction of the
magistrates court or the supreme court. This judgment is not only unassailable, but is
also very progressive in the application of the law. The court in its analysis based its
reasoning on an individual’s fundamental right to approach the courts. While section
34 of the Constitution64 currently entrenches an individual’s rights to resolve a
dispute in a court of law, this obviously did not apply at the time.

4.3.1 The Application of the Presumption

The Constitution has significantly affected the application of the presumption that
legislation does not oust or restrict the jurisdiction of the courts. To fully appreciate
the operation and significance of this presumption, it is necessary to consider the
application of the presumption both prior to and after the new constitutional
dispensation. As a result of South Africa’s erstwhile ‘notorious domestic policies’,
the rights and liberties of individuals were curtailed considerably by limiting or
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. Ouster clauses which excluded the jurisdiction
of the courts have been identified – as a particularly ‘odious feature’ of the old order
legislation.65 As a matter of fact, the use of such ouster clauses to exclude the
jurisdiction of the courts at the time, were regarded as the ‘usual practise’ when
dealing with so-called ‘emergency legislation’.66 Generally, parliament had the
power to oust the jurisdiction of the courts where it was deemed to be in the public
interest. Innes CJ reiterates the position in R v Padsha,67 where it was declared that:

‘It is competent for Parliament to oust the jurisdiction of courts of law if it

considers such a course advisable in the public interest.’

62
1983 (4) SA 287 (W) at 289 F.
63
125 of 1977.
64
Section 34 of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that
can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or,
where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’
65
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 197. Devenish makes the point that: ‘The use of ouster
clauses to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts has been a singularly unfortunate and odious
feature of our security legislation which sanctioned unlimited detention without trial.’
66
Cockram Interpretation of Statutes at 112.
67
1923 AD 281 at 304. (Emphasis Added)

139
What is worth reflecting on in the South African context, is how ‘public interest’
insidiously came to be associated with the ‘interest of state security’ and maintaining
the status quo. Of particular significance is the (now defunct) Internal Security Act.68
In terms of section 29 of the Internal Security Act, it was expressly stipulated that:

‘No court of law shall have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of
any action taken in terms of this section.’69

The courts nevertheless maintained that the legislation in question did not totally
exclude their jurisdiction. In instances where officials had acted fraudulently or ‘with
malice or caprice’ – or if they went ‘beyond the limits of competency’ – the courts
could have intervened. The effect of officials not being required to furnish reasons
for their actions meant that legislation which had already been considerably whittled
down in legal force, had now become a ‘de facto nullity’. This problem was further
compounded, in that the onus of proof alleging fraud or mala fides lay with the
person alleging it.70Evidence of the status quo is reflected in Bunting v Minister of
Justice, 71where the position is articulated as follows:

‘A court of law could also interfere if it is demonstrated or shown that the

Minister had used these powers in a mala fide manner ... But the onus of
showing that the Minister had not exercised his discretion properly is upon
whoever alleges that ...’

In a similar vein, Jansen J in Stanton v Minister of Justice72maintained that:

68
74 of 1982.
69
The Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 has been repealed by the Internal Security and
Intimidation Amendment Act 138 of 1991.
70
Further support for this contention can be found in the case of Stanton v Minister of Justice
1960 (3) SA 353 (T) 360 A-B.
71
1963 (4) SA 531 (C) 533.
72
1960 (3) SA 353 (T) at 360. See also Stadsraad van Vanderbylpark v Administrateur,
Transvaal 1982 (3) SA 166 (T) at 175 where the court went further and provided that: ‘The
alleged unreasonableness must be “inexplicable” except on the assumption of mala fides or
ulterior motive or that the (official)... did not apply his mind to the matter.’

140
 ‘The Minister’s power is ... purely administrative. It is not incumbent on him
to give reasons for his decision. The onus is on the applicant to establish mala
fides.’

Due to the high degree of proof required when alleging fraud or mala fides, it is not
surprising that Holmes JA in the case of National Transport Commission and
Another v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd73 described the process as a
‘formidable’ one. Nevertheless, the case of Hurley and Another v Minister of Law
and Order74 arrived at the contrary outcome (to the above-mentioned cases), when
construing if the relevant security legislation. The court’s findings in Hurley were
based on a ‘restrictive interpretation’ of the ouster clause in dispute. In adopting this
approach, Devenish maintained that the Court was able to ‘preserve the jurisdiction
of the courts in a very contentious branch of South African law’.75 This rule –
embodied in the ‘Hurley principle’ as it later came to be referred to – has been
accepted and applied in subsequent decisions.76 Indeed, the Hurley judgment is a
land-mark decision in the history of South African law.

Under the previous constitutional system which was based on the Westminster
paradigm, parliament was sovereign. As a result, everything which was enacted by
Parliament – irrespective of how demeaning, offensive or morally repugnant, for
example the Group Areas Act77 could not be challenged.

73
1972 (3) SA 726 (AD) at 735.
74
1985 (4) SA 709 (D).
75
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 197-199. See the author’s comments and criticism on
the findings of the Hurley judgment.
76
The decisions in respect of which the so-called ‘Hurley principle’ have been applied include,
United Democratic Front v State President 1987 (3) SA 296 N; Nqumba v State President
1987 (1) SA 456 (E) at 460; and Radebe v Minister of Law and Order 1987 (1) SA 586 (W).
77
77 of 1957.

141
4.3.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current
Constitutional Dispensation

Prior to the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, the Supreme Court78
possessed an inherent jurisdiction to review administrative action.79 While courts
generally could review the lawfulness of actions of the administration, parliament
was sovereign and its laws could not be invalidated. By the use of ouster clauses
discussed above, statute law could prevent and in some cases even prohibit courts
from reviewing certain actions. This situation has changed fundamentally with the
system of constitutional supremacy.

Because that which is enacted has to be compatible with the values and principles
enshrined in the Constitution, parliament has to ensure that the principles
encapsulated in the Constitution are given expression to. In respect of the
presumption under consideration, these principles are embodied to a large extent in
section 34 which deals with the right of access to courts, and to some extent in
section 3380 which deals with the right to administrative justice, and in section 35
(3)81 which deals with the right of an accused person to approach a court of law to
have his or her matter heard. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus is mainly on
section 34.

An examination of the classification referred to above – as articulated by du Plessis82

– reveals that the common law presumption that legislation is not to oust or restrict
the jurisdiction of the courts, has now been subsumed under the Constitution.83 The

78
The Supreme Court is now referred to as the High Court.
79
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 93. Botha states that: ‘The High Court always
had an inherent common-law jurisdiction to review such decisions, for example on the
grounds of mala fides (bad faith).’
80
Section 33(1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to administrative
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.’
81
Section 35(3) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Every accused person has a right to a fair
trial...’
82
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 153.
83
Ibid at 170.

142
relevant section entitling persons access to the courts in terms of section 34 of the
Constitution, states:

‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’

The three key elements pivotal to the operation of the right that have been identified,
are: a) access, b) independence, and c) impartiality and fairness.84 Spelt out more
explicitly, the right first creates a right of access to a court, tribunal or forum.
Secondly, in respect of the legal process, the independence and impartiality has to be
observed, and thirdly, it is imperative that the matter is decided in a fair and public
hearing.85

With the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, a judicial awareness ... that
access to court is a fundamental right is clearly reflected in case-law.86 The
Constitutional Court in the case of Bernstein v Bester NO,87 boldly affirmed that:

‘In all democratic societies the state has the duty to establish independent
tribunals for the resolution of civil disputes ... In a constitutional state that
obligation is of fundamental importance and it is clearly recognised as such in
our Constitution.’

Further, in the matter of De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly88, an ouster

clause purporting to place issue of parliamentary privilege beyond judicial scrutiny –
relating to the Speaker of the national assembly– was held to be unconstitutional.

It is interesting to note that what emerges from an examination of the above, is that
while prior to the new constitutional dispensation ouster clauses were regarded as
singularly the most intrusive restraint to accessing justice – with the advent of the

84
De Waal, Currie and Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 711.
85
Ibid 711-712. See Montsisi v Minister van Polisie1984 (1) SA 619 which is an illustration of
when section 34 can be used to challenge the validity of time limitation clauses.
86
The case in point is that of Williamson v Schoon 1997 (3) SA 1053 (T).
87
1996 (2) SA 751 (CC).
88
1998 (7) BCLR 916 (CC) at para 40.

143
current constitutional dispensation, it is the costs of litigation that have been
identified as the ‘biggest single impediment’ to accessing justice.89

Nevertheless, the courts have started to heed the impact of legal costs, and as a result
thereof, have declined inappropriate constitutional law cases and making cost orders
against losing applicants.90 Because the principles underpinning this particular
presumption have been incorporated in the Constitution as fundamental rights, it
would seem, therefore, that it would no longer be necessary to invoke the
presumptions itself. What is necessary, however, is to ensure that the principles
embodied therein continue to be developed in accordance with the spirit and objects
of the Bill of Rights – to ensure that they are constitutionally sound and continue to
be relevant. In the current constitutional era, the underlying jurisprudence is no
longer one of legal positivism. It appears to be akin to natural law – with the
Constitution as supreme law giving rise to a jurisprudence of constitutional
transformation. The rules of natural justice that are embodied in some of the
common-law presumptions have now been subsumed in the Bill of Rights. However,
where necessary, it is incumbent on judicial officers to apply the presumptions that
are compatible with constitutional values – to achieve social, economic and political
justice.

4.4 Statutes Do Not Contain Invalid or Purposeless Provisions

What can be gleaned from an examination of the presumption that statutes do not
contain invalid or purposeless provisions, is that it is almost always couched in
negative language. While one would expect that with regard to a presumption that
promotes validity and purposefulness, it would be phrased in more positive terms,
this is seldom the case.91 Nevertheless, a variety of terms are used to describe this

89
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 714-715. See Thusi v Minister of
Home Affairs 2011 (2) SA 561 (KZP) at para 104.
90
Ibid at 715.
91
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 187.

144
particular presumption, which include ‘futile’, ‘nugatory’, ‘unnecessary’,
‘meaningless’, ‘invalid’ and ‘purposeless’.92

On closer inspection, what is obvious about the operation of the presumption, is that
it ensures that when interpreting statutes, these must be construed to render it
effective, intelligible and valid – rather than in a manner that would render it
inoperative and purposeless.93 To re-iterate the position, it is provided that ‘the
subject matter should rather be of force that comes to naught.’94 It therefore follows
that if there are two or more interpretations of a provision, the one that renders the
provision valid and meaningful should be given effect to – rather than one that would
result in invalidity or confusion.

The case of South African Transport Services v Olgar95 provides a fitting example of
the ‘confusion’ alluded to above. Referring to section 15 of the Road Transport
Act96, it was noted that paragraph (a) of section 15 (2) of the Act was an illustration
of the confusion created by the draftsman attempting to lump together – in a single
paragraph – both essential elements and alternative requirements. The result of the
shoddy draftsmanship was that the paragraph in dispute97 offered two different
interpretations. To obviate the problem caused by the ‘confusion’ that had arisen, the
Appellate Division held that if a provision is capable of two meanings, it is necessary
to give effect to the meaning which is more consistent with the purpose of the
legislation in question.98 It is therefore provided that where uncertainty, confusion
and conflict are likely to arise, the operation of the presumption ought to favour a

92
Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 207. See discussion in Devenish where the author
in his analysis of the presumptions uses terms such as ‘futile’, ‘nugatory’, ‘unnecessary’ and
‘meaningless’ to describe the operation of the presumption.
93
Ibid at 207-208.
94
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 61. From the cases of R v Pickering 1911 TPD
1054 at 1058 and R v Correia, we note that: ‘the words of an instrument are to be so
construed that the subject-matter should rather be of force than come to nought’.
95
1986 (2) SA 684 (A) 693 (H).
96
74 of 1977.
97
Para (a) of Section 15 (2).
98
Botha Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 54.

145
construction eliminating these.99 The court in the case of Esselman v Administrateur
SWA100 adopted a similar stance.

Where the validity of a provision is being challenged, the tendency is that courts are
more inclined towards an interpretation that would render an enactment valid, rather
than giving it a meaning so ‘extravagant or wide that it would result in invalidity’.101
Both Du Plessis and Devenish concur that in deciding over two or more possible
readings, that such interpretation must first and foremost be possible.102 It therefore
follows that the presumption would not apply, if when construing legislation the
statutory provision under examination is ‘ostensibly susceptible to being rendered
nugatory’.103 This presumption also applies to subordinate legislation. The applicable
maxim here is the ut res magis valeat quam pereat rule, which requires that when
interpreting subordinate legislation, the interpreter needs to ensure that the legislation
is intra vires and valid rather than ultra vires.104

The presumption has also been invoked in instances where the court has had the
arduous task of deliberating over the risk of invalidating key provisions of an
enactment or of frustrating its objectives.105 In the case of Ex Parte Minister of
Justice: In re R v Jacobson and Levy,106 the application of the presumption that the
legislature does not intend legislation which is futile or nugatory – was illustrated in
the following extract:

‘If the language of a statute is not clear and would be nugatory if taken
literally, but the object and motivation are clear, then the statute must not be
reduced to a nullity merely because the language used is somewhat obscure.’

99
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 189.
100
1974 (2) SA 597 (SWA). The court stressed that an ‘effective and purposive’ interpretation
was to be preferred above one which would defeat the purpose of the provision.
101
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 189.
102
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 209. (Emphasis Added)
103
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 188.
104
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 207.
105
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 61.
106
1931 AD 466 at 477.

146
The approach of the court in adopting a meaning that furthered the purpose of the
statute rather than one that frustrated it, was clearly reflected.107 The unmistakable
purposive methodology of the presumption is clear. It is trite that the most important
principle of interpretation, is that courts have to determine the purpose of legislation
and give effect to that object or purpose. The presumption that legislation must be
effectual and purposeful forms the very essence of contemporary and enlightened
statutory interpretation.108 While Botha’s cogent advocacy of the purposive
methodology is commendable, prior to the new constitutional dispensation the
methodology was generally not favoured by the courts. A predilection by the courts
for the literal approach prior to the current constitutional dispensation, is clearly
reflected in case-law.109

4.4.1 The Application of the Presumption

Particular situations or circumstances might warrant the courts having to invoke

more than one presumption when deciding on a matter. An analysis of such
situations merits attention. In instances where a statute creates an offence, but fails to
provide for a specific penalty – in order to prevent the statute in question from being
declared invalid or ineffective, the court in such instances has to consider whether an
appropriate penalty is to be imposed. It is emphasized that, in its deliberations, the
court must consider:

 The manner in which the provision (that creates the offence) is worded; and
 Whether the provision does indeed create an offence.110

In this regard –R v Forlee, must be examined.111

107
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 208.
108
Botha Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 53. It is noted that Botha only discusses the
presumption – Statutes do not contain invalid of purposeless provisions in the earlier edition
of his book.
109
The cases of Public Carriers Association & Others v Toll Road Concessionaires (Pty) Ltd
and Others 1990 (1) SA 925 at 943; Union Government (Minister of Finance) v Mack 1917
AD 731 and Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 being
the cases in point.
110
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 188.
111
1917 TPD at 52.

147
Forlee was found guilty of a contravention of an earlier Union statute, by selling
opium. It was argued on his behalf that he had not committed an offence since the
Act in question provided no penalty for the selling of opium.112 The court in casu
invoked the presumption ‘that legislation did not contain futile or meaningless
provisions’, and found that a failure to provide a penalty did not render the Act
invalid – since the court had the discretion to impose the punishment it deemed
appropriate. The decision understandably provoked robust criticism in the legal
fraternity. It is maintained that Forlee was incorrectly decided.113 The nullem crimen
principle, as a whole, reflects the inherent justice of the Roman-Dutch common law
based on natural law. It is submitted that the principles, maxims and presumptions of
interpretation are not to be applied in an arbitrary manner, but should be applied in
accordance with the theory and methodology of interpretation that is consistent with
the ethos of Roman-Dutch common law.114 The jurisprudence of the new
constitutional dispensation has spawned a new methodology of interpretation. This
jurisprudence is akin to natural law characteristic of Roman-Dutch law. It is therefore
evident that the values that underlie an open and democratic society – as reflected in
the South African Constitution – epitomise the Roman-Dutch principles of what is
considered to be fair and just. In the process of interpretation, these values must be
given expression. In the new constitutional era, the role of a judge has to be a moral
one, based on the morality of the Constitution. There is a responsibility to apply the
values of the Constitution to give effect to social justice and transformation. The
element of morality is inherent in deontic reasoning and supports therefore a deontic
theory of interpretation.

112
Ibid.
113
Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 208-209. In the recent case of Director of Public
Prosecutions of Western Cape v Prins 2012 (2) SACR 183 (SCA), where Mr. Prins was
charged in the Regional Court with contravening section 5(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 32 of 2007, he objected to the charged arguing that section 5(1) did not
provide for a penalty. The Western Cape High Court held that, as the Act did not specify a
penalty clause, section 5(1) of the Act did not create an offense and dismissed the appeal. The
Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal on the basis that section 276 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is a general empowering provision authorizing courts to impose
sentences in all cases.
114
Ibid at 24.

148
The case of Esselman v Administrateur, SWA,115 is yet another example where the
court – in deciding on the correct approach – found it necessary to invoke the
presumption against invalid or purposeless provisions. The court, in its quest for the
correct approach, had erred in that it should have adopted a more balanced approach
in the application of the presumption that promotes public interest and the
presumption against invalid and purposeless provisions. It is not surprising therefore
that the findings have been widely criticised. In this case, the applicant petitioned the
court for an interdict preventing the respondent from removing sand from his farm –
as he contended that he needed the material for his own purposes. The relevant
section116 authorised the administration to remove any material for construction and
maintenance of roads from private property, without having to compensate the
owner. However, in terms of section 30(d), it was required that in exercising its
duties, no private owner was to suffer damage. Hoexter J, in his judgment, invoked
the presumption against invalid and purposeless provisions and construed section
30(d) of Ordinance of SWA as merely an instruction to minimize damage and
rendered the enactment as a whole valid in the circumstances.

It is submitted that this is precisely a case where the presumption that statutes do not
contain invalid or purposeless provisions should not have been applied – since
clearly the owner was not compensated. What was required, therefore, was that the
court should have attempted to ‘weigh up the respective rights of the parties’ so that
‘justice could at least be seen to be done’.117 The applicant bought the farm because
he needed the sand for his own purposes. The effect of section 30(d) vested the
applicant with at least a prima facie right to the sand – which under normal
circumstances would not have been protected – but in this particular instance
deserved protection. Therefore, the approach of the court in casu ought to have
invoked the presumption that an enactment promotes public interest as well as the
presumption against invalid and purposeless provisions. It is maintained that a more

115
1974 (2) SA 597 (SWA).
116
Section 30 of Ordinance 17 of 1972 (SWA).
117
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 209.

149
balanced application of the presumptions would have undoubtedly led to a ‘more
acceptable result’.118

In the absence of a justiciable Bill of Rights, fundamental rights,119 the rights of the
owner should have been more energetically protected using the presumptions. Even
though the common-law presumptions should have been a surrogate for the Bill of
Rights and which should it is submitted, have been invoked when fundamental rights
were undermined – prior to the current democratic regime, this was seldom done.

4.4.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current

Constitutional Dispensation

Prior to the current constitutional era, the purposive methodology which underpinned
the operation of the presumption that statutes do not contain invalid and purposeless
provisions, was rarely applied by courts. It is noted that a purposive methodology
underpins this particular presumption. It is therefore maintained that there is merit in
the argument that the presumption is ‘indeed conducive to purposive interpretation’
and ‘holds its own in the new constitutional dispensation’.120

Referring to the three distinct categories of presumptions discussed above,121 a

careful examination of the presumption that legislation does not contain invalid or
purposeless provisions, reveals that the presumption does not fall squarely within any
of the categories outlined by Du Plessis above. Clearly the presumption has not been
subsumed under the Constitution and is also not incompatible with the principles
encapsulated in it. The position is, in fact, quite the contrary. However, in respect of
the third category which recognises presumptions that are left unaffected by the
Constitution, the presumption does have some bearing. This lends itself to a

118
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 65.
119
The fundamental rights which are referred to are upheld in terms of Chapter 2 of the
Constitution and include the following rights: equality; human dignity; freedom from slavery;
servitude and forced labour; privacy; freedom of religion, belief and opinion, freedom of
expression; freedom of association; freedom of trade, occupation and profession; adequate
health care, food, water and access to social security; and administrative action.
120
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 189.
121
See classification as per Du Plessis in Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 153.

150
discussion of the interpretation provision of the Constitution and the operation
thereof.

Section 39 is a peremptory provision. This means that all courts, tribunals or forums
are under an obligation to review the aim and purpose of legislation in light of the
Bill of Rights. The so-called plain meaning approach is no longer applicable.122 In
other words, it is submitted that the current constitutional order requires that there
must be a departure from the strictly literal or legalistic approach when dealing with
questions of interpretation.123 This sentiment is echoed by Ngcobo J, in a dictum in
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,124
where he postulates that:

‘legislation must be interpreted purposively to promote the spirit, the purport

and the objects of the Bill of Rights ... the emerging trend in statutory
construction is to have regard to the context in which the words occur, even
where the words to be construed are not unclear and ambiguous.’

The purposive methodology epitomised in the approach above is also reflected in

other recent case-law. This includes African Christian Democratic Party v The
Electoral Commission;125 Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana126 and the
Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegan Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd.127 The last-
mentioned case merits closer attention. In this case, what emerges is that as a result
of adopting a purposive or value-orientated method of interpretation, Moseneke J –
in the interests of justice – found in favour of the applicants and awarded them
restitution in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.128 In terms of section
39(2) of the Constitution which requires that all statutes be interpreted ‘through the

122
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 90-91.
123
Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa
(2nd edition) at 32-71.
124
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 72.
125
2006 (5) BCLR 579 (CC).
126
1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (CC).
127
2007 (6) SA 199 (CC).
128
22 of 1994.

151
prism of the Bill of Rights’,129 one sees Moseneke J engaging in a ‘moral evaluation’
relating to the dispossession of land rights in South Africa.

Because the interpretation clause is regarded as a ‘force that informs all legal
institutions and decisions with the new power of constitutional values’,130 it is
maintained that this presumption, in particular, has a positive prognosis in the current
constitutional era131 – as it is in accordance with the principles inherent in a
transformative constitution.

4.5 The Legislature Does Not Intend that which is Harsh, Unjust
or Unreasonable

It is submitted that the presumption that the legislature does not intend that which is
harsh, unjust or unreasonable – in its embodiment of the intrinsic values of justice
and fairness – has to be regarded as singularly the most crucial presumption that
could have been invoked to uphold and protect civil rights and liberties, prior to
South Africa’s introduction of a Bill of Rights. It is not surprising that in its
encapsulation of the principles of natural law, this particular presumption enjoyed
considerable esteem in Roman-Dutch law.132 The principle underpinning the
presumption is reflected in the words of Johannes Voet about the nature of the law.
He provides that it ‘ought to be just and reasonable ... (for) it preserves equality and
binds citizens equally’.133 Quite clearly, what is observed is that in the South African
context, and in the absence of a Bill of Rights, this particular common-law
presumption which epitomised justice, fairness and equality could conceivably have
been considered as a surrogate for the Bill of Rights.

129
See case of Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO and Others
2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) par 21. Langa DP explains that the ‘new’ methodology in
interpretation requires that: ‘All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with
the Constitution.’
130
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588.
131
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 191.
132
Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 162.
133
Ibid.

152
In terms of the operation of this presumption in statutory interpretation, the approach
of the courts has been that where a statute was capable of more than one
interpretation, or where the slightest degree of doubt arises when construing a
provision of a statute, expression could be given to the presumption that the
legislature must have intended that which was just, equitable and reasonable.
Therefore, in the case of Principal Immigration Officer v Bhula,134 the court applied
this presumption by stating that:

‘Where, ... two meanings may be given to a section, and the one meaning
leads to harshness and injustice, whilst the other does not, the court will hold
that the legislature rather intended the milder than the harsher meaning.’

In a similar vein, when issues of vested rights were in dispute, the underlying
protection of fundamental rights that were central to the operation of the
presumption, ensured that such onerous provisions were strictly construed. Steyn
submits that the interpretation of such (onerous) provisions ought to be interpreted
strictly – so as to ensure that the outcome is the least unreasonable or inequitable.135
This submission was met with approval in the case of Transvaal Investments Co v
Springs Municipality,136 where it was held, as per Solomon JA, that:

‘It is a well-established rule in the construction of statutes that where an Act is

capable of two interpretations, that one should be preferred which does not
take away existing rights, unless it is plain that such was the intention of the
Legislature.’

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that this particular presumption embodied the very
essence of the fundamental principles of justice and fairness, unfortunately under the
pre-democratic system of parliamentary sovereignty, parliament basically had free
reign to enact absolutely any law it wanted to – irrespective of how unjust, unfair,
unethical, immoral or unreasonable it was. However during the apartheid era the

134
1931 AD 323 at 336-337.
135
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 170.
136
1922 AD 337 at 347.

153
courts could have been more assertive in protecting rights. Clearly, this was not
always the case.

4.5.1 The Application of the Presumption

Prior to the new democratic order, regardless of the presumption that the legislature
does not intend that which is harsh, unjust or unreasonable, statutes which were
innately unjust or unreasonable were nevertheless still given effect to by the courts.
The main reason for this could be attributed to the fact that when construing the
relevant legislation, courts were inclined to give effect to the ‘plain meaning’ of the
words or the ‘intention of the legislature’. From the case of Principal Immigration
Officer v Bhula,137 the position of the court was as follows:

‘where a statute is clear the court must give effect to the intention of the
legislature, however harsh its operation may be to individuals affected
thereby’.

It is, however, the following submission made by the previous Appellate Division
when deliberating, that ‘this court has no power to adjudicate on the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of an Act of Parliament’, since the ‘function of the court is to
declare the law as given by the Legislature, and not to make it’,138 that raises
pertinent questions about the obligations of courts in the realm of judicial law-
making.

As a result of applying a literal methodology, as reflected above, courts during the

apartheid era were instrumental in upholding and giving effect to ‘notorious racial
and draconian security legislation’.139 The correct approach of the courts when
construing provisions that allowed for inroads into the liberty of the individual – who
is neither charged nor convicted of an offence – should have been that such
provisions be restrictively interpreted. Thus, the court’s approach to the

137
1931 AD 323 at 336.
138
See S v Takaendesa 1972 (4) SA 72 (RAD) at 77, where the court as per Beadle CJ
maintained that: ‘…(there) is no justification for a court of law assuming the mantle of the
legislature and itself amending the statute.’
139
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 162.

154
interpretation of the ‘idle person’ provision in respect of the Native (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act140 in the cases of In Re Vakaza141 and S v Sibiya142 – has been
criticized because it should have been subjected to a restrictive interpretation.

The findings of the court in the case of S v Werner,143 where the court rebutted the
operation of the presumption by necessary implication when construing the
provisions of the Group Areas Act,144 was also flawed. In this case, Indian and
Coloured families who were unable to find suitable accommodation in residential
areas designated for Indian and Coloured families, settled in a so-called White area.
King J, in trying to prevaricate about the role and function of the courts, made the
submission that:

‘an Act of Parliament creates law but not necessarily equity. As a judge in a
Court of Law I am obliged to give effect to the provisions of an Act of
Parliament. Speaking for myself and if I were sitting as a Court of Equity, I
would have come to the assistance of the appellant.’145

The above is an apt example of the ‘ridiculous dicta’ that Du Plessis speaks of. The
mode of reasoning adopted by the court in the application of the presumption is
nonsensical and ridiculous, as it makes the interpretation of equity entirely dependant
on the wording of the enactment.146 Theoretically it would seem that while the
principles of fairness and justice that were pivotal to the operation of the presumption
– and which could quite easily have operated as a surrogate for a Bill of Rights – did
not materialise, with some notable exceptions.147 Under a system of parliamentary
sovereignty, whereby parliament could enact any law and if the aim and the
‘intention of the legislature’ was clear, as reflected in case-law discussed above, the

140
25 of 1945.
141
1971 (2) SA 10 (E) 11.
142
1971 (1) SA 199 (E) 201.
143
1981 (1) SA 187 AD.
144
77 of 1957.
145
See S v Adams 1979 (4) SA at 793 (T) at 798 G.
146
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 84-85.
147
See for example Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 and
R v Detody 1926 AD 198.

155
courts had no choice but to apply the law – no matter how harsh, unjust or
unreasonable it was.

4.5.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current

Constitutional Dispensation

The principles underpinning the presumption that harsh, unjust or unreasonable

results are not intended – are fully in keeping with the spirit and scope of the
fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. In a post-apartheid constitutional
order, the importance of a right to equality cannot be over-emphasised. Section 39
the Constitution speaks of the type of society that the people wish to create and
emphasises that it has to be based on equality, dignity and freedom148 – which are
reflective of a transformative constitutional order. It is therefore quite clear that
section 9,149 the equality provision, is not only the cornerstone of democracy but that
it is given recognition as the first right, in terms of the Bill of Rights. Because South
African society was previously based primarily on inequality and discrimination that
were perpetuated by apartheid laws. Built into the equality provision is a mandate
that measures have to be taken to ensure the protection of the rights, as well as the
advancement of people who have been discriminated against as a result of past
racially and discriminatory laws and practices.150 To attempt to redress and
ameliorate the situation to which most people of South Africa were subjected to for
decades, is indeed no small feat. For this reason, the implementation of affirmative
action policies and the promulgation of legislation such as the Promotion of Equality
and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,151 which have as their genesis the
equality provision of the Constitution, must be seen as steps in the right direction.

148
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 146.
149
Section 9 (1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the
right to equal protection and benefit of the law.’
150
Section 9 (2) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Equality includes the full and equal
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’
151
Act 4 of 2000.

156
From an examination of the operation of the equality provision, as expounded above,
it is obvious that before the new constitutional dispensation and introduction of the
Bill of Rights, the jurisprudence premised on the presumption that statute law is not
unjust, inequitable and unreasonable, did not apply to the extent to which one would
have expected.152 The courts, in particular, were criticised because of their failure to
apply the presumption where the rights of individuals were at stake. As can be
garnered from an examination of relevant case-law, where courts could have seized
the opportunity to mitigate the rigours of apartheid, this was easier in theory than in
practice.

The position on the role and function of the judiciary in the current constitutional
dispensation is substantially different to that which prevailed during the apartheid
era. The replacement of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty by constitutional
supremacy means that the overriding consideration of statutory interpretation is that
the fundamental values must be considered within the framework of the Constitution.
The courts are now obligated to reconcile the aim and purpose of legislation with the
provisions in the Bill of Rights. From the case of Matiso v Officer Commanding, PE
Prison,153 Froneman J articulated his position on the subject as follows:

‘The values and principles contained in the Constitution are, and could only
be formulated and expressed in wide and general terms, because they are to be
of general application. In terms of the Constitution the Courts bear the
responsibility of giving specific content to those values and principles in any
given situation.’

However, in view of the fact that the values that underlie this particular presumption
are considered as being the pillars on which our Constitution is based, the reliance on
the application of this particular presumption is no longer necessary, as it is
incumbent on judicial officers to give effect to and promote the values that underlie
an open and democratic society.

152
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 155.
153
1994 (4) SA 592 (SE) at 597-598.

157
4.6 Conclusion

In evaluating the role of presumptions in statutory interpretation, what is obvious is

that the reliance on presumptions in statutory interpretation since 1994 has not
depreciated. In fact, it is observed that not only has the Constitutional Court relied
extensively on presumptions for the purposes of constitutional interpretation, but
although many of the common-law presumptions have been subsumed into the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, as highlighted in the discussion above, presumptions
have continued to be invoked by the courts for purposes of statutory interpretation.154
What has emerged has been an interesting inter-relationship between statute law, the
common-law and the Constitution.

In the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,155 the Constitutional

Court affirmed that there is a general obligation on courts to develop the common-
law appropriately, in accordance with section 39 (2). The Court was emphatic that
this obligation was not to be regarded as ‘purely discretionary’. The case of Bhe v
Magistrate of Khayelitsha and Others156 is also relevant. From the case, it is noted
that customary law has not evolved to meet the changing needs of community life.
Had customary law been permitted to develop in an ‘active and dynamic manner,’157
the initial position in Bhe’s case would have been significantly different. Clearly it
would not have excluded women from inheriting on the grounds of gender.158 What
is apparent is that the judgements of Carmichele and Bhe were not only innovative
and creative, but indeed quite pro-active in dealing respectively with the
development of the common and customary law. As the Constitution specifically
mandates that the rules of common-law and customary law have to be developed in
accordance with the principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights, it is therefore expected
that the presumptions which form part of the common-law, will continue to

154
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 152-153.
155
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para 39.
156
2005 (1) SA 850 (CC).
157
Woolman The Selfless Constitution – Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundation of
South Africa’s Basic Law at 448.
158
Ibid.

158
‘augment, enrich and enhance the Constitution’159 in facilitating and understanding
of the operation and application of law in the current constitutional order.

The Constitution enjoins the judiciary to consider, respect, protect, promote and fulfil
the foundational values on which the current system is based.160 This is reflected in
section 7(2) of the Constitution which provides that: ‘the State must respect, protect,
promote and fulfil rights in the Bill of Rights.’ Section 7(2) clearly epitomises the
161
ethos of a transformative Constitution. It conveys the idea that the State is not
simply only required to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights, but it
must also ensure that it protects, enhances and realises the enjoyment of these
rights.162

Section 39 clearly mandates a value-based methodology. Implicit therein, is the

responsibility of the judiciary to heed the call ‘to improve the quality of life of all
citizens.’163 Section 39 therefore in operating together with Section 7(2) of the
Constitution which applies directly to the promotion of social and economic rights,
has resulted in the emergence of a ‘new’ jurisprudence. Such jurisprudence requires a
new, creative, innovative and pro-active approach to interpretation, as evidenced in
the Carmichele, Bhe and Rivonia School cases. A pro-active approach to the process
of interpretation, which is based on legal reasoning and is infused with ethical and
moral considerations, to promote social advancement, is what is required in a
transformative constitutional system. These are the core elements that comprise the
deontic theory of interpretation, which is proposed for interpretation in the era of
constitutional democracy in South Africa. In this regard the presumptions of
interpretation involving principles of justice, fairness and equity still have an
important role to play.

159
Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 151-152.
160
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 199.
161
De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context at 671.
162
Ibid.
163
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 204.

159
 CHAPTER 5

THE RELEVANCE OF THE CANONS AND MAXIMS OF

INTERPRETATION IN A SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

5.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the canons and maxims of interpretation. The chapter
therefore examines some of the more popular or commonly used common-law
maxims and canons of construction.1 The aim is to determine:
a) whether these common-law rules which may be regarded as being outmoded
and archaic – still apply; and

b) their relevance and beneficial application in the current democratic

constitutional order.

Rules of interpretation are commonly referred to as the ‘canons of construction.’2 In

fact, however, they are not rules or laws, in the ordinary sense of the word. No
canon can ever conclusively resolve a dispute over the meaning of a statute, nor is a
court required to apply a canon.3 The canons are merely generalisations about the use

1
For purposes of the research, the focus will be on some of the more commonly used
maxims and canons of interpretation. In examining the Rules of Restrictive Interpretation,
the Eiusdem Generis Rule and the Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Et Ipsa Lex will form the
basis of the discussion. In terms of Extensive Interpretation, Interpretation by Implication
(and the rules relating thereto), and Interpretation by Analogy will be dealt with more fully.
Canon law is the body of laws and regulations made by ecclesiastical authority (Church
leadership), for the government of a Christian organization or church and its members. It is
the internal ecclesiastical law governing the Catholic church, the Eastern and Oriental
Orthodox churches, and the Anglican Communion of churches. The way that such church
law is legislated, interpreted and at times adjudicated varies widely among these three
bodies of churches. In all three traditions, a canon was originally a rule, adopted by a
church council. These canons formed the foundation of canon law.
http://wikipedia.org/wiki/canon‐law (Accessed on July 2012)
2
Statsky Legislative Analysis and Drafting at 83.
3
Ibid.

160
of language and are therefore regarded as the ‘customs of writing.’4 What is obvious
from an examination of the process of interpretation, however, is that any discussion
on the application of the rules of interpretation – in particular the maxims and canons
of interpretation – is incomplete without considering the role of the judges who have
to apply these rules. There are a number of factors ‘constitutional and otherwise’ that
support the law-making discretion of judges or courts during the interpretation of
legislation.5 These factors will be examined more fully to help shed light on the
subject and to provide a more nuanced understanding of the role of judges in the
realm of judicial law-making in the current democratic constitutional dispensation. It
is submitted that the role of the judge in a transformative constitution needs to be
compatible with the goals of such a system, which in the South African context is to
give effect to social transformation involving civil, political as well as socio-
economic rights. In a transformative constitutional state, it is clear that the courts
should focus on attempting to ameliorate the conditions of inequality and the
eradication of poverty – by striving towards the attainment of social justice through
transformation. The role of the judge it is submitted should therefore involve a moral
function.

Before the current democratic constitutional order, Dugard observed that ‘Critics of
the South African judiciary have been accused of failing to understand its role in the
legal process.’6 While there is a perception that South African judges, unlike their
American counterparts, ‘do not make law but only declare it’,7which is in effect the
operation of the iudicis est ius dicere sed non dare maxim, the same author stresses
that critics ought to be reminded that while the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States have a more political role to play, the function of the South African
judge can be described as being purely judicial.8 This position has been changed

4
Ibid. In the case of a statute, certain canons of construction can help a court ascertain what
the drafters of a statute – usually the legislature – meant by the language used in the law.
When a dispute involves a contract, a court will apply other canons of interpretation, or
construction, to help determine what the parties to the agreement intended at the time they
made the contract. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/construction (Accessed on July 2012)
5
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 163-165.
6
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 366.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.

161
significantly with the advent of the new constitutional order. As ‘guardians of
constitutional values’,9 section 39(2) of the Constitution mandates that it is now the
responsibility of the judicial officer to reconcile the aim and purpose of the
legislation with the provisions of the Constitution, and to uphold and give expression
to the values that underlie an open and democratic society. This is not a matter of
choice or election but one of obligation which is inherent in a deontic theory of
interpretation.

The creative application of the rules of interpretation, by way of the canons and
maxims of interpretation, are not to be seen as ‘a foreign principle falling outside the
ambit’10 of their functions – but should be regarded as being very much part of what
is required by a judicial officer in giving effect to his ‘discretionary powers’.11 The
crux of this important debate is dealt with in more detail below.

5.2 The Role of the Judge in the Realm of Judicial Law-Making

In examining the role of judges in the process of interpretation, what is fundamental

to the discussion is the ‘ancient’ question of whether judges create or invent law12 or
interpret the law only mechanically,13 or are they involved in a more creative law-
making function in the judicial process.

5.2.1 Concretisation

The interesting terminology used when describing the process of transition from
interpretation to application is concretisation. Concretisation is the final stage in the
interpretation process when the legislation is applied or becomes a reality.14 During
concretisation, the abstract text of the legislation and the purpose of the legislation –
which was determined earlier in the process – are correlated with the concrete facts

9
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 164.
10
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 97.
11
Ibid.
12
Dworkin Laws Empire at 225.
13
Ibid. (Emphasis added)
14
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 159.

162
of the case, in order to reach a meaningful conclusion.15 Some of the other terms
used to describe the process – are correlation, harmonisation, realisation and
actualisation.16 In examining the term concretisation and other synonyms, what is
apparent is that the words tend to convey a move away from the abstract to the
practical reality of the situation.17 What has to be emphasized, however, is that the
process is only complete when the prescribed constitutional values and principles are
also given expression to. Section 39(2) of the Constitution – which requires that
courts must attempt to reconcile the aim and purpose of legislation within the
provisions in the Bill of Rights18 – reinforces the role of judges as enforcers or
guardians of constitutional values thereby giving them a moral function.19

However, the question of the law-making role of the courts during statutory
interpretation is a matter of serious contention between on the one hand ‘textualists’
or the ‘pure literalists’, and on the other hand the contextualists or the ‘intentionalist
literalists.’20 According to the textualists who tend to favour the more orthodox
viewpoint, the role of the courts is a more conservative one, in that the judicial
officer is bound by the words used by the legislature. The pure literalists maintain

15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Du Toit ‘The dimension of Futurity in the Law: Towards a Renewal of the Theory of
Interpretation’ (1977) Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap at 11. Du Toit points out that the essence
of statutory interpretation lies in the realization of the possible meanings of the original,
legislation. Hence the use of the word ‘realisation’ or ‘actualisation’ to describe the process.
The meaning of the text is tantamount to its application in a given concrete situation. Hence
the use of the word ‘concretisation’ to describe the process.
18
Section 39 provides that :-
‘(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common-law or customary
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.’
19
Graham ‘SA Needs New Moral Code, Says Priest’ June 18-24, 2014 The Southern Cross at
1. The article acknowledges the need for a ‘moral code’ for the country’s law-making
processes. Father Mkhatshwa of the Moral Regeneration Movement commented on the
Constitutional Court Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng submission that ‘religion was to be
factored into the law-making processes.’ It was further emphasized that such a moral code
must be used to promote the best interests of the people, especially the disadvantaged.
20
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 231.

163
that the ipsissima verba of the legislation must be adhered to – no matter the
consequences.21 The role of the court, therefore, is only to interpret legislation in a
mechanical way. If there are any modifications, corrections or additions to be
effected – such changes should be left to the legislature.22 A case in point is that of
Engels v Allied Chemical Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd,23 where the viewpoint was
reflected as follows:

‘The basic reasoning behind this approach is that by remedying a defect

which the Legislature could have remedied, the court is usurping the
function of the Legislature and making law, not interpreting it.’

The contextualists or the ‘intentionalist literalists’, as they are also referred to,
maintain a contrary view. Proponents of the intentionalist-literalist approach are of
the opinion that the words of the legislation may be altered – provided that this
process is clearly discernible from the intention of the legislature.24 Basically, this
view is in keeping with the school of thought that courts do, in fact, have a creative
law-making function during the process of interpretation. The stance maintained in
Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v Chawanda,25illustrates this thinking:

‘…This is because judges have a certain amount of freedom or latitude in the

process of interpretation and application of law. It is now acknowledged that
judges do not merely discover the law, but they also make law. They take
part in the process of creation. Law-making is an inherent and inevitable part
of the judicial process.’

21
Ibid.
22
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 160. The idea that no changes are to be
effected to the legislative text, except by the legislature, is consistent with the maxim iudicis
est dicere non dare – which basically means that ‘it is the province of a judge to interpret the
law, and not to make it.’ It is noted that maxim is in conflict with the purposive methodology
and the ethos of the Constitution.
23
1993 (4) SA 45 (Nm) at 54 A-B.
24
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 231.
25
1991 (2) SA (ZSC) 825 at 832 H-I.

164
The literalists’ viewpoint that the courts will usurp the power of the legislature when
legislation is interpreted creatively, is based on a number of false assumptions,
anomalies and contradictions.26

The term often used to describe the process whereby changes are effected to the
ipsissima verba, is the modification of language.’27 However, it has to be stressed
that it is not essentially the language of the legislation that is modified at all – rather,
the meaning of the legislation is ‘adapted’ during interpretation to give effect to the
legislative purpose.28 Du Plessis is quite emphatic that the orthodox viewpoint which
forms the basis of the literalists or textualists’ school of thought, which prohibits any
form of modification as described above, could indeed ironically result in an
incorrect and unjustifiable form of judicial law-making.29 Section 39(2) – which
mandates the process of statutory interpretation – requires that the courts must
reconcile the aims and the purpose of legislation with the provisions of the
Constitution.30It is submitted that in a transformative Constitution, as alluded to, the
function of the judge has to be a moral function. What is therefore required in the
process of interpretation, is that judges need to embrace the challenge to give effect
to social justice, by paying particular attention to the ethical and moral considerations
in the process of legal reasoning and analysis of cases before them. The theory which
underpins this rationale and which supports this approach, is the proposed deontic
theory of interpretation.

26
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 97.
27
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at162.
28
Ibid.
29
Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 37.
30
Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE) at 597-598, the
law-making function of the judiciary was expounded by the court as follows: ‘In terms of the
Constitution, the courts bear the responsibility og giving specific content to those values and
principles in any given situation. In doing so, Judges will invariably “create” law… This
does not mean that Judges should now suddenly enter an orgy of judicial law-making, but
they should recognize that their function of judicial review, based on the supremacy of the
Constitution, should not be hidden under the guise of simply seeking and giving expression
to the will of the majority in Parliament.’

165
5.2.2 Factors which support Modificative Interpretation

There are a number of factors that support the law-making discretion of the courts
during the interpretation of legislation. Some of these include:

(i) The reading-down principle : where legislation is - on the face of it –

unconstitutional, but is reasonably capable of another plausible
interpretation compatible with the Constitution;
(ii) Section 39 (2) of the Constitution: During interpretation the courts
must try to reconcile the aim and purpose of the legislation with the
provisions of the Constitution;
(iii) Constitutional Supremacy: In terms of section 2 of the Constitution,
the Constitution is the supreme law of the country;
(iv) The common law presumptions: In particular, the presumption that
the legislature does not intend futile, meaningless and nugatory
legislation; and
(v) The independence of the judiciary: In terms of Section 165(2) of the
Constitution, this also facilitates judicial law-making.31

5.2.3 Factors that Limit Judicial Law-Making During Statutory

Interpretation

(i) The principle and practice of democracy: Reference here is to

section 1 of the Constitution and the preamble. Although the courts
are described as being guardians of constitutional values, they are
not allowed to take over the constitutional role of the legislature.
They make law only in a secondary sense.
(ii) The principle of separation of powers: This tends to support the
textualists’ ideology that courts cannot make any alterations to the
legislative text.
(iii) The common-law presumption: that the legislature does not intend to
change the existing law more than is necessary.

31
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 164-165

166
 (iv) The rule of law and the principle of legality.
(v) Judges and judicial officers are accountable and responsible for their
judgments and actions on three levels:
 First – personal responsibility;
 Second – formal responsibility; and
 Third – substantive accountability with reference to the
constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness and
openness expressed in section 1 (d) of the Constitution.
(vi) Penal Provisions: the courts cannot create new crimes.32
In attempting to address the question of whether judges make law in the process of
judicial law-making, one’s attention is directed to the fact that a ‘full understanding
of the judicial process on the part of the judge must be considered.33 The essence of
this is captured by Judge Jerome Frank:

‘To do their intricate job well our judges need all the clear consciousness of
their purpose which they can summon to their aid. And the pretence, the self
delusion, that when they are creating, they are borrowing, when they are
making something new, they are merely applying the commands given them
by some existing external authority, cannot but diminish their efficiency ...
The honest, well trained judge with the completest possible knowledge of
the character of his powers and his own prejudices and weaknesses is the
best guarantee of justice.’34

It is interesting that the learned judge refers to ‘the creating’ of and the ‘making of
something new’ in the process of interpretation.35 Dugard affirms that once there is a
clear ‘recognition of such creative powers of the judiciary, in the interpretation of
statutes’, the law-making task for judges is made easier if they are guided by
accepted legal values – rather than by subconscious preferences.36 He develops this

32
Ibid.
33
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 381.
34
Ibid at 381-382. (Emphasis Added)
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid at 382. Statsky is in agreement with Dugard that courts do in fact have the power to
create law, and ascribes much of this to the general language of the statute. See Statsky
Legislative Analysis and Drafting at 11, which reflects the authors thinking on this aspect of

167
argument further in asserting that such legal values or principles should be employed
to guide judicial policy and to assist the election that judicial officers are usually
faced with. These legal values or principles should form part of the South African
legal heritage, and must encapsulate the basic political and legal ideal of the modern
democratic society, in order to promote the well-being and free the potential of the
individual. These are today encapsulated in the Constitution.

In reflecting on the key elements, as articulated above, what is clear is that Dugard is
undoubtedly referring to a value-based method of interpretation. As a value-laden
document, the Constitution is underpinned by a number of express and implied
norms and values. The fundamental principles are not only the ideals to which the
South African society has committed itself, but they also form the objectives which
should now regulate all aspects of South African society.37 The spirit of the Bill of
Rights referred to in section 39(2) of the Constitution, is a reflection of these
fundamental principles. The spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights must be
promoted during the process of interpretation.38 As guardians of the Constitution,
judges must give expression to the values – to uphold and protect the Constitution.39
This means that courts or judges will have to make value judgments during the
interpretation and application of legislation.40 As a result of section 2 which declares
the supremacy of the Constitution, and section 39(2) which articulates the manner in
which laws are to be interpreted in the democratic era in South Africa, a ‘new’
jurisprudence has emerged. The value-based methodology mandated by section
39(2), has resulted in a paradigmatic shift away from positivism to a jurisprudence
that is akin to natural law. The formalistic literal approach to interpretation has been
replaced by one which can be described as a purposive, and value-based

interpretation: ‘…the courts role in applying statutes is very limited because of the doctrine
of separation of powers. In practice, however, the court often has a major creative role in the
application of Statutes. This is due to the nature a) of the language and b) of the legislative
process.’
37
Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 65.
38
Ibid.
39
The sentiment that judges are guardians of constitutional values is reflected in Matiso v
Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE), discussed above.
40
Such value-judgments are consistent with a value-based methodology that underpins the
operation of a teleological theory of interpretation. See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive
examination of the traditional theories of interpretation.

168
methodology of interpretation. The methodology of interpretation that must be
applied must be adapted to be brought in line with the values of the Constitution. As
reflected in an examination of case-law, the ‘new’ jurisprudence requires a ‘new’
theory for interpretation. The proposed deontic theory – which embodies the
elements of morality as its central feature and requires an amalgamation of the
different methodologies of interpretation as its modus operandi – is most suited to a
transformative constitution striving to further the agenda of social transformation.

As already discussed, concretisation41 is the final stage in the interpretation process,

during which the facts of the case and the relevant legislation are harmonised within
the framework of the purpose of the legislation in a holistic manner. The possibilities
which arise during the process of concretisation may also be influenced by the
Constitution.42 Sometimes this may require a certain ‘tampering with the ipsissima
verba of the statute’.43 Such modificative interpretation occurs when the initial
meaning of the text does not correspond fully to the purpose of the legislation as
influenced by the Bill of Rights, and its values. It also occurs where the text has
stipulated either more or less than its purpose, or when the prima facie or the initial
meaning of the text is in conflict with the Constitution and its inherent values.44
Because the legislative text ‘bounds state authority’,45 Du Plessis cautions that the
‘interpreter-judge is no legislator’46 and that such adaptive interpretation is to make
sense of the legislature’s law as it stands and not to substitute the judge’s law for it.47
Judges should therefore make the law only in a secondary sense and not in a primary
sense as does the legislature.

If the purpose indicates that modification is necessary (and possible), in principle

there are two possibilities that may arise. Either the initial meaning of the text is
reduced (restrictive interpretation), or the initial meaning is extended (extensive

41
See discussion at 4.2.1 Concretisationin the Chapter 4.
42
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 166.
43
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 229.
44
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 166.
45
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 229.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.

169
interpretation). The canons and maxims that define the restrictive and extensive rules
of interpretation will be explored more fully in this chapter.48 In examining the
canons and maxims of interpretation, the purpose of this chapter is to provide clarity
on the following important considerations. The first is directed at assessing the
significance and relevance of the rules and maxims of interpretation in the current
constitutional order in South Africa. If the enquiry reveals that the rules are found to
be applicable and relevant, the next part of the analysis will be directed at
ascertaining how these rules ought to be applied and given expression to promote the
values in the Bill of Rights. This would also require an analysis of the relevant
theories of interpretation.49 It is submitted that the canons and maxims found in the
common-law are therefore still relevant but must be used to give expression to the
values encapsulated in the Bill of Rights which are not only liberal but also socio-
economic in nature.

5.3 Techniques of Restrictive Interpretation

5.3.1 Definition

Restrictive interpretation is applied when the words of a particular provision embrace

more than its purpose. Courts employ the technique of restrictive interpretation to
limit or restrict the meaning of the words. The meaning of the text is then modified to
reflect the true purpose.50

Restrictive interpretation is justified in order to bring the words in line with the clear
object of the Act.51 It is submitted that where such object is absent, or perhaps not

48
For purposes of the research, only the more commonly used rules have been selected to
illustrate their relevance for the operation of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation in
the current constitutional order.
49
The relevant theories of interpretation are examined in detail in Chapter 2, but are referred
to throughout the thesis to highlight the need for a new theory in the new dispensation. Such
a theory is the proposed deontic theory of interpretation.
50
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 121. De Ville provides that courts
traditionally apply three forms of restrictive interpretation: noscitur a sociis, eiusdem generis
and cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Restrictive interpretation is however, not only
limited to instances where the above-mentioned rules apply. Any interpretation which
restricts the broader ordinary meaning of the text in light of the purpose of the legislation, is
by definition restrictive interpretation.
51
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 65.

170
clearly ascertainable, the technique of restrictive interpretation should be used to
harmonise the meaning of a statutory provision with the common-law prior to the
dispensation and in contemporary South Africa to bring it in line with the
Constitution. The point emphasized here is that restrictive interpretation should be
used not only to bring words in line with the legislature’s intention,52 but also in line
with the values in the Constitution. For the purposes of the discussion, the following
two manifestations of restrictive interpretation are discussed, to demonstrate their
inherent flexibility:

Eiusdem Generis Rule; and

Cessante Ratione Legis, Cessat Et Ipsa Lex.

5.3.2 Eiusdem Generis Rule

This is a well known maxim which literally means ‘of the same kind’.53 The maxim
is based on the noscitur a socciis principle, that words are known by those with
which they are associated. This means that the meaning of the words is qualified by
their relationship to other words, or, said another way, the maxim is used to restrict
the meaning of general words by reference to specific words in their vicinity.54

In the general application of the maxim, the procedure revolves around the
establishing of the following:

a) Do the words form a genus or class?

b) Is the genus followed by a general expression?

52
Ibid.
53
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 170.
54
Ibid. See for example, the application of the eiusdem generis rule in Poovalingam v Rajbansi
1992 (1) SA 283 (A) at 294, where the words ‘or otherwise’ had to be interpreted eiusdem
generis to include similar procedures by which parliamentary business is transacted. The
letter did not relate to any business transacted in the House on that date. The letter also did
not fall within the ambit of any procedure recognized by Parliament. The section therefore
did not provide the respondent with the legal immunity for the consequences of publishing
the letter. See also S v Du Plessis 1981 (3) SA 382 (A) at 403-404, where it was held that the
words ‘or any other means’ in terms of section 118 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 had to be
interpreted eiusdem generis.

171
c) Does the statute express any intention as far as the general expression is
concerned?
If so, then the general expression must be interpreted eiusdem generis within the
scope of the matters which form the genus or class and can only be applied if there is
a definite genus or category.55

Sacks v City Council of Johannesburg56 has been described as being an ‘exemplary

illustration of how the maxim should be applied’.57 A traffic by-law provided that
‘no person shall sit or be on any street, nor shall any person stand, congregate or
walk or otherwise act in any such manner as to obstruct the free traffic ...’

The accused, a prominent trade unionist, had addressed a crowd of people which had
gathered to hear him speak during an industrial dispute. He addressed the crowd
from a car on a public street, and, as a result, caused an obstruction of the flow of
traffic. What is evident from an analysis of the facts and findings in casu, is that the
process starts off with a consideration of the actual words – whether addressing the
crowd from a loudspeaker and the consequential traffic congestion it caused could be
construed as being in contravention of the traffic by-law in question. Apart from a
consideration of the actual words of the provision, a contextual examination of the
law – in light of the other conduct mentioned in the by-law and other by-laws
relating to the subject – proved to be most useful.58 The court was able to establish
from the object or the purpose of the Act, that the law was intended to make
punishable only conduct which caused an obstruction by the direct physical act of the
person. The phrase ‘or other act’ had to be read ‘eiusdem generis’ to give effect to
the object or the purpose of the statute.59 Therefore, in the final analysis, the court
found that the traffic by-law did not apply to the individual who addressed a crowd
of people that had gathered to hear him. This was a consequential obstruction.

55
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 170-172.
56
1931 TPD 443.
57
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 72.
58
Ibid at 72-73.
59
Ibid at 73.

172
In reflecting on the outcome of the case, Devenish makes the point that the Sacks’
case might reflect that which has been referred to as being the ‘inarticulate premise’
of judicial sympathy to liberal values.60 With regard to some of the more
controversial decisions, it would appear that judges have exercised their choice
without providing a satisfactory explanation – which suggests that the ‘inarticulate
premise may have played some part in the preference shown for certain precedents
and principles, at the expense of others.61 It is therefore acknowledged that if the
judicial process is regarded as an exercise in choice, and not as a purely mechanical
operation, it will ‘open the way’ or allow for the judiciary to resolve competing
claims and to exercise its choice in accordance with articulated judicial policy
decisions, based on legal valves.62

The ‘legal values’ that Dugard refers to epitomise a value-coherent or a teleological

mode of interpretation.63 In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, the
fundamental values in the Bill of Rights are the foundation of a normative, value-
laden jurisprudence, during which all conduct has to be evaluated.64 A proponent of
the teleological approach – Denning explains that the modus operandi of the
teleological method of interpretation requires that whenever one is presented with a
choice, one must choose the meaning that most accords with reason and justice.65
This is precisely the manner in which the judge in Sacks applied his mind to the
matter at hand, in order to arrive at his conclusion. Devenish is therefore justified in
his submission that, had an executive-minded judge presided over the case, in all
likelihood a completely different outcome and finding might have been reached.66 In
terms of the eiusdem generis rule, however, there should be caution with regard to its

60
Ibid.
61
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 381.
62
Ibid.
63
See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 247-249, for an examination of the
teleological theory of interpretation.
64
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 108.
65
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 46.
66
Ibid at 73.

173
application.67 The submission that the rule is to be applied with considerable
circumspection,68 is therefore well received and relevant for the new dispensation.

S v Buthelezi69 is an apt example of the application that the eiusdem generis rule is
not to be applied mechanically. In the case, the statute made reference to ‘any place
of entertainment, café, eating house, race course, or premises or place to which the
public are granted to have access’. The court held that the words ‘... premises or
place to which the public are granted to have access’, should be interpreted eiusdem
generis and therefore they did not include a court-room and a police station as places
of entertainment.70 Quite interestingly, however, the court in S v Sayed71 maintained
a contrary view point in the application of the rule. A statute prohibited the
obstruction of free passage along a public street ‘by means of any wagon, cart, or
other thing whatsoever’. The court declined to interpret the words eiusdem generis
and therefore found that the provision also included ‘full boxes of vegetables’ which
had caused an obstruction – even though a genus or class was clearly discernible
from the wording of the statute.72

What is important, is that with regard to both above-mentioned cases is that, the
actual wording of the particular statute or provision was the first consideration in
order to determine whether there was in fact an accepted genus or class. While the
application of the rule appears to have yielded a different outcome in each of the
cases,73 the determining factor that the court took into consideration was the purpose
of the legislation – as the rule may not be applied contrary to the legislature’s clear
intention.74 What is therefore obvious about the role of a judge, is that it is not
merely one of election, but also requires a moral evaluation of the text and the

67
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 125.
68
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 70-71.
69
1979 (3) SA 1349 (N).
70
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 71, for the authors comments about
Buthelezi’scase.
71
1962 (2) SA 128 (C) at 129.
72
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 73, for the authors comments about Sayed’s case.
73
Reference here is made to S v Buthelezi 1979 (3) SA 1349 (N) and S v Sayed 1962 (2) SA
128 (c).
74
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 235.

174
context, and therefore extends to both ‘linguistic’ and ‘non-linguistic
considerations.’75 The amalgamation of the different methodologies is clearly
evidenced in the courts’ approach to the question of interpretation. While the starting
point of interpretation is initially a consideration of the words used, this has to extend
to a consideration of the context and also to search for the purpose of the legislation.
While the above cases were heard prior to the Constitution, subsequent to the
Constitution it is necessary, in terms of section 39(2), to also conduct a ‘teleological
evaluation.’ What is therefore evident is that the court’s approach in the application
of the canons and maxims of interpretation is reflective of an eclectic methodology,
which forms the modus operandi for the operation of the proposed deontic theory of
interpretation.

5.3.3 Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Et Ipsa Lex

The maxim literally means that ‘if the reason for the law ceases (or falls away) then
the law itself also falls away.’76 However, an Act of Parliament or enacted legislation
cannot fall away by reason of custom or circumstances; it is necessary for the
legislature to actually repeal the legislation concerned. Therefore, there is merit in
Botha’s argument that the cessante ratione rule is not applied in South Africa in its
original form.77

The question that arises – is when does one employ the rule? The rule is used as a
device of restrictive interpretation, whereby the court gives effect to the purpose of
the legislation, which justifies the suspension of the operation of the statute.78 This
becomes necessary where it is revealed – from an examination of the circumstances
of the case – that it would be futile or unnecessary to apply the legislation.79 One
statute in particular – which has resulted in courts invoking the application of the

75
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 49.
76
De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 122.
77
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 168.
78
Ibid at 169. See the operation of the cessante ratione legis in Suliman v Hansa 1971 (4) SA
69 (D); Ex Parte Vermaak 1977 (2) SA 129 (N) 133; and Singh v Govender Construction
1986 (3) SA 613 (N) 618.
79
Ibid.

175
cessante ratione rule quite frequently – has been the defunct Stock Theft Act.80
Before its amendment, section 10(1) provided for the levying of a compensatory fine.
In some cases, the court was faced with the problem of whether the compensatory
fine still had to be paid – even though the stolen stock had been returned to the
owner. The cases of R v Mbamali and Xaba81 and R v Nteto,82 are considered here to
compare the different approaches to statutory interpretation applied by the presiding
judges, and to examine the outcome as a result thereof. While the court in R v
Mbamali and Xaba enforced the letter of the law and levied the compensatory fine,
in R v Nteto the court held that as the complainant in the matter had already been
compensated, the purpose of the legislation had been achieved, and a compensatory
fine was not necessary.83 What is clear, is that while the court in R v Mbamali and
Xaba adopted the literal methodology in the interpretation of the provision – hence
the finding that the compensatory fine was still required to be paid – the approach
and methodology of the court in R v Nteto was unmistakably more purposive and
value-coherent in nature.84 This is clearly reflected in Gane J’s reasoning, where he
applies his mind to the question of interpretation of the legislation, as follows:85

‘I think the object of Section 10 of Act 26 of 1923 is to secure compensation

to complainants; and once however that object has been secured, the
necessity of the compensatory fine falls away.’

Devenish’s remarks, that the approach of the court in attempting to ascertain the
legislature’s presumed intention ‘pursuant to the uncertainty of the legislature’s
intention’, is in-keeping with a value-based evaluation that is pivotal to teleological
interpretation.86 In applying the same maxim in De Kock v Resident Magistrate of

80
26 of 1923.
81
1938 NPD 2.
82
1940 EDL 305.
83
See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 169, for a commentary on the
application of the cessante ratione legis rule in Ntetos case.
84
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 68, for a critique of the application of the cessante
ratione legis rule in Mbamali and Xaba and Nteto.
85
See De Ville - Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 123 for the authors comment
about the operation of the Stock Theft Art 26 of 1923 in Nteto’s case.
86
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 68-69.

176
Caledon,87 where the provision to be considered provided that ‘no person in any
district where not less than two attorneys practice, shall be committed and enrolled as
an agent’, one finds De Villers CJ vacillating between a literal and a purposive
methodology – with the judge eventually electing to apply a literal approach.88 This
is decidedly not the way in which the provision should have been applied.

In making reference to the dilemma faced by judges in the process of interpretation,

where they are often faced with conflicting approaches or competing values of
construction, the point is made that because there is no hierarchy of rules of statutory
construction and presumptions, the judge has the discretion to select that which he
feels is best suited to the interpretation of the statute before him.89 This reinforces the
point made by the renowned judge Felix Frankfurter, that the process of construction
is ‘not an exercise in logic or dialectic,’, but rather an ‘exercise in choice ...’.90 As
seen with the operation of the other maxims of interpretation, what is evident from an
examination of the relevant cases, is that the process of interpretation is clearly an
eclectic one – commencing with an analysis of the ordinary grammatical meaning of
the words, and thereafter requiring a teleological evaluation of all of the facts under
examination. It is therefore clear that this maxim is compatible with the ethos of the
democratic constitutional dispensation.

5.4 Techniques of Extensive Interpretation and the Maxims

Related to Such Interpretation

5.4.1 Definition

Extensive interpretation is the opposite of restrictive interpretation. This occurs in

instances where the purpose is broader than the initial meaning of the legislation. The
meaning of the text is then extended within the framework of the purpose of the

87
(1896) 13 SC 386.
88
See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 69, for the author’s criticism of the approach
adopted by the judge in De Kocks case.
89
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 370.
90
Ibid at 371.

177
legislation – to give effect to that purpose. This applies where the legislation has
specified less, but in fact intended more.91

Extensive interpretation, however, does not only refer to instances where particular
words are assigned wider connotations – as described above. It also involves inter
alia reading further words into a statute by way of implication.92 Generally, when
courts employ this method of interpretation, they do so with a degree of
circumspection.93 The important consideration in the process of interpretation is the
reason for the promulgation of the Act. Once this is ascertained, the courts will look
to provide a meaning that furthers – rather than one that frustrates the purpose of the
legislation.94

As with the techniques of restrictive interpretation, the more commonly accepted and
used maxims that are applied quite frequently in South African courts have been
selected, and will form the basis of the analysis. The following mechanisms of
extensive interpretation – interpretation by implication and interpretation by analogy
– will be explored more fully.

5.4.2 Interpretation by Implication

Interpretation by implication involves extending the textual meaning on the grounds

of a reasonable and essential implication which is evident from legislation. Express
provisions are thus extended by implied provisions.95 It is emphasized that the ‘test’
that courts use generally when applying the rules of interpretation by implication, are

91
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 172.
92
An illustration of words being read into a statute by way of implication, is evident in Rennie
NO v Gordan and Another NNO 1988 (1) SA 1 (A) at 22. This approach has also been
adopted in the interpretation of the Constitution in Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others
NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC).
93
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 76.
94
This methodology where courts must attempt to further the purpose of legislation, is
purposive. The Constitutional Court has adopted the view that, in general, a generous or
broad interpretation should be given to the Bill of Rights See S v Zuma and Others 1995 (4)
BCLR 401 (SA) para 14; and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another
v Minister of Justice and Other 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) para 21.
95
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 173.

178
not only instances of usefulness or convenience – but also necessity.96 Such
implication may arise from inference abstracted from an examination of all the
provisions of the statute.97 There are various grounds that could result in the
provisions of the legislation being extended by implication. What is noted, is that
most of these grounds tend to overlap and are not always easy to prove.98 – as is
illustrated:

(i) Interpretation ex contrariis

The implication here arises from opposites. If the legislation
provides for a particular case, then the implication is that it makes a
contrary provision for the opposite case.99 The maxim generally
overlaps with the expression unius est exclusion alterius rule.100
(ii) Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius Rule
The rule basically provides that the expression of one thing results in
the exclusion of the other.101 Devenish describes it as the ‘rule of
logical thought’.102 In Keeley v Minister of Defence,103 the court
refused to apply the rule, since the court found that in doing so
would defeat the purpose of the legislation. In terms of the Defence

96
See for example Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 1938 AD 195, where the court found
that a municipality has a statutory right to contain a river for the purposes of water supply. It
also therefore by implication has a right to remove washed-up silt from the dam.
97
See for example Mpehle v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 1996 (7)
BCLR 921 (CK) at 928-930. The court in casu examined section 149 (4) (d) and section 153
(4) of the 1993 Constitution, to decide whether the power to terminate the membership of a
member of the province, included the power to suspend such a member.
98
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 173.
99
See application of the Ex Contrari is Rule in S v Mjoli and Another 1981 (3) SA 1233 (A) at
1247.
100
Mureinik ‘Expressio Unius: Exclusio Alterius? (1987) South African Law Journal at 264.
101
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 85.
102
Ibid at 86. In Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice) and Registrar of Asiatics
12911 AD 13 at 28, it was said that the maxim: ‘may sometimes afford useful guidance for
construing a doubtful enactment, but it is not a rigid rule of construction to be applied
without reference to the context in which the expression… occurs.’ Notwithstanding the fact
that the quotation refers directly to Chotabhai’s case, it highlights an important aspect of the
maxims, which is their flexibility in nature, making them still relevant and applicable in the
current constitutional order to further the aims of social transformation.
103
1980 (4) SA 695 (T).

179
 Act,104 section 3 stipulated that ‘every citizen’ was liable to undergo
compulsory military training. The issue in contention, was whether
the application of the above rule would result in a non-citizen not
being compelled to undergo military training. In examining the other
provisions of the Act, the court declined to invoke the rule in the
circumstances of the case.105
The application of the rule requires a weighing up of all the relevant
linguistic, contextual and common-law considerations in order to
determine whether judicial law-making was justified in the
circumstances.106 The methodology once again supports that which
has been proposed in this chapter as well as others – that the process
of interpretation involves an analysis of an amalgamation of the
various methodologies of interpretation when construing legislation.
It is submitted that the inherent flexibility of the maxims and the
amalgamation of the methodologies that forms the basis of their
modus operandi, favours the operation of the proposed deontic
theory in the constitutional era in South Africa.107

(iii) Interpretation by Implication ex consequentibus

With regard to the application of the rule in the case below, it is
necessary to decide whether a prohibition or authorisation, not
contained in the express words of the provision, is implied.108

The case of Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter109 is relevant to

the discussion. In the matter, the court had to decide whether a law
which authorised the City Council to dam a river and to maintain a

104
44 of 1957.
105
See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 106, for the operation of the
inclusiouniusest exclusion alteriusrule in Keeley’s case.
106
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 86.
107
The amalgamation of the methodologies compares favourably with the eclectic methodology
that has been proposed for the operation of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. See
Chapter 1, 1.6.4 Eclecticism, for a closer analysis of the terms eclectic and eclecticism.
108
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 86.
109
1938 AD 195.

180
 dam, also included the right to remove silt – which infringed upon
the rights of a landowner. Once again, in its analysis of the matter,
what is evident is that the court did not only focus on the linguistic
aspects of the legislation, but also extended its analysis to the
balancing of the rights of the Council and those of the landowner. In
so doing, it was necessary to give effect to all of the fundamental
jurisprudential issues which also justified judicial law-making –
more specifically, interpretation by implication – in giving effect to
the ex consequentibus rule.110
In applying the rule, Stratford J arrived at the following outcome:

‘I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion on the

evidence that without the right to remove the silt, the right
and power of the municipality cannot be properly enjoyed or
exercised. If this is the position in fact the law is clear, that
the right to clean (ie. take away silt) is one conferred by
necessary implication.’111

(iv) Interpretation ex accessoria eius de quo verba loguuntur

Basically the rule provides that if the principal thing is forbidden or
permitted, then the accessory thing is also forbidden or permitted.112
In order to apply the rule effectively, it is essential to distinguish
between accessory powers. It would appear that even though
accessory powers are much wider than necessary powers – in reality,
such a distinction is, in fact, an artificial one.113 This is supported by
the fact that courts tend to use the terms ‘reasonably incidental’114
and ‘reasonably ancillary’115 interchangeably. In Moleah v

110
Ibid at 226-227.
111
Ibid at 227.
112
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 173.
113
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 87.
114
Brakpan Town Council v Burstein 1932 TPD 335 at 402.
115
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd v Marshalls Township Syndicate Ltd 1917
AD 662 at 666.

181
 University of Transkei and Others116 Van Zyl J drew attention to the
fact that ancillary and incidental powers have either to be reasonably
incidental or reasonably ancillary to the conferred power. He
maintained further that although ancillary and incidental powers are
broader concepts than necessary or essential powers, the use of the
adjective ‘reasonably’ implies necessity.117

Due to the fact that the approach that has been adopted, for purposes of the
research, with regard to the rules and the presumptions of interpretation, has
been to focus on only selected rules and presumptions of interpretation, in
examining the canons and the maxims of interpretation, it is emphasized that
only the selected maxims form the crux of the debate. For the reasons
submitted, the natura ipsius rei118 and the ex correlativis119 are only noted
here as maxims that may also be employed to extend the purpose of the text.

5.4.3 Interpretation by Analogy

This method of interpretation involves extending the legislative provisions from one
case to an analogous one – where the language of the legislation concerned does not
expressly provide for such a case. If legislation applies to certain instances and its
purpose can apply equally to other instances, the provisions of the legislation in
question must be extended to such other instances on the basis of equality of ratio.120
Maxwell refers to this technique as ‘equitable construction’, and submits that the rule
was not very popular in England.121It is noted that due to the obvious influence of

116
1988 (2) SA 522 (TK).
117
Ibid at 538.
118
The maxim is concerned with inherent relationships. So, for example, the power to issue a
regulation implies the power to withdraw it.
119
The maxim deals with mutual and reciprocal relationships.
120
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 174,
121
Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes 1969 at 236. The author defines ‘equitable
construction’ as extending to general cases the application of an enactment, which literally,
was limited to a special case, on the ground, in the words of Coke, that ‘it was the wisdom of
ancient parliaments to comprehend much matter in few words.’ He further advances a
definition of the ‘equity’ according to Powden as that which enlarges or diminishes the latter
according to its discretion…Experience shows us that no lawmakers can foresee all things

182
English law on South African law, the South African courts and judiciary, as a result,
have also shown an aversion to analogical interpretation.122

Steyn has asserted that interpretation by analogy should also be considered as

interpretation by implication.123 He has submitted further that – even though our
courts have shown a resistance to employ this particular technique of interpretation –
its use may be justified. This is on the basis that no matter how ‘painstakingly and
exhaustively statutes are drafted, it is virtually impossible for a legislature to foresee
every concatenation of circumstances that may arise – hence the drafting of
legislation in such a manner that would allow for the ‘combinations of factual
situations’124 not provided for expressly in the provision. Steyn’s research on the
subject has revealed that interpretation by analogy was not applied in Roman-Dutch
law where it would make inroads into the rule of law – for example, as indicated
below:

(i) In the case of legis correctivae and leges exorbitanes – i.e. statutory
provisions which change the common law or make inroads into the
principles of common law;
(ii) With regard to laws which impose penalties or remove or limit rights
– i.e. casibus odiosis;
(iii) In the case of leges singulars or personales – i.e. laws presumably
intended for specified circumstances or particular persons; and
(iv) In provisions where restrictive words or expressions such as ‘only’
or ‘to this extent only’ are used. In such cases, an extended meaning
would be in conflict with the apparent intention of the legislation.125
It has been observed that because interpretation by analogy is a consequence of the
purposive theory of interpretation found in Roman-Dutch law, it involved a

which may happen, and therefore it is fit that if there be any defect in the law, it should be
reformed by equity…’
122
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 174.
123
Ibid.
124
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 78.
125
Ibid.

183
‘jurisprudential synthesis of natural law’ to be justified and hence applied.126
However, due to the influence of English law and the dominance of parliamentary
sovereignty prior to the new democratic dispensation, our courts were reluctant to
apply a purposive methodology, and generally declined to fill in gaps or omissions in
statutes.127 Nevertheless, there have been a few exceptions where our courts have
decided otherwise. A case in point is S v Mpofu,128 where the court found that where
there is clear evidence that an article or section thereof has been omitted as a direct
result of a printer’s error, the court is obliged to insert or provide the missing words.
This position is also reflected in Ex Parte Wilson,129 where the court held that:

‘this is a case not provided for and accordingly an order of Court is

necessary and it seems to the Court that a procedure must be adopted which
will correspond as nearly as possible to that laid down in the Act and
regulations already referred to and that the officials should act in accordance
with the spirit of the provision quoted, and attempt, as nearly as possible, to
follow them out’.130

It is noted that while prior to the new constitutional era our courts vacillated over the
role of judges – particularly with regard to the filling in of gaps of provisions in
legislation – this position has been changed fundamentally since the inception of the
Constitution and, in particular, by section 39(2).131 As guardians or enforcers of the
Constitution, judges are mandated to give effect to the ‘spirit, purport and object of
the Bill of Rights’. This reinforces the creative element that is fundamental to
judicial law-making and the moral obligation on the part of judges to give expression
to the values of the Constitution so as to facilitate and promote transformation.
Dugard endorses the creative role of judges in filling in gaps of a statute where

126
Ibid 77-78.
127
Ibid at 80.
128
1979 (2) SA 255 (R).
129
1930 OPD 16.
130
Ibid at 18.
131
Section 39(2) provides:-
‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common-law or customary law,
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.’

184
jurisprudentially justified. It is maintained that in terms of the process of
interpretation, these rules are not used to guide a judge to a particular interpretation,
but to justify an interpretation already arrived at by judicial intuition.132 Labuschagne
describes the creative law-making function that occurs during statutory
interpretation, as secondary or a ‘sub-ordinate law-making function’ that inevitably
forms part of the process.133 He explains further that legislation, as a document, is
‘incomplete’, and it is only when the court applies the legislation that it becomes
‘real’ and a ‘complete’ functional statute.134 For this reason, it is submitted that the
role of the judge is accentuated by the fact that they are expected to play a role in
ensuring that ‘the final link in the legislative chain’,135 is in keeping with the aims
and vision of a transformative constitution.

5.5 Conclusion

As has already been discussed, the role of the judiciary – to promote the values of the
Constitution – is clearly mandated in terms of section 39.136 However, what is
apparent, is that the discretion of the judiciary to modify or adapt the initial meaning
of the text, is limited.137 If the purpose of the legislation is not sufficiently clear, or if
it does not support a modification or adaptation of the initial meaning of the text, the
legislature has to rectify the errors or supply the omissions in the legislation.138

There may, however, be cases that arise whereby the court would not be able to
supply an omission in the particular legislation.139 In such instances, the common-

132
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 369-370. (Emphasis Added)
133
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 161.
134
Ibid.
135
Ibid.
136
Section 39 (1) of the Constitution provides that:-
‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom……’ (Emphasis Added)
137
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 174.
138
Ibid.
139
Ibid.

185
law may be referred to in order to complete the concretisation process.140 Such
judicial law-making is ‘legitimate’ – provided it takes place within clearly defined
parameters that reflect the principles and ethos of the common-law and the
Constitution.141 Due to the fact that, section 39(2) of the Constitution, provides that
the common-law has to also be in-keeping with constitutional values, requires that
the common-law is brought in line with the values and principles of the Constitution
in the process of interpretation.142

As discussed in this chapter and as is shown throughout this dissertation – what is

evident from examination of the various rules, maxims, techniques and aids to
interpretation, is that in the process of interpretation is eclectic. While the process
initially starts with the literal theory and an examination of the ordinary grammatical
meaning of the words (literal theory), in order to ascertain the ipsissima verba, the
enquiry tends to further lend itself to conducting a contextual examination of the
background (contextual theory). A search for the purpose for the promulgation of the
legislation is also highly relevant to the evaluation (purposive theory). The process
is, however, not complete until the legislation is tested against the values and
principles of the Constitution (teleological mode of interpretation). The combined
operation of the methodologies of interpretation, as indicated above, is eclectic.

The creative application of the discretion of judges is now mandated in terms of

section 39(2) of the Constitution – which provides that the ‘spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights must be promoted during the process of interpretation’, while
section 39(1) refers to an open and democratic society based on democratic values,
of which freedom, equality and human dignity are singled out as being the corner-
stones or pillars.143 The moral and ethical elements that comprise the basis of the

140
See discussion of what entails concretisation at 5.2.1 Concretisation.
141
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 94.
142
Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that:-
‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common-law or customary law,
every court tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.’ (Emphasis added)
143
Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides that:-
‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom …...’ (Emphasis added)

186
enquiry in terms of section 39, informs the proposed deontic theory that has been
identified as being the preferred theory of interpretation in the current constitutional
era. Section 39(2) mandates that the common-law and customary law have to be
developed to reflect constitutional values. From Carmichele v Minister of Safety and
Security,144 the stance of the Constitutional Court is reflected as being not purely
discretionary, but that there is in fact an obligation on courts to develop the common
law appropriately. As a result of this constitutional mandate, it is clear that section 39
(2) and section 7, invites pro-activism.

What is evident from case-law,145 is that the methodology for the interpretation and
application of the canons and maxims of interpretation resembles the eclectic
methodology that is suggested as the modus operandi for the operation of the
proposed deontic theory. To meet the needs of a transformative society however, a
pro-active interpretation and application of the law is essential. Such a pro-active,
eclectic methodology is what characterises the operation of the proposed deontic
theory of interpretation in the current constitutional era in South Africa.

144
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).
145
See for example, Keeley v Minister of Defence 1980 (4) SA 695 (T); S v Mjoli and Another
1981 (3) SA 1233 (A) and Mpehle v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another
1996 (7) BCLR 921 (CK), amongst others.

187
 CHAPTER 6

THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN

LAW ON SOUTH AFRICAN LAW

6.1 Introduction

Due to the interpretive directive in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution – that
‘when interpreting legislation ... every court, tribunal and forum, must consider
international law and may consider foreign law’,1 the influence of international and
foreign law is the crux of the discussion in Chapter 6. This immediately raises a host
of questions about the nature and existence of international law. The first of these is
whether international law qualifies as a system of law.

According to John Austin’s theory that law is the command of a political superior (to
a political inferior) – backed by a threat of sanction – international law does not
qualify as law. Hart, who rejected Austin’s command theory of law, was willing to
accept international law as a species of ‘law’.2 However, of all of the submissions
that have been made to assess whether international law qualifies as a system of law,
Pollock’s identification of specific elements has been considered as being the most
satisfactory response to the question. Pollock asserts a legal system of law, is where
there is a political community and recognition by its members of settled laws binding
upon them. In terms of the criteria articulated by Pollock, international law therefore
qualifies as a system of law, for three reasons:

i. Because there is a political community – over 191 modern states – there is the
existence of a political community.

1
Section 39 (1) of the Constitution provides:-
‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –
a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom;
b) must consider international law; and
c) may consider foreign law.’
2
Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 7-8.

188
ii. There is a set of established rules and principles that comprise the
international legal order.
iii. The members of the international community recognize these rules and
principles as binding upon them.3

While history has revealed incidents of violation of international law, generally it is

observed that states do comply with international law. To put it categorically,
‘international law is not binding because it is enforced, but it is enforced because it is
already binding’.4 While the origins of international law can be traced as far back as
the ancient histories of the Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and Romans, it was not until the
Roman and medieval times that the scholarly jurists had a role to play in the
development of international law. Due to the fact that in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries the Netherlands was a leader of economic and intellectual life in
Europe, it is not surprising that the Dutch contribution to the development of
international law was most significant. Grotius, the acclaimed ‘father of international
law’, and Van Bynkershoek a distinguished judge who wrote extensively on
maritime and commercial law, were the most instrumental in shaping the new
international order.5 What is noteworthy about the contribution of each of these
writers, is that it also reflected the genesis of the natural law versus the positivism
debate. While Grotius’s work De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres – which reflected the
idea that ‘the law of nature is a dictate of reason’ – contributed to modern natural
law, Van Bynkershoek’s emphasis on the importance of consent in the form of
custom or treaty as the basis of international law, revealed him to be one of the early
positivists.6 While the natural law versus the positivism debate underpins the field of
international law – its undeniable influence on other aspects of law cannot be
ignored. It is emphasized that this debate is also significant in the field of statutory
interpretation – particularly with regard to the theory or the methodology that should

3
Ibid.
4
Ibid at 8-9.
5
Ibid at 9-10.De Jure Praeda was not published during Grotius’s lifetime. It discovered in
1864 and published in 1868. De Domino Maris (1702), De Foro Legatorum (1721) and
Quaestionum Juris Publici (1737) were amongst the works that were undertaken by Van
Bynkershoek.
6
Ibid at 10.

189
inform the process of statutory interpretation – and it is therefore a theme that
reverberates throughout this chapter and others.

It is clearly evident that an examination of the statutory process in the preceding

chapters has revealed that the interpretation and application of section 39 has
transformed the process of interpretation – from a ‘mechanical re-iteration of what
was supposedly “intended” by parliament’, to that which is now permitted by the
Constitution.7 As a result, a transformed methodology – which prescribes the manner
in which laws are to be interpreted – has seen the emergence of a new jurisprudence.
This jurisprudence is clearly no longer one of positivism, but is akin to natural law. It
therefore raises the question as to the extent of the influence of international and
foreign law in shaping the ‘evolving’ jurisprudence in a post-democratic
constitutional era in South Africa. For this reason,8 this chapter is intended to:

a) explore the mandate contained in section 39(2);

b) formulate an understanding of the distinction between international law and

foreign law; and

c) determine how the influence of international law and foreign law has
transformed (and continues to transform) the methodology and theory of
interpretation in the current constitutional order in South Africa.

6.2 Comparative Law

6.2.1 Is Comparative Law a Method, a Discipline or a Science?9

Constantinesco considers that the prime purpose of the science of comparative law is
to classify world legal systems into a few large families. Watson’s definition is
similar to that of Constantinesco, to some extent. He submits that comparative law is

7
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th Edition) at 103. In Union Government v Mack 1917 AD
731, it was held that the intention of the legislature should be deduced from the words used in
the legislation; in other words the plain meaning of the text in an intentional disguise.
8
See discussion in Chapter 3, 3.7 The Interpretation and Application of section 39.
9
See Venter Constitutional Comparison – Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa As
Constitutional States at 15, where the author poses the question about what is comparative
law.

190
to be regarded as an academic discipline in its own right. He qualifies his statement
on the basis that it is a study of the relationship – above all the historical relationship
– between legal systems or between rules of more than one system. Kokkini-
Iatridow, from her examination of the subject, disagrees with Constantinesco. She is
of the opinion that even though comparative law is capable of developing into an
independent scientific discipline, it is not to be regarded as a science.10

However, of all of the views on the subject, the submission by Peter de Cruz – that
comparative law is neither a branch of law, nor a body of rules, but is a method of
study – is the most sound. His well-considered, well-structured definition of
comparative law is articulated as follows:

‘Modern comparative law draws on a range of disciplines, but is eclectic in

its selection. It recognizes the important relationship between law, history
and culture and operates on the basis that every legal system is a special
mixture of the spirit of its people, and is the product of several intertwining
and interacting historical events which have produced a distinctive national
character and ambience’.11

It is submitted that the above definition is without doubt a more a comprehensive

one than the others presented above. It has, at its core, some important elements in
its formulation – that the others seem to ignore. Elements encapsulated in Peter de
Cruz’s definition (and lacking in the others) are:

(i) a recognition of history and culture;

(ii) an appreciation of a special mixture of the spirit of its people;
(iii) the acknowledgement that, as a final product, every legal system is
unique; and
(iv) the assertion that the discipline itself is eclectic.

What is apparent, is that the view that a reader interested in justificatory practices in
the interpretation of statutes in any particular system can come to understand that

10
Ibid at 16. (Emphasis added).
11
Ibid at 17.

191
system better by attempting to understand what it is not- is indeed quite perceptive.12
There is no one-size-fits-all, or no standard recipe for valid comparative research.
However, giving due consideration to the factors as identified above, when effecting
a comparison it will surely yield well-conceived and executed research.
Nevertheless, the view that being overtly concerned with the nature and
methodology of the pursuit of legal comparison may prove to be an obstacle in the
ascertaining of useful results13– is beneficial.

6.2.2 Understanding the Purpose for Comparative Law

The process of legal comparison depends, to a large extent, on the purpose for which
it is undertaken. The purpose of legal comparison can therefore vary widely –
depending on the particular purpose of the research. According to Zweigert and
Kötz, generally, the more specific purpose that legal comparisons would be
conducted, are for the following reasons:

(i) As an aid to the legislative process.

(ii) As an instrument of interpretation of law.
(iii) As a vehicle for teaching law.
(iv) As a means of promoting legal unification.
(v) The development of a common private-law system (particularly in
Europe).14

Kazuyuki Takahashi suggests that there are two purposes for effecting a comparative
study:

 To look for possible solutions to constitutional problems – to which other

countries could have found a solution; and

12
MacCormick and Summers Interpreting Statutes-A Comparative Study at 461.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid at 19. According to Zweigert and Kötz, the more profound the purpose of comparison
becomes, the more paragidmatic will be the tertiumcomparatonis and its distinction from
compatibility; the more the emphasis is on the production of new and verified scientific
knowledge, the more important does the sensible compatibility most likely be co-determined
by the nature of chosen comparative standard or framework.

192
 A more detached and objective manner of observing foreign constitutional
laws with a sense of general curiosity.15

Engaging in a comparative analysis is beneficial for the following reasons:

(i) Knowing about constitutional issues and theories discussed in

foreign countries, is always stimulating and fascinating;
(ii) It helps widen ones perspective about other possibilities of
constitutional thinking;
(iii) It provides new ways or frames of looking at constitutional law; and
(iv) It enables one to become aware of constitutional issues that could
have been missed, and also of potential issues sure to arise in the
near future in ones own country.
(v) It provides an understanding not only of the constitutional laws of
foreign countries, but also of ones own – through raising awareness
of similarity and difference in respective laws.16

The benefit of adopting the latter objective approach – as outlined above – is

significant for a number of reasons. As a relatively ‘new’ democratic constitutional
state, South Africa is in a position that enables its judiciary to turn to, consider, and
to reflect on, constitutional issues in foreign jurisdictions – and to find possible
solutions when confronted with similar problems. Generally, an effective
comparison with foreign jurisdictions does not only reveal similarities, the
differences in respect of the operation of law, the application of theories and
approaches to statutory interpretation are also noted. It is therefore intended to adopt
a similar approach to a comparative analysis of international and foreign law – to
that articulated by Takahashi above. In the South African context the role and
emphasis of international law is particularly relevant. Whereas international law was
15
Jackson and Tushnet Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law at 47.
16
Ibid. See also MacCormick and Summers Interpreting Statutes-A Comparative Study at 24,
where it is submitted that; ‘one of the great virtues of a comparative approach in legal and
jurisprudential studies, is the heightened awareness of its own system, both in reminding one
of its traditional and well understood strengths and weaknesses, and yet also, all the more, in
enabling one to notice and appreciate hitherto unnoticed features.’ This statement is
particularly relevant for purposes of the research as comparatively the South African
Constitution is a relatively new constitution compared to most other jurisdictions.

193
previously regarded as a threat to the state, it is now viewed as one of the pillars of
democracy. 17

6.3 A Consideration of the Features of Selected Constitutional States

and their Influence on South Africa Law

The jurisdictions which have been selected include:

(i) Canada;
(ii) United States of America;
(iii) Germany; and
(iv) United Kingdom

The reason for the selection of the above mentioned jurisdictions relate mainly to
the fact that they have been instrumental in influencing the development of South
Africa law over the past few decades particularly in constitutional law and
human rights.

6.3.1 Canada

Modern Canadian constitutionalism is significant for a number of reasons.

Firstly, as a former British-colonial dispensation, founded upon the supremacy of
the British Parliament, that prevailed in Canada over a hundred years, it was
transformed in 1980 into a system directed by a supreme Constitution and
Charter of Rights. Secondly, and that which makes it relevant to the research, is
that constitutional jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court has become an
‘influential reference point’ in the development of constitutionalism18. This is
especially the case in countries like South Africa with a history of parliamentary
sovereignty modelled on the Westminster System.19

17
Dugard ‘International Law and the South African Constitution’ (1997) European Journal of
International Law at 77.
18
Venter Constitutional Comparison-Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as
Constitutional States at 27.
19
De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context at 42. See the authors’
discussion of the Westminster system which is described as follows: ‘The Westminster model
has its origin in Britain. Of particular importance is the fact that the Westminster

194
 The Supreme Court of Canada is not established in terms of constitutionalism,
but is a feature of an ordinary federal state. Section 52(1) of the Canadian Act20
introduced an important element to Canadian constitutional law. Previously due
to the British-colonial supremacy of a parliament doctrine, the courts
constitutional testing function related mostly to matters of federal-provincial
legislative authority. The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in 1980, projected the fundamental rights dimension of the constitution
to the fore, and in so doing making the Constitution an ‘absolute standard.’21

Another significant contribution that the Supreme Court has made to the process
of interpretation of rights entrenched in the Charter, is that it has set out the two
basic sets of tests or standards for the validity of law interfering with one’s
constitutional rights, namely reasonableness and proportionality.22 Further, the
approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd23 has often
been referred to in a number of judgements in South African Courts. In the cases
of S v Zuma24 and The Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical
Fruits25 the Constitutional Court, followed the position of the Canadian Supreme
Court by making reference to the following dictum of the case of R v Big M Drug
Mart Ltd:

‘In my view... the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be

sought, by reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter [of

constitutional model is premised on the British Constitution and is actively a series of

conventions, ordinary laws in the form of statutes, common-law and case law, that broadly
regulate state power as well as the regulations between the State and its citizens. Where the
Westminster model has been adopted, particularly in former British colonies such as pre-
democratic South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe, the practice has been to reduce the
Constitution to writing. An important feature of the Westminster system is that of
parliamentary sovereignty or parliamentary supremacy which basically means that there is no
Bill of Rights which denies Parliament the power to destroy or curtail liberties. Parliament is
said to have the power to make any law on any subject.’
20
Canadian Act of 1980.
21
Venter Constitutional Comparison-Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as
Constitutional States at 94-94.
22
Ibid at 96.
23
1985 18 DLR (4th) 321.
24
1995 (2) SA 642 (CC).
25
2007 (6) SA 199 (CC).

195
 Rights and Freedoms] itself, to the language chosen to articulate the
specific right or freedom to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined,
and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific
rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the
Charter. The implementation should be ...a generous rather than a legalistic
one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for
individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection.’26

Many courts both South African and Candian, have often referred to R v Big M
Drug Mart Ltd to re-inforce support for the application of the purposive
methodology, as is evidenced here. The obvious influence of Canadian
constitutionalism in shaping the emerging jurisprudence in South African law in
this respect apparently in South African case law is noted.27

6.3.2 United States of America

The following influence of the United States constitutional model may be

regarded as being significant to the development of the South African
Constitution. An important feature of the United States constitutional model is
that of constitutional supremacy. Like the South African Constitution, which
declares its supremacy, the United States Constitution, is also premised on the
idea that the Constitution is the highest law and that all law and conduct are
required to comply with it.28

The inclusion of Bill of Rights which serves to protect individuals’ freedoms and
liberties is an important contribution. Constitutionally protected rights in the Bill
of Rights were also responsible for a so-called ‘rights culture’ in the South
African context. The manner in which this operates is two-fold, not only are

26
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321 at 95-96.
27
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321 has been cited in S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642
(CC) and Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA
199 (CC).
28
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 46.

196
 fundamental rights protected, but it also serves as a limit on the power of
government not to infringe on freedoms and liberties of individuals.29

Another important feature that has been borrowed from the United States system,
is that of judicial review.30 The techniques that facilitate such a process in South
African law, include the reading-in, reading-down, severance.31

6.3.3 Germany

Similar to the model of the United States of America, the German model
operates on that of constitutional supremacy. This brings into focus the concept
of Rechstaat, which basically affirms that the Constitution is the highest law and
all law and conduct must be subject to the Constitution.32 In terms of the South
African Constitution, the notion of constitutional supremacy has far-reaching
implications. From a historical perspective, it is obvious that the German
constitutional model, was drafted in reaction to Nazi atrocities, so as to ensure
that the inhumane conditions to which people were subjected, are never repeated.
Likewise the South African constitutional model was drafted in response to
notorious and abhorrent apartheid legislation.33 To that extent the similarities are
noted.

Another ‘important layer’ to the German Constitution, is that in an attempt to

secure democratic rule, the German Constitution which is the Basic Law of 1949,
has established a value-based democratic order.34 Such a value-based order,
resonates with the current South African constitutional dispensation. This is
particularly the case in respect of section 39(2) which mandates a value-
orientated approach to the process of interpretation.

29
Ibid.
30
Ibid at 45.
31
See Chapter 3, 3.4 for a discussion of Reading-in, Reading-down, Severance and
Reading in Conformity with the Constitution.
32
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 49-50. See also Muller’s article
‘Basic Questions of Constitutional Concretisation’ (1999) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review at 269-
283 for a discussion of foreign terms adopted into South African law.
33
Ibid at 49.
34
Ibid at 49-50.

197
 Due to the fact that section 39(2) authorises a departure from literalism, what has
emerged as a result thereof has seen a distinct shift from literalism to
purposivism. The emerging jurisprudence thereof is no longer one of positivism,
but may be regarded as being akin to natural law. This is significant in the
current constitutional era in South Africa, since an emerging jurisprudence
requires a new theory and methodology for the process of interpretation of
legislation. To redress the social inequalities of a racially divided and segregated
society, it is suggested that this ‘new’ theory must incorporate ethical and moral
considerations and must be applied pro-actively. As a result of the invaluable
contribution by way of assimilation of a value-based order, that is the dominant
feature of the German constitutional model into the South African system, has
created the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of interpretation in South
Africa. The theory as suggested, is the proposed deontic theory of interpretation.

6.3.4 United Kingdom

The Westminster constitutional model has had its origin in Britain. The
influence of the Westminster constitutional model on South African law has had
far-reaching consequences. In Britain, Parliament comprises the House of
Commons and the House of Lords. Parliament is of central importance as it
exercises sovereign or supreme law making powers.35 This is a distinct feature
of the Westminster model, that is been referred to as parliamentary sovereignty.
According to this doctrine, parliament has complete law-making powers.
Therefore in terms of the model, courts do not have the power to decide on the
constitutionality of legislation.36 According to Dicey, the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty may be defined as follows:

‘Neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament has under the
English Constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever, and

35
De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 42.
36
Ibid at 43.

198
 further that no person or body is recognised by the Law of England as
having a right to override or set the Legislation of Parliament.’37

What is evident is that the doctrine was imposed on South African law during the
British-colonial rule. In accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, during the apartheid era, the South Africa courts in general applied
mainly a literal or textual approach when interpreting the law. As a result of
giving effect to the so called will of parliament or command of the sovereign,
many of the laws which were applied, were applied without any consideration of
ethical or moral elements, or how harsh or unjust the laws were. This position
changed significantly with the introduction of the Interim Constitution and the
supremacy status of the Constitution. The new South African democratic
Constitution has been instrumental in enabling the judiciary to give effect to the
values that reflect an open and democratic society.

In contrast to the United Kingdom, in South Africa a paradigmatic shift from

parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy, has clearly transformed
the approach to statutory interpretation from a literal or textual methodology to a
more value-based methodology. The idea of the independence of the judiciary
re-enforces the idea that judges in a transformative constitutional democracy
ensure that they consider the ethical and moral considerations in interpreting
legislation to give effect to social and economic aims to achieve social justice.

6.4 The Position Adopted by South African Courts to

International Law before 1994

As alluded to, before 1994, South Africa’s constitutional system was modelled
significantly on that of Britain, premised on parliamentary sovereignty. The effect
was that South African courts frequently referred to English Law rather than Roman-
Dutch law particularly in the field of public law. Because the tendency in English

37
Dicey Introduction to the Study of Law and the Constitution at 70.

199
Law was to treat customary international law as municipal law,38a similar position
was adopted by South African courts.

6.4.1 Customary International Law

For decades, South African courts assumed that the rules and principles of customary
international law might be applied by municipal courts as if they were in some way
part of South African law. Consequently, it was not required that international law
had to be proven to be a foreign legal system.39

In 1971, in South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation v Buchan,40 the court

refused to admit an affidavit from an expert on international law on the grounds that
international law was not foreign law and therefore could not be proved by affidavit.
South African courts therefore showed cogent support for the Monist Approach
(which is the doctrine of incorporation) in respect of customary international law.41In
most instances, the position maintained by South African courts was that they
applied customary international law without questioning its place in the legal order.42
In a number of cases – commencing with South Atlantic Islands Development
Corporation v Buchan43 in 1971– the courts expressly asserted that international law
‘forms part of our law’ and that it was the duty of a municipal court ‘to ascertain and
administer the appropriate rule of international law’.

38
Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 45.
39
Ibid at 51.
40
1971 (1) SA 234 (C) at 238 B-F.
41
Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 42-43. The Monist
School whose advocates were Kelsen, Verdoss and Scelle, maintain that international law
and municipal must be regarded as manifestations of a single conception of law. As a result,
the Monists argue that municipal courts are obliged to apply rules of international law
directly without the need for any act of adoption by the courts, or transformation by the
legislature. Dualists, whose protagonists include Triepel and Anzilotti, see international law
as completely different systems of law. Therefore they contend that international law may be
applied by domestic courts only if ‘adopted’ by such courts or transformed into local law by
legislation.
42
Ibid at 46.
43
1972 (1) SA 234 (C) at 283 C-D

200
6.4.2 Treaties and Municipal Courts

Because the position in South Africa mirrored that of the United Kingdom, the
power to enter into treaties was entrusted completely to the executive.44 Before
1994, therefore, the South African approach to the incorporation of treaties was
clearly a Dualist Approach; treaties were negotiated, signed and ratified by the
executive.45 The legislature played no part in the treaty-making process. Only those
treaties incorporated by an Act of Parliament became part of South African law. This
explains why treaties usually did not become part of municipal law without some act
of legislative incorporation.46 With the new dispensation section 231 (4) of the
Interim Constitution provided that ‘the rules of customary international law binding
on the Republic shall, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of
Parliament, form part of the law of the Republic’. The omission of the word
‘binding’ from the 1996 Constitution has led commentators to argue that all rules of
customary international law including those to which South Africa may have
‘persistently objected’ are now very much part of municipal law.47

The need for legislation to transform a treaty into South African law was clearly
illustrated by Stein CJ in Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and
Accident Insurance Co Ltd,48 where it was maintained that it was:

‘trite law … that in this country the conclusion of a treaty, convention or

agreement by the South African government with any other government is
an executive and not a legislative act. As a general rule, the provisions of an
international instrument so concluded, are not embodied in our law except
by legislative process…’49

44
Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 48.
45
Ibid at 53.
46
Ibid at 48.
47
Keightely ‘Public Interntational Law and the Final Constitution’ (1996) South African
Journal on Human Rights at 408.
48
1965 (3) SA (A) at 161 C-D.
49
The dictum was confirmed by the Appellate Division in S v Tuhadeleni and Others 1969 (1)
SA 153 (A) at 173-175.

201
Prior to 1994 the courts vacillated in their approach to the place of international law
in the South African legal order, this changed significantly with the new
constitutional dispensation, and, in particular, section 39 – the interpretation
provision of the Constitution.

6.5 The Position Adopted by South African Courts to

International Law and Foreign Law in the New Constitutional
Order

6.5.1 An Examination of International Law

From an examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, that is, in terms
of section 233,which provides that:

‘when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law;’

and section 39, which declares that:

‘(1) when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum

(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law,’ [Emphasis added]

It is clear that the courts are under an obligation to ensure that South African law is
interpreted to comply with international law – particularly with regard to human
rights. While a court must consider treaties to which South Africa is a party in
interpreting the Bill of Rights, no such rule exists in respect of treaties to which
South Africa is not a party, where the Bill of Rights is not an issue.50 A treaty to
which South Africa is not a party is res inter aliosacta and may not be considered
qua treaty, although it may be considered as evidence of a customary rule.

50
Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 63.

202
Different considerations apply in respect of a treaty to which South Africa is a party,
but has not been incorporated into municipal law. Firstly, a municipal court may
have recourse to an unincorporated treaty in order to interpret an ambiguous statute.
Secondly, an unincorporated treaty may be taken into account in a challenge to the
validity of delegated legislation on the grounds of unreasonableness.51Although there
is no clear judicial support for this proposition, the question has twice been raised
and left open by the erstwhile Appellate Division. In the cases of Winter v Minister
of Defence and Others52 and S v Tuhadeleni,53 the Appellate Division left open the
question of whether proclamations might be tested against the terms of the mandate
for South West Africa – a treaty which was not incorporated into municipal law.
Dugard correctly maintains that this is a sound proposition, since the concept of
reasonableness is inextricably linked with presumptions of legislative intent, and
there is a presumption that the legislature in enacting a law did not intend to violate
South Africa’s international obligations.54

With the advent of the new constitutional order in 1994, both the Constitutional
Court and other courts have shown an inclination to be guided by international law.
In Glennister v The President of the Republic of South Africa,55 the majority court
maintained a firm stance on the status of the international law and its influence on
South African law. The position of the court is reflected in the dictum as follows:

‘It is possible to determine the contents of the obligations section 7(2)

imposes on the State without taking international law into account. But
section 39(1)(b) makes it constitutionally obligatory that we should. This is
not to use the interpretive injunction of that provision ... to manufacture or
create constitutional obligations. It is to respect the careful way in which the
Constitution itself creates concordance and unity between the Republic’s

51
Ibid at 63-64.
52
1940 AD 194 at 198.
53
1969 (1) SA 153 (A) at 176-177.
54
See Dugard’s comments on the findings of the cases of Winter v Minister of Defence and
Others 1940 AD 194 at 198; and S v Tuhadeleni 1969 (1) SA 153 (A) at 176-177 in
International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 64.
55
2011 (3) SA 347 (CC).

203
 external obligations under international law, and their domestic legal
impact.’

While the decisions of the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights
have usually been referred to, South African courts have also been influenced by the
‘views’ of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the reports of the
United Nations with regard to human rights.56 This is manifestly reflected in one of
the earliest decisions, S v Makwanyane and Another,57 which involved the
constitutionality of the death penalty. In this judgment, Chaskalson P, laid down
clearly articulated guidelines for reliance on international and foreign law in
constitutional interpretation by stating that:

‘Customary international law and the ratification and accession to

international agreements are (sic!) dealt with in S231 of the Constitution,
which sets the requirements for such law to be binding within South
Africa.In the context of Section 35(1), public international law would
include non-binding as well as binding law… International agreements and
customary international law accordingly provide a framework within which
Chap 3 [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for that
purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments… may
provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of
Chap 3.
In dealing with comparative law we must bear in mind that we are required
to construe the South African Constitution, and not an international
instrument or the Constitution of some foreign country, and that this has to
be done with due regard to our legal system, our history and circumstances,
and the structure and language of our own Constitution …we can derive

56
Ibid. See also discussion in De Vaal and Currie The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at
570 on the status of international instruments relating to socio-economic rights. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1996 (ICESCR) is the
most important international instrument relating to socio-economic rights. Other instruments
protecting rights that have been ratified by South Africa are the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), the
Convention of the Rights of the Child (1995) and the African Charter of Human and People’s
Rights (1981).
57
1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), 1995 (3) SA 391.

204
 assistance from public international law and foreign case-law, but we are in
no way bound to follow it.’58

The above dictum is significant for a number of reasons. First, in construing the 1996
Constitution, it is required that a South African court must consider international law
and may consider foreign authorities. Such authorities are to be considered because
they are of value in their own right.59 Chaskalson P in fact laid down a binding
precedent effectively granting constitutional authorisation to consider international
law and foreign law when interpreting constitutional provisions not found in the Bill
of Rights. What is evident, however, is that he does not explicitly say whether – in
the interpretation of such provisions – a court is enjoined to consider public
international law. Considering the language in which the above dictum is phrased, it
is probably not specific enough to read it as imposing such an injunction. However
section 39 requires that international law must be considered. It is thus highly
advisable (but advisable nonetheless), to consider international law in constitutional
interpretation – except in terms of the ‘black letter’ provisions in section 231 and
232 or the presumption embodied in section 233 that international law must not just
be considered, but indeed observed as binding with regard to municipal law. Second
is the observation that binding as well as non-binding international law provides a
framework within which the Bill of Rights can be evaluated and understood. Third,
the court in Makwanyane was emphatic that in the interpretation of the 1996
Constitution, with its own structure and language – transnational authorities must be
relied on with due regard to the uniqueness of our Constitution, our history, and our
circumstances. It is noted that such an approach to interpretation should therefore
operate in accordance with its own theoretical framework, as is the proffered deontic
theory of interpretation. It is emphasized that even though assistance may be derived
from international law and foreign law, a court – according to the judge – is in no
way bound to follow either of them. Nevertheless, in spite of this, a criticism of the
manner in which Chaskalson P suggests that one ought to interpret international and
foreign law, is that it is flawed because he overlooked a critical difference between

58
Ibid at para 35 and para 39.
59
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-172 - 32-173.

205
international law and foreign law for purposes of constitutional interpretation, which
is that international law must be considered and that foreign law may be
considered.60

The case of Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others61 is also relevant in this regard. The applicants
in the case sought to set aside section 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act62 – providing for amnesty from criminal and civil proceedings –
on the grounds that it was inconsistent with section 22 of the Interim Constitution,
which provides that every person shall have the right to have justiciable disputes
settled by a court of law, or, where appropriate, another independent or impartial
forum. The applicants in the case maintained that the state was obliged by
international law – particularly the Geneva Conventions of 1949 – to prosecute those
responsible for gross human rights violations and that the provisions of section 20(7)
which authorised amnesty for such offences, constituted a breach of international
law.63

In terms of the international convention it was provided:

‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary

to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to
be committed, any of the grave breaches.’64

Mahomed DP postulated his finding on the place of international law, as follows:

‘The issue which falls to be determined in this court is whether Section

20(7) of the Act is inconsistent with the Constitution. If it is, the enquiry as
to whether or not international law prescribes a different duty is irrelevant to

60
Ibid. See Du Plessis’ criticisms about the approach of the court in Makwanyane, with regard
to the interpretation of international law and foreign law.
61
1996 (4) SA 671 (CC).
62
34 of 1995.
63
See Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32- 178, for a
commentary on the findings of the court with regard to the AZAPO case.
64
1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 687 para 25.

206
 that determination. International law and the contents of international law
treaties to which South Africa might or might not be a party at any
particular time are, in my view, relevant only to the interpretation of the
Constitution itself, on the grounds that the lawmakers of the Constitution
should not lightly be presumed to authorise any law which might constitute
a breach of the obligations of the state in terms of international law.’65

The Constitutional Court thought that the issue which falls to be determined was
whether section 20(7) was inconsistent with the Constitution and the enquiry as to
whether or not international law prescribes a different duty is irrelevant to that
determination.66 In according the meaning of section 39, the court thought it was
directed only to have regard to public international law. The approach therefore was
that, international law would have to be binding in terms of the black-letter
constitutional law qualified to be ‘(public) international law’, as envisaged in terms
of section 39(1).67 What is evident from the position adopted by Mahomed DP in
the AZAPO case, is that he did not treat ‘binding’ as well as ‘non-binding’
international law as a framework within which the Bill of Rights ‘can be evaluated
and understood’.68 The judgment was therefore not well received amongst legal
scholars and academics on the basis that it failed to adequately address the question
of whether conventional and customary international law obliges a successor regime
to punish the officials and agents of the prior regime for international crimes. The
court’s reading and application of section 39(1)(b) has been criticised as being
superfluous, for the reason that if a court, tribunal or forum is bound to follow
‘binding’ international law, there is no need for any further impetus to drive it further
by additional provisions.69

65
Ibid at 688 para 26.
66
See Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-172-32-179 for Du
Plessis’ comments on the courts reasoning and analysis if the AZAPO case.
67
Reference is made to the Interim Constitution. At the time that the matter was being litigated,
section 34(1) of the Interim Constitution was the Interpretation Clause- the equivalent of
section 39(1) of the Final Constitution.
68
See Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-178 - 32-179 for
Du Plessis’ criticisms of the stance maintained by Mohamed DP in the AZAPO case.
69
See Dugard’s comments in International Law- A South African Perspective (4thedition) at 65.

207
The extent to which the decisions of the above judgments have influenced
subsequent cases is evident in Government of RSA and Others v Grootboom and
Others.70 The case dealt with the interpretation and meaning of section 26 of the
Constitution.71 The right to housing in the form of basic shelter was at the heart of
the dispute.In construing the section, which guarantees everyone’s right to adequate
housing and enjoins the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures
within its available resources to achieve the realisation of this, the court had to also
consider the place of international law.72 What is noteworthy about Yacoob J’s
reference to Chaskalson P’s dictum in Makwanyane, is that he added a significant
qualification:

‘The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the

weight to be attached to any particular principle on the rule of international
law will vary. However, where the relevant principle of international law
binds South Africa, it may be directly applicable.’73

In Grootboom, the court thus maintained the distinction between international law
binding on South Africa and other sources of international law that must be
considered in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.74 The Grootboom court
focussed its inquiry on Articles 11.2 and 2.1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and highlighted the differences
between the interpretive significance of the provisions of the Covenant and section
26 of the South African Constitution. The court was also of the opinion that the
general comments (issued) by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights of the ICESCR, was significant in that it constituted a guide to

70
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
71
Section 26 of the Constitution provides that -
‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an
order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may
permit arbitrary evictions.’
72
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-179.
73
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC),2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 26.
74
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-180, for Du Plessis’
comments on the findings of the Grootboom case.

208
the interpretation of section 26. By allowing itself to be guided by the Committee in
this way, the Grootboom Court not only restored the Makwanyane standard on
recourse to non-binding international law, but also developed the standard further to
acknowledge the importance of reliance on an applicable text in the interpretation of
international law.75

The findings of S v Makwanyane are significant because they invalidate the death
penalty on the basis of its conflict with inter alia the right to life, and because it was
regarded as being cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.76Although the
Constitution does not provide a comprehensive definition of the right to life, the
Constitutional Court judges presiding over the matter agreed that the right to life
incorporates the right not to be deliberately put to death by the state. O’Regan J, in
her judgment, explained that the right to life meant more than simply the guarantee
of a physical existence. It was also inextricably ‘entwined’ with the right to human
dignity.77 She articulates her reasoning as follows:

‘…The Constitution seeks to establish a society where the individual value

of each member of the community is recognised and treasured. The right to
life is central to such a society. The right to life, thus understood
incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to human dignity and life are
entwined. The right to life is more than existence. It is a right to be treated
as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially
diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity.’

In S v Makwanyane, the court treated the right to life, the right to equality, and the
right to dignity as collectively giving meaning to the prohibition of cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment – as provided for in terms of section 11(2) of
the Interim Constitution. The court therefore made ‘extensive and decisive use of the
contextual interpretation’.78In this regard, the Constitutional Court, referring to S v
Zuma,79 adopted the stance maintained by Kentridge AJ, that:

75
Ibid.
76
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 260.
77
Ibid at 267-268.
78
Ibid at 144.

209
 ‘whilst paying due regard to the language that has been used, [an
interpretation of the Bill of Rights should be “generous” and “purposive”
and “give expression to the underlying values of the Constitution”’.80

Basically, what was emphasized, was that if there was a clear meaning of a
provision, it cannot be ignored in favour of a ‘generous’ and purposive’ meaning of
the provision. But at the same time, the dictum stresses that while the literal meaning
must be given ‘due regard’ to, it is not necessarily determinant of meaning. In other
words, a literal meaning will be an acceptable interpretation of a provision, only if it
is consistent with a ‘generous’ and ‘purposive’ interpretation that ‘gives expression
to the underlying values of the Constitution.81 This is clearly a value-based or a
value-coherent method of interpretation, which is the essence of the teleological
method of interpretation. Likewise, in the above-mentioned AZAPO case, the
Constitutional Court relied on international law, when construing section 20(7) of
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act82 in according a meaning to
the provision, in order to promote harmony between international law and municipal
law. The stance in casu maintained by the court is unmistakably purposive.

What is significant with regard to the above-mentioned cases, is that in construing

the relevant provisions, the court initially focused on the ordinary, literal or plain
meaning of the words. The provisions were also examined contextually. However,
before arriving at its finding with respect to the relevant sections in all the above-
mentioned cases, there must be purposive or teleological enquiry to establish the
meaning of the provision – by giving due consideration to the underlying values of
the Constitution.83 Because the mode of interpretation of international treaties and
instruments is teleological, it is logical that in construing the relevant provisions, the
same standard and mode of interpretation should apply in interpreting the provisions

79
1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA; 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC).
80
1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 9.
81
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 136.
82
Act 34 of 1995.
83
See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 136, for a discussion of the
courts approach to the preferred method of interpretation.

210
of the Constitution. As a result of this, the Grootboom court had to consider but was
not be necessarily bound by the comments of the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of ICESCR – with regard to what comprised
the notion of ‘a minimum core’ of socio-economic rights.84

It is noted that the approach of the judge in giving consideration to the elements that
comprised ‘a minimum core’ of socio-economic rights, can, without doubt, be
regarded as furthering the agenda of social transformation. The Court’s search for
factors that go beyond ascertaining the purpose for the provision or placing the right
in its context, and this is in keeping with the proposed deontic theory of
interpretation which requires that in the process of interpretation, regard must be
given to moral and ethical considerations. It is therefore apparent that without being
aware of it, the court in Grootboom had applied concepts in judicial reasoning that
are consistent with deontic logic.

From an examination of the interpretation and application of international law, what

is also evident is that the methodology of interpretation requires the adoption of an
amalgamation of the different methods of interpretation. This is consistent with the
eclectic method of interpretation referred in earlier chapters. This methodology also
forms the basis of the modus operandi of the proposed deontic theory.85 From an
examination of Makwanyane, AZAPO and Grootboom, what has emerged in the
above-mentioned judgments constitutes a new jurisprudence which is reflective of
the Constitutional Court’s position and approach to international law into South
African law.

6.5.2 An Examination of Foreign Law

The South African constitutional jurisprudence not only reflects the influence of a
wide range of international human rights law instruments, but there is also evidence
of the influence of foreign constitutions. Some of the more influential include the
German Basic Law, the Canadian Charter, the United States Constitution, and the

84
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-179- 32-180 for Du
Plessis’ comments on the findings of the Grootboom case.
85
See Chapter 1, 1.6 Definitions of Terms and Concepts for a discussion of the modus
operandi of the proposed deontic theory.

211
Indian Constitution – which were all instrumental in developing and shaping the
South African Constitution and its Bill of Rights.86

In K v Minister of Safety and Security,87 O’Regan J’s position on foreign law was
clear. She maintained that:

‘There can be no doubt that it will often be helpful for our courts to consider
the approach of other jurisdictions to problems that may be similar to our
own…
Consideration of the responses of other legal systems may enlighten us in
analysing our own law, and to assist us in developing it further. It is for this
very reason that our Constitution contains an express provision, authorising
courts to consider the law of other countries when interpreting the Bill of
Rights.’88

Further reference to foreign law is evident in the following dictum by Kriegler J, in S

v Mamabolo (E Tv, Business Day and Freedom of Expression Institute
intervening)89– in his submission that:

‘... where a provision in our Constitution is manifestly modelled on a

particular provision in another country’s constitution, it would be folly not
to ascertain how the jurists of that country have interpreted their
precedential provision.’90

The view maintained in the above dicta about the significance and relevance of
foreign law, is acceptable in light of the fact that as a fairly ‘new’ democracy, the

86
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-183. See earlier
discussion in this chapter for an examination of the selected jurisdictions in 6.3 A
Consideration of the Features of Selected Constitutional States and their Influence of
South African Law. Further see Davis ‘Democracy-its Influence upon the Process of
Constitutional Interpretation’ South African Journal on Human Rights 103-121 where the
author in his article carefully analyses the jurisprudential developments of the law in other
jurisdictions for example Canada, India, United States and Bophuthatswana and their
influence on the emerging constitutional democracy in South Africa.
87
2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC), 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC).
88
Ibid at paras 34-35.
89
2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC), 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC).
90
Ibid at para 133.

212
older jurisdictions and constitutions are able to provide precedents and
jurisprudential analysis that are beneficial for interpretation of South African law and
our Constitution. However, while effecting comparisons with other jurisdictions can
indeed prove beneficial, ‘the wholesale importation of foreign doctrines and
precedents’91 is to be avoided. In Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another,92
Kriegler J was guarded in his approach to the influence of foreign jurisdictions. It
was maintained that:

‘…And when I conduct comparative study, I do so with great caution.The

survey is conducted from the point of view afforded by the South African
Constitution, construed on unique design and intended for unique
purposes.’93

In emphasising the uniqueness of the South African constitutional system, he

followed the position adopted by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane, that:

‘we must bear in mind that we are required to construe the South African
Constitution ... with due regard to our legal system, our history and
circumstances and the structure and language of our Constitution’.94

Therefore, it would seem that even though reference to foreign law is expressly
provided for in terms of section 39(1), it was not the intention of the drafters of the
Constitution that foreign doctrines and precedents be applied in an unqualified
manner. The danger of over-reliance on foreign jurisdictions, reference to
inappropriate foreign sources, and shallow comparativism95 – as highlighted above –
must be avoided at all costs, if an effective comparative analysis is to be conducted.

91
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-186.
92
1996 (3) SA at 850.
93
Ibid at para 127.
94
1995 (3) SA 391 at para 39.
95
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-183-32-187.

213
6.6 Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter involves essentially an examination of section 39 of

the Constitution. In order to formulate an understanding of the distinction between
the references to international law and foreign law, it is necessary to explore the
constitutional imperative contained in section 39 – that ‘every court, tribunal and
forum a) must consider international law and b) may consider foreign law’. This has
presented some interesting and thought–provoking ideas about both international law
and foreign law.

A jurisprudential analysis of case-law has revealed that in the application of

international law, international norms and standards must be considered – but are
not binding in the interpretation of our law. Not only does international law provide
a framework against which the norms, standards and principles are to be measured,
but it also provides clarity on the methodology that should underlie the process of
interpretation. International law influences the way we interpret laws in South
Africa. As a result of the influences of international law on South African law, laws
ought to be interpreted purposively.96 This is largely because international
instruments are interpreted purposively or teleologically. As a result of this
influence, it is observed that with regard to the method of interpretation, there has
been a definite paradigmatic shift from the literal to the purposive or teleological
mode of interpretation.

Foreign law is also not binding, but may be considered in the process of
interpretation. What this therefore ensures, is that it creates room and allows for a
‘creative imagination’ in raising new questions and new possibilities with regard to
both new and old problems.97 This view is also espoused by Liebenberg who is
unwavering in her support that a reflection on the consideration of the interpretation
of the socio-economic rights in other international and comparative jurisdictions
should generate ‘new’ options and possibilities in considering the emerging

96
This is clearly evident in case law. See for example S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA; 1995
(2) SA 642 (CC); and S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); 1995 (3) SA
391 (CC)
97
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-183-32-188.

214
jurisprudence in South Africa.98 A comparison of the position in foreign jurisdictions
is therefore useful, in that it allows for a certain degree of flexibility to consider the
approach to statutory interpretation in other jurisdictions, and to decide on a
preferred method of interpretation in South African law.

Van der Walt’s view on constitutional comparativism is innovative and relevant in

the South African context. He contends that:

‘ As a history of errors, comparative study shows us a range of fallacious

doctrines, theories and arguments that have already been discredited and
should be avoided. As a history of possibilities, comparative study shows us
that certain doctrines, theories and arguments could still be used as possible
explanations of or solutions for individual problems. As a history of
examples, comparative study shows us the methods, techniques and
approaches that are available to us. Like the historical study of law, the
comparative study of law liberates us from what we need not do; it cannot
and should not enslave us by telling us what we have to do.’99

Van der Walt’s submission is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it highlights
the fact that a comparative analysis is extremely useful. It is helpful in that it enables
the interpreter to consider other possibilities in terms of the array of different
methods, techniques and approaches that are available.

Secondly, in terms of the submission, the point is made that a comparative analysis
should provide a set of options that should liberate us, by enabling the interpreter to
decide what needs to be done and what is most appropriate – rather than restricting

98
See Libenberg ‘Socio-Economic Rights: Revisiting the Reasonableness Review/Minimum
Core Debate’ in Woolman and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations at 324, where the
author is also supportive of the idea that international and comparative sources are not to be
referred to slavishly, but rather because they broaden the range of options available to courts
in developing the interpreting of socio-economic rights, that they are also to ensure that the
court is aware of applicable law standards. Nevertheless, the South African courts remain
under a duty to consider which interpretations best advance the values and transformative
commitments of the Constitution in the current political, economic and social context of
South Africa. The crux of Liebenberg’s argument supports the idea that in a transformative
Constitution that judges are under a moral obligation to heed the commitment for social
reform and social justice. It is submitted that such ethical and moral considerations are
central to the operation of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation.
99
Ibid at 32-189.

215
interpretation only to that which is familiar. Section 39 prescribes the manner in
which the process of interpretation should apply. It is clear that not only must the
values that underlie an open and democratic society be given expression to, but
section 39 specifically mandates that international and foreign law are to be
considered – as they are regarded as being intrinsically part of the process of
interpretation. This value-based methodology, which underpins the statutory process,
has resulted in a distinct shift from positivism to that which is akin to natural law –
with the Constitution as the supreme law, in a sense a surrogate for natural law or a
higher law. While the tendency after 1994 has been to adopt a purposive theory – as
it accords with international norms and standards and is in keeping with the values of
the Constitution – this particular theory is in itself not to be regarded as the
uncontested ‘Open Sesame!’100for purposes of interpretation. The evolving
jurisprudence with its influences from South African and international law, requires
a ‘new’ theory and a ‘new’ methodology for the process of interpretation. It is
suggested that the proposed deontic theory with an eclectic methodology requires
that in the process of interpretation one should be inclusive and comprehensive, as
explained.

The third point made by Van der Walt is interesting, in that he specifically makes
reference to a range of ‘fallacious doctrines, theories and arguments’,101 which he
asserts are to be avoided. It is submitted that by simply focusing on that which other
jurisdictions have applied, would not only be fallacious, but also counter-productive.
What a comparative analysis has revealed is that in the process of interpretation in
South Africa, one ought not slavishly apply a theory, doctrine or approach that has
worked elsewhere. South Africa’s unique history and background, and factors that
influence decision-making in South Africa, require an indigenous approach to
interpretation. I t is therefore submitted that a deontic theory of interpretation, which
is based on deontic reasoning and requires pro-active consideration of ethical and
moral elements as its central feature, provides the most viable option to address the
challenge of social transformation in the current constitutional era.

100
Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 116. (Emphasis added)
101
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-183 - 32-188.
(Emphasis Added)

216
 CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

It is submitted that the aims and objectives of the research required for this thesis, as
articulated in Chapter 1, have been addressed.1 Each of the chapters examined a
particular aspect of statutory interpretation and a discussion with regard to each has been
conducted. The approach adopted at the outset was that the multifarious rules and
principles that inform the field of statutory interpretation had to be scrutinized. The
purpose was to provide a response to the research problem posed, which was to
determine whether the Constitution and in particular section 39 have transformed the
process of interpretation, and, if so, how has this influenced the law in South Africa.2
The response to the research problem is in the hypothesis. It is submitted that the
findings of the research are in support of the hypothesis: the Constitution has indeed
transformed the process of interpretation in South Africa.

Not only has the Constitution transformed the process of interpretation in South Africa,
but what has occurred as a result thereof is that our courts are obliged to give effect to
the operation of section 39 – resulting in a transformative Constitution with a new
emerging jurisprudence. It is no longer one of legal positivism, but one akin to natural
law, with the Constitution being the supreme law and all that such a Constitution entails.
The thesis postulates a ‘new’ theory and the ‘new’ methodology – designated as the
deontic theory, which requires an eclectic methodology. The formulation and

1
See the Aims and Objectives of the research as discussed at 1.3 Aims and Objectives in
Chapter 1.
2
See the Research Problem and Hypothesis as set out at 1.2 Research Problem and Hypothesis
in Chapter 1.

217
presentation of this theory of interpretation for the new constitutional order, is supported
by the findings of the research undertaken, a summary of which is detailed hereunder.

7.2 A Summary of the Observations and Findings of the Study

An examination of the cases that form the basis of the research are important from the
perspective of their impact on the developing law and jurisprudence and the changes
effected in the current constitutional era in South Africa.

The most important feature, from an analysis of the subject, has been the transition from
the formalistic and mechanical approach of legal interpretation to a more purposive,
generous or teleological method – and that which is often referred to as a value-
orientated method of interpretation.3 The supremacy of the Constitution and the
operation of section 39(2), in particular, must be regarded as being instrumental in
ensuring that the orthodox methodology of interpretation is eclipsed by the new
constitutional order.4 It is therefore obvious from the plethora of case-law decided
subsequent to the Constitution, that the value-laden approach to interpretation that has
been applied by courts, has resulted in a manifestly more equitable and just outcome of
the legal process.5 This compares starkly with the discredited system of apartheid with
its inherently racist laws that prevailed prior to the new constitutional dispensation.

What is also clear is that the courts have been granted a power to ‘create’ law, in a
secondary sense. As a result of a number of corrective techniques which have been
illustrated by the operation of reading-down, reading-in and the severance process,
3
The more commonly accepted theories of Statutory Interpretation have been discussed
throughout the thesis. Chapter 2 essentially focuses on a critical examination of the theories of
interpretation.
4
Chapter 3 deals predominantly with an examination of various aspects of the Constitution. The
importance of the supremacy clause and the significance of section 39, as well as other relevant
provisions are considered in detail.
5
See for example Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6)
SA 199 (CC); African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral Commission 2006 (5) BCLR
(CC); Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana 1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (CC); Bato Star Fishing
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) BCLR 735 (CC) and SV
Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC).

218
during constitutional review,6 a competent court may endeavour, if reasonably possible,
to modify or adapt legislation to render it constitutional and alive, or may as a last resort
declare it invalid and strike it down, if it is found wanting.7

It is submitted that the combined effect of this power and the ability of the courts in the
process of judicial review has effected a paradigmatic shift in emphasis from a literal to
a value-laden approach to interpretation – resulting in an emerging constitutional
jurisprudence in South Africa. Since the 1996 Constitution is often referred to as being
‘post liberal and transformative in nature’,8 it is not surprising that the term
‘transformative constitutionalism’9 is used to describe this emerging jurisprudence. In
attempting to address the inequalities in a post-apartheid South African society,
transformative constitutionalism emphasizes the realization of, inter alia, socio-
economic justice and all it entails.10 Pieterse, a strong protagonist of social
transformation, identified the attainment of social justice as being a distinct trait of a
transformative South African Constitution.11 In examining the concepts of ‘social
justice’ and ‘transformation’ alluded to, Liebenberg opines that the concepts of social
justice and transformation should inform the way we interpret legislation.12 Du Plessis

6
See Chapter 3 for a complete discussion and analysis of the processes and mechanisms that
apply in constitutional review or the testing of legislation against the Constitution.
7
Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 195-197.
8
Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) South African Journal on
Human Rights at 146.
9
Ibid. See Klare’s discussion on the influence of a transformative constitution on constitutional
and statutory transformation.
10
Brand Courts, Socio-Economic Rights and Transformative Politics, (2009) LLD Thesis,
University of Stellenbosch.
11
Pieterse‘What Do We Mean When We Talk About, Transformative Constitutionalism?’(2005) 20
South African Public Law at 155. See also Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 3
Stellenbosch Law Review at 351.
12
Liebenberg ‘Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights’ (2005) 1
Stellenbosch Law Review at 17.

219
perceptively explains that the transformative nature of the Constitution has far-reaching
implications for interpretation.13

In the research undertaken, there are many judgments that have illustrated the
significance of social justice realised in terms of the Constitution.14 The seminal cases of
the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others15
and the Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others16, are
described as being two of the ‘most conspicuously inspired by transformative
constitutionalism’.17 In the application of the socio-economic rights, namely section 26
and section 27 of the Bill of Rights respectively, the Constitutional Court emphasized
that the responsibility of a competent court was to enforce these rights to provide
respectively access to the right to housing, (in terms of section 26),18 and the right to
health care, food, water and social security (in terms of section 27).19 As a result, the
‘far-reaching implications’ that Du Plessis refers to above, resulted in the granting of

13
Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd
edition) at 32-81.
14
See also the cases of S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); Bato Star Fishing
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC);
Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC).
15
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
16
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
17
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-82.
18
Section 26 of the Constitution - the Right to Housing, provides that:
‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3)No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of
court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit
arbitrary evictions.’
19
Section 27 of the Constitution - the Right to Health Care, food, water and Social security,
provides that:
‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to –
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents,
appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.’

220
declaratory and mandatory orders in Grootboom and the upholding of the state’s
obligation to supply and administer Nevirapine to pregnant HIV women in Treatment
Action Campaign.20 The approach of the court in Khosa21 which stressed the political
community’s responsibility to provide non-citizens who find themselves on the margin
of that community with the material benefits, and Fourie22 which recognised that gays
and lesbians have an entitlement to public recognition of their intimate relationships as
discussed in Chapter 3, is clearly indicative of a more expansive approach adopted by
the courts in deciding on matters relating to fundamental socio-economic rights. What is
apparent from case-law dealing with socio-economic rights, is that the central question
that the court focuses on is whether the means chosen is reasonably capable of
facilitating the realisation of the socio-economic rights in question. The court has thus
indicated that it will assess the reasonableness of the state’s conduct in light of the
social, economic and historical context and consideration will have to be given to the
capacity of the institutions responsible for implementing the programme.23 While the
court in Soobramoney24 raised the standard of the rationality test for socio-economic
rights claims, the court in Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign adopted a
slightly different approach in that it proceeded to advance a set of criteria for assessing
the reasonableness of the state’s acts or omissions. The assessment of the reasonableness
of government programme25 is influenced by two factors, firstly, the concept of
progressive realisation, and secondly, the availability of resources (which is linked to the
first).

20
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-82.
21
Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (5) BCLR 569 (CC).
22
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC).
23
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) at para 43.
24
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
25
Michelman ‘Against Regulatory Taking: of the Two-Stage Inquiry-A Reply to Theunis Roux’ in
Woolman and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations at 306-307.

221
Nevertheless in spite of these interventions, Liebenberg is quite bold in her assertion that
the law and legal processes alone are not sufficient to ‘bridge the chasm between the
realities of poverty and inequality that pervade our society.’26 What is needed is that
when courts decide in respect of cases dealing with socio-economic rights, is that they
should embrace the challenge that the jurisprudence to be applied must ‘facilitate the
transformation of unjust social and economic relations entrenched by current laws.’27
This highlights the responsibility of judges in the interpretative process – to ensure that
social justice through transformation is achieved. A recent finding by Davis and Klare
on transformative constitutionalism has revealed that despite the fact that the 1996
Constitution mandates courts to uphold and protect human rights, some judges in the
lower courts and Supreme Court of Appeal are ‘reluctant to deviate from traditional
legal reasoning and fail to be more sensitive to the context, and the potential and real
consequences’28 of their decisions. It is unfortunate that even though ‘the Constitution
invites imagination and self-reflection about legal method, analysis and reasoning
consistent with its transformative goals’,29 certain judges are content to continue to
operate in the comfort of old methodologies. Klare argues forcefully that in a
transformative constitutional democracy, such as in South Africa, the role and
responsibility of judges must be re-visited. He submits that:

‘Judicial mindset and methodology are part of law, and therefore they must
be examined and revised so as to promote equality, a culture of democracy
and transparent governance.’30

26
Liebeneberg ‘Socio-economic Rights: Revisiting the Reasonableness Review/ Minimum Core
Debate’ in Woolman and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations at 329.
27
Ibid.
28
Davis and Klare ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law’
(2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights at 403.
29
Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) South African Journal on
Human Rights at 156.
30
Ibid.

222
The sentiment encapsulated in the quotation above is integral to this thesis. This is
significant because it speaks directly to the theories of interpretation that are applied in
South African courts, and impacts on the methodology that informs their operation.
What is revealed from the analysis of the more commonly accepted theories of
interpretation,31 is that while they are not completely devoid of merit, the paradigm in
which they operate is inadequate to achieve the goals of social justice and to attain
transformation in the contemporary constitutional and political system in South Africa.
This view is supported by Klare, who maintains that it could not have been the intention
that the new Constitution was to be interpreted using legalistic and obsolete methods of
interpretation, based on primitive literalism.32

It is therefore submitted that a theory which acknowledges the responsibility of the

courts and the role of judicial officers to achieve the transformative goals of the
Constitution, is the most appropriate in the current constitutional order. Bearing this in
mind, a deontic theory is postulated. In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,33 the
Constitutional Court accentuated the importance of the responsibility of judges in the
South African context. It was stated that:

‘Particularly in a country where so few have the means to enforce their

rights through the courts, it is essential on those occasions when the legal
process does establish that an infringement of an entrenched right has
occurred, it will be effectively vindicated. The courts have a particular
responsibility in this regard and are obliged to “forge new tools” and shape
innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal.’

The proposed deontic theory of interpretation which requires that judges are expected in
the process of interpretation, to apply ethical and moral reasoning, together with

31
The more commonly accepted theories of interpretation are examined fully in Chapter 2. These
include the Literal Theory, the Contextual Approach, the Purposive Theory, the Teleological
Theory, the Intention Theory, the Objective Theory and the Judicial Theory.
32
Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) South African Journal on
Human Rights at 156.
33
1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) para 69.

223
induction and deduction, all of which are to be applied pro-actively as a ‘new tool’, is
referred to by the court, in the dictum above – in order to achieve social justice.34

7.3 The Formulation of a New Theory Involving Deontic Reasoning

In a transformative South African constitutional democracy, with the Constitution as the

supreme law, the paradigmatic shift or transition from literalism to purposivism has not
only resulted in an emerging new jurisprudence, but has significantly changed the way
laws are to be interpreted. This idea supports the position that this ‘new’ jurisprudence
requires a ‘new’ theory and a new methodology to interpretation. In his presentation of a
general theory of law, Wahlgren submits that while the task of developing a new theory
might be regarded as being an ‘ambitious, long-term project’, in the same vein he
acknowledges that it need not necessarily ‘only be the result of extensive philosophical
investigations’.35 The quest for a ‘new’ theory in a transformative constitutional
democracy in South Africa, might also have initially been regarded as an ambitious
project. However, the sound and carefully reasoned judgements of the courts36
illustrating the ethical and moral elements underpinning the courts’ reasoning and
therefore emphasizing the approach adopted by judges in assimilating this factor when
deliberating and adjudicating – has contributed to formulating a new theory of
interpretation. The proposed deontic theory of interpretation which has its origin in
classical philosophy37 with a holistic component and a modus operandi which requires

34
See Chapter 1 for the definition accorded to the deontic theory and the description of the eclectic
methodology that would apply in the operation of the model.
35
Wahlgren‘A General Theory of Artificial Intelligence and the Law’ Legal Knowledge Based
Systems; JURIX 1994 at 87.
36
See for example Höerskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education
Mpumalanga and Others 2009 (3) ALL 386 (SCA); Modder East Squatters v
ModderklipBoerdery; President of the Republic of South Africa v ModderklipBoerdery 2004 (8)
BCLR 821 (SCA) and Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy (CCT 51/12) 2013
ZAZZ 9.
37
From the discipline of philosophy, ‘holism’ is described as the theory that whole entitles, as
fundamental components of reality, have an existence other than as the mere sum of the parts.
http://www.thesaurus.com/broese/holism (Accessed on March 2015). The term holism is
generally applied to views that treat the meanings of all of the words in a language as

224
an eclectic methodology and pro-active approach to the application of law is, it is
submitted the most appropriate in the transformative constitutional era in South Africa.

While the court’s approach in the interpretation and the application of legislation in the
Rivonia School case,38 is reflective of the pro-active manner which underpins the
methodology for the operation of the proposed deontic theory,39 it is evident that there
are other recently decided cases that have adopted a pro-active stance without
acknowledging it by name.40 It is therefore submitted that a transformative Constitution
requires a theory which embraces transformation. The proposed deontic theory of
interpretation with a pro-active mode of application, as opposed to a minimalistic
approach,41 it is submitted, is a theory of interpretation which is most favourable in the
current constitutional order.

In order for a proposed theory to qualify as a new theory of legal reasoning, the theory
must exhibit certain distinct criteria.In terms of its overall structure, therefore, a theory
must comprise certain basic components. The theory must:

 Have its own distinct model

It is submitted that the proposed deontic theory as presented, which operates according
to its own theoretical framework and modus operandi, has revealed a distinctiveness
with regard to its application. The proposed deontic theory is one that involves inductive

interdependent. The interdependence associated with ‘holism’ is usually taken to follow from the
meaning of each word or sentence being tied to its use. The determinants of the meanings of our
terms are interconnected in a way that leads a change in the meaning of any single term to
produce a change in the meanings of each of the rest.- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-holism (Accessed on March 2015)
38
MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR 1365
(CC).
39
See definition of a deontic theory in Chapter 1, 1.6.2Deontic Theory.
40
See for example Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and
Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC); Department of Land Affairs and Others v Goedgelegen
Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC); and Minister of Home Affairs and Another v
Fourie and Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC).
41
See Woolman The Selfless Constitution - Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of
South Africa’s Basic Law at 580-581 for the author’s discussion on the concept of minimalism.

225
and deductive legal reasoning, encapsulates ethics and morality and is applied in a pro-
active manner.42

 Be a general theory

What is required here is that a theory must reflect the components that could be
accepted by scholars of various traditions. The theory as postulated is a general theory
of application. The main reason for this submission is that an examination of case law
has revealed that the theory is capable of being applied to different areas in law,for
example private law, public law, commercial law and international law, which is evident
from the array of legal judgments examined.

 Be transparent

What is expected here, is that the components are to be described in a non-technical way
and all legal and technical terms are explained as they appear. The application of the
theory will operate on the basis of an eclectic methodology. An understanding of how
this would unfold has been illustrated in the jurisprudential analysis of the traditional
theories of interpretation applied in South African courts

 Reflect explicitness

This is necessary in order to ensure that all the relevant aspects of the jurisprudential
paradigm be included – to make it possible to identify. It has been necessary to explore
the various rules of interpretation as well as to examine a host of canons and maxims, to
determine the applicability and relevance of the proposed deontic theory of
interpretation. An examination of the above has revealed that the proposed deontic
theory of interpretation may very well be used and applied with regard to the commonly
accepted canons and maxims of interpretation.43

 Comprise its own modus operandi

42
See discussion in Chapter 1, 1.4 Background/Overview for the articulation of the elements of
the deontic theory.
43
See Chapter 5, for an examination of the canons and maxims of interpretation.

226
As defined the proposed deontic theory of interpretation would operate in accordance
with its own set of rules and methodology. The methodology or modus operandi that
informs the proposed deontic theory, has been clearly defined. The modus operandi is an
eclectic methodology. What is proposed for the operation of the theory is an
amalgamation of the modus operandi of the various theories of interpretation, which has
to be applied pro-actively. Such pro-activism is identified as being pivotal to its
operation. The operation of the eclectic method with a pro-active approach as outlined,
is unique to the proposed deontic theory.44

 Be flexible

What is evident is that the inherent flexibility of the proposed deontic theory, in that it is
a theory that may be applied to legislation, the common-law and customary law, makes
it extremely favourable for interpretation in a transformative constitutional system.

The basis of Wahlgren’s work is significant because it supports the rationale for the
research undertaken. This is that future advancements are dependent on one’s ability to
develop more adequate theories reflecting their own unique characteristics and
requirements.45 The research undertaken clearly illustrates that the proposed deontic
theory of interpretation, as expounded, conforms with all of the criteria, as articulated.
What has emerged as an important feature in the application of the proposed deontic
theory of interpretation is that it supports the idea that in interpreting a statute, that the
statute is to be read holistically. Holism is the idea that something can be more than the
sum of its parts. It contends that one must understand reality as a whole. In applying
holism to language would result in semantic holism. The idea behind semantic holism is
that every word has a meaning only in relation to other words, sentences, or language (as
a whole), in which it is used.46 In his analysis of the concept of ‘holism’ which in effect

44
See discussion in the eclectic methodology in Chapter 1, 1.6.3 Methodology.
45
Wahlgren‘A General Theory of Artificial Intelligence and the Law’ Legal Knowledge Based
Systems: JURIX 1994 at 88.
46
Semantic holism, is defined as, the idea that words have no meaning apart from the context, or
sentences in which they are used. This can, perhaps, be better understood by looking at the

227
was an appraisal of Smuts’ work Holism and Evolution, Mowatt maintains that Smuts
coined the term ‘holism’ to describe the ‘more’ that he referred to. Holism is thus best
described as a force inherent in any object or organism. Mowatt argues further that
when holism and the process of evolution are combined they comprise the main forces
of existence namely:
(i) Evolution – which is the force of development and growth and

(ii) Holism – which is the form of regulation and formation.

However Mowatt emphasises that Smuts did not specifically define holism but rather
developed throughout his thesis the concept of holism incrementally.47 Likewise, in the
process of interpretation the court is guided by the basic principle that each of the
elements or ‘layers’ that comprise its separate parts - should be read as a ‘harmonious
whole’ within their broader context in a manner that furthers the statutory purpose.48 It
is therefore submitted that the proposed deontic theory of interpretation which
incorporates the elements of inductive and deductive legal reasoning, an evaluation of
ethical and moral considerations and is applied pro-actively in accordance with an
eclectic methodology, embraces the idea of holism. The proposed deontic theory of
interpretation is intended to operate holistically in resolving matters of dispute in the
interpretation of statutes.

7.4 Prognosis and Conclusion

What can be garnered from the findings of the research and from the rich repository of
case-law and jurisprudence that the study has explored, is that the emerging
jurisprudence requires a new legal theory for statutory interpretation in the era of
constitutional transformation in South Africa. This may, perhaps, not come as a surprise

meaning of holism, and contrasting it atomism. Holism can be contrasted with atomism, which is
the idea that everything can be broken down into smaller parts. Applied to biology one would
argue that one can obtain an accurate picture of a duck by breaking down the duck into
fundamental ‘duck parts.’
http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/holism-and-inst.pdf (Accessed on October 2013)
47
Mowatt ‘Holism and the Law’ (1991) 108 South African Law Journal at 344.
48
Kim Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends at 1.

228
for scholars and lawyers. From his analysis of the conventional theories of statutory
interpretation since the advent of the Constitution, Du Plessis is unwavering in his
assertions that the conventional theories of interpretation are insufficient in a
constitutional democracy. His view is both relevant and receptive to the idea of an
‘emerging discourse on legal interpretation’.49 In fact, Du Plessis goes so far as to
suggest the augmented Savignian Quartet, in its adapted form, as a model for both
constitutional and statutory implementation.50 Another legal scholar who has been
openly critical of the assessment of the adjudicative performance of the Constitutional
Court due to the inadequacy of available theories – has been Roux. In one of his seminal
works, he identifies the need for an appropriate legal theory of interpretation in the new
constitutional order. He submits that:

‘The problems with the currently available theories of judicial review…is

that none of them is directed at constitutional courts in new democracies.
What is required therefore, is a new account, drawing on some of the
political science insights but expressed in terms of an acceptable legal
theory.’51

While the inadequacy of the conventional theories of interpretation and the need for an
acceptable legal theory is a subject that has been broached by legal academics and jurists
– none have endeavoured to suggest an appropriate or acceptable alternative. It is for this
reason that the research undertaken is relevant, as it provides a feasible, practical and
sound option by way of a deontic theory of interpretation coupled with a pro-active
methodology. The proposed deontic theory of interpretation as explicated, is a model
that is based on ethical and moral considerations and requires an eclectic – pro-active
methodology to further the aims of social transformation. For the reasons suggested and

49
Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-40.
50
Ibid at 160.
51
Roux T 'Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa' (2009) 7
International Journal on Constitutional Law at 112.

229
supported by a myriad of case-law, as illustrated throughout this thesis, the proposed
deontic theory is presented as a theoretical framework for interpretation in the
transformative constitutional era – in South Africa. As indicated above the deontic
theory also involves the concept of holism: the sum being more than the parts. This is
also a method of legal reasoning and provides a basis for a pro-active application of the
meaning of a text, as mandated by section 7 and section 39 (2) of the Constitution.
Deontic reasoning involves balancing conflicting values, harmonisation and
prioritisation of values, besides the application of the principles of holism. Values must
include, besides human dignity, equality and freedom the transformative socio-economic
values necessary for economic equality in South Africa.

230
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Dugard J ‘Courts and the Poor in South Africa: A Critique of Systemic Judicial
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Dyzenhaus D ‘The Pasts and Future of the Role of Law in South Africa’ (2008) 124
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Hoexter C ‘The Principle of Legality in South African Administrative Law’ (2004)

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Kelley DR ‘Eclecticism and the History of Ideas’ (2001) 62 Journal of the History
of Ideas 577-592

Klare K ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) South African

Journal on Human Rights 146-188

Lake DA ‘Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the
rise of Eclecticism in International Relations’ (2014) European Journal of Human
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Langa P ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review351

Lee RM, Nguyen V and Pagnoni A ‘Securing Uniqueness of Rights e-Documents: A

Deontic Process Perspective’ (2008) 3Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronics
Commerce Research 83-102

Lenta P ‘Judicial Deference and Rights’ (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg
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Africa’ (2006) 17Stellenbosch Law Review 5-36

Mclean K ‘Towards a Framework for Understanding Constitutional Deference’

(2010) 25 South African Public Law 445-470

Michelman FI ‘A Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman’

(1995)South African Journal on Human Rights 447-480

Mowatt JG ‘Holism and the Law’ (1991) 108 South African Law Journal 343-349

Muller ‘Basic Questions of Constitutional Concretisation’ (1999) 3 Stellenbosch Law

Review 269-283

Mureinik E ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ (1986) 103 South African Law
Journal 615-645

Mureinik E ‘Expressio Unius: Exclusio Alterius?’ (1987) South African Law Journal
264

Mureinik E‘A Bridge to Where?’(1994) South African Journal on Human Rights 31-
48

Ntlama N ‘The “Deference” of Judicial Authority to the State’ (2012) Obiter 135-
144

Pieterse M ‘What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transformative

Constitutionalism’ (2005) 20South African Public Law 155-166

Roux T 'Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa'

(2009) 7International Journal on Constitutional Law 106-138

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of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC)’
(2009) 72 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 336-345

Singh A ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgement – Jacob Zuma v

The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54 N’ (2009) 30
Obiter 784-790

Singh A ‘A Re-evaluation of the Common Law Presumptions of Interpretation in the

Light of the Constitution’ (2012) 75 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law
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Snyman J ‘Interpretation and The Politics of Memory’ (1998) ActaJuridica312-321

Tebbe N ‘Eclecticism’ (2008-2009) 25 Constitutional Commentary at 317-320

Van der Walt AJ ‘Dancing with Codes - Protecting, Developing and Deconstructing
Property Rights in a Constitutional State’ (2001) 118South African Law Journal 258-
311

CASES

Adampal (Pty) Ltd v Administrator 1989 (3) SA 800 (A)

African Christian Democratic Party v the Electoral Commission and Others2006 (5)
BCLR 579 (CC)

Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy (CCT 51/12) 2013 ZAZZ 9

Association of Amusement and Novelty Machine Operators and Another v Minister

of Justice and Another 1980 (2) SA 636 (AD)

Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of

South Africa and Others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC)

Baloro and Others v University of Bophuthatswana and Others 1995 (8) BCLR 1018
(B)

238
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and
Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687(CC)

Benning v Union Government 1914 AD 180

Bersteinand Othersv Bester and Others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC)

Bhe v Magistrate of Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) SA 850 (CC)

Bhyat v Commissioner for Immigration 1932 AD 125

Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 1938 AD 195

Brakpan Town Council v Burstein 1932 TPD 335

Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC)

Bunting v Minister of Justice 1963 (4) SA 531 (C)

Buthelezi andOthers v Attorney General, Natal 1986 (4) SA 377 (D)

Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal
Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC)

Carmichele and Geldenhys v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2002 (4)
SA 719 (CC)

Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice) and Registrar of Asiatics1911

AD 13

Commissioner SARS V Executor, Frith’s Estate 2001 (2) SA 261 (SCA)

Crow v Detained Mental Patients Special Board 1985 (4) SA 83 (ZH)

Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipality Council 1920 AD 530

Daniels v Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC)

De Kock v Resident Magistrate of Caledon 1986 (13) SC 386

De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis 1995 (2) SA 40 (T)

239
De Lille and Another v Speaker of The National Assembly 1998 (7) BCLR 916 (C)

De Villiers v Cape Divisional Council 1875 Buch 50

De Wet v Deetlefs 1928 AD 286

Department of Land Affairs and Others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd
2007 (6) SA 199 (CC)

Derby Lewis and Another v Chairman, Amnesty Committee of the Truth and
ReconciliationCommission and Others 2001 (3) SA 1033 (C)

Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Prins 2012 (2) SACR 183 (SCA)

Dulabh and Another v Department of Land Affairs 1997 (4) SA 1108 (LCC)

Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC); 1996 (3)
SA 850 (CC)

Ebrahim v Minister of the Interior 1997(1) SA 655 (A)

Engels v Allied Chemical Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Another 1993 (4) SA 45 (Nm)

Ensor NO v Rensco Motors (Pty) Ltd 1981(1) SA 815 (A)

Esselman v Administrauteur SWA 1974 (2) SA 597 (SWA)

Evans v Schoeman 1949 (1) SA 571 (A)

Everett v Minister of the Interior 1981 (2) SA 453 (C)

Ex Parte Application of the President of RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC)

Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In Re Rex v Jacobson and Levy 1931 AD 466

Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re SY Walters and Another
2002 (4) SA 613 (CC)

Ex Parte Slater, Walker Securities (SA) Ltd 1974 (4) SA 657(W)

Ex Parte Vermaak1977 (2) SA 129 (N)

240
Ex Parte Wilson 1930 OPD 16

Executive Council of Western Cape v Minister of Provincial Affairs and

Constitutional Development of RSA 2000 (1) SA 661 (CC)

Farrar’s Estate v CIR 1926 TPD 501

Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional

Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC)

Ferreira v Levin NO and Others1996 (2) SA 984 (CC)

Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC)

Geyser v Msunduzi Municipality 2003 (5) SA 19 (N)

Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 (4) SA
715 (A)

Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC)

Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA)

Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and

Others2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)

Grootboom v Oostenburg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (CC)

Heatherdale Farms (Pty) Ltd & Others v Deputy Minister of Agriculture and
Another 1980 (3) SA 476 (T)

Hlatshwayo v Hein 1998 (1) BCLR 123 (LCC)

Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1949 (1) SA 842 (A)

Hoerskool Ermelo and Another v The Head of Department of Education,

Mpumalanga and Others [2009] 3 SA 422 (SCA); Head of Departmen, Mpumalanga
Department of Education and Others v Hoerskool Ermelo 2009 (ZACC) 32

Holomisa v Argus Newspaper Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W)

241
Hurley and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1985 (4) SA 709 (D)

Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 (5)
BCLR 433

In Re Former Highlands Residents: Sonny and Others v Department of Land Affairs

2000 (2) SA 351 (CC)

In Re Vakaza 1971 (2) SA 10 (E)

Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor

Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO and
Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC)

Jaga v Donges1950 (4) SA 653 (A)

Janse van Rensburgv the Master 2001 (3) SA 519 (W)

Johannesburg Consolidated Insurance Company Ltd v MarshallsTownship Syndicate

Ltd 1917 AD 662

K v Minister of Safety and Security2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC), 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC)

Kalla and Another v The Master and Others 1995 (1) SA 261 (T)

Keeley v Minister of Defence 1980 (4) SA 695 (T)

Khosa v Minster of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC)

Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA (W)

Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and
Others 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC)

Mathophe & Others v Soweto Council 1983 (4) SA 287 (W)

Matiso v Officer Commanding, Port Elizabeth Prison and Another 1994 (4) SA 592
(SE)

Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC)

242
MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12)
BCLR 1365 (CC)

Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (10)
BCLR 968

Minster of Education, Western Cape, and Others v Governing Body, Mikro Primary
School and Another 2006 (1) SA 1 (SCA): 2005 (10) BCLR 973 (SCA)

Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC).

Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1075

Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC)

Minister of Interior v Machadodorp Investments 1957 (2) SA 395 (A)

Minister of Land Affairs and Another v Slamdien and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 413
(LCC)

Mjuqu v Johannesburg City Council 1973 (3) SA 421 (A)

Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC)

Modder East Squatters and Another v ModderklipBoerdery; President of the

Republic of South Africa v ModderklipBoerdery 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA)

Moleah v University of Transkei and Others 1998 (2) SA 522 (Tk)

Montsisi v Minister van Polisie1984 (1) SA 619 (A)

Mpehle v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 1996 (7) BCLR
921 (Ck)

National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000(2)
SA 1 (CC)

National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice
and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC)

243
National Transport Commission and Another v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd
1972 (3) SA 726 (AD)

NK v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835
(CC).

Nqumba v State President 1987 (1) SA 456 E

Osman and Anotherv Attorney-General, Transvaal 1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC)

Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co

Ltd 1965 (3) SA 150 (A)

Poovalingam v Rajbansi1992 (1) SA 283 (A)

Potgieter en ’n Ander v Kilian 1995 (11) BCLR 1498 (N)

Principal Immigration Officer v Bhula 1931 AD 323

Public Carrier Association and Others v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd and
Others1990 (1) SA 925 (A)

Publications Control Board v Central News Agency1970 (3) SA 479 (AD)

Qolezeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1994 (3) SA 625 (E)

R v de Beer1929 TPD 104

R v Detody 1926 AD 198

R v Forlee 1917 TPD 52

R v Letoani 1950 (3) SA 669 (O)

R v Mbambali and Xaba 1938 NPD 2

R v Nteto 1949 EDL 304

R v Padsha1923 AD 218

R v Pickering 1911 TPD 1054

244
R v Sachs 1953 (1) SA 392 (A)

R v Thomas1954 (1) SA 185 (SWA)

Raats Rontgen andVermeulen (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, Cape and Others 1991 (1)
SA 827 (A)

Radebe v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1987 (1) SA 586 (W)

Reek NO v Registrateurvan Aktes Transvaal 1969 (1) SA 589 (T)

Rennie NO v Gordan and Another NNO 1998 (1) SA 1 (A)

Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 (3) SA 1293 (LCC)

RPM Bricks (Pty) Ltd v City Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2007 (9) BCLR
993 (T)

S v Adams1979 (4) SA 793 (T)

S v Buthelezi 1979 (3) SA 1349 (N)

S v Conifer (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 651 (A)

S v De Bruin 1975 (3) SA 56 (T)

S v Du Plessis 1981 (3) SA 382 (A)

S v Huyser 1979 (3) SA 490

S v Kohler 1979 (1) SA 861 (T)

S v Labuschagne1979 (3) SA 1320 (T)

S v Mamabolo(E TV and Others Intervening) 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC);2001 (3) SA
409 (CC)

S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)

S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC)

S v Mjoli and Another 1981 (3) SA 1233 (A)

245
S v Motshari [2001] 2 All SA 207 (NC)

S v Mpofu 1979 (2) SA 225 (R)

S v Ngwenya 1979 (2) SA 96 (A)

S v Radebe 1988 (1) SA 772 (A)

S v Reed 1972 (2) SA 34 (RA)

S v Sibiya 1971 (1) SA 199 (E)

S v Takaendesa 1972 (4) SA 72 (RA)

S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC)

S v Tuhadeleni and Others 1969 (1) SA 153 (A)

S v Weinberg 1979 (3) SA 89 (A)

S v Werner 1981 (1) SA 187 (A)

S v Yolelo 1981 (1) SA 1002 (A)

S v Zuma and Others1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA; 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC)

SA Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 (1) SA 263 (A)

Sachs v City Council of Johannesburg 1931 TPD 443

Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11

Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1997 (12) BCLR 1675 (CC)

SAR andR v Smiths Coasters (Prop) Ltd 1931 AD 113

Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey 1980 (1) SA 472 (A)

Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation v Haslam and Others 2000 (2) SA 415
(SCA)

Shabalala v Attorney General 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC)

246
Singh v Govender Construction 1986 (3) SA 613 (N)

Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 (T)

Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC);

1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)

Stadsraad van Vanderbylpark v Administrateur, Traansvaal and Others 1982 (3) SA

166 (T)

Stanton v Minister of Justice and Others 1960 (3) SA 353 (T)

Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd 1962 (1) SA 458
(A)

South African Transport Services v Olgar1986 (2) SA 684 (A)

South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation Ltd v Buchan 1971 (1) SA 234 (C)

Suliman v Hansa 1971 (4) SA 69 (D)

Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council 1994 (3) SA 789 (A)

The State v Sayed 1962 (2) SA 128 (C)

Theron en Anderev Ring Van Wellington van die NG Serdinghkerk in SuidAfrikaen

Andere1976 (2) SA 1 (A)

Thoroughbred Breeders Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 (4) SA 551

Transvaal Investment Co Ltd v Springs Municipality 1922 AD 337

Treatment Action Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2002 (4)
BCLR 356 (T); 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC)

Thusi v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 (2) SA 561 (KZP)

Union Government v Mack 1971 AD 713

Union Government v Tonkin 1918 AD 533

United Democratic Front v State President and Others 1987 (3) SA 296 N

247
United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2003 (1) SA 495 (CC)

University of Cape Town v Bar Council and Another 1986 (4) SA 903 (A)

Van Heerden and Others, NNO v Queens Hotel (Pty) Ltd and Others 1973 (2) SA 14
(RA)

Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910

Volshenk v Volshenk1946 TPD 486

Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC)

Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 (1) SA 337 (CC)

Williamson v Schoon1997 (3) SA 1053 (T)

Winter v Minister of Defence and Others 1940 AD 194

Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v Chawanda 1991 (2) SA 825 (ZS)

Zuma v The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54 (N)

FOREIGN CASES

Campbell v Hall 1774 1 Comp. 204, 98 E. R. 1045 (KB)

Grey v Pearson(1857) 6 HL Cas 61

Heydon Case(1584) 76 ER 637

R v Correia 2005 ONCJ 435

R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321

RJR MacDonald v Canada (1995) 3 SCR 199

248
ACTS AND LEGISLATION

Bantu Laws Amendment Act 1964

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977

Defence Act 44 of 1957

Interim Constitution of South Africa 1993

Internal Security and Intimidation Amendment Act138 of 1991

Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 (As Amended)

Land and Trust Act of 1936

Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 78 of 1996

Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998

Marriage Act 25 of 1961

National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998

Native (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act 25 of 1945

Native Land Act of 1913

Ordinance Act 17 of 1972

Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951

Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995

Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994

Restitution of the Land Rights Act 22 of 1996

Schools’ Act 84 of 1996

Security Act 74 of 1982

249
South African Citizenship Act 49 of 1949

The Group Areas Act 77 of 1957

Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000

War Measures Act 18 of 1947

War Measures Act 31 of 1944

FOREIGN ACTS AND LEGISLATIONS

Canadian Act of 1982

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Graham S ‘SA needs new moral code, says priest’ (June 18-June 24, 2014) Southern
Cross

Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (4th edition)

ShortersOxford English Dictionary (3rd edition)

CONFERENCE PAPERS/PAPERS

Brand JFD ‘Courts, Socio-Economic Rights and Transformative Politics’, 2009 LLD
Thesis, University of Stellenbosch

Langa P ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ Prestige Lecture delivered at

Stellenbosch University on 9 October 2006

Wahlgren P ‘A General Theory of Artificial Intelligence and the Law’ Legal

Knowledge Based Systems: JURIX 1994; 79-91

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251