Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 94-96 (1989):
As we understand § 1988's provision for allowing a “reasonable attorney's fee,” it
contemplates reasonable compensation, in light of all of the circumstances, for the time
and effort expended by the attorney for the prevailing plaintiff, no more and no less.
Should a fee agreement provide less than a reasonable fee calculated in this manner, the
defendant should nevertheless be required to pay the higher amount. The defendant is
not, however, required to pay the amount called for in a contingent-fee contract if it is
more than a reasonable fee calculated in the usual way. It is true that the purpose of §
1988 was to make sure that competent counsel was available to civil rights plaintiffs, and
it is of course arguable that if a plaintiff is able to secure an attorney *94 on the basis of a
contingent or other fee agreement, the purpose of the statute is served if the plaintiff is
bound by his contract. On that basis, however, the plaintiff should recover nothing from
the defendant, which would be plainly contrary to the statute. And Congress implemented
its purpose by broadly requiring all defendants to pay a reasonable fee to all prevailing
plaintiffs, if ordered to do so by the court. Thus it is that a plaintiff's recovery will not be
reduced by what he must pay his counsel. Plaintiffs who can afford to hire their own
lawyers, as well as impecunious litigants, may take **945 advantage of this provision.
And where there are lawyers or organizations that will take a plaintiff's case without
compensation, that fact does not bar the award of a reasonable fee. All of this is
consistent with and reflects our decisions in cases involving court-awarded attorney's
fees.
[5] [6] Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40
(1983), directed lower courts to make an initial estimate of reasonable attorney's fees by
applying prevailing billing rates to the hours reasonably expended on successful claims.
And we have said repeatedly that “[t]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney's fee is
properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct.
1541, 1544, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation
by other factors. We have never suggested that a different approach is to be followed in
cases where the prevailing party and his (or her) attorney have executed a contingent-fee
agreement. To the contrary, in Hensley and in subsequent cases, we have adopted the
lodestar approach as the centerpiece of attorney's fee awards. The Johnson factors may be
relevant in adjusting the lodestar amount, but no one factor is a substitute for multiplying
reasonable billing rates by a reasonable estimation of the number of hours expended on
the litigation. In Blum, we rejected, as contrary to congressional intent, the notion that
fees are to be calculated on a cost-based standard. Further, as we said in Blum, “Congress
did not *95 intend the calculation of fee awards to vary depending on whether plaintiff
was represented by private counsel or by a nonprofit legal services organization.” 465
U.S., at 894, 104 S.Ct., at 1547. That a nonprofit legal services organization may
contractually have agreed not to charge any fee of a civil rights plaintiff does not
preclude the award of a reasonable fee to a prevailing party in a § 1983 action, calculated
in the usual way.
1
It is clear that Congress “intended that the amount of fees awarded ... be governed by
the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation ...
and not be reduced because the rights involved may be non-pecuniary in nature.” S.Rep.
No. 94-1011, at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 5913. “The purpose of §
1988 is to ensure ‘effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights
grievances.” Hensley, supra, 461 U.S., at 429, 103 S.Ct., at 1937, quoting H.R.Rep. No.
94-1558, p. 1 (1976). Even when considering the award of attorney's fees under the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., the Court has applied the § 1988 approach, stating: “A
strong presumption that the lodestar figure-the product of reasonable hours times a
reasonable rate-represents a ‘reasonable fee’ is wholly consistent with the rationale
behind the usual fee-shifting statute....” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986).
If a contingent-fee agreement were to govern as a strict limitation on the award of
attorney's fees, an undesirable emphasis might be placed on the importance of the
recovery of damages in civil rights litigation. The intention of Congress was to encourage
successful civil rights litigation, not to create a special incentive to prove damages and
shortchange efforts to seek effective injunctive or declaratory relief. Affirming the
decision below would create an artificial disincentive for an attorney who enters into a
contingent-fee agreement, unsure of whether his client's claim sounded in state tort law or
in federal civil rights, from fully exploring all possible avenues of relief. Section 1988
makes no distinction between actions for damages and suits for equitable relief. *96
Congress has elected to encourage meritorious civil rights claims because of the benefits
of such litigation for the named plaintiff and for society at large, irrespective of whether
the action seeks monetary damages.
**946 [7] It should also be noted that we have not accepted the contention that fee
awards in § 1983 damages cases should be modeled upon the contingent-fee
arrangements used in personal injury litigation. “[W]e reject the notion that a civil rights
action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort suit benefiting only the
individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil
rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be
valued solely in monetary terms.” Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574, 106 S.Ct. 2686,
2694, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986).
[8] Respondent cautions us that refusing to limit recovery to the amount of the
contingency agreement will result in a “windfall” to attorneys who accept § 1983 actions.
Yet the very nature of recovery under § 1988 is designed to prevent any such “windfall.”
Fee awards are to be reasonable, reasonable as to billing rates and reasonable as to the
number of hours spent in advancing the successful claims. Accordingly, fee awards,
properly calculated, by definition will represent the reasonable worth of the services
rendered in vindication of a plaintiff's civil rights claim. It is central to the awarding of
attorney's fees under § 1988 that the district court judge, in his or her good judgment,
make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of the case. The
trial judge should not be limited by the contractual fee agreement between plaintiff and
counsel.
2
[9] The contingent-fee model, premised on the award to an attorney of an amount
representing a percentage of the damages, is thus inappropriate for the determination of
fees under § 1988. The attorney's fee provided for in a contingent-fee agreement is not a
ceiling upon the fees recoverable under § 1988. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
