Historiographical Inquiries: The

Historian, Facts, and the Scientific

Status of History
Essay 1: Critically Analyse the Relationship Between
the Historian and the Facts
I. Introduction: The Evolving Understanding of Historical Facts
The seemingly straightforward relationship between the historian and historical facts has been a
subject of profound and evolving debate within historiography. The nineteenth-century empiricist
or "common-sense" view often depicted historical facts as objective, discrete entities existing
independently of the historian, akin to "fish on the fishmonger's slab," waiting to be collected and
presented. This perspective, however, has been extensively challenged. The relationship is not
one of passive reception by the historian but rather a dynamic, reciprocal, and constitutive
process. The historian is not merely a collector of pre-existing data but an active agent in the
transformation of "facts of the past" into "historical facts." This essay will critically analyze this
intricate relationship, arguing that facts are selected, interpreted, and imbued with meaning by
the historian. The historian's work, in turn, is inevitably shaped by their socio-historical context,
individual perspective, and the theoretical frameworks they employ, rendering the notion of
"pure," unmediated facts untenable.
The very act of questioning the relationship between the historian and facts is, in itself, a
product of modern historiography. Earlier chroniclers, while recording events, did not typically
problematize this relationship with the same degree of self-conscious reflection that emerged
with the professionalization of history. Ancient and medieval chroniclers often documented
occurrences without the explicit methodological scrutiny that became prominent from the 19th
century onwards. The Enlightenment, followed by the formalization of history as an academic
discipline, brought questions of method, evidence, and objectivity to the forefront. This
intellectual shift made the historian-fact dyad a central arena for debate, implying that our
current understanding of this relationship is itself a historically conditioned perspective.
Comprehending this dynamic is therefore fundamental to understanding the nature of historical
knowledge and its enduring claims to represent the past.
II. The Nature of Historical Facts: More Than "What Happened?"
A "historical fact" is commonly understood as a fact about the past, answering the basic
question, "What happened?". However, the historian's task extends beyond a mere
chronological listing of events. Historians strive to uncover why events occurred, the
circumstances contributing to their causes, their subsequent effects, and how they were
interpreted. This inherent analytical layer suggests that even the definition and establishment of
a historical fact involve interpretation. The process of establishing these facts is rigorous, relying
heavily on primary sources—first-hand evidence such as official documents, letters, diaries, and
eyewitness accounts. Historians corroborate information by comparing multiple sources and
cross-referencing accounts with other forms of evidence, including archaeological findings.
Philosophically, facts are often defined as true data, distinct from inferences, theories, values, or
opinions. They can be understood as "obtaining states of affairs" or the "worldly correlates of
true propositions". This philosophical underpinning highlights the truth-claim inherently
associated with facts, even as their establishment in historical practice proves complex.
Numerous challenges impede the straightforward recovery of past facts. Significant information
has been lost over time; oral histories, while rich, can suffer from information degradation
through transmission; and written documents predating modern copying methods were prone to
errors or deliberate alterations. Furthermore, some historical materials are outright propaganda,
while even authentic documents can be ambiguous or conflict with other sources. This inherent
uncertainty in the historical record creates a crucial space where the historian's interpretive
faculties become indispensable.
The "raw material" of the past—the sum total of all occurrences—is virtually infinite. In contrast,
"historical facts" are finite, representing the outcome of a deliberate process of selection and
verification. This process itself involves a preliminary level of interpretation even before the
historian begins to construct a narrative. As historians seek to understand why events happened
and how they were interpreted, they are already moving beyond a simple register of
occurrences. The act of designating a past event as a "historical fact" is an act of attributing
significance, a decision made by the historian. The availability and nature of surviving sources
directly influence the historian's capacity to establish facts, which, in turn, shapes the range of
possible interpretations. A scarcity of sources might necessitate more speculative
interpretations, whereas an abundance of conflicting sources demands a more intricate
hermeneutic engagement.
III. The Historian's Indispensable Role: Selection and Interpretation
The work of E.H. Carr has been pivotal in reshaping the understanding of the historian's role. He
famously argued that history is "a continuous process of interaction between the historian and
his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past". This perspective
fundamentally rejects the notion that facts can "speak for themselves." Central to Carr's thesis is
the necessity of selection. Historians, he contended, are "necessarily selective". The vast ocean
of past events contains innumerable "facts of the past," but only a few are "caught" by the
historian to become "historical facts". For instance, countless individuals may have crossed the
Rubicon river, but Julius Caesar's crossing became a significant historical fact because
historians, for their own interpretive reasons, deemed it so.
This interaction is not a one-way street; rather, it is a "molding" process. As Carr described, "the
historian is engaged on a continuous process of molding his facts to his interpretation and his
interpretation to his facts". This implies a give-and-take, where the historian's developing
understanding shapes the selection and presentation of facts, while the facts themselves
constrain and inform the interpretation. Interpretation, in this view, is not an optional adjunct to
fact-gathering but, as Carr put it, the "life-blood of history". Without interpretation, facts remain
disparate and meaningless. The historian requires "imaginative understanding" to penetrate the
surface of events and grasp the thoughts, motives, and contexts that lay behind past actions.
Carr's concept of a "dialogue" between the historian and the facts implies that the historian's
contemporary concerns, questions, and intellectual milieu actively shape which aspects of the
past are investigated and, consequently, which "facts of the past" are elevated to the status of
"historical facts." Historians, as Carr noted, inevitably view the past "only through the eyes of the
present". The questions a historian poses are often prompted by current societal issues,
ongoing scholarly debates, or new theoretical perspectives. For example, the rise of social
history as a sub-discipline led to the "discovery" and foregrounding of facts about the everyday
lives of ordinary people, aspects of the past that were largely ignored by earlier generations of
historians focused predominantly on political and diplomatic events. This demonstrates that
while the occurrences of the past do not change, their status as historical facts and their
perceived significance can and do evolve, reflecting shifts in the historian's interpretive
framework. The act of selection, therefore, is not arbitrary but is guided by the historian's
research question or hypothesis, which is itself a product of their intellectual and social
environment, linking individual scholarly agency to broader historiographical currents.
IV. The Challenge of Objectivity: The Historian's Lens
The traditional positivist approach to history, most famously articulated by Leopold von Ranke,
held that the historian's primary aim was to show the past "how it really was" (wie es eigentlich
gewesen). This implied that a high degree of objectivity was attainable through rigorous
adherence to methodological principles, including meticulous source criticism, the prioritization
of primary sources, and a conscious effort by the historian to free themselves from personal or
political biases and to avoid moral judgments or anachronistic speculation. Ranke's emphasis
on empirical research and factual accuracy laid a crucial foundation for the professionalization
of history.
However, the possibility of achieving absolute objectivity has been extensively critiqued. E.H.
Carr, for example, argued that "absolute and timeless objectivity" in history is an illusion
precisely because the processes of selection and interpretation are inherent and unavoidable.
Facts, in his view, are "always refracted through the mind of the recorder". The historian's own
historical and social environment, their values, cultural background, and the theoretical
frameworks they adopt inevitably influence their work. These influences can manifest as various
forms of bias, including cultural, national, or confirmation bias, which shape how events are
perceived and narrated.
This does not necessarily mean that history descends into pure subjectivism. Some scholars
suggest that history, as a discipline, occupies a space between science and art, striving to
merge the pursuit of verifiable truth with the expressive and interpretive qualities of artistic
representation. This suggests a more nuanced understanding than a simple dichotomy between
absolute objectivity and complete subjectivity. While complete detachment may be an
unattainable ideal, historians employ a range of methods to mitigate bias and enhance the
reliability of their accounts. These include rigorous peer review processes, critical and
comparative evaluation of sources, a conscious effort towards self-reflexivity regarding one's
own potential biases, and the transparent presentation of evidence and methodology.
The pursuit of objectivity, even if ultimately recognized as an ideal rather than a perfectly
achievable state, has historically been a powerful driver of methodological rigor within the
discipline. Ranke's call for objectivity, for instance, was instrumental in the development of
systematic source criticism techniques that remain fundamental to historical research. Even as
later historians like Carr and postmodern thinkers critiqued the possibility of pure objectivity, the
methodological tools developed under the positivist paradigm continue to form the bedrock for
establishing the evidential basis of historical claims. Paradoxically, the increasing awareness of
subjectivity and potential bias has led to an even more critical engagement with sources and a
greater emphasis on self-reflection by historians, thereby strengthening historical methodology.
This creates a productive tension between the historian's creative and interpretive role and the
discipline's aspiration to represent the past truthfully, a tension that forces continuous
re-evaluation of methods, interpretations, and conclusions.
The following table offers a comparative overview of differing historiographical perspectives on
the relationship between the historian and facts:
Table 1: Contrasting Historiographical Views on Facts and the Historian
Feature Positivism (e.g., Ranke) E.H. Carr's Postmodernism (e.g.,
Interactionism Hayden White)
Nature of Facts Objective; "found" in Selected from past; Constructed; narrated;
sources interpreted by historian textual
Role of Historian Discoverer; impartial Selector; interpreter; Author; constructor of
recorder dialogist narratives
Possibility of High; achievable Limited; an ideal; Illusion; meaning is
Objectivity through rigorous influenced by present imposed/constructed
method
Primary Mode of Empirical research; Dialogue between past Narrative emplotment;
Work source criticism & present; deconstruction
interpretation
This table synthesizes complex ideas from various scholarly traditions, illustrating the evolution
of thought regarding the historian-fact relationship. It highlights how each school of thought
conceives the fundamental elements of historical practice, providing a framework for
understanding the ongoing debates within the discipline.
V. Postmodernism and the Construction of Historical Narratives
The postmodernist turn in the late 20th century introduced a more radical challenge to traditional
understandings of historical facts and objectivity. Jean-François Lyotard's concept of an
"incredulity towards metanarratives" encapsulates this skepticism towards grand, overarching
explanations of history that claim universal truth. This skepticism extends to the very idea of a
single, objective historical reality that can be neutrally represented.
Hayden White has been a particularly influential figure in this regard, arguing that historical
narratives are essentially "verbal fictions" whose contents are "as much invented as found". He
contends that the formal structures of historical writing have more in common with literary
narratives than with scientific treatises. Historians, according to White, employ
"emplotment"—casting historical events into recognizable story forms (e.g., romance, tragedy,
comedy, satire)—to shape disparate data into a coherent and meaningful account. This act of
emplotment is, for White, a "fiction-making aspiration," suggesting that the meaning attributed to
historical events is not inherent in the events themselves but is constructed by the historian
through narrative choices. Keith Jenkins, another prominent postmodernist voice, advocates for
moving beyond earlier historiographical debates, such as those framed by Carr and Elton, to
engage with theorists like Richard Rorty and Hayden White, emphasizing the "discourse of
history" and its inherently reflexive and constructed nature.
The "linguistic turn," which heavily influenced postmodern thought, further complicates the
historian-fact relationship. Drawing on thinkers like Ferdinand de Saussure, it posits that
language does not simply mirror an external reality but actively constructs our understanding of
it. Historical discourse, therefore, can only "signify the real"; it is not a transparent window onto
the past but a system of representation with its own conventions and limitations. From this
perspective, historical facts themselves come to be seen as constructed artifacts. As Carl
Becker suggested, "the facts of history do not exist for any historian until he creates them," and
Nancy Partner echoes this by stating that historical facts are "constructed artifacts no different in
cognitive origin than any made thing or fiction".
Postmodernism does not necessarily deny that events occurred in the past. Rather, it radically
questions our ability to access and represent that past in a neutral, unmediated fashion. The
focus shifts from the "facts" in isolation to the process of narrating and constructing those facts
into meaningful historical accounts. White's argument about emplotment, for instance, implies
that the same set of "facts of the past" can be configured into vastly different historical narratives
depending on the historian's chosen narrative framework. This suggests that the "meaning" of
the past is not inherent in the raw data but is imposed by the historian. This represents a more
profound departure from traditional empiricism than even Carr's interactionism, as Carr still
maintained a belief in a dialogue with facts that could constrain and validate interpretation. If
history is primarily a literary or narrative construction, its truth claims become more complex and
potentially relativized, sparking ongoing debates about historical authority, the criteria for
evaluating competing historical accounts, and the very nature of historical knowledge.
VI. Conclusion: A Reciprocal and Constitutive Relationship
The relationship between the historian and historical facts is undeniably active, interpretive, and
constitutive, rather than passive or purely receptive. The journey of historiographical thought
reveals a significant evolution from the positivist certainty in objective, discoverable facts to a
postmodern skepticism that emphasizes the constructed nature of historical narratives.
Throughout this evolution, there has been an increasing recognition of the historian's profound
agency in shaping our understanding of the past.
E.H. Carr's concept of an "unending dialogue between the present and the past" remains a
particularly useful mediating position. It acknowledges both the indispensable constraints
imposed by evidence—the "facts of the past"—and the inescapable necessity of interpretation
by the historian, who is situated in their own present. While the notion of "pure" facts, untouched
by human interpretation, may be an illusion, historical inquiry is not thereby reduced to arbitrary
invention. It relies on a rigorous, self-critical, and methodologically sound engagement with
surviving evidence to construct plausible, defensible, and meaningful accounts of the past. The
historian bears the crucial responsibility of making their processes of selection, interpretation,
and narration transparent and open to scrutiny by their peers and the wider public.
Ultimately, the critical analysis of the historian-fact relationship serves to strengthen history as a
discipline. By moving beyond a naive empiricism, historians are compelled to confront the
inherent complexities of their craft. Acknowledging the influence of subjectivity and the
constructive role of narrative does not lead to a nihilistic rejection of historical truth, but rather
fosters a more sophisticated understanding of how historical knowledge is produced, validated,
and contested within a community of scholars and in society at large. This enhanced
methodological self-awareness is vital not only for practitioners of history but also for all
consumers of historical knowledge, enabling a more critical evaluation of the historical claims
and narratives encountered in an increasingly information-saturated world.

Essay 2: Is History a Science?

I. Introduction: The Enduring Debate
The question "Is History a Science?" represents one of the most enduring and pivotal debates
within historiography and the philosophy of history. It probes the epistemological foundations of
historical inquiry, its methods, aims, and the nature of the knowledge it produces. Views on this
matter span a wide spectrum, from emphatic assertions that history is indeed a science, "no
less and no more," as J.B. Bury famously proclaimed , to arguments stressing fundamental
distinctions between historical study and the natural sciences, as articulated by thinkers like
E.H. Carr and R.G. Collingwood. This essay will argue that while history employs rigorous
methodologies and shares certain attributes with scientific inquiry, particularly with the social
sciences, it differs fundamentally from the natural sciences in its primary subject matter (unique
human experiences, actions, and intentions), its dominant explanatory modes (which are often
narrative and idiographic), and its ultimate aims (which frequently prioritize understanding
meaning, context, and particular causal sequences over the formulation of universal, predictive
laws). Therefore, history is best understood as a distinct humanistic discipline that incorporates
strong scientific characteristics, or as a social science with a unique qualitative, temporal, and
interpretive focus.
The debate over history's scientific status is often more than a mere classificatory exercise; it
frequently serves as a proxy for deeper discussions about history's epistemological authority, its
claim to produce reliable knowledge, and its overall intellectual rigor. In periods where "science"
has been perceived as the preeminent model for legitimate knowledge, such as the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, the aspiration for history to be recognized as "scientific" can be seen
as an attempt to elevate its academic standing and secure its place among rigorous intellectual
disciplines. Historians like Bury, in championing history as a science, were arguably seeking this
enhanced status. Conversely, those who emphasize history's distinctness from the natural
sciences, such as idealist philosophers like Collingwood , are often defending its unique
humanistic value against what they perceive as the reductive tendencies of scientism. The
question, therefore, touches not only upon methodology but also upon the perceived cultural
and intellectual role of historical inquiry.
II. Defining "Science": A Contested Terrain
Central to any discussion of whether history is a science is the definition of "science" itself, a
term that is far from monolithic and is often contested. It is crucial to distinguish between various
conceptions of science to evaluate history's relationship to it. The natural sciences, such as
physics, chemistry, and biology, are typically characterized by their reliance on empirical
evidence, systematic observation, controlled experimentation, hypothesis testing, and the
pursuit of general, universal laws (a nomothetic approach) that allow for prediction and possess
replicability. Their primary object of study is the natural world, and they often strive for a high
degree of objectivity. The social sciences, including disciplines like sociology, economics,
anthropology, and political science, focus on human behavior, social structures, and institutions.
They employ a diverse array of methodologies, encompassing both quantitative approaches
(such as statistical analysis and mathematical modeling) and qualitative methods (like case
studies, interviews, and ethnographic observation). Social sciences often deal with probabilities
and complex systems where deterministic laws are elusive. The formal sciences, such as
mathematics and logic, differ significantly in that they are based on a priori reasoning and
deductive systems, rather than empirical observation of the external world. Despite these
variations, the core of scientific inquiry, broadly conceived, generally involves systematic
investigation, evidence-based reasoning, critical analysis, rigorous methodologies, and the
overarching aim of producing reliable, verifiable, and communicable knowledge about its subject
matter.
The perceived "scientificity" of history often hinges on which of these definitions of science is
adopted as the benchmark. If history is compared strictly against the methodological template of
the natural sciences, with their emphasis on experimentation and universal laws, it often
appears to fall short. However, if history is assessed against the broader aims and more varied
methodologies of the social sciences, or against a general definition of science as rigorous,
evidence-based inquiry, its alignment becomes considerably closer. The emergence of
disciplines termed "historical sciences," such as paleontology and cosmology, further
complicates the picture. These fields deal with past events and unique evolutionary pathways,
often relying on inference from incomplete evidence and narrative explanation rather than direct
experimentation, which makes them distinct from laboratory-based sciences yet still
fundamentally scientific in their rigor and pursuit of empirically grounded understanding. The
definition of science one adheres to, therefore, directly influences the conclusion reached
regarding history's scientific status.
III. Arguments for History as a Science (or Possessing Scientific Attributes)
Several arguments have been advanced for considering history a science, or at least a
discipline possessing significant scientific attributes. The Positivist tradition, notably exemplified
by Leopold von Ranke in the 19th century, played a crucial role in this regard. Ranke's
aspiration to reconstruct the past "as it really was" (wie es eigentlich gewesen) emphasized
empirical research, the meticulous and critical use of primary sources, and a striving for
objectivity by minimizing the historian's biases. This Rankean approach, with its focus on factual
accuracy and systematic source analysis, laid a "scientific" foundation for modern historical
practice and its professionalization.
Building on this, J.B. Bury's influential declaration in 1903 that "History is a science, no less and
no more" was part of a broader intellectual movement aiming to establish history's credentials
as a rigorous, non-literary discipline, distinct from mere storytelling. Proponents of this view
highlight shared methodological elements: history, like science, involves systematic inquiry,
observation (albeit of historical sources rather than natural phenomena directly), analysis,
classification, and the interpretation of evidence. The historical method itself, with its detailed
procedures for source criticism (evaluating authenticity, integrity, and credibility), embodies
systematic elements of investigation. Furthermore, history, akin to scientific endeavors, aims to
discover truths about its specific subject matter—the human past—through rational inquiry and
evidence-based argumentation.
More recently, the emergence of cliometrics, or the "new economic history," represents a clear
attempt to make at least a branch of history more explicitly "scientific" in a manner analogous to
disciplines like economics. Cliometricians systematically apply economic theory, often
employing mathematical models and econometric (statistical) techniques, to analyze
quantitative historical data. This approach seeks to test hypotheses, identify causal
relationships, and provide more precise explanations for economic and social change in the
past.
The "scientific" aspects of history are arguably most evident in its methodology—the systematic
procedures developed for finding, evaluating, and interpreting evidence—rather than in its
capacity to produce universal laws or make precise, replicable predictions. Ranke's enduring
contribution, for instance, was primarily methodological, establishing rigorous standards for the
handling of primary sources. The detailed historical method, encompassing external and internal
source criticism and principles for establishing the credibility of evidence, is a testament to this
systematic approach. Cliometrics introduces further methodological formalization through
quantification and modeling. These developments point towards a "science of method" within
history, underscoring its commitment to disciplined inquiry. The recurring impetus to define
history as "scientific" often correlates with periods where science holds significant cultural
prestige, and various academic disciplines seek to emulate its perceived rigor and success.
IV. Arguments Against History as a (Natural) Science
Despite these scientific attributes, compelling arguments delineate history, particularly from the
natural sciences. E.H. Carr identified several key distinctions :
1. Particular vs. General: History primarily deals with unique, particular, and
non-repeatable events and individuals, whereas science (especially natural science)
seeks to establish general laws and universal principles.
2. Lessons of History: History does not offer direct, transferable "lessons" or predictive
laws in the way scientific theories might.
3. Predictability: History is largely unable to predict future events with the kind of accuracy
 associated with scientific prediction based on established laws.
4. Subjectivity: The historian's selection of facts, interpretation, and narrative construction
introduce an unavoidable element of subjectivity, unlike the ideal of objectivity in many
natural sciences.
5. Scope: History engages with issues of human intentionality, motivation, morality, and
values, which are often considered outside the direct purview of the natural sciences.
R.G. Collingwood, an influential idealist philosopher, further elaborated on history's
distinctiveness. He argued that the true subject of history is past human thought. The historian's
task is to "re-enact" this thought in their own mind, to understand the "inside" of events (the
intentions, purposes, and meanings behind actions) as distinct from the "outside" (the purely
physical or behavioral aspects of events) that might be studied by natural science. For
Collingwood, historical knowledge is fundamentally idiographic, concerned with the particularity
and specificity of human actions and their underlying thoughts, rather than nomothetic
(law-seeking).
A core differentiating factor is the problem of general laws. History rarely, if ever, produces
universal, predictive laws comparable to those found in physics or chemistry. Historical
explanations are typically context-specific, contingent, and often take a narrative form, tracing
sequences of events and actions rather than subsuming them under general covering laws. The
complexity and contingency of human affairs, influenced by individual and collective agency,
culture, and chance, make the nomothetic approach largely inapplicable. Historians cannot
conduct replicable experiments by re-running past events in a controlled laboratory setting. The
unique, unrepeatable nature of historical phenomena and the significant role of human agency
and unforeseen contingencies further distinguish history from the experimental and law-seeking
natural sciences.
These arguments against classifying history as a natural science often serve to highlight what
makes history a distinctively human science or a core discipline within the humanities. Its
profound concern with meaning, intention, the uniqueness of experience, and the subjective
dimension of the past aligns it closely with humanistic inquiry. Collingwood's emphasis on
"re-enacting thought" points directly to this human-centeredness. Similarly, Carr's observations
about the role of subjectivity, morality, and the interpretation of values in historical work resonate
with humanistic concerns. The predominantly idiographic nature of historical explanation—its
focus on understanding the specific and the unique —contrasts sharply with the nomothetic
drive characteristic of most natural sciences. These are not necessarily "weaknesses" of history
but rather defining features of its specific domain and its unique contribution to knowledge.
Consequently, judging history by the epistemological and methodological criteria of the natural
sciences can be seen as a category error. Its value, rigor, and contributions must be assessed
by standards appropriate to its own subject matter, aims, and methods of explanation.
The following table provides a comparative overview of History, Natural Science, and Social
Science across key dimensions:
Table 2: Comparing History, Natural Science, and Social Science
Feature History Natural Science Social Science
Primary Aim Understanding past Discovering universal Understanding societal
human actions, laws of nature; patterns, human
contexts, meanings, prediction; explanation behavior, social
change over time of phenomena structures; often
informing policy
Primary Subject Unique past events, Natural phenomena, Human societies, group
Feature History Natural Science Social Science
Matter human agency, physical universe, behavior, institutions,
thought, societies, biological systems social processes
cultures
Dominant Source criticism Experimentation, Quantitative (statistical
Methodology (primary/secondary), systematic observation, analysis, surveys,
narrative construction, mathematical modeling, modeling) & qualitative
interpretation, hypothesis testing, methods (case studies,
qualitative analysis; nomothetic approach interviews,
some quantitative ethnography)
methods (e.g.,
cliometrics)
Nature of Explanation Often narrative, Law-based, nomothetic Probabilistic,
idiographic (generalizing), model-based, seeks
(particularizing), causal predictive, causal general patterns and
chains of specific mechanisms correlations, causal
events, contextual inference
Key Interpretive narratives, Universal laws, Social theories, policy
Outcomes/Products historical accounts, theories, predictions, recommendations,
understanding of technological statistical models,
continuity and change, applications understanding of social
critical perspectives on dynamics
the past
This table helps to clarify the nuanced position of history by systematically comparing its core
characteristics with those of both natural and social sciences, drawing upon various sources
defining these disciplines and their methodologies. It supports an argument that moves beyond
a simple affirmation or negation of history's scientific status, highlighting its unique
interdisciplinary position.
V. History as a Social Science or a Unique Humanistic Discipline
Given the distinctions from natural sciences, the debate often shifts to whether history is best
classified as a social science or as a unique humanistic discipline. There are compelling
arguments for viewing history as a social science. Both history and social sciences share
human beings and their societies as a common subject of inquiry. Historians increasingly draw
upon analytical frameworks, concepts, and theories from disciplines like sociology,
anthropology, economics, and political science to analyze past events and structures.
Methodological overlaps are also evident; some historical research, particularly in fields like
social history, economic history (cliometrics being a prime example ), and demographic history,
employs quantitative methods or systematic qualitative analysis that are akin to those used in
other social sciences. Crucially, history provides an essential long-term perspective for
understanding social change, the development of institutions, and the roots of contemporary
problems, a contribution highly valued by other social sciences.
However, historical inquiry also presents unique challenges and aspects when compared to
other social sciences. Historical events are often characterized by immense complexity,
multi-causality, and contingency, making them resistant to the kinds of simplification or modeling
that some social sciences employ. The historian's deep immersion in the particularities of a
specific time and place, while crucial for nuanced understanding, can sometimes lead to a
"privatizing" effect, where the emphasis on uniqueness makes generalization or comparative
analysis difficult. While narrative explanation is utilized in some social sciences, it remains a
more central and defining mode of explanation in history. History often explains by constructing
a coherent story of how something came to be, focusing on specific causal chains and
contextual understanding rather than aiming for broad, generalizable patterns in the same way
as, for example, sociology or economics might.
Simultaneously, history retains strong ties to the humanities. Its focus on the interpretation of
meaning, the understanding of human experience in its cultural context, and the qualitative
aspects of the past are hallmarks of humanistic inquiry. The narrative form, central to much
historical writing, often possesses literary qualities, emphasizing clarity, coherence, and even
aesthetic considerations in its presentation of the past. History, in this sense, acts as a crucial
bridge between the humanities and the social sciences. It incorporates rigorous analytical
methods often associated with the social sciences while retaining a profound focus on the
particularity, contingency, and meaning of human experience that defines the humanities. The
rise of cliometrics pushes certain areas of history closer to social science methodologies, but
traditional narrative history, with its emphasis on interpretation and context, remains a vibrant
and essential part of the discipline. This hybrid nature can be seen not as a weakness, but as a
strength, allowing for a diverse and multifaceted engagement with the human past. The debate
about whether history is a science might be less fruitful than exploring which aspects of
historical practice can be considered scientific and how history productively interacts with
different branches of science and the humanities.
VI. Conclusion: Defining History's Epistemological Status
The question of whether history is a science does not yield a simple affirmative or negative
answer. Instead, a nuanced understanding reveals that history is a complex discipline with a
distinct epistemological status. It employs rigorous methodologies for the critical evaluation of
evidence and the construction of arguments, sharing this commitment to systematic inquiry with
the sciences. It aligns particularly closely with the social sciences in its focus on human
societies and behavior, and in its increasing use of analytical concepts and, in some subfields,
quantitative techniques.
However, history differs fundamentally from the natural sciences in its primary subject
matter—the unique, contingent, and intentional actions of human beings in the past—and in its
explanatory goals. It rarely seeks to formulate universal, predictive laws. Instead, historical
explanation often takes the form of narrative, seeking to understand the specific causal
pathways, contexts, and meanings of past events. Its idiographic approach, focusing on the
particular, contrasts with the predominantly nomothetic approach of the natural sciences.
Ultimately, history's value lies not in its ability to replicate the models of the natural sciences, but
in its unique capacity to interpret and explain the human past in all its richness, complexity, and
contingency. The methodologies of history, while different from those of experimental sciences,
possess their own well-established rigor, grounded in the critical use of evidence, logical
argumentation, peer review, and a constant engagement with evolving historiographical
perspectives. Whether formally labeled a "science" or not, history remains an indispensable
discipline. Its ability to produce compelling, evidence-based, and meaningful understandings of
the past provides crucial insights into human identity, social change, and the contemporary
human condition. The ongoing debate about its nature, far from undermining it, serves to
continually refine its methods, clarify its intellectual contributions, and reinforce its vital role in
human understanding. The ultimate measure of history's worth is not its classification, but its
power to illuminate the past in ways that inform and enrich the present. A flexible and nuanced
understanding of both "science" and "historical inquiry" fosters a more productive
interdisciplinary dialogue and a deeper appreciation for the diverse ways in which humanity
makes sense of the world and its own complex past.

Works cited

1. Edward Hallett Carr / The Historian and His Facts -- 1961,

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