RULE 66

1. When is quo warranto compulsory? When is quo warranto

discretionary?

The solicitor General or a Public prosecutor, when directed by

the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case
specified in Section, Rule 66 can be established by proof,
must commence the action. And quo warranto is
discretionary the solicitor general or a public prosecutor
may, with the permission of the court in which the action is
to be commenced, bring such an action at the request
and upon the relation of another person; but in such case
the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the
expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved
by and to be deposited in the court by the person at
whose request and upon whose relation the same is
brought.

2. Distinguish a quo warranto action commenced by a private

individual from a quo warranto action commenced by the Solicitor
General or Public Prosecutor.

In the action commenced by the private individual, it is

necessary for the petitioner to prove his right to the office
in dispute. If he fails to prove this, it is unnecessary for the
court to pass upon the right of the respondent to the
office.

In an action commenced by the Solicitor General or a Public

Prosecutor, it is not necessary that there be a person
claiming to be entitled to the office alleged to have been
usurped. The duty of the court is to pass upon the right of
the respondent only.
G.R. No. 237428

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.

CALIDA, Petitioner vs
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent

FACTS:
Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an
impartial tribunal. She reiterates that the six (6) Justices ought to have inhibited themselves on the
grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, and of having
acted as a material witness in the matter in controversy. Respondent also argues denial of due
process when the Court supposedly took notice of extraneous matters as corroborative evidence and
when the Court based its main Decision on facts without observing the mandatory procedure for
reception of evidence.
She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable
officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and the
President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent any allegation of grave abuse
of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a
person of proven integrity.
By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), seeks a denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration for being
proforma. In any case, the OSG argues that respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial
of due process and that quo warranto is the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable
officer. The OSG adds that the issue of whether respondent is a person of proven integrity is
justiciable considering that the decision-making powers of the JBC are limited by judicially
discoverable standards. Undeviating from its position, the OSG maintains that the petition is not
time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the State and that the
peculiar circumstances of the instant case preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period.
ISSUES: WON there is a denial of due process to warrant the petition for quo warranto
RULING:
Respondent is seriously in error for claiming denial of due process. Respondent refuses to
recognize the Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and over her person on the ground that
respondent, as a purported impeachable official, can only be removed exclusively by
impeachment. Reiterating this argument, respondent filed her Comment to the Petition, moved that
her case be heard on Oral Argument, filed her Memorandum, filed her Reply/Supplement to the
OSG's Memorandum and now, presently moves for reconsideration. All these representations
were made ad cautelam which, stripped of its legal parlance, simply means that she asks to be
heard by the Court which jurisdiction she does not acknowledge. She asked relief from the Court
and was in fact heard by the Court, and yet she claims to have been denied of due process. She
repeatedly discussed the supposed merits of her opposition to the present quo warranto petition in
various social and traditional media, and yet she claims denial of due process. The
preposterousness of her claim deserves scant consideration.
 Respondent also harps on the alleged bias on the part of the six (6) Justices and that
supposedly, their failure to inhibit themselves from deciding the instant petition amounts to a
denial of due process.
Respondent's contentions were merely a rehash of the issues already taken into consideration and
properly resolved by the Court. To reiterate, mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown.
Much noise and hysteria have been made that a sitting Chief Justice can only be removed
by impeachment and that quo warranto is an improper remedy not sanctioned by the Constitution.
The wind of disinformation was further fanned by respondent who claimed that her ouster was
orchestrated by the President. This campaign of misinformation attempted to conceal and
obfuscate the fact that the main issue in the petition which the Court is tasked to resolve is the
qualification of respondent.
G.R. No. 202860

LEE T. ARROYO, Petitioner vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ULYSSES A.
BRITO, Respondents

FACTS:
The case arose from the reorganization of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) under Republic Act No. 8371, which merged the Office for Northern Cultural
Communities (ONCC) and the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC). As a result, the
positions of several regional directors, including that of the Regional Director for Region V, were
affected. Lee T. Arroyo was appointed as the Regional Director for NCIP in Region V in 2000,
while Ulysses A. Brito, who had been the Regional Director of OSCC for Region V, was
temporarily appointed to the same position under a memorandum order.
Brito filed a petition for quo warranto, invoking his right to security of tenure under
Republic Act No. 6656, arguing that his prior appointment was permanent and that Arroyo's
appointment was invalid. Brito contended that he had a legitimate claim to the position of
Regional Director, and thus Arroyo's appointment should be nullified.
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in favor of Brito and partially granted the petition,
reinstating Brito to his position as Regional Director of Region V of NCIP. The CA reasoned that
Brito had standing to file the quo warranto petition and that he was entitled to security of tenure
despite the temporary nature of his appointment. Lee T. Arroyo filed a petition for review before
the Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the CA’s decision.

ISSUES: Whether Brito has standing to file a quo warranto petition under Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, challenging the validity of Arroyo's appointment.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Brito had the standing to file the quo warranto [Link], having
been appointed as the Regional Director for Region V of the Office of Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC), had a direct, personal interest in the position. Brito was the previous holder
of the position before Arroyo’s appointment. As the incumbent Regional Director prior to the
reorganization, Brito was a person who had a direct stake in the office he [Link] in a quo
warranto case is typically granted to a person who has been displaced from a public office and who
claims that another individual is unlawfully occupying that office. In this case, Brito argued that he
was unlawfully removed from the position in favor of Arroyo, whom he claimed was ineligible to
hold the post. Therefore, he had a clear and direct legal interest in challenging Arroyo's
[Link] Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto petition may be filed by a person
who is entitled to the office and claims that the office is being unlawfully occupied. Brito had a
legitimate claim to the office of Regional Director. Although his appointment was
temporary, he had previously held the position and had been displaced by the new
appointment of Arroyo.
The Supreme Court emphasized that Brito's prior appointment gave him the right to assert a
claim to the position. In essence, the Court viewed Brito’s challenge as a claim that he was
being illegally deprived of an office to which he had a legitimate claim, thereby conferring
standing to file a quo warranto.
The Court also acknowledged the concept of de facto officers, individuals who are not
legally appointed but who have been occupying public offices with the apparent authority and
recognition of their position. Brito, despite his temporary status, was recognized as the de
facto Regional Director by virtue of his service and the fact that his position had been
acknowledged before the reorganization. Since Brito had been serving in the position and
performing the duties of the office, he had the standing to challenge the new appointment of
Arroyo, whose appointment Brito contended was unlawful.
Lastly, the Court considered that Brito had no other remedy to contest Arroyo’s
appointment. Quo warranto serves as a remedy to challenge unlawful appointments to a
public office, particularly when a party has been removed from office and has no other
avenue to reclaim their position. The Court noted that Brito’s only option to assert his legal
right to the office was through the filing of a quo warranto petition.
G.R. No. 210273
Rivera v. COMELEC

FACTS:
The case arose from the 2013 Barangay Elections where Pedro Rivera (petitioner) filed a
petition for quo warranto before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking to disqualify
Rodrigo Torres (respondent) from his position as the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Malanday,
Valenzuela City, which Torres won in the election. Rivera claimed that Torres was disqualified
from running for the position due to his conviction for a criminal offense that involved moral
turpitude, which, according to the law, made him ineligible for public office. Rivera argued that
Torres was perpetually disqualified under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 (the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), as Torres had been convicted of illegal drug-
related offenses prior to the election.
The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition, ruling that Torres was not disqualified
under the law because the conviction was not final at the time of his candidacy. Rivera's
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied by the COMELEC en banc. Consequently,
Rivera filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 66, seeking to nullify the
decisions of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether Rivera has standing to file the quo warranto petition under Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court.
RULING:
Rule 66, Section 1 provides that quo warranto may be filed by an individual who has a
direct interest in the public office or who claims that a person is unlawfully holding the office, and
that the office is being usurped or held without lawful authority.
Rivera was a qualified elector in Barangay Malanday, Valenzuela City, and his interest in the
validity of the election and Torres's eligibility as the elected Barangay Chairman was direct. As a
losing candidate or as a voter in the election, Rivera was personally affected by the election result.
He could, therefore, challenge the election of Torres on the grounds that Torres was disqualified
from holding the position due to his criminal conviction.
Quo warranto is a remedy for the removal of a person from public office when that personis
unlawfully occupying the office. The petition must be filed by someone with a legal interest in the
office being contested. In this case, Rivera, as a qualified voter in the same barangay, had a right to
challenge the legality of the officeholder's election.
Rivera’s direct interest in the outcome of the election was clear, as his ability to enjoy the full
benefit of his right to vote was tied to the legal qualifications of the person holding the office.
Therefore, Rivera was entitled to file a quo warranto petition to challenge the title of Torres to the
office of Barangay Chairman. The Court found that the fact that Rivera lost in the election or that
he was not the winning candidate did not deprive him of standing. The Court emphasized that a
qualified elector
may challenge the qualifications of an elected official, even if they were not a successful
candidate, so long as they can demonstrate a legal interest in the office being contested.
In this case, Rivera's claim of Torres's disqualification based on his conviction was
sufficient to grant him standing, as this directly affected Rivera's right to a lawfully
elected public official.
As to the second issue, the Supreme Court upheld the COMELEC's dismissal of
the quo warranto petition and affirmed that the COMELEC correctly ruled that Torres
was not disqualified from holding office, based on the non-finality of his conviction. The
Court's reasoning is based on the interpretation of the relevant disqualification provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code and the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.
9165). The Omnibus Election Code, in relation to disqualification for moral turpitude,
provides that a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is disqualified from
holding any public office. However, the Court clarified that disqualification applies only
if the conviction becomes final before the election.
The key issue here was that Torres’s criminal conviction for drug-related offenses
had not yet attained finality at the time of the election. The Supreme Court highlighted
that disqualification under the law only occurs after the conviction becomes final and
executory. Since Torres’s conviction was still on appeal, it had not yet reached this stage.
The Court ruled that since Torres's conviction had not yet become final, he was not
disqualified at the time of the election. This meant that Torres's eligibility was unaffected
by the criminal conviction because the disqualification provision was not triggered until
the conviction became final. The Court stated that it was not the function of the
COMELEC to determine whether the conviction would eventually be overturned on
appeal but only to rule on the legal status of the conviction at the time of the election.
Finally, the Court reaffirmed that, in the context of quo warranto, the title to a public
office cannot be questioned based on a conviction that is still on appeal. A final and
executory conviction is a necessary requirement before a person can be disqualified from
running for public office due to a criminal offense involving moral turpitude.