Security Architecture
GhostWire should adopt end-to-end encryption (E2EE) with forward secrecy by default. A
modern approach is to use a double-ratchet or Noise-based handshake for session
establishment. For example, libsodium’s crypto_box (X25519 + XSalsa20-Poly1305) provides
public-key authenticated encryption (Authenticated encryption | libsodium). In practice one
generates a fresh ephemeral key pair per session (or per message) so that past messages
cannot be decrypted if long-term keys are compromised. Indeed, authenticated public-key
encryption allows the recipient’s public key to encrypt and compute a shared secret on the fly
(Authenticated encryption | libsodium). Nonces or counters (e.g. libsodium’s
crypto_secretstream) should be used to prevent replay; crypto libraries typically suggest
random or incrementing nonces and even built-in stream APIs for multiple messages
(Authenticated encryption | libsodium). All data streams must be MAC-authenticated to protect
integrity.
Key exchange and management: Use elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) such as X25519
for key agreement. One option is to employ a Noise protocol handshake (e.g. via the Rust snow
crate) to negotiate shared secrets with mutual authentication. Each peer should have a
long-term identity key pair (e.g. Ed25519 or secp256k1) and use signed ephemeral keys for
handshakes. Libp2p itself uses PeerId identities in this way; its Noise and TLS transports sign
static DH keys with identity keys for authenticating the handshake (IdentityExchange in
libp2p::noise::handshake - Rust). Implement Trust-On-First-Use or a web-of-trust to verify public
keys (each node maintains known peer public keys or fingerprints). Key rotation and revocation
must be supported: for example, designate a single master identity key and use short-lived
subkeys for messaging and encryption
(rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md at master ·
WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub). If a device is compromised, its subkey can be revoked
without replacing the master key (the master only identifies the owner)
(rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md at master ·
WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub).
Attack protections: To thwart MITM and injection attacks, authenticate every handshake (e.g.
sign the DH handshake). Verify that handshake public keys match known peer identities (or are
vouched by DIDs). Use session nonces, sequence numbers or libsodium’s
crypto_secretstream to prevent replay (Authenticated encryption | libsodium). Protect
against downgrade by refusing weaker cipher suites. For transport security, use TLS 1.3 (Rust’s
rustls) or Noise, both of which mandate forward secrecy cipher suites. Importantly, do not rely
on static symmetric keys except for an initial bootstrapping; always derive ephemeral session
keys.
Recommended libraries: For cryptography, prefer battle-tested crates/bindings such as
libsodium-sys or sodiumoxide for NaCl functions (crypto_box, crypto_sign), ring or rust-crypto
for primitives, and signatory for signatures. The cryptography.rs “Awesome Rust Cryptography”
list also notes rustls (TLS), snow (Noise), and OpenMLS (IETF Messaging Layer Security) as
up-to-date choices (Awesome Rust Cryptography | Showcase of notable cryptography libraries
developed in Rust) (Awesome Rust Cryptography | Showcase of notable cryptography libraries
developed in Rust). All recommended tools are open-source and have Rust support.
Decentralized Networking
GhostWire should use a truly P2P stack to avoid central points of failure and preserve privacy.
libp2p is a natural fit: it’s modular, supports Rust (via rust-libp2p), and includes peer discovery,
DHT (Kademlia), and secure transports. Libp2p can run over TCP/UDP and has built-in support
for encryption (Noise/TLS) and multiplexing. It easily handles NAT traversal (UPnP, hole
punching) and overlays.
For anonymity, consider tunneling libp2p over Tor or I2P. A proof-of-concept shows that
rust-libp2p streams can be routed through Tor via a SOCKS proxy (Anonymous peer to peer
applications in Rust (rust-libp2p over Tor) | COMIT Developer Hub). However, one must be
careful: simply using Tor as a transport without disabling identity leakage can fail to improve
privacy (libp2p_community_tor - Rust). The libp2p Tor transport crate warns that it “doesn’t
provide any enhanced privacy if used like a regular transport” (libp2p_community_tor - Rust).
Thus, if using Tor, the app should disable peer ID exchange, metadata leaks, and possibly add
dummy traffic. Tor adds latency but provides strong onion routing. I2P is an alternative
onion-style network that runs as a P2P overlay; it is “more secure” internally (garlic routing) but
cannot reach the regular Internet (I2P vs Tor in 2025 [Online Anonymity Explained &
Compared]). If GhostWire’s use case is strictly P2P messaging and darknet (IOC sharing), I2P
could be used for full peer anonymity. Otherwise Tor for general secrecy + libp2p for robustness
is sensible.
A comparison:
Feature libp2p (Rust) Tor I2P
Latency Low (direct P2P) High (multiple hops) Moderate (P2P
overlay)
Throughput High (fast transfers) Low (≈tor defaults) Moderate to high
(local)
Anonymity None by default (use High (onion routing) High (garlic routing)
overlay)
Decentralizatio Fully (DHT, no central Partially (directory Fully (no central
n nodes) authorities) servers)
Rust support First-class (rust-libp2p) Good (via socks, arti, or Partial (i2p_rs exists)
torut)
Use-case General P2P apps Anonymous Internet Anonymous
(IPFS, blockchain, etc) browsing, hidden P2P/distributed
services services
In practice, using rust-libp2p with a DHT or gossip protocol for peer discovery and message
relaying will avoid single points of failure. For added resilience in hostile networks, libp2p’s
mDNS and Kademlia can find peers in local or global modes. If censorship is a concern, Tor
bridges or I2P tunnels could be used as fallback transports.
Ephemeral Messaging
GhostWire’s messaging should be “burn-after-reading” by design. This means messages
aren’t stored by relays or the network after delivery and are automatically deleted on both
devices once read (or after a timeout). Cryptographically, this implies per-message ephemeral
keys and no long-term storage of plaintext. For one-to-one chats, a double-ratchet protocol (as
in Signal) is ideal: each message is encrypted with a fresh symmetric key derived via a
Diffie-Hellman ratchet, and keys are discarded after use (Wickr's Messaging Protocol | AWS
Wickr) (File:Double Ratchet Algorithm.png - Wikipedia). The Double Ratchet diagram illustrates
how each message advances the sending and receiving chain keys, ensuring forward secrecy
(File:Double Ratchet Algorithm.png - Wikipedia).
(File:Double Ratchet Algorithm.png - Wikipedia) Figure: The Double Ratchet algorithm
(public-domain) generates fresh shared keys for each message, then deletes them, achieving
forward secrecy and post-compromise security (File:Double Ratchet Algorithm.png - Wikipedia).
For group chats, a modern approach is the IETF’s Messaging Layer Security (MLS). MLS
provides a group key agreement with forward secrecy and so-called “post-compromise security”
(The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture). In MLS, when someone leaves the group
or a session key is updated, new group secrets are computed without affecting other members.
Implementations like openmls in Rust can manage dynamic groups. Alternatively, Matrix’s
Olm/Megolm (via the vodozemac crate) provides ratcheting for small and large groups and has
been security-audited (Awesome Rust Cryptography | Showcase of notable cryptography
libraries developed in Rust). In all cases, ensure clients discard old session keys and provide a
“no trace” guarantee on disk.
Practices for ephemeral design: avoid any central logging service. Use end-to-end encrypted
direct sends (or ephemeral pubsub); have clients confirm delivery (to trigger deletion). Do not
write messages to disk except in encrypted form, and automatically wipe plaintext after display.
Ephemerality also means not retaining metadata: drop or randomize timestamps, IP addresses,
or sequence info.
Threat Intelligence Sharing
When sharing IOCs (“Indicators of Compromise”), the system should protect those data as
rigorously as chat. One pattern is a “drop/fetch” model: a peer drops an encrypted IOC into
the network (e.g. into a DHT under a random key or topic) and others fetch it by that key. Each
IOC payload should be individually confidentially encrypted and signed. Use libsodium
(NaCl) primitives: e.g. crypto_box_seal for anonymous sender encryption (if the recipient’s
pubkey is known) or crypto_box_easy for mutual auth encryption (Authenticated encryption |
libsodium). Every IOC blob should carry a digital signature (e.g. Ed25519 via crypto_sign)
by the originator so recipients can verify authenticity (Public-key signatures | Libsodium
documentation). The signature binds the IOC data to a trusted peer identity, preventing
spoofing.
For confidentiality and integrity, libsodium’s docs advise: “Based on Bob’s public key, Alice
computes a shared secret key [via DH]. That shared secret key can be used to verify that the
encrypted message was not tampered with” (Authenticated encryption | libsodium). In practice,
one could use a hybrid approach: encrypt each IOC with symmetric keys (ChaCha20-Poly1305
or AES-GCM), then encrypt those keys with recipients’ public keys. For signing,
crypto_sign() appends an Ed25519 signature to a message (Public-key signatures |
Libsodium documentation). Alternatively, use libsodium's sealed box for anonymous public-key
encryption (though note sealed boxes alone have no forward secrecy).
To share widely, GhostWire might use a secure pubsub or message queue. For example,
libp2p’s pubsub (Gossipsub) could carry encrypted IOC messages. Each subscriber decrypts
only those they have keys for. Authenticity requires that all participants trust the public keys of
valid sources. If IOCs are dropped to a DHT, peers can fetch by content hash, verifying the
signature on retrieval. In all cases, emphasize confidentiality (encrypt data at rest/in transit),
integrity (MAC or sign to detect tampering), and authenticity (sign with identity keys).
Optionally, timestamp or TTL fields can be cryptographically bound (e.g. include in signed data)
to prevent replay of old IOCs.
Trust and Reputation System
A decentralized reputation model will help users judge IOC sources and peers. One approach is
aggregated peer feedback: each peer can rate others based on past interactions (accurate
intel, valid chat). These local ratings propagate through the network to form global trust scores.
For example, the EigenTrust algorithm assigns each peer a global trust value based on the
weighted sum of all peers’ ratings (eigentrust.dvi) (eigentrust.dvi). In EigenTrust, peers assign
scores to each other (positive or negative), normalize them, then a distributed power iteration
yields each peer’s “reputation vector” (eigentrust.dvi). Malicious peers (who receive low
feedback) end up with low global trust, so honest peers can prefer interactions with high-trust
nodes.
However, EigenTrust has limitations against collusion and sparse networks. For stronger
resilience, consider EigenTrust++ or community-based trust: only trust transitively within
“circles of friends”. In practice, peer feedback should be weighted by the trustworthiness of the
rater (good peers’ feedback counts more). One can also incorporate behavior-based metrics:
e.g. consistency of shared IOCs, response rate, or anomaly scores. New nodes start with
neutral/low trust but can “earn” trust through verified contributions.
To resist Sybil attacks, some form of identity cost or social graph can help. Schemes like
SybilGuard exploit social network edges: if each honest user has a few trust links to known
peers, large clusters of Sybil nodes become statistically detectable. In practice, GhostWire could
encourage peers to exchange introduction tokens or endorsements, forming a sparse trust
graph. Joining the trust network might require a joiner to be vouched for by existing trusted
peers, limiting Sybil inflation. Alternatively, light-weight proof-of-work for identity creation (e.g.
requiring a small PoW to register a peer ID) can raise the bar for spawning many identities.
Overall, the trust system should be transparent and tamper-resistant: store trust scores on a
ledger or DHT in signed form (so peers can’t lie about global scores), and periodically
recompute/validate them in a decentralized way. Attackers who behave honestly at first and
then maliciously should see their scores plummet (punished by dropped feedback).
Incorporating graph algorithms or rank propagation (as in EigenTrust) and decay factors (older
feedback counts less) can help the system adapt and isolate “bad” peers.
Authentication and Authorization
GhostWire must authenticate peers without a central authority. Each peer should have a unique
public/private key pair as its identity (PeerID). One approach is to use Decentralized Identifiers
(DIDs): a peer generates a DID (a cryptographic identifier) and publishes its public keys to a
distributed ledger or DHT
(rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md at master ·
WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub). A DID Document (DDO) contains the peer’s public
key(s) and service endpoints. Because the DID is self-certifying (it’s derived from the public
key), no CA is needed (rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md
at master · WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub). This matches the Web-of-Trust concept
where each peer vouches for itself and others via verifiable claims
(rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md at master ·
WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub).
Authorization (who can fetch IOCs or join chats) can be tied to identities. For example, peers
might maintain ACLs listing allowed public keys or DIDs. Peers sign messages with their private
keys, and others verify against the corresponding public key in their trust store. Public keys must
be rotated and revocable: e.g. using the DKMS model, treat the long-term key as identity and
use rotating subkeys for different purposes
(rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md at master ·
WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub). If a subkey is compromised, peers can block messages
signed by the old key and accept a signed “key update” from the master key. DID frameworks
often support key rotation via new DDO versions signed by the DID controller.
In a P2P context, libp2p’s identity keys already provide a mechanism: during the Noise or TLS
handshake, each side proves knowledge of its peer’s public key via signatures
(IdentityExchange in libp2p::noise::handshake - Rust). The snippet [37†L44-L49] notes that
even if you know a peer’s identity, the handshake still sends a signed payload so the other can
authenticate the DH key. Thus, mutual authentication is built-in. For GhostWire, use that feature:
if peers have exchanged public identity keys (out-of-band or via DID/ledger), simply require
each handshake to be signed by those keys (IdentityExchange in libp2p::noise::handshake -
Rust). No username/password or central logins are needed.
Privacy demands that identities not be trivially linkable to real-world IDs. Encourage
pseudonymous DIDs (random strings) and avoid leaking IP addresses. Key rotation means a
peer can periodically switch subkeys or addresses to obscure long-term tracking. For
revocation, implement keylists or short key TTLs: store revoked keys in the network (e.g. a
signed revocation notice in DHT) so others stop accepting them. PeerIDs (hash of public key)
inherently prevent impersonation without key compromise.
Privacy and Anonymity (Cloak)
All message traffic should be fully encrypted and routed to obscure metadata. Onion routing
(like Tor) is a strong option: GhostWire clients can either become onion services or route traffic
through Tor circuits, hiding IP addresses. For example, each peer could listen on a Tor
hidden-service address and connect to others by .onion addresses. Libp2p can use Tor’s
SOCKS proxy (via crates like torut) to create transports; the COMIT blog confirms it is feasible
(Anonymous peer to peer applications in Rust (rust-libp2p over Tor) | COMIT Developer Hub).
Tor hides who is talking to whom, though at the cost of latency. If using Tor, be sure to strip
identifying info (disable mDNS, randomize peerID usage, etc.), since the libp2p-Tor crate warns
that it “explicitly doesn’t provide any enhanced privacy” without such precautions
(libp2p_community_tor - Rust).
Alternatively, I2P provides an encrypted, decentralized “darknet” where each peer has a .i2p
address and garlic-encrypted tunnels. It’s harder to integrate (Java-based routers exist, though
[i2p-sam][13] has a Rust SAM client), but it avoids Tor’s central directory servers. I2P tends to
have less bandwidth and no egress to clearnet, but it’s end-to-end encryption by default.
For maximum anonymity, consider mixnets or VPN-like layering. Projects like Nym or HOPR
(mixnet networks) shuffle messages and add dummy traffic, defending even against global
passive adversaries. Tunneling all GhostWire traffic through a general-purpose VPN
(commercial or self-hosted) is also an option, but trust transfers from the network to the VPN
provider. A safer “cloak” is to use Tor/I2P at the application level.
In summary, best practice is defense in depth: encrypt E2E, then route via anonymity overlays.
Users should have the option (via a cloak command) to send all communication through Tor or
I2P. GhostWire’s code can even embed Tor (via arti or [torut]) so connections are made as Tor
streams. For ultimate privacy, consider periodically changing entry guards or mixing with dummy
traffic.
(File:Onion diagram.png - Wikimedia Commons) Figure: Onion routing hides source/destination
by wrapping messages in layers of encryption (Tor-like). GhostWire can emulate this via Tor/I2P
tunnels (I2P vs Tor in 2025 [Online Anonymity Explained & Compared]) (libp2p_community_tor -
Rust).
User Interface (Optional)
For a privacy-friendly GUI, use a Rust-centric framework. Two popular choices: Yew (or Seed)
for WebAssembly-based web UIs, and Tauri for desktop. Yew lets you write the frontend in
Rust, compiling to WASM, which avoids JavaScript vulnerabilities. The code runs client-side and
can communicate with the Rust core over asynchronous channels. Tauri embeds a Rust
backend with a minimal webview frontend (HTML/JS/CSS). Since GhostWire is security-critical,
Tauri could host a small React/Vue or static page that calls into Rust via Tauri’s IPC (no remote
code execution). As one maintainter notes, Tauri does not use WASM by default – the JS/Rust
bridge is native (Tauri, wasm and wasi · tauri-apps tauri · Discussion #9521 · GitHub) – but you
can still compile the UI to WASM if preferred.
Emphasize simplicity: the UI should not query external servers or load remote scripts. It should
default to offline use (perhaps periodic manual updates). Use libraries with a small attack
surface (e.g. no heavy DOM manipulation frameworks). Consider GTK (via gtk-rs) for a
pure-Rust desktop UI as an alternative to web tech. In all cases, follow secure GUI practices:
sanitize any user-generated content, avoid eval-like features, and keep the UI codebase
minimal.
Modular Architecture and Scalability
GhostWire should be built as modular services or plugins so features (messaging, IOC
exchange, networking) can evolve independently. For instance, the core P2P engine could be
one module, the crypto layer another, and the CLI/GUI front-end separate. In Rust, use features
and traits to allow swapping implementations (e.g. swap Noise for TLS transport, or replace
pubsub with direct DHT messaging). A plugin system could load additional commands at
runtime (for future extensions).
Useful open-source tools:
● Networking: rust-libp2p for P2P stack, tokio for async runtime.
● Messaging: OpenMLS for group messaging, signal-protocol or double-ratchet
implementations in Rust.
● Storage: sled or RocksDB for any needed local cache.
● Microservices: If a microservices style is desired, Rust offers Tonic for gRPC or Warp
for HTTP APIs. Alternatively, a lightweight pub/sub (NATS) or message bus could
connect modules.
Architecturally, define clear interfaces: e.g. a “network” module exposes “send_msg” and
“subscribe_topic” APIs, while a “crypto” module exposes “encrypt/decrypt” and “sign/verify”. Use
serde for message serialization. If Go is considered, similar roles could be filled by Go-libp2p or
btcd’s wire (but Rust is preferred for memory safety).
Finally, leverage concurrency: GhostWire should handle many peers smoothly. Rust’s async and
Tokio enable high throughput. The system should not assume any single chain of processing –
use asynchronous handlers for inbound messages and parallel tasks for crypto. By breaking
functionality into crates or microservices (e.g. one for trust computation, one for networking), the
project remains extensible.
References
State-of-the-art cryptography and secure P2P frameworks were consulted to ensure
GhostWire’s design follows current best practices (Authenticated encryption | libsodium)
(eigentrust.dvi) (IdentityExchange in libp2p::noise::handshake - Rust), while retaining a
privacy-first and open-source ethos. The recommendations above prioritize audited,
Rust-compatible libraries (libsodium/NaCl, rust-libp2p, MLS, etc.) and proven anonymity
techniques (The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture) (libp2p_community_tor - Rust).
Each module should cite and follow its respective specifications (e.g. RFCs for MLS, Noise
protocol papers, W3C DID standards
(rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md at master ·
WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub)
(rwot5-boston/topics-and-advance-readings/dkms-recommendations.md at master ·
WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston · GitHub)) for correctness. The overall architecture remains
developer-focused, emphasizing clear trust boundaries and minimal implicit assumptions.
