EN BANC

[G.R. No. 207264. June 25, 2013.]

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order
dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the
Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The
assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of
petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.

On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter

and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas; 1 (2) that she is a resident
of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas
which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a
resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the
Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives; 2 (3) that
her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate
is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; 3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of
another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant 4 of the
United States of America; 5 and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in
fact, an American citizen. 6 TaSEHC

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be

the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas),
there is no valid and binding marriage between them. According to petitioner,
although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a
religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by
the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio. 7 Consequently, petitioner argues
that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his
residence cannot be attributed to her. 8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate
of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July
1964. 9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent
resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by
evidence. 10
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 During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent
filed a "Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits" 11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an
article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking and
Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and
Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which
provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that
petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a
Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting
Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which
indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 12
cancelling petitioner's COC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED. EHaCTA

The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that
she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled
that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for the
position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration 14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply
obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised
that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen.
Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted into dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012. As to her
alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement prescribed by the
Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen, she
never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution 15
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed
winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality 16

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 declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and
executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from
the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its
execution. 17

On same day, petitioner took her oath of office 18 before Feliciano R.

Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at
noon of 30 June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner
raises the following issues: 19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction
over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. aEIADT

32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of Respondent Tan's alleged "newly-discovered evidence"
without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case
without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner's right to due
process of law.

33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the
residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a
Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent

COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not confusing,
stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it is
the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her
eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House of Representatives is
best discussed in another tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It appears then
that petitioner's recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing its final and executory judgment in SPA No.
13-053.
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 Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the
issues raised by petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted
during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was
emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the House of
Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when

she was duly proclaimed 20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the
Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction

for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a
petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has
filed such action. HcTIDC

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. . . .

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction

over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has
no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the

House of Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, 22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC 23 and
Guerrero v. COMELEC, 24 the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
b e e n proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis
supplied.) TaSEHD

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 This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v.
COMELEC, 25 wherein the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath , and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis
supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 26 to wit:

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office
by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as
questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns —
were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass
upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the

House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once
a proclamation has been made, COMELEC's jurisdiction is already lost and,
thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be
noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the
context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but
who had also assumed office. DIETcC

For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC, 27 the Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate
had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the Speaker of the House,
and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or after the
start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his
comment in which he brought to Our attention that on September 26,
2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of the
Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives of the First
Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he
had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr.
and assumed his duties accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has

already been transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate
had already assumed office, and hence, was already considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case.
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 Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat
what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only " at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election." 28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner
attached a purported Oath of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on
5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership
to the House of Representatives. ATHCDa

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of

Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. — Members shall
take their oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before
the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must

be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in
open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte,
there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and,
thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy —

that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May
2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the
argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when
she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision.
The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be
allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed
a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was
promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC
En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final and executory
on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides: SECIcT

Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. — Decisions in pre-

proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify
a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final
and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming

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 final and executory, petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 37
29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 64 30 of the Rules of Court by

filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed to do
so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5
June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino
citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say
that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her
ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been
testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the
Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere
to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under
Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally
construed in order . . . to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before
the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny
due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then
the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as

petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC.
From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when
the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5)
months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires
that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case
of Sahali v. COMELEC: 31 IDTHcA

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not

necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or
right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable
than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion for
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 reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground
of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
". . . for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied
with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding,
respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to
present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become
either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru
a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact
t h a t respondent is a holder of an American passport which she
continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to
substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to
present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent
utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she
had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an
American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and
hold any elective public office in the Philippines . " 32 (Emphasis
supplied.) cAHIaE

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the
cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her
status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such
status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no
proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc,
petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that
she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to her. 33 Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. 34 Petitioner
explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to
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 serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity." 35 We cannot,
however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said
Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No.
9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the
observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated
only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012. HDTcEI

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath

of office as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that
Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make
reference to what is already part of the records and evidence in the present
case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC." 36 This statement
raises a lot of questions — Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-
acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it
at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that
she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A.
No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque,
she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the
first time before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For
another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of
R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-
05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued
by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner's oath of office as Provincial
Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance
with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast
on petitioner's citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner
has lost her natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of
Marinduque:
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show
that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be
counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
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 In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had
already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as
to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There
being no proof that [petitioner] had renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has

met the one-year residency requirement of the law and never
abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that
she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never
regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an
American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA." 37 (Emphasis supplied.) ESAHca

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the
COC is summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the
evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of
determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in Mastura
v. COMELEC : 38
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be
disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should
be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the
framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created
and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad
powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available
to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules
of evidence.

Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which
warrants this Court's exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a well-defined
meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on Elections 39 where the
Court held:
. . . A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave
abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse
of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary
or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
(Emphasis supplied.) SDIaCT

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially
show that grave abuse of discretion exists.

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 Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in
enforcing the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications
of Members of the House of Representatives other than those enumerated in
the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.
The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for
the House of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely
applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the
case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by
petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired
her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied the constitutional
provision and nothing more.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the
27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.

SO ORDERED. SHECcD

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Carpio, Villarama, Jr. and Leonen, JJ., join the dissent of J. Brion.
Velasco, Jr. and Mendoza, JJ., took no part.
Brion, J., see dissent.
Peralta, J., is on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., took no part due to voluntary inhibition.

Separate Opinions
BRION, J., dissenting:

The petition before us is a petition for certiorari 1 with a prayer for a

temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and/or status quo ante
order, that seeks to annul: (1) the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) March 27, 2013 2 and May 14, 2013 3 COMELEC Resolutions
cancelling petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes' ( petitioner or Reyes) Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative in the lone district of
Marinduque, and (2) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality 4 declaring the May
14, 2013 Resolution final and executory in SPA Case No. 13-053(DC).

I. THE CASE AND THE DISSENT IN CONTEXT

I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my strong reservations to the
majority's outright dismissal of this most unusual case — a term I do not use
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 lightly as shown by the reasons stated below.
I clarify at the outset that the present case is at its inception stage; it is
a newly filed petition that the Court is acting upon for the first time and
which the majority opted to DISMISS OUTRIGHT after an initial review, based
solely on the petition and its annexes and its "finding [that there was] no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections." AaHcIT

Subsequent to the COMELEC's rulings, however, intervening events

occurred that might have materially affected the jurisdictional situation and
the procedural requirements in handling and resolving the case. The petitioner
w a s proclaimed as the winner by the Marinduque Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC), and she subsequently took her oath of office.

This Dissent is filed, not on the basis of the intrinsic merits of the case,
but because of the outright and reckless denial of the minority's plea that the
respondents be required to at least COMMENT on the petition in light of the
gravity of the issues raised, the potential effect on jurisprudence, and the
affected personal relationships within and outside the Court, before any further
action can be made. The presented issues refer to —

- the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of

the petition, which jurisdiction should now lie with the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and
- the grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in handling
the case that led to the assailed COMELEC decision.

Viewed in these lights, it should be appreciated thatthe Court in effect

did not rule on the merits of the case after considering the parties'
legal and factual positions. The majority's Resolution is in fact only a ruling
that the Court no longer wishes to review the COMELEC's rulings despite the
issues raised and the attendant intervening circumstances.
Despite its seemingly simple approach, the Court's outright dismissal of
the petition is replete with profound effects on the petitioner on the indirect
beneficiary of the ruling, and on jurisprudence, as it effectively upholds the
disqualification of petitioner and leaves the remaining candidate in Marinduque
as an unopposed candidate. 5 What is not easily seen by the lay observer is
that by immediately ruling and avoiding the jurisdiction of the HRET on
the matter of qualification , the majority avoids a quo warranto petition that,
if successful, would render petitioner Reyes disqualified, leaving the
congressional position in Marinduque's lone district vacant. HEcTAI

Significantly, the Dissent is not a lonely one made solely by the

undersigned; he is joined by three (3) other Justices. 6 Seven (7) Justices 7
formed the majority with three (3) Justices inhibiting for personal reasons, 8
with one (1) Justice absent. 9
II. SUMMARY OF THE DISSENT'S SUPPORTING POSITIONS

That this unusual case at least deserves further proceedings from this
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 Court other than the OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL the majority ordered, is supported
by the following considerations:

First, the questions raised in the petition are NOT too

unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
a. Under Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the Court may
dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for delay, or
the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant
further proceedings . In the present case, the majority
dismissed the petition outright despite the threshold issue of
jurisdiction that Reyes squarely raised.
b. The due process issues Reyes raised with respect to the
COMELEC proceedings cannot be taken lightly, in particular,
the COMELEC's failure to accord her the opportunity to
question the nature and authenticity of the evidence
submitted by the respondent Joseph Tan (Tan) as well as
controverting evidence the petition cited. In fact, no less than
COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr., echoed this
concern in his Dissenting Opinion from the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. THIASE

c. A third issue raised relates to the COMELEC's imposition of a

qualification for the position of congressman, other than
those mentioned in the Constitution. The Court's Resolution
glossed over this issue and did not touch it at all. For this
reason, this Dissent will similarly refrain from discussing the
issue, except to state that the issue raised touches on the
Constitution and should have at least merited a passing
mention by the Court in its immediate and outright dismissal
of the petition.

Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be

without basis and out of our sense of delicadeza (which we should
have), the Court should at least hear and consider both sides before
making a ruling that would favor the son of a Member of the Court.
To reiterate, the COMELEC en banc ruling cancelling Reyes' CoC means
that: (1) Reyes' CoC is void ab initio; (2) that she was never a valid candidate at
all; and (3) all the votes in her favor are stray votes. Consequently, the
remaining candidate would be declared the winner, as held in Aratea v.
Commission on Elections 10 Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 11 and
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections. 12
Third, the majority's holding that the jurisdiction of the HRET only begins
after the candidate has assumed the office on June 30 is contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence; in fact, it is a major retrogressive jurisprudential
development that can emasculate the HRET. In making this kind of ruling, the
Court should have at least undertaken a full-blown proceeding rather than
simply declare the immediate and outright dismissal of the petition.
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 Note in this regard that the majority's jurisprudential ruling —

a. is contrary to the HRET rules. HDITCS

b. effectively allows the filing of any election protest or a

petition for quo warranto only after the assumption to office
by the candidate on June 30 at the earliest. In the context of
the present case, any election protest or petition for quo
warranto filed on or after June 30 would be declared patently
out of time since the filing would be more than fifteen (15)
days from Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013.

c. would affect all future proclamations since they cannot be

earlier than 15 days counted from the June 30 constitutional
cut-off for the assumption to office of the newly elected
officials.
III. THE ASSAILED COMELEC PETITION
A. The Petition Before the COMELEC
The present petition before this Court and its attachments show that on
October 1, 2012, Reyes filed her CoC for the position of Representative for the
lone district of Marinduque. On October 10, 2012, Tan filed with the COMELEC a
petition to deny due course or to cancel Reyes' CoC. Tan alleged that Reyes
committed material misrepresentations in her CoC, specifically: (1) that she is a
resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac Marinduque when in truth she is a resident of 135
J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City or Bauan Batangas following the
residence of her husband; (2) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (3) that
she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (4)
that her date of birth is July 3, 1964, when in truth it is July 3, 1958; (5) that her
civil status is single; and (6) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be
elected to.
B. The COMELEC Proceedings
In her Answer, Reyes averred that while she is publicly known to be the
wife of Rep. Hermilando Mandanas of Bauan, Batangas, the truth of the matter
is that they are not legally married; thus, Mandanas' residence cannot be
attributed to her. She also countered that the evidence presented by Tan does
not support the allegation that she is a permanent resident or a citizen of the
United States. With respect to her birth date, her birth certificate issued by the
NSO showed that it was on July 3, 1964. At any rate, Reyes contended that the
representations as to her civil status and date of birth are not material so as to
warrant the cancellation of her CoC. DSacAE

On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit

Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits consisting of, among
others, a copy of an article published online on January 8, 2013 entitled
"Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes." This article provided a
database record from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
indicating that Reyes is an American citizen and a holder of a US passport that
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 she has been using since 2005. Tan also submitted a photocopy of a
Certification of Travel Records from the BID, which showed that Reyes holds a
US passport No. 306278853. Based on these pieces of evidence and the fact
that Reyes failed to take an Oath of Allegiance and execute an Affidavit of
Renunciation of her American citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (RA
9225), Tan argued that Reyes' was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative and thus, her CoC should be cancelled.

C. The COMELEC First Division Ruling

O n March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
granting the petition and cancelling Reyes' CoC. On the alleged
misrepresentations in Reyes' CoC with respect to her civil status and birth date,
the COMELEC First Division held that these are not material representations
that could affect her qualifications or eligibility, thus cancellation of CoC on
these grounds is not warranted.

The COMELEC First Division, however, found that Reyes committed false
material representation with respect to her citizenship and residency. Based
on the newly discovered evidence submitted by Tan, the COMELEC
First Division found that Reyes was a holder of a US passport, which
she continued to use until June 30, 2012; she also failed to establish that
she had applied for repatriation under RA 9225 by taking the required Oath of
Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American
Citizenship. Based on these findings, the COMELEC First Division ruled the
Reyes remains to be an American citizen, and thus, is ineligible to run and hold
any elective office. IASTDE

On the issue of her residency in Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque, the

COMELEC First Division found that Reyes did not regain her domicile of origin in
Boac, Marinduque after she lost it when she became a naturalized US
citizen; that Reyes had not shown that she had re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225, there being no proof that she had renounced her US
citizenship; thus, she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in America.
Citing Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 13 the COMELEC First Division held
that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons
his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still
show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines by positive acts
and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice.

Finally, the COMELEC First Division disregarded Reyes' proof that she met
the one-year residency requirement when she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13,
2011 as it is not sufficient to satisfy the one-year residency requirement.
On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for reconsideration. Attached to
the motion were an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated
September 21, 2012 and a Voter Certification in Boac, Marinduque dated April
17, 2012. In her Motion, Reyes admitted that she was married to an American
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 citizen named Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997 and thus, she acquired dual
citizenship through marriage to an American citizen. aHTEIA

D. The COMELEC en banc Ruling

O n May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its Resolution
denying Reyes' motion for reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division on the ground that the former's motion was a mere
rehash of the arguments she raised against the First Division ruling.

D-a. Commissioner Lim's Concurring Opinion

Commissioner Lim concurred in the result and held that Reyes failed to
comply with twin requirements of RA 9225; she belatedly filed her Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship but failed to submit an Oath of Allegiance.
She also failed to prove that she complied with the one-year residency
requirement for lack of evidence of any overt or positive act that she had
established and maintained her residency in Boac, Marinduque. EACIcH

D-b. Chairman Brillantes' Dissenting Opinion

Chairman Brillantes dissented from the majority and held that Tan failed
to offer substantial evidence to prove that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship. He
noted that the internet article by a certain Eli Obligacion showing that Reyes
used a US passport on June 30, 2012 is hearsay while the purported copy of the
BID certification is merely a photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the
original, thus similarly inadmissible as evidence. Chairman Brillantes also
emphasized that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) cannot be a pre-election substitute for a quo warranto
proceeding. Under prevailing laws, there remains to be no pre-election legal
remedy to question the eligibility or lack of qualification of a candidate.
Chairman Brillantes was of the view that a petition to deny due course tackles
exclusively the issue of deliberate misrepresentation over a qualification, and
not the lack of qualification per se which is the proper subject of a quo warranto
proceeding.

Finally, he opined that the issues pertaining to Reyes' residence and

citizenship requires exhaustive presentation and examination of evidence that
are best addressed in a full blown quo warranto proceeding rather than the
summary proceedings in the present case.

IV. EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMELEC DECISION

A. On May 18, 2013, the Marinduque PBOC proclaimed Reyes as the
duly elected member of the House of Representatives for Marinduque,
having garnered the highest number of votes in the total of 52, 209 votes.
B. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality
declaring its May 14, 2013 Resolution final and executory citing paragraph b,
Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to
paragraph 2, Section 8, of Resolution No. 9523 which provides that a
decision or resolution of the Commission en banc in Special Actions
and Special Cases shall become final and executory five (5) days after
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 its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.
C. On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before House Speaker
Rep. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. DEcTCa

V. THE PETITION BEFORE THIS COURT

A. Positions and Arguments
In support of her petition before this Court, Reyes submits the following
positions and arguments:

(1) COMELEC has been ousted of jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed the winner for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque;
(2) COMELEC violated her right to due process when it took
cognizance of the documents submitted by Tan that were not
testified to, offered and admitted in evidence without giving
her the opportunity to question the authenticity of these
documents as well as present controverting evidence;

(3) COMELEC gravely erred when it declared that petitioner is

not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the one year residency
requirement despite the finding that he assumed and held
office as provincial administrator;

(4) COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in enforcing the

provision of RA 9225 insofar as it adds to the qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives other than those
enumerated in the Constitution.
B. The Issues Raised
As presented to this Court, the petition raised the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the COMELEC is ousted of jurisdiction over
the petition who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of Member,
House of Representatives? aESIHT

(2) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion

when it took cognizance of Tan's newly discovered evidence
without having been testified to, as well as offered and
admitted in evidence, in violation of Reyes' right to due
process?

(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion

when it declared that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen and did
not meet the one-year residency requirement for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives?
(4) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when, by enforcing RA 9225, it imposed additional
qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House
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 of Representatives under Section 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution?

How the public respondent COMELEC views the issues presented,

particularly the question of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion are
presently unknown elements in these proceedings as the COMELEC has not
been heard on the case. To be sure, it should have a say, as a named
respondent, especially on the matter of jurisdiction.

VI. THE MAJORITY RULING

On the issue of the COMELEC's
jurisdiction
Without the benefit of full blown arguments by the parties, the majority
ruling ruled on the merits of the jurisdictional issue and held that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes'
qualifications and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions unless a petition is
filed with the tribunal.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives. A candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives with the concurrence of
three requisites: (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath; and (c) assumption
of office.

It went on to state that Reyes cannot be considered a Member of the

House of Representatives because she had not yet assumed office; she can
only do so on June 30, 2013. It pointed out, too, that before Reyes'
proclamation on May 18, 2013, the COMELEC en banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of Reyes US citizenship and lack of residency; thus, there
was no longer any pending case at that time. In these lights, it held that
COMELEC continued to have jurisdiction. HSaIET

On the issue of admissibility of the

evidence presented and due process

The majority emphasized that the COMELEC is not strictly bound to

adhere to the technical rules of evidence. Since the proceedings to deny due
course or to cancel a CoC are summary in nature, then the newly discovered
evidence was properly admitted by the COMELEC. Also, there was no denial of
due process since Reyes was given every opportunity to argue her case before
the COMELEC.
On the issue of citizenship

Again ruling on the merits, the majority upheld the COMELEC's finding
that based on the Tan's newly discovered evidence, Reyes is an American
citizen and thus is ineligible to run and hold any elective office. The majority
likewise held that the burden of proof had been shifted to Reyes to prove that:
(1) she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that (2) she re-acquired such status
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 by properly complying with the requirements of RA 9225, and that Reyes had
failed to substantiate that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and complied
with the requirements of RA 9225. It emphasized that Reyes inexplicably failed
to submit an Oath of Allegiance despite belatedly filing an Oath of Renunciation
and that her oath that she took in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator does not suffice to satisfy the requirements of RA 9225.

On the issue of residency

The majority similarly affirmed the COMELEC's ruling that Reyes had not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the United States and thus did not satisfy
the one-year Philippine residency requirement. It held that Reyes effectively
abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque when she became a
naturalized US citizen. In the absence of proof that she had renounced her
American citizenship, she cannot be considered to have abandoned her
domicile of choice in the US. The majority also noted that Reyes' service as
Provincial Administrator from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient
to prove her one-year residency in Boac, Marinduque. IDAEHT

VII. COMMENTS ON THE MAJORITY'S RULING

The majority's unusual approach and strained rulings that already

touched on the merits of substantial issues raised should, at the very least, not
be allowed to stand without comments. I call these "comments" as a
"refutation" implies a consideration on the merits of properly submitted and
debated issues, which did not happen in this case.

A. No basis exists to DISMISS the petition outright.

Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court 14 merely requires that the
petition be sufficient in form and substance to justify an order from the Court to
act on the petition and to require the respondents to file their comments. The
same rule also provides that the Court may dismiss the petition outright (as the
majority did in the present case) if it was filed manifestly for delay or if the
questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.

In the present case, the petition is indisputably sufficient in form and

substance; no issue on this point was even raised. Thus, the question before
the Court — if Rule 64, Section 6 were to be followed — is whether the issues
raised by Reyes were too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.

I submit that the issues raised cannot be unsubstantial as they involve

crucial issues of jurisdiction and due process.

The due process issue, of course, pertained to the assailed COMELEC

ruling that admittedly can be evaluated based on the records. The matter of
evaluation, however, is not simply a matter of doing it; it is the very problem
that I raise because it must be a meaningful one that fully appreciates the
parties' positions, particularly in a situation where the petition raised
arguments that are not without their merits. In this situation, the Court
cannot simply go through the motions of evaluation and then simply
strike out the petitioner's positions. The Court's role as adjudicator and the
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 demands of basic fairness require that we should fully hear the parties and rule
based on our appreciation of the merits of their positions in light of what the
law and established jurisprudence require. CIAHaT

a. The Due Process Component

The determination of the merits of the petitioner's claim point us, at the
very least, to the need to consider whether evidence attributed to a person who
is not before the Court and whose statement cannot be confirmed for the
genuineness, accuracy and truth of the basic fact sought to be established in
the case, should be taken as "truth." Even casting technical rules of evidence
aside, common sense and the minimum sense of fairness dictate that an article
in the internet cannot simply be taken to be evidence of the truth of what it
says, nor can photocopies of documents not shown to be genuine be taken as
proof of the "truth." To accept these materials as statements of "truth" is to be
partisan and to deny the petitioner her right to both procedural and substantive
due process. Again, at the very least, further inquiry should have been
made before there was the judgment.

Some, to be sure, may label the denial of further inquiry to lack of

prudence; others, not so charitably minded, may however refer to this
as partisanship.

b. The Jurisdictional Component.

The jurisdictional component of the petition is interesting because it

involved matters that were not covered by the assailed COMELEC
rulings for the simple reason that they were intervening events that
transpired outside (although related with) the assailed rulings. In fact, they
involved questions of fact and law separate from those of the assailed
COMELEC rulings. Yet, the majority, in its rush to judgment, lumped them
together with the assailed rulings under the dismissive phrase "did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion" in the dispositive portion of its ruling. Such was
the haste the majority exhibited in the desire to pronounce swift and dismissive
judgment. I can only surmise that the majority might have considered
the jurisdictional issues raised "too insubstantial to warrant further
proceedings."

Is this still lack of prudence? CSHEca

Reyes' proclamation divested the

COMELEC of jurisdiction over her
qualifications in favor of the HRET
The profound effect of the majority's ruling on HRET jurisdiction and on
jurisprudence render comments on this point obligatory, if only to show that the
matter is not insubstantial and should further be explored by the Court.

The majority held that the COMELEC still has jurisdiction because the
HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of the petitioner's
qualifications, as well as over the assailed resolutions unless a
petition is duly filed. The ponencia emphasizes that Reyes has not averred
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 that she has filed such action.

This line of thought is, to say the least, confusing, particularly on the point
of why Reyes who has garnered the majority of the votes cast in Marinduque,
who has been proclaimed pursuant to this electoral mandate, and who has
since taken her oath of office, would file a petition, either of protest or quo
warranto, before the HRET. Why she would file a petition for certiorari before
this Court may be easier to understand — the COMELEC, despite her
proclamation and oath, has issued an order mandating her disqualification
executory; she may merely want to halt the enforcement of this COMELEC order
with the claim that the arena for her election and qualification has shifted now
to the HRET and is no longer with the COMELEC.

In any case, to stick to election law basics, the matter of jurisdiction

between the COMELEC and the HRET has always constituted a dichotomy; the
relationship between the COMELEC and the HRET in terms of jurisdiction is not
an appellate one but is mutually exclusive. HSEIAT

This mutually exclusive jurisdictional relationship is, as a rule, sequential.

This means that the COMELEC's jurisdiction ends when the HRET's jurisdiction
begins. Thus, there is no point in time, when a vacuum in jurisdiction would
exist involving congressional candidates. This jurisdiction, of course, refers to
jurisdiction over the subject matter, which no less than the Philippine
Constitution governs. Under Section 17, Article VI, the subject matter of HRET's
jurisdiction is the "election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House
of Representatives."

Where one jurisdiction ends and the other begins, is a matter that
jurisprudence appears to have settled, but is nevertheless an issue that the
Court should perhaps continue to examine and re-examine because of the
permutation of possible obtaining situations — which, to my mind, translates to
the existence of a critical issue that should be ventilated before this Court if it is
to make any definitive ruling on any given situation.

I submit on this point that the proclamation of the winning candidate is

t h e operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election
contests relating to the winning candidate's election, return and qualifications.
In other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation
and the party questioning the qualifications of the winning candidate should
now present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e., quo warranto) before
the HRET who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving the election, returns and qualification of members of the
House of Representatives.

The Court has interestingly rendered various rulings on the points which
all point to the statement above. In Limkaichong v. Comelec, 15 the Court
pointedly held that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. 16 DHaECI

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 The Court speaking through no less than Associate Justice Roberto A.
Abad in the recent case of Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 17 held that
the settled rule is that "the proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET". 18
Based on these considerations, it appears clear that any ruling from this
Court — as the majority ruled — that the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative who has been proclaimed but not yet assumed office is a
major retrogressive jurisprudential development, in fact, a complete turnaround
from the Court's prevailing jurisprudence on the matter; such rule — if it
becomes established — can very well emasculate the HRET.

Thus, the Court should now fully hear this matter, instead of dismissively
ruling on a new petition where the respondent side has not been fully heard.

The ponencia's holding on the

COMELEC's jurisdiction vis-Ã -vis
the HRET is inconsistent with the
HRET Rules
The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET is also supported by the HRET
Rules. They state:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. — The Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives. SHaATC

RULE 15. How Initiated. — An election contest is initiated by the

filing of a verified petition of protest or a verified petition for quo
warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. Neither
shall a petition for quo warrantoinclude an election protest.
RULE 16. Election Protest. — A verified petition contesting
the election or returns of any Member of the House of
Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same
office, within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the
winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the
protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee. . .
.
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. — A verified petition for quo
warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of
Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any registered voter of the
district concerned within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be
designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known
as the respondent[.]
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 Based on the above Rules, it appears clear that as far as the HRET is
concerned, the proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections
serves as the reckoning point as well as the trigger that brings any contests
relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within its sole and
exclusive jurisdiction.

In the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC retained
jurisdiction (because Reyes, although a proclaimed winner, has not yet
assumed office), the majority effectively emasculates the HRET of its
jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto only after the assumption to office by the candidate (i.e., on June 30 in
the usual case). To illustrate using the dates of the present case, any election
protest or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen
(15) days from Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall certainly be
dismissed outright by the HRET for having been filed out of time under the
HRET rules. aSATHE

Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its

discretion when it declared its May
14, 2013 Resolution final and
executory?
By the petitioner's theory, the COMELEC en banc's May 14, 2013
Resolution (cancelling Reyes' CoC) did not attain finality because Reyes'
proclamation on May 18, 2013 divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it relating to Reyes' eligibility. Two material records are
critical on this point. First, the fact of proclamation on May 18, 2013 which
came one (1) day ahead of the May 19, 2013 deadline for the finality of the May
14, 2013 Resolution pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The second
is the COMELEC order of June 5, 2013 which declared its resolution of May 14,
2013 final and executory.

How these instruments will co-exist and be given weight in relation with
one another is a matter that, at this point and in the absence of research,
deliberation, debate and discussion may not be easily be made. The Court, to
be sure, would want to hear the HRET, the COMELEC and the Office of
the Solicitor General, on this point. Of course, this hearing and debate
will not take place under the hasty dismissive action the majority
made.

Did the COMELEC gravely abuse

its discretion in the appreciation
and evaluation of the evidence
leading it to erroneously conclude
that Reyes is not a natural born
Filipino citizen and that she had
abandoned and lost her domicile
of origin when she became a
naturalized American citizen

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 As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions to this rule have
been established and consistently recognized, among others, when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the
Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct
the COMELEC's error. 19 aSTAcH

It is also basic in the law of evidence that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is
substantial evidence. 20 In the present case, the majority obviously believed,
together with the COMELEC, that Tan did overcome this burden and that his
documentary evidence he submitted established that Reyes is not a Filipino
citizen. A major clash between the parties exists, of course, on this point as
Reyes, as expressed in her petition, is of the completely opposite view. Even a
quick look at Tan's evidence, however, indicates that Reyes' view is not without
its merits and should not simply be dismissively set aside.

First, Tan submitted an article published online (blog article) written by

one Eli J. Obligacion (Obligacion) entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth About
Regina O. Reyes." This printed blog article stated that the author had obtained
records from the BID stating that Reyes is an American citizen; that she is the
holder of a US passport and that she has been using the same since 2005.

How the law on evidence would characterize Obligacion's blog article or,
for that matter, any similar newspaper article, is not hard for a law student
answering the Bar exam to tackle: the article is double hearsay or hearsay
evidence that is twice removed from being admissible as it was offered to prove
its contents (that Reyes is an American citizen) without any other competent
and credible evidence to corroborate them. Separately of course from this
consideration of admissibility is the question of probative value. On top of these
underlying considerations is the direct and frontal question: did the COMELEC
gravely abuse its discretion when it relied on this piece of evidence to conclude
that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen? cECTaD

Second, Tan also submitted a photocopy of a "certification" issued by

one Simeon L. Sanchez of the BID showing the travel records of Reyes from
February 15, 2000 to June 30, 2012 and that she is a holder of US Passport No.
306278853. This photocopy also indicates in some entries that Reyes is an
American while other entries denote that she is Filipino. The same questions of
admissibility and probative value of evidence arise, together with the direct
query on the characterization of the COMELEC action since the COMELEC
concluded on the basis of these pieces of evidence that Reyes is not a Filipino
citizen because it is not only incompetent but also lacks probative value as
evidence.

Contributory to the possible answer is the ruling of this Court that a

"certification" is not a certified copy and is not a document that proves that a
party is not a Filipino citizen. 21

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 Interestingly, in its March 27, 2013 Resolution that the petitioner now also
assails, the COMELEC First Division ruled:
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a
Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact
that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she
continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to
substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the
conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
CoC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she
can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by
becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a
valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to
be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines. 22
cSICHD

This ruling, undeniably, opens for Reyes the argument that in the absence
of sufficient proof (i.e., other than a photocopy of a "certification") that she is
not a natural born Filipino citizen, no burden of evidence shifts to her to prove
anything, particularly the fact that she is not an American citizen. Considering
that Tan might have also failed to prove by substantial evidence his allegation
that Reyes is an American citizen, the burden of evidence also cannot be
shifted to the latter to prove that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 in
order to re-acquire her status as a natural born Filipino citizen.

It ought to be considered, too, that in the absence of sufficient proof that

Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship, the twin requirements under RA 9225 for re-
acquisition of Filipino citizenship should not apply to her. Of course, Reyes
admitted in her MR before the COMELEC that she is married to an American
citizen. This admission, however, leads only to further arguments on how her
admitted marriage affected her citizenship. Jurisprudence is not lacking on this
point as in Cordora v. Comelec, 23 the Court held that the twin requirements of
RA 9225 does not apply to a candidate who is a natural born Filipino citizen who
did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country, viz.:
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our
rulings in Mercado v. Manzano, Valles v. COMELEC, and AASJS v.
Datumanong. Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the
present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual
citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to
Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in
Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Va l l e s stated that dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for
those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is
involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-
born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
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 allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is
brought about by the individual's active participation in the
naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is
allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's foreign
citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act

of 2003, was enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and
Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I ____________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. aACEID

In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not

concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225
states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and
desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the
bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, Velasco v.
COMELEC, and Japzon v. COMELEC, all of which involve natural-born
Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and
thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present
case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country.
Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to
him.

As to the issue of Reyes' residency in Boac, Marinduque, the COMELEC

First Division as affirmed by the COMELEC en banc held:
Accordingly, the more appropriate issue is whether respondent
had regained her domicile of origin in the Municipality of Boac,
Marinduque after she lost the same when she became a naturalized
American citizen.
xxx xxx xxx

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 Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts,
and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made
it his domicile of choice.
CTIEac

In this case, there is no showing that whatsoever that respondent

had already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so
as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines.
There being no proof that respondent had renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by respondent to show that she has
met the one-year residency requirement of the law and never
abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that
she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her
one-year residency. For, respondent has never regained her domicile
in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of
her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. 24

This COMELEC action again opens questions about its appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence and whether it overstepped the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, if indeed the above-cited
findings and conclusions have no basis in fact and in law.

To begin with, the evidence submitted by Tan, even assuming that it is

admissible, arguably does not prove that Reyes was a naturalized American
citizen. At best, the submitted evidence could only show that Reyes was the
holder of a US passport. In Aznar v. Comelec, 25 the Court ruled that the mere
fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application
for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. In the present case, the fact that Reyes is a holder of a
US passport does not portend that she is no longer a natural born Filipino
citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship. In addition, how the
COMELEC arrived at a conclusion that Reyes is naturalized American citizen can
be seen as baffling as it did not appear to have provided any factual basis for
this conclusion.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS

All told, the COMELEC does not appear to have an airtight case based on
substantial evidence on the citizenship and residence issues, and much less a
similar case on the jurisdictional issue, to justify a VERY PROMPT OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL ACTION from this Court. Bolstering this view is that petitioner
Reyes is not lacking in arguably meritorious positions to support her cause,
even if only to the extent of being fully heard by this Court.

If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE or at least

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 t o BE SEEN TO BE ADMINISTERING JUSTICE in the way described in the
speeches of many a Justice of this Court, it should not deliver the kind of hasty
and imprudent action that it did in this case. The proper course of action, if the
Court indeed honestly wants to achieve this objective in the present case, is to
require the COMELEC to COMMENT on the petition and to decide matters from
that point. HEDCAS

Footnotes
1.Rollo , p. 70.
2.Id.

3.Id. at 71.
4.Respondent relies on the following facts: (a) [petitioner] was admitted to the
California State Bar on June 12, 1995; (b) [petitioner] maintained a US
address and earned her undergraduate studies in Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C.; (c) [petitioner] married an American citizen named
Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved; and (4) [petitioner] acquired properties and established
businesses in the U.S.; COMELEC Resolution dated 27 March 2013. Id. at 44.
5.Id. at 71.
6.Id. at 72.

7.Id. at 84.
8.Id. at 87.
9.Id. at 93.
10.Id. at 94.

11.Id. at 127-139.
12.Id. at 40-51.
13.Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
14.Id. at 140-157.

15.Id. at 52-60.
16.Id. at 163-165.
17.Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to Par.
2, Sec. 8 of Resolution No. 9523 provides that a decision or resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc in special actions and special cases shall become final and
executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is
issued by the Supreme Court. Sec. 3, Rule 37, Part VII also provides that
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 decisions in petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days
from promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

18.Id. at 162.
19.Id. at 9.
20.Id.

21.318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995).

22.G.R. No. 172131, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 179.
23.G.R. No. 163756, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405.
24.391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000).

25.G.R. Nos. 179240-41, 1 April 2009, 583 SCRA 1, 33.

26.G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 798-799.
27.G.R. No. 179285, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 381, 390.

28.Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

29.Section 1. Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File. — Unless otherwise
provided by law, or by any specific provisions in these Rules, any decision,
order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
30.Section 2. Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by
the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except
as hereinafter provided.
31.G.R. No. 201796, 15 January 2013.
32.Rollo , pp. 47-48.

33.Id. at 148.
34.Id. at 154.
35.Id. at 149.

36.Id. at 26.
37.Id. at 49-50.
38.G.R. No. 124521, 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499.

39.G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.

BRION, J., dissenting:
1.Rollo , pp. 3-37.
2.Id. at 40-51.

3.Id. at 52-55.
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 4.Id. at 163-165.
5.Congressman Lord Allan Jay Velasco, son of incumbent Supreme Court Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
6.Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Marvic Mario Victor F.
Leonen.
7.Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno; and Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Jose
Portugal Perez, and Bienvenido L. Reyes.

8.Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Jose Catral Mendoza and Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe.
9.Justice Diosdado M. Peralta.
10.G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012.
11.G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, October 9, 2012.

12.G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013.

13.G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
14.Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 6. Order to comment. — If the Supreme Court finds the petition

sufficient in form and substance, it shall order the respondents to file their
comments on the petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof;
otherwise, the Court may dismiss the petition outright. The Court may also
dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for delay or the questions raised
are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings. (n)

15.G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33 & 179240-41, April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA
1.
16.Id., "We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath , and assumed office as
a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at
the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification
should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the
HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a
case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with
respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of
the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section
250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals'
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members."
xxx xxx xxx
"Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the
congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one's
eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before
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 the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo
warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules . In Pangilinan
v. Commission on Elections we ruled that where the candidate has already
been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of
petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives."
17.G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012.
18.Id., "While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all
questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not
extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution
vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The
proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos
had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.
Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the
issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
19.Sabili v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012.
20.Matugas v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 151944, January 20, 2004, 420
SCRA 365.

21.See Matugas v. Commission on Elections, ibid, where the Court held:

"Furthermore, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that
when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office, as in this case, the contents of said
document may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof. The subject letter-inquiry, which contains the
notation, appears to be a mere photocopy, not a certified copy.
The other document relied upon by petitioner is the Certification
dated 1 September 2000 issued by the BID. Petitioner submits that
private respondent has declared that he is an American citizen as shown by
said Certification and, under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, such
declaration may be given in evidence against him.
The rule cited by petitioner does not apply in this case because the rule
pertains to the admissibility of evidence. There is no issue here as to the
admissibility of the BID Certification ; the COMELEC did not hold that the
same was inadmissible. In any case, the BID Certification suffers from
the same defect as the notation from the supposed US Embassy
official. Said Certification is also a photocopy, not a certified copy ."
Moreover, the certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the
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 "nationality" of private respondent. While some entries indicate that he is
"American," other entries state that he is "Filipino."
22.Rollo , p. 48.

23.G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.

24.Rollo , pp. 48-50.
25.G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703.

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