INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

REPORT OF

THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE SURVEILLANCE IMPLEMENTATION

COORDINATION GROUP (SURICG/5)

Web-conference, 22 - 24 September 2020

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of

the Meetings and not the Organization.

Approved by the Meeting

and published by the ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, Bangkok
 SURICG/5
Table of Contents i-2

HISTORY OF THE MEETING Page

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... i-3

2. Opening of the Meeting ................................................................................................................... i-3
3. Attendance ....................................................................................................................................... i-3
4. Officers and Secretariat.................................................................................................................... i-3
5. Organization, working arrangements and language ......................................................................... i-3
6. Draft Conclusions, Draft Decisions and Decision of SURICG - Definition .................................... i-3

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of Agenda ............................................................................................... 1

Agenda Item 2: Review of outcomes of relevant meetings including ICAO 40th Assembly,
DGCA/56 and APANPIRG/30 on Surveillance ..................................................... 1

Agenda Item 3: Review of regional requirements for Surveillance in the e-ANP, Seamless
ANS Plan and the reported implementation status ................................................. 2

Agenda Item 4: Review the Action Items from SURICG/4 Meeting ............................................. 7

Agenda Item 5: Update on surveillance activities and explore potential

cooperation opportunities ....................................................................................... 8

Agenda Item 6: Review Report of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 Meeting and

discuss possible options for future of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG............................. 13

Agenda Item 7: Review Report of DAPs WG/3 Meeting ............................................................. 22

Agenda Item 8: Review ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (AIGD) .. 26

Agenda Item 9: Next meetings & any other business .................................................................... 27

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1: List of Participants

Attachment 2: List of Working/Information Papers and Presentations

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Regional Supplement to the ASTERIX Interface Control Document (ICD)

for the ASIA/PAC Region (Third Edition)
Appendix B: Updated List of Task/Action Items SURICG/5
Appendix B1: Action Items for SEA BOB ADS-B WG/15
Appendix C: Updated ADS-B Implementation Status in the ASIA/PAC Region
Appendix D: ADS-B Data Sharing Implementation Status in the Asia/Pacific Region
Appendix E1&E2: SEA & BOB Sub-regional ADS-B implementation plan/projects
Appendix F1: Proposed amendment to the TOR of the SEA/BOB ADS-B WG
Appendix F2: Proposed TOR for a regional ADS-B Working Group
Appendix G: Mode S DAPs Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
(DAPs IGD v 2.0)
Appendix H: Revised Terms of Reference of Mode S DAPs Working Group
Appendix I: Revised ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
(AIGD v.13)
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i-3 History of the Meeting

1. Introduction

1.1 The Fifth Meeting of the Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group

(SURICG/5) was held from 22 to 24 September 2020. The Meeting was an on-line meeting using MS
Teams.

2. Opening of the Meeting

2.1 The meeting was opened by Mr. MH Hui, the Co-chair of SURICG.

2.2 In his opening remarks, Mr. MH Hui, welcomed participants and thanked the ICAO
APAC Regional Office for hosting this meeting, which is the first time using video conference, with
good facilities and meticulous preparations. He pointed out that the global aviation industry has been
hit unprecedentedly by pandemic. This region is of no exception. He emphasized that the SURICG
must therefore need to strike a balance in bringing forward new initiatives, while staying pragmatic and
setting proper priorities in a harmonized manner, so as to cater for differences among
states/administrations in their pace of recovery in air traffic. Mr. Hui also expressed his appreciation to
the job well done by member States/Administrations in supporting the SURICG’s work in the past
years.

2.3 He expressed great appreciation and thankfulness to the excellent leadership by Mr. Li
Peng, former ICAO APAC Regional CNS Officer, in providing steering and guidance in not only
surveillance, but also a broad spectrum of CNS services for the past 20 year, laying a good foundation
for the SURICG to ride on and continue development. Mr. Hui was confident that the SURICG would
continue to steer the way forward on Mode S and ADS-B surveillance for the region, and he looked to
the active participation from the audience in the 3-day meeting.

3. Attendance

3.1 The Meeting was attended by 120 participants from 20 States/Administrations and 5
International Organizations and 1 service provider from industry, including Australia, China, Hong
Kong-China, Macao China, DPR Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Nepal, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, USA, Viet Nam, CANSO,
EUROCAE, IATA, IFATCA, ICCAIA (AIREON) and PCCW Global. A list of participants is at
Attachment 1.

4. Officers and Secretariat

4.1 Mr. Hui Man Ho, Acting Assistant Director-General of Civil Aviation (Air Traffic
Engineering Services), Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong China, and Mr. Yeo Cheng Nam,
Consultant (Aeronautical Telecommunications & Engineering) CAA Singapore co-chaired the
Meeting. Mr. Luo Yi Regional Officer CNS, ICAO APAC Regional Office, acted as meeting secretary
with the support of Ms. Bhabhinan Sirapongkosit, the Programme Assistant of the same office.

5. Organization, working arrangements and language

5.1 The online meeting was conducted around 3 and a half hours a day. The working
language was English inclusive of all documentation and this Report. The meeting considered 8
working papers, 21 information papers, 1 presentation and 5 flimsies. A List of Papers presented at the
meeting is at Attachment 2.

6. Draft Conclusions, Draft Decisions and Decisions of SURICG – Definition

6.1 SURICG recorded its actions in the form of Draft Conclusions, Draft Decisions and
Decisions within the following definitions:
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History of the Meeting i-4

Draft Conclusions deal with matters that, according to APANPIRG terms of

reference, require the attention of States, or action by the ICAO in accordance with
established procedures;

Draft Decisions deal with the matters of concern only to APANPIRG and its
contributory bodies; and

Decisions of SURICG that relate solely to matters dealing with the internal working
arrangements of SURICG.

_______________
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 1

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of Agenda

1.1 The provisional agenda items provided in WP/01 was adopted by the meeting as the
agenda items for the meeting.

Agenda Item 2: Review of outcomes of relevant meetings including ICAO 40th Assembly,
DGCA/56 and APANPIRG/30 on Surveillance

Outcome of Relevant Meetings on Surveillance (WP/02)

2.1 Through the paper presented by the Secretariat, the meeting reviewed the related
outcomes of ICAO 40th Assembly, the 56th Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation Asia
and Pacific Regions (DGCA/56) and APANPIRG/30 meeting on Surveillance Service.

2.2 The meeting was informed that there was no outstanding issue on surveillance in
Assembly 40, however, some of the Assembly Resolutions were relevant to CNS area with reference
to Resolutions adopted by the Assembly (Provisional Edition October 2019), as well as some paragraphs
relevant to CNS incorporated in Technical Commission Report of 40th Assembly (Doc10137). The
meeting also noted the latest update of Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and
Spectrum Task Force (ICNSS-TF).

2.3 The DGCA/56 Conference developed 35 Action Items among which 14 Action Items
were identified by SURICG/5 as relevant to implementation of CNS and services including 56/2; 56/3;
56/6; 56/11; 56/12; 56/15; 56/16; 56/21;56/29; 56/30; 56/32; 56/33; 56/34; 56/35. The meeting was
informed that CNS SG/23 also reviewed the outcome of DGCA/56.

2.4 The meeting noted the Conclusions/Decisions related to surveillance implementation

adopted by APANPIRG and follow-up actions taken by the Secretariat. In particular, through
Conclusion APANPIRG/30/15 (CNS SG/23/14-SURICG/4/6), Revised Surveillance Strategy for the
APAC Region was adopted, and the Edition 12 of the ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance
Document (AIGD) and the first edition of Mode S DAPs Implementation and Operations Guidance
Document were also adopted by the Twenty Third Meeting of CNS Sub-group on behalf of
APANPIRG. The adopted documents were posted on the ICAO APAC website under e-Document. The
Asia/Pacific ATM Automation System Task Force (ATMAS/TF) was established through Decision
CNS SG/23/13 (SURICG/4/5), the first meeting of ATMAS/TF will be held from 28 to 30 October,
2020.

2.5 The meeting noted the Proposal for Amendment (PfA) to the Regional Supplementary
Procedure (SUPP Doc 7030) from SURICG/2 has been processed in accordance with established
procedure, and the approved PfAs were circulated to States on 18 June 2020 through a State Letter with
reference: T8/11.2 – AP130/20 (CNS), and this change will be incorporated in the new Six Edition of
Doc 7030/6 as part of the restructuring process of Doc 7030.

1090MHz Spectrum and 24-Bit Address Issues with UAS (IP/07)

2.6 The secretariat presented a brief summary on regional activities on 1090 MHz spectrum
and 24-bit aircraft address issues associated with unmanned aircraft. The meeting noted the topic was
firstly presented to the region by Chairperson of the ICAO Surveillance Panel (SP) on APAC
Aeronautical Surveillance Workshop in November 2018, further discussed in SEA/BOB ADS-B
WG/14 through Working Paper 07 Address and Spectrum Issues for Small UAS and developed Draft
Conclusion 14/02 – Small UAS Cooperative Surveillance Equipage. As requested by the SURICG Co-
chair, the ICAO SP chair presented Working Paper 12 Potential Issues Associated with RPAS Operating
Exclusively at Low Altitudes (Less Than 500 Feet above Ground Level) to SURICG/4, the meeting
 SURICG/5
2 Report on Agenda Items

discussed and proposed a revised Draft Conclusion SURICG/4/2 - UAS Cooperative Surveillance
Equipage. Finally, CNS SG/23 meeting adopted the proposal through Conclusion CNS SG/23/11.

2.7 The meeting noted that on 8 November 2019, ICAO issued a State Letter on the
Subject: 1090 MHz spectrum issues and proper management of 24-bit aircraft addresses associated with
unmanned aircraft operating exclusively at very low level, Ref.: SP 44/2 - 19/77. ICAO member States
are urged to note the ongoing ICAO initiatives to ensure the continued safe and reliable operation of
aeronautical surveillance systems, and encouraging State to make use of the guidance material enclosed
in the letter. The meeting agreed to incorporate this guidance material into AIGD for easy reference in
this region.

Proposal for Amendment of Annex 10 regarding ACAS X (Flimsy/01)

2.8 The secretariat informed the meeting about the ICAO State Letter, Ref.:
AN 7/1.3.105-20/42, issued on 8 April 2020, with the Subject: Proposals for the amendment of Annex
10, Volume IV regarding airborne collision avoidance system X (ACAS X). States are encouraged to
make their comments to reach Montréal by 8 October 2020.

Agenda Item 3: Review of regional requirements for Surveillance in the e-ANP, Seamless ANS
Plan and the reported implementation status

PNG Deployment of Space Based ADS-B (IP/08)

3.1 After a successful Space based ADS-B trial using a VPN on the internet to deliver data,
PNG has contracted for Space based ADS-B to serve the whole PNG FIR plus 50 miles. The system
has been installed and data is now flowing, will bring improved safety and efficiency to the PNG FIR.
Service acceptance testing will be performed by the ANSP, supported remotely by Aireon (due to
COVID). It is expected to become operational later in 2020 and will operate in tandem with existing
ADS-B and radar services.

3.2 The system will initially use dual MPLS lines to USA to receive the service, but PNG
has joined CRV and expects to transition to a dual CRV solution in 2021.The CRV solution will use
two Package C nodes, supported by 1 MPLS and one VSAT terminal. A CRV contract has been signed
with PCCW to provide the CRV connections supporting AFTN/AMHS, Voice, AIDC, ADS-B ground
station sharing and Space based ADS-B. Aireon was approved to connect to the CRV earlier in 2020
and can now deliver Space based ADS-B to other CRV customers potentially without additional
communication links.

3.3 PNG also anticipates sharing ADS-B ground station data with Australia and Indonesia
via CRV.

3.4 In response to various queries, ICCAIA provided further clarification to the meeting
on the following issues:

 applicable separation standards (5 nautical miles in airspace where VHF DCPC is

available and probably procedural or ASEPS elsewhere);

 top antenna and 125W transmit power is required to guarantee performance, but
Aireon can “see” bottom antenna and lower power transmissions at lower
probability of detection;
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 3

 VHF voice communication is used over the land mass, and VHF, CPDLC and HF is
used in Oceanic airspace;

 that PNG traffic only requires limited bandwidth consumption on the CRV link;
and

 Guaranteed availability is ensured by Aireon by using appropriate duplication of

elements in the whole chain from aircraft to ATC.

FAA’s Operational Evaluation of Space-based ADS-B in the Caribbean (IP/09)

3.5 FAA shared with the meeting about its Operational Evaluation of Space-Based ADS-
B (SBA) trials in the Caribbean, including an overview of the SBA trials, data analysis summary, and
identified installation and performance issues.

3.6 ADS-B surveillance coverage in Miami ARTCC (ZMA) offshore airspace is limited to
coverage provided by ground stations located on the Florida peninsula and Puerto Rico. There is a broad
expanse of airspace in the corridor between these areas where existing ADS-B terrestrial coverage is
unavailable and where existing cooperative surveillance sources have reliability/redundancy issues.
Currently, the radar site at Grand Turk (GDT), in the Turks and Caicos Islands is a single point of
failure, due to the lack of terrestrial ADS-B or redundant surveillance coverage, which can impact US
managed airspace in the Caribbean.

3.7 Review of the received SBA data has highlighted the following potential issues:

1) Lack of detection for single antenna installations (e.g., Bottom only)

2) Poor performance (e.g. low power) from diversity installations
3) Short periods of time with single satellite coverage.

3.8 In order to assess SBA performance in the trial airspace, the following update threshold
requirements were identified:

1) 8 second 97%
2) 30 second 99.9%

3.9 The 8 second 97% requirement is necessary to meet the RTCA DO-318 requirement
for use of SBA in radar airspace. The 30 second 99.9% requirement is used by the FAA to track aircraft
that have entered into a coasting condition, and is an “operational suitability” threshold defined by FAA
controllers.

3.10 ZMA controllers have used the test area in Miami Centre to determine the feasibility
of using SBA data operationally to separate aircraft transiting through the SBA trial airspace. During
this testing, ZMA determined the number of aircraft exhibiting detection issues exceeds the minimum
acceptable level required to begin using SBA to provide separation services.

3.11 The FAA, in collaboration with Aireon, have identified the following as potential
mechanisms to improve airspace performance:

1) Identify poor performing aircraft for remediation;

2) Aireon to modify their system to optimize coverage and improve probability
of detection (Pd); and
3) FAA implement an exclusion list for poor performing aircraft
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4 Report on Agenda Items

3.12 The FAA will continue to analyse data to identify improvements made from
coordinated work with Aireon and relevant stakeholders. This analysis and coordinated work will assist
in identifying the potential impact that each issue is having on aircraft detection. If necessary, the FAA
will also work with appropriate foreign counterparts to create an adequate Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) for handling aircraft with diversity antenna installations versus non-diversity
installations.

3.13 During the discussion, the meeting was informed that the actual performance of SBA
was dependant on many factors, including number of aircraft in the region (i.e., airspace density), 1090
MHz spectrum congestion, etc. The new software upgrade released by Aireon is focused on improving
receiver performance and is applicable globally across their entire constellation.

Long-range Air Traffic Surveillance Display System for ATFM (IP/12)

3.14 Hong Kong China has developed an in-house system for displaying long-range air
traffic surveillance tracks up to 4000km from the Hong Kong International Airport, which is
approximately 5 hours of flying time beyond airspace boundary. The system is designed to enhance
the situational awareness of flow managers on the air traffic and assist in flow control decision making.
It is currently used by Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) Unit of Hong Kong China in assessing
the overall impacts of certain flow restriction imposed by other airspaces.

3.15 The long-range air traffic surveillance display system is based on terrestrial ADS-B
data service for monitoring air traffic from “departure to destination”. Space-based ADS-B data is
planned to be integrated into the system to strengthen the coverage by early 2021. The Human Machine
Interface (HMI) of the display system has been specially designed for flow managers with an aim to
reduce display clutter caused by various elements and enhance HMI efficiency.

Space based ADS-B update (IP/13)

3.16 Aireon presented an Update regarding Space based ADS-B on behalf of ICCAIA.
Space based ADS-B is now being operationally used around the world. The IRIDIUM NEXT
constellation that hosts the Aireon ADS-B system consists of 66 satellites plus 9 spares orbit the earth
and 6 additional satellites are available on the ground.

3.17 Aireon provides the end-to-end system and 24/7 support together with tools and reports
to ANSPs to monitor key performance parameters. Aireon has now been certified by EASA as an ANSP.
Service acceptance testing has been completed for 10 ANSPs, and is in the process of site acceptance
readiness for 2 others outside Asia Pacific.

3.18 Within Asia Pacific, ANSPs in Singapore, India, PNG and Hong Kong have contracted
for an operational service with Aireon and a trial deployment in Indonesia has been awarded. Aireon
has also been approved to connect to the Asia Pacific CRV to allow delivery of Space based ADS-B
data to ANSPs.

3.19 Aireon is very flexible in the way it delivers the services and in the applications it
envisages for the data. Of particular note is the flexibility it has in the commercial arrangements
especially in the current aviation environment.

3.20 However, Aireon noted that its data cannot be shared with other ANSPs without a
formal agreement to ensure that both security and Aireon intellectual property is protected. Aireon noted
that Space based ADS-B can be used to support Air Traffic Flow management and that it has contracted
with Eurocontrol to progress the integration of the data into the European ETFMS. They are keen to
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 5

work with any ANSPs and their ATFM vendors to progress AFTM support from departure to
destination.

Proposed Solutions for Sharing of Surveillance Data (WP/08)

3.21 Following the Conclusion CNS SG/23/10 (SURICG/4/1) - ADS-B and Flow
Management, there is a need to share surveillance data to provide surveillance from “departure to
destination”.

3.22 Singapore proposed solutions for sharing of surveillance data using SWIM/CRV (other
networks and datalink may work as well), viz. Distributed, Single Source or Hybrid solutions. The paper
discussed the advantages and drawbacks of each solution which offers States the freedom to choose for
the implementation which best suits them. The paper also discussed the solutions in detail requiring
technical and governance issues to be ironed out. The meeting proposed that a study group to be set up
to explore the three solutions or other solutions that may be presented.

PCCWG Solution on Surveillance Data over SWIM/CRV (Flimsy/02)

3.23 PCCW Global, the selected CRV service provider through ICAO TCB process,
presented their capability to provide a hosted platform over SWIM/CRV for sharing of surveillance
data.

3.24 The meeting discussed the draft decision proposed by Singapore in WP/08 to set up a
multidisciplinary study group, to be led by SURICG, including experts from surveillance, SWIM and
ATFM, etc. in APAC Region to further explore the solutions on surveillance data sharing, and agreed
to take it as a SURICG ACTION ITEM at this stage, and invite interested member States / organization
to join this study group by informing the secretariat. Singapore will take the lead to prepare working
papers for SWIM TF/4 and CNS SG/24 on behalf of SURICG, and Hong Kong China will support this
initiative. The meeting then formulated the following draft decision for consideration by CNS SG/24:

Draft Decision SURICG/5/1 - Establishment of a Study Group to Explore Solutions on Regional

Surveillance Data Sharing
What: Noting the operational needs of this region to enhance Expected impact:
surveillance data sharing and new technologies available, ☐ Political / Global
That, a study group comprising surveillance, SWIM and ATFM ☐ Inter-regional
experts to be set up to study and recommend solutions on ☒ Economic
surveillance data sharing to provide surveillance from “departure to
☒ Environmental
destination”.
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: To enhance surveillance coverage, enhance
surveillance data availability by providing
additional layers of surveillance services, and
Follow-up: ☐Required from States
support implementation of advanced Air Traffic
Management (ATM) tools such as Air Traffic
Flow Management (ATFM).
Status: Draft to be adopted by
When: 4-Dec-20
Subgroup
Who: ☒Sub Groups ☐APAC States ☐ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ
☒Other: SURICG

Additional System Area Codes (SAC) for Surveillance Systems in APAC

and Update on Regional Supplement to ASTERIX ICD (WP/03)
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6 Report on Agenda Items

3.25 With the development and expansion of surveillance facilities, there is a need to
introduce additional System Area Codes (SAC) for surveillance systems in APAC. Subsequently, the
Regional Supplement will have to be updated to cater the new introduction.

3.26 The secretariat informed the meeting through the working paper that Australia had
requested ICAO APAC Regional Office for an additional SAC for its surveillance facilities. According
to the Recommendation in paragraph 3.1.2 of the ICD, ICAO APAC Regional office has accepted the
A4hex to be the additional SAC as proposed by Australia.

3.27 The acceptable code A4hex is to be reflected into the next edition the Regional
Supplement as in Table 1, and the System Identification Code (SIC) provided by Australia, Laos PDR
and the Philippines, as well as the editorial updates on the binary representation of SAC of Brunei
Darussalam are to be reflected into the next edition the Regional Supplement (draft) which is provided
in Appendix A to this Report.

The SAC SIC Code Allocation Management and Using in China (IP/20)

3.28 As multiple surveillance sources are connected to a certain set of ATM Automation
Systems, a standardized configuration management of SAC and SIC codes can help in quickly locating
the source of surveillance data.

3.29 CAAC ATMB has about 140 sets Radars, more than 300 sets ADS-B ground stations,
about 20 sets MLAT, more than 40 sets ADS-B data processing center/data station, and 90 sets air
traffic control ATM Automation System. CAAC ATMB has multiplexed SIC codes according to
different air traffic control application systems and the network structure of surveillance data sources.
ADS-B data is filtered, optimized, and fused through the ADS-B data center/data station before
connecting into the ATM Automation System. Each ADS-B data center/ data station can be considered
as a radar. Therefore, ADS-B data center/data station and radar equipment share China’s 256 SICs
identification code resources for unified allocation and management.

3.30 China has also planned to multiplex SICs identification code in the ATM Automation
Systems based on the geographic location of China’s radar construction, in order to make sure that when
a radar is connected to the ATM Automation System in an adjacent control area, it does not have the
same SIC parameters as the other surveillance equipment set in the system.

3.31 Considering the implementation of MLAT systems, Tower Integrated Automation

Systems, and national Air Traffic Flow Management System and other equipment, 256 SIC codes will
not meet the operational needs of ATS provision, and China recommended that ICAO APAC Office
allocates about 5 additional SAC codes to allow CAAC ATMB easily identifying different types of
surveillance source information to exclude potential risks in ATM system configuration.

3.32 During the discussion, the meeting recognized the need for the region to propose
planning criteria to support ICAO APAC Office in coordinating additional SAC assignment to a
State/Administration, and the meeting agreed to take this task as a SURICG ACTION ITEM to be
reported on SURICG/6. ICAO APAC Office, in consultation of Co-chairs of SURICG, will put up a
working paper with proposed criteria for discussion in SURICG/6. Following the previous practice for
Australia, China is suggested to prepare a plan on using SAC/SIC with necessary reserved capacity, and
submit the plan outlining the need of additional SAC through a formal letter to ICAO APAC Office.
Myanmar informed the meeting about the submission of its SIC implementation plan to ICAO APAC
Office, and it should be included in the third edition of Regional Supplement to ASTERIX Interface
Control Document (ICD) for ASIA/PAC Region.
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 7

Agenda Item 4: Review the Action Items from SURICG/4 Meeting

4.1 The meeting reviewed the action items of the SURICG through WP/04 presented by
the Secretariat. The meeting further reviewed the table of DO260B compliant ADS-B ground stations
in APAC Region based on the outcome of the SURICG/4 and noted the proposal from SEA/BOB
WG/15 to stop the review of this historical table as almost all ground stations having been compliant
with Version 2 (ADS-B DO260B). SURICG/5 agreed there is no need to further review this table, and
the relevant action item was removed accordingly.

The ICAO Aircraft Address Monitoring in Japan (IP/14)

4.2 As an agreed action item by SURICG/4, Japan presented to the meeting on its
experience on the ICAO Aircraft Address (Mode-S address) monitoring since 2007, which including
monitoring activity, tool function, monitoring results and reporting paths. JCAB already took 6
correcting actions for Japanese civil aircraft and JSDF (Japan Self Defense Force) aircrafts in recent 4
years. The meeting thanked Japan for this sharing, and agreed to incorporate the main content of this
paper into the AIGD.

4.3 During the discussion, the meeting highlighted the importance in correctly using 24-
bit address, as duplicate addresses may impact surveillance system and controllers-pilots satellite
communications, as well as cause risk to TCAS functionality. The regulator should ground the aircraft
with wrong 24-bit address immediately for correction to address safety concerns.

Introduction to the Management and Application of 24-Bit

Aircraft Addresses for Chinese Civil Aviation (IP/17)

4.4 CAAC issued "Regulation for Aircraft Address Management of Civil Aircraft " to
make use of aircraft addresses efficiently and standardly for civil aviation in China. The 24-bit address
has a greater advantage to identify aircraft than the traditional SSR code. With the implementation of
the National ADS-B Construction Project and the application of the Mode S radars, it becomes possible
to identify aircraft by 24-bit aircraft address in ATM automation system.
4.5 The Radio Regulatory Office of CAAC is authorized to perform unified address
management responsibility. The 24-bit aircraft addresses should be assigned to the civil aircraft
registered in China, the civil aviation ground surveillance systems installed in China, the surface-
operating vehicles in civil airport, and research activities. The 24-bit aircraft addresses used by ground
surveillance systems and surface-operating vehicles are valid for no more than 10 years, and the validity
period of the 24-bit addresses for research activities is no more than 1 year.

4.6 The aircraft addresses in China are divided into 64 blocks by CAAC, each block has
4,096 addresses. At present, 20 blocks have been used, mainly by aircraft. 2 blocks have been assigned
to the ground surveillance systems and surface-operating vehicles.

4.7 ADS-B data quality analysis in China revealed 2 main problems about the application
of 24-bit aircraft addresses. One is the duplication of 24-bit aircraft addresses, the other one is that the
24-bit aircraft addresses in FPL are not standardized. These two problems impacted the accuracy of
aircraft identification and may cause wrongly track coupling in the ATM automation system.

Mode S Radar Survey to Support II/SI Mixed Operation in China (IP/18)

4.8 According to the APANPIRG Conclusion 19/40, the Mode S interrogator installed in
ICAO APAC region shall only use Interrogator Identifier (II) code. The Air Traffic Management Bureau
of CAAC (ATMB of CAAC) is running more than 140 SSRs currently in China, among which 78 are
Mode S capable. By the end of 2030, ATMB will operate around 220 Mode S interrogators. It will
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8 Report on Agenda Items

become very difficult to operate all the Mode S interrogators by II code then. China hence conducted a
Mode S radar capability survey to support II/SI mixed operation which is considered as the solution in
future.

4.9 The survey covered all the Mode S interrogator models in China, including Thales,
Selex (Leonardo), Indra, and domestic companies like Nriet, Suncreat and Jiuzhou. The survey was
conducted in the laboratories of ATMB with support of domestic partners. The test bench composed of
the radar systems and the RASS kits. The RASS event generator supported in simulating serials of II/SI
mixed scenarios, and the radar systems were observed and analysed under these scenarios. The result
of the survey shows that all the radar models operating in China now are capable of II/SI mixed
operation. Considering the limited number of II code, APAC region is then requested to introduce SI
code application.

4.10 The meeting thanked this informative sharing and noted this survey was conducted in
simulated environment for Mode S interrogators. Considering the cooperative nature between ground
facilities and airborne transponders, it is necessary to further study on the introduction of SI code to
APAC region, including avionics equipage, operational experience in Europe and MID region, etc.
DAPs WG is tasked on this ACTION ITEM and the outcome of this study is expected to polish the
regional Mode S roadmap.

4.11 With the papers presented and the discussion under this agenda item, the meeting
further reviewed and updated the list of Task/Action items, which is provided in Appendix B to this
Report.

Agenda Item 5: Update on surveillance activities and explore potential cooperation opportunities

5.1 Under this agenda item, the meeting reviewed a number of papers presented by member
States/Administration.

Example of ADS-B Position Verification Performance (WP/07)

5.2 Compared with conventional means of aeronautical surveillance such as secondary

surveillance radar (SSR), ADS-B can provide a better positional accuracy and update rate, but ADS-B
has a security concern of spoofing, which is transmissions of signals containing false aircraft
information by an attacker. An effective countermeasure against spoofing is a position verification
method using Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA).

5.3 Electronic Navigation Research Institute (ENRI) of Japan conducted a performance

evaluation of the position verification method in a spoofing experiment using a prototype WAM/
ADS-B system. As a result of the experiment, a good probability of detection was observed, and the
probability of a false alarm was consistent with the threshold design.

5.4 This example of performance evaluated in the spoofing experiment is considered as

information contributed to the SURICG activity and useful for ADS-B Implementation and Operations
Guidance Document (AIGD) for incorporation as a guidance material for security issues associated with
ADS-B.

5.5 Japan clarified the two ground stations used in the verification were provided from the
same Japanese manufacturer. The meeting noted similar topics were discussed in previous meetings,
and reiterated the challenge in implementation of TDOA while using ground stations from different
vendors, as there was difference in the definition of timing. The meeting was also informed that TDOA
mechanism was also implemented with Aireon space based ADS-B service, the output data was able to
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 9

flagged as validated or not validated. It is necessary to consider the balance between required
performance and the affordable cost under different operational environment equipped with various
communication means and flight information provision to implement TDOA anti-spoofing. As the
TDOA algorithm is not a complex calculation, the introduced latency met the operational requirements
perfectly.

5.6 As some security related materials are considered as sensitive, the appropriate process
to share technical information should be made through ICAO Regional Office upon request from State
representatives.

Update on ATC Surveillance Activities in Australia (IP/02)

5.7 Australia presented the current status of its surveillance projects, including
terminal/enroute radar project, data transport migrating from dedicated serial lines to an IP based
network, military ATC radar upgrading to support both civilian and Defence surveillance requirements,
WAM upgrading, surface surveillance capability (A-SMGCS) extension for new runways, investigating
various options in technology stacks to meet specific aerodrome service requirements at airports,
ADS-B operations and additional project proposal, 3 nautical mile separation standards using ADS-B,
ADS-B data sharing with Indonesia (6 sites in Indonesia and 4 sites in Australia), ADS-B use in surface
movement, investigation on economic and safety benefits of space-based ADS-B, transponder
regulations and mandates, lower cost ADS-B avionics for VFR, operational use of Flight ID from radar
and safety enhancement by using DAPs.

5.8 The meeting thanked the informative sharing, and invited Australia to provide more
specific papers to share its experience in future meetings, particularly on the ADS-B application for
surface movement.

Implementation of New Surveillance System within Pyongyang FIR (IP/03)

5.9 This paper presented the information on the transition of surveillance system from SSR
to ADS-B within Pyongyang FIR. The relevant information of new surveillance system implementation
was issued by NOTAM early in February of this year and published the relevant AIRAC AIP AMDT
effective from October 08, 2020 through the AIS. RAIM prediction NOTAM is planned in future and
ADS-B data sharing with adjacent States is also proposed.

Recent ADS-B Avionics Issues Observed in the United States (IP/04)

5.10 FAA presented to the meeting about recent ADS-B avionics issues observed in the U.S.
with DO-260B/ED-102A systems (1090ES systems only) via the ADS-B Performance Monitor (APM)
tool. It is an update of the IP/06 presented to SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15. (ref. to paragraph 6.8-6.11 of
this report)

B787 DO-260B/ED-102A track extrapolation issue

5.11 As of 9 Sep 2020, 32 B787 aircraft were on the FAA No Services Aircraft List (NSAL);
18 of these aircraft have been detected within U.S. ADS-B coverage during 2020. The FAA is
coordinating with State Regulators who have operators with B787 aircraft on the NSAL. B787 operators
who have applied Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB340036-00 to their aircraft must have their
cognizant State regulator notify the FAA to remove them from the FAA NSAL. Such notification,
including the ICAO aircraft addresses of the specific aircraft to which Boeing SB
B787-81205-SB340036-00 was applied, should be sent to Brent.R.Elliott@faa.gov with a copy to
Alejandro.Rodriguez@faa.gov and doug.arbuckle@faa.gov.
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10 Report on Agenda Items

B787 NACv=0 issue.

5.12 As of 9-Aug-2020, FAA has observed no significant occurrences of this issue within
U.S. ADS-B coverage during the prior two months. Therefore, the FAA will not further report on this
issue in the future.

Revisions to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-114, ADS-B Operations (IP/05)

5.13 This paper provided a summary of new and revised guidance included in FAA
Advisory Circular (AC) 90-114B, ADS-B Operations, published on December 20, 2019, it briefly
introduced the most significant part about Transponder operations during formation flying,
Non-Performing Equipment (NPE), ADS-B performance during aerobatic flight, No Services Aircraft
List (NSAL), Public ADS-B Performance Report (PAPR), Inoperative ADS-B and Non-ADS-B
Operations, GPS Interference, Preflight requirements for certain operators, Service Availability
Prediction Tool (SAPT) outages, Call-sign mismatch (CSMM), ADS-B Requirements for ADS-R and
TIS-B, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Same Link Rebroadcast (ADS-SLR) and Privacy ICAO
Address (PIA).

ADS-B Equipage and Quality Performance in the U.S. (IP/06)

5.14 This paper provided a summary of observed NIC/NACp performance compared to the
requirements of the U.S. ADS B mandate, as well as ADS-B equipage trends in the U.S. As the scope
of U.S. ADS-B monitoring coverage extended somewhat beyond the airspace where the U.S. ADS-B
mandate (14 CFR 91.225) applied, during the most recent two-month analysis window ending on 9
August 2020, almost 25% (1,711 out of 6,882) of the observed aircraft were not registered in the U.S.

Observed NIC/NACp performance compared to 14 CFR 91.227 requirements

5.15 The number of air carrier aircraft has increased considerably over the two-year period
(from 4,204 to 9,627 aircraft, before the traffic reductions due to COVID-19), the NIC results are
relatively consistent over the analysis period. Note the increased reporting of NACp=8 and NACp=7
during 2019; this is believed to be due to late transponder retrofits of aircraft having pre-existing
SA-On GPS position sources. Similar to the NIC results, once NACp falls below 7, the most likely
value to be reported is NACp=0.

Tracking ADS-B equipage trends in the U.S.

5.16 Since 1 October 2018, the number of ADS-B Version 0 aircraft has decreased from
5,091 to 788; the number of ADS-B Version 1 aircraft has decreased from 2,537 to 388, while ADS-B
Version 2 aircraft equipage has more than doubled. During the period shown in the paper, the number
of 1090ES-equipped aircraft has roughly doubled, the number of “Dual”-equipped aircraft has been
roughly flat at just over 1,000 aircraft, and the number of UAT-equipped aircraft has more than
quadrupled. The rapid increase in UAT equipage which began in late 2019 is due largely to the
popularity of a UAT product which is packaged with either a wingtip or tailcone light and marketed as
a “quick, easy and cheap” installation.

Airspace Applicability of the U.S. 2020 ADS-B Equipage Mandate (IP/11)

5.17 As an update of the IP/07 presented to SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15, USA reminded the
meeting of the U.S 2020 ADS-B equipage mandate from 1 January 2020. The FAA provides a Google
Earth file on a public website (URL provided in the paper) showing polygons encompassing the airspace
where ADS-B Version 2 is required after January 1, 2020 as specified in 14 CFR §91.225 (the U.S.
ADS-B mandate). The U.S. ADS-B mandate applies only to the sovereign airspace of the United States,
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 11

which is any airspace over the land regions comprising the constituent States of the U.S., the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and all other territories including the territorial waters surrounding these
land regions out to 12 nautical miles from their coastlines. The meeting noted that in some U.S. managed
airspace where the U.S. ADS-B mandate does not apply, aircraft which are equipped with ADS-B
Version 2 (TSO-C166b) may receive preferential ATC services from the FAA. Operators without
equipment meeting the performance requirements in TSO-C166b are expected to plan their routes of
flight (including alternate airports) around U.S. sovereign airspace over specifically listed U.S.
territories, and that such operators should train their flight crews to generally decline a voluntary ATC
rerouting through this airspace unless required to safely operate their aircraft.

5.18 USA also called attention to several recently published Notices in the U.S. Federal
Register as Docket No. FAA-2019-0239 and Docket No. FAA-2019-0539.

Update on Surveillance Facilities in Indonesia (IP/15)

5.19 Indonesia considered to reduce the number of radar stations and replace them with
ADS-B ground station. Radar will be kept at some moderate up to high density airspace/airport, and to
support surveillance service at the FIR boundary. Nine of the twelve ATM systems have capability to
process surveillance data (Mode A/C/S/ES and ADS-B) and the rest capable to process Mode A/C/S/ES.
Only 3 of ATM systems have additional capability to receive input Mode S Downlinked Aircraft
Parameters (DAPs). Indonesia has prioritized to upgrade several ATM systems that unable to process
ADS-B data. A-SMGCS installation in Bali has been postponed due to the impact of Covid-19.
Starting on 23rd April 2020, Indonesia has implemented mandatory ADS-B equipment for all transport
category aircraft in 9 terminal areas and 10 airports. It was published in the AIRAC AIP Amendment
Number 89 date 27th February 2020. ADS-B data sharing implemented with Singapore and Australia,
more coordination are ongoing with Philippine, India, PNG, and Malaysia. ADS-C/CPDLC (PBCS)
implemented in August 2020 at Ujung Pandang FIR, while trial operation in Jakarta FIR.

Discussion on Technical Methods to Prevent Runway Incursion

with Operation Verification (IP/16)

5.20 Runway incursion is considered among the high-risk incident categories. China
presented to the meeting on the concept of two kinds of technology means and methods to prevent
runway incursion, as well as the test and verification of the runway incursion prevention system at
Shanghai Hongqiao Airport based on this concept.

5.21 Technical means are mainly implemented to prevent the wrong behaviour that may
cause runway incursion, or to provide warnings and reminders before or during runway incursion
occurrence. It can be divided into two categories.

1) to enhance controllers’ ability to perceive the surface operation situation, detect

conflicts in advance, send out warnings and prevent them from sending out wrong
commands, through the system such as A-SMGCS, Tower Electronic Flight Strip
System, Integrated Tower Automation System, etc.; and

2) to enhance pilots and vehicle drivers’ situational awareness by implementing stop

bar, runway status light system, airborne/vehicle mobile terminal system to provide
them with the common situation information as the controllers, and provide them
with clear runway safety tips.

5.22 As per the traffic and configuration of Shanghai Hongqiao Airport, a comprehensive
demonstration and verification system for preventing runway incursion was successfully implemented
by applying the relevant technical means aforementioned, which consisted of A-SMGCS, Vehicle
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12 Report on Agenda Items

Mobile Terminal System, Video surveillance system, Runway Status Light system (RWSL). The
system effectively prevented runway incursion by applying various technical means.

5.23 China further clarified that the video surveillance system used in the project is a
technology defined in Digital Tower concept to provide panorama view, as enhancement to A-SMGCS
by vision enhancement and MLAT information to improve the situational awareness of tower controller.
The mobile terminal system is applicable to other airports, however, it may require application
customization upon local constraints and user training.

Update on ADS-B Implementation Project in Republic of Korea (IP/19)

5.24 The Republic of Korea originally operated a total of 15 radars. The ADS-B OUT
Service agreement was established in 2013, and the project has been successfully completed and started
operating for enroute air traffic control in May 2020, after finishing a flight inspection and operation
acceptance test. ADS-B ground stations are located in 10 sites with 2 operations stations in Incheon
ACC and Daegu ACC. This ADS-B system and the existing Radar are initially integrated to the ATC
system and then the processed data is transmitted to the controller situation display. Consequently,
ADS-B supplements existing surveillance systems, can detect and monitor aircraft position in Incheon
FIR including Jeju southern region (e.g. ATOTI) which has higher route crossing point density.

5.25 ADS-B is commonly used to supplement existing surveillance systems, as a result,

radar shutdown issues were immediately resolved through improving the amount and utility of
surveillance data. ADS-B system prepared for malfunction of existing air route radars and overcome
radar performance limits as well as improved overall ANS safety The Republic of Korea is gradually
expanding its use of ADS-B and planning to install additional UAT ADS-B stations in the future.

5.26 Republic of Korea clarified to the meeting that the HMI refresh rate of ATM automation
system was 4 seconds after the integration ADS-B data, and will decide ADS-B avionics equipage
mandate plan in 2020.

Updates the Action Plan for Surveillance in China (IP/21)

5.27 CAAC ATMB deployed primary surveillance radars (PSRs), secondary surveillance
radars (SSRs) and ADS-B equipment for air surveillance. Surface Movement Radars (SMRs) and
Multilateration (MLAT) systems have been implemented in major airports.

 Radars

o Operational:29 PSR/SSR combined and 111 SSR

o under construction: 71 sets including12 PSR/SSR combined, 59 SSR

o In total, 31 PSR/SSR combined and 154 SSR.

 ADS-B

o The CAAC ATMB established an ADS-B surveillance network with hierarchical

architecture including ADS-B ground stations, level-3 local data processing stations,
level-2 regional data processing centers and level-1 national data processing centers.

o ATMB installed 329 ADS-B ground stations,36 level-3 local data processing stations,8
level-2 regional data processing centers and 1 level-1 national data processing center
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Report on Agenda Items 13

in China. Trial operation of ADS-B systems have been carried out since October 2019
across the country.

 Surface Movement Radar(SMR)

o A total of 28 busy airports in 24 different cities have planned SMRs, presently 20 busy
airports at 18 cities with SMR operation.

 Multilateration (MLAT)

o MLAT system is mainly used in airports with complex surface operating environments.
It is equipped with SMRs to monitor the airport activity areas, optimize ground taxiing,
and improve operating efficiency. MLAT systems have been operated at busy airports
of 11 different Chinese cities. new MLAT system in other 12 Chinese cities is under
construction. Finally, 28 busy airports in 23 cities will have MLAT deployments.

Latest Update on ADS-B OUT Mandate in Europe (Flimsy/03)

5.28 Hong Kong China informed the meeting about the deferral of European ADS-B
mandate from 7 June 2020 to 7 December 2020. The announcement by European Commission (EC) on
5 May 2020 also included new amendments allowing certain non-ADS-B operations.

Standards to Support Global Interoperability (SP/01)

5.29 As invited by the meeting, Mr. Christian Schleifer Heingärtner, the Secretary General
of EUROCAE presented to the meeting on the role, function, process and available resources of this
worldwide recognised industry standards-development organisation for aviation. The presentation also
covered the domains of activities with highlights on surveillance related updates.

5.30 The meeting expressed its appreciation and gratitude to EUROCAE, encouraged States
to nominate members to attend various technical WG meetings. EUROCAE suggested to focus on
challenges and priorities to effectively balance the needs in different regional environments in making
standards. As it is globally and publically open, EUROCAE encouraged SURICG members to make
use of the online resources by subscribing the email service from EUROCAE webpage at
www.eurocae.net to enhance the engagement with EUROCAE, and benefit from this open consultation
process in the standards development, to gain visibility and have the possibility to provide comments
on draft standards. The meeting highly recognized the value to explore more on better collaboration
with EUROCAE during various meetings in APAC region.

Agenda Item 6: Review Report of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 Meeting and discuss possible
options for future of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG

Review Report of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 Meeting (WP/05)

6.1 The Chairperson of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 from CAA Singapore presented the
Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the South-East Asia/Bay of Bengal Sub-Regional ADS-B
Implementation Working Group (SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15), held in Singapore from 3 to 5 December
2019. The meeting noted updates of ADS-B projects and activities in the South East Asia and Bay of
Bengal sub-regions presented in the meeting report.
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14 Report on Agenda Items

6.2 The meeting reviewed the ADS-B implementation information consolidated by

SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 in the Table of ADS-B Implementation Status in the APAC Region, and
further updated this table which is provided in Appendix C to this Report.

6.3 The ADS-B Data Sharing Implementation Status in the Asia/Pacific Region reviewed
by SEA/BOB WG/15 meeting, was further reviewed and updated by this meeting to reflect significant
development and achievements since the SEA/BOB WG/15. The latest status is provided in
Appendix D to this Report.

6.4 The meeting discussed that surveillance data to support ATFM beyond adjacent FIRs
would be required however, real time of surveillance data for ATFM applications might not be that
critical. Such requirement could be met by a surveillance data base.

Implementation and co-ordination activities and issues observed

6.5 The meeting noted the following updates and information on ADS-B implementation
presented by States and ICCAIA:

- Surveillance Activities in Singapore (IP/10)

- Updates on ADS-B Implementation in China (IP/08)
- ADS-B current activities in Indonesia (IP/11)
- ADS-B Updates in Malaysia (IP/13)
- Ensuring Preparedness for the U.S. 2020 ADS-B Equipage Mandate (IP/07)

- Implementation of Space-Based ADS-B Services over Oceanic Region of Indian

FIRs (IP/03)
- Space-Based ADS-B Update (IP/02)
- ADS-B Application in Beijing ATM Automation System (IP/04)
- Use of CRV for space-based ADS-B Surveillance Data distribution(IP/12)

6.6 Airports Authority of India (AAI) is planning to implement the Space-Based ADS-B
to provide air traffic surveillance over entire oceanic region of Indian Flight Information Region. This
information was also circulated as IP/09 at APANPIRG/30 meeting. Space-Based ADS-B data is
available at Chennai and SAT 1 has been completed. The data is yet to be integrated. Next SAT 2 will
be done after integration of data in Automation System by October 2020 after which, the operational
use would be possible. Malaysia currently is evaluating space-based ADS-B as an alternative solution
for data sharing to cover the small area of airspace within the Bay of Bengal that is without radar
coverage.

6.7 Some performance issues were observed by China including duplicated aircraft
addresses; mismatching on the aircraft status (airborne/on-the-ground); unavailability of Item 18
CODE/ in the flight plan and wrong Aircraft Identification (ACID) from the FMS system. China was
invited to share the identified issues through the regional ADS-B database (APRD) which is available
on the ICAO APAC website. China confirmed that they will input the identified issues into the database
once further analysis and conclusions are made.

Recent ADS-B Avionics Issues Observed in the United States

6.8 USA provided information on four recent ADS-B avionics issues with 1090ES
Version 2 systems:
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Report on Agenda Items 15

(1) Embraer 17x track jumping issue

(2) Collins TSS 4100 Geometric Altitude Reporting as Pressure Altitude
(3) B787 DO-260B/ED-102A track extrapolation issue
(4) B787 NACv=0 issue

6.9 The first three issues have been discussed at prior SEA/BOB or SURICG meetings.
The cause of the first issue remains unknown, though the issue has not been observed in just over a
year. The second issue is a rare condition for which a software fix has been issued by Collins.

6.10 With regard to the third issue, the State regulators of several B787 operators have still
not notified the FAA that the appropriate Boeing Service Bulletin has been applied to their aircraft, per
Airworthiness Directive 2017 NM 118 AD. The paper provided an updated listing of B787 operators
which are listed on the FAA No Services Aircraft List (NSAL), and noted that such aircraft will not be
in compliance with 14 CFR 91.225 (the U.S. ADS B mandate) after January 1, 2020. The paper
reminded States of the proper procedures to have listed B787s removed from the NSAL.

6.11 The fourth issue is newly reported by the U.S. and also impacts compliance with the
U.S. ADS-B mandate if not resolved. Boeing has issued guidance to B787 operators not to intermix
certain Integrated Navigation Receivers (INRs) until a software fix has been implemented for the B787
Integrated Surveillance System (ISS). This guidance was provided in Boeing Multi Operator Message
MOM-MOM-19-0612-01B (dated 01 Nov 2019) and Boeing Fleet Team Digest 787-FTD-34-19005
(dated Nov. 3, 2019). Boeing reported that a Service Bulletin with the ISS software fix is targeted for
availability by the end of December 2019.

India’s Plan and Progress on Implementation of ADS-B Surveillance Data

Sharing with Neighbouring States for Seamless ATM

6.12 India presented information regarding ADS-B surveillance data sharing with
neighbouring States, and the potential Seamless ATM benefits which was also presented to
APANPIRG/30 meeting through WP/18.

6.13 ADS-B data sharing between Myanmar and India had been commissioned in 2018. A
Letter of Agreement (LOA) on ADS-B data sharing was signed between Myanmar and India on 5 May
2015. As per the agreement, data from the Agartala and Port Blair ADS-B stations from India were
being shared with Yangon while the ADS-B data from Sittwe and Coco Islands from Myanmar were
shared with India.

6.14 CANSO expressed congratulations for the successful implementation of data sharing
between India and Myanmar and recalled that the agreement for the surveillance sharing between the
two States was signed at a CANSO event in Japan few years ago. The meeting noted that Indian side is
ready for ADS-B data sharing with Sri Lanka and Maldives.

6.15 The meeting noted that the ADS-B station at Campbell Bay was under installation and
was not yet ready for data sharing with Indonesia and Malaysia.

6.16 The benefits for ADS-B implementation were highlighted including management of
large scale deviations during monsoons, reduction of Large Height Deviations (LHDs), ATC situational
awareness and improvement. As a consequence, India is ready to commence ADS-B data sharing with
other States including Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh as and when possible.

6.17 An AIP Supplement had been promulgated on 25 October 2018 for mandating the
carriage of ADS-B OUT equipage on all aircraft to fly between FL (flight level) 290 to FL 460 within
Indian continental airspace, effective from 01 January 2020. In response to a query, India clarified that
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16 Report on Agenda Items

ADS-B mandate issued by DGCA India was for whole Indian airspace. ADS-B will be used for
awareness purpose for the near term. Using ADS-B for reduction of separation minima would also
require for air/ground COM capability such as DCPC and/or CPDLC.

ADS-B Data Sharing between China/Myanmar & China/Laos PDR.

6.18 China provided updates on their surveillance data sharing plan with Myanmar and Laos
PDR. It was informed that more than 190 flights per day currently passing LINSO, the Entry-Exit Point
between Kunming and Yangon FIR and 160 flights per day passing SAGAG, the Entry-Exit Point
between Kunming and Vientiane FIRs. China considered to build several passages including multiple
parallel air routes of Kunming-Myanmar, Kunming-Laos which would realize the separation of air
flows and meet the increasing traffic demand passing through these areas.

6.19 Kunming FIR is provided with 56 ADS-B ground stations, 5 of which are able to
provide coverage for the boundary areas between China/Myanmar and China/Laos PDR. A level-2
ADS-B Data Processing Center (ADC) has also been commissioned for collecting all ADS-B ground
stations data within Kunming FIR, verifying and fusing the ADS-B data, and providing real and reliable
ADS-B data output. The ADC could customize the output of each version of ASTERIX CAT021 (such
as V0.26, V1.4, V2.1), and could define the output data for specific airspace for the data users. Currently
the ADS-B data from ADC is used by Kunming's ATC automation system and fused with radar data
for track calculation.

6.20 China proposed to conduct the sharing of ADS-B data with Myanmar and Laos PDR
in the following steps for consideration:

a) choose the existing ground transmission link for the ADS-B data sharing; or to
promote the opening of the CRV link;

b) consider the implementation of the transmission link according to the actual

business promotion plan;

c) conduct signal routing, testing and evaluation; and

d) implement ADS-B data sharing and advance data-related applications.

6.21 Myanmar informed the meeting that the ADS-B ground station and surveillance data
processor at Lashio will be installed by the end of February 2020 Myanmar will be ready for further
discussion on surveillance data sharing with China in March 2020.

Outcome of Ad Hoc Groups on South East Asia (SEA) and

Bay of Bengal (BOB) projects

6.22 The meeting reviewed the reports on the Sub-regional ADS-B implementation
plan/projects presented by SEA and BOB Ad Hoc working groups (Singapore was Rapporteur for SEA
while India was for BOB). The discussions were based on the outcome of previous meetings of the
SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/14 and information made available to the meeting. The outcome of discussions
by Ad Hoc groups is provided in Appendix E1 and Appendix E2 to this report which could serve as a
basis for further development of the sub-regional implementation plans and follow-up actions for
coordination by States/Administrations. States/Administrations concerned were urged to take follow-
up actions to achieve early implementation of the identified projects. The Ad Hoc working groups had
also consolidated information on the ADS-B data sharing projects.
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 17

6.23 The meeting appreciated the updates including some new projects on data sharing made
by both Ad Hoc working groups led by Singapore and India. The meeting urged India, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Maldives, China and Myanmar for negotiation on MOU as soon as possible in order to progress
implementation of ADS-B surveillance data sharing among States as early as possible.

Update on ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database (APRD)

6.24 Hong Kong China updated the meeting on the latest status of ADS-B Avionic Problem
Reporting Database (APRD) after its deployment in ICAO APAC web site in 2017. The APRD could
contain useful information of generic ADS-B avionics performance problem commonly encountered in
the Region as well as specific avionics issues that States/Administrations need to pay attention during
the ADS-B Implementation. However, the usage of APRD by States/Administrations appears to be low
since its deployment. States/Administrations were encouraged to make best use of the database to
improve the quality of avionics equipage in ADS-B mandated airspace, report and share avionics issues.
APRD direct link: https://applications.icao.int/ADSB-APRD/login.aspx

6.25 The States/Administrations, which have yet registered for APRD, to nominate point of
contact to ICAO Regional Office for accessing the APRD. States/Administrations were also urged to
report problems of ADS-B avionics and sharing of experience through the APRD.

High Precision Timing on ADS-B

6.26 Singapore presented the usefulness of high precision timing in ADS-B messages for
anti-spoofing purposes. Anti-spoofing can be done in a variety of ways. First method is to verify the
ADS-B position against that reported by a “Wide Area Multi-lateration System”. Second method is to
perform reasonableness check by checking the ADS-B reported position against the one using TDOA
from two or more ADS-B stations from the same manufacturer. Third method is to perform
reasonableness check by checking the ADS-B reported position against the one using TDOA from two
or more ADS-B stations from different manufacturers. However, in this case, there is a need to perform
a correction at the time stamping. After correction, the error on the TDOA position will be about 1.6nm,
which is relatively large. However, it is still useful for anti-spoofing purposes. Even with a stand-alone
receiver, it is possible to use dead-reckoning to determine whether the reported position is reasonable.

6.27 It was concluded from the examples given that high-precision time-stamping is key to
TDOA for verification of ADS-B reported position. States are hence urged to request that high-precision
timing field I021/074 of the ASTERIX CAT 21 be filled when purchasing ADS-B receivers.
Mitigation of Spoofed/False ADS-B Reports

6.28 India introduced a feasible concept and schematic for mitigating the effect of spoofed
ADS-B reports on ATM Automation System which would enhance the civil aviation safety. It requires
some research & development work regarding algorithms. Validated ADS-B reports are authentic and
the integrity of the report will depend on NUC value only.

6.29 Spoofing of tracks becomes very dangerous when the unreal tracks with similar
characteristics are flooded to ATM Automation system. To make ADS-B system spoofing proof, there
are two techniques / concepts or schematics.

a) First one is based on TDOA (time difference of arrived signal). It requires

minimum 4 Ground receivers, geographically separated as per requirement,
number of data links and one central processor for calculating distance and
direction of the RF source to validate the real track. However, this technic is
considered quite expensive; and
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18 Report on Agenda Items

b) The other one technique / concept is integrating UHF direction finder with ADS-B
ground receiver using an external server with algorithms for validating the real
track and transmitting ASTERIX CAT. 21 Data to ATM Automation System for
ATM purpose.

6.30 Some States mentioned that no spoofed reports had been received yet. Back up
procedure control might be used in case of flooding spoofed data received. Cost and benefits should
also be put into consideration for the solution.

Oceanic Procedural Airspace Transition to Enroute Surveillance Airspace

6.31 Singapore and Aireon (a member of ICCAIA) jointly presented the technology changes
and discussed a way in which Oceanic Air Traffic Control could become the same or very similar to
Air Traffic Control as used in continental surveillance airspace.

6.32 The surveillance technology is now operationally available and the achievement of this
transition now depends on the improvement in pilot to ATC communication.

6.33 ICAO will examine and likely develop a separation standard for DCPC type of Satellite
voice communication and ADS-B. Whilst satellite voice communication is not yet used as sole
communications method to support 5 NM separation, increasing performance, reliability and capability
is expected to lead towards this objective.

6.34 Singapore and Canada have successfully demonstrated delivery of satellite voice calls
to the ATC sector responsible for the flight, as well as ATC initiation of calls to aircraft.

6.35 The eventual consequences of such a transition would lead to harmonization of

Continental and Oceanic airspace resulting in

- Saving for airlines, as efficiencies of enroute procedures were brought to Oceanic

Airspace. Capacity increases would be provided; and

- Removal of the need for separate “Oceanic systems”. This has already occurred in
most Asia Pacific States. This will reduce hardware/software maintenance costs
and potentially any remnant organizational silos.

6.36 The meeting reiterated the support to the Conclusion of APANPIRG/30/13 on the same
subject. Consequently, the meeting urged States to review the use of new technologies to improve ATM
and encouraged States/Administrations further evaluate satellite voice communication operational use
scenarios and ICAO is invited to develop the relevant standards in this connection.

Space-based ADS-B and supporting Long Range Communications

6.37 Singapore informed the meeting that Singapore had received the space-based ADS-B
data from Aireon and had conducted flight checks. It was observed that using 125W transponder, the
average Probability of Detection (based on 8 second update rate) is approximately 92%. As for
commercial aircraft (with a transmitting power of around 200W), the Probability of Detection (based
on 8 second update rate) is observed to be approximately 99%.

6.38 Singapore also shared with the meeting on the long range communication that can
potentially be used with space-based ADS-B. With VHF, separation may be reduced to 5nm and 3nm.
With CPDLC, separation can be reduced to 14nm. ICAO is currently evaluating the use of SATVOICE
for radar-like separation. If space-based VHF is made available, radar-like separation may be applied.
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 19

6.39 It was also noted that the ITU World Radio Conference in 2019 (WRC-19) had
approved an agenda for allocation of frequency for space-based VHF (i.e. allowing VHF to be used in
space) to be included for next WRC in 2023. Trials and evaluation will be carried out between 2019 to
2023.

6.40 Singapore also provided information on on-going developments of High-Altitude

mobile stations-based VHF and information on wide Band HF which might achieve RCP240 as
estimated by the industry without provision of strong justifications.

6.41 Upon a query, it was clarified that no difference in accuracy between the data derived
from ADS-B ground station and those received from space-based ADS-B as both are the same position
report broadcasted by aircraft. However, initially, there were some error data indicating high-jack
received from space-based ADS-B reports while actually no such data had been sent from aircraft.
Regarding ADS-B data reports delay, the data from space-based ADS-B reports would take slightly
longer deliver time than those from local ADS-B stations however, such data sometimes received earlier
than those received from remote ADS-B stations via VSAT.

Demonstration on spaced based ADS-B data and DCPC SATVOICE trials

6.42 The meeting appreciated a brief demonstration presented by Singapore on the ADS-B
data derived from space- based ADS-B and the audio recording of HF, VHF and DCPC type of
SATVOICE conversations between ATC controllers and pilots for voice quality comparison. An in-
house developed processing server can filter the ADS-B data for the specified airspace for display or
for onwards transmission to another user.

Improvements in Spaced-based ADS-B Performance following Singapore iSAT

6.43 Reference to PTT presentation of the results of flight check using125 watt transponder
(reduced to 125-watt minimum transmitting power) at iSAT Singapore (see the above paragraph 6.37).
Improvement has been made by Airoen to enhance the probability of detection. A new flight testing
will be conducted with CAA. Singapore to confirm.

ADS-B data sharing with Space-based ADS-B

6.44 ICCAIA (Aireon) introduced the concept of some alternatives for ADS-B data sharing
using space-based ADS-B. The adjacent FIRs can share traffic information derived from space-based
ADS-B. One way would be ANSP FIR1 send part or all of its Space based ADS-B data to FIR 2 if
suitable contractual arrangements can be agreed with the supplier. Another possibility is to consider a
number of ANSPs as a single “consortium” and the space-based ADS-B service provider could provide
a consolidated ADS-B data to each member of the consortium. In response to a query, ICCAIA
confirmed that it could provide space-based ADS-B data to its customers (ANSPs) as and when it
received the relevant data or at any interval without any additional cost. It could also supply to any of
its customers the ADS-B reports received from aircraft within 100 NM outside the customer’s FIR
boundaries at no extra cost.

6.45 In response to a query, ICCAIA confirmed that when setting up a space based service,
the customer can choose (at no extra cost) whether the Aireon data is sent:

a. As it is received (called event driven) or

b. On a periodic basis
These modes are described in ED129B
 SURICG/5
20 Report on Agenda Items

6.46 The meeting noted the proposed options and considered necessary to keep multi-layer
of surveillance services to increase performance reliability at current stage.

Emerging ADS-B Development and Potential Data Sharing collaborations

6.47 Singapore discussed how new technology can be used to help improve ADS-B
coverage and/or provide additional layer(s) of surveillance services and other possible data sharing
collaborations.

6.48 High altitude mobile stations (or high altitude unmanned aircraft) are being developed
by various parties, including Loon, Thales and Airbus. Such stations are able to carry payloads to a
height of 20km or more, over quasi-fixed locations. If ADS-B receivers are mounted on such platforms,
ADS-B coverage can potentially be up to 420nm or more. Unlike space-based ADS-B which require
many satellites to cover a particular area due to its orbit, high altitude mobile stations -based ADS-B
only require minimal number of stations if the area to be covered is not too huge. The high altitude
mobile stations-based ADS-B can form another surveillance layer, in addition to those of terrestrial and
space-based ADS-B. These surveillance layers can back up each other to enhance the availability of
surveillance data.

6.49 In addition to the usual benefits of situation awareness and minimizing large height
deviations, the data may be used to enhance Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM). These emerging
technologies may be harnessed to enhanced ATM and surveillance services.
Possible ADS-B data sharing Collaborations

6.50 Following the Conclusion CNS SG/23/10 (SURICG/4/1) - ADS-B and Flow
Management, there is a need to share surveillance data to provide surveillance from “departure to
destination”. One possible way to achieve it is to set up one or more centralized ADS-B data bases to
collect such data from States who are willing to contribute the data. Contributing States will be allowed
to retrieve the data in accordance with the governance rules. Alternatively, surveillance data could be
shared among a group of States via System Wide Information Management (SWIM). It is possible for
a few States to share ADS-B data in a multi-lateral manner instead of the current bi-lateral arrangement.
Under this concept, a few States will make available their ADS-B data for other contributing States to
access via SWIM.

6.51 Similar to the CRV procurement process, States from a region may collectively procure
space-based or high altitude mobile station-based ADS-B data. Each of these States will receive the
data of the entire region and sieve out whatever it needs. Without such collective procurement, sharing
of space-based or high altitude mobile station-based ADS-B data with other states may require
commercial arrangements with the respective data service providers.

6.52 Open data sharing, i.e., multi-lateral collaboration instead of the current bi-lateral
collaboration, may be required to support new ATM applications such as ATFM.

6.53 States/Administrations were encouraged to consider the applications of various

technologies to provide alternative ADS-B services and consider open data sharing to support new ATM
applications in the near future.

Review Action Items and ToR of the WG

6.54 The Secretariat presented the current TOR of the SEA/BOB ADS-B Implementation
Working Group for review by the meeting. The meeting recalled the discussions on the future focus of
the working group at the previous meetings of the WG. The meeting also reviewed current action items
resulted from the previous meeting as part of its work programme of the Working Group. The meeting
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 21

closed 5 action items and keep three outstanding action items. The potential actions items derived from
the proposed amendment to the TOR of SEA/BOB ADS-B Working Group and the proposed TOR of
the regional ADS-B Working Group is also included into the list of action items for consideration by
SURICG. The consolidated list of task/action items is provided in Appendix B1 to this Report.

Achievement and future of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG

6.55 The meeting reviewed and discussed the paper jointly presented by Singapore, CANSO
and the Secretariat. The meeting recalled that the SEA ADS-B WG was established by APANPIRG in
2007 through APANPIRG conclusion 18/38. In 2011, SEA ADS-B WG was renamed as SEA/BOB
ADS WG. The meeting reviewed the achievements of the working group as listed below:

a) Producing the cost sharing framework;

b) Producing the draft data sharing agreement;
c) Producing the templates for ADS-B mandates;
d) Working out the sub-regional implementation plan;
e) Harmonization of avionics requirement;
f) Successful implementation of data sharing;
g) Reduction of separation from Singapore to Hong Kong China; and
h) Implementation of the ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database;

6.56 The meeting discussed next step and the possible future work for the ADS-B WG
including a number of new tasks identified in the proposed amendment to TOR. These new items
include required harmonisation for a regional ADS-B mandate for upper airspace; studying and
contributing to drafting of standards by RTCA, EUROCAE and ICAO Panels; and promotion of open
sharing ADS-B data via a regional data base and/or SWIM over CRV.

6.57 The meeting further reviewed the proposed amendment to current TOR to incorporate
the above added items in Appendix F1 to this Report. The meeting also discussed whether the
SEA/BOB ADS WG should be closed and a new working group – regional ADS-B working group be
established to deal with identified new subject/works specified in the TOR provided in Appendix F2
to this Report. The meeting further considered an option to merge the work of the working group into
work programme of SURICG. The meeting discussed benefits and cost of each option. The member
States which participated in meeting expressed their preference for one of the following options:

a) Close SEA/BOB WG and transfer remaining tasks to SURICG:

Supported by: Malaysia, China, Hong Kong China and Myanmar; (only one meeting
per years versus– six-month interval, efficiency concerns)

b) Continue SEA/BOB ADS-B Implementation WG:

Singapore; Indonesia; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India (small groups more effective for
discussions and focusing ADS-B related deliverable)

c) Establish a new regional dedicated ADS-B WG meeting:

Thailand; Viet Nam prefer for establishment of a new group to deal with ADS-B related
matters including the surveillance data sharing.

6.58 As SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 submitted the discussions outcome to SURICG for
consider final decision on the way forward, in order to facilitate the discussion of SURICG/5, secretariat
prepared the flimsy/05 to summarize the future options for SEA/BOB ADS-B WG in two options:
 SURICG/5
22 Report on Agenda Items

Option 1: To be integrated with SURICG

SEA/BOB ADS-B WG has completed most of their objectives. On-going
tasks could be transferred to SURICG, and SURICG could be expanded from
3 to 4 days to cater for integration.

With emerging task forces/working groups under CNS Sub-group, it would

be appropriate to close long-established WG with objectives fulfilled.

Option 2: To be continued
SEA/BOB ADS-B WG was an effective working group with focus on ADS-
B matters and data-sharing projects. A smaller group structure can provide
greater flexibilities. If needed, the scope and TOR of the WG could be
expanded to suit the prevailing needs of the region.

6.59 The meeting further discussed pros and cons of Option 1 and Option 2, but could not
reach a consensus by all members of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG. As such a vote was proposed and
conducted among members of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG on the aforementioned two options. Australia,
China, Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and IATA supported
Option 1, while the Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam and CANSO supported Option 2. Finally, based
on the outcomes of the vote, the meeting agreed to formulate the following draft decision on the future
of SEA/BOB ADS-B Working Group:

Draft Conclusion SURICG/5/2 - Dissolution of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG

What: Noting that most of the tasks outlined in the TOR have been Expected impact:
achieved and the completion of residual part of action items ☐ Political / Global
will be performed by SURICG, ☐ Inter-regional
☒ Economic
That, the SEA/BOB ADS-B WG be dissolved. ☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: The SEA/BOB ADS-B WG terms of
reference have been completed and pending action Follow-up: ☐Required from States
items will be performed by SURICG.
When: 4-Dec-20 Status: To be adopted by Sub Group
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☒APANPIRG ☒Other:
SURICG

6.60 The meeting highly recognized the great achievements made by SEA/BOB ADS-B
WG in past years, SURICG was requested to carefully design future meeting structure in four days to
maintain the effectiveness in promoting ADS-B and implementing data sharing.

6.61 The meeting further updated the ADS-B data sharing between China and Myanmar,
China and Lao PDR, as well as the alternative communication line between India and Myanmar. The
meeting agreed to follow these issues as ACTION ITEMs of SURICG, and ICAO secretariat was
requested to provide offline support.

Agenda Item 7: Review Report of DAPs WG/3 Meeting

7.1 Under this agenda item, the meeting reviewed outcome of the Third Meeting of the
Mode S DAPS Working Group through WP/06 presented by the co-chairs of the WG.
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 23

7.2 The third meeting of the Mode S DAPS Working Group was held on 12 to 14 May
2020 via video conference. The meeting was attended by 64 participants from Australia, China, Hong
Kong - China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, United States, and IFALPA. The meeting report and papers discussed in the meeting
is available at: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2020-DAPs-WG3.aspx.

Utilization of Mode-S DAPs Data for Weather Forecast

7.3 As advanced ATM, like Trajectory Based Operation (TBO), requires high-accurate
trajectory prediction. One of major factors of estimated flight time error in TBO is weather uncertainty.
DAPs data are expected to be useful for improving numerical weather prediction because temporal and
spatial intervals of DAPs data are very short. Japan conducted experiments for improving weather
forecast accuracy by utilizing DAPs data extracted from BDS 5,0 and BDS 6,0, and the experimental
results indicated that Mode S DAPs data have a potential to improve weather forecasts.

Guidance Material for Assignment of Interrogator Codes (IC)

for MLAT and ADS-B

7.4 In the previous Mode S DAPs WG meetings, there were discussions on which II codes
should be used by MLAT and ADS-B with interrogators. In practice, interrogators for MLAT are
assigned II code = 0. While its logical for II code = 0 to be used for such equipment, some of the content
in the Annex 10 Vol 4 and Doc 9924 seemed to either contradict or do not give clear indication.

For example: Section 3.1.2.5.2.1.2.3 of Annex 10 Vol 4 states that II Code = 0 shall only be used for
supplementary acquisition in conjunction with acquisition based on lockout override.
7.5 While the ICAO provisions do provide some guidance on the use of II Codes = 0, it
does not provide the reader with clear guidance whether interrogators installed with MLAT and ADS-
B may use II Code = 0.

7.6 The ICAO Surveillance Panel (SP) Aeronautical Surveillance Working Group
(ASWG) has been informed in Sep 2019 on the lack of guidance material relating to this issue. During
the ASWG meeting, it was generally agreed that II=0 may be used for interrogators in both MLAT and
ADS-B. It is expected that new text will be adopted by ASWG sometime this year.

II/SI Operations

7.7 In order for radars to use SI codes, the aircraft have to be SI capable. Although ICAO
mandated that all aircraft transponders have to be SI capable by 1 January 2003, but not all are SI
capable.

7.8 Non SI capable transponders will only be able to recognize the last 4 bits, hence will
mistakenly lock out to other radars with different SI codes, but with the same last 4 bits. To work around
the situation, parts of Europe employed a special mode of operation known as the II/SI Operation. Under
this operations, the radar will only lock-out aircraft with SI capable transponder but will not lock out
non-SI capable transponder.

Mode S Roadmap

7.9 MODE S DAPS WG/3 discussed the recommended the following roadmap for various
Mode S DAPs related issues to be adopted by SURICG.

Mode S Mandates

7.10 Considering that a number of applications will require Mode S, and that it would be
easier for new aircraft to be fitted with Mode S upon delivery rather than to retrofit at a later date. It is
also noted that EHS can support more applications than ELS, States are strongly encouraged to mandate
forward fit of Mode S of EHS by 1 Jan 2022. IATA expressed support to Mode S in general. As for
retrofitting existing airframes equipped with Mode A/C with Mode S transponders, the proposed
 SURICG/5
24 Report on Agenda Items

timeframe for 1 Jan 2022 was tight for airlines that had portions of their fleet with Mode A/C only. It
was a challenging target date to meet in normal circumstances and with the impact of the COVID crisis
on airline economics, it could become even more challenging. As such, the meeting agreed to defer
retrofit of Mode S transponder to DAPs WG for further deliberation. IATA would also be invited to
take part in discussion on Mode S roadmap/mandate in the coming meetings of DAPs WG.

Draft Conclusion SURICG/5/3(DAPS WG3/1) - Mode S Forward Fit Equipage in

APAC Region
What: Regarding fitment of Mode S equipage, Expected impact:
☐ Political / Global
That, States/Administrations in APAC Region be strongly ☐ Inter-regional
encouraged to mandate that registered aircraft with a maximum ☒ Economic
certified take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg or having a maximum ☐ Environmental
cruising true airspeed capability greater than 250 knots, with a date ☒ Ops/Technical
of manufacture on or after 1 January 2022 be equipped with Mode S
avionics compliant with EHS.
Why: Considering that a number of
DAPs applications will require Mode S, most
aircraft already have Elementary Mode S and that Follow-up: ☐Required from States
it’s easy for new aircraft to be equipped with
Enhanced Mode S.
When: 16-Dec-20 Status: To be adopted by PIRG
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☒APANPIRG ☐ICAO HQ
☒Other: SURICG

Use of SI Codes

7.11 Parts of Asia Pacific may require the use of SI code due to high concentration of Mode
S radars. Other parts may not. It is possible for certain regions in Asia Pacific to commence the use of
SI codes first while the rest continue to uses the II code first. To overcome the issue with non SI-capable
aircraft, the II/SI Code Operation may also be considered.

Radar Clustering

7.12 Very few States are practicing radar clustering. States with the competency and
operational requirement may apply such technique.

Use of Conspicuity Code

7.13 Most Asia Pacific States still uses Mode A codes for flight plan coupling. In
anticipation that Mode S codes would be used in future, it was agreed that the Mode A code of 1000 be
reserved as the conspicuity code for Asia Pacific so as to match the European region. It is likely to take
many years before all States can support this capability across APAC and EUR. The ATM systems must
support the conspicuity code feature. In preparation on the use of the conspicuity code, States
developing new automation systems are encouraged to include the conspicuity code capability into the
system.

Weather Reporting Capability

7.14 Based on information provided by aircraft manufacturers, there is currently no service

bulletins that will help upgrade aircraft with such weather reporting capability. There is also currently
no plan to develop such upgrades. It is envisaged that weather reporting capability will be available in
the next generation transponder. Instead of mandating weather reporting capability, it may be more
practical to Mandate Enhanced Mode S and derive weather information using algorithms.
 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 25

Datalink Map

7.15 Europe is experiencing very high usage of the 1090MHz frequency. In order to prevent
States from over interrogating, Europe has a datalink map which restricts the registers that States can
extract from. Europe even have rules stating that Mode S radars should not actively interrogate for
Mode A and Flight ID unless there is a change. At this moment, the frequency congestion situation
within Asia Pacific is not as severe as that in Europe. Hence it is not foreseen that such datalink map is
required soon within APAC region.
7.16 The SURICG/5 meeting noted the effectiveness and achievements made by DAPs WG
in last year, and recognized that the complex situation in publishing the regional roadmap on evolving
Mode S technology, Mode S DAPs WG was then tasked to conduct more studies and further polish the
roadmap, aiming to formulate a new version for consideration by SURICG/6 meeting in 2021.

Amendments to the Guidance Materials

7.17 The edition 1.0 of the Mode S DAPs IGD has been adopted in 2019 to provide guidance
for States in the implementation and operational application. The Mode S DAPs WG made further
improvements to the Mode S DAPs IGD. The main changes include adding introduction of Mode S
DAPs data source, additional text for Mode S mandates, supplement benefits to ATC operation brought
by Mode S DAPs, revise procedure of DAPs extraction, refine the regulations and procedures related
to the use of ICAO 24-bit Aircraft Address/Aircraft Identification and add one specific example of
Mode S DAPs application.

7.18 The table below indicated the relevant sections with the amendments.

Section Contents
1.2.1 Mode S and DAPs
3 Reference
4.1 Mode S ELS
4.2 Mode S EHS
7.1 Mandating Mode S DAPs
7.3.4 Interrogate Comm-B Data
7.4.1 Elementary Surveillance
9.2 Use of ACAS RA
Appendix 4 A Brief Introduction of Mode S DAPs Data
Source

7.19 Accordingly, the SURICG/5 formulated the following draft Conclusion for
consideration by CNS SG/24 meeting.

Draft Decision SURICG/5/4(DAPS WG3/2) - Mode S DAPs IGD 2.0

What: That, the Mode S DAPs Implementation and Expected impact:
Operation Guidance Document Edition 2.0 provided in Appendix G ☐ Political / Global
to this Report be adopted. ☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: Editorial
correction and revision to reflect regional updates Follow-up: ☐Required from States
in implementation.
When: 4-Dec-20 Status: To be adopted by Sub group
Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☐ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other:
 SURICG/5
26 Report on Agenda Items

Allocation of 24-Bit Aircraft Addresses

7.20 The Mode S DAPs WG was briefed on possible changes to the allocation of 24-bit
aircraft addresses.

7.21 Blocks of 24-bit aircraft addresses are assigned to States by ICAO. Each block is
defined by a fixed pattern of the first 4, 6, 9, 12 or 14 bits of the 24-bit address. Thus, blocks of different
sizes (1,048,576, 262,144, 32,768, 4,096 and 1,024 consecutive addresses) are made available.

7.22 In the last decade, some States with 1,024 addresses have developed their air hub and
does not have enough addresses. The SP-ASWG has tasked its Technical Sub-group (TSG) to
investigate/identify options for additional allocation of 24-bit aircraft addresses to States who currently
have a small number of addresses (such as 1024).

Other topics discussed

7.23 Other topics discussed include Mode S parameter sets, DAPs extraction strategy, Roll-
call schedule management, aircraft parameters availability, experiences in SSR Mode S mixed mode
(mode S and Mode A/C) and handling of empty Resolution Advisory messages.

Terms of reference

7.24 The Mode S DAPs WG/3 reviewed the Terms of Reference that was adopted by
SURICG/4 through Decision SURICG 4/4. The meeting proposed minor editorial changes to the TOR,
and included Australia, Indonesia, Nepal and Sri Lanka as new members. USA will continue to join the
DAPs WG activities as observer. The revised Terms of Reference is provided as Appendix H.

Decision SURICG/5/5 - Revised TOR of Mode S DAPs WG

What: That, the revised Terms of Reference of Mode S Expected impact:
DAPs Working Group provided in Appendix H to the Report be ☐ Political / Global
adopted. ☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: Editorial
correction and revision to reflect regional updates Follow-up: ☐Required from States
in implementation.
When: 24-Sep-20 Status: Referred back to WG/TF
Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☐ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ
☒Other:SURICG

Agenda Item 8: Review ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (AIGD)

8.1 Under this agenda, Hong Kong China led the discussion and incorporation of materials
to update AIGD during the meeting with amendments including the content of WP/7, IP/4, IP/7 and
IP14 presented by Japan, USA and secretariat, as well as retrofitting content of WP/6 from SURICG/2
presented by New Zealand. Proposed changes to AIGD are summarized as below:

 Updated the status of known ADS-B avionics problems in Attachment A of

Appendix 2 “List of known ADS-B avionics problems”, including:
o B787 NACv = 0 Issue

 Updated Section 5.1.4.5.1 on ICAO Aircraft Address Monitoring

 Added the following new sections:

 SURICG/5
Report on Agenda Items 27

o Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface Movement (Section 9.3.6)

o 1090 MHz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issue with Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) (Section 9.3.7)
o Measures for Enhancing the Security of ADS-B (Section 10.3)
o Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) Based Position Verification Method
(Section 10.3.1)

8.2 The meeting agreed to formulate the following draft Conclusion for consideration by
CNS SG/24 meeting.

Draft Conclusion SURICG/5/6 - Revised ADS-B Implementation and Operations

Guidance Document (AIGD)
What: That, the revised ADS-B Implementation and Expected impact:
Operations Guidance Document (AIGD) provided in Appendix I to ☐ Political / Global
the Report, which consolidated all change proposals during ☐ Inter-regional
SURICG/5, be adopted as Version 13. ☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: Updates and editorial correction Follow-up: ☐Required from States
Status: Draft to be adopted by
When: 4 Dec 2020
Subgroup
Who: ☒CNS Sub group ☐APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ

8.3 The meeting thanked Hong Kong China, Japan, USA and New Zealand for efforts in
keeping the AIGD updated.

Agenda Item 9: Next meeting & any other business

SSR Reception Malfunction Caused by UAV Video Transmitter (IP/10)

9.1 This paper explained the dangers of video transmitter used in Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle(UAV) through the recent SSR reception malfunction by RF-interference.

9.2 The first abnormal phenomenon caused by radio interference was occurred in signal
processors of second surveillance radar(SSR). RF-interference on SSR can also affect DME. When SSR
reception malfunction by RF-interference occurred, the reply efficiency of DME decreased
significantly.

9.3 The UAV video transmitter device is using 1,080MHz to 1,200MHz, which overlapped
the frequencies of SSR and DME, and may have a significant impact on SSR and DME.

Update of Surveillance Panel (ASWG) (Flimsy/04)

9.4 ICAO Surveillance Panel’s Aeronautical Surveillance Working Group (ASWG) met
from Sept 21 to 25 September 2020 in VTC. SP member nominated by Singapore informed SURICG/5
on the relevant updates from the first three days of ASWG, including clarification on BDS 6,2 for Doc
9871, proposal on Common Clock Architecture of MLAT for Doc 9924, update to increase of squitter
rate (Annex Vol 4), introduction of ACAS Xa Xo (Doc 9863), issues need to be addressed in using
1090 MHz, development of Version 3 transponder, proposal for allocation of additional 24-bit aircraft
address, proposal to correct the Metric AC Altitude Field Encoding, assignment of II code for MLAT
and ADS-B, and unwanted power of some newer type transmitter.
 SURICG/5
28 Report on Agenda Items

Date and Venue for the Next Meeting

9.5 The meeting discussed the next time to meet, and agreed that SURICG/6 was
tentatively scheduled for 27-30 April 2021.

Note of appreciation

9.6 On behalf of the Group, Mr. MH Hui, Co-chair of SURICG from Hong Kong China,
expressed thankfulness to the ICAO APAC Regional Office, all participants from member
states/administrations, and international organizations, including CANSO, EUROCAE, IATA,
ICCAIA, IFATCA and PCCW Global, for their significant contributions in making the meeting a
successful and fruitful one. He gave a brief summary on the achievements by the SURICG in this
meeting while highlighting the key issues discussed and addressed. He believed that with the strong
dedication and unfailing support from all, the SURICG would upkeep our good work and momentum
to continue taking a significant role in shaping the future direction of surveillance implementation for
this region.

____________
 SURICG/5
Appendix A to the Report

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

REGIONAL SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE ASTERIX INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENT (ICD)

FOR THE ASIA/PAC REGION

THIRD EDITION

September 2020

Issued by the ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional Office, Bangkok

 APX. A - 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1. General .................................................................................................................................. 2

2. Syntax ................................................................................................................................... 2

3. Assignment of the Systems Identifiers ................................................................................. 3

4. System Area Code (SAC) Allotment Scheme ...................................................................... 4

Table 1 – System Area Codes

5. System Identification Code (SIC) Assignment ..................................................................... 5

Sample Format

6. System Identification Code (SIC) – Australia ...................................................................... 6

7. System Identification Code (SIC) – Brunei Darussalam ...................................................... 12

8. System Identification Code (SIC) – People’s Republic of China ......................................... 13

9. System Identification Code (SIC) – Hong Kong, China ....................................................... 15

10. System Identification Code (SIC) – Macao, China............................................................... 16

11. System Identification Code (SIC) – Indonesia ..................................................................... 17

12. System Identification Code (SIC) – Lao People’s Democratic Republic ............................. 18

13. System Identification Code (SIC) – Malaysia ...................................................................... 19

14. System Identification Code (SIC) – Myanmar ..................................................................... 20

15. System Identification Code (SIC) – New Zealand................................................................ 21

16. System Identification Code (SIC) – Papua New Guinea ...................................................... 22

17. System Identification Code (SIC) – Philippines ................................................................... 23

18. System Identification Code (SIC) – Republic of Korea........................................................ 24

19. System Identification Code (SIC) – Singapore ..................................................................... 25

20. System Identification Code (SIC) – Sri Lanka ..................................................................... 26

21. System Identification Code (SIC) – Thailand ...................................................................... 27

22. System Identification Code (SIC) – Vietnam ....................................................................... 28

 APX. A - 2

Regional Supplement to the

All Purpose Structured Eurocontrol Surveillance
Information Exchange (ASTERIX) ICD
for the ASIA/PAC Region

System Area Code (SAC) and

System Identification Code (SIC)

ADDRESSING SCHEME OF RADAR DATA EXCHANGE

1. General

In order to avoid ambiguity, every radar system (i.e. radar sensor, radar data processing
system, server) shall have a unique identification within the Asia and Pacific regions to
represent either a radar source or a sink, participating in the radar data exchange.

2. Syntax

The format of System Identifier field of radar data exchange shall be composed of two
subfields as illustrated below:

SAC SIC

Field Name Element Type Field Size

SAC System Area Code Binary One octet
SIC System Identification Code Binary One octet

2.1 System Area Code (SAC)

2.1.1 The SAC field shall consist of an eight-bit number assigned to a country or a territory.

2.1.2 The SAC field format shall be as illustrated below:

MSB
b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1

Where: b represents a binary digit and the MSB stands for Most Significant Bit

2.1.3 System Identification Code (SIC)

2.1.3.1 The SIC shall consist of an eight-bit number assigned to each radar system (radar sensor,
processing system, server, etc.) located in the country or territory as defined by the SAC.
 APX. A - 3

2.1.3.2 The SIC field format shall be as illustrated below:

MSB
b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1

Where: b represents a binary digit and MSB stands for the Most Significant Bit

2.1.4 The individual SICs are assigned by the National Administration concerned within
the area identified by the SAC and are published in the this Document.

2.1.5 Within a country or territory identified by a SAC up to 256 individual codes (SICs)
can be assigned.

2.1.6 The SICs shall be indicated by decimal and presented by binary in their relevant tables.

2.1.7 Recommendation The assignment of SICs could be divided into groups by different
functions and facilities categories.

3. Assignment of the Systems Identifiers

3.1 System Area Codes

3.1.1 One SAC is assigned to each country or territory.

3.1.2 Recommendation When needed, more than one SAC could be assigned to a single
country or territory, for example, to differentiate between civil and military
applications.

3.1.3 The SACs allotment is provided in the Table 1 - System Area Codes (SAC)

3.1.4 Amendments to the System Area Codes (SAC) shall be coordinated by ICAO
ASIA/PAC Regional office.
 APX. A - 4

System Area Code (SAC) Allotment Scheme

(by country alphabet order and even hexadecimal numbers)

Table 1 - System Area Codes

SAC Country/ Binary SAC Country/ Binary

(Hexad) Geographical Area Representation (Hexad) Geographical Area Representation

02 American Samoa 0000 0010 50 Mongolia 0101 0000

04 Australia 0000 0100 52 Myanmar 0101 0010
A4 Australia 1010 0100 54 Nauru 0101 0100
06 Bangladesh 0000 0110 56 Nepal 0101 0110
08 Bhutan 0000 1000 58 New Caledonia 0101 1000
10 Brunei Darussalam 0001 0000 60 New Zealand 0110 0000
12 Cambodia 0001 0010 62 Niue Island 0110 0010
16 China 0001 0110 64 Pakistan 0110 0100
18 Hong Kong, China 0001 1000 66 Palau 0110 0110
20 Taibei, China 0010 0000 68 Papua New Guinea 0110 1000
22 Cook Islands 0010 0010 72 Philippines 0111 0010
24 DPR. of Korea 0010 0100 74 Republic of Korea 0111 0100
26 Fiji 0010 0110 76 Samoa 0111 0110
28 French Polynesia 0010 1000 78 Singapore 0111 1000
30 India 0011 0000 80 Solomon Islands 1000 0000
32 Indonesia 0011 0010 82 Sri Lanka 1000 0010
34 Japan 0011 0100 84 Thailand 1000 0100
36 Kiribati 0011 0110 86 Tonga 1000 0110
38 Lao PDR. 0011 1000 88 Tuvalu 1000 1000
40 Macao, China 0100 0000 90 United States 1001 0000
42 Malaysia 0010 1010B 92 Vanuatu 1001 0010
44 Maldives 0100 0100 94 Vietnam 1001 0100
46 Marshall Islands 0100 0110 96 Wallis Islands 1001 0110
48 Micronesia 0100 1000

* 14, 70 is intentionally left blank

 APX. A - 5

System Identification Codes (SIC) Assignment

by country alphabet order

(Sample Format)

SIC Radar Data System Radar Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)
Radars in Terminal Areas
001 Location A PSR/SSR 0000 0001
002 B PSR/MSSR 0000 0010
003 C PSR/MSSR 0000 0011
065 D PSR/MSSR 0100 0001
066 PSR/MSSR 0100 0010
E

Radars in En-Route Airspace

132 Location F MSSR 1000 0100
133 G SSR 1000 0101
134 X MSSR 1000 0110
135 MSSR 1000 0111
195 Y SSR 1100 0011
196 Z SSR 1100 0100

Processing Systems
228 ATCC - RDPA 1110 0100
229 ATCC – RDPB 1110 0101
 APX. A - 6

AUSTRALIA

1. System Identification Code (SIC)

Table 1: Proposed SIC assignment for Australia – grouped into functions and facilities categories.

SIC Range Type

(Decimal)

0001 – 0010 ATC Centres

0011 – 0040 Terminal Area Radar Stations
0041 – 0080 Enroute Radar Stations
0081 – 0200 ADS-B Ground Stations
0200 – 0255 Reserved for Military

Table 2: Detailed SIC assignment for Australia

SIC System Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)
0001 Reserved Undefined 0000 0001
0002 Brisbane TAAATS ATC Centre 0000 0010
Centre
0003 Melbourne TAAATS ATC Centre 0000 0011
Centre
0004 Reserved Undefined 0000 0100
0005 Reserved Undefined 0000 0101
0006 Reserved Undefined 0000 0110
0007 Reserved Undefined 0000 0111
0008 Reserved Undefined 0000 1000
0009 Reserved Undefined 0000 1001
0010 Reserved Undefined 0000 1010
0011 Redden Creek PSR/MSSR 0000 1011
0012 Brisbane PSR/MSSR 0000 1100
0013 Mt Sommerville PSR/MSSR 0000 1101
0014 Sydney PSR/MSSR 0000 1110
0015 Mt Majura PSR/MSSR 0000 1111
0016 Gellibrand Hill PSR/MSSR 0001 0000
0017 Adelaide PSR/MSSR 0001 0001
0018 Perth PSR/MSSR 0001 0010
0019 Transportable PSR/MSSR 0001 0011
0020 Reserved Undefined 0001 0100
0021 Reserved Undefined 0001 0101
0022 Reserved Undefined 0001 0110
0023 Reserved Undefined 0001 0111
0024 Reserved Undefined 0001 1000
0025 Reserved Undefined 0001 1001
0026 Reserved Undefined 0001 1010
0027 Reserved Undefined 0001 1011
0028 Reserved Undefined 0001 1100
0029 Reserved Undefined 0001 1101
 APX. A - 7

AUSTRALIA (CONT’D)

SIC System Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)
0030 Reserved Undefined 0001 1110
0031 Reserved Undefined 0001 1111
0032 Reserved Undefined 0010 0000
0033 Reserved Undefined 0010 0001
0034 Reserved Undefined 0010 0010
0035 Reserved Undefined 0010 0011
0036 Reserved Undefined 0010 0100
0037 Reserved Undefined 0010 0101
0038 Reserved Undefined 0010 0110
0039 Reserved Undefined 0010 0111
0040 Reserved Undefined 0010 1000
0041 Hans Tableland MSSR 0010 1001
0042 Mt Alma MSSR 0010 1010
0043 Swampy Ridge MSSR 0010 1011
0044 Tabletop MSSR 0010 1100
0045 Mt Hardgrave MSSR 0010 1101
0046 The Round Mountain MSSR 0010 1110
0047 Mt Boyce MSSR 0010 1111
0048 Mt Bobbora MSSR 0011 0000
0049 Mt Macedon MSSR 0011 0001
0050 Summertown MSSR 0011 0010
0051 Kalamunda MSSR 0011 0011
0052 Reserved Undefined 0011 0100
0053 Reserved Undefined 0011 0101
0054 Reserved Undefined 0011 0110
0055 Reserved Undefined 0011 0111
0056 Reserved Undefined 0011 1000
0057 Reserved Undefined 0011 1001
0058 Reserved Undefined 0011 1010
0059 Reserved Undefined 0011 1011
0060 Reserved Undefined 0011 1100
0061 Reserved Undefined 0011 1101
0062 Reserved Undefined 0011 1110
0063 Reserved Undefined 0011 1111
0064 Reserved Undefined 0100 0000
0065 Reserved Undefined 0100 0001
0066 Reserved Undefined 0100 0010
0067 Reserved Undefined 0100 0011
0068 Reserved Undefined 0100 0100
0069 Reserved Undefined 0100 0101
0070 Reserved Undefined 0100 0110
0071 Reserved Undefined 0100 0111
0072 Reserved Undefined 0100 1000
0073 Reserved Undefined 0100 1001
0074 Reserved Undefined 0100 1010
0075 Reserved Undefined 0100 1011
 APX. A - 8

AUSTRALIA (CONT’D)

SIC System Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)
0076 Reserved Undefined 0100 1100
0077 Reserved Undefined 0100 1101
0078 Reserved Undefined 0100 1110
0079 Reserved Undefined 0100 1111
0080 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0000
0081 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0001
0082 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0010
0083 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0011
0084 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0100
0085 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0101
0086 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0110
0087 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 0111
0088 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1000
0089 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1001
0090 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1010
0091 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1011
0092 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1100
0093 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1101
0094 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1110
0095 Reserved for ADS-B 0101 1111
0096 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 0000
0097 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 0001
0098 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 0010
0099 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 0011
0100 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 0100
0101 ADS-B Test bed ADS-B Ground Station 0110 0101
0102 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 0110
0103 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 0111
0104 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 1000
0105 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 1001
0106 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 1010
0107 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 1011
0108 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 1100
0109 Reserved for ADS-B 0110 1101
0110 Bundaberg (DSGK) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0110 1110
0111 Bundaberg (DSGK) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0110 1111
0112 Caiguna (CAG) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0000
0113 Caiguna (CAG) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0001
0114 Esperance (ESP) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0010
0115 Esperance (ESP) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0011
0116 Ayres Rock (AYE) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0100
0117 Ayres Rock (AYE) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0101
0118 Warburton (WBR) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0110
0119 Warburton (WBR) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 0111
0120 Broken Hill (BHI) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1000
 APX. A - 9

AUSTRALIA (CONT’D)

SIC System Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)
0121 Broken Hill (BHI) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1001
0122 Jackson (JAK) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1010
0123 Jackson (JAK) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1011
0124 Birdsville (BDV) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1100
0125 Birdsville (BDV) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1101
0126 Billabong (BLB) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1110
0127 Billabong (BLB) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 0111 1111
0128 Thursday Is (TUD) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0000
0129 Thursday Is (TUD) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0001
0130 Meekathara (MEK) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0010
0131 Meekathara (MEK) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0011
0132 Oodnadatta (OOD) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0100
0133 Oodnadatta (OOD) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0101
0134 Karratha (KA) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0110
0135 Karratha (KA) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 0111
0136 Longreach (LRE) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1000
0137 Longreach (LRE) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1001
0138 Doongan (DGN) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1010
0139 Doongan (DGN) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1011
0140 Woomeras (WRA) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1100
0141 Woomeras (WRA) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1101
0142 Newman (NWN) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1110
0143 Newman (NWN) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1000 1111
0144 Leonora (LEO) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0000
0145 Leonora (LEO) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0001
0146 Balgo Hills (BGO) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0010
0147 Balgo Hills (BGO) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0011
0148 Mt Isa (MA) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0100
0149 Mt Isa (MA) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0101
0150 Tennant Creek (TNK) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0110
0151 Tennant Creek (TNK) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 0111
0152 Nullabor (NUB) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1000
0153 Nullabor (NUB) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1001
0154 Broome (BRM) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1010
0155 Broome (BRM) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1011
0156 Mornington Is. (MTI) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1100
0157 Mornington Is. (MTI) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1101
0158 Mt Oxley (MXL) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1110
0159 Mt Oxley (MXL) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1001 1111
0160 Alice Springs (AS) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1010 0000
0161 Alice Springs (AS) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1010 0001
0162 Mt Barrow (BOW) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1010 0010
0163 Mt Barrow (BOW) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1010 0011
0164 Telfer (TEF) GS#01 ADS-B Ground Station 1010 0100
0165 Telfer (TEF) GS#02 ADS-B Ground Station 1010 0101
0166 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 0110
 APX. A - 10

AUSTRALIA (CONT’D)

SIC System Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)
0167 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 0111
0168 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1000
0169 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1001
0170 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1010
0171 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1011
0172 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1100
0173 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1101
0174 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1110
0175 Reserved for ADS-B 1010 1111
0176 Reserved for ADS-B 1011 0000
0177 Reserved for ADS-B 1011 0001
0178 Reserved for ADS-B 1011 0010
0179 Reserved for ADS-B 1011 0011
0180 Unused 1011 0100
0181 Unused 1011 0101
0182 Unused 1011 0110
0183 Unused 1011 0111
0184 Unused 1011 1000
0185 Unused 1011 1001
0186 Unused 1011 1010
0187 Unused 1011 1011
0188 Unused 1011 1100
0189 Unused 1011 1101
0190 Unused 1011 1110
0191 Unused 1011 1111
0192 Unused 1100 0000
0193 Unused 1100 0001
0194 Unused 1100 0010
0195 Unused 1100 0011
0196 Unused 1100 0100
0197 Unused 1100 0101
0198 Unused 1100 0110
0199 Unused 1100 0111
0200 Unused 1100 1000
0201 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1100 1001
0202 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1100 1010
0203 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1100 1011
0204 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1100 1100
0205 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1100 1101
0206 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1100 1110
0207 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1100 1111
0208 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0000
0209 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0001
0210 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0010
 APX. A - 11

AUSTRALIA (CONT’D)

SIC System Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)
0211 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0011
0212 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0100
0213 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0101
0214 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0110
0215 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 0111
0216 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 1000
0217 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 1001
0218 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 1010
0219 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 1011
0220 Reserved for Military Reserved - Restricted 1101 1100
0221 Reserved Reserved 1101 1101
0222 Reserved Reserved 1101 1110
0223 Reserved Reserved 1101 1111
0224 Reserved Reserved 1110 0000
0225 Reserved Reserved 1110 0001
0226 Reserved Reserved 1110 0010
0227 Reserved Reserved 1110 0011
0228 Reserved Reserved 1110 0100
0229 Reserved Reserved 1110 0101
0230 Reserved Reserved 1110 0110
0231 Reserved Reserved 1110 0111
0232 Reserved Reserved 1110 1000
0233 Reserved Reserved 1110 1001
0234 Reserved Reserved 1110 1010
0235 Reserved Reserved 1110 1011
0236 Reserved Reserved 1110 1100
0237 Reserved Reserved 1110 1101
0238 Reserved Reserved 1110 1110
0239 Reserved Reserved 1110 1111
0240 Reserved Reserved 1111 0000
0241 Reserved Reserved 1111 0001
0242 Reserved Reserved 1111 0010
0243 Reserved Reserved 1111 0011
0244 Reserved
0245 Reserved
0246 Reserved
0247 Reserved
0248 Reserved
0249 Reserved
0250 Reserved
0251 Reserved
0252 Reserved
0253 Reserved
0254 Reserved
0255 Reserved
 APX. A - 12

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Radar in Terminal Area

SIC Radar Data System Radar Type Code Binary

1 Brunei Terminal Area Radar PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

 APX. A - 13

CHINA

SIC Code
(Decimal)
Radar Data Source (Binary)

0 ~127 Reserved for non-civil aviation user

Flight Information Regions
128 Beijing FIR 1000 0000
129 Shanghai FIR 1000 0001
130 Shenyang FIR 1000 0010
131 Wuhan FIR 1000 0011
132 Guangzhou FIR 1000 0100
133 Kunming FIR 1000 0101
134 Lanzhou FIR 1000 0110
135 Urumqi FIR 1000 0111
136 Hongkong FIR 1000 1000
137 Taibei FIR 1000 1001
138-143 Reserved
Air Traffic
144 Shenyang ACC 1001 0000
145 Harbin ACC 1001 0001
146 Hailar ACC 1001 0010
147 Dalian ACC 1001 0011
148 Beijing ACC 1001 0100
149 Hohhot ACC 1001 0101
150 Taiyuan ACC 1001 0110
151 Shanghai ACC 1001 0111
152 Jinan ACC 1001 1000
153 Hefei ACC 1001 1001
154 Nanchang ACC 1001 1010
155 Xiamen ACC 1001 1011
156 Wuhan ACC 1001 1100
157 Zhengzhou ACC 1001 1101
158 Guangzhou ACC 1001 1110
159 Changsha ACC 1001 1111
160 Nanning ACC 1010 0000
161 Kunming ACC 1010 0001
162 Guiyang ACC 1010 0010
163 Chengdu ACC 1010 0011
164 Xi-an ACC 1010 0100
165 Lanzhou ACC 1010 0101
166 Urumqi ACC 1010 0110
167 Guilin ACC 1010 0111
168 Hongkong ACC 1010 1000
169 Qing Dao ACC 1010 1001
170 Taibei ACC 1010 1010
171-191 Reserved
 APX. A - 14

CHINA (CONT’D)

Radar Station
192 Beijing-1 SSR 1100 0000
193 Beijing-2 PSR/SSR 1100 0001
194 Beijing-3 PSR/SSR 1100 0010
195 Tianjin SSR 1100 0011
196 Taiyuan SSR 1100 0100
197 Hohhot SSR 1100 0101
198 Guangzhou-1 PSR/SSR 1100 0110
199 Guangzhou-2 SSR 1100 0111
200 Shenzhen PSR/SSR 1100 1000
201 Sanya PSR/SSR 1100 1001
202 Changsha SSR 1100 1010
203 Enshi SSR 1100 1011
204 Wuhan PSR/SSR 1100 1100
205 Zhengzhou -1 PSR/SSR 1100 1101
206 Zhengzhou -2 PSR/SSR 1100 1110
207 Guilin SSR 1100 1111
208 Nanning SSR 1101 0000
209 Shantou SSR 1101 0001
210 Zhuhai PSR/SSR 1101 0010
211 Haikou PSR/SSR 1101 0011
212 Kunming SSR 1101 0100
213 Chengdu PSR/SSR 1101 0101
214 Guiyang -1 SSR 1101 0110
215 Guiyang -2 PSR/SSR 1101 0111
216 Chongqing PSR/SSR 1101 1000
217 Shanghai -1 PSR/SSR 1101 1001
218 Shanghai -2 SSR 1101 1010
219 Shanghai -3 PSR 1101 1011
220 Hefei SSR 1101 1100
221 Fuzhou SSR 1101 1101
222 Xiamen PSR/SSR 1101 1110
223 Lianyungang SSR 1101 1111
224 Nanjin PSR/SSR 1110 0000
225 Shenyang PSR/SSR 1110 0001
226 Dalian PSR/SSR 1110 0010
227 Xi’an SSR 1110 0011
228 Lanzhou SSR 1110 0100
229 Nanchang SSR 1110 0101
230 Qingdao SSR 1110 0110
231 Jinan SSR 1110 0111
232 Urumqi PSR/SSR 1110 1000
233 Harbin PSR/SSR 1110 1001
234-258 Reserved
 APX. A - 15

HONG KONG, CHINA

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars in Terminal Areas

001 Tai Mo Shan Terminal Area Radar PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

002 Sha Chau Approach Surveillance Radar PSR/MSSR 0000 0010

003 Beacon Hill Approach Secondary Surveillance Radar MSSR 0000 0011

Radars in En-Route Airspace

101 Mount Parker Route Secondary Surveillance Radar MSSR 0110 0101

111 Mount Parker Route surveillance Radar PSR 0110 1111

 APX. A - 16

MACAO, CHINA

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars Systems

001 Coloane Approach Surveillance Radar PSR/MSSR 1111 0001

002 Reserved for other Radar

003 Reserved for other Radar

004 Reserved for other Radar

005 Reserved for other Radar

 APX. A - 17

INDONESIA

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Terminal areas and en-route airspace

001 Medan PRS/SSR 0000 0001
002 Pekanbaru PSR/SSR 0000 0010
003 Tanjung Pinang PSR/SSR 0000 0011
004 Palembang PSR/SSR 0000 0100
005 Jakarta/CGK PSR/MSSR 0000 0101
006 Pontianak PSR/SSR 0000 0110
007 Yogyakarta PSR/MSSR 0000 0111
008 Surabaya PSR/SSR 0000 1000
009 Makassar PSR/SSR 0000 1001
010 Benjarmasin PSR/SSR 0000 1010
011 Balikpapan PSR/SSR 0000 1011
012 Denpasar PSR/MSSR 0000 1100
013 Biak PSR/SSR 0000 1101
En-route airspace
101 Banda Aceh SSR 0110 0101
102 Natuna MSSR 0110 0110
103 Jakarta/HLP SSR 0110 0111
104 Semarang SSR 0110 1000
105 Manado SSR 0110 1001
106 Kendari SSR 0110 1010
107 Waingapu SSR 0110 1011
108 Ambon SSR 0110 1100
Processing systems
201 Jakarta/CGK 1100 1001
202 Medan 1100 1010
203 Denpasar 1100 1011
204 Makassar 1100 1100
205 Yogyakarta 1100 1101
 APX. A - 18

LAOS

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radar in Terminal Areas

001 Vientiane Terminal Area Radar PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

Radar in En-Route Airspace

002 Savannakhet Secondary
Surveillance Radar MSSR 1000 0100
 APX. A - 19

MALAYSIA

SIC Radar Data System Radar Type Code (Binary)

(Decimal)
Radar In Terminal Areas
001 KLIA PSR/MSSR Mode S 0000 0001
002 Bukit Subang PSR/MSSR 0000 0010
003 Langkawi PSR/MSSR Mode S 0000 0011
004 Johor Bahru PSR/MSSR Mode S 0000 0100
005 Kota Bharu PSR/MSSR Mode S 0000 0101
006 KLIA SMR SMR 0000 0110
009 KLIA MLAT MLAT 0000 1001
090 Butterworth PSR/MSSR 0101 1010
091 Kuantan PSR/MSSR 0101 1011
092 Kota Kinabalu PSR/MSSR Mode S 0101 1100
093 Kuching PSR/MSSR Mode S 0101 1101
094 Miri PSR/MSSR Mode S 0101 1110
095 Sibu PSR/MSSR Mode S 0101 1111
096 Tawau PSR/MSSR Mode S 0110 0000
097 Labuan PSR/ MSSR 0110 0001

Radar In En-Route Airspace

111 Genting Highland MSSR 0110 1111
112 Mersing MSSR Mode S 0111 0000
113 Sandakan PSR/MSSR Mode S 0111 0001
114 Kuala Terengganu ADS-B ADS-B / MLAT 0111 0010
122 Genting Highland ADS-B ADS-B 0111 1010
124 Langkawi ADS-B ADS-B 0111 1100
125 Kota Kinabalu ADS-B ADS-B 0111 1101
126 Sandakan ADS-B 0111 1110
127 Kuching ADS-B 0111 1111
128 Bintulu ADS-B 1000 0000

Processing Systems
201 Kuala Lumpur ATCC 1100 1001
202 Kota Kinabalu ATCC 1100 1010
203 Kuching ATCC 1100 1011
204 Miri Approach 1100 1100
205 KKFIR ADS-B Central Processing 1100 1101
 APX. A - 20

MYANMAR

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radar in Terminal Areas

YANGON Approach Radar (ASR/SSR)
001 PSR/MSSR 0000 0001
MANDALAY Approach Radar (ASR/SSR)
002 PSR/MSSR 0000 0010
Radar in En-Route Airspace
101 YANGON Radar (SSR) MSSR 0110 0101
102 MANDALAY Radar (SSR) MSSR 0110 0110
103 MYEIK Radar (SSR) MSSR 0110 0111
104 NAYPYITAW Radar (SSR) MSSR 0110 1000
ATM Automation System
200 YANGON Approach Automation System NEC 1100 1001
201 YANGON ACC Automation System THALES 1100 1010
202 MANDALAY Approach Automation System THALES 1100 1011
ADS-B in En-Route Airspace
129 COCO ISLAND ADS-B GS 1 ADS-B 1000 0001
130 COCO ISLAND ADS-B GS 2 ADS-B 1000 0010
131 SITTWE ADS-B GS 1 ADS-B 1000 0011
132 SITTWE ADS-B GS 2 ADS-B 1000 0100
133 MANDALAY ADS-B GS 1 ADS-B 1000 0101
134 MANDALAY ADS-B GS 2 ADS-B 1000 0110
135 MYEIK ADS-B GS 1A ADS-B 1000 0111
136 MYEIK ADS-B GS 1B ADS-B 1000 1000
151 MYEIK ADS-B GS 2A ADS-B 1001 0111
152 MYEIK ADS-B GS 2B ADS-B 1001 1000
145 YANGON ADS-B GS 1 ADS-B 1001 0001
146 YANGON ADS-B GS 2 ADS-B 1001 0010
147 LASHIO ADS-B GS 1A ADS-B 1001 0011
148 LASHIO ADS-B GS 2A ADS-B 1001 0100
149 LASHIO ADS-B GS 1B ADS-B 1001 0101
150 LASHIO ADS-B GS 2B ADS-B 1001 0110
151 TACHILEIK ADS-B GS 1 ADS-B 1001 0111
152 TACHILEIK ADS-B GS 2 ADS-B 1001 1000
 APX. A - 21

NEW ZEALAND

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars Systems

001 Auckland PSR 0000 0001

002 Rua-o-te-whenua SSR 0000 0010

003 Te Wereaiti SSR 0000 0011

004 Balance SSR 0000 0100

005 Ohakea PSR 0000 0101

006 Hawkins Hill PSR/SSR 0000 0110

007 Mt. Robertson SSR 0000 0111

008 Christchurch PSR 0000 1000

009 Cass Peak SSR 0000 1001

 APX. A - 22

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

SIC Radar Data System Radar Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radar in Terminal Area

PSR/SSR 000 0001
001 Port Moresby Approach
 APX. A - 23

PHILIPPINES

SIC Radar Data System Radar Type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars in Terminal Areas

001 Manila PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

002 Mactan PSR/SSR 0000 0010

003 Subic PSR/SSR 0000 0011

004 Clark* PSR/MSSR 0000 0100

Radars in En-Route Airspace

101 Tagaytay SSR** 0110 0101

102 Laoag MSSR 0110 0110

103 Mt. Luay, Cebu MSSR 0110 0111

104 Palawan *** 0110 1000

105 Samal, Davao *** 0110 1001

106 Zamboanga *** 0110 1010

Radar Data Processing System

201 Manila APP – TRDP 1100 1001

202 Mactan APP – TRDP 1100 1010

203 Subic APP – TRDP 1100 1011

204 Clark APP – TRDP* 1100 1100

205 Manila ACC – RDP 1100 1101

206 Manila ACC – Wide Area TRDP*** 1100 1110

207 Manila ACC – ERDP *** 1100 1111

Note:
* For installation in 2004
** To be replaced in the CNS/ATM implementation; either MSSR or Mode - S
*** For installation in the CNS/ATM implementation; either MSSR or Mode - S
 APX. A - 24

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars in Terminal Areas

001 Kimpo PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

005 Kimhae PSR/SSR 0000 0101

010 Cheju PSR/MSSR 0000 1010

015 Inchon PSR/MSSR 0000 1111

(new
installation)

020/025 Reserved for other Radar

031/050 Reserved for Military Radars

Radars in En-Route Airspace

119/138 Reserved for En-Route (Planned)

Processing Systems

210 Taegu ACC 1101 0010

215 Kimpo ARTS 1101 0111

220 Kimhae ARTS 1101 1100

225 Cheju ARTS 1110 0001

230 Inchon ARTS 1110 0110

236/255 Reserved for Military ARTS

 APX. A - 25

SINGAPORE

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars in Terminal Areas

001 ASR 1 PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

002 ASR 2 PSR/MSSR 0000 0010

005 LSR PSR/MSSR 0000 0101

Processing System

065 ATCC – RDPA 0100 0001

066 ATCC – RDPB 0100 0010

 APX. A - 26

SRI LANKA

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars in Terminal Areas

001 Bandaranaike International Airport Colomblo PSR 0000 0001

Radars in En-Route Airspace

011 Pidurutalagala PSR/MSSR 0000 1011

021 Area Control Centre - Ratmalana Airport Colombo 0001 0101

022 Approach Control Centre - Bandaranaike International Airport, 0001 0110

Colombo
 APX. A - 27

THAILAND

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars in Terminal Areas and En-Route Airspace

001 Donmuang PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

006 Chiangmai PSR/MSSR 0000 0110

007 Mae Hong Son MSSR 0000 0111

012 Ubonratchathani MSSR 0000 1100

016 Suratthani PSR 0001 0000

021 Phuket PSR 0001 0101

026 Hatyai MSSR 00011010

Processing System

228 ATCC – RDPA 1110 0100

229 ATCC – RDPB 1110 0101

 APX. A - 28

VIET NAM

SIC Radar Data System Radar type Code

(Decimal) (Binary)

Radars in Terminal Areas and En-Route Airspace

001 Noi Bai/Ha Noi (Radar Data head 1) PSR/MSSR 0000 0001

002 Son Tra/Da Nang PSR/MSSR 0000 0010

003 Tan son Nhat/Ho chi Minh PSR/MSSR 0000 0011

Radars in En-Route Airspace

131 Noi Bai/Ha Noi (Radar Data Head 2) PSR/SSR 1000 0011

132 Vinh MSSR 1000 0100

133 Qui Nhon MSSR 1000 0101

134 Ca Mau MSSR 1000 0110

Processing Systems

221 ATCC - RDP Noi Bai/Ha Noi 1101 1101

222 ATCC - RDP Tan Son Nhat/Ho Chi Minh 1101 1110
 SURICG/5
Appendix B to the Report

LIST OF ACTION ITMES FOR SURICG

Forum Remarks /
No. Subject Status / Target Date Action Party Status
Raised follow-up
South Pacific On-going
Previous
Develop and implement regional collaboration project for States
meeting of
ADS-B out operational use including data sharing in South On-going Initial stage
1 ADS-B SITF SURICG/4 SURICG/6
Pacific and report on implementation progress. Transferred to Report by Ad
and ADS-B
SURICG Hoc WG at
SITF/14
ADS-B SITF14
Updates to
Modes S SI
Secretariat in
Review the status code still not
consultation
Examine the density of Mode S radar installations in the of coordination very active by
with States.
2 Region to determine the need for development of a SI code SURICG/2 SURICG/4 for Mode S II States. Current
Tasked to ICAO
allocation/implementation plan and related issues CODEs allocation information
sec. & DAPS
/SURICG/6 shows that II
WG
code is still
sufficient.
A Study Group to Explore Solutions on Surveillance Data Led by
Sharing in coordination with SWIM/ATFM experts Singapore,
3 SURICG/5 SURICG/6 Report status
(prepare a working paper to seek endorsement from CNS supported by
SG/24) HK
Co-chairs,
Implemented by
4 Regional planning criteria for additional SAC assignment SURICG/5 SURICG/6 concerned
ICAO APAC
States
Study Mode S roadmap, including SI/II operation
5 experience, 1030/1090MHz congestion and retrofit Mode S SURICG/5 SURICG/6 DAPs WG
avionics
Co-chairs,
ICAO APAC,
6 Follow up the action items from SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 SURICG/5 SURICG/6
concerned
parties
Review SURICG TOR to incorporate SEA/BOB ADS-B
7 SURICG/5 SURICG/6 Co-chairs
WG TOR

*SURICG/2 agreed to keep subject list resulted from the ADS-B SITF/15 for consideration by States in preparation of further SURICG meetings.

APX. B - 1
 Appendix B to the Report

All members States/Administrations to contribute with papers at next meeting on any of the following items.

 ASBUs relating to ADS-B IN

 Implementation of Space Based ADS-B
 ASBU B0-NET using ADS-B
 Use of lower cost, lower performance ADS-B systems (TSO199)
 Use of Mode S DAPS in APAC region
 Use of electronic scan primary radars in APAC region
 Use of Mode C transponder veils in APAC region
 Use of Flight ID data from mode S interrogation and ADS-B
 Mode S problem reporting in APAC region
 Mode S analysis tools used in APAC region
 ADS-B test equipment used in APAC region
 Need to amend SUPPs 7030 on SIL matter
 Management issues with 24 bit ICAO codes in APAC
 Update and maintain ADS-B problem database
 Consider need for aircraft transponder Mode S mandates

___________

APX. B - 2
 SURICG/5
Appendix B1 to the Report

LIST OF ACTION ITMES (COMPLETED ACTION ITEMS HAVE BEEN REMOVED)

No. Subject Forum Raised Status / Target Date Remarks / Action Party
follow-up
1. ATS operational letter of agreements between neighboring SEA ADS-B Ongoing – Reports at Report progress China, Hong Kong
FIRs among South China Sea States for radar-like WG/6 each meeting (need to China, Viet Nam
surveillance service coordination through and Singapore
SEACG for separation Consistent On-going needs
(Operational agreement between Singapore and Viet Nam criteria to be applied) separation to be seamless agreement
was signed first in Nov. 2013 and later updated in July applied in 4 FIRs, for the minima –
2014 for 30 NM separation, agreement for 20 NM was new action item major traffic flow;
signed Oct. 2016) for 4 parties. Refer Hong Kong/Sanya
surveillance Sanya/Ho Chi Minh
To further progress rest parts for major ATS Routes L642 China, VN, are able to capability to ATM
and M771 to apply new separation criteria using ADS-B provide radar surveillance SG.
and other surveillance to L642,M771within the
relevant FIRs. (SEA/BOB
WG/15)
2. Develop and implement regional collaboration project for SEA/BOB Nov. 2018 Develop and Bay of Bengal
ADS-B out operational use including data sharing in Bay WG/11 implement sub- States
of Bengal area and report on implementation progress. SEA/BOB WG/14 regional ADS-B
SEA/BOB collaboration Detailed needs to be
Status updated at WG/11 WG/13 projects. finalized by
A simple document containing projects for BoB data On-going SEA/BOB
sharing to be prepared by India Have the MOU
between India/Sir India, Sri Lanka
MOU for Bay of Bengal data sharing projects Lanka; Malaysia and
India/Malaysia Indonesia
( Consolidated in SEA/BOB WG/15) and
India/Indonesia
agreed.
On going

APX. B1 - 1
 Appendix B1 to the Report

No. Subject Forum Raised Status / Target Date Remarks / Action Party
follow-up
3. Make proposals for ADS-B data sharing between China SEA/BOB March 2020 States concerned China, Myanmar
and Myanmar & China and Laos PDR. WG/13 discuss for a and Lao PDR.
concreate proposal
for the data
sharing
*The following items (4-8) are suggested by SEA/BOB WG/15

4. harmonization of mandates across the various FIRs SEA/BOB Ongoing

WG/15

5. promotion of new means of data sharing (such as data SEA/BOB Ongoing

sharing through a centralised data base or SWIM) WG/15

6. Study the potential applications and issues of new forms SEA/BOB Ongoing
of ADS-B stations and Long Range Communications. WG/15

7. Sharing of innovative means to solve ADS-B related SEA/BOB Ongoing

issues. WG/15

8. Consolidation of issues to be considered at other ADS-B SEA/BOB Ongoing

related forum (e.g. Surveillance Panel, RTCA, WG/15
EUROCAE), or by vendors.

____________

APX.B1 - 2
 SURICG/5
Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION STATUS IN THE APAC REGION

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied

AFGHANISTAN ADS-B & Multi Lateration subject to safety

system installed. assessment

AUSTRALIA A total of 50 ADS-B ground 2009/effective date All airspace 2.5NM, 3NM WAM is
stations and 28 WAM stations of mandating in for IFR and 5 NM operating in
are operational (Total 78) upper airspace aircraft from surveillance Tasmania since
12/12/2013. 2/2017 separations. 2010 with 5
ATC readiness since 2004 NM separation
ADS-B data sharing with An ADS-B mandate 3/2016 - service.
Indonesia operational since for all IFR aircraft Manual of
2/2011. applies from 2/2017. ATC updated WAM is also
to include 3 operating in
ADS-B data sharing planned Some limited nautical mile Sydney for 3
with PNG exemptions for separation NM separation
foreign registered using ADS-B service in TMA
ASMGCS using multilateration aircraft and some in terminal and for
and ADS-B is operational in private operations. control unit. precision
Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne runway
and Perth 3/2017 – monitoring
2.5NM
function.
November 2016 – ADS-B separation
converted to “radar like” Cat 48 authorized
CASA has
for use in Melbourne Terminal using ADS-B
when also approved the use
Area and Perth Terminal Area
in early 2017. used with of reduced
radar. specification
CMATS replacing the current ADS-B avionics
ATM system is expected to be Vectoring to support
fully operational in 2024 period. allowed using ADS-B IN and
ADS-B ATC situational
awareness for
Precision Runway VFR aircraft
Monitoring for
Sydney WAM

BANGLADESH Bangladesh has a plan to install Bangladesh is

four ADS-B ground stations to be willing to share
installed at Dhaka, Cox’s Bazar, ADS-B data
Saidpur and Barisal Airports by with
2019. neighbouring
States to
ADS-B data will be integrated enhance the
with new ATM system at Dhaka. safety and
surveillance
Bangladesh has also a plan to capability in the
install MLAT stations to provide sub-region.
surface movement control at
HSIA, Dhaka as well as TMA
coverage as a backup and
complimentary RADAR coverage
to the Dhaka MSSR.

APX. C - 1
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied

BHUTAN ADS-B ground infrastructure Equipage mandate

feasibility study will be will be issued once
completed in the middle of 2020. after the completion
of feasibility study.

BRUNEI 5 ADS-B ground stations with

DARUSSALAM WAM functionality installed in
2015 and full operation in
October 2016. ADS-B/WAM data
are fused with radar data in the
TopSky ATC Automation system
(Thales) to enhance full radar
surveillance coverage for Brunei
Darussalam.

Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on ADS-B data sharing
with Singapore and Brunei
Darussalam is expected to sign in
April 2019.

CAMBODIA 3 ADS-B ground stations installed

at Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and
Stung Treng City since 2011 and
able to provide full surveillance
coverage for Phnom Penh FIR.
Cambodia is willing to share data
with others.

CHINA 5 UAT ADS-B stations are used The operation of

for flight training of CAFUC. The national ADS-B
upgrade to 1090ES ADS-B Service is
stations project has already started implementing in step
in 2017, and the project is planned -by-step way.
to finish by 2022.
The phase 1-plan has
308 ADS-B stations nationwide been carried out since
have already finished installation October 2019, details
and SAT by the end of 2018. as fllows:
 ADS-B control
4 ADS-B stations operational in operation will be
Sanya FIR since 2008. implemented in En-
route area upper
Chengdu-Jiuzhai and Chendu - 8400m without Radar
Lhasa route with 9 ADS-B control ability;
stations.  Radar/ADS-B
combined control
9 ADS-B stations deployed on the operation will be
routes H15 and Z1 by the end of implemented in En-
2015. route area upper
8400m with Radar
19 ADS-B stations at the small control ability.
airport.

APX. C - 2
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied

The ADS-B mandate

published in October,
2019, in a separated
AIC named
“Implementation of
ADS-B Control
Services”

HONG KONG A larger-scale A-SMGCS AIP supplement HKFIR at or 5NM surveillance Fully
CHINA covering the whole Hong issued on 29 Aug above FL290 separation implemented
Kong International Airport put 2014 with 8 Dec ADS-B in
into operational use in April 2009. 2016 as effective HKFIR by
date. phased approach
Data collection/ analysis on to ensure safe
aircraft ADS-B equipage in Hong and smooth
Kong airspace conducted on integration of
quarterly basis since 2004. ADS-B into the
Air Traffic
ADS-B trial using a dedicated Management
ADS-B system completed in System to
2007. provide aircraft
separation
ADS-B out operations over PBN service since
routes L642 and M771 at or November
above FL 290 within HK FIR was 2018.
effective in December 2013 and
within HK FIR at or above FL
290 has been effective since
December 2016.

ADS-B ground station

infrastructure completed in 2013.

ADS-B signal provided by

Mainland China to cover southern
part of Hong Kong FIR
commenced in 2010 and has been
put into operational use after
commissioning of the new ATMS
since November 2016.

MACAO, Mode S MSSR coverage available Airspace – ATZ

CHINA for monitoring purposes. only

DEMOCRATIC ADS-B has been used as back-up

PEOPLE’S surveillance of SSR since 2008.
REPUBLIC OF
KOREA

APX. C - 3
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied

FIJI ISLANDS ADS- B /multilateration ground ADS-B mandate Mandate for

stations installed. Situations commencing from domestic
awareness service provided in 31st December 2013 registered
2013. aircraft.

FRANCE ATM system is ready for 5 NM for airspace

(French ADS-B sensors/Installation of 5 under coverage.
Polynesia) first GS expected at beginning of
2017.
2nd stage with implementation of
7 GS and associated VHF
coverage.

INDIA ASMGCS (SMR + Multilat) is AIP supplement ADS-B in India

operational at Delhi, Mumbai, issued on 17th April to provide
Chennai, Kolkata, Bangalore, 2014 with effective redundancy for
Hyderabad, Jaipur, Amritsar, date of radar and filling
Lucknow, Ahmedabad and implementation from the surveillance
Guwahati Airports. 29th May 2014. gaps.

ASMGCS(SMR+MLAT) ADS-B data

proposed at Cochin and trial operations
Bhubaneswar (VOCI&VEBS) commenced in
Expected to be completed by 2015 in both
December 2019. Non-radar and
radar
environment, in
En-route &
ADS-B Ground Stations were
Terminal phases
installed at 21 locations across
of flight for
continental airspace and including
ATC purposes.
Oceanic airspace at Port Blair.
Installation of 10 more ADS-B
Ground stations was completed.
AIP SUP 18 of
2014 issued
ATM automation systems at 22
ATC Centres are capable of
processing ADS-B based
ADS-B data and provide the APP approved
information on Display. at VOCL and
VOCB

INDONESIA All 30 ADS-B ground station Starting on Using 5 NM ADS-B data

have been met with DO260B in 23rd April separation sharing had
November 2019; 2020, standard. been conducted
Indonesia has by Indonesia
The 18 new ADS-B ground implemented with Australia
stations, with DO260B capability, mandatory and Singapore.
will be established to cover the ADS-B
traffic in terminal and area. The 7 equipment LOA of
ADS-B ground station has been for all collaboration in
installed in Papua. The transport ADS-B data
rescheduling of completion for 11 aircraft sharing has been

APX. C - 4
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied
ground stations in 4Q2021. category achieved with
flying at all India.
The ADS-B ground stations has level (SFC up
been integrated to 9 ATC systems to FL600) in
and 3 others will follow after 2 ACCs, 9
being upgraded. TMAs and 10 LOA of
Airports. collaboration in
ADS-B data
sharing are
under reviewing
by Malaysia,
Philippines and
PNG.

JAPAN Multilateration Systems for

surface monitoring have been
implemented at eight airports

PRM (WAM) has been

implemented at Narita Airport.

En-route WAM system is

manufacturing and will be put
into operation in FY2018

Plan to evaluate accuracy of

ADS-B information under RAD
condition.

LAO PDR. 2 ADS-B ground stations were

installed in Vientiane and
Luangprabang Int’l Airport in
2015 and the ADS-B data is fused
with MSSR data target in the
ATM Automation system.

3 additional ADS-B ground

stations (DO-260B compliant)
will be completed the installation
at existing MSSR sites
(Xiengkhouang, Savannakhet and
Champasack) by 2016 to Q1 of
2017 to enhance the full ADS-B
coverage of Lao FIR.

APX. C - 5
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied

MALAYSIA Ground Infrastructure: AIC Issued on Phase 1: On ICAO approved

Kuala Lumpur FIR: September 2017. ATS routes surveillance
1. Installation of two (2) ADS-B N571, P628, separation.
GS in Langkawi and Genting has AIP Supp on 16 Jan L510, P627,
been completed in October 2017. 2020. L645 and
2. Upgrading of Kuala P574 at FL
Terengganu ADS-B for ADS-B 290 to FL
Version 2 capability is to be 410 within
completed at the end of Dec 2021. Kuala
3. Operation of all three ADS-B Lumpur FIR
in new Kuala Lumpur ATC
System is to be completed in Dec Phase 2: En-
2021. route airspace
Kota Kinabalu FIR:
Four (4) new ADS-B will be
installed in Kuching, Bintulu,
Kota Kinabalu and Sandakan, to
be completed in Dec 2021.
Implementation Plan:

Phase 1: ADS-B services on

specific ATS routes and Flight
Levels within Kuala Lumpur FIR,
target date Mar 2021.

Phase 2: ADS-B as secondary

means of surveillance within the
Kuala Lumpur FIR for en-route
airspace. Target date: Mar 2022.

Phase 3: ADS-B used as the

primary means of surveillance for
en-route airspace. (TBA)

MALDIVES 4 ADS-B stations installed in Seaplane in

Nov. 2012 (2 at Male’ Ibrahim Maldives
Nasir Intl Airport, 1 at equipped with
Kulhudhuffushi Island in the ADS-B for
North and 1 at Fuah Mulah Island AOC purpose.
in the South to cover 95% of the These seaplanes
FIR at/above FL290. have ADS-B IN
functions as
Maldives’ well.
ADS-B is integrated with the
ATM system (in November
2013), and under observation
prior to commencing trials.

Maldives has planned to share

ADS-B data with its adjacent
FIRs. Updated by email

APX. C - 6
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied

MONGOLIA Ten ADS-B ground stations for

combination SSR and filled the
surveillance gaps implemented in
2015 and integrated with ATM
system and trial operation in early
2016.

MYANMAR a) The ADS-B Implementation Doing ADS-B data Supplement

Update analysis and statistic radar and fill the
- The five ADS-B ground stations for ADS-B equipped gaps to improve
have been installed in Myanmar. Aircraft in Yangon safety and
Among them, SITTWE and CoCo FIR. efficiency
Island ground stations are ADS-C/CPDLC
installed in 2014, and are DO260 integrated in
compliant. The other 3 stations, Yangon ACC
YANGON, MANDALAY and since 2010.
MYEIK airport ground stations
are DO260B compliant and
installations were finished in
2016.
- All ADS-B data are fused with
MSSR data in the TopSky ATC
Automation system (Thales) in
2016 and using as MSSR backup
in Yangon ACC.

b) The ADS-B data sharing

update between neighbouring
States

- Myanmar and India signed the

MOU agreement for ADS-B data
sharing on 6th May 2015. ADS-B
data sharing test between Agartala
(India) - Sittwe (Myanmar), and
Port Blair (India)

- CoCo Island (Myanmar) have

been accomplished between
technical teams since June 2018.
At present, the shared
ADS-B data from Myanmar side
is now using as backup
automation system at Kolkata for
test purpose. But, Myanmar side
is needed to discuss with ATM
manufacturer for operational use
of the India's Data at Yangon
ACC.

- Myanmar have planned to install

new ADS-B Station in the 2nd
quarter of 2019 at LASHIO
Airport located in north-eastern

APX. C - 7
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied
part of Myanmar closed to the
China-Myanmar border near the
LINSO transfer point on A599
ATS route. After the installation
finished, the ADS-B data sharing
process can be proceeded between
Myanmar and China.

NEPAL Four ADS-B ground stations have Safety

been installed in 2019 at assessment will
Kathmandu (Phulchowki), be done soon.
Bhairahawa, Nepalgunj and
Dhangadi.

NEW Three ADS-B ground stations

CALEDONIA commissioned in 2010 to cover
international traffic at La tontouta
airport serving Tontouta ACC &
APP. It is used for Situation
awareness and SAR.

NEW MLAT and ADS-B data is being New Zealand All controlled 5 NM
ZEALAND used from the WAM system introduced the airspace surveillance
centred in the Queenstown area to following ADS-B within the separation in en-
provide surveillance coverage and OUT mandate as NZZC FIR route controlled
surveillance separation (5 NM) follows: above FL245 airspace, and
over the southern half of the ADS-B OUT 3NM surveillance
South Island of New Zealand. equipment separation in
requirement for all terminal
MLAT and ADS-B data from the aircraft operating in controlled
Auckland MLAT system is used NZZC FIR controlled airspace – where
to support surface movement airspace above FL surveilled.
control at NZAA (Auckland). 245 from 31
December 2018
The New Zealand Navigation and
Airspace and Air Navigation Plan New Zealand has
“New Southern SKY” was issued plans to introduce the
in May 2014 following ADS-B
OUT mandates:
34 ADS-B ground stations have ADS-B OUT
been installed. equipment
requirement for all
aircraft operating in
any controlled
airspace within the
NZZC FIR from 31
December 2021.

Since July 2018 all

new aircraft
registered in New
Zealand, or any

APX. C - 8
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied
currently registered
aircraft upgrading
transponder(s) are
required to install
DO260B
transponder(s) which
meet the relevant
NZCAA rule set.

The Rule specifies

the minimum
Technical Standing
Orders (TSO), or
transponder GNSS
receiver models for
position input into
ADS-B.

PAKISTAN Tender for procurement of 5

ADS-B stations issued to be
installed at Pasni, Lakpass,
Rojhan, Dalbandin and Laram-
top. Contract expected to be
finalized by end of 2016. These
stations will be DO260B
compliant and operational by end
of 2017.

PAPUA NEW Initially 7 ADS-B sites to be An ADS-B mandate None Air Traffic
GUINEA deployed across PNG to provide is on CASA PNG Control
seamless coverage above FL285. roadmap, however
legislation yet to be Approach/
Three (3) sites installed as of developed. Arrivals
December 2017. Two (2) of these
are operational.First site to be The Australian 2018 – 5NM
installed May/June 2017, with mandates will largely 2019 – 3NM
remainder to be completed in drive equipage for (approach)
2018. overflights (e.g. East-
Asia to Upper Airspace
Additional 7 sites to be rolled-out Australia/South (>FL245)
in the 2018/19 timeframe. Site Pacific).
location will be dependent on 2017/18 –
infrastructure, security and an Expectation is that Situational
analysis of Phase 1 site PNGASL (the awareness.
performance. ANSP) will lead
development of 2018/19 – 5NM
PNGASL (ANSP) will commence ADS-B mandate
a transition to new ATM framework. Note:
automation system in May 2018. Implementation
Initial steps may dictated by
The system will support fusion of include mandate training
ADS-B and RADAR data. above F245 – but will requirements and
depend on new ATM system
performance of Phase transition
priorities.

APX. C - 9
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied
5 mile separation to be provided 1 ADS-B
using ADS-B and fused ADS- deployment.
B/Radar from May 2018. Country-wide
mandate not Flight Service
From 2018 onwards, PNGASL envisaged before
will be looking to share ADS-B 2021/22. Directed Traffic
data with Indonesia and Australia. (FIS)

2019 – Situational
awareness

PHILIPPINES One ADS-B GS installed at the

Manila ATM Center for
situational awareness.

One ADS-B Ground Station

installed at Bataraza, Palawan
for data sharing with Singapore.

Additional ground stations are

planned to be installed in Laoag
Airport, Tagaytay, Jomalig Island,
Puerto Princesa Airport, Mt.
Majic Mactan, and General
Santos “Tambler” Airport.

REPUBLIC OF Currently, MLAT/ADS-B are After trial operation After trial After trial
KOREA being used for surface monitoring in the first half of operation in operation in the
and situation awareness at some 2020, time for the first half first half of 2020,
airports. equipage mandate of 2020, the separation criteria
For enroute surveillance , will be decided. scope of will be decided.
additional installation of 10 application
ADS-B Ground stations is now in will be
progress. It will be completed by decided .
December 2019.
95% of Korean national carriers
are equipped with ADS-B Out
transponder as of 2018.

SINGAPORE The airport MLAT system was AIC was issued on At and above 40nm Safety case was
installed in 2007 and “far-range” 28 December FL290, implemented on completed end
ADS-B sensor was installed in 2010/effective from affecting the ATS routes L644 of November.
2009. 12 Dec.2013. following and N891. 2013.
ATS routes 20nm
ATC system has been processing ADS-B OUT L642, L644, implemented on
ADS-B data since 2013. equipment M753, M771, ATS routes L642,
requirement for all N891 & M771, M753 and
aircraft operating on N892 N892.
selected ATS routes
within the WSSS At and above
FIR from 27 January FL290,
2022. affecting the

APX. C - 10
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied
ADS-B OUT following
equipment ATS routes
requirement for all L517, L625,
aircraft operating L649, M758,
within the WSSS M767, M768,
FIR from 26 January M772 &
2023. N884.

AIP updated in May

2018 to reflect the
ADS-B equipment
certified as meeting:

a. EASA - (AMC
20-24), or

b. EASA CS-ACNS
(Subpart D -
Surveillance -
SUR), or

c. FAA - Advisory
Circular No: 20-
165A (or later
versions), or

d. The equipment
configuration
standards in
Appendix XI of
Civil Aviation Order
20.18 of CASA.

SRI LANKA Total of 5 ADS-B Ground Revised Date of All ATS Initially 5 NM On completion
Receiving Stations and 01 Equipage mandate Routes within within Approach of a safety
Central Processing Station have would be 31st Dec Colombo Radar Coverage, assessment, use
been installed in March 2017. 2020. TMA 8 Nm within Area of ADS-B
ADS-B Data is fused with Multi- Radar Coverage alone for ATC
sensor Data, including MSSR Ref: AIC A02/16 & Procedural separation
and ADS-C in the ATM system (Initially AIC A02/14 Separation purposes.
at Colombo ACC Ratmalana was issued in minima outside
was launched for operational November 2014) Radar Coverage.
used on 15 Nov. 2017. New
ATM system planned for
operational at APP Centre in
2018 will also be capable of
fusing Multi-sensor Data,
including MSSR and ADS-B

THAILAND Six ADS-B ground stations (DO- Aircraft equipage

260B compliant) have been mandate is expected
installed since 2015 for the to be issued in 2021
research and development with the expected
purpose. Installation of more target effective date
ADS-B ground stations to provide in 2026.

APX. C - 11
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied
coverage in terminal and airport
areas is being assessed.

The MLAT system have been

implemented at VTBS and
VTBD. At VTSP and VTCC,
MLAT systems are being
installed with expectation to be
operational in 2020.

Multiple surveillance sensor data

such as Mode-S SSR, ADS-B,
MLAT and WAM are integrated
into the new ATM systems and
expected to be operational in early
2020.

The ATS surveillance data

sharing with the adjacent FIRs
was approved in principle in
October 2018.

TONGA Trial planned for 2017

UNITED The US identified required The U.S. ADS-B Out Class A, B, The U.S. is using The U.S. has
STATES ADS-B Service Volumes in 2007. rule (14 CFR 91.225 and C both terminal and implemented
Using data from over 600 and 14 CFR 91.227) airspace, plus en route (5nm) integrated
terrestrial radio sites, the US was issued in May Class E separation WAM/ADS-B
domestic ADS-B system became 2010 and specifies airspace criteria, in the following
operational in 2014. that the ADS-B Out above 10,000 depending on the terminal areas:
As of 1 January 2020, ADS-B mandate is effective ft MSL. See specific airspace Charlotte
aircraft equipage is mandated in on 1 January 2020. 14 CFR and available LAX
most controlled airspace within 91.225 for surveillance
the US. Over 160,000 US details. information. Implementation
registered aircraft are now Terminal of integrated
equipped. ADS-B is available to separation WAM/ADS-B
U.S. air traffic control facilities includes the is being
for ATC separation; all En Route following considered for
Centers and major Terminal separation additional U.S.
facilities are using ADS-B for criteria: terminal areas.
ATC separation.
- 3nm

- 2.5nm

- independent
parallel approach
operations down
to 3600 ft
centreline
separation

- dependent

APX. C - 12
 Appendix C to the Report

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure Mandated Intended

Date of issue/
State/ and ATC System readiness or Airspace separation
effectiveness date of Remarks
Administration Implementation plan and/or ATS- criteria to be
equipage mandate
routes applied
parallel approach
operations down to
2500 ft centreline
separation
(currently 1.0 nm
diagonal distance).

VIET NAM Two phases ADS-B AIC issued on 20 M771, L642, Operators
implementation plan adopted. June 2013/ADS-B L625, N892, required to have
Phase 1 implemented in March mandating effective M765, M768, operational
2013. Phase 2 commenced in from 12 December N500 and approval from
2015 for whole lower and upper 2013 in Ho Chi Minh L628 State of aircraft
Hanoi FIR and 2018 for Ho Chi FIR. At/above registry.
Minh FIR FL290.

______________

APX. C - 13
 SURICG/5
Appendix D to the Report

ADS-B Data Sharing Implementation Status in the Asia/Pacific Region

Related Initiation Agreement Target Data Sharing Implementation

ATS Route Served Remarks/Challenges
States/Administrations Year Date Year Status
Phase 1a
L511, R592, G578, B349,
M735, G326, A587, 2010 2010 2010 Completed SEA Report: Project 1
M768, A461, R340,
B472, B473, G459
Australia - Indonesia
Phase 1b
Browse Basin oil rig (Australia) awaiting
M774, A458, J199, 2014 2014 TBD Ongoing
acceptance testing
M766, G326, A587

Phase 2
2017 2019 TBD Completed SEA Report: Project 2
L895, A585

Australia - Papua New Guinea TBN Ongoing SEA Report: Project 6

Brunei - Singapore M758, M768, M767 2015 2019 2019 Ongoing SEA Report: Project 2

Project 1
2010 2013 2013 Completed
M771, L642
China – Hong Kong, China
Project 2
2017 2018 Completed Supplementary data sharing of Route A1
M771, L642, A1
China - Lao PDR A581, B465 2019 TBD Ongoing
China - Myanmar A599 2019 2021 Ongoing
India - Indonesia B466, P574, N563 2018 2019 Ongoing Data Sharing LoA on progress
N571, P628, L510, P627,
India - Malaysia 2017 2021 Ongoing
L645, P574

A201, A599, B465, G463, Myanmar side: Discussion with ATM

India - Myanmar L507, P646, P762, G472, 2015 6/5/2015 2018 Completed manufacturer for operational use at ACC is
L524, M770, L759 needed. Indian side completed.

Indonesia - Papua New Guinea R204, A215, B462, B456 2018 2019 2022 Ongoing SEA Report: Project 6

B466, N571, P628, L510,

Indonesia - Malaysia 2017 2021 Ongoing
P627, L645 and P574

Indonesia - Philppines A461, R590, B472 2018 2019 2022 Ongoing SEA Report: Project 5
G580, L504, M761 ,
Indonesia - Singapore M646, N875 2017 TBN Ongoing SEA Report: Project 2

APX. D - 1
 SURICG/5
Appendix D to the Report

ADS-B Data Sharing Implementation Status in the Asia/Pacific Region

Related Initiation Agreement Target Data Sharing Implementation

ATS Route Served Remarks/Challenges
States/Administrations Year Date Year Status
Project 1
M758, M768, L649, 2017 2021 Ongoing SEA Report: Project 2

Malaysia - Singapore Project 2

M904, M765, N875, 2018 2021 Ongoing SEA Report: Project 2
N891
N571, P628, L510, P627,
Malaysia - Thailand L645, P574 2018 2021 Ongoing

Project 1: Effect on
Myanmar A201, A599, Data communication between Myanmar and
Myanmar - India B465 2018 2015 2020/2021 Ongoing India is unstable. Different Multiaircraft
Effect India: G463, L507, Address from India ADS-B Data
P646, N895
Project 2: L301, M770
2019 2016 2020/2021 On trial

Philippines - Singapore N884, M522, M754, 2018 2018 Completed SEA Report: Project 2
M767, M772, L649

Project 1
N892, N891, M771, 2007 2013 Completed SEA Report: Project 2
M753, M758, L642, L644
Singapore - Vietnam
Project 2
N892, N891, M771,
2014 2016 2018 Completed SEA Report: Project 2
M753, M758, M904,
L642, L644

APX. D - 2
 SURICG/5
Appendix E1 to the Report

REPORT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA SUB GROUP

Singapore, 3-5 November 2019

States Present

China
Hong Kong China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

Previously Identified Projects

The South East Asia Group provide an update on the near term implementation of the following
projects that were identified in previous meetings.

Project 1 – ADS-B Data Sharing Between Australia and Indonesia

Phase 1a
Indonesia and Australia sharing ADS-B data from the following sites:

 Saumlaki (Indonesia) (Installed)

 Merauke (Indonesia) (Installed)
 Waingapu (Indonesia) (Installed)
 Kintamani - Bali (Indonesia) (Installed)
 Thursday Island (Australia) (Installed)
 Gove (Australia) (Installed)
 Broome (Australia) (Installed)
 Doongan (Australia) (Installed)

Data Sharing Agreement signed in Nov 2010;

Communications links between Australia and Indonesia were upgraded from VSAT to terrestrial links
in Mar 2016. The service quality was improved.

Benefits
Data used for air situational awareness and safety nets.
Enhanced Safety at FIR boundary.
Operational service commenced by Australia in 2010.
Indonesia has been using the data for Tier 2 services since Sep 2014

Phase 1b
Indonesia and Australia sharing ADS-B data from the following additional sites:
 Timika (Indonesia) (Installed) - Commenced data sharing
 Kupang (Indonesia) (Installed) - Commenced data sharing
 Christmas Island (Australia) (Not yet installed)
 Browse Basin oil rig (Australia) (installed in 2018)

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 Appendix E1 to the Report

Data Sharing Agreement signed on 18 Jun 2014:

Indonesia announced the use of ADS-B for situational awareness on 24 July 2014. Indonesia
announced on 30 Apr 2015 that ADS-B will be used for separation from FL290 to FL460 (tier-1) with
effect from 25 June 2015. The carriage of ADS-B equipment for flights between FL290 and FL460
remain optional until Dec 2017. From 1 Jan 2018, Indonesia implemented ADS-B mandate from
FL290 to FL600 in Jakarta and Ujung Pandang FIRs.

Phase 2
Data sharing between Australia and Indonesia already completed.
 Cilacap (Indonesia)

Project 2 – ADS-B Data Sharing In Southeast Asia

Phase 1
Under the near term implementation plan, the parties have commenced ADS-B data sharing from the
following sites:

 Singapore (Singapore provide data to Indonesia)

 Natuna (Indonesia provide data to Singapore)
 Matak (Indonesia provide data to Singapore)
 Con Son (Viet Nam provide data to Singapore)
 Sanya FIR (China provide fused data from four ADS-B stations to Hong Kong China)

VHF radio communication services (DCPC) were provided from the following stations to Singapore
and Hong Kong China. This is to enable implementation of radar-like separations in the non-radar
areas within the Singapore FIR as well as routes L642 and M771.

 Natuna VHF (Install for Singapore by Indonesia) (Installed)

 Matak VHF (Install for Singapore by Indonesia) (Installed)
 Con Son VHF (Install for Singapore by Viet Nam) (Installed)
 Sanya VHF (Install for Hong Kong China by China) (Installed)

ADS-B Data sharing and DCPC services agreement between Singapore and Indonesia signed in Dec
2010.

ADS-B Data sharing and DCPC services agreement between Singapore and Vietnam signed in Nov
2011.

DCPC services agreement between China and Hong Kong China signed in 2005.
ADS-B Data sharing agreement between China and Hong Kong China signed in 2013.

Operational Status
Singapore agreed on separation minima with Viet Nam and have commenced on ADS-B operations
since Dec 2013. Singapore commenced with 40nm separation and subsequently reduced to 30nm
separation between Singapore and Ho Chi Minh FIR. Further reduction to 20nm longitudinal
separation was implemented on 10 Nov 2016.

All 4 administrations (China, Hong Kong China, Singapore and Viet Nam) agreed that operational
approval is not required.

APX. C1 - SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 APX. E1 - 2

 Appendix E1 to the Report

Initial Benefits

The above sharing/collaboration arrangements will benefit L642, M771, N891, M753, N892 and
L644. Enhanced safety and reduced separation have been achieved. Mandate was effective in
Singapore FIR from Dec 2013. China published the mandate in Oct 2019. Mandate for domestic fleet
was effective on 10 Oct 2019. Mandate for international fleet will effective on 31 Dec 2020. Hong
Kong China’s ADS-B mandate was effective from Dec 2016 for aircraft at FL290 and above.

Phase 2
The Philippines has installed ADS-B station at Manila ATM Centre. It will install six other ADS-B
stations within Manila FIRs (Puerto Princesa-Palawan, Laoag, Jomalig, Mt Majic, General Santos
Airport and Iba Zambales). These ADS-B stations are targeted to complete by 2020.

Singapore and the Philippines signed an MOU in Oct 2015 to make available ADS-B data and VHF
facilities at Bataraza, Palawan for Singapore. The project was completed in Aug 2017.

The Philippines indicated that there is a surveillance gap at Northwestern part of Manila FIR and is
studying acquisition of space-based ADS-B data to cover the surveillance gap.

China’s four ADS-B ground stations deployed in Sanya FIR may be able to cover parts of the
surveillance gap. China is prepared to share its ADS-B data, via its ADS-B data processor, with
neighbouring states.

Brunei signed an MOU with Singapore in April 2019 where Brunei will share ADS-B data with
Singapore and provide the VHF facilities for Singapore ATC use. Data sharing is expected to
commence in 2020.

Singapore and Viet Nam signed an agreement in Jul 2016 to make available ADS-B data and VHF
facilities at Ca Mau for Singapore. The facilities were commissioned in Nov 2018.

Phase 3
Vietnam has ADS-B coverage at the Southern part of L625, N892, N884, M767 and M772 and
Vietnam is willing to share the ADS-B data with the Philippines and Singapore. The discussion
between Singapore and Vietnam is in progress.

The Philippines is studying the use of space-based ADS-B to cover its surveillance gaps.

In addition to sharing ADS-B data from its ADS-B station at Terrengganu, Malaysia is also willing to
share the ADS-B data from its ADS-B stations at Kuchin, Bintulu, Kota Kinabalu, which are
scheduled to be installed by 2021. The data from these three stations are also useful to Indonesia and
will be shared under Project 3. Singapore will share data from its Singapore ADS-B station with
Malaysia. It is noted that data sharing from Terrengganu can only be done after June 2020.

Malaysia and Singapore will initiate discussions after June 2020 on data sharing from the following
sites:

 Terrengganu (Malaysia) (Installed)

 Bintulu (Malaysia) – To be installed by 2021
 Kota Kinabalu (Malaysia) – To be installed by 2021
 Kuching (Malaysia) – To be installed by 2021
 Singapore (Singapore) - Installed

APX. C1 - SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 APX. E1 - 3

 Appendix E1 to the Report

Initial benefits
Enhanced Safety at FIR boundary and coverage redundancy

Project 3 – ADS-B data sharing between Indonesia and Malaysia

Indonesia and Malaysia are willing to share the ADS-B data from the following sites:
 Pontianak (Indonesia) – Installed
 Tarakan (Indonesia) - Installed
 Bintulu (Malaysia) – To be installed by 2021
 Kota Kinabalu (Malaysia) – To be installed by 2021
 Kuching (Malaysia) – To be installed by 2021

Malaysia and Indonesia are reviewing the collaboration agreement.

Initial benefits
Enhanced Safety at FIR boundary and coverage redundancy

Project 4 – ADS-B data sharing between Cambodia, Thailand and Viet Nam

Cambodia is willing to share the ADS-B data from the following sites:
 Phnom Penh International Airport (installed)
 Siem Reap International Airport (installed)
 Stung Treng City (installed)

Vietnam is planning to install stations in the HCM FIR from 2016 to 2020. Vietnam is willing to share
data with Cambodia and Thailand.

Initial benefits
For redundancy

Project 5 – ADS-B data sharing between Indonesia and the Philippines

Indonesia and the Philippines initiated discussion in 2019 on data sharing:

Melonguane (Indonesia) (will be installed in 2020)
General Santos (The Philippines) (yet to install)

Initial benefits
Situational awareness

Project 6 – ADS-B data sharing between Australia, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea

Data Sharing between Australia and Papua New Guinea

 Thursday Island (Australia) (installed)
 Gove (Australia) (installed)
 Kintore (Australia) Not yet installed – Target to be installed by 2019
 Burns Peak – Port Moresby (PNG) (installed)
 Mt Robinson (PNG) (to be installed by 2018) or Mt Nauwein (to be installed by 2018)

APX. C1 - SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 APX. E1 - 4

 Appendix E1 to the Report

Note that the above information was based on previous updates as both Australia and Papua New
Guinea were not present at the meeting.

Data Sharing between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea

 Mt Nauwein (PNG) (to be installed by 2018)– Phase 1
 Merauke (Indonesia) (installed) – Phase 1
 Jayapura (Indonesia) (installed)– Phase 2

New ATM system installed in PNG.

The parties will probably sign direct bi-lateral agreements in 2020.

General remark for all the above projects: As agreed at previous APAC ADS-B Task Force and
WG meetings, sharing of ADS-B data should include sharing of VHF radio facilities/services,
where possible

___________

APX. C1 - SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 APX. E1 - 5

 SURICG/5
Appendix E2 to the Report

REPORT FROM BAY OF BENGAL AD HOC WORKING GROUP

SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/14
(Singapore, 3-5 December, 2019)

States Presented:

Bangladesh
Bhutan
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Maldives
Myanmar
Thailand
India
Sri Lanka

The participants met to update the status of implementation of ADS-B and possible Data sharing
between the neighbouring States.

Implementation Updates

1. Bangladesh

We are trying to modernize our systems through the implementation of ATM project. At first it was in
PPP & now it is on G2G with France. This was under the process of government approval. Government
approval is granted, and 5 ADS-B receivers will have been installed at detailed below,

Cox’s Bazar, Barisal, Saidpur, Dhaka and Sylhet, there is another one for Extended Economic Zone at
new area in the Bay of Bengal which is 200NM at south of the country.

2. Bhutan

Bhutan cannot join previous SEA/BOB ADS-B meeting as we do have plan to implement ADS-B, but
now we are targeting to complete ADS-B feasibility study by mid of 2019 and now it is extended up to
mid of 2020.We found out that feasibility study (Coverage and ground station location) is necessary as
Bhutan is surrounded by mountain terrain.

As per the result of feasibility study we are going to implement installation of ground station.

Bhutan do not have any national policy or regulation about data sharing, so we will be shari ng data
with any neighbouring countries/states as per the regional norms and conditions.

3. China
China has been continuously promoting to push forward the application of ADS-B technology. China
provided update on the installation and related activities regarding ADS-B surveillance system as
follows:

 5 UAT ADS-B stations are used for flight training of CAFUC. The upgrade to 1090ES ADS-B
stations project has already started in 2017, and the project is planned to finish by 2022;
 4 ADS-B station in operational in Sanya FIR since 2008;
APX. C2 - SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15
APX. E2 - 1
 Appendix E2 to the Report

 Chengdu-Jiuzhai and Chendu - Lhasa route with 9 ADS-B stations;

 9 ADS-B stations deployed on the routes H15 and Z1 by the end of 2015;
 19 ADS-B station at the small airport; and
 308 ADS-B stations nationwide have already finished installation and SAT by the end of 2018.
And there are 2 level-1 data processing centres working in main-standby mode for redundancy,
8 level-2 data processing centres to concentrate data from data stations within its area of
responsibility, as well as 36 data stations to collect received data from GSs. All the installation
and SAT of GSs, level-2 data processing centres and level-1 data processing centres have
already complete. The trial operation has started from October 10, 2019 and the ADS-B
mandate had also been published on October 1, 2019, which is effective from October
10.2019.

4. Indonesia
Indonesia earlier informed that ADS-B ground station at Aceh is already operational and expressed
willingness to share data with India (It was earlier decided to have Port Blair-Aceh data sharing, but
for better coverage and usability it was suggested in the meeting to have data sharing of upcoming
Campbell Bay ADS-B - Aceh when India is ready).

Indonesia now will share the data with Campbell Bay ADS-B – Aceh only.
Campbell Bay ADS-B is installed.

Letter of Agreement between Indonesia and India regarding ADS-B data sharing is on progress
Letter of agreement is agreed by Indonesia and India, yet to be signed.

5. Malaysia

Malaysia has completed the installation of the two new ADS-B ground station in Langkawi and
Genting and will be integrated into the ATM system in 2018. Both stations are compliance with DO-
260B with output data handling function as plot and tracks (ASTERIX CAT21 rev. 0.23, rev. 0.26 and
rev. 2.1.)

Malaysia venturing to share data with Indonesia, India and Thailand. Data sharing from India (Port
Blair or Campbell Bay ADS-B), or from Indonesia (Aceh ADS-B) or from Thailand will close the
surveillance gap within the KL FIR.

Malaysia available ADS-B data through ADS-B central processing system is integrated to existing
ATC Systems via temporary node and only capable for legacy data exchange format. With that
limitation and unavailability of other essential hardware, the existing ATC is not capable for data
sharing. The new ATC system is in progress and only expected to be completed by 2H2019, thus Data
Sharing target has to be shifted to 2H2021. However, Malaysia is reviewing the sample agreement
proposed by India in 2018, and will revert as soon as possible.

ATC system is in progress and only expected to be completed by 2Half of 2020. Data sharing will be
clarified after that activity.

6. Maldives
Not present
Maldives started using ADS-B to enhance ATS surveillance capability in Male FIR on 7 th February
2016.

APX. C2 - SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 APX. E2 - 2

 Appendix E2 to the Report

With 4 ground stations (2 autonomous stations at Male; 2 unduplicated ground stations: 1 at an island
in the North and the other in the South), the ADS-B provides coverage up to 90% of Male FIR above
FL290.

ADS-B serves as the backup for Male radar and is in use for vectoring and 5NM separation
commensurate with Radars

As part of the effort towards full implementation of ADS-B, from March 2017 aircraft imported for
commercial air transport in the Maldives are required to be equipped with ADS-B Out, as published in
AIP ENR 1.6-3.

The full implementation, which would require carriage of ADS-B Out, is targeted for the year 2020

Maldives is making efforts to complete the airworthiness approval for all locally registered aircraft,
already equipped with ADS-B.

Out of the 73 aircraft registered for commercial air transport in the Maldives, 62 aircraft have given
approval for ADS-B by Maldives Civil Aviation Authority (MCAA).

This include 55 seaplanes (Twin Otter aircraft with floats) conducting commercial air transport between
Velana International and resort islands. These aircraft, although operate on VFR, are fitted with ADS-
B out functionality combined with GPS to give highly accurate positional information.

7. Myanmar

The 5 ADS-B ground stations have been installed in Myanmar. Among them, Sittwe and Co Co Island
ground stations are installed in 2014 and they are DO260 compliant, and Yangon, Mandalay and
Myeik airports ground stations are DO260B compliant and installation was finished in 2016.

All ADS-B data are fused with MSSR data target in the Top Sky ATC Automation system (Thales) in
2016, and using as MSSR backup and surveillance monitoring in Yangon ACC.

In addition, Myanmar have planned to install new ADS-B Station in the First quarter of 2020 at Lashio
Airport located in north-eastern part of Myanmar closed to the China-Myanmar border near the
LINSO transfer point on A599 ATS route. After the installation finished, the ADS -B data sharing
process can be proceeded between Myanmar and China after March, 2020.

For the communication links between Yangon and Beijing, it can use the existing 2M E1 IPLC link
which is now using for AFTN messaging and (AIDC Testing) Voice, and also can be used the existing
Yangon-Beijing VSAT link as backup.

Myanmar also willing to participate the special coordination meetings to promote relevant works in
terms of the surveillance data sharing among the countries to enhance the safety and surveillance
capability in the sub-region.

Lashio installation will be completed by First quarter of 2020.

Redundant Communication link via Land line / CRV / V-SAT is proposed under discussion.

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 Appendix E2 to the Report

8. Thailand

Thailand provided update on the installation and related activities regarding ADS-B and other related
surveillance system as follows:

ADS-B Ground Infrastructure and ATC System Readiness or Implementation Plan

 MLAT has been in operation at VTBS since 2006 and has been installed at VTBD with the
expectation to be operational in 2020. At VTCC and VTSP, M-LAT is being installed with
expectation to be operational in 2020.

 Six ADS-B ground stations (DO-260B compliant) have been installed covering airspace at and
above 20,000 feet primarily for research and development purpose and are being undergone the
certification process by Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT) with a target date by the end
of 2020.

 Additional ADS-B ground stations are planned to be installed aiming at providing coverage from
ground to 11,000 feet for TMA and Airport operations.

 Multiple surveillance sensor data including SSR, ADS-B and WAM are integrated into the new
ATM systems and expected to be operational in early 2020.

 Legal assessment regarding ADS-B data sharing with other states has been underway.

Date of Issue/Effectiveness Date of Equipage Mandate

 Aircraft equipage mandate is expected to be issued in 2021 with the expected target effective date
in 2026.

Data sharing

 ATS surveillance data sharing with adjacent FIRs was approved in principle in October 2018.

 User requirements, particularly ATS routes to be served, and communication link test plan are
discussed in 2018-2019.

9. India (no update provided in 2018)

India informed that 21 ADS-B ground receivers have already been installed and the information has
been promulgated through AIP SUPP 18/2014 to use ADS-B in the provision of ATS surveillance
service. The data sharing agreement between India and Myanmar has been signed on 06 th May 2015.
India is willing to share ADS-B data with Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. India has invited open
tenders for procurement of ten more ADS-B Ground Stations for installation at Kadappa, Raipur,
Pantnagar, Indore, Jabalpur, Bikaner, Goa, Aurangabad, Dhanbad and Campbell Bay (in Bay of Bengal
near FIR boundaries of Chennai, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur) is completed in third quarter of 2019.
The The objective is to provide ADS-B coverage in areas where there is no or limited Secondary
Surveillance Radar (SSR) coverage. The data from the above ADS-B ground stations is integrated
with existing ATM systems at different Area Control Centres. India expects the ground stations to be
DO-260B compliant and operational by the end of 2018. The ADS-B receivers are capable of DO-
260B, but not all the ATM Automation Systems are capable of DO-260.

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 Appendix E2 to the Report

10. Sri Lanka (no update provided in 2018)

Not Present
Sri Lanka has installed 5, ADS-B stations and data received by the stations have been integrated and
available for sharing. The ADS-B coverage is approximately 350NM from Piduruthalagala, the highest
mountain situated in central Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is willing to share this data with India and Maldives.
India is requested to provide a soft copy of draft agreement for sharing of ADS-B data with Sri Lanka
so as to enable Sri Lanka to look into the terms and conditions of draft agreement.

ADS-B Data Sharing

Project 1 - ADS-B Data Sharing between China, Laos and Myanmar

Phase 1 China and Laos sharing ADS-B data from following:

Kunming ADS-B data processing Centre (china), which can customize the output of ADS-B data in
version, specific area and height range depend on Laos’s requirement.

Route to be affected B465.

China and Myanmar sharing ADS-B data from the following sites:
Lashio (Myanmar) Not yet installed – Target to be installed by March 2020.Route to be affected A599

China and Myanmar sharing ADS-B data from the following:

Kunming ADS-B Data Processing Centre (China), which can customize the output of ADS-B data in
version、specific area and height range depend on Myanmar's requirement.

Operational Status
N/A

Expected benefits
 Enhanced air navigation safety at FIRs boundary.
 Promoting air traffic control work efficiency.

Project 2 - ADS-B Data Sharing between India and Indonesia

Phase 1
Aceh – Indonesia
Camp Bell Bay – India

Route to be affected B466, P574 and N563

Operational Status
Camp Bell to Chennai link BSNL is under testing. Indonesia waiting till CRV scheduled 1st quarter
2020. India is getting ready for CRV by the end of first quarter 2020 with PCCW.

Benefits
Enhanced safety by reduction in occurrences of LHDs and LLDs in BOB region.

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 Appendix E2 to the Report

Project 3 - ADS-B Data Sharing between India and Malaysia

Phase 1
Port Blair/Campbell-Langkawi (2H2021)
Route to be affected N571, P628, L510, P627, L645 and P574

Operational Status
New ATM system installation in June 2020.

Expected benefits
Enhanced safety by reduction in occurrences of LHDs and LLDs in BOB region.

Project 4 - ADS-B Data Sharing between India and Myanmar

Phase 1
The ADS-B data sharing between Kolkata and Yangon FIR was an initiative taken by India and
Myanmar to enhance safety and reduce LHDs along Kolkata-Yangon FIR boundary.

In 6 May 2015, Myanmar and India have signed the MOU agreement for ADS-B data sharing between
the two countries.

As per the data sharing agreement, ADS-B data sharing test between Agartala(India) and Sittwe
(Myanmar) and Port Blair(India) and Coco Island(Myanmar) has been accomplished between
technical teams since June 2018. Kolkata has integrated the ADS-B feed from Sittwe and Co Co Island
in its Automation system. Presently the data is given in the back up automation system at Kolkata for
test purpose and ADS B equipped aircrafts are tracked from as far as 250 nm west of Bangkok.

But for Myanmar side, India’s data is just received to Yangon ACC technical management room and
need to discuss with ATM Manufacturer (Thales) of Surveillance Display System to integrate India’s
ADS-B data to existing Surveillance Display System for operational use in Yangon ACC. Because the
multicast address and port from India’s ADS-B data are different with existing setup.

The communication link used for ADSB data transfer between Yangon and Kolkata is the existing
E1 IPLC link which is used for DSC phone between the two ATS units.

Route to be affected A201, A599, B465, G463, L507, P646, P762, G472, L524, M770 and L759

Operational Status
Operationalized for situational awareness.

Expected benefits
Enhanced safety by reduction in occurrences of LHDs and LLDs in BOB region.

Project 5 - ADS-B Data Sharing between Indonesia and Malaysia

Phase 1
Langkawi - Aceh (2H2019 2H2021)
Route to be affected B466, N571, P628, L510, P627, L645 and P574

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 Appendix E2 to the Report

Operational Status
New ATM Automation system installation by June 2020 then data sharing.

Expected benefits
Enhanced safety at FIR boundary

Project 6 - ADS-B Data Sharing between Malaysia and Thailand

Phase 1
Langkawi - Phuket

General discussion about possibility to share ADS-B data for route N571, P628, L510, P627, L645
and P574

Operational Status
N/A

Expected benefits
 Enhanced visibility of surveillance targets in Bay of Bengal.
 Enhanced situational awareness at FIR boundary.

Project 7 - ADS-B Data Sharing between India and Sri Lanka (no update provided in 2018,
2019)

Phase 1
Trivandrum – Colombo (2H2018)
Trichy-Colombo (2H2018)
Route to be affected TBN

Operational Status
N/A

Expected benefits
Enhanced safety at FIR boundary

Important Notes

1. Terminology used in the region should be standardised and consistent, and recognise what crew
need to know.

2. States need to develop procedures for the use of DAPs in relation to operating procedures, for
example the use of selected altitude information being displayed on the controllers’ screens and
related pilot practices: pilots and controllers need to be aware of each other’s operating practices.

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 Appendix E2 to the Report

3. There is a need to consider the capture, storage, and potential uses of ADS-B data. For example, in
some states those data might be used to draw premature conclusions about the causes of an
accident or incident and result in inappropriate or unwarranted enforcement action. In addition,
there were concerns about who can access ADS-B data and for what purposes. Examples of
inaccurate data being used by members of the public to make complaints about aircraft flight paths
and noise impost are a concern.

____________

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 SURICG/5
Appendix F1 to the Report

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR SEA/BOB ADS-B WG

APANPIRG18 Conclusion 18/38 agreed to the establishment of a sub-regional ADS-B Implementation

Working Group in the South-East Asia area (SEA ADS-B WG) by the end 2007 to develop the terms
of cooperation and an implementation plan for near-term ADS-B applications in the sub-region.

APANPIRG/22 Decision 22/34 agreed to rename the Southeast Asia Sub-regional ADS-B
Implementation Working Group to “South East Asia and Bay of Bengal Sub-regional ADS-B
Implementation Working Group” and tasked the new Working Group to develop a revised Terms of
Cooperation and work programme in the sub-regions.

The outcome of the ADS-B Working Group will report to APANPIRG through the Surveillance
Implementation Coordination Group.

The SEA/BOB ADS-B WG shall

(a) Develop Terms of Co-operation which will include:
• establishing model documents for possible use by States when:
o Agreeing to share ADS-B data, and DCPC (such as VHF radio voice communication)
capability between adjoining States for various ADS-B applications (including a sample letter
of agreement); or
o Establishing ADS-B avionics fitment mandates
• identifying optimum coverage for ADS-B ground stations and associated VHF radio voice
communication in the sub-regional FIR boundary areas.

(b) Develop an implementation plan for near term ADS-B application which will delivery efficient
airspace and increased safety on a regional basis that include:
• schedule and priority dates to bring into effect ADS-B based services taking into account;
o Timing of any equipage mandates.
o Timing of any ATC automation upgrades to support ADS-B.
o Timing of commissioning of any ADS-B data and associated VHF radio voice
communication facilities.
• consideration of major traffic flows
• harmonization of mandates across the various FIRs
• promotion of new means of data sharing (such as data sharing through a centralized data base
or SWIM)

(c) Coordination for implementation of the plan and identify implementation issues and solutions

(d) Consolidation of issues to be considered at other ADS-B related forum (e.g. Surveillance Panel,
RTCA, EUROCAE), or by vendors.

(e) Sharing of innovative means to solve ADS-B related issues.

(f) Study the potential applications and issues of new forms of ADS-B stations and Long Range
Communications.

Composition: The Group will be composed of experts nominated by States in the Sub-region including:
Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, China, Hong Kong China, Cambodia, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam,
IATA and CANSO.

Reporting: The Group will present its report to Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group
____________

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 SURICG/5
Appendix F2 to the Report

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ADS-B WG

An ADS-B Working Group is to be established under the Surveillance Implementation Coordination

Group. The outcome of the ADS-B Working Group will report to the Surveillance Implementation
Coordination Group.

The ADS-B WG shall

(a) Monitor and influence the developments of ADS-B related technologies and applications.

(b) Develop an implementation plan for near term ADS-B technology and application, including
provision of minimum layers of surveillance services.

(c) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of ADS-B data sharing projects.

(d) Promotion of new means of data sharing (such as data sharing through a centralized data base
or SWIM)

(e) Harmonization of mandates across the various FIRs

(f) Sharing of implementation and operation issues, and innovative means to solve such issues.

(g) Consolidation of implementation and operation issues and forward them to other ADS-B related
forum (e.g. Surveillance Panel, RTCA, EUROCAE), or vendors for considerations.

Composition: The Group will be composed of experts nominated by States in Asia Pacific. IATA and
CANSO.

Reporting: The Group will present its report to Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group

___________

APX. F - SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 APX. F2 -1

 Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters
Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

SURICG/5
Appendix G to the Report

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

MODE S DOWNLINK AIRCRAFT PARAMETERS IMPLEMENTATION

AND OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5

1.1 PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................................... 5

1.2 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2.1 Mode S and DAPs ................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.2 Benefit of Mode S and Use of DAPs ....................................................................................................... 6
1.3 ARRANGEMENT OF DAPS IGD .................................................................................................................. 6
1.4 DOCUMENT HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................ 6
1.5 COPIES ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
1.6 CHANGES TO DAPS IGD ............................................................................................................................ 7
1.7 EDITING CONVENTIONS ............................................................................................................................. 7
1.8 DAPS IGD REQUEST FOR CHANGE FORM ................................................................................................ 8
1.9 AMENDMENT RECORD ............................................................................................................................... 9

2. ACRONYMS LIST ......................................................................................................................................... 10

3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ....................................................................................................................... 12

4. DESCRIPTION OF MODE S DAPS DATA ................................................................................................. 14

4.1 MODE S ELS ............................................................................................................................................ 14

4.2 MODE S EHS ............................................................................................................................................ 15
4.3 DAPS DATA EXCHANGE PROTOCOL BETWEEN SURVEILLANCE AND ATM AUTOMATION SYSTEM ..... 16

5. IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES AND PHASES .................................................................................. 17

5.1 IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES................................................................................................................ 17

5.1.1 Stakeholders Coordination ................................................................................................................... 17
5.1.2 System Compatibility ............................................................................................................................ 17
5.1.3 DAPs Data Integrity ............................................................................................................................. 18
5.1.4 System Integration ................................................................................................................................ 18
5.2 IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST ............................................................................................................ 19
5.2.1 Activity Sequence .................................................................................................................................. 19
5.2.2 Concept Phase ...................................................................................................................................... 19
5.2.3 Design Phase ........................................................................................................................................ 20
5.2.4 Implementation Phase .......................................................................................................................... 21

6. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING ............................................................................................. 22

6.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................... 22
6.2 PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING................................................................................................... 22
6.3 ATS SYSTEM VALIDATION ....................................................................................................................... 22
6.3.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines ............................................................................................................... 22
6.3.2 System Safety Assessment ..................................................................................................................... 22
6.3.3 Integration Test ..................................................................................................................................... 23
6.3.4 ATS Operation Manuals ....................................................................................................................... 23
6.4 SYSTEM MONITORING ............................................................................................................................. 23
6.4.1 Consideration for System Monitoring ................................................................................................... 23

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6.4.2 Mode S DAPs Problem Reports ............................................................................................................ 24

6.4.3 Example of Mode S DAPs Problem ...................................................................................................... 25
6.5 APPLICATION ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................... 25
6.5.1 Data Recording ..................................................................................................................................... 26
6.5.2 Local Data Collection........................................................................................................................... 26
6.5.3 Avionics Problem Identification and Correction ................................................................................... 26
6.6 IDENTIFIED ISSUES ................................................................................................................................... 26

7. REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES ........................................................................................................ 27

7.1 MANDATING MODE S DAPS .................................................................................................................... 27

7.2 AVIONICS .................................................................................................................................................. 28
7.2.1 Mode S Transponder Capabilities ........................................................................................................ 28
7.2.2 Transition Guidelines ............................................................................................................................ 29
7.2.3 Interrogation of Transponders on Ground ............................................................................................ 29
7.3 MODE S INTERROGATOR ......................................................................................................................... 30
7.3.1 Working Principles ............................................................................................................................... 30
7.3.2 Interrogator Codes ............................................................................................................................... 30
7.3.3 Interrogation Methods .......................................................................................................................... 31
7.3.4 Interrogate Comm-B Data .................................................................................................................... 31
7.4 ATM AUTOMATION SYSTEM.................................................................................................................... 33
7.4.1 Elementary Surveillance ....................................................................................................................... 33
7.4.2 Enhanced Surveillance ......................................................................................................................... 34
7.5 FLIGHT PLANNING ................................................................................................................................... 35
7.5.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 7 - Aircraft Identification................................................................................. 35
7.5.2 Equipment (Surveillance Equipment /SSR Equipment) ......................................................................... 35
7.5.3 Inconsistency between Mode S Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability ...................................... 36
7.5.4 Setting Flight ID in Cockpits ................................................................................................................ 37
7.6 CONTINGENCY PLAN ................................................................................................................................ 37

8. TRAINING AND COMPETENCE ................................................................................................................ 38

8.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................... 38
8.2 TRAINING OF AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER (ATC) IN DAPS .............................................................. 38
8.3 TRAINING OF AN ATSEP IN DAPS ........................................................................................................... 38
8.4 COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT OF AN ATSEP IN DAPS............................................................................... 39

9. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES ON MODE S DAPS APPLICATION .................................................................. 40

9.1 USE OF SELECTED ALTITUDE ................................................................................................................... 40

9.2 USE OF ACAS RA..................................................................................................................................... 40

APPENDIX 1: MODE S DAPS ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 42

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF IDENTIFIED ISSUES................................................................................................... 46

APPENDIX 3: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................................ 50

APPENDIX 4: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF MODE S DAPS DATA SOURCE .......................................... 52

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

This Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (DAPs
IGD) provides guidance for the planning, implementation and operational application of Mode S DAPs
technology in the Asia and Pacific Regions.

The procedures and requirements for Mode S DAPs operations are detailed in the relevant States’ AIP.
This IGD is intended to provide key information on Mode S DAPs performance, integration, principles,
procedures and collaboration mechanisms.

The content is based upon the work to date of the Mode S DAPs Working Group and various ANC
Panels for the operational use of Mode S DAPs.

1.2 Background

1.2.1 Mode S and DAPs

Mode S (Select) is an extension of conventional SSR which permits selective addressing of individual
aircraft equipped with MODE S transponders. Additional data known as Downlink Aircraft Parameters
(DAPs) may also be extracted from the aircraft, including aircraft identification which should correspond
to the ACID entered in the flight plan.

Mode S operates on the same radio frequencies (1030 and 1090 MHz) as conventional SSR systems
allowing for interrogation of older Mode A/C transponders and well as more modern Mode S
transponders.

Each Mode S equipped aircraft is assigned a unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address. Using the selective
interrogation capability of the Mode S SSR, Mode S Sensors are able to first acquire and then selectively
interrogate a specific aircraft via its unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address. This significantly improves the
radar’s detection and tracking performance, and therefore improving the ability of ATC to monitor and
control the aircraft, as well as the others around it.

The innovation of Mode S resides in the use of selective addressing of aircraft which offers technical
advantages over conventional SSR, such as reducing “fruit” and “garbling”, providing higher integrity
radar tracks.

Mode S technology has the following characteristics:

a) selective interrogation,
b) individual aircraft address and
c) datalink capability.
The Mode S Application includes Mode S radar system, datalink Systems, MLAT Systems, etc.

Various avionics systems onboard an aircraft receive data from sensors to provide the DAPS output. The
data mainly comes from several sets of sensors, such as air data sensors (including pitot probe, static port,
temperature sensor, angle of attack sensor), inertial sensors (including position gyroscopes, rate
gyroscopes and accelerometers) and magnetic sensor(s). Part of the parameters produced by other
avionics systems (such as MCP/FCU, FMS, TCAS, etc.) are also defined as downlink aircraft parameters.

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These parameters are then sent to the transponder through standard data buses, and stored inside the
relevant transponder’s 56-bit Binary Data Storages (BDS). Ground-based surveillance systems (such as
MSSR or MLAT) can downlink the desired parameters using specific Mode S protocols.

For detailed information about DAPs data source, please refer to Appendix 4.

Mode S DAPs is an application of the Mode S Datalink System. The downlink standard length
transaction interface shall deliver DAPs to the transponder which then makes data available to the
ground surveillance systems. Each DAP shall be packed into the Comm-B format (‘MB’ field) and can
be extracted using either the ground-initiated Comm-B (GICB) protocol, or using MSP downlink
channel 3 via the dataflash application.

1.2.2 Benefit of Mode S and Use of DAPs

The Mode S Application reduces the weakness of Mode A/C, because of the selective interrogation
reducing synchronous garble and asynchronous interference. The parity check technique improves
reliability and integrity of surveillance data. The availability of almost 17 million unique aircraft
addresses, in conjunction with the automatic reporting of flight identity, alleviates Mode 3/A code
shortages and enables unambiguous aircraft identification, if the correct aircraft address and/or Aircraft
Identification are entered in both the flight plan and aircraft systems. The datalink technique assists the
acquisition of downlink aircraft parameters, and the additional track label information improves the air
situational awareness. The controller and pilot are presented with improved situation awareness, which
reduce the R/T workload.

1.3 Arrangement of DAPs IGD

The Mode S DAPs Implementation and Operations Guidance Document consists of the following parts:

Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Acronym Lists
Section 3 Reference Documents
Section 4 Description of Mode S DAPs Data
Section 5 Implementation Principles and Phase
Section 6 System Integrity and Monitoring
Section 7 Regulations and Procedures
Section 8 Training and Competence
Section 9 Specific Examples on Mode S DAPs Applications

1.4 Document History and Management

The framework of this document was introduced in the first Working Group Meeting of Mode S
Downlink Aircraft Parameters in March 2018. The Meeting agreed to further develop based on the
proposed framework to a complete document for approval as regional guidance document. A working
team, consisting of volunteers from China, Hong Kong-China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and
New Zealand was established by the Meeting to contribute to the content of the document. In July 2018,
the completed draft of this document was ready for circulation among States for review and comment.

The aim of this document to supplement SARPs, PANS and relevant provisions contained in ICAO
documentation and it will be regularly updated to reflect evolving provisions.

1.5 Copies

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Paper copies of this DAPs IGD are not distributed. Controlled and endorsed copies can be found at the
following web site: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx and may be freely downloaded from the
web site, or by emailing APANPIRG through the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office who will send
a copy by return email.

1.6 Changes to DAPs IGD

Whenever a user identifies a need for a change to this document, a Request for Change (RFC) Form (see
Section 1.8 below) should be completed and submitted to the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office.
The Regional Office will collate RFCs for consideration by the Surveillance Implementation
Coordination Group.

When an amendment has been agreed by a meeting of the Surveillance Implementation Coordination
Group then a new version of the DAPs IGD will be prepared, with the changes marked by an “|” in the
margin, and an endnote indicating the relevant RFC, so a reader can see the origin of the change. If the
change is in a table cell, the outside edges of the table will be highlighted; e.g.:

Final approval for publication of an amendment to the DAPs IGD will be the responsibility of
APANPIRG.

1.7 Editing Conventions

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1.8 DAPs IGD Request for Change Form

RFC Nr:

Please use this form when requesting a change to any part of this DAPs IGD. This form may be
photocopied as required, emailed, faxed or e-mailed to ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office
+66 (2) 537-8199 or APAC@icao.int

1. SUBJECT:

2. REASON FOR CHANGE:

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: [expand / attach additional pages if necessary]

4. REFERENCE(S):
5. PERSON INITIATING: DATE:
ORGANISATION:
TEL/FAX/E-MAIL:

6. CONSULTATION RESPONSE DUE BY DATE:

Organization Name Agree/Disagree Date

7. ACTION REQUIRED :
8. DAPs IGD EDITOR DATE REC’D :
9. FEEDBACK PASSED DATE :

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1.9 Amendment Record

Amendment Date Amended by Comments

Number
0.1 20 March 2018 China Initial draft for consideration by
Hong Kong, China Mode S DAPs WG/1
0.2 1 August 2018 China First completed draft based on the
Hong Kong, China agreed document framework in
Japan Mode S DAPs WG/1 for review and
Singapore comment by States
Malaysia
0.3 23 August 2018 China Based on Version 0.2 draft, China
hold a meeting to discuss problems
respecting the first completed draft.
This is a revised document according
to content of this meeting.
0.3.1 26 September 2018 China Based on Version 0.3 draft, States
Hong Kong, China make a full comment on the content
Singapore of IGD. This is a revised document
New Zealand according to those comments.
0.3.2 6 November 2018 China Based on Version 0.3.1 draft, States
New Zealand discussed all comments of IGD in
Hong Kong, China the Mode S DAPs WG 1st Web
Singapore Conference. This is revised by the
Malaysia meeting decisions.
0.4 27 December 2018 China Based on Version 0.3.2, States
New Zealand review and comment on the IGD.
Singapore This is a revised document according
Australia to those comments.
1.0 14 March 2019 China Consideration by Mode S DAPs
Japan WG/2
Singapore
Malaysia
1.1 17 February 2020 China Modify based on Version 1.0, States
New Zealand review and comment on the IGD.
Singapore
2.0 Consideration by Mode S DAPs
WG/3

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2. ACRONYMS LIST

AA Aircraft Address
AC Altitude Code
ACID Aircraft Identification
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
ANC Air Navigation Conference
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
APAC Asia Pacific
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network
ATS Air Traffic Service
ATSEP Air Traffic Safety Electronic Personnel
BDS Comm-B Data Selector
CA Capability
CDTI Cockpit Display Traffic Information
CFL Cleared Flight Level
CLAM Cleared Level Adherence Monitoring
CNS Communications, Navigation and Surveillance
DAPs Downlink Aircraft Parameters
DF Downlink Format
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EHS Mode S Enhanced Surveillance
ELM Extended Length Message
ELS Mode S Elementary Surveillance
ES Extended Squitter
EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment
EUROCONTORL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
FIR Flight Information Region
FLTID Flight Identification (transmitted by aircraft)
FMS Flight Management System
FS Flight Status
FRUIT False Relies Unsynchronized In Time
GICB Ground-Initiated Comm-B
HMI Human Machine Interface
IC Interrogator Code
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ID Identity
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
II Interrogator Identifier
IRF Interrogation Repetition Frequency
MHz Megahertz
MIP Mode Interlace Patterns
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLAT Multilateration
MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MSP Mode S Specific Protocol
SARPs (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices
SFL Selected Flight Level
SI Surveillance Identifier
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar

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STCA Short-Term Conflict Alert

UTC Universal Time Coordinated
WAM Wide Area Multilateration
WG Working Group

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3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Id Name of the document Edition Date Origin Domain

1 Aeronautical Telecommunications, Edition 2 2007 ICAO
Annex 10 - Vol. III - Communication
Systems

2 Aeronautical Telecommunications, Edition 5 2014 ICAO

Annex 10 - Vol. IV - Surveillance Radar
and Collision Avoidance Systems

3 Doc 9871, Technical Provisions for Edition 2 2012 ICAO

Mode S Services and Extended Squitter.

4 Doc 9688 Manual on Mode S specific Edition 2 2004 ICAO

service.

5 ED-73E, Minimum Operational Edition 1 May EUROCAE

Performance Standards for Secondary 2011
Surveillance Radar Mode S
Transponders.

6 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Edition 11 April 2018 ICAO

Guidance Document APAC
7 Concept of Operations Mode S in Edition 2 November Eurocontrol
Europe (Mode S CONOPS) 2013

8 Mode S Elementary Surveillance (ELS) Edition 1 January Eurocontrol

Operations Manual 2011

9 Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM Plan May ICAO

2015 APAC

10 Doc 9924 Aeronautical Surveillance Second 2017 ICAO

Manual Edition

11 Preliminary System Safety Analysis for Edition April 2004 Eurocontrol EATMP
the Mode S Elementary Surveillance 1.8

12 Elementary Surveillance (ELS) and April 2008 MIT ATC

Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) validation Lincoln Project
via Mode S Secondary Radar
Laboratory
13 Aircraft Derived Data Validation August MIT ATC
Algorithms 2012 Lincoln Project
Laboratory
14 Doc.4444 Procedures For Air Navigation Sixteenth November ICAO
Services Air Traffic Management Edition 2016

15 Clarification Mode S Transponder in an Edition 3 May Eurocontrol

Airport/A-SMGCS Environment 1.1 2005

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16 Minimum Operational Performance Edition E 17 March RTCA

Standards for Air Traffic Control Radar 2011
Beacon System /Mode Select (ATCRBS
/ Mode S) Airborne Equipment

17 MARK 4 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Edition 4 15 ARINC

TRANSPONDER (ATCRBS/MODE S) November
2011

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4. DESCRIPTION OF MODE S DAPs DATA

Inside the aircraft transponder, DAPs are stored in different BDS Registers for responding to DAPs
interrogation requests by a Mode S ground system. Aircraft parameters are periodically delivered from
aircraft sensors, flight management system, etc., to these registers via the downlink standard length
transaction interface. BDS Registers, which have not been updated within the specified maximum update
interval, are cleared or indicated as invalid and such aircraft parameters would be unavailable for ground
interrogations. When a Mode S SSR sends an interrogation requesting the downlink of registers, DAPs
are packed into Comm-B format (known as “MB” field) and are extracted using either the GICB
protocol or Mode S specific protocols (MSPs) channel 3.

BDS Registers are identified by two-digit hex number. For example, BDS Register for selected vertical
intention, which is identified by hex number 4016, is commonly written as BDS code 4, 0 in publications.
Depending on the stage of Mode S implementation, i.e. Mode S ELS and Mode S EHS, the scope of
Mode S DAPs data involved would be different as illustrated in the following subsections.

Detailed data format and maximum update interval of each BDS register are given in “ICAO Doc 9871 -
Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended Squitter”.

4.1 Mode S ELS

In Mode S ELS implementation, aircraft and ground Mode S system should be compliant of providing
the following functionalities over traditional Mode A/C systems:

a) Selective interrogation;
b) Use of ICAO Aircraft Address;
c) Automatic reporting of ACID;
d) Report of transponder capability;
e) Altitude reporting with resolution of 25ft (subject to aircraft capability);
f) Provision of flight status to indicate airborne or on-the-ground (subject to aircraft capability);
g) Report of SI Code capability; and
h) ACAS active resolution advisory report (when equipped with TCAS)

DAPs associated with Mode S ELS are stored in BDS code 1,0, BDS code 1,7, BDS code 2,0 and BDS
code 3,0 registers of aircraft’s transponder.

Table 4-1 DAPs in Mode S ELS

Register Name Usage

Datalink Capability To report the data link capability of the Mode S
BDS code 1,0
Report transponder/data link installation.
Common Usage GICB To indicate common usage GICB services currently
BDS code 1,7
Capability Report supported.
BDS code 2,0 Aircraft Identification To report aircraft identification to the ground.
ACAS Resolution
BDS code 3,0 To report ACAS active resolution advisory
Advisory Report

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With the above functionalities properly configured, Mode S ELS could bring the following benefits to
ATC operations:

a) Provide unambiguous aircraft identification using the unique aircraft address and aircraft
identification;
b) Help solving Mode 3/A code shortage in congested airspace, using the Mode S conspicuity
code (A1000) instead of discrete Mode 3/A codes;
c) Improve surveillance data integrity by;
1) reducing synchronous garble*,
2) lessening over-interrogations, and
3) simplifying aircraft identification in case of false targets;
d) Improve the accuracy of multi-surveillance tracking and safety nets with more accurate target
detection from Mode S radars and high resolution in altitude reporting; and
e) Able to process more aircraft tracks than conventional Mode A/C radars; and
f) Able to provide ACAS active resolution advisory from suitably equipped aircraft[AA1].
*Note, while Mode S will help to reduce data garble it will not totally resolve the issue. Issues around
multi-path and different transponder types in close proximity (e.g. Mode A/C near a Mode S transponder)
mean that the return received by the radar may not be correct. In the case of a Mode A/C transponder
close to a Mode S transponder, instances have been recorded where the Mode S address has been
transposed into the reply from the Mode A transponder.

4.2 Mode S EHS

Mode S EHS implementation includes all the features of Mode S ELS with the addition of DAPs stored
in BDS code 4,0, BDS code 5,0 and BDS code 6,0 registers of aircraft’s transponder. The following table
summarizes the details of DAPs of these three registers:

Table 4-2 DAPs in Mode S EHS

Register Name/Downlink Aircraft Parameters Usage

MCP/FCU Selected
Altitude
Selected
FMS Selected Altitude To provide information about the
BDS code 4,0 Vertical
Barometric Pressure Setting aircraft’s current vertical intentions
Intention
MCP/FCU Mode
Target Altitude Source
Roll Angle
Track
True Track Angle
and To provide track and turn data to the
BDS code 5,0 Ground Speed
Turn ground systems.
Track Angle Rate
Report
True Air Speed
Magnetic Heading
Heading
Indicated Air Speed
and To provide heading and speed data to
BDS code 6,0 Mach Number
Speed ground systems.
Barometric Altitude Rate
Report
Inertial Vertical Velocity

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In addition to those improvements contributed by Mode S ELS in Section 4.1, Mode S EHS
implementation provides the following benefits to ATC operation:

a) Further improve multi-surveillance tracking accuracy and performance through the use of
DAPs on track, turn, speed and heading of the aircraft in the track calculation;
b) Further improve the accuracy of safety nets, e.g. Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA), through
the provision of more accurate aircraft tracks;
c) Allow the implementation of new safety nets in ATM automation system for cross-checking
selected aircraft vertical intention (i.e. Selected Altitude) with ATC controllers’ instruction as
well as verifying the barometric pressure setting applied in the aircraft with QNH setting in
ATM automation system; and
d) Improve situational awareness of ATC controllers by enabling the direct access of aircraft
parameters in ATM automation system, e.g. Indicated Air Speed, Selected Altitude, Barometric
Pressure Setting, etc.;
e) Progressive reduction of R/T workload per aircraft.

4.3 DAPs Data Exchange Protocol Between Surveillance and ATM Automation System

The decoding of DAPs data from downlink messages is handled by ground surveillance equipment such
as radars, ADS-B, MLAT and WAM ground stations. The Surveillance Data Processor (SDP) within the
ATM automation system can combine multiple downlink messages into single target report for display to
controllers. All Purpose Structured EUROCONTROL Surveillance Information Exchange (ASTERIX)
formats are commonly used as the protocol for target report transmission from surveillance systems to
the ATM automation system.

ASTERIX formats are categorized based on the types of surveillance data involved. ASTERIX Category
20, ASTERIX Category 21 and ASTERIX Category 48 are responsible for the DAPs data transmission
from MLAT systems, ADS-B systems and radars respectively. For each ASTERIX category, the protocol
format is further divided into different editions with variations on the supported DAPs data. ANSP’s
should carry out appropriate studies on the available protocol editions during the design stage to ensure
the chosen format can cater for the scope of DAPs proposed to be implemented and that the Surveillance
and ATM automation systems can correctly process the protocol selected.

For details, previous and current versions of ASTERIX Category 20, Category 21 and Category 48
specification documents can be downloaded from the following link of EUROCONTROL web sites:

https://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/cat020-multilateration-mlt-messages-part-14

https://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/cat021-automatic-dependent-surveillance-broadcast-ads-b-mess
ages-part-12

https://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/cat048-monoradar-target-reports-part-4-next-version-cat-001

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5. IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES AND PHASES

Implementation guidance is developed to progress the DAPs implementation from concept to operational
use in ICAO APAC region. In this chapter, section one addresses the implementation principles, which
describes the issues of international coordination, system compatibility, data integrity and system
integration, while section two addresses the implementation phase, to assist States with the management
of DAPs implementation activities.

5.1 Implementation Principles

5.1.1 Stakeholders Coordination

DAPs provide useful information from aircraft which can benefit ANSP and airspace users.
Improvements in efficiency and safety can be achieved, however the resultant changes in operational
procedures to provide the improvements, will affect ANSPs, Regulators, Airlines, and other related
airspace users. Before implementation by any States, a coordination team should be formed to study,
coordinate, support and consult the implementation plans and related activities. The coordination team
should include field experts on avionics, data link, surveillance infrastructures and end users.

Changes in the ATM operational procedures as the result of the use of DAPs requires coordination
among ATS providers, Regulators, Airlines, and where applicable, coordination among neighboring
States to maximize the benefits. All States are encouraged to share their operational experiences, and to
report anomalies through Mode S DAPs WG and the Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group.

Not all Surveillance and ATM automation systems are capable of processing and using DAPs, therefore
investment in all related fields needs to be considered by all States. The coordination team should be
consulted for the future investment plans and related activities considering the technical and operational
aspects. Consideration needs to be given to achieve a balance between investment and benefits.

5.1.2 System Compatibility

a) Technical:
DAPs can be obtained by different surveillance technologies such as Mode S Radar, ADS-B, MLAT and
WAM, however not all the transponders can support DAPs. Different surveillance technologies in ICAO
APAC States mean that system compatibility should be considered.

Potential interference between different surveillance technologies should be fully considered before
implementation, otherwise the efficiency and safety of the system cannot be ensured. Harmonization
between different technologies should be considered and optimized to reduce the RF congestion on
1030MHz and 1090MHz.

Since not all aircraft are equipped with Mode S transponders, and not all the Mode S transponder have
the ability to support DAPs, compatibility and efficiency should always be considered before
implementation.

When DAPs are implemented, the data rate will increase compared to the conventional radar data, and
the related BDS information extraction strategies should be considered. To reduce load on the 1090MHz
spectrum, only those registers intended for operational use should be interrogated/extracted.

b) Operational:
Different processing systems can support DAPs in different levels, hence the quality and information of
target may be different after the processed DAPs has been added. For example, some radar tracking

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algorithms will consider DAPs as an input to the tracking, so the quality and information of the target
will be a little bit different, therefore there should be compatibility considerations between different
systems before use of the target data.

There are different air traffic management and operation strategies used by neighboring States. So, the
operational procedures should always consider the operational compatibilities. For example, Mode A/C
transponders and Mode S transponders may be working in the same area.

5.1.3 DAPs Data Integrity

DAPs data integrity should always be the first consideration when putting DAPs data into use. Since the
data integrity from the source are not delivered by any related BDS register now, States are encouraged
to find a reliable methodology to ensure the data integrity prior to the use of the data. Additionally,
ongoing means of determining data integrity should be implemented, along with an ability to exclude
invalid DAPs data from ATM automation systems.

States which already have experience on data integrity are encouraged to share this information with
other States. The coordination team could support and harmonize this activity, and provide a standard
method to evaluate the data integrity, and share the method to all the States.

5.1.4 System Integration

By introducing DAPs, the target characteristic from the source to the end user may be different
compared to pre-DAPs implementation. In different phases of the processing flow of target data, DAPs
can be used by different systems to improve tracking performance. Some key points in the data flow are
as follows:

a) Airborne Avionics Systems

As DAPs data comes from different kinds of sensors and avionics systems on the aircraft, the reliability
of the data should be ensured before the data is used operationally. Research has shown that some BDS
data is missing or not updated correctly. The reasons for this needs to be established as it can mean that
use of some DAPs data is not suitable for implementation. Examples of issues include:

1) Older Flight Management Systems which do not provide all the DAPs data, and
2) Incorrect installation (e.g. onboard equipment wired to wrong registers)

b) Ground Sensor Systems

Ground sensors may use the DAPs to improve their target tracking performance, having an impact on the
tracking function; the target data produced by this kind of sensors will show different characteristics to
the pre-DAPs implemented tracking function, such as the turning rate, the kinematic movement and so
on. Data users need to be aware of this performance improvement.

c) Ground Automation Systems

Ground automation systems can use DAPs information for a wide variety of uses, such as for tracking,
safety net processing, situational awareness, en-route meteorological information sharing and so on.
Ensuring DAPs information is processed and used in an appropriate way should be considered during
implementation.

d) Other Surveillance Systems

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Any DAPs data should be capable of being integrated with other surveillance systems data, and any
potential difference and impact should be considered before use. Some of the information can be cross
checked by different surveillance technologies.

e) Other Related Systems

5.2 Implementation CHECKLIST

The purpose of this implementation checklist is to document the range of activities that needs to be
completed to bring a DAPs application from an initial concept to operational use. Some activities of this
checklist may be specific to individual stakeholders.

5.2.1 Activity Sequence

The activities are listed in an approximate sequential order. However, each activity does not have to be
completed prior to starting the next activity. In many cases, a parallel and iterative process should be
used to feed data and experience from one activity to another. It should be noted that not all activities
will be required for all applications.

5.2.2 Concept Phase

a) Construct operational concept:

1) Purpose;
2) Operational environment;
3) ATM functions; and
4) Infrastructure;

b) Identify benefits:
1) Safety enhancements;
2) Efficiency;
3) Capacity;
4) Environmental;
5) Cost reductions;
6) Accessibility; and
7) Other metrics (e.g. predictability, flexibility, usefulness);

c) Identify constraints:
1) Air-Ground interoperability;
2) Compatibility with non-equipped aircraft;
3) Need for exclusive airspace;
4) Required ground infrastructure;
5) RF spectrum;
6) Integration with existing technology;
7) Technology availability; and
8) Actuality of existing infrastructure;

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d) Prepare business case:

1) Cost benefit analysis; and
2) Demand and justification.

5.2.3 Design Phase

a) Identify operational requirements:

1) Security; and
2) Systems interoperability;

b) Identify human factors issues:

1) Human-machine interfaces;
2) Training development and validation;
3) Workload demands;
4) Role of automation vs. role of human;
5) Crew coordination/pilot decision-making interactions; and
6) ATM collaborative decision-making.

c) Identify technical requirements:

1) Standards development;
2) Prevailing avionics standards;
3) Data required;
4) Functional processing;
5) Functional performance;
6) Required certification levels; and
7) Identify the infrastructure that needs upgrade.

d) Equipment development, test, and evaluation:

1) Prototype systems built to existing or draft standards/specifications;
2) Upgrade and test scheme for the existing infrastructure;
3) Developmental bench and flight tests;
4) Acceptance test parameters; Acceptance test should be performed to ensure all the key
indicators are met; and
5) Select and procure technology.

e) Develop procedures:
1) Pilot and controller actions and responsibilities;
2) Standardize the interaction and phraseologies;
3) Controller’s responsibility to maintain a monitoring function, if appropriate;
4) System certification procedure should be made.
5) Standard Operating Procedure should be made if the human machine interface of the
system is changed.

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6) Contingency procedures; For example duplicate Mode S address is detected;

7) Emergency procedures, for example ACAS message is received;
8) General procedures for unforeseen issues should be made; and
9) Develop AIP and Information documentation.

f) Prepare design phase safety case:

1) Safety rationale;
2) Safety budget and allocation; and
3) Functional hazard assessment.

5.2.4 Implementation Phase

a) Prepare implementation phase safety case;

b) Conduct operational test and evaluation:

1) Flight deck and ATC validation simulations; and
2) Flight tests and operational trials;

c) Obtain systems certification:

1) Aircraft equipment; and
2) Ground systems;

d) Obtain regulatory approvals:

1) Air traffic certification of use;

e) Impact Assessment
An impact assessment should be conducted to gauge the effect in terms of security, efficiency,
operating regulations, human factors, infrastructure, environment, and so on.
f) Implementation transition:
1) Promulgate procedures;
The regulatory authority shall promulgate general regulations to the participants. Each
participant shall formulate corresponding detailed regulations.
2) Deliver training;
Training should be conducted to ensure the personnel are familiar with standard, regulation, and
technology of the Mode S DAPs implementation and operation. Licensing process could be
executed if needed.
3) Continue data collection and analysis;
4) Resolve any unforeseen issues; and
5) Continue feedback into standards development processes;

g) Performance monitoring to ensure that the agreed performance is maintained.

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6. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING

6.1 Introduction

CNS and ATM environment is an integrated system including physical systems (hardware, software, and
communication networks), human elements (pilots, controllers and engineers), and the operational
procedures for its applications. The integration of Mode S DAPs with other surveillance technologies
enables more information from an aircraft to be used to provide a safer service.

Because of the integrated nature of such system and the degree of interaction among its components,
comprehensive system monitoring is recommended. The procedures described in this section aim to
ensure system integrity by validation, identification, reporting and tracking of possible problems
revealed during system monitoring with appropriate follow-up actions.

6.2 Personnel Licensing and Training

Prior to operating any element of the Mode S DAPs system, operational and technical personnel shall
undertake appropriate training as determined by the ANSP or State Regulatory Authority, including
compliance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation where applicable. With these the
personnel will be familiar with regulation, standard and requirement of the Mode S DAPs
implementation and operation.

6.3 ATS System Validation

6.3.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines

To meet system integrity requirements, ANSPs or States should conduct a validation process that
confirms the integrity of their equipment and procedures. Such processes shall include:

a) A system safety assessment for new implementations is the basis for definitions of system
performance requirements. Where existing systems are being modified to utilize additional
services, the assessment demonstrates that the ATS Provider’s system will meet safety
objectives.
b) Integration test results confirming interoperability for operational use of airborne and ground
systems; and
c) Confirmation that the ATS operation procedure are compatible with those of adjacent providers
where the system is used across a common boundary.

6.3.2 System Safety Assessment

The objective of the system safety assessment is to ensure that implementation and operation of Mode S
DAPs is safe. The safety assessment should be conducted for implementation as well as any future
enhancements and should include:

a) Identifying failure or error conditions;

b) Assigning levels of criticality;
c) Determining risks/probabilities for occurrence;
d) Identifying mitigating measures;

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e) Categorizing the degree of acceptability of risks; and

f) Operational hazard ID process.

Following the safety assessment, States should institute measures to offset any identified failure or error
conditions that are not already categorized as acceptable. This should be done to reduce the probability
of their occurrence to an acceptable level. This could be accomplished through automation of
procedures.

6.3.3 Integration Test

States should conduct trials with suitably equipped aircraft to ensure the DAPs data meets the
operational and technical requirements to provide ATS. The introduction of the Mode S DAPs will give
more information about the aircraft, and should not affect the performance of the existing system. States
should be satisfied by test results and analysis carried out by the ANSP.

6.3.4 ATS Operation Manuals

States may coordinate with adjacent States to confirm that their ATS operation manuals contain standard
operating procedures to ensure harmonization of procedures that impact across common boundaries.

6.4 System Monitoring

During the implementation and operation of the Mode S DAPs technology, routine collection of data is
necessary in order to ensure that the system continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety and
interoperability requirements, and that operational service delivery and procedures are working as
intended.

6.4.1 Consideration for System Monitoring

Mode S transponders may have been installed a long time ago to support mandatory ACAS functionality.
The Mode A/C function has been permanently used by ATC, but the Mode S functions may not have
been used. Any failure impacting Mode A/C would have been detected by ATC during normal operation
and corrective action would have been undertaken. Before implementing Mode S for surveillance,
system checks are usually made to ensure the correct operation of the Mode S transponders (e.g.
continue to correctly process Mode A/C and Mode S replies), but possibly no system checks were made
to ensure that the DAPs data was correct, so a number of undetected failures may have existed over the
years of operation.

A number of Mode S transponder from different OEMs have been observed to be non-compliant with
Annex 10 Volume IV requirements (e.g. no SI code capability, no reply to aircraft register extraction,
incorrectly configured aircraft address, incorrect content of BDS registers), even though the transponder
is certified to level 2. Although actions have been taken in some areas (mainly where Mode S has been
implemented) to address these problems, some aircraft with MODE S which are not working correctly
still operate (mostly in areas where Mode S has not yet been implemented).

During the initial deployment of European Mode S, it was discovered that avionics upgrade performed
on some aircraft had resulted in erroneous transponder operations so that, in some cases, the aircraft
could not even be detected by the ground radar. It is therefore recommended that before commencing
Mode S surveillance operations in a given airspace, system monitoring be put in place for the purpose of
timely detection and rectification of hidden transponder problems. This will enable the ANSP and
aircraft operators to remedy identified issues prior to using Mode S operationally.

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The communication lines for transferring surveillance information in a Mode S radar require much
higher data throughput as there is more information per aircraft. For example, compared to a Mode A/C
radar, Mode S DAPs require up to three times more data throughput.

Mode S DAPs bring safety benefits even when only a portion of the traffic is properly equipped. Some
aircraft can be configured to provide additional data items, but their use should be considered with
caution since some airborne installations may not have been certified, hence data may be erroneous.
System monitoring to validate the transmitted information is considered desirable for DAPs operation.

6.4.2 Mode S DAPs Problem Reports

During the application of the Mode S DAPs, some problem may be found during the observation of one
or more specific events. Faulty Mode S DAPs data should be recorded and analyzed. Problems may be
found during the routine analysis of application data. Any problem should be documented and reported
to the DAPs WG.

After a problem has been found, the finder can attempt to resolve it with the appropriate party and report
the solution to the DAPs WG. The problem and solution will be distributed to the DAPs WG members. If
the problem has not been resolved, the problem should be reported to the DAPs WG, and members will
be encouraged to resolve the problem. In many cases, a Mode S DAPs problem will be systematic across
a particular aircraft or avionics configuration. Engagement with, and correction by the manufacturer may
be required.

The mode S DAPs problem should be reported with the form as shown in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1 Mode S DAPs Problem Report Form

PRS#
Start Time/Date UTC End Time/Date UTC
Registration Aircraft ID
Flight ID ICAO Aircraft Address
Aircraft Type
Flight Sector/ Location
ATS Unit
Description / additional information
Originator Originator Reference number
Organizatio
n
PRS#: A unique identification number assigned by the PRS Administrator to
this problem report. Organizations writing problem reports are
encouraged to maintain their own internal list of these problems for
tracking purposes. Once the problems have been reported to the PRS
and incorporated in the database, a number will be assigned by the PRS
and used for tracking by the SURICG.
Start Time/Date UTC: UTC time/date when the event occurred.
End Time/Date UTC: UTC time/date when the event ended.
Registration: Registration number (tail number) of the aircraft involved.
Aircraft ID: Coded equivalent of call sign as entered in FPL Item 7.
Flight ID: The Flight ID/Flight Number downlinked from the aircraft.

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ICAO Aircraft Address: Unique aircraft address expressed in Hexadecimal form.

Aircraft Type: The aircraft model involved.
Flight Sector/Location: The departure airport and destination airport for the sector being flown
by the aircraft involved in the event. These should be the ICAO.
Identifiers of those airports. Or if more descriptive, give the location of
the aircraft during the event.
ATS Unit: ICAO identifier of the ATC center or tower controlling the aircraft at
the time of the event.
Originator: Point of contact at the originating organization for this report (usually
the author).
Organization: The name of the organization (airline, ATS provider or communications
service provider) that created the report.
Description: This should provide as complete a description of the situation leading up
to the problem as is possible. Where the organization reporting the
problem is not able to provide all the information (e.g. the controller
may not know everything that happens on the aircraft), it would be
helpful if they would coordinate with the other parties to obtain the
necessary information. The description should include:
a) A complete description of the problem that is being reported
b) The route contained in the FMS and flight plan
c) Any flight deck indications
d) Any indications provided to the controller when the problem
occurred
e) Any additional information that the originator of the problem
report considers might be helpful but is not included on the list
above
If necessary, to contain all the information, additional pages may be
added. if the originator considers it might be helpful, diagrams and other
additional information (such as printouts of message logs) may be
appended to the report.

6.4.3 Example of Mode S DAPs Problem

Through monitoring, it has been reported that erroneous DAPs data have been observed due to failure or
improper setting/installation of Mode S equipment. A Working Paper of the ICAO Surveillance Panel
Working Group (WP ASP12-20) has indicated that a lot of incorrect, outdated and even erroneous data
and parameters are present for DAPs data. The errors and/or miss-matches can be frequent, including:

a) The ACID is not always correct (erroneous)

b) The Selected Altitude is not correct or is not updated (For example Selected Altitude data
should be provided the MCP/FCU not by the FMS as the FMS data is usually incorrect).
c) Mode S DAPs data does not correspond to the content of the requested register.

6.5 Application Analysis

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During the Operation of Mode S DAPs, the application analysis is necessary to ensure that the system
continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety and interoperability requirements. To analyze the
Mode S DAPs applications, routine data should be recorded.

6.5.1 Data Recording

It is recommended that ATS providers and communication service providers retain the records defined
below for at least 30 days to allow for accident/incident investigation processes. These records should be
made available on request to the relevant State safety authority. Where data is sought from an adjacent
State, the usual State to State channels should be used.

Where possible these recordings shall be in a form that permits a replay of the situation and
identification of the messages that were received by the ATS system. Data exchange across borders may
not be possible due to different Radar or ATM message formats or to State regulatory issues.

Not only the data from ground equipment, but also the data from aircraft equipment should be recorded.
By analyzing the recorded data, the exact reason of the failures can be found.

6.5.2 Local Data Collection

ATS providers and communications service providers should identify and record Mode S DAPs system
component failures that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of controlled flights or
compromise service continuity.

6.5.3 Avionics Problem Identification and Correction

ATS providers should develop systems or procedures to:

a) detect Mode S DAPs avionics anomalies and faults

b) advise the regulators and where appropriate the aircraft operators on the detected Mode S DAPs
avionics anomalies and faults
c) devise mechanisms and procedures to address identified faults

Regulators should ensure that appropriate corrective actions are taken to address identified faults.

An example of Mode S DAPs analysis is taken in Appendix 1.

6.6 Identified Issues

Several identified issues had already been recognized during the implementation of the Mode S DAPs
data application in ATM automation system. Some of them even disrupted the operation of ATC services.
Thus, it is necessary to ensure the reliability of DAPs for utilization for ATC operation. This section will
present some issues for helping to figure them out.

Based on the experience gained from States, the common Mode S DAPs problems are summarized under
different categories in Appendix 2. It is noted that many cases of wrong DAPs found in Mode S
implementation were because of the aircraft avionics capability. There are also some issues that resulted
of human factors. Experiences showed that it was important to keep close coordination with airlines to
promote the DAPs application. Airlines should be informed of the issues in time and to check their
aircraft Mode S transponders in a timely manner. At the same time, airlines need improve their working
procedures including ensuring they file flight plans correctly.

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7. REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

Mode S DAPs involves the transmission of specific data from aircraft. These data messages can be
interrogated by the ground equipment called Mode S interrogator. ATM use the data to show the more
precise and integrated situation of the surveillance aircraft. The following procedures relate to the use of
Mode S DAPs data in ATS ground surveillance applications.

The implementation of the Mode S DAPs system will support the provision of high-performance
surveillance, enhancing flight safety, improving the controller efficiency and reducing the workload of
both the controller and pilot.

7.1 Mandating Mode S DAPs

a) Depending on the type of operations that States are going to conduct, States will have to
consider whether there is a need to publish mandates. Some operations will require all aircraft
within an airspace to be suitably equipped while others can still work well on a ‘best equipped
best served’ basis.

b) Use of Multilateration on airport surface is an example of an operation where it is

recommended for all aircraft to be equipped with Mode S transponders. Another example is the
conspicuity code environment, where Flight Identification may be used as the prime means to
couple flight plans, allowing ANSPs to overcome the shortage of Mode A codes. Equipage
mandates would be necessary for such operations.

c) With appropriate software, ATM automation systems can use Mode S DAPs to provide
additional information to controllers, enabling a reduction in controller workload and the
enhancement of Safety Net systems. Equipage mandates are not necessary, but consideration to
the nature of the services required and/or a cost-benefit study, may warrant such mandates.

d) As at May 2018, examples of States which use Mode S DAPs without publishing mandates are
Australia1, New Zealand and Singapore. Examples of States with published mandates for Mode
S DAPs are France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

e) In publishing mandate/regulations, States should:

1) Define the standards applicable to the State.
i. E.g. Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Temporary Guidance Leaflets (TGL) 13
Revision 1 for Elementary Surveillance in version 0 and version 1 transponders; or
ii. E.g. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Acceptable Means of Compliance
(AMC) 20-13 for Enhanced Surveillance in version 0 and version 1 transponders; or
iii. E.g. Elementary Surveillance (ELS) requirements stated in European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) CS-ACNS-Subpart D, Section 2 (i.e. CS ACNS.D.ELS) for Elementary
Surveillance in version 2 transponder; or
iv. E.g. Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) requirements stated in European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) CS-ACNS-Subpart D, Section 3 (i.e. CS ACNS.D.EHS) for Enhanced
Surveillance in Version 2 transponder
v. E.g. Mode S level 2 if the requirement is simply for Airport Surface Multilateration.
2) Define the airspace affected by the regulations

1 Australia has a mandate for Mode S transponders at selected airports utilising Multilateration for surface
surveillance, but no widespread mandates for airborne DAPs usage

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i. E.g. Within the [FIR Authority] Flight Information Region above Flight Level XXX
3) Define the category of aircraft that the regulation applies to
i. E.g. Aircraft with a maximum certified take-off mass exceeding 5,700 kg or having a
maximum cruising true airspeed capability greater than 250 kt; or
ii. E.g. All IFR aircraft
4) Define the timing of the regulations allowing sufficient time for operators to equip.
i. E.g. With effect from 1 Jan 2020.

7.2 Avionics

7.2.1 Mode S Transponder Capabilities

a) The various levels of capabilities for Mode S Transponders are described in subsequent
paragraphs. State should select the capability as required by its operations.

b) According to ICAO Annex 10, Vol. 4, Mode S transponders shall conform to one of five levels
of capability as follows:
1) Level 1 is the basic transponder. Level 1 permits surveillance based on Mode A/C as well
as on Mode S. With a Mode S aircraft address, it comprises the minimum features for
compatible operation with Mode S interrogators. It has no datalink capability and will not
be used by international air traffic.
2) Level 2 has the same capabilities as Level 1 and permits standard length datalink
communication from ground to air and air to ground. It includes automatic aircraft
identification reporting. This is the minimum level permitted for international flights. Data
parity with overlay control (ICAO Annex 10, Vol. 4, 3.1.2.6.11.2.5) for equipment
certified on or after 1 January 2020.
3) Level 3 has the capabilities as level 2 and also those prescribed for ground-to-air ELM
communications.
4) Level 4 has the capabilities as level 3 and also those prescribed for air-to-ground ELM
communications.
5) Level 5 has the capabilities as level 4 and also those prescribed for enhanced Comm-B and
ELM communications.

c) Other than the various levels, transponders also can have the following features:
1) Extended squitter - transponders that shall have the capabilities of level 2, 3, 4 or 5 and
those prescribed for extended squitter operation.
2) SI Capability - Transponders with the ability to process SI codes shall have the capabilities
of level 2, 3, 4 or 5 and those prescribed for SI code operation.
3) Data flash Application – transponders that implement the data flash mode.
4) Hijack Mode Capability – transponders that support the Hijack Mode and have the
capabilities of level 2, 3, 4 or 5.
5) ACAS Compatibility –transponders compatible with ACAS.
6) Antenna Diversity – in aircraft with transponder using two antennas, receivers and
transmitting channels.
7) According to ED-73E, Elementary Surveillance – elementary surveillance transponders
will require at least level 2 transponder and have the following capabilities:

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i. Flight status reporting;

ii. Barometric pressure altitude reporting
iii. Transponder capability (CA)
iv. II and SI code capable
v. Declaration of capability (BDS code 1,0)
vi. Common usage GICB capability report (BDS code 1,7)
vii. Mode S specific services capability (BDS code 1,8 to BDS code 1,C)
viii. Flight identification (BDS code 2,0)
ix. ACAS Active Resolution Advisory (BDS code 3,0) if equipped with ACAS II
x. Aircraft register (BDS code 2,1) – optional

8) According to ED-73E, Enhanced Surveillance – enhanced surveillance transponders have

the capabilities of elementary surveillance transponders, plus the capability to provide the
following DAPs:
i. Magnetic Heading (BDS code 6,0)
ii. Indicated Airspeed and/or Mach No. (BDS code 6,0)
iii. Vertical Rate (climb/descend) (BDS code 6,0)
iv. True Airspeed (provided if Track Angle Rate is not available) (BDS code 6,0)
v. MCP/FCU Selected Altitude (BDS code 4,0)
vi. Ground Speed (BDS code 5,0)
vii. Roll Angle (BDS code 5,0)
viii. Track Angle Rate (if available) (BDS code 5,0)
ix. True Track Angle (BDS code 5,0)
x. Barometric Pressure Setting (BDS code 4,0)

7.2.2 Transition Guidelines

a) Equipage of aircraft will be achieved over a period of time. Not all aircraft will be equipped
with the necessary capability. A transition plan is required to accommodate varying degrees of
aircraft equipment compliance.

b) As part of the formulation for a transition plan, States should assess the impact of having
aircraft that are not suitably equipped within the affected airspace, to enable the implementation
of suitable mitigating measures. States should also collect statistics on the readiness of the
aircraft within the affected airspace.

c) For different operations, the mitigation measures in the transition plan could be different. For
example, if the operation is just to use the Mode S DAPs to provide useful information to the
controllers, the impact of having unequipped aircraft is minor. Mitigating measures could be as
simple as making the controllers aware that not all aircraft are able to provide the information.
On the other hand, where mode S is mandated for airport surface Multilateration, mitigating
measures for having unequipped aircraft may include having special procedures for
non-equipped aircraft or the deployment of a surface movement radar.

7.2.3 Interrogation of Transponders on Ground

Table 7-1 summarizes the requirements to inhibit or not inhibit replies from aircraft on the ground.

Table 7-1 The Requirements of Interrogation of Transponders on Ground

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Type of interrogations Transponder reply

Mode A/C Should be inhibited
Mode A/C/S All Call Shall always be inhibited
Mode S only All Call (UF =11) Shall always be inhibited
Mode S (Roll call UF=0,4,5,16,20,21,24) Shall not be inhibited
Shall be inhibited if surface type of extended
Acquisition Squitter (Short Squitter)
squitter is transmitted
Extended Squitter (Long Squitter) Shall not be inhibited
[Information obtained from Eurocontrol’s Clarification Mode S Transponder in an Airport/A-SMGCS
Environment Ed 1.1 dated 3 May 2005]

a) Replies to Mode A/C/S all call and Mode S only all call interrogations shall always be inhibited
when the aircraft declares the on the ground state. It shall not be possible to inhibit replies to
discretely addressed Mode S interrogations regardless of whether the aircraft is airborne or on
the ground.
b) Mode A/C replies should be inhibited (i.e. Mode A/C transponder set to standby) when the
aircraft is on the ground to prevent interference when in close proximity to an interrogator or
other aircraft. Mode S discretely addressed interrogations do not give rise to such interference.
An exception on the recommendation to inhibit Mode A/C replies will be at airports having
Multilateration systems working with Mode A/C.
c) Mode S transponders shall be set to the correct mode according to its flight status (i.e. airborne
mode when it’s in the air and ground mode when on the ground). When an aircraft is in ground
mode, replies to all call are inhibited. It is recommended that aircraft provide means to
determine the on-the-ground state automatically and provide that information to the
transponder.

7.3 Mode S Interrogator

7.3.1 Working Principles

The Mode S interrogators transmit interrogation to elicit replies for detection of Mode S transponders
and more information from the aircraft. Use of a unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address and provision of all
the required aircraft data in one reply will reduces interrogation rates.

Each aircraft can be interrogated selectively, needing only one or two ‘hits’ per aircraft per scan and
minimizing interference problems associated with SSR Mode A/C.

The operation of a Mode S interrogator will not interfere with the SSR performance of any aircraft
equipped with a Mode A/C transponder.

A Mode S interrogator is capable of performing the conventional surveillance function with Mode A/C
transponders.

7.3.2 Interrogator Codes

The Mode S system requires each interrogator to have an IC, which can be carried within the uplink and
downlink transmissions. The 4-bit IC uplink field in UF11 shall contain either 4-bit II code or the lower
4 bits of the 6-bit SI codes. It is recommended that whenever possible an interrogator should operate
using a single interrogator code.

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The II codes shall be assigned to interrogators in the range from 0 to 15. The II code value of 0 shall only
be used for supplementary acquisition. The SI codes shall be assigned to interrogators in the range from
1 to 63. The SI code value of 0 shall not be used.

The assignment of interrogator II or SI codes, where necessary in areas of overlapping coverage, across
international boundaries of flight information regions, shall be the subject of regional air navigation
agreements. The ICAO Asia Pacific Regional Office maintains a register of II codes used – where States
have provided this information to the office. States are encouraged to provide this information to the
Regional Office and update it when changes are made.

7.3.3 Interrogation Methods[AA2]

The particular air traffic and environment of each interrogator will influence the selection of suitable
interrogation periods, interrogation repeat frequency, MIP and Probability of Reply.

Figure.7-1 The Typical MIP

The repetition frequency and duration of the All-Call period is a local implementation issue (the stated
ICAO maximum is 250Hz). The exact duration of either period will depend on the characteristics of the
system such as the antenna revolution rate, the beam-width and the maximum range. There will normally
be several all-call periods (and hence roll-call periods as one will always follow the other) available to
interrogate all targets in range during one revolution.

There is a careful balance between the reliable acquisition of all targets and the potential of flooding the
RF environment with unwanted replies to acquisition interrogations. It is necessary to choose an
appropriate Mode Interlace Pattern to manage the acquisition activities to ensure minimal interference.
The default objective is to define a MIP which effectively detects and performs surveillance on classical
SSR Mode A/C aircraft using Mode A/C interrogations which also detects and acquires Mode S aircraft
using Mode S interrogations. The MIP is constructed in order to separate Mode A/C and Mode S all-calls
from Mode S selective (roll-call) activity. MIP defines the sequences of all-call interrogation types that
might be made during cycles of all-call periods. Every interrogator is likely to have different needs and
hence different ways of operating.

7.3.4 Interrogate Comm-B Data

The GICB procedure is initiated by a Mode S interrogator for eliciting the Mode S DAPs containing
aircraft derived data from a Mode S aircraft installation.

The GICB protocol allows for the immediate transfer of data required by the ground and the extraction
of information stored in the Mode S transponder. This information (if available) is contained in the reply
to an interrogation specifying the address (BDS code) of the storage location containing that information.

The interrogation with specific BDS can elicit the corresponding Comm-B data where contained in
Mode S transponder’s registers. The Mode S DAPs can be implemented in two stages: ELS and EHS.

The first processing step for any Mode S data link application is to obtain the transponder CA value from
the aircraft. The 3-bit CA field is found in the “Mode S All-Call Reply” (DF=11) and the “Extended
Squitter” (DF=17) downlinks. If CA=0, then this transponder is surveillance-only and supports no data
link functions at all. If CA≥4 indicate that the Mode S transponder is fully capable of at least 56-bit

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short uplink and downlink message transfer. These Mode S transponders may support the ELS, EHS
requirements. The values of CA= 1, 2, 3 are reserved.

Mode S aircraft
Acquisition

CA Field CA=0 Surveillance

Check Only

CA≥4

BDS 1,0 Request

Initial Phase
BDS 2,0 Request BDS 1,7 Request BDS 3,0 Request

BDS40/50/60 NO Surveillance
Capable Only
YES

Able to Extract NO
BDS40/50/60
YES

Within NO Stop
Coverage Request
Tracking Phase

YES
BDS40/50/60
Request

Figure.7-2 The Typical Procedure of DAPs Extraction

Given that the Mode S transponder’s CA value is 4 or greater, the second processing step for any Mode S
data link application is to extract the transponder’s Mode S data link capability report register BDS code
1,0. Bits in this register indicate the support of such Mode S data link functions as aircraft identification
(register BDS code 2,0), ACAS (register BDS code 3,0), common-usage capability (register BDS code
1,7) etc. The Mode S-Specific services capability bit in register BDS code 1,0 indicates whether the
avionics installation supports further data link functions. If this bit is set, the Mode S data link
application would next extract the common-usage capability register BDS code 1,7. All of the registers
involved with the EHS application have bit flags assigned in this register BDS code 1,7. If the bit flag is
set, it indicates that the corresponding register has been updated in a timely manner and contains valid

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data which can be extracted by the interrogator. The processing protocol is sufficient initialization for
basic data link applications such as ELS, EHS since all their status and configuration information is
available from register BDS code 1,0 and register BDS code 1,7.

So, the Mode S interrogator should transmit the selectively interrogation to elicit the Mode S transponder
reply with the specific formats and Comm-B data contained in the corresponding registers.

Normally, the more Comm-B data requested by the Mode S interrogator, the more information can be
extracted from the aircraft transponder registers. It will also help the ATC controller get the aircraft's
flight status and flight intention. However, there should be some necessary limitations for the Comm-B
data request to avoid the phenomenon of Comm-B data discontinuity because of the limited Roll-Call
interrogation duration.

It is suggested that the number, periodicity and priority of BDS data extraction rule be reasonably and
effectively implemented according to the requirements and the number of aircraft in the airspace. The
scientific strategy can ensure the ATC controller get Comm-B data timely and effectively.

7.4 ATM Automation System

7.4.1 Elementary Surveillance

For the Elementary Surveillance, the following parameters of aircraft can be beneficial to the ATM
automation system:

a) ICAO 24-bit Aircraft Address/Aircraft Identification

1) The ATM automation system should collect the real aircraft address/aircraft identification
from the received message, and the aircraft address/aircraft identification can be shown on
the control HMI to identify the aircraft.
2) The ATM automation system can use the aircraft address/aircraft identification to correlate
an aircraft’s track with the flight plan, so the use of aircraft address/aircraft identity can
alleviate the shortage of Mode 3/A code. Correlation between track and flight plans is
normally based on either the 24-bit aircraft address, aircraft identification, or the Mode
3/A code. The correlation will depend on their weights and priority.
3) The ATM automation system can also utilize the aircraft address/aircraft identification to
improve the tracking function.

4) The ATM automation system could provide DUPE warning between aircrafts which have
the same ICAO 24-bit aircraft address, same aircraft identification or the same MODE 3/A
code.

b) Transponder Capability Report

The ATM automation system can collect datalink capability of transponder from the receive message and
show the information to the controller. The controller can estimate whether the aircraft with this
transponder meets the requirement in the airspace

c) Altitude reporting in 25ft interval

The ATM automation system can collect aircraft altitude reporting in 25ft increments and provides
valuable improvements to the quality of safety nets. The improvements should reduce the number of
nuisance alerts and enhance the integrity of separation assurance.

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d) Flight status (airborne/on the ground)

The ATM automation system can collect the flight status of the aircraft. Whether the aircraft is airborne
or on the ground can be shown in the system to improve situational awareness of the controller. Also, the
flight status can be used to filter the aircraft on the ground in the system if necessary.

e) ACAS Resolution Advisory Report

The ATM automation system can collect the ACAS Resolution Advisory Report and the information can
be shown in the system to improve situational awareness of the controller.

7.4.2 Enhanced Surveillance

For the Enhanced Surveillance, the following parameters of aircraft can be beneficial to the ATM
automation system:

a) Selected Altitude
1) The ATM automation system can collect the selected altitude of the aircraft and show the
information to the controller to improve the situational awareness of the controller.
2) The ATM automation system can generate an optimized CLAM alert when the SFL chosen
by the crew does not match the cleared altitude given by the controller, alerting the
controller to take appropriate action to remedy the issue.
3) The ATM automation system can also utilize the SFL to improve the accuracy of safety
net.

b) Barometric data
The ATM automation system can collect the barometric data of the aircraft and show the information to
the controller. The system can provide a warning when the barometric data transmitted by the aircraft
does not match the parameter of the area where the aircraft is operating.

c) Roll Angle, Track Angle Rate, True Track Angle, Ground Speed, Magnetic Heading, True
Airspeed
1) The ATM automation system can collect these parameters and may allow the display of
some of the information to the controller to improve the situational awareness of the
controller. Display of some parameters, provides a clearer picture to the controllers
generating a reduction in radio calls with the pilot, so the R/T usage between controller
and individual aircraft under service are reduced.
2) The system can utilize the kinematics information of the aircraft to perform a more precise
tracking function and improve the accuracy of safety net.
3) The system may use True track angle, Magnetic Heading, True Airspeed and Ground
Speed to calculate a wind direction and speed of a specific area, which will enable the
updating of forecast winds and improve trajectory modeling in the system. The system
may also show the wind information to the controller to improve situational awareness of
the controller.

d) Vertical Rate
The ATM automation system can collect the vertical rate data of the aircraft to improve the precision of
the compute altitude and the accuracy of the related alert. The system can make use of the data to realize
an optimized CFL protection in STCA and MSAW analysis function.

e) Indicated Air Speed/Mach Number

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The ATM automation system can acquire indicated air speed/Mach number of the aircraft, allow ATC to
monitor the aircrew compliance with the controller’s instructions, and if required provide a warning to
the controller when there is a mismatch.

7.5 Flight Planning

7.5.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 7 - Aircraft Identification

ACID must be accurately record in item 7 of the ICAO Flight Plan form as per the following
instructions:

Aircraft Identification, not exceeding 7 alphanumeric characters and without hyphens or symbols is to be
entered both in item 7 of the flight plan and replicated exactly when set in the aircraft (for transmission
as Flight ID) as follows:

Either,

a) The ICAO designator for the aircraft operating agency followed by the flight identification (e.g.
KLM511, NGA213, JTR25), when in radiotelephony the call sign to be used by the aircraft will
consists of the ICAO telephony designator for the operating agency followed by the flight
identification (e.g. KLM 511, NIGERIA213, JESTER25).
Or,

b) The nationality or common mark registration marking of the aircraft (e.g. EIAKO, 4XBCD,
N2567GA), when:
1) in radiotelephony the callsign used by the aircraft will consists of this identification alone
(e.g. CGAJS), or preceded by the ICAO telephony designator for the operating agency
(e.g. BLIZZARD CGAJS),
2) the aircraft is not equipped with radio.

Note 1: No zeros, hyphens, dashes or spaces are to be added when the Aircraft Identification consists of less than 7 characters.

Note 2: Appendix 2 to ICAO DOC4444 (PANS-ATM 16th edition, 2016) refers.

Note 3: Standards for nationality, common and registration marks to be used are contained in Annex 7, section 3.

Note 4: Provisions for the use of radiotelephony call signs are contained in Annex 10, Volume II, Chapter 5. ICAO designators
and telephony designators for aircraft operating agencies are contained in Doc 8585 — Designators for Aircraft
Operating Agencies, Aeronautical Authorities and Services.

7.5.2 Equipment (Surveillance Equipment /SSR Equipment)

a) ICAO Flight Plan Item 10 – Surveillance Equipment and Capabilities

When an aircraft is equipped with a Mode S Transponder, appropriate Mode S designator shall be
entered in item 10 of the flight plan to indicate that the flight is capable of transmitting Mode S DAPs
messages.

These are defined in ICAO DOC 4444 as follows:

‘N’ No surveillance equipment for the route to be flown is carried, or the equipment is
unserviceable

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SSR Mode A and C

‘A’ Mode A transponder
‘C’ Mode A and Mode C transponder
SSR Mode S
‘E’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and extended
squitter (ADS-B) capability

‘H’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and enhanced

surveillance capability

‘I’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, but no pressure-altitude capability

‘L’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, extended squitter

(ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability

‘P’ Mode S transponder, including pressure-altitude, but no aircraft identification capability

‘S’ Mode S transponder, including both pressure altitude and aircraft identification capability

‘X’ Mode S transponder with neither aircraft identification nor pressure-altitude capability

Note: Enhanced surveillance capability is the ability of the aircraft to down-link aircraft derived data via a Mode S transponder.

b) ICAO Flight Plan Item 18 – Other Information

Where required by the appropriate authority the ICAO AA (24 Bit Code) may be recorded in Item 18 of
the ICAO flight plan, in hexadecimal format as per the following example:

CODE/7C432B

Members or states should note that use of hexadecimal code may be prone to human error and is less
flexible in regard to airframe changes for a notified flight.

7.5.3 Inconsistency between Mode S Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

Inconsistency between flight planning of Mode S and surveillance capability of an aircraft can impact on
ATC planning and situational awareness. States are encouraged to monitor for consistency between flight
plan indicators and actual surveillance capability. Where discrepancies are identified aircraft operators
should be contacted and instructed to correct flight plans, or general advice (as appropriate to the
operational environment and type of flight planning problems) should be issued to aircraft operators.

Advice to Operators:

Concerning inconsistency between Mode S Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability:

a) ICAO AA (24 Bit Code) not submitted, or submitted incorrectly.

b) Mode S and surveillance capabilities indicators incorrectly.

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The flight planning requirements for aircraft are described in local document reference or ICAO DOC
4444 Appendix 2. The capability of the aircraft transponder and ADS-B capability will typically be
available in the transponder manual or in the aircraft flight manual for the aircraft. If in doubt, consult
the transponder manual, aircraft flight manual or the Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer.

7.5.4 Setting Flight ID in Cockpits

a) Flight ID Principles
The Flight ID is the equivalent of the aircraft callsign and is used in both Mode S SSR and ADS-B
technology. Up to seven characters long, it is usually set in airline aircraft by the flight crew via a cockpit
interface. It enables air traffic controllers to identify an aircraft on a display and to correlate a radar or
ADS-B track with the filed flight plan ACID. Flight ID is critical, so it must be entered carefully.
Punching in the wrong characters can lead to ATC confusing one aircraft with another.

It is important that the Flight ID entered in the transponder exactly matches ACID entered in the flight
plan.

Intuitive correlation between an aircraft’s flight identification and radio callsign enhances situational
awareness and communication. Airlines typically use a three letter ICAO airline code in flight plans,
NOT the two letter IATA codes.

b) Setting Flight ID
The callsign dictates the applicable option below for setting Mode S or ADS-B Flight ID:

1) The flight number using the ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operator if a
flight number callsign is being used (e.g. QFA1 for Qantas 1, THA54 for Thai 54).
2) The nationality and registration mark (without hyphen) of the aircraft if the callsign is the
full version of the registration (e.g. VHABC for international operations).
3) The registration mark alone of the aircraft if the callsign is the abbreviated version of the
registration (e.g. ABC for domestic operations).
4) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign approved by the ANSP or regulator
(e.g. SPTR13 for firespotter 13).
5) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign in accordance with the operations
manual of the relevant recreational aircraft administrative organization (e.g. G123 for
Gyroplane 123).

7.6 Contingency Plan

ANSPs should prepare appropriate contingency plans in the event of a system failure that prevents use of
Mode S DAPs.

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8. TRAINING AND COMPETENCE

8.1 Introduction

Training and development play an important role in the effectiveness of organizations and to the
experiences of people in work. Training on DAPs has implications in improving productivity, aviation
safety and personal development. The primary goal of the training is to develop and maintain an
appropriate level of trust in DAPs related module, i.e. to make ATC and ATSEP aware of the likely
situations where DAPs will be effective and, more importantly, situations in which DAPs will not be so
effective (e.g. sudden, unexpected maneuvers).

8.2 Training of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) in DAPs

With the inclusion of DAPs into surveillance and ATM automation system, an ATC training plan should
adopt a modular approach. This approach progressively introduces various features, functionality of the
new system on one hand and allows for integration with the ATC operational procedures. Additional
benefits include shorter, logical self-contained units, clear attainable goals, better evaluation of training
effectiveness and simplified self-assessment.

The ANSP should develop familiarization and rating focused training to ATC prior to adoption of DAPs
in Surveillance and ATM automation systems.

The ANSP should ensure that all ATC concerned are assessed as competent for the use of the relevant
DAPs module.

8.3 Training of an ATSEP in DAPs

a) The ANSP should develop an ATSEP training programme that is acceptable to the ANS
Regulator prior to its implementation.

b) As a minimum, the training programme should comprise three levels as described below:
1) Level 1 (Basic training). This should comprise training on the basic Surveillance and ATM
automation systems operating in the State and their impacts on the safety of aircraft
operations. The ANSP should ensure every ATSEP undergoes the basic training.
2) Level 2 (Qualification training). This should comprise training to develop knowledge and
skills on Surveillance and ATM automation systems. The ANSP should ensure each
ATSEP is trained in one or more domains depending on their job scope.
3) Level 3 (Specialized training). This should comprise training on specific Surveillance and
ATM automation systems installed in the State, followed by on-the-job training.

c) The ANSP should conduct a yearly review of the training plan for each ATSEP at the beginning
of the year to identify any gaps in competency or changes in training requirements and
priorities the type of training required for the coming year in regards of DAPs development.

d) The ANSP should keep records of individual ATSEP training, competency assessment and
approval history, where applicable, and associated documents. The records should be kept at
least until the Surveillance and ATM automation system of which the ATSEP was trained on is
no longer in use with the ANSP.

e) The individual training records for each of ATSEP should include a training plan detailing the
courses completed as well as the time-frame for attending future courses as required under

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his/her training plan.

8.4 Competency Assessment of an ATSEP in DAPs

a) The ANSP should develop an assessment methodology to determine the competency of an

ATSEP in accordance with the competency framework developed in PANS-Training and which
should be adapted to suit the local context.

b) The ANSP may select a person to be a competency assessor only if the person –
1) is an ATSEP approved in accordance with paragraph 8.3 for the particular Surveillance and
ATM automation system; and
2) has received adequate training in the conduct of competency assessment, practical checks
and oral questionings.

c) A competency assessor should not conduct a competency assessment on an ATSEP who is

under the direct supervision of the competency assessor, unless the assessment is done in the
presence of a second independent assessor.

d) The assessment methodology should include a process for on-going competency checking and
refresher training to ensure retention of competence.

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9. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES ON MODE S DAPs APPLICATION

9.1 Use of Selected Altitude

Since August 2013, Mode S data processing functions have been implemented in Chengdu ATM
automation system. The system uses the select altitude data extracted from the Mode S DAPs to provide
an optimized CLAM alert for controllers. The system will generate the alert when the SFL chosen by the
crew does not match the cleared altitude recorded in the ATM automation system. And a time delay
parameter is predefined for the response time of the flight after controllers input to the ATM automation
system (typically at the time of instruction given to the pilot).

Thanks to this new kind of alert, controllers have a better awareness of the intention of the airplanes and
may discover the crew’s mis-operation much earlier than the traditional CLAM, and then take actions
timely to avoid the potential conflict.

In April 2017, an A320 aircraft was maintaining level flight at 27600 feet with another flight flying
nearby at 26600 feet. Suddenly, the crew set an error altitude 22600 feet. The ATM automation system
triggered the alert immediately even before the aircraft began to descend. The controller quickly noticed
the alert and informed the crew in time. The aircraft successfully stopped descend at 27400 feet.

9.2 Use of ACAS RA[AA3]

With the advancement of the ASTERIX standards and DAPs application, an ATM system can handle the
derived data from Aircraft, which is detected, received and transmitted through the Mode S Radar,
ADS-B station, and WAM sensors . In the event that an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS)
Resolution Advisory (RA), the ATM system is able to provide a visual and aural alarm warning and
indicative pilot intention to the controller.

Resolution Advisory (RA) alerting function works as follows:

- A resolution advisory is present when, in the subfields I048/260, I020/260, I021/260, I021/260 or
I062/380 subfield #12(ACS), the bits are set as follows:

• the first bit of the ARA field set to 1 and the RAT bit set to 0 or,

• the first bit of the ARA field set to 0, the MTE bit set to 1 and the RAT bit set to 0.

- A resolution advisory is removed when:

• the ACAS RA report subfield (I048/260, I020/260, I021/260 or I062/380 subfield #12(ACS)) contains
the RAT bit set to 1, or

• An ACAS RA report is not received in the relevant Data Item of the ASTERIX report.

Besides, the Resolution Advisory Intention is populated base on the PILOT selection and according to
the following table:

MTE ARA 42 43 44 45 46 47 RA Selection RA Intention

(60) (41)
1 0 Any 0 Any 1 Any Any Descend Positive descend (Descent

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to avoid the threat)

1 0 Any 1 Any 0 Any Any Climb Positive climb (Climb to
avoid the threat)
1 0 Any 0 Any 0 Any Any Other Other (reduce rate of climb
or descent, etc)

*NOTE: ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System, applied in the EURO Aviation System, has the
same meaning as TCAS abbreviated to Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System in the USA
Aviation System

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APPENDIX 1: Mode S DAPs Analysis

a) Data Recording Configuration

Figure 1 represents an example of a configuration for data recording. The Mode S sensor sends
interrogations to an individual aircraft using a unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address. The Mode S
transponder has 255 BDS Registers. Each register stores aircraft parameters data derived from FMS or
other sensors. An interrogation uses GICB protocol to request a specific BDS Register data. In response
to the interrogation, Mode S transponder sends a reply which contains the BDS register data.

Aircraft
interrogation
Mode S Transponder FMS
BDS registers
BDS01 altimeter

BDS02 weather
reply … sensor
BDSff …

Mode S Sensor

GICB Radar data

controller monitor Data Storage

Figure1 - Example of Data Recording Configuration

b) Data Analysis

As described above section, erroneous DAPs data have been observed due to failure or improper
setting/installation of Mode S avionics equipment. Bad data hinders the use of DAPs by the ATM service.
To employ DAPs for ATM services, the reliability of DAPs is important. Therefore, it is necessary to
analyze the recorded data to ensure reliability of the DAPs data.

If a controller finds some problem during the application of the Mode S DAPs, the ATS providers can
analyze the recorded data to find the exact reason which caused the problem. If the ATS equipment has a
fault which caused the problem, the ATS provider should implement a solution as soon as possible. If the
ATS provider proves that the problem is caused by an avionics fault, then the problem should be reported
to the appropriate party to solve the problem. The ATS providers need to devise mechanisms and
procedures to address identified faults.

ATS providers should develop systems to analyze the routine recorded data. From the analyses, ATS
providers can provide more information of the transponder’s performance such as SI capability, datalink
capability etc. The information can be used to improve the capability of the operation of Mode S DAPs
equipment. By analyzing the recorded data, advice on avionics anomalies and faults, which have been
detected, can be passed onto the regulators and the aircraft operators.

c) DAPs Data Validation

To ensure that Mode S DAPs are operating in conformance with the ICAO requirements, validating
DAPs data is highly recommended. It has been noted that there are some drawbacks in the traditional
methodology of executing tests for aircraft on the ground as follows:

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1) Avionics for DAPs consist of several devices and functional blocks. They are
interconnected, and the configuration is complicated.
2) Avionics and configuration differ depending on each aircraft.
3) It is difficult to cover the possible test patterns completely.
4) Ground test methodology would not detect failures or anomalies that occur after the
testing.

Responding to these drawbacks, MIT Lincoln Laboratory developed and proposed a DAPs validation
methodology, which monitors DAPs data received from actual flying aircraft to detect erroneous data.
The MIT validation methodology is mainly categorized by two groups, static value tests and dynamic
value tests.

Static value tests are executed to detect erroneous values of the bits and fields in BDS registers which do
not change during a flight. Those bits and fields represent the avionics system’s configuration, capability,
and status information. These tests verify that those bits and fields are proper values in compliance with
the ICAO regulations for DAPs applications. Table 1 shows an example of static value tests. As can be
seen by the table, failed data were detected in each BDS register test. For BDS Register 2016, failed data
with wrong character coding were caused not due to equipment problem, but to faulty data input.

Table 1 Example of Static Value Tests

BDS Total Count Aircraft

Test Item
Register Executed Failed Executed Failed
BDS code
Aircraft identification capability flag = ‘1’ 544,980 7,183 3,615 146
1,0
BDS code Each character conforms to ICAO 6-bit
737,993 1,516 3,596 144
2,0 character coding
BDS code
Unavailable data fields are set at zero 54,248,802 1,755 3,614 4
4,0

Dynamic value tests validate the values which dynamically change according to aircraft motion, such as
aircraft speed and track angle. The tests compare the DAPs values with equivalent data like
radar-measured positions. If the difference between DAPs values and radar-derived parameters exceeds
the acceptability threshold, the DAPs value is accounted as an error. Figure 2 represents an example of
dynamic value tests. This figure indicates that ground speed differences between DAPs data and
radar-derived data fall inside the threshold range.

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Figure 2 - Example of Dynamic Value Tests

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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF IDENTIFIED ISSUES

Safety Implications to ATC

Ref. Issue Cause Recommendations
(Yes / No)
Through joint investigation with the airlines, it found
Wrong ground bits Yes
that parts of the aircraft A were exchanged with
in DAPs led to the The wrong ground bits in DAPs could make
another aircraft B for test. The malfunction part was
1. track decoupling ATM automation system display track
discovered when the wrong ground bits data was
from the flight plan decoupled with flight plan
found coming from the aircraft B.

Many cases of wrong aircraft identification were

Through the joint efforts of
found at the beginning of mode S operation. All
ATMB and the airlines, the
Wrong aircraft related data collected and sent to the relevant airlines Yes
aircraft identification data
2. identification by the management department. Through joint Wrong aircraft identification could lead to
became more and more
investigation with the airlines, it was found that the wrong flight plan coupling.
accurate.
issue is normally due to pilot’s error.

Barometric Pressure, such as BARO or QNH, is

available in Mode S BDS code 4,0. Initial testing Yes EASA Safety Information
Wrong Barometric found that data above the transition level for some There will display a wrong Barometric Bulletin SIB-2016-05R2
3. Pressure aircraft types would not be useful due to a mismatch Pressure with aircraft in ATM automation (“Incorrect Downlink
between what the crew set in the cockpit, and what system. Barometric Pressure Settings”)
the aircraft Downlinked. covers this issue.

Different The altitude tracking, and

processing between Currently, the altitude accuracy of Mode A/C radar is display mechanism of ATM
Yes automation systems need to be
Mode A/C and 100ft, while that of Mode S radar is 25ft. The altitude
In Mode S radar and Mode, A/C radar optimized to avoid altitude
4. tracking, and display mechanism of ATM automation
Mode S Altitude overlapped area, the ATM automation jumping.
systems could be received both precisions altitude
systems might display an altitude jumping.
data.

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Mode S The data transmission rate of

If Mode S interrogators request the aircraft Mode S radar to feed ATM
interrogators transponder registers too frequently in busy airspace, automation system needs to be
Yes
request the aircraft it may appear that the transponder registers selected reasonably to meet the
ATM automation system would display
5. transponder information cannot complete the whole transmission requirements of ATC
process. The BDS parameters requesting rule needs track delay or intermittent interruption of operations in busy airspace to
registers too
to be set by the Mode S interrogator reasonably. radar data. prevent track delay or
frequently in busy
intermittent interruption of
airspace radar data.

Mode S DAPs data

does not
correspond to the
content of the
requested register Different options can be
It has been noted that from time to time Mode S implemented to decrease the
DAPs data does not correspond to the content of the impact of such as:
requested register. For example, the content of BDS
1. limit the number of radars
code 5,0 is received when extracting BDS code 4,0.
This phenomenon is called “BDS swap”. Yes extracting aircraft registers

6. Wrong information could display to 2. implement specific filters in

Table 1 represents an example data of BDS swap. controller. radar or in the surveillance
The table shows the data of BDS code 0,5/4,0/5,0 data processing to discard the
data downlink from an aircraft in three sequential
erroneous data (e.g. when two
scans. As can be seen by the table, BDS swap
occurred at 08:05:45. different registers are received
with the same content they are
both discarded)

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According to Annex 10, the

aviation authority of each State
is responsible for assigning
24-bit addresses to all aircraft
in its registry using the block
allocated by ICAO to that
State.
The duplicate address should
Yes
One case was related to a local airline, wrong spare be detected and reported.
The possible consequences are as follows:
parts of the airplane were installed by mistake during Without duplicate address
1. An aircraft may be locked out in error, if
maintenance. The airline replaced the spare parts detection, if an aircraft enters
it is the same beam. This may result in a
after being informed. Another case was military the range of the Mode S SSR
new aircraft not being detected when it
aircraft. with the same ICAO 24-bit
enters Mode S radar coverage.
Another reason has been observed that in many cases address as that of an existing
2. Possible track label swap for crossing
Duplicated aircraft the 24-bit aircraft address transmitted by the aircraft target, the information of the
aircraft, this may result in incorrect labeling
7. does not match its nationality (i.e. its State of new aircraft could be
address of an aircraft on the Radar screen.
Registry’s block) or is otherwise incorrectly erroneously associated with
3. In the technical operation of Mode S
configured in the transponder. Care needs to be taken the existing target.
Elementary surveillance, duplicated address
to ensure that the registration and the 24- bit address Once the Mode S DAPs
may result in the possible loss of a track
of every aircraft are processed and assigned System detect more than one
when the two aircraft are crossing due to
simultaneously by the regulatory authority, and aircraft is transmitting the
the interrogation scheduling within the
reporting mechanisms are in place to rectify incorrect same ICAO 24-address, it will
ground station.
configurations. initiate a duplicate address
report and a duplicate address
condition shall be declared,
and when receive new
information of this address, the
system should associate the
information by ID or position
but not the address.

incorrect aircraft Yes

Although the overwhelming majority aircrafts are
This affects the function of aircraft address
8. address in flight equipped with Mode S transponders, many flight
correlation in ATM automation system.
plan plans are not filed with the correct aircraft address in

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item 18.

Aircrew round the system output figures from Spot

Wind data was the main reason for variations by crew
incorrect wind response. No
9.
speed and direction e.g. Recorded wind 283/42kts, crew response
280/40kts.

Table 1 Example Data of BDS Swap

Time of Scan
BDS Register 08:05:35 08:05:45 08:05:55
(BDS swap occurred)
BDS code 0,5 605f80c056966f a3280030a40000 605f845303ce8d
BDS code 4,0 a3280030a40000 a3280030a40000 a3280030a40000
BDS code 5,0 fff8cf1f800489 a3280030a40000 ffb8cf1f80048a

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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Name States/Administration Name States/Administration

Luo Yi ICAO Xie Yulan China

Cao Susu China Guo Jianhua China

Jin Lijie China Duan Bo China

Zhang Kai China Wang Xiaowei China

Chen Yang China Wang Yu China

Zhou Shuiping China Tang Weisheng China

Yao Yuan China Michael MH Chu Hong Kong, China

Charles Leung Charn Wai Hong Kong, China Hiromi Miyazaki Japan

Yasuhiro Otani Japan Ho Wee Sin Singapore

Mei Chin NG Singapore Chin Lin KWEK Singapore

Meng Soon KHOO Singapore Khairul Nazmi Bin Zainol Ariffin Malaysia

Mohd Shahrul Azree Bin Remly Malaysia Shairyzal B. Mohammad C. Azizan Malaysia

Alford Andy New Zealand Milns Alex Australia

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APPENDIX 4: A Brief Introduction of Mode S DAPs Data Source

1. Introduction

1.1 During the 2nd meeting of ICAO APAC Mode S DAPs WG, China presented an information
paper regarding the Mode S DAPs data source, the meeting was of the view that the content of the paper
will help in the understanding of the basic mechanism of avionics relevant to surveillance application
and implementation of DAPs.

-Refer to Mode S DAPs WG/2 IP05 “Preliminary Study of DAPs Data Sources”

1.2 The Mode S DAPs provides useful information on aircraft that will enhance ATM operations.
More attention should be paid when introducing Mode S DAPs and it’s important to clearly understand
what these parameters are and where these parameters come from. This text provides give some brief
information about the parameters.

2. Mode S DAPs ELS and EHS

2.1 Mode S DAPs-based surveillance includes ELS (Elementary Surveillance) and EHS (Enhanced
Surveillance).

2.2 Most of the ELS parameters are capability parameters of the aircraft, hence are static. They can
be used for improved aircraft identification, and have less direct impact on ATC operations. The ELS
parameters are shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 ELS Parameters Information

Register DAP Set Bits Units Quantity Range

24-Bit Aircraft Address (AA) NA NA NA NA

Transponder Capability (CA) NA NA NA NA
Flight Status (FS) NA NA NA NA
Altitude Reporting in 25ft NA ft 25 [-1000, 50175]
ELS
BDS 1,0 Datalink Capability Report 56 NA NA NA
BDS 1,7 Common GICB Capability Report 56 NA NA NA
BDS 2,0 Aircraft Identification Report 56 NA NA NA
BDS 3,0 ACAS Resolution Advisory Report 9-22 NA NA NA

2.3 EHS parameters are more related to the aircraft’s intention and status, and most of them are
dynamic. The implementation of EHS parameters has a larger impact on controllers. The EHS
parameters are shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 EHS Parameters Information

Register DAP Set Bits Units Quantity Range

Selected Altitude (MCP/FCU) 2-13 ft 16 [0, 65520]

BDS 4,0 Selected Altitude (FMS) 15-26 ft 16 [0, 65520]
EHS
Barometric Pressure Setting 28-39 mb 0.1 [0, 410]
BDS 5,0 Roll Angle 3-11 dg 45/256 [-90, +90]

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True Track Angle 14-23 dg 90/512 [-180, +180]

Ground Speed 25-34 kt 2 [0, 2046]
Track Angle Rate 37-45 dg/s 8/256 [-16, +16]
True Airspeed 47-56 kt 2 [0, 2046]
Magnetic Heading 3-12 dg 90/512 [-180, +180]
Indicated Airspeed 14-23 kt 1 [0, 1023]
BDS 6,0 Mach No 25-34 NA 2.048/512 [0, 4.092]
Barometric Altitude Rate 37-45 ft/min 32 [-16384, +16352]
Inertial Vertical Velocity 48-56 ft/min 32 [-16384, +16352]

3. Mode S DAPs Data System

3.1 The ELS and EHS parameters originate from varies sensors and cockpit settings. After being
organized by the avionics systems, the information is being sent to the transponder through standard
aircraft data buses, and subsequently formatted by the transponder and stored inside the relevant Binary
Data Storages (BDS). The ground-based surveillance system could downlink desired DAPs by specific
Mode S GICB (Ground Initiated Comm-B) protocol.

Transponder

Cockpit
Setting Avionic
Systems

Other
Other
Aircraft
Other
Aircraft
Systems
Aircraft
Systems
Data Bus Systems

Pitot Static AOA TAT

Figure 3.1 Typical DAPs Data Source Block Diagram

Transponder and TCAS Computer

3.2 The most common standard of the civil aircraft transponder, the Mark 4 Air Traffic Control
Transponder, is based on the ARINC 718A standard. There are 3 main interface plugs defined on the rear
panel, namely TP (Top Plug), MP (Middle Plug), and BP (Bottom Plug).

3.3 The airborne collision avoidance system, Traffic Computer TCAS and ADS-B Functionality, is
based on the ARINC 735B standard, . There are 6 main interface plugs defined on the rear panel, namely
LTP (Left Top Plug), LMP (Left Middle Plug), LBP (Left Bottom Plug), RTP (Right Top Plug), RMP
(Right Middle Plug) and RBP (Right Bottom Plug).

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TP LTP RTP

MP LMP RMP

BP LBP RBP

Figure 3.2 Transponder and TCAS Computer Examples from ACSS

Data Bus

3.4 The most common data bus, the Digital Information Transfer System, is based on the ARINC
429 standard. The standard defines the data transfer between most of the avionics systems. There are also
other standards such as the ARINC 629 used on Boeing B777, Airbus A330 and A350, as well as the
ARINC 664 (AFDX, Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet) used on A380 and B787.

Avionics and DAPs Data

3.5 The Aircraft Address (AA) is a parameter programmed [WSH(4]into the aircraft frame after the address
is allocated by the State registration authority. Normally there are 2 ways to program this parameter, one
is to program the pins of the MP (connected for “1”, open for “0”), and the other is to use Aircraft
Personality Module (ARINC 607) to store the address, and then interface to the MP.

Note: For more detailed information about Aircraft Address, refer to ARINC 718A Attachment
2B. For APM implementation guidelines, refer to ARINC 718A Attachment 9.

Figure 3.3 APM Example from ACSS

3.6 The Transponder Capability (CA) is a result of the combination of on-the-ground status and
transponder capability level. Normally the on-the-ground status is automatically indicated by the weight
sensor fitted on the aircraft, but some GA planes use manual means to indicate the status by switching
the transponder knob to the GND option. The[AA5] transponder receives on-the-ground status from the TP

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pins (5J and 5K), make validation of the status with Ground Speed, Radio Altitude or Airspeed, and then
announce the status. The transponder capability level is a static value which is fixed after manufacturing.

Figure 3.4 TT31 Mode S Transponder from TRIG

3.7 The Flight Status (FS) is a result of combination of the on-the-ground status, SPI, and Alert.
The on-the-ground is the same as in 3.6, the SPI is from pushing IDENT function button of the
transponder by pilot, and the Alert is produced by changing Mode A code (If changed to 7500, 7600,
7700, that’s permanent alert; and if changed to other codes, that’s 18 seconds temporary alert).

3.8 The Common Usage GICB Capability Report is generated by the transponder itself by
detecting the corresponding input data availability, and then set the corresponding bit related to that
GICB register.

3.9 The main source of Aircraft Identification is from FMS, input by pilot through Flight ID (or
Flight No) menu, and the related data transmitted to transponder by specific data bus (ARINC 429
Labels 233~237). If the Flight ID is empty, then the Aircraft Registration data may be provided within
another data bus (ARINC 429 Labels 301-303).

3.10 According to TCAS standard (ARINC 735B Chapter 3.3.4.1), the Datalink Capability Report
and the Resolution Advisories Report are sent to the Transponder from TCAS Computer by specific
protocol (TGD-TCAS to Transponder data transfer protocol, and Transponder to TCAS data transfer
protocol is named XGD. The data bus used is ARINC 429 Label 270). The data are sent from RMP of
the TCAS Computer to TP of the Transponder, related pins refer to Figure 3.5.

TP-5E Label270 RMP-15J RMP-14A Label270 TP-5E

TP-5F Label270 RMP-15K RMP-14B Label270 TP-5F

XPDR #1 TCAS XPDR #2
ARINC TP-5G RMP-14F ARINC RMP-14H TP-5G ARINC
718A 735B 718A
TP-5H RMP-14G RMP-14J TP-5H

Figure 3.5 Illustrations of Datalink Capability and RA Report Transfer

3.11 There are 2 kinds of Selected Altitude, one is from MCP/FCU (Boeing’s Mode Control Panel
and Airbus’s Flight Control Unit), and the other is from FMS (Flight Management System). The first one
is set by the pilot in response to a controller’s [WSH(6]instruction during the flight, the second one is calculated
by the FMS automatically to achieve the best cost-efficient[AA7].

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Figure 3.6 MCP of Boeing B787 & FCU of Airbus A380

3.12 The Barometric Pressure Setting (BPS) is also located in the MCP/FCU, and set by the pilot
rotating the knob to the pressure value comes from the aerodrome’s ATIS (Automatic Terminal
Information System).

3.13 The other parameters mainly come from the sensors onboard the aircraft, the sensors are
organized in 3 groups, the air data sensors, the inertial sensors and the magnetic sensor.

3.14 The air data sensors are used to sense the medium through which the aircraft is flying,
including pitot (static) probe, static port, temperature sensor, angle of attack sensor. Typical sensed
parameters are total pressure (Pt), static pressure (Ps), pressure changing rate, air temperature (TAT), and
angle of attack. Derived data includes Barometric Altitude (ALT), Indicated Airspeed (IAS), Vertical
Speed (VS), Mach (M), Static Air Temperature (SAT), Total Air Temperature (TAT), True Airspeed (TAS)
and Angle of Attack (AOA). The simplest system provides ALT and IAS.

Figure 3.7 Air Data Sensors and Integrated Sensor on Airbus A380

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 Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters
Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

3.15 The inertial sensors are used to detect the motion of the aircraft in a universal reference system,
including position gyroscopes, rate gyroscopes and accelerometers. By detection of the 3D dynamic of
the aircraft, derived data includes Ground Speed (GS), Wind Speed, Wind Direction, True Track Angle,
Roll Angle, and Track Angle Rate and so on.

Figure 3.8 Gyro, Accelerometer and LASEREF IV IRU from Honeywell

3.16 The magnetic sensor is used to sense the direction and to find the magnetic north, and give out
the main parameter of Magnetic Heading. The world magnetic model is show below:

Figure 3.9 World Magnetic Model 2000

3.17 Some airplane platform uses an integrated solution to process these data, each air data sensor is
connected with an Air Data Module (ADM) which converts the analog data to digital data and make the
compensation of the instrumental and positional error. These data then feed to the input of Air Data
Inertial Reference Systems (ADIRS) to calculate all the parameters mentioned before. And after that the
parameters are sent to transponder and other avionics systems by the Data Bus.

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 Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters
Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

ADM ADM ADM Total

Transponder Pressure

Static
ADIRS Pressure

Standby Air Data Inertial Angle of

Meters Reference Attack
System
Other
Other
Aircraft Total Air
Other
Aircraft
Systems Temp.
Aircraft
Systems
Systems ADM ADM ADM
Data Bus

Pitot Static AOA TAT

Figure 3.10 Typical ADIRS Architecture

3.18 The most commonly used data bus for parameters from ADIRS is ARINC 429 (and the newest
evolution is AFDX invented by Airbus and implemented in varies new aircrafts like A380 and B787),
and the standard ARINC 429 Labels used by these parameters are as follows:

Table 3.1 ADIRS Parameters Used Labels of ARINC 429

No DAP Item Label
1 Mach No. 205
2 Indicated Air Speed 206
3 True Air Speed 210
4 Barometric Altitude Rate 212
5 Ground Speed 312
6 True Track Angle 313
7 Magnetic Heading 320
8 Roll Angle 325
9 Track Angle Rate 335*
10 Inertial Vertical Velocity 365
*Note: This label in GAMA configuration is not used for Track Angle Rate

3.19 By using these parameters, the aircraft dynamic is illustrated as in Figure 3.11.

True Roll Track Angle

North Angle Rate
Turning
Magnetic Radius
North

Gravity
Magnetic
Heading
True Wind True Track
Airspeed Effect Angle
Ground
Speed Vertical
Rate
True
East

Figure 3.11 Illustration of Aircraft Dynamic

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Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

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 SURICG/5
Appendix H to the Report

REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE OF MODE S DAPS WORKING GROUP

(by Mode S DAPs WG/3, 14 May 2020)

Working Arrangement of the Mode S DAPS WG

Membership: The Mode S DAPS WG shall be composed of experts involved in technical and operation
of surveillance services as well as operational experts. Member States of SURICG are encouraged to
volunteer to form this Working Group. The working group shall normally invite representatives of
International Organizations recognized by the ICAO Council and Industry Partners as required by the
group which represent important civil aviation interests to participate in its work in a consultative
capacity.

Meetings: The Mode S DAPS WG shall convene annually with at least one face-to-face meeting per
year, and supplemented with WebEx meetings as required. The outcome of the meetings shall be
reported to the SURICG.

Schedule and delivery: Subject to the extent of prioritized applications considered by the Mode S
DAPS WG, the schedule for delivery of the working group shall be 3 years after initiation of the Mode
S DAPS WG (28 March 2018). The delivery point(s) will be nominated by SURICG through discussion.
The Mode S DAPS WG shall report to the APANPIRG via the SURICG.

Terms of Reference. See next section.

Term of Reference

The Objectives of Mode S DAPs Working Group are to:

1) Ensure harmonized implementation of Mode S DAPs in the Asia and Pacific Regions according
to Surveillance Strategy adopted by APANPIRG;

2) Facilitate the implementation of Mode S DAPs application in the Asia and Pacific Regions
using the project management principles where appropriate to maximize its benefit to region;
and

3) Review, identify and address major issues in technical, operational and regulatory aspects to
facilitate the Mode S DAPs implementation in the Asia and Pacific Regions.

Deliverables to meet the Objectives:

1) Progress report to be submitted to SURICG addressing the Mode S DAPs Working Group
deliverables (listed in 2 to 7 below);

2) To study and identify applicable Mode S DAPs applications in the Asia and Pacific Regions
considering:

- Concept of use/operation;
- Cost of system;
- Requirement of surveillance systems (focusing on radar);
- Matching functionality in ATC automation system;
- Other currently available or emerging technologies;
- ICAO Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) and Aviation System Block Upgrades (ASBU); and
- Evaluation method for Mode S DAPs performance.

APX. H - 1
 Appendix H to the Report

3) To identify and develop the regional requirements of Mode S DAPs capability in the area of
aircraft equipage, surveillance systems (focusing on radar) and ATC automation system, taking into
account the relevant performance expectations of the Asia/Pacific Seamless ATMANS Plan;

4) To develop roadmap for Mode S DAPs application in the Asia and Pacific Regions taking into
account of:
- Available equipment standards;
- Readiness of airspace users and ATS providers; and
- Development of standardized and systematic approach to Mode S DAPs application.

5) To develop guidance materials to assist States and airspace users on the use of Mode S DAPs
in the Asia and Pacific Regions;

6) To encourage research and development, trials and demonstrations in the field of Mode S DAPs
application; and

7) Draft Conclusions and Decisions to be formulated relating to matters in the field of Mode S
DAPS that come within the scope of the SURICG work plan.

[Note: Mode S DAPS Working Group will report to SURICG and SURICG will coordinate with CNS
Sub-group.]

Current Members: The working group is currently comprised of representatives from Australia,
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Nepal,
New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam, and is led by China and
Singapore.

APX. H - 2
 Appendix H to the Report

TERM OF REFERENCE

Efforts thus far

The Objectives of Mode S DAPs Working Group are to:
1 Ensure harmonized implementation of Mode S DAPs in the Asia Discussed at this meeting.
and Pacific Regions according to Surveillance Strategy adopted
by APANPIRG;

2 Facilitate the implementation of Mode S DAPs application in the High level principle is in the
Asia and Pacific Regions using the project management draft guidance material.
principles where appropriate to maximize its benefit to region;
and

3 Review, identify and address major issues in technical, Issues are being discussed
operational and regulatory aspects to facilitate the Mode S DAPs in the Working Group.
implementation in the Asia and Pacific Regions.

Deliverables to meet the Objectives:

1 Progress report to be submitted to SURICG addressing the Mode
S DAPs Working Group deliverables (listed in 2 to 7 below);

2 To study and identify applicable Mode S DAPs applications in Applications are being
the Asia and Pacific Regions considering: discussed in the Working
- Concept of use/operation Group.
- Cost of system
- Requirement of surveillance systems (focusing on radar)
- Matching functionality in ATC automation system
- Other currently available or emerging technologies;
- ICAO Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) and Aviation System
Block Upgrades (ASBU);
- Evaluation method for Mode S DAPs performance.

3 To identify and develop the regional requirements of Mode S Discussed at this meeting.
DAPs capability in the area of aircraft equipage, surveillance
systems (focusing on radar) and ATC automation system, taking
into account the relevant performance expectations of the
Asia/Pacific Seamless ATMANS Plan;

4 To develop roadmap with a view to formulate mandates for Mode Discussed at this meeting.
S DAPs application in the Asia and Pacific Regions taking into
account of:
- Available equipment standards
- Readiness of airspace users and ATS providers
- Development of standardized and systematic approach to Mode
S DAPs application;

5 To develop guidance materials to educate States and airspace Guidance material to

users on the use of Mode S DAPs in the Asia and Pacific Regions: educated States is adopted
by SURICG/4.
No guidance material for
airspace users available yet.

6 To encourage research and development, trials and Research and development

demonstrations in the field of Mode S DAPs application; and activities are being shared
in the Working Group.

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 Appendix H to the Report

7 Draft Conclusions and Decisions to be formulated relating to On-going.

matters in the field of Mode S DAPS that come within the scope
of the SURICG work plan.

_____________

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 SURICG/5
Appendix I to the Report

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND

OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 7

1.1 Arrangement of the AIGD .................................................................................................. 7

1.2 Document History and Management .................................................................................. 7
1.3 Copies ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.4 Changes to the AIGD .......................................................................................................... 8
1.5 Editing conventions ............................................................................................................ 8
1.6 AIGD Request for Change Form ........................................................................................ 9
1.7 Amendment Record .......................................................................................................... 10

2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS............................................................ 15

2.1 Acronym List .................................................................................................................... 15

2.2 Glossary of Terms ............................................................................................................. 16

3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS………………………………………………………... 17

4. ADS-B DATA .................................................................................................................. 19

5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 20

5.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 20

5.1.1 Planning ................................................................................................................... 20

5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination ..................................... 20
5.1.3 System compatibility ............................................................................................... 20
5.1.4 Integration ................................................................................................................ 21
5.1.5 Coverage Predictions ............................................................................................... 24

5.2 Implementation checklist .................................................................................................. 25

5.2.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................. 25
5.2.2 Activity Sequence .................................................................................................... 25
5.2.3 Concept Phase .......................................................................................................... 25
5.2.4 Design Phase ............................................................................................................ 25
5.2.5 Implementation Phase .............................................................................................. 26

6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 28

6.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 28

6.2 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation .............................. 29

7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING ............................................................ 32

7.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 32
7.2 Personnel Licensing and Training .................................................................................... 32
7.3 System Performance Criteria for an ATC separation service ........................................... 32
7.4 ATC system validation ..................................................................................................... 33

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7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines ............................................................................. 33

7.4.2 System safety assessment .................................................................................... 33
7.4.3 Integration test ..................................................................................................... 34
7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals ...................................................................................... 34
7.4.5 ATS System Integrity .......................................................................................... 34

7.5 System Monitoring ........................................................................................................... 35

7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS) ....................................................................... 35

7.5.2 The monitoring process ....................................................................................... 35
7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information ............................................................. 36
7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports ....................................................................................... 36
7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report............................................................................... 36
7.5.6 Processing of Reports .......................................................................................... 37

7.6 APANPIRG....................................................................................................................... 37

7.7 Local Data Recording and Analysis ................................................................................. 37

7.7.1 Data recording ..................................................................................................... 37

7.7.2 Local data collection ............................................................................................ 38
7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction .................................................. 38

7.8 ADS-B Problem Report .................................................................................................... 39

7.8.1 Report Form ......................................................................................................... 39

7.8.2 Description of Fields ........................................................................................... 40

7.9 ADS-B Performance Report Form.................................................................................... 41

8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ....................................... 42

8.1 Reliability ......................................................................................................................... 42

8.2 Availability ....................................................................................................................... 42
8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems ................................. 43
A: System design ......................................................................................................... 43
B: Logistics strategy ................................................................................................... 44
C: Configuration Management .................................................................................... 45
D: Training & Competency plans ................................................................................ 46
E: Data collection & Review....................................................................................... 46

9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES .......................................................... 47

9.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 47
9.2 ADS-B Regulations .......................................................................................................... 47
9.3 Factors to be considered when using ADS-B ................................................................... 48

9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data..................................................................................... 48

9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance .......................................................................... 48
9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service ...................................................................... 49
9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data........................................................................................ 49
9.3.5 Synergy between GNSS and ADS-B ................................................................... 50
9.3.6 Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface Movement .................................................... 51

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9.3.7 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issue With Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) ..................................................................................................... 52

9.4 Reporting Rates ................................................................................................................ 53

9.4.1 General ................................................................................................................ 53

9.5 Separation ......................................................................................................................... 53

9.5.1 General ................................................................................................................. 53

9.5.2 Identification Methods ......................................................................................... 53
9.5.3 ADS-B Separation ................................................................................................ 53
9.5.4 Vertical Separation............................................................................................... 53

9.6 Air Traffic Control Clearance Monitoring ....................................................................... 55

9.6.1 General ................................................................................................................. 55

9.6.2 Deviation from ATC clearances .......................................................................... 55

9.7 Alerting service ................................................................................................................. 54

9.8 Position Reporting ............................................................................................................ 55

9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage .................................. 55

9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirement in ADS-B airspace .................................. 55

9.9 Phraseology....................................................................................................................... 55

9.9.1 Phraseology standard ........................................................................................... 55

9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B ................................................. 56

9.10 Flight Planning.................................................................................................................. 57

9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity ....................................... 57

9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements ................................................................. 58
9.10.3 Setting Flight Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits ........................................... 59

9.11 Procedures to Handle Non-compliant ADS-B Aircraft or

Mis-leading ADS-B Transmissions .................................................................................. 60

9.12 Emergency Procedures .................................................................................................... 63

9.13 Procedures to Handle GPS Time and Week Counter Rollover ........................................ 64

10. Security Issues Associated with ADS-B ........................................................................ 65

10.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 65
10.2 Considerations .................................................................................................................. 65
10.3 Measures for Enhancing the Security of ADS-B .............................................................. 66
10.3.1 Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) Based Position Verification Method ........ 66

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Appendix 1 – An Example of Commissioning Checklist

Appendix 2 – Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis of ADS-B Avionics

Performance

Appendix 3 – A Template for ADS-B Mandate/Regulations for Aircraft Avionics

Appendix 4 – An Example of Advice to Operators Concerning Inconsistency between

ADS-B Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

Appendix 5 – Checklist of Common Items or Parameters for the Monitoring of ADS-B

System

Appendix 6 – Baseline ADS-B Service Performance Parameters

Appendix 7 – Guidance Material on Generation, Processing and Sharing of ASTERIX

Category 21 ADS-B Messages

Appendix 8 – ICAO Guidance Material on 1 090 Mhz Spectrum Issues and Proper
Management of 24-Bit Aircraft Addresses Assoicated with Unmanned
Aircraft

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2003 recommended that States recognize
ADS-B as an enabler of the global ATM concept bringing substantial safety and capacity benefits;
support the cost-effective early implementation of it; and ensuring it is harmonized, compatible and
interoperable with operational procedures, data linking and ATM applications.

The Twelve ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2012 endorsed the Aviation System Block
Upgrades (ASBU) to provide a framework for global harmonization and interoperability of seamless
ATM systems. Among the Block Upgrades, the Block 0 module “Initial Capability for Ground
Surveillance” recommends States to implement ADS-B which provides an economical alternative to
acquire surveillance capabilities especially for areas where it is technically infeasible or commercially
unviable to install radars.

This ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (AIGD) provides guidance material
for the planning, implementation and operational application of ADS-B technology in the Asia and
Pacific Regions.

The procedures and requirements for ADS-B operations are detailed in the relevant States’ AIP. The
AIGD is intended to provide key information on ADS-B performance, integration, principles,
procedures and collaboration mechanisms.

The content is based upon the work to date of the APANPIRG ADS-B Study and Implementation Task
Force (SITF), the Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group (SURICG) and various ANC Panels
developing provisions for the operational use of ADS-B. Amendment to the guidance material will be
required as new/revised SARPs and PANS are published.

1.1 ARRANGEMENT OF THE AIGD

The AIGD consists of the following Parts:

Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Acronyms and Glossary of Terms
Section 3 Reference Documents
Section 4 ADS-B Data
Section 5 ADS-B Implementation
Section 6 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B
Implementation
Section 7 System Integrity and Monitoring
Section 8 Reliability and Availability Considerations
Section 9 ADS-B Regulations and Procedures
Section 10 Security Issues Associated with ADS-B

1.2 DOCUMENT HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT

This document is managed by the APANPIRG. It was introduced as draft to the first Working Group
meeting of the ADS-B SITF in Singapore in October 2004, at which it was agreed to develop the draft to
an approved working document that provides implementation guidance for States. The first edition was
presented to APANPIRG for adoption in August 2005. It is intended to supplement SARPs, PANS and
relevant provisions contained in ICAO documentation and it will be regularly updated to reflect
evolving provisions.

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1.3 COPIES

Paper copies of this AIGD are not distributed. Controlled and endorsed copies can be found at the
following web site: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx

Copy may be freely downloaded from the web site, or by emailing APANPIRG through the ICAO Asia
and Pacific Regional Office who will send a copy by return email.

1.4 CHANGES TO THE AIGD

Whenever a user identifies a need for a change to this document, a Request for Change (RFC) Form (see
Section 1.6 below) should be completed and submitted to the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office.
The Regional Office will collate RFCs for consideration by the Surveillance Implementation
Coordination Group.

When an amendment has been agreed by a meeting of the Surveillance Implementation Coordination
Group then a new version of the AIGD will be prepared, with the changes marked by an “|” in the
margin, and an endnote indicating the relevant RFC, so a reader can see the origin of the change. If the
change is in a table cell, the outside edges of the table will be highlighted; e.g.:

Final approval for publication of an amendment to the AIGD will be the responsibility of APANPIRG.

1.5 EDITING CONVENTIONS

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1.6 AIGD REQUEST FOR CHANGE FORM

RFC Nr:

Please use this form when requesting a change to any part of this AIGD. This form may be photocopied
as required, emailed, faxed or e-mailed to ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office
+66 (2) 537-8199 or APAC@icao.int

1. SUBJECT:

2. REASON FOR CHANGE:

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: [expand / attach additional pages if necessary]

4. REFERENCE(S):
5. PERSON INITIATING: DATE:
ORGANISATION:
TEL/FA/X/E-MAIL:

6. CONSULTATION RESPONSE DUE BY DATE:

Organization Name Agree/Disagree Date

7. ACTION REQUIRE :
8. AIGD EDITOR DATE REC’D :
9. FEEDBACK PASSED DATE :

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1.7 AMENDMENT RECORD

Amendment Date Amended by Comments

Number
0.1 24 December 2004 W. Blythe Modified draft following
H. Anderson contributions from ADS-B SITF
Working Group members.
Incorporated to TF/3 Working
Paper #3.
0.2 (1.0) 24 March 2005 H. Anderson Final draft prepared at ADS-B
SITF WG/3
0.3 (1.1) 03 June 2005 Nick King Amendments following SASP
WG/WHL meeting of May 2005
0.4 15 July 2005 CNS/MET SG/9 Editorial changes made

1.0 26 August 2005 APANPIRG/16 Adopted as the first Edition

2.0 25 August 2006 Proposed by Adopted as the second Edition

ADS-B SITF/5 and adopted
by APANPIRG/17
3.0 7 September 2007 Proposed by Adopted as the second amendment
ADS-B SITF/6 and adopted (3rd edition)
by APANPIRG/18
4.0 5 September 2011 Proposed by Adopted amendment on
ADS-B SITF/10 and adopted consequential change to the Flight
by APANPIRG/22 Plan and additional material on the
reliability and availability for ADS-
B ground system
5.0 14 September 2012 Proposed by Included sample template on
ADS-B SITF/11 and adopted harmonization framework
by APANPIRG/23
6.0 June 2013 Proposed by Revamped to include the latest
ADS-B SITF/12 and adopted ADS-B developments and
by APANPIRG/24 references to guidance materials on
ADS-B implementation
7.0 September 2014 Proposed by (i) Included guidance materials
ADS-B SITF/13 and adopted on monitoring and analysis of
by APANPIRG/25 ADS-B equipped aircraft
(ii) Included guidance materials
on synergy between GNSS
and ADS-B
(iii) Revised ATC Phraseology
(iv) Included clarification on
Flight Planning
8.0 September 2015 Proposed by ADS-B SITF/14 (i) Updated the guidance
and adopted by materials on monitoring and
APANPIRG/26 analysis of ADS-B equipped
aircraft
(ii) Updated the categories of
reported ADS-B avionics
problems
(iii) Updated the guidance
materials on ADS-B flight

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plan
(iv) Updated the guidance
materials on disabling ADS-B
transmissions
(v) Remove reference to
operational approval for use of
ADS-B Out by ATC

9.0 September 2016 Proposed by ADS-B SITF/15 (i) Included a list of additional
and adopted by functional requirements for
APANPIRG/27 ADS-B integration
(ii) Addition of a checklist of
common items or parameters
for monitoring of ADS-B
System
(iii) Amendment to emphasize the
issue on potential incorrect
processing of DO-260B
downlinks by ADS-B ground
stations during upgrade
(iv) Updated the list of known
ADS-B avionics problems
(v) Included a general
recommendation of technical
solution on acquisition of
Mode 3/A code information
via Mode S downlink for DO-
260 aircraft in ADS-B
implementation with Mode
A/C SSR environment

10.0 June 2017 Proposed by SURICG/2 (i) Updated “B787 position error
with good NUC” in the list of
known ADS-B avionics
problems.
(ii) Included new problem type
“Incorrect Ground Bit Setting
in ADS-B Avionics Downlink
Data” and “A350 ADS-B on-
ground performance” in the
list of known ADS-B avionics
problems.
(iii) Amendment to the template
for ADS-B Mandate /
Regulations for Aircraft
Avionics.
(iv) Included a general
recommendation to use ADS-
B in overcoming the
limitations of Mode A/C radar
technology.
(v) Included a general
recommendation on carrying

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out ICAO Aircraft Address

Monitoring
(vi) Aligned to replace NACp for
NAC throughout the
document
(vii) Aligned to use ICAO Aircraft
Address throughout the
document

11.0 April 2018 Proposed by SURICG/3 (i) Editorial Updates – including

/replacing ADS-B SITF with
SURICG (Sections 1, 1.4, 2.1,
7.5.1, 7.5.5, 7.5.6, 7.6, 7.8.2)
(ii) Correction of HPL Definition
(Section 2.2)
(iii) Update of reference
documents as in Attachment 2
of WP/02
(iv) Include reference to APRD
(Section 7.5.1)
(v) Update of sample regulations
(Section 9.2)
(vi) Update in Position Reporting
Performance (Section 9.3.2)
(vii) Update in GNSS Integrity
Prediction Service (Section
9.3.3)
(viii) Update name of RASMAG
in Sharing of ADS-B Data
(Section 9.3.4)
(ix) Clarification of reporting rate
requirements (Section 9.4.1)
(x) Use of Ident during ADS-B
emergencies.(Section 9.12)
(xi) Appendix 1 missing from
Version 10 – reinstate.
(xii) Appendix 2 – update for
available APRD.
(xiii) Update to B787 service
bulletin status. (Attachment A
in Appendix 2)
(xiv) replace "Date UTC" to
"Start Time/Date UTC",
replace "Time UTC" to "End
Time/Date UTC" and related
contents in the Report Form
(Section 7.8.1)
(xv) replace description of "Date
UTC" as "UTC Time/Date
when the event occurred",
replace description of "Time
UTC" as "UTC Time/Date
when the event ended" as

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 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

sometimes the problem will

lasts across mid-night.
(Section 7.8.2)
(xvi) In Remote Control &
Monitoring (RCMS) part,
suggest to replace "ASTERIX
Output Load" to "ASTERIX
Output Load and Link Status"
(Appendix 5)
(xvii) Update on DO260A EMG
issue (Section 9.12)
(xviii) Update the link to the
Guidance Material on
generation, processing and
sharing of ASTERIX (Section
4)
(xix) Reference to Space based
ADS-B and ATC automation
as in WP12 is added under
5.1.4.4.6
(xx) Updated Section 4Managing
the Problem in Appendix 2 to
incorporate the General
mechanism and procedure for
blacklisting aircraft
(xxi) Updated the Attachment A
to Appendix 2 – List of known
ADS-B avionics problems
(xxii) Added Appendix 6 –
Baseline ADS-B Service
Performance Parameters
(xxiii) Added Appendix 7 –
Guidance Material on
Generation, Processing and
Sharing of ASTERIX
Category 21 ADS-B Messages

12.0 April 2019 Proposed by SURICG/4 (i) Added procedures on handling

GPS time and week counters
rollover (Section 9.13)

(ii) Added two new problem types

to Attachment A of Appendix
2 “List of known ADS-B
avionics problems”, including:

o Rockwell TSS-4100
Geometric Altitude
Reporting as Pressure
Altitude
o Improper NACv reporting

(iii) Updated the status of known

ADS-B avionics problems in
Attachment A of Appendix 2

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“List of known ADS-B

avionics problems”, including:

o B787 position error with

good NIC
o Rockwell TSS-4100 track
extrapolation issue
o Embraer 170 track jumping
issue
o Airbus Single Aisle
production wiring issue
o Boeing 777-300ER
production wiring issue

13.0 September 2020 Proposed by SURICG/5 (i) Updated the status of known
ADS-B avionics problems in
Attachment A of Appendix 2
“List of known ADS-B
avionics problems”, including
B787 NACv = 0 Issue

(ii) Updated Section 5.1.4.5.1 on

ICAO Aircraft Address
Monitoring

(iii) Added the following new

sections:

o Use of ADS-B for Airport

Surface Movement
(Section 9.3.6)

o 1090 Mhz Spectrum and

24-bit Aircraft Address
Issue with Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS)
(Section 9.3.7)

o Measures for Enhancing

the Security of ADS-B
(Section 10.3)

o Time Difference of Arrival

(TDOA) Based Position
Verification Method
(Section 10.3.1)

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2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS

2.1 ACRONYM LIST

ACID Aircraft Identification

ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
AIGD ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AIT ADS-B Implementation Team
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
APANPIRG Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group
APRD ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database
ARINC Aeronautical Radio Incorporate
ATC Air Traffic Control (or Air Traffic Controller)
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
ATSP ATS Provider
ATSU ATS unit
CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CDTI Cockpit Display Traffic Information
DAIW Danger Area Infringement Warning
FIR Flight Information Region
FLTID Flight Identification
FMS Flight Management System
FOM Figure of Merit used in ASTERIX messaging
GPS Global Positioning System (USA)
HPL Horizontal Protection Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTCA Medium Term Conflict Alert
MTTR Mean Time To Restore
NACp Navigation Accuracy Category
NIC Navigation Integrity Category
PRS Problem Reporting System
RAI Restricted Area Intrusion
RAM Route Adherence Monitoring
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RFC Request for Change
RNP Required Navigation Performance
SIL Source Integrity Level
SITF Study and Implementation Task Force
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert
SURICG Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group

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2.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ADS-B In An ADS-B system feature that enables the display of

real time ADS-B tracks on a situation display in the
aircraft cockpit.
ADS-B Out An ADS-B system feature that enables the frequent
broadcast of accurate aircraft position and vector
data together with other information.
Asterix 21 Eurocontrol standard format for data message
exchange
FOM (Figure of Merit) A numeric value that is used to determine the
accuracy and integrity of associated position data.
HPL (Horizontal Position Limit) The containment radius within which the true
position of the aircraft will be found for 99.999% of
the time, or the probability indicated by the reported
SIL value (DO-260A/B).
NACp (Navigational Accuracy Category) Subfield used to announce the 95% accuracy limits
for the horizontal position data being broadcast.
NIC (Navigational Integrity Category) Subfield used to specify the containment radius
integrity associated with horizontal position data.
NUCp ( Navigation Uncertainty Category) A numeric value that announces the integrity of the
associated horizontal position data being broadcast.
SIL (Source Integrity Level) Subfield used to specify the probability of the true
position lying outside the containment radius defined
by NIC without being alerted.

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3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Id Name of the document Reference Date Origin Domain

1 Annex 2: Rules of the Air Tenth Edition July 2005 ICAO
Including
Amendment 43
dated 10/11/16
2 Annex 4: Aeronautical Chart Eleventh Edition July 2009 ICAO
including
Amendment 59
dated 10/11/16
3 Annex 10: Aeronautical Fifth Edition July 2014 ICAO
Telecommunications, Vol. IV –
Surveillance Radar and Collision
Avoidance Systems
4 Annex 11: Air Traffic Services Fourteenth Edition July 2016 ICAO

5 Annex 15: Aeronautical Fifteenth Edition July 2016 ICAO

Information Services
6 PAN-ATM (Doc 4444/ATM501) Sixteenth Edition November ICAO
2016
7 Air Traffic Services Planning First Edition 1984 ICAO
Manual (Doc 9426/AN924) including
Amendment 4
30/12/92
8 Manual on Airspace Planning First Edition 1998 ICAO
Methodology for the Determination including
of Separation Minima (Doc Amendment 1
9689/AN953) dated 30/8/02
9 Doc 9859 Safety Management Third Edition 2013 ICAO
Manual (SMM)

10 Technical Provisions for Mode S Second Edition 2012 ICAO

Services and Extended Squitter including
(Doc 9871/AN460) Amendment 1
dated 09/01/17
11 Aeronautical Surveillance Manual Second Edition 2017 ICAO
(Doc 9924)

12 ICAO Circular 326 AN/188 First Edition 2012 ICAO

“Assessment of ADS-B and
Multilateration Surveillance to
Support Air Traffic Services and
Guidelines for Implementation”.
13 Regional Supplementary Fifth Edition 2008 ICAO
Procedures (Doc 7030) including
Amendment 9
dated 25/04/14
14 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260 2000 RTCA
Standards (MOPS) for 1090 MHz September 13,
Automatic Dependent Surveillance 2000
– Broadcast (ADS-B) – including
Change 1 Change 1 to 2006

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RTCA DO-260
June 27, 2006

15 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2003 RTCA

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended April 10, 2003
Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B)

Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2006

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Change 1
Squitter Automatic Dependent June 27, 2006
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Change 1

Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2006

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Change 2
Squitter Automatic Dependent December 13,
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 2006
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Change 2
16 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260B 2009 RTCA
Standards for 1090 MHz Extended December 2, 2009
Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services
(TIS-B)

Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260B 2011

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended December 13,
Squitter Automatic Dependent 2011
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Corrigendum 1

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4. ADS-B DATA

APANPIRG has decided to use 1090MHz Extended Squitter data link for ADS-B data exchange in the
Asia and Pacific Regions. In the longer term an additional link type may be required.

To ensure interoperability of ADS-B ground stations in the Asia Pacific (ASIA/PAC) Regions, during
the 16th APANPIRG Meeting held in August 2005, the ASTERIX Category 21 version 0.23 (V0.23)
which had incorporated DO260 standard was adopted as the baselined ADS-B data format for
deployment of ADS-B ground stations and sharing of ADS-B data in the ASIA/PAC Regions. At this
time, DO260A and DO260B standards were not defined.

This baselined version provides adequate information so that useful ATC operational services, including
aircraft separation, can be provided. V0.23 can be used with DO260, DO260A and DO260B ADS-B
avionics/ground stations to provide basic ATC operational services. However, V0.23 cannot fully
support the more advanced capabilities offered by DO260A and DO260B.

As the avionics standards changed through the different versions of DO260, the ADS-B ground station
processing also needed to change, so that downlinks received from aircraft would be correctly
interpreted in construction of the ASTERIX Category 21 messages. It is important that States with
“older generation” ADS-B ground stations designed to support DO260 or DO260A, take action to
upgrade to support the latest ADS-B avionics standard as well as the older standards. DO260B avionics
will become more common in the Asia Pacific region as the FAA and European ADS-B mandates for
2020 require this version.

States intending to implement ADS-B surveillance and share ADS-B data with others might consider to
adopt a more updated version of ASTERIX in order to make use of the advanced capabilities offered by
DO260A and DO260B compliant avionics.

A guidance material on generation, processing and sharing of ASTERIX Cat. 21 ADS-B messages is
provided at Appendix 7 for reference by States.

In this guidance material, the ADS-B data contained inside ASTERIX Cat 21 are classified as Group 1
(mandatory), Group 2 (Desirable) and Group 3 (Optional). It is required to transmit all data that are
operationally desirable (Group 2), when such data are received from the aircraft, in addition to the data
that are mandatory (Group 1) in ASTERIX messages. Whether Group 3 optional data will need to be
transmitted or not should be configurable on item-by-item basis within the ADS-B ground station
depending on specific operational needs.

It is considered necessary that all data that are mandatory in ASTERIX messages (i.e. Group 1 data
items) and operationally desirable (i.e. Group 2 data items) when such data are received from aircraft,
should be included in data sharing. In the event that the data have to be filtered, the list of optional data
items (i.e. Group 3 data items) needs to be shared will be subject to mutual agreement between the two
data sharing parties concerned.

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5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 Planning

There are a range of activities needed to progress ADS-B implementation from initial concept
level to operational use. This section addresses the issues of collaborative decision making,
system compatibility and integration, while the second section of this chapter provides a
checklist to assist States with the management of ADS-B implementation activities.

5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination

5.1.2.1 Any decision to implement ADS-B by a State should include consultation with the
wider ATM community. Moreover, where ADS-B procedures or requirements will
affect traffic transiting between states, the implementation should also be coordinated
between States and Regions, in order to achieve maximum benefits for airspace users
and service providers.

5.1.2.2 An effective means of coordinating the various demands of the affected organizations is
to establish an implementation team. Team composition may vary by State or Region,
but the core group responsible for ADS-B implementation planning should include
members with multidiscipline operational expertise from affected aviation disciplines,
with access to other specialists where required.

5.1.2.3 Ideally, such a team should comprise representatives from the ATS providers, regulators
and airspace users, as well as other stakeholders likely to be influenced by the
introduction of ADS-B, such as manufacturers and military authorities. All identified
stakeholders should participate as early as possible in this process so that their
requirements can be identified prior to the making of schedules or contracts.

5.1.2.4 The role of the implementation team is to consult widely with stakeholders, identify
operational needs, resolve conflicting demands and make recommendations to the
various stakeholders managing the implementation. To this end, the implementation
team should have appropriate access to the decision-makers.

5.1.3 System compatibility

5.1.3.1 ADS-B has potential use in almost all environments and operations and is likely to
become a mainstay of the future ATM system. In addition to traditional radar-like
services, it is likely that ADS-B will also be used for niche application where radar
surveillance is not available or possible. The isolated use of ADS-B has the potential to
foster a variety of standards and practices that, once expanded to a wider environment,
may prove to be incompatible with neighbouring areas.

5.1.3.2 Given the international nature of aviation, special efforts should be taken to ensure
harmonization though compliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs). The choice of systems to support ADS-B should consider not only the
required performance of individual components, but also their compatibility with other
CNS systems and prevailing avionics standards.

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5.1.3.3 The future concept of ATM encompasses the advantages of interoperable and seamless
transition across flight information region (FIR) boundaries and, where necessary, ADS-
B implementation teams should conduct simulations, trials and cost/benefit analysis to
support these objectives.

5.1.4 Integration

5.1.4.1 ADS-B implementation plans should include the development of both business and
safety cases. The adoption of any new CNS system has major implications for service
providers, regulators and airspace users and special planning should be considered for
the integration of ADS-B into the existing and foreseen CNS/ATM system. The
following briefly discusses each element.

5.1.4.2 Communication system

5.1.4.2.1 The communication system is an essential element within CNS. An air

traffic controller can now monitor an aircraft position in real time using
ADS-B where previously only voice position reports were available.
However, a communication system that will support the new services
that result from the improved surveillance may be necessary.
Consequently, there is an impact of the ongoing ADS-B related work on
the communication infrastructure developments.

5.1.4.3 Navigation system infrastructure

5.1.4.3.1 ADS-B is dependent upon the data obtained from a navigation system
(typically GNSS), in order to enable its functions and performance.
Therefore, the navigation infrastructure should fulfill the corresponding
requirements of the ADS-B application, in terms of:

a) Data items; and

b) Performance (e.g. accuracy, integrity, availability etc.).

5.1.4.3.2 This has an obvious impact on the navigation system development,

which evolves in parallel with the development of the surveillance
system.

5.1.4.4 Other surveillance infrastructure

5.1.4.4.1 ADS-B may be used to supplement existing surveillance systems or as the

principal source of surveillance data. Ideally, surveillance systems will
incorporate data from ADS-B and other sources to provide a coherent
picture that improves both the amount and utility of surveillance data to the
user. The choice of the optimal mix of data sources will be defined on the
basis of operational demands, available technology, safety and cost-benefit
considerations.

5.1.4.4.2 ADS-B is one of the cost-effective means in complementing and

overcoming limitations of Mode A/C radars, including false targets, aircraft
positions temporarily not displayed and split tracks, which could cause
aircraft display issues on radar screens for ATC irrespective of brands of
Air Traffic Management System being used. Within busy airspace, aircraft

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could be managed at close lateral distance while vertically separated. In

such situation, Mode A/C radars sometimes provide garbled detection, in
the form of false targets due to overlapping replies from two or more
aircraft. In the case of ADS-B, ADS-B data are broadcast in an omni-
directional, random and periodic intervals without suffering from the same
issue. In addition, automatic data validation is usually done at ADS-B
receivers to ensure integrity of ADS-B information received from the
aircraft.

5.1.4.4.3 A guidance material on issues to be considered in ATC multi-sensor fusion

processing including integration of ADS-B data is provided on the ICAO
website http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx for reference by
States.

5.1.4.4.4 Acquisition of Mode 3/A code for DO-260 aircraft through Mode S
downlink

There is a potential problem for some of the air traffic management systems
(ATMS) for fusion of ADS-B targets with Mode A/C SSR targets, because
a common identifier to the aircraft, Mode 3/A code, is not available through
ADS-B. Then ATMS can only rely on proximity analysis of aircraft
position and Mode C altitude to determine whether detections from two
distinct types of surveillance sources belong to the same aircraft. This
matching technique might introduce ambiguity in associating ADS-B with
Mode A/C SSR targets for fused display.

States may consider enhancing their ADS-B ground stations to listen to

Downlink Format 5 and 21 (DF 5 and 21) of Mode S interrogation replies
which carry the Mode 3/A code of the same aircraft. As a result, ADS-B
target reports of the same DO-260 aircraft can be filled with Mode 3/A code
acquired from Mode S downlink to facilitate matching with Mode A/C SSR
targets before transmitting to the ATMS.

The transmission of DF 5 and DF 21 messages from a Mode S aircraft

requires to be triggered by ground-based Mode S interrogators, either
through active or passive interrogation. For active interrogation, Mode S
interrogators can be installed alongside with ADS-B ground stations for
actively triggering DF 5 and DF 21 messages transmission from the aircraft.
The interrogators shall follow ICAO standard to perform periodic all-call
and roll-call to the aircraft in range. For passive interrogation, the ADS-B
ground stations will only passively listen to the DF messages from the
aircraft for acquiring the Mode 3/A code. It is required to ensure that Mode
S interrogations are performed by external systems, such as A-SMGCS,
MLAT system or Mode S radar under their coverage.

The above provides an interim solution during transition from Mode A/C
SSR to Mode S SSR. After upgrading to Mode S SSR, ATMS can have an
alternative means to make use of Flight ID or ICAO Aircraft Address to
perform association between ADS-B and Mode S radar targets without
ambiguity.

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5.1.4.4.5 A guidance material on processing and displaying of ADS-B data at air

traffic controller positions is provided on the ICAO website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.

5.1.4.4.6 Most of the ATC automation systems that support terrestrial ADS-B will
also support space-based ADS-B without modifications. For more guidance,
reference can be made to WP/12 on "ATC Automation Requirement and
Space-based ADS-B" delivered during 3rd meeting of the SURICG.

5.1.4.5 Additional Functional Requirements for ADS-B Integration

5.1.4.5.1 The following list of functions could be considered by each individual

States to see whether they are suitable for their own operational needs or
applicable to local environment from ADS-B integration point of view:

 The priority of ADS-B sensor position data vs radar data could be

adaptable;

 For ADS-B aircraft, receipt of the Mode S conspicuity code could

trigger use of the Flight ID / ICAO Aircraft Address for flight plan
correlation;

 If, due to sensor or aircraft capability limitation, no SSR code is

received for an aircraft, the system could use Flight ID/ ICAO Aircraft
Address for track correlation;

 For correlation based on Flight ID, the received ID could exactly match
the ACID of the flight plan;

 For correlation based on ICAO Aircraft Address, the received address

could match the address entered in the flight plan item 18 CODE/
keyword;

 The system could generate an alert for a correlated flight for which the
Flight ID from the track does not match the flight plan ACID and/or the
ICAO Aircraft Address from the track does not match the code given in
the flight plan Item 18 CODE/ keyword;

 The system could allow the setting of ADS-B above or below the radar
sources within the Surveillance Data Processor Tile Set on a per-tile
basis;

 Priority could only apply to data received at or above the adapted NUCp,
NACp, NIC, and/or SIL thresholds;

 The system could be configurable to either discard ADS-B data or

display the track with an indication of ADS-B degradation if the
received NUCp, NACp, NIC, or SIL is below an adapted threshold;

 If the system is configured to display the degraded track, the degraded

position and status could only be displayed if there are no other
surveillance sources available;

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 The system could allow the adaptation of ADS-B emergency codes to

map to special Mnemonics;

 The system could include an adaptable Downlinked Aircraft Parameters

(DAP) field that invokes a popup with the following information from
Mode-S and ADS-B aircraft:

- Magnetic Heading
- True Track Angle
- Indicated Airspeed/Mach Number
- Groundspeed
- Track Angle Rate
- True Airspeed
- Roll Angle
- Selected Altitude
- Vertical Rate

 The system could generate a conformance alert if the Selected Altitude

and the Cleared Flight Level do not match.

 The system could monitor 1 the ICAO Aircraft Address of individual

aircraft and generate alert for the following cases:
- ICAO Aircraft Address does not match with that specified in
flight planICAO Aircraft Address is all 0 or F (expressed in
hexadecimal)
- ICAO Aircraft Address is not defined in ICAO’s allocation
- Duplicate ICAO Aircraft Address detected within single sensor
in the same time-frame
- Duplicate ICAO Aircraft Address detected within multi-sensors
in the same time-frameICAO Aircraft Address changes during
the flight
- Aircrafts whose state identification number is not match with
the state information registered in its flight plan
- Aircrafts whose state identification number is not defined in
SARPs (Annex 10)
- Mode-S transponder of which P4 pulse was not detected
- Mode-A/C transponder replied to Mode-S all call

5.1.5 Coverage Predictions

5.1.5.1 Reliable and robust analysis and planning of ADS-B coverage to support seamless
ATM initiative requires accurate and reliable coverage modelling. States should ensure
that surveillance engineering/technical teams are provided with modelling tools to
provide accurate and reliable coverage predictions for ATM planning and analysis.

1
Monitoring could be done by ATM system or other systems of the States/Administration

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5.2 IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST

5.2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this implementation checklist is to document the range of activities that needs to be
completed to bring an ADS-B application from an initial concept to operational use. This checklist may
form the basis of the terms of reference for an ADS-B implementation team, although some activities
may be specific to individual stakeholders. An example of the checklist used by AirServices Australia
is given at Appendix 1.

5.2.2 Activity Sequence

The activities are listed in an approximate sequential order. However, each activity does not have to be
completed prior to starting the next activity. In many cases, a parallel and iterative process should be
used to feed data and experience from one activity to another. It should be noted that not all activities
will be required for all applications.

5.2.3 Concept Phase

a) construct operational concept:

1) purpose;
2) operational environment;
3) ATM functions; and
4) infrastructure;

b) identify benefits:

1) safety enhancements;
2) efficiency;
3) capacity;
4) environmental;
5) cost reductions;
6) access; and
7) other metrics (e.g. predictability, flexibility, usefulness);

c) identify constraints:

1) pair-wise equipage;
2) compatibility with non-equipped aircraft;
3) need for exclusive airspace;
4) required ground infrastructure;
5) RF spectrum;
6) integration with existing technology; and
7) technology availability;

d) prepare business case:

1) cost benefit analysis; and

2) demand and justification.

5.2.4 Design Phase

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a) identify operational requirements:

1) security; and
2) systems interoperability;

b) identify human factors issues:

1) human-machine interfaces;
2) training development and validation;
3) workload demands;
4) role of automation vs. role of human;
5) crew coordination/pilot decision-making interactions; and
6) ATM collaborative decision-making;

c) identify technical requirements:

1) standards development;
2) prevailing avionics standards;
3) data required;
4) functional processing;
5) functional performance; and
6) required certification levels;

d) equipment development, test, and evaluation:

1) prototype systems built to existing or draft standards/specifications;

2) developmental bench and flight tests; and
3) acceptance test parameters; and
4) select and procure technology;

e) develop procedures:

1) pilot and controller actions and responsibilities;

2) phraseologies;
3) separation/spacing criteria and requirements;
4) controller’s responsibility to maintain a monitoring function, if appropriate;
5) contingency procedures;
6) emergency procedures; and
7) develop AIP and Information documentation

f) prepare design phase safety case:

1) safety rationale;
2) safety budget and allocation; and
3) functional hazard assessment.

5.2.5 Implementation phase

a) prepare implementation phase safety case;

b) conduct operational test and evaluation:

1) flight deck and ATC validation simulations; and

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2) flight tests and operational trials;

c) obtain systems certification:

1) aircraft equipment; and

2) ground systems;

d) obtain regulatory approvals:

1) air traffic certification of use;

e) implementation transition:

1) Promulgate procedures and deliver training

2) continue data collection and analysis;
3) resolve any unforeseen issues; and
4) continue feedback into standards development processes;

f) performance monitoring to ensure that the agreed performance is maintained.

5.2.5.1 Once the implementation project is complete, ongoing maintenance and upgrading of
both ADS-B operations and infrastructure should continue to be monitored, through
the appropriate forums.

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6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 BACKGROUND

6.1.1 It is obvious that full benefits of ADS-B will only be achieved by its harmonized
implementation and seamless operations. During the 6th meeting of ADS-B SEA/WG in
February 2011, Hong Kong, China initiated to strengthen collaboration among
concerned States/Administrations for harmonized ADS-B implementation and seamless
operations along two ATS routes L642 and M771 with major traffic flow (MTF). An
ad-hoc workgroup comprising concerned CAAs/ANSPs from Hong Kong, China,
Mainland China, Vietnam and Singapore was subsequently formed to elaborate and
agree on a framework regarding implementation timelines, avionics standards, optimal
flight levels, and ATC and engineering handling procedures. As a coherent effort, ADS-
B implementation along ATS routes L642 and M771 has been harmonized while Hong
Kong, China and Singapore have published respective Aeronautical Information
Circulars and Airworthiness Notices on ADS-B mandates for these two routes with
effect on 12 December 2013.

6.1.2 It is considered that the above implementation framework for ATS routes L642/M771
would serve as a useful template for extension to other high density routes to harmonize
ADS-B implementation. Paragraph 6.2 shows the detailed framework.

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6.2 TEMPLATE OF HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION

Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation along ATS Routes L642 and M771

No. What to harmonize What was agreed Issue / what needs to be further
discussed
1 Mandate Effective Singapore (SG), Hong Kong (HK), China (Sanya) :
12 Dec 2013
Vietnam (VN) : to be confirmed

2 ATC Operating Procedures No need to harmonize Refer to SEACG for consideration of the
impact of expanding ADS-B surveillance
on ATC Operating Procedures including
Large Scale Weather procedures.

3 Mandate Publish Date No need to harmonize To publish equipment requirements as

early as possible.

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4 Flight Level SG, HK, CN :

- At or Above FL290 (ADS-B airspace)
- Below FL290 (Non-ADS-B airspace)

VN to be confirmed

5 Avionics Standard (CASA/AMC2024) SG - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 ADS-B Task Force agreed that DO260B
HK - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 will be accepted as well.
VN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165
CN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 SG, HK, and CN agreed their ADS-B GS
will accept DO260, DO260A and
DO260B by 1 July 2014 (Note 1)

6 Flight Planning Before 15 Nov 2012, as per AIGD

On or after 15 Nov 2012, as per new flight plan
format

7 Aircraft Equippage
7a) Procedures if Aircraft Not Equipped or SG, HK, CN : FL280 and Below
Aircraft without a Serviceable ADS-B VN to be confirmed
Transmitting Equipment before Flight

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7b) Aircraft Equipped but Transmitting Bad For known aircraft, treat as non ADS-B aircraft. Share blacklisted aircraft among

Data (Blacklisted Aircraft) concerned States/Administration

8 Contingency Plan

8a) Systemic Failure such as Ground System Revert back to current procedure.

/ GPS Failure

8b) Avionics Failure or Equipped Aircraft Provide other form of separation, subject to bilateral Address the procedure for aircraft

Transmitting Bad Data in Flight agreement. transiting from radar to ADS-B airspace

From radar/ADS-B environment to ADS-B only and from ADS-B to ADS-B airspace.

environment, ATC coordination may be able to

provide early notification of ADS-B failure.

9 Commonly Agreed Route Spacing SEACG Need for commonly agreed minimal in-

trail spacing throughout.

Note 1: Also included two ADS-B GS supplied by Indonesia at Matak and Natuna

______________

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7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) environment
is an integrated system including physical systems (hardware, software, and communication networks),
human elements (pilots, controllers and engineers), and the operational procedures for its applications.
ADS-B is a surveillance system that may be integrated with other surveillance technologies or may also
operate as an independent source for surveillance monitoring within the CNS/ATM system.

Because of the integrated nature of such system and the degree of interaction among its components,
comprehensive system monitoring is recommended. The procedures described in this section aim to
ensure system integrity by validation, identification, reporting and tracking of possible problems
revealed during system monitoring with appropriate follow-up actions.

These procedures do not replace the ATS incident reporting procedures and requirements, as specified
in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Appendix 4; ICAO’s Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426),
Chapter 3; or applicable State regulations, affecting the reporting responsibilities of parties directly
involved in a potential ATS incident.

7.2 PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING

Prior to operating any element of the ADS-B system, operational and technical personnel shall
undertake appropriate training as determined by the States, including compliance with the Convention
on International Civil Aviation where applicable.

Notwithstanding the above requirement and for the purposes of undertaking limited trials of the
ADS-B system, special arrangements may be agreed between the operator and an Air Traffic Services
Unit (ATSU).

7.3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR AN ATC SEPARATION SERVICE

A number of States have introduced ADS-B for the provision of Air Traffic Services, including for
surveillance separation. The ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel (SASP) has completed
assessment on the suitability of ADS-B for various applications including provision of aircraft
separation based on comparison of technical characteristics between ADS-B and monopulse secondary
surveillance radar. It is concluded that that ADS-B surveillance is better or at least no worse than the
referenced radar, and can be used to provide separation minima as described in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444)
whether ADS-B is used as a sole means of ATC surveillance or used together with radar, subject to
certain conditions to be met. The assessment result is detailed in the ICAO Circular 326 AN/188
“Assessment of ADS-B and Multilateration Surveillance to Support Air Traffic Services and Guidelines
for Implementation”.

Regarding the use of ADS-B in complex airspace (as discussed in ICAO Circular 326), complex
airspace may be considered to be airspace with the following characteristics:

- Higher aircraft density

- Higher route crossing point density
- A higher mixture of different aircraft performance levels
- A higher rate of aircraft manoeuvring (as distinct from straight and level flight).

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The following recommendations need to be considered:

1. Whether complex or not, States are urged to consider whether the current or required
surveillance system performance is better, equivalent or worse than the SASP reference.

2. If the current or required surveillance system used by a State is lower or equivalent in

performance than the reference MSSR used in Circular 326 Appendix A, then that State may
use the Appendix C performance criteria.

3. If the current or required surveillance system used by a State is higher performance than the
reference MSSR used in Circular 326 Appendix A, then the State must ensure that the ADS-B
system achieves the more demanding performance.

4. State should undertake, in all cases, a safety assessment that ensures that any additional risks
and safety requirements already identified for the airspace where ADSB or MLAT is to be
implemented, or any newly identified risks, are effectively controlled and risk is reduced to an
acceptable level.

States intending to introduce ADS-B separation minima shall comply with provisions of PANS-ATM,
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030) and Annex 11 paragraph 3.4.1. States should adopt the
guidelines contained in this document unless conformance with
PANS-ATM specifications requires change.

7.4 ATC SYSTEM VALIDATION

7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines

To meet system integrity requirements, States should conduct a validation process that confirms
the integrity of their equipment and procedures. Such processes shall include:

a) A system safety assessment for new implementations is the basis for definitions of
system performance requirements. Where existing systems are being modified to utilize
additional services, the assessment demonstrates that the ATS Provider’s system will
meet safety objectives;

b) Integration test results confirming interoperability for operational use of airborne and
ground systems; and

c) Confirmation that the ATS Operation Manuals are compatible with those of adjacent
providers where the system is used across a common boundary.

7.4.2 System safety assessment

The objective of the system safety assessment is to ensure the State that introduction and
operation of ADS-B is safe. This can be achieved through application of the provisions of
Annex 11 paragraph 2.27 and PANS-ATM Chapter 2. The safety assessment should be
conducted for initial implementation as well as any future enhancements and should include:

a) Identifying failure conditions;

b) Assigning levels of criticality;

c) Determining risks/ probabilities for occurrence;

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d) Identifying mitigating measures and fallback arrangements;

e) Categorising the degree of acceptability of risks; and

f) Operational hazard ID process.

Following the safety assessment, States should institute measures to offset any identified failure
conditions that are not already categorized as acceptable. This should be done to reduce the
probability of their occurrence to a level as low as reasonably practicable. This could be
accomplished through system automation or manual procedures.

Guidance material on building a safety case for delivery of an ADS-B separation service is
provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for
reference by States.

7.4.3 Integration test

States should conduct trials with suitably equipped aircraft to ensure they meet the operational
and technical requirements to provide an ATS. Alternatively, they may be satisfied by test
results and analysis conducted by another State or organization deemed competent to provide
such service. Where this process is followed, the tests conducted by another State or
organization should be comparable (i.e. using similar equipment under similar conditions).
Refer also to the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of
Separation Minima (Doc9689).

7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals

States should coordinate with adjacent States to confirm that their ATS Operation Manuals
contain standard operating procedures to ensure harmonization of procedures that impact across
common boundaries.

7.4.5 ATS System Integrity

With automated ATM systems, data changes, software upgrades, and system failures can affect
adjacent units. States shall ensure that:

a) A conservative approach is taken to manage any changes to the system;

b) Aircrew, aircraft operating companies and adjacent ATSU(s) are notified of any planned
system changes in advance, where that system is used across a common boundary;

c) ATSUs have verification procedures in place to ensure that following any system
changes, displayed data is both correct and accurate;

d) In cases of system failures or where upgrades (or downgrades) or other changes may
impact surrounding ATS units, ATSUs should have a procedure in place for timely
notification to adjacent units. Such notification procedures will normally be detailed in
Letters of Agreement between adjacent units; and

e) ADS-B surveillance data is provided with equal to or better level of protection and
security than existing surveillance radar data.

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7.5 SYSTEM MONITORING

During the initial period of implementation of ADS-B technology, routine collection of data is necessary
in order to ensure that the system continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety and
interoperability requirements, and that operational service delivery and procedures are working as
intended. The monitoring program is a two-fold process. Firstly, summarised statistical data should be
produced periodically showing the performance of the system. This is accomplished through ADS-B
Periodic Status Reports. Secondly, as problems or abnormalities arise, they should be identified,
tracked, analyzed and corrected and information disseminated as required, utilizing the ADS-B Problem
Report.

Guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of ADS-B Avionics Performance are given at
Appendix 2. Checklist of common items or parameters that could be considered for monitoring is
summarized at Appendix 5 for reference.

7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS)

The Problem Reporting System is tasked with the collection, storage and regular dissemination
of data based on reports received from SURICG members. The PRS tracks problem reports and
publish information from those reports to SURICG members. Problem resolution is the
responsibility of the appropriate SURICG members.

The PRS Administrator shall:

a) prepare consolidated problem report summaries for each SURICG meeting;

b) collect and consolidate ADS-B Problem Reports; and

c) maintain a functional website (with controlled access) to manage the problem reporting
function.

The PRS is managed through the Asia Pacific ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting
Database (APRD) which is accessible to authorized users via
https://applications.icao.int/ADSB-APRD/login.aspx.

7.5.2 The monitoring process

When problems or abnormalities are discovered, the initial analysis should be performed by the
organization(s) identifying the problem. In addition, a copy of the problem report should be
entered in to the PRS which will assign a tracking number. As some problems or abnormalities
may involve more than one organization, the originator should be responsible for follow-up
action to rectify the problem and forward the information to the PRS. It is essential that all
information relating to the problem is documented and recorded and resolved in a timely
manner.

The following groups should be involved in the monitoring process and problem tracking to
ensure a comprehensive review and analysis of the collected data:

a) ATS Providers;

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b) Organizations responsible for ATS system maintenance (where different from the ATS
provider);

c) Relevant State regulatory authorities;

d) Communication Service Providers being used;

e) Aircraft operators; and

f) Aircraft and avionics manufacturers.

7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information

It is important that information that may have an operational impact on other parties be
distributed by the authorised investigator to all authorised groups that are likely to be affected,
as soon as possible. In this way, each party is made aware of problems already encountered by
others, and may be able to contribute further information to aid in the solution of these
problems. The default position is that all states agree to provide the data which will be de-
identified for reporting and record keeping purposes.

7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports

Problem reports may originate from many sources, but most will fall within two categories;
reports based on observation of one or more specific events, or reports generated from the
routine analysis of data. The user would document the problem, resolve it with the appropriate
party and forward a copy of the report to the PRS for tracking and distribution. While one
occurrence may appear to be an isolated case, the receipt of numerous similar reports by the
PRS could indicate that an area needs more detailed analysis.

To effectively resolve problems and track progress, the problem reports should be sent to the
nominated point of contact at the appropriate organization and the PRS. The resolution of the
identified problems may require:

a) Re-training of system operators, or revision of training procedures to ensure compliance

with existing procedures;

b) Change to operating procedures;

c) Change to system requirements, including performance and interoperability; or

d) Change to system design.

7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report

The ATS Providers should complete the ADS-B Periodic Status Report annually and deliver the
report to the regional meeting of the SURICG. The Periodic Status Report should give an
indication of system performance and identify any trend in system deficiencies, the resultant
operational implications, and the proposed resolution, if applicable.

Communications Service Providers, if used, are also expected to submit Periodic Status Reports
on the performance of the networks carrying ADS-B data at the annual regional meeting of the
SURICG. These reports could also contain the details of planned or current upgrades to the
network.

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7.5.6 Processing of Reports

Each group in the monitoring process should nominate a single point of contact for receipt of
problem reports and coordination with the other parties. This list will be distributed by the PRS
Administrator to all parties to the monitoring process.
Each State should establish mechanisms within its ATS Provider and regulatory authority to:

a) Assess problem reports and refer them to the appropriate technical or operational
expertise for investigation and resolution;

b) Coordinate with aircraft operators;

c) Develop interim operational procedures to mitigate the effects of problems until such
time as the problem is resolved;

d) Monitor the progress of problem resolution;

e) Prepare a report on problems encountered and their operational implications and

forward these to the PRS;

f) Prepare the ADS-B periodic status report at pre-determined times and forward these to
the Secretary of the annual meeting of the SURICG; and

g) Coordinate with any Communication Service Providers used.

7.6 APANPIRG

APANPIRG, with the assistance of its contributory bodies, shall oversee the monitoring process to
ensure the ADS-B system continues to meet its performance and safety requirements, and that
operational procedures are working as intended. The APANPIRG’S objectives are to:

a) review Periodic Status Reports and any significant Problem Reports;

b) highlight successful problem resolutions to SURICG members;

c) monitor the progress of outstanding problem resolutions;

d) prepare summaries of problems encountered and their operational implications; and

e) assess system performance based on information in the PRS and Periodic Status
Reports.

7.7 LOCAL DATA RECORDING AND ANALYSIS

7.7.1 Data recording

It is recommended that ATS Providers and Communication Service Providers retain the records
defined below for at least 30 days to allow for accident/incident investigation processes. These
records should be made available on request to the relevant State safety authority. Where data
is sought from an adjacent State, the usual State to State channels should be used.

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These recordings shall be in a form that permits a replay of the situation and identification of
the messages that were received by the ATS system.

7.7.2 Local data collection

ATS providers and communications service providers should identify and record ADS-B system
component failures that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of controlled flights or
compromise service continuity.

7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction

ATS providers need to develop systems to:

a) detect ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults

b) advise the regulators and where appropriate the aircraft operators on the detected
ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults

c) devise mechanisms and procedures to address identified faults

Regulators need to develop and maintain systems to ensure that appropriate corrective actions
are taken to address identified faults.

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7.8 ADS-B PROBLEM REPORT

7.8.1 Report Form

PRS #
Start Time/Date UTC End Time/Date UTC
Registration Aircraft ID
Flight ID ICAO Aircraft Address
Aircraft Type
Flight Sector/
Location
ATS Unit
Description / additional information

Originator Reference
Originator
number
Organization

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7.8.2 Description of Fields

Field Meaning
Number A unique identification number assigned by the PRS
Administrator to this problem report. Organizations writing problem reports
are encouraged to maintain their own internal list of these problems for
tracking purposes. Once the problems have been reported to the PRS and
incorporated in the database, a number will be assigned by the PRS and used
for tracking by the SURICG.
Start Time/Date UTC time/date when the event occurred.
UTC
End Time/Date UTC time/date when the event ended.
UTC
Registration Registration number (tail number) of the aircraft involved.
Aircraft ID (ACID) Coded equivalent of voice call sign as entered in FPL Item 7.
ICAO Aircraft Unique ICAO Aircraft Address expressed in Hexadecimal form (e.g.
Address 7432DB)
Flight ID (FLTID) The identification transmitted by ADS-B for display on a controller situation
display or a CDTI.
Flight The departure airport and destination airport for the sector being flown by
Sector/Location the aircraft involved in the event. These should be the ICAO identifiers of
those airports. Or if more descriptive, the location of the aircraft during the
event.
Originator Point of contact at the originating organization for this report (usually the
author).
Aircraft Type The aircraft model involved.
Organization The name of the organization (airline, ATS provider or communications
service provider) that created the report.
ATS Unit ICAO identifier of the ATC Center or Tower controlling the aircraft at the
time of the event.
Description This should provide as complete a description of the situation leading up to
the problem as is possible. Where the organization reporting the problem is
not able to provide all the information (e.g. the controller may not know
everything that happens on the aircraft), it would be helpful if they would
coordinate with the other parties to obtain the necessary information.
The description should include:

 A complete description of the problem that is being reported

 The route contained in the FMS and flight plan
 Any flight deck indications
 Any indications provided to the controller when the problem
occurred
 Any additional information that the originator of the problem report
considers might be helpful but is not included on the list above

If necessary to contain all the information, additional pages may be added. if

the originator considers it might be helpful, diagrams and other additional
information (such as printouts of message logs) may be appended to the
report.

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7.9 ADS-B PERFORMANCE REPORT FORM

Originating Organization
Date of submission Originator
Report Period
TECHNICAL ISSUES

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

GENERAL COMMENTS

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8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

Reliability and Availability of ADS-B systems should normally be equivalent or better than the
reliability and availability of radar systems.

Guidance material on Reliability and Availability standards for ADS-B systems and supporting voice
communications systems are included in the document “Baseline ADS-B Service Performance
Parameters” at Appendix 6.

The “Baseline ADS-B Performance Parameters” document contains three Tiers of service performance
parameters with different reliability and availability standards for each Tier. The appropriate Tier should
be selected for the type of ADS-B service intended:

(a) Tier 1 standards are for a high performance traffic separation service;

(b) Tier 2 standards are for a traffic situational awareness service with procedural separation; and

(c) Tier 3 standards are for a traffic advisory service (flight information service)

To achieve high operational availability of ADS-B systems to support aircraft separation services, it is
necessary to operate with duplicated/redundant systems. If one system fails, the service continues using
an unduplicated system. This is acceptable for a short period, whilst the faulty system is being repaired,
because the probability of a second failure during the short time window of repairing is low.

However, it is necessary to ensure that the repair does not take too long. A long repair time increases the
risk of an unexpected failure (loss of service continuity); which in turn, introduces potential loss of
service (low availability) and loss of aircraft operational efficiency and/or safety impacts.

Checklist of common items or parameters that could be considered for monitoring is summarized at
Appendix 5 for reference.

8.1 Reliability

8.1.1 Reliability is a measure of how often a system fails and is usually measured as Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF) expressed in hours. Continuity is a measure equivalent
to reliability, but expressed as the probability of system failure over a defined period. In
the context of this document, failure means inability to deliver ADS-B data to the ATC
centre. Ie: Failure of the ADS-B system rather than an equipment or component failure.

8.1.2 Poor system MTBF has a safety impact because typically it causes unexpected
transition from one operating mode to another. For example, aircraft within surveillance
coverage that are safely separated by a surveillance standard distance (say, 5 NM) are
unexpectedly no longer separated by a procedural standard distance (say 15 mins), due
to an unplanned surveillance outage.

8.1.3 In general, reliability is determined by design (see para 8.3 B below)

8.2 Availability

8.2.1 Availability is a measure of how often the system is available for operational use. It is
usually expressed as a percentage of the time that the system is available.

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8.2.2 Poor availability usually results in loss of economic benefit because efficiencies are not
available when the ATC system is operating in a degraded mode (eg using procedural
control instead of say 5 NM separation).

8.2.3 Planned outages are often included as outages because the efficiencies provided to the
Industry are lost, no matter what the cause of the outage. However, some organisations
do not include planned outages because it is assumed that planned outages only occur
when the facility is not required.

8.2.4 Availability is calculated as

Availability (Ao) = MTBF/(MTBF+MDT)

where MTBF= Mean Time Between SYSTEM Failure

MDT = Mean Down Time for the SYSTEM

The MDT includes Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), Turn Around Time (TAT) for
spares, and Mean Logistic Delay Time (MLDT)
NB: This relates to the failure of the system to provide a service, rather than the time
between individual equipment failures. Some organisations use Mean Time Between
Outage (MTBO) rather than MTBF.

8.2.5 Availability is directly a function of how quickly the SYSTEM can be repaired. Ie:
directly a function of MDT. Thus availability is highly dependent on the ability & speed
of the support organisation to get the system back on-line.

8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems

A: System design can keep system failure rate low with long MTBF. Typical techniques are:
 to duplicate each element and minimise single points of failure. Automatic changeover or
parallel operation of both channels keeps system failure rates low. Ie: the system keeps
operating despite individual failures. Examples are :

o Separate communication channels between ADS-B ground station and ATC centre
preferably using different technologies or service providers eg one terrestrial and one
satellite

 Consideration of Human factors in design can reduce the number of system failures due to
human error. E.g. inadvertent switch off, incorrect software load, incorrect maintenance
operation.

 Take great care with earthing, cable runs and lightning protection to minimise the risks of
system damage

 Take great care to protect against water ingress to cables and systems

 Establish a system baseline that documents the achieved performance of the site that can be
later be used as a reference. This can shorten troubleshooting in future.

 System design can also improve the MDT by quickly identifying problems and alerting
maintenance staff. Eg Built in equipment test (BITE) can significantly contribute to
lowering MDT.

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B: Logistics strategy aims to keep MDT very low. Low MDT depends on logistic support
providing short repair times. To achieve short repair times, ANSPs usually provide a range
of logistics, including the following, to ensure that the outage is less than a few days:

 ensure the procured system is designed to allow for quick replacement of faulty modules to
restore operations
 provide remote monitoring to allow maintainers to identify the faulty modules for transport
to site
 provide support tools to allow technicians to repair faulty modules or to configure/setup
replacement modules
 provide technicians training to identify & repair the faulty modules
 provide local maintenance depots to reduce the time it takes to access to the site
 provide documentation and procedures to “standardise” the process
 use an in-country spares pool to ensure that replacement modules are available within
reasonable times
 use a maintenance contract to repair faulty modules within a specified turnaround time.
I.e.: to replenish the spares pool quickly.

Whilst technical training and remote monitoring are usually considered by ANSPs, sometimes
there is less focus on spares support.

Difficulties can be experienced if States :

a) Fail to establish a spares pool – because procurement of spares at the time of failure can
bring extensive delays due to :
b) obtaining funds
c) obtaining approval to purchase overseas
d) obtaining approval to purchase from a “sole source”
e) difficulties and delays in obtaining a quotation
f) delays in delivery because the purchase was unexpected by the supplier
g) Fail to establish a module repair contract resulting in :
- long repair times
- unplanned expenditure
- inability for a supplier to repair modules because the supplier did not have adequate
certainty of funding of the work

Spares pool
ANSPs can establish, preferably as part of their acquisition purchase, adequate spares buffer
stock to support the required repair times. The prime objective is to reduce the time period that
the system operates un-duplicated. It allows decoupling of the restoration time from the module
repair time.

Module repair contract

ANSPs can also enter into a maintenance repair contract, preferably as part of their acquisition
purchase, to require the supplier to repair or replace and deliver failed modules within a
specified time – preferably with contractual incentives/penalties for compliance. Such support
contracts are best negotiated as part of the acquisition contract when competition between
vendors is at play to keep costs down. Sometimes it is appropriate to demand that the support
contractor also keep a certain level of buffer stock of spares “in country”.

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It is strongly recommended that maintenance support is purchased under the same contract as
the acquisition contract.

The advantages of a module repair contract are:

- The price can be determined whilst in the competitive phase of acquisition
– hence avoids excessive costs
- The contract can include the supplier bearing all shipping costs
- Can be funded by a define amount per year, which support the budget
processes. If the costs are fixed, the supplier is encouraged to develop a
reliable system minimising module repairs.
- It avoids delays and funding issues at the time of the module failure

Other typical strategies are:

 Establish availability and reliability objectives that are agreed organization wide. In
particular agree System response times (SRT) for faults and system failure to ensure that
MDT is achieved. An agreed SRT can help organizations to decide on the required logistics
strategy including number, location and skills of staff to support the system.

 Establish baseline preventative maintenance regimes including procedures and performance

inspections in conjunction with manufacturer recommendations for all subsystems

 Use remote control & monitoring systems to identify faulty modules before travel to site.
This can avoid multiple trips to site and reduce the repair time

 Have handbooks, procedures, tools available at the site or a nearby depot so that travel time
does not adversely affect down time

 Have adequate spares and test equipment ready at a maintenance depot near the site or at the
site itself. Vendors can be required to perform analysis of the number of spares required to
achieve low probability of spare “stock out”

 Have appropriate plans to cope with system and component obsolescence. It is possible to
contractually require suppliers to regularly report on the ability to support the system and
supply components.

 Have ongoing training programs and competency testing to ensure that staff are able to
perform the required role

The detailed set of operational and technical arrangements in place and actions required to
maintain a system through the lifecycle are often documented in a Integrated Logistics Support
Plan.

C: Configuration Management aims to ensure that the configuration of the ground stations is
maintained with integrity. Erroneous configuration can cause unnecessary outages. Normally
configuration management is achieved by :

 Having clear organizational & individual responsibilities and accountabilities for system
configuration.

 Having clear procedures in place which define who has authority to change configuration
and records of the changes made including, inter alia

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o The nature of the change including the reason

o Impact of the change & safety assessment
o An appropriate transition or cutover plan
o Who approved the change
o When the change was authorized and when the change was implemented

 Having appropriate test and analysis capabilities to confirm that new configurations are
acceptable before operational deployment.

 Having appropriate methods to deploy the approved configuration (Logistics of

configuration distribution). Suggested methods;

o Approved configuration published on intranet web pages

o Approved configuration distributed on approved media

D: Training & Competency plans aim to ensure that staff has the skills to safety repairs
Normally this is achieved by:

 Conduct of appropriate Training Needs Analysis (TNA) to identify the gap between trainee
skill/knowledge and the required skill/knowledge.

 Development and delivery of appropriate training to maintainers

 Competency based testing of trainees

 Ongoing refresher training to ensure that skills are maintained even when fault rates are low

E: Data collection & Review :

Regular and scheduled review should be undertaken to determine whether reliability/availability

objectives are being met. These reviews need to consider :

 Reports of actual achieved availability & reliability

 Data regarding system failures including “down time” needs to be captured and analysed so
the ANSP actually knows what is being (or not being) achieved.

 Any failure trends that need to be assessed. This requires data capture of the root cause of
failures

 Any environmental impacts on system performance, such coverage obstructions such as

trees, planned building developments, corrosion, RFI etc. Changes in infrastructure may
also be relevant including air conditioning (temperature/humidity etc.) and power system
changes.

 System problem reports especially those that relate to software deficiencies (design)

 System and component obsolescence

 Staff skills and need for refresher training

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9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

9.1 INTRODUCTION

ADS-B involves the transmission of specific data messages from aircraft and vehicle systems. These
data messages are broadcast at approximately 0.5 second intervals and received at compatible ground
stations that relay these messages to ATSU(s) for presentation on ATS situation displays. The
following procedures relate to the use of ADS-B data in ATS ground surveillance applications.

The implementation of the ADS-B system will support the provision of high performance surveillance,
enhancing flight safety, facilitating the reduction of separation minima and supporting user demands
such as user-preferred trajectories.

9.2 ADS-B REGULATIONS

As agreed at APANPRIG 22/8, States intending to implement ADS-B based surveillance services may
designate portions of airspace within their area of responsibility by:

(a) mandating the carriage and use of ADS-B equipment; or

(b) providing priority for access to such airspace for aircraft with operative ADS-B equipment over
those aircraft not operating ADS-B equipment.

In publishing ADS-B mandate/regulations, States should consider to :

 define the ADS-B standards applicable to the State. For interoperability and harmonization,
such regulations need to define both the standards applicable for the aircraft ADS-B position
source and the ADS-B transmitter.

 define the airspace affected by the regulations and the category of aircraft that the regulation
applies to.

 define the timing of the regulations allowing sufficient time for operators to equip. Experience
in Asia Pacific Regions is that major international carriers are having high equippage rates of
ADS-B avionics. However the equippage rates of ADS-B avionics for some regional fleets,
business jets and general aviation are currently low and more time will be required to achieve
high equippage rates.

 establish the technical and operational standards for the ground stations and air traffic
management procedures used for ADS-B separation services, including the associated voice
communications services.

States may refer to Appendix 3 on the template for ADS-B mandate/regulations for aircraft avionics.
Some States listed below have published their ADS-B mandate/regulations on their web sites that could
also be used for reference.

(a) Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia

Civil Aviation Order 20.18 Compilation No. 4) 2014, Civil Aviation Order 82.1 (Compilation No. 13) ,
Civil Aviation Order 82.3 (No. 18), Civil Aviation Order 82.5 (No. 19)
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017C01115/Download”

(b) Civil Aviation Department (CAD) of Hong Kong, China

Aeronautical Information Publication Supplement No. A01/16 dated 1 February 2016

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“https://www.ais.gov.hk/HK_AIP/supp/A01-16.pdf”

(c) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)

Aeronautical Information Publication (eAIP) Part 2 ENR 1.8 – Regional Supplementary Procedures –
Section 7 – Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out exclusive airspace within parts
of the Singapore FIR
“https://fpl-1.caasaim.gov.sg/aip/2018-03-14/final/2018-03-14/html/index-en-GB.html”

(d) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

ADS–B Out Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, Final Rule
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-05-28/pdf/2010-12645.pdf

States are encouraged to mandate forward fit for newly manufactured aircraft on and after 1
January 2020, having a maximum certified takeoff weight of 5700kg or greater, or having a
maximum cruising true airspeed capability of greater than 250 knots, with ADS-B avionics
compliant to Version 2 ES (equivalent to RTCA DO-260B) or later version 2.

9.3 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN USING ADS-B

9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data

The accuracy and integrity of pressure altitude derived level information provided by ADS-B
are equivalent to Mode C level data provided through an SSR sensor and subject to the same
operational procedures as those used in an SSR environment. Where the ATM system converts
ADS-B level data to display barometric equivalent level data, the displayed data should not be
used to determine vertical separation until the data is verified by comparison with a pilot
reported barometric level.

9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance

The ADS-B data from the aircraft will include a NUCp/NIC/SIL/NACp categorization of the
integrity and accuracy of the horizontal position data. This figure is determined from
NIC/ NACp/ SIL values for DO260A/B compliant avionics and NUC values for DO260/ED102
compliant avionics.

In general, for 5NM separation, if the HPL value used to generate ADS-B quality indicators
(NUC or NIC) is greater than 2 nautical miles the data is unlikely to be of comparable quality to
that provided by a single monopulse SSR. ADS-B data should not be used for separation unless
a suitable means of determining data integrity is used.

The key minimum performance requirements for an ADS-B system to enable the use of a 3 NM
or 5 NM separation minimum in the provision of air traffic control is provided in the ICAO
Circular 326 (especially Appendix C).

ADS-B reports with low integrity may be presented on situation displays, provided the
controller is alerted (e.g. by a change in symbology and/or visual alert) to the change and the
implications for the provision of separation. An ANS Provider may elect not to display
ADS-B tracks that fail to meet a given position reporting performance criterion.

9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service

2
Subject to endorsement by CNS/SG/22 in July 2018

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ADS-B uses GNSS for position determination. As such, availability of GNSS data has a direct
influence on the provision of a surveillance service.

ATS Providers may elect to use a GNSS integrity prediction service to assist in determining the
future availability of useable ADS-B data. The integrity prediction service alerts users to
potential future loss or degradation of the ADS-B service in defined areas. When these alerts
are displayed, the system is indicating to its users that at some time in the future the ADS-B
positional data may be inadequate to support the application of ADS-B separation. It is
recommended that the prediction service is made available to each ATSU that is employing
ADS-B to provide a separation service, to ensure that air traffic controllers are alerted in
advance of any predicted degradation of the GNSS service and the associated reduction in their
ability to provide ADS-B separation to flights that are within the affected area. This is similar
to having advance warning of a planned radar outage for maintenance.

ADS-B should not be used to provide separation between aircraft that will be affected by an
expected period of inadequate position reporting integrity.

If an unpredicted loss of integrity occurs (including a RAIM warning report from aircrew) then;

(a) ADS-B separation should not be applied by ATC to the particular aircraft reporting
until the integrity has been assured; and

(b) The controller should check with other aircraft in the vicinity of the aircraft reporting
the RAIM warning, to determine if they have also been affected and establish
alternative forms of separation if necessary.

9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data

ADS-B Data-sharing for ATC Operations

Member States should consider the benefits of sharing ADS-B data received from aircraft
operating in the proximity of their international airspace boundaries with adjacent States that
have compatible technology in an effort to maximize the service benefits and promote
operational safety.

Data sharing may involve the use of the data to provide separation services if all the
requirements for delivery of separation services are satisfied. In some cases, States may choose
to use a lower standard that supports surveillance safety nets and situational awareness whilst
operations are conducted using procedural separation standards.

Any agreement on the sharing of surveillance data should be incorporated in Letters of

Agreement between the States concerned. Such agreements may also include the sharing of
VHF communication facilities.

A template for ADS-B data-sharing agreement is provided on the ICAO APAC website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.

ADS-B Data-sharing for Safety Monitoring

With endorsement of the methodology by both the ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel
(SASP) and the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG), ADS-B
data can be used for calculating the altimetry system error (ASE) which is a measure of the

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height-keeping performance of an aircraft. It is an ICAO requirement that aircraft operating in

RVSM airspace must undergo periodic monitoring on height-keeping performance. The existing
methods to estimate aircraft ASE include use of a portable device, the Enhanced GPS
Monitoring Unit, and ground-based systems called Height Monitoring Unit/Aircraft Geometric
Height Measurement Element. The use of ADS-B data for height-keeping performance
monitoring, on top of providing enhanced and alternative means of surveillance, will provide a
cost-effective option for aircraft operators. States are encouraged to share ADS-B data to
support the height-keeping performance monitoring of airframe.

Civil/Military ADS-B Data-sharing

Civil/military data sharing arrangements, including aircraft surveillance, were a key part of
civil/military cooperation in terms of tactical operational responses and increasing trust between
civil and military units.

Aircraft operating ADS-B technology transmit their position, altitude and identity to all
listeners, conveying information from co-operative aircraft that have chosen to equip and
publicly broadcast ADS-B messages. Thus there should be no defence or national security
issues with the use and sharing of such data.

Some military transponders may support ADS-B using encrypted DF19 messages, but these data
are normally not decoded or used at all by civil systems. In most cases today, tactical military
aircraft are not ADS-B equipped or could choose to disable transmissions. In future, increasing
numbers of military aircraft will be ADS-B capable, with the ability to disable these
transmissions. ADS-B data sharing should not influence the decision by military authorities to
equip or not equip with ADS-B. Moreover, it is possible for States to install ADS-B filters that
prevent data from sensitive flights being shared. These filters can be based on a number of
criteria and typically use geographical parameters to only provide ADS-B data to an external
party if aircraft are near the boundary.

A guidance material on advice to military authorities regarding ADS-B data sharing is provided
on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by
States.

9.3.5 Synergy of ADS-B and GNSS

States intending to implement GNSS/PBN or ADS-B should consider the efficiency of

implementing the other technology at the same time due to the inherent efficiencies in doing so.
GNSS systems provide navigation solutions to IFR aircraft for the conduct of enroute, terminal
and non-precision approaches. The use of GNSS/PBN can provide higher performance and
higher safety. Transition to GNSS can avoid significant ground infrastructure costs.

ADS-B systems provide surveillance based upon GNSS position source. ADS-B provides high
performance and high update surveillance for both air-air and ATC surveillance. Transition to
ADS-B can avoid the costs associated with ground based radar infrastructure. ADS-B system
installations rely on acceptable GNSS equipment being installed in the aircraft to provide the
position source and integrity.

If the fleet is equipped with ADS-B, they will already have most of the requirements to use
GNSS for navigation satisfied. Similarly, if aircraft have suitable GNSS on board, they will
have a position source to support ADS-B. It is noted however, that some care is needed to
ensure that the requirements of GNSS/PBN and surveillance are both satisfied.

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There is significantly less cost for these systems to be installed in an aircraft at the same time. A
single installation of GNSS & ADS-B will involve :
 a single design activity instead of two
 a single downtime instead of two
 installation of the connection between GPS and ADS-B transponder
 a single test, certification and aircraft flight test
For the affected aviation community (ANSP, regulator and operator), the lessons learnt and
issues faced in both GNSS and ADS-B have significant commonality. This can lead to
efficiencies in Industry education and training.

9.3.6 Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface Movement

Both DO321/ED-163 and the EUROCONTROL guidance for the provision of ATS using ADS-
B for Airport Surface Movement state the horizontal position accuracy needs to be ≤ 10 meters
at 95%, which translates into a positional accuracy of NACp = 10.

However, most of the currently deployed GNSS horizontal position sources provide values
leading to either a NACp = 9 (30 meters) or a NACp = 8 (92 meters), whilst the actual position
accuracy could reach 2 to 3 meters. Provided that the position source is GNSS-based, States can
consider to use the following ADS-B quality indicators to determine the horizontal positional
accuracy:

 DO260
 NUCp > 6

 DO260A
 NACp ≥ 8
 NIC > 0
 SIL = 2

 DO260B
 NACp ≥ 8
 NIC > 0
 SIL = 3

Guidance documents recommend implementing some form of horizontal positional accuracy

monitoring for using ADS-B positional data with accuracy down to NUCp > 6 or NACp ≥ 8 for
airport surface movement. Visual monitoring by controllers of vehicles on taxiways and
runways can be considered as an initial monitoring of the horizontal positional accuracy within
the airport. In addition, States can consider to evaluate the performance of ADS-B tracks
against reference tracks from proven surveillance systems, e.g. tracks from MLAT systems with
certified accuracy, to show that ADS-B data is suitable for ground surveillance and falls within
the requirements of international standards.

For ADS-B only tracks with quality indicators below the required accuracy, States are
encouraged to keep the display of the tracks in the surveillance display with due discrimination
on the track symbols in order to enhance the situation awareness of controllers.

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9.3.7 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issue with Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS)

Proper and efficient utilization of available bandwidth and capacity at 1 090 MHz is a key
element to ensure the safe and reliable operation of aeronautical surveillance systems, including
secondary surveillance radar (SSR), automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) and
airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS). Studies conducted by ICAO expert groups have
identified certain issues and potential technical concerns to the operation of these surveillance
systems in the presence of large numbers of unmanned aircraft (UA), if those UA are equipped
with an ADS-B OUT transmitter on 1 090 MHz and operating at very low levels.

Recognizing issues associated with those UA which may adversely affect safety for all aircraft
in the area, ICAO has developed guidance material (see Appendix 8) to assist States in
validating the utilization of 1 090 MHz and for withholding 24-bit aircraft addresses to UA
unless certain criteria have been met. States are encouraged to make use of the guidance
material as well as any other related provisions to ensure that the surveillance capabilities being
provided by the aforementioned surveillance systems.

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9.4 Reporting Rates

9.4.1 General

The ADS-B system shall maintain a reporting rate that ensures at least an equivalent degree of
accuracy, integrity and availability as specified by the performance requirements of a radar
system that is used to provide a similar ATC service. The standard reporting rate is
approximately 0.5 second from the aircraft, but the rate of update provided to the ATM system
(for the situation display) may be less frequent (e.g. 5 seconds), provided performance
requirements for the service are achieved. Reporting rate requirements are included in the
document “Baseline ADS-B Service Performance Parameters” which is available at Appendix 6.

9.5 SEPARATION

9.5.1 General

ADS-B data may be used in combination with data obtained by other means of surveillance
(such as radar, flight plan track, ADS-C) for the application of separation provided appropriate
minima as determined by the State are applied. It should be noted that the quality of
communications will have a bearing on the determination of appropriate minima.

All safety net features (MSAW, STCA, MTCA, RAM and DAIW/ RAI etc) should possess the
same responsiveness as equivalent radar safety net features.

9.5.2 Identification Methods

Some of the methods approved by ICAO for establishing identification with radar, may be
employed with ADS-B (see PANS-ATM chapter 8). One or more of the following
identification procedures are suggested:

a) direct recognition of the aircraft identification in an ADS-B label on a

situation display;

b) transfer of ADS-B identification;

c) observation of compliance with an instruction to TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT.

Note: In automated systems, the “IDENT” feature may be presented in different ways,
e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and associated label.

9.5.3 ADS-B Separation

ADS-B Separation minima has been incorporated by ICAO in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), and in
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).

In a mixed surveillance environment, States should use the larger separation standard applicable
between aircraft in the conflict pair being considered.

9.5.4 Vertical separation

9.5.4.1 Introduction

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The ADS-B level data presented on the controllers situation display shall normally be
derived from barometric pressure altitude. In the event that barometric altitude is
absent, geometric altitude shall not be displayed on displays used for provision of air
traffic services. Geometric altitude may be used in ATM systems for other purposes.

9.5.4.2 Vertical tolerance standard

The vertical tolerances for ADS-B level information should be consistent with those
applied to Mode C level information.

9.5.4.3 Verification of ADS-B level information

The verification procedures for ADS-B level information shall be the same as those
employed for the verification of Mode C level data in a radar environment.

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9.6 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CLEARANCE MONITORING

9.6.1 General

ADS-B track data can be used to monitor flight path conformance with air traffic control
clearances.

9.6.2 Deviations from ATC clearances

The ATC requirements relating to monitoring of ADS-B traffic on the situation display should
be similar to those contained in PANS-ATM Ch.8.

9.7 ALERTING SERVICE

For ADS-B equipped aircraft, the provision of an alerting service should be based on the same criteria
as applied within a radar environment.

9.8 POSITION REPORTING

9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage

States should establish voice and/or CPDLC position reporting procedures consistent with those
applicable with radar for aircraft that have been identified by ATC.

9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirements in ADS-B airspace

ATSUs may promulgate in the AIP meteorological reporting requirements that apply within the
nominated FIR. The meteorological reporting data required and the transmission methods to be
used by aircrew shall be specified in AIP.

9.9 PHRASEOLOGY

9.9.1 Phraseology Standard

States should use common phraseology for both ADS-B and radar where possible, and should
note the requirement for ADS-B specific phraseology in some instances. States shall refer to
PANS ATM Chapter 12 for ADS-B phraseology:
ADS-B EQUIPMENT DEGRADATION
ADS-B OUT OF SERVICE (appropriate information as necessary).

TO REQUEST THE CAPABILITY OF THE ADS-B EQUIPMENT

a) ADVISE ADS-B CAPABILITY;

*b) ADS-B TRANSMITTER (data link);
*c) ADS-B RECEIVER (data link);
*d) NEGATIVE ADS-B.
* Denotes pilot transmission.

Note: For (b) and (c) – the options are not available for aircraft that are not equipped.

TO REQUEST RESELECTION OF AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION

REENTER FLIGHT IDENTIFICATION.

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Note: For some aircraft, this option is not available in-flight

TERMINATION OF RADAR AND/OR ADS-B SERVICE

IDENTIFICATION LOST [reasons] (instructions).

TO REQUEST THE OPERATION OF THE MODE S OR ADS-B IDENT FEATURE

SQUAWK IDENT.

Note: For some standalone ADS-B equipage affecting General Aviation, the option of
“TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT” may be available

TO REQUEST AIRCRAFT SWITCHING TO OTHER TRANSPONDER OR TERMINATION

OF ADS-B TRANSMITTER OPERATION
a) SWITCH TO OTHER TRANSPONDER
b) STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION. SQUAWK (code) ONLY.

Note:
a) In many cases the ADS-B transmitter cannot be operated independently of the SSR
transponder and switching off the ADS-B transmission would also switch off the SSR
transponder operation

b) “STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION” applies only to aircraft that have the facility to
switch off the ADS-B transmission, while maintaining SSR operation.

9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B

It should be noted that independent operations of Mode S transponder and ADS-B will not be possible
in many aircraft (e.g. where ADS-B is solely provided by 1090 MHz extended squitter emitted from the
transponder). Additionally, some desirable but optional features of ADS-B transmitters may not be fitted
in some aircraft. Controller training on this issue, as it relates to the following examples of radio
telephony and/or CPDLC phraseology is recommended.

9.9.2.1 STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION or STOP SQUAWK

Issue: In most commercial aircraft, a common “transponder control head” is used for SSR transponder,
ACAS and ADS-B functionality. In this case, a pilot who complies with the instruction to stop operation
of one system will also need to stop operation of the other systems – resulting in a loss of surveillance
not intended or expected by the controller.

ATC need to be aware that an instruction to “Stop ADS-B Transmission” may require the pilot to switch
off their transponder that will then stop all other functions associated with the transponder operations
(such as ACARs etc). Pilots need to be aware of their aircraft’s equipment limitations, the
consequences of complying with this ATC instruction, and be aware of their company policy in regard
to this. As with any ATC instruction issued, the pilot should advise ATC if they are unable to comply.
Recommendation: It is recommended that the concatenated phrases STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION,
SQUAWK (code) ONLY or STOP SQUAWK, TRANSMIT ADSB ONLY are used. It is recommended
that controller training highlights the possible consequences of issuing these instructions and that pilot
training highlights the consequences of complying with this instruction. It is also recommended that
aircraft operators have a clearly stated policy on procedures for this situation. Should a pilot respond
with UNABLE then the controller should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not
remove the safety defences of the other surveillance technologies. This might include manual changes to
flight data, coordination with other controllers and/or change of assigned codes or callsigns.

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Very few aircraft provide the capability to turn off ADS-B without turning off TCAS. It is not
recommended to switch off ATC transponders (& remove TCAS protection). The only action for most
pilots of aircraft transmitting misleading ADS-B data in response to ATC requests is to recycle the
transponder, or switch to the alternate transponder as appropriate. Besides, aircraft that do not support
ADS-B OFF should have the details included in the flight manual including the undesirability of
disabling TCAS.

9.9.2.2 STOP ADSB ALTITUDE TRANSMISSION [WRONG INDICATION or reason] and

TRANSMIT ADSB ALTITUDE

Issue: Most aircraft will not have separate control of ADSB altitude transmission. In such cases
compliance with the instruction may require the pilot to stop transmission of all ADSB data and/or
Mode C altitude – resulting in a loss of surveillance not intended or expected by the controller.

Recommendation: It is recommended that, should the pilot respond with UNABLE, the controller
should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not remove the safety defences of other
surveillance data. This might include a procedure that continues the display of incorrect level
information but uses pilot reported levels with manual changes to flight data and coordination with other
controllers.

9.9.2.3 TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT

Issue: Some aircraft may not be capable or the ADSB SPI IDENT control may be shared with the SSR
SPI IDENT function.

Recommendation: It is recommended that controllers are made aware that some pilots are unable to
comply with this instruction. An alternative means of identification that does not rely on the ADSB SPI
IDENT function should be used.

9.10 FLIGHT PLANNING

9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity

The aircraft identification (ACID) must be accurately recorded in section 7 of the ICAO Flight
Plan form as per the following instructions:

Aircraft Identification, not exceeding 7 characters is to be entered both in item 7 of the flight
plan and replicated exactly when set in the aircraft (for transmission as Flight ID) as follows:
Either,

a) The ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operating agency followed by the
flight identification (e.g. KLM511, BAW213, JTR25), when:

in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the ICAO telephony designator for the
operating agency followed by the flight identification (e.g. KLM 511, SPEEDBIRD
213, HERBIE 25).
Or,

b) The registration marking of the aircraft (e.g. EIAKO, 4XBCD, OOTEK), when:

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1) in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the registration marking alone

(e.g. EIAKO), or preceded by the ICAO telephony designator for the operating
agency (e.g. SVENAIR EIAKO),

2) the aircraft is not equipped with radio.

Note 1: No zeros, hyphens, dashes or spaces are to be added when the Aircraft
Identification consists of less than 7 characters.

Note 2: Appendix 2 to PANS-ATM refers. ICAO designators and telephony designators

for aircraft operating agencies are contained in ICAO Doc 8585.

9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements

9.10.2.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 10 – Surveillance Equipment and Capabilities

An appropriate ADS-B designator shall be entered in item 10 of the flight plan to indicate that the
flight is capable of transmitting ADS-B messages.

These are defined in ICAO DOC 4444 as follows:

B1 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” capability

B2 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” and “in” capability
U1 ADS-B “out” capability using UAT
U2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using UAT
V1 ADS-B “out” capability using VDL Mode 4
V2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using VDL Mode 4

During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the B1 and B2 descriptors
was recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may
take some time for formal adoption:

B1 ADS-B “out” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter

B2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter

States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.

9.10.2.2 ICAO Flight Plan Item 18 – Other Information

Where required by the appropriate authority the ICAO Aircraft Address (24 Bit Code) may be
recorded in Item 18 of the ICAO flight plan, in hexadecimal format as per the following example:

CODE/7C432B

States should note that use of hexadecimal code may be prone to human error and is
less flexible in regard to airframe changes for a notified flight.

9.10.2.3 Transponder Capabilities

When an aircraft is equipped with a mode S transponder, that transmits ADS-B messages,
according to ICAO Doc 4444, an appropriate Mode S designator should also be entered in item 10;
i.e.: either s

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o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and extended

squitter (ADS-B) capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, extended squitter
(ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability.

During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the E and L descriptors was
recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may take
some time for formal adoption:

o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and ADS-B

capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, ADS-B and
enhanced surveillance capability.

States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.

9.10.2.4 Inconsistency between ADS-B Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

Inconsistency between flight planning of ADS-B and surveillance capability of an aircraft can
impact on ATC planning and situational awareness. States are encouraged to monitor for
consistency between flight plan indicators and actual surveillance capability. Where discrepancies
are identified, aircraft operators should be contacted and instructed to correct flight plans, or
general advice (as appropriate to the operational environment and type of flight planning problems)
should be issued to aircraft operators. An example of such advice is provided at Appendix 4.

9.10.3 Setting Aircraft Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits

(a) Flight ID Principles

The aircraft identification (sometimes called the flight identification or FLTID) is the equivalent
of the aircraft callsign and is used in both ADS-B and Mode S SSR technology. Up to seven
characters long, it is usually set in airline aircraft by the flight crew via a cockpit interface. It
enables air traffic controllers to identify and aircraft on a display and to correlate a radar or
ADS-B track with the flight plan date. Aircraft identification is critical, so it must be entered
carefully. Punching in the wrong characters can lead to ATC confusing once aircraft with
another.

It is important that the identification exactly matches the aircraft identification (ACID) entered
in the flight notification.

Intuitive correlation between an aircraft’s identification and radio callsign enhances situational
awareness and communication. Airline aircraft typically use a three letter ICAO airline code
used in flight plans, NOT the two letter IATA codes.

(b) Setting Flight ID

The callsign dictates the applicable option below for setting ADS-B or Mode S Flight ID:

(i) the flight number using the ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operator if a
flight number callsign is being used (e.g. QFA1 for Qantas 1, THA54 for Thai 54).

(ii) the nationality and registration mark (without hyphen) of the aircraft if the callsign is
the full version of the registration (e.g .VHABC for international operations).

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(iii) The registration mark alone of the aircraft if the callsign is the abbreviated version of
the registration (eg ABC for domestic operations).

(iv) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign approved by the ANSP or

regulator (e.g. SPTR13 for firespotter 3).

(v) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign in accordance with the operations
manual of the relevant recreational aircraft administrative organization (e.g. G123 for
Gyroplane 123).

9.11 PROCEDURES TO HANDLE NON-COMPLANT ADS-B AIRCAFT OR MIS-LEADING

ADS-B TRANSMISSIONS

ADS-B technology is increasingly being adopted by States in the Asia/Pacific Region. Asia/Pacific
Region adopted 1090 extended squitter technology. Reliance on ADS-B transmissions can be expected
to increase over the coming years.

Currently a number of aircraft are transmitting ADS-B data which is misleading or non-compliant with
the ICAO standards specified in Annex 10. Examples include:

a) aircraft broadcasting incorrect message formats;

b) aircraft broadcasting inertial positional data and occasionally indicating in the messages that the
data has high integrity when it does not;

c) using GPS sources that do not generate correct integrity data, whilst indicating in the messages
that the data has high integrity;

d) transmitting ADS-B data with changing (and incorrect) flight identity; and

e) transmitting ADS-B data with incorrect flight identity continuously.

If the benefits of ADS-B are to flow to the aviation industry, misleading and non-compliant ADS-B
transmissions need to be curtailed to the extent possible.

The transmission of a value of zero for the NUCp or the NIC or the NACp or the SIL by an aircraft
indicates a navigational uncertainty related to the position of the aircraft or a navigation integrity issue
that is too significant to be used by air traffic controllers.

As such, the following procedure currently stipulated in the Regional Supplementary Procedures Doc
7030 3 , shall be applicable in the concerned FIRs on commencement of ADS-B based surveillance
services notified by AIP or NOTAM:

If an aircraft operates within an FIR where ADS-B-based ATS surveillance service is provided, and

a) carries 1090 extended squitter ADS-B transmitting equipment which does not comply with one of the
following:

3
SURICG/2 recommended States/Administrations to update their ADS-B Avionics Equipage
Requirements to align with the template in Appendix 3

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1) EASA AMC 20-24; or

2) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia; or
3) installation in accordance with the FAA AC No. 20-165 – Airworthiness Approval of ADS-B;
or

b) the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;

then:

a) except when specifically authorized by the appropriate ATS authority, the aircraft shall not fly unless
the equipment is:

1) deactivated; or
2) transmits only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL

States may elect to implement a scheme to blacklist those non-compliant aircraft or aircraft consistently
transmitting mis-leading ADS-B information, so as to refrain the aircraft from being displayed to ATC.
Please refer Appendix 2 for guidance in implementing the blacklist scheme.
A sample template is given below for reference by States to publish the procedures to handle non-
compliant ADS-B aircraft or misleading ADS-B transmissions in their ADS-B mandate/regulations:

After <insert earliest date that ADS-B may be used for any relevant operational purpose> if an aircraft
carries ADS-B transmitting equipment which does not comply with :

(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in Non-
Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ Extended
Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
(b) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Subpart D —
Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B), or
(c) Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or later versions)
Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Systems, or
(d) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.

or the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;

the aircraft must not fly unless equipment is:

(a) deactivated; or

(b) set to transmit only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL.

Note:

1. It is considered equivalent to deactivation if NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL is set to continually

transmit only a value of zero.

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2. Regulators should take appropriate action to ensure that such regulations are complied with.

3. ATC systems should discard ADS-B data when NUC or NIC or NACp or SIL =0.

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9.12 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

ATC surveillance systems should provide for the display of safety-related alerts and warnings, including
conflict alert, minimum safe altitude warning, conflict prediction and unintentionally duplicated SSR
codes and aircraft identifications.

The ADS-B avionics may transmit emergency status messages to any ADS-B ground station within
coverage. The controller receiving these messages should determine the nature of the emergency,
acknowledge receipt if appropriate, and initiate any assistance required. An aircraft equipped with
ADS-B might operate the emergency and/or urgency mode as follows:

a) emergency;
b) no communications;
c) unlawful interference;
d) minimum fuel; and/or
e) medical.

Selection of an emergency transponder code (e.g. 7600) automatically generates an emergency

indication in the ADS-B message. However, some ADS-B transponders may only generate a generic
emergency indication. That means, the specific type of emergency, e.g., communication failure, is not
always conveyed to the controller in an ADS-B environment. The controller may only receive a generic
emergency indication irrespective of the emergency codes being selected by the pilot.

In some early ADS-B avionics configurations, when a generic emergency indication is being
transmitted, a request to “Transmit ADS-B Ident” or “Squawk Ident” may not result in the Ident
indication being displayed in the ATC System. This is because the emergency and ident flags share the
same data elements in the ADS-B downlink message.

Due to limitations of some ADS-B transponders, procedures should be developed for ATC to confirm
the types of emergency with pilots based on operational needs of States.

In contrast to DO260 avionics, for DO-260A avionics, the transmission of an Emergency/Priority status
message in the ADS-B message set will also include the original MODE A code allocated by ATC.
When the aircraft resets the MODE A code to the original allocated code the ground station can retain
the Emergency/Priority status in the Asterix message, for up to 100 seconds, even though the aircraft is
no longer squawking an emergency code. This situation can generate confusion as to the actual status of
the aircraft.

Executive control responsibility

The responsibility for control of the flight rests with the ATSU within whose airspace the aircraft is
operating. However, if the pilot takes action contrary to a clearance that has already been coordinated
with another sector or ATSU and further coordination is not possible in the time available, the
responsibility for this action would rest with the pilot in command, and performed under the pilot’s
emergency authority.

Emergency procedures

The various circumstances surrounding each emergency situation preclude the establishment of exact
detailed procedures to be followed. The procedures outlined in PANS-ATM Chapter 15 provide a
general guide to air traffic services personnel and where necessary, should be adapted for the use of
ADS-B.

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9.13 PROCEDURES TO HANDLE GPS TIME AND WEEK COUNTER ROLLOVER

The GPS system is often used in the ATC environment, including:

- to time stamp surveillance data with the “time of applicability” of the data. This allows
positional data to be “extrapolated” to the time of display and allows old data to be discarded.
- to time synchronise ATC systems to the correct time, so that when it uses surveillance data, it
can determine the “age” of the data.
- to time stamp recorded data and maintenance data

Thus accurate time is important to minimise incorrect positional data being presented to ATC and to
ensure that valid data is not discarded – amongst other important technical roles in synchronising
various computer servers in a network.

9.13.1 GPS TIME – COUNTERS AND LEAP SECONDS

The GPS navigation message contains information about the current date and time in the form of a
sequential week counter (representing the number of weeks elapsed since the last time this counter
was reset to zero). This counter is 10 bits long and this resets to zero every 1024 weeks (19.6 years).
GPS week zero started at 00:00:00 UTC on January 6, 1980, and the week number became zero again
on August 21, 1999. A rollover event occurred on 6 April 2019.

ATC systems use UTC. The difference between GPS time and UTC changes whenever a “leap
second” is inserted in UTC. Wikipedia says that “one-second adjustment that is occasionally applied
to civil time Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) to keep it close to the mean solar time at Greenwich,
in spite of the Earth's rotation slowdown and irregularities”. This is done in coordination with the
international community.

The GPS messages sent by the satellites includes the difference between GPS time and UTC, thus
allowing the GPS receivers to calculate UTC.

9.13.2 GPS RECEIVER ISSUES

Each GPS receiver has firmware/software that computes UTC from the GPS time counters and from
the known offset. In the past some GPS receivers have not coped well with these changes. The
triggers occur very infrequently and in some cases they have not been adequately tested.

This can cause incorrect UTC time to be output following some events such as:

- Software deficiencies highlighted by the week number rollover. The rollover occurs each
19.6 years

- Deficiencies at leap second introductions (at intervals greater than 1 year)

- Loss of GPS-UTC time offset (sometimes at power off in devices not using non-volatile
storage). Typically this can result in up to 15 minutes of incorrect time data until the offset is
restored from the satellite messages.

Other problems such as receiver lock up (service failure) can occur when the GPS receiver is exposed
to rare real world events or stimuli.

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9.13.3 ATC SYSTEM RISKS AND MITIGATION

ANSPs and regulators need to be aware of the potential issues that may arise from GPS receivers that
inadequately process events and stimuli.

Possible mitigations that could be considered include:

- Testing GPS receivers with a GPS test tool that simulates possible events/ stimuli

- Co-ordination with GPS receiver manufacturers

- Disconnect GPS receivers just before expected events – and check the output before
reconnecting the GPS receiver. (in this case the ANSP would be relying on the ability of the
ATC or surveillance system to operate for a period without the GPS synchronisation).

10. SECURITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ADS-B

10.1 INTRODUCTION

ADS-B technologies are currently “open systems” and the openness is an essential component of
successful use of ADS-B. It was also noted that ADS-B transmission from commercial aircraft is a
“fact of life” today. Many commercial aircraft are already equipped with ADS-B and have been
transmitting data for some time.

It was noted that there has been considerable alarmist publicity regarding ADS-B security. To a large
extent, this publicity has not considered the nature and complexity of ATC. Careful assessment of
security policies in use today for ADS-B and other technologies can provide a more balanced view.

10.2 CONSIDERATIONS

A list of ADS-B vulnerabilities categorised into threats to Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
has been reviewed and documented into the guidance material on security issues associated with
ADS-B provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” under
“Restricted Site” for reference by States. States could contact ICAO Regional Office to get access to
the guidance material. The following recommendations are made to States :

(a) While ADS-B is recognized as a key enabling technology for aviation with potential safety
benefits, it is recommended that States made aware of possible ADS-B security specific
issues;

(b) It is recommended that States note that much of the discussion of ADS-B issues in the Press
has not considered the complete picture regarding the ATC use of surveillance data;

(c) For current ADS-B technology implementation, security risk assessment studies should be
made in coordination with appropriate national organisations and ANSPs to address
appropriate mitigation applicable in each operational environment, in accordance with ATM
interoperability requirements; and

(d) Future development of ADS-B technology, as planned in the SESAR master plan for
example, should address security issues. Studies should be made to identify potential
encryption and authentication techniques, taking into consideration the operational need of

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air to ground and air to air surveillance applications. Distribution of encryption keys to a
large number of ADS-B receivers is likely to be problematic and solutions in the near and
medium term are not considered likely to be deployed worldwide. Internet based encryption
strategies are not deployable when ground stations are pass receivers.

10.3 MEASURES FOR ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF ADS-B

10.3.1 TIME DIFFERENCE OF ARRIVAL (TDOA) BASED POSITION VERIFICATION

METHOD

One of the technologies for enhancing ADS-B security is TDOA-based position verifiation,
which is able to mitigate false targets caused by spoofing. In a case of spoofing, the position of the
emitter (attacker) is likely to differ from the position contained in the ADS-B signal. Such positional
difference can be detected by means of TDOA.

When an emitter (aircraft or spoofing emitter) transmits an ADS-B signal, (at least) two
receivers detect the signal and measure the time of arrival (TOA). The difference of the TOAs
between the two receivers is a TDOA. Next, decoding the ADS-B signal obtains the position
contained in the signal. A calculation using the ADS-B position and the known receiver positions
obtains the expected TDOA.
True position (unknown)

Measured
TDOA
Compare
ADS-B Position
Expected
TDOA
Figure 10.3.1.1 Illustration of the Procedures of TDOA method

The measured and expected TDOAs are compared. The TDOA difference is large in a case of
spoofing and small in a case of a legitimate aircraft, as illustrated in Figure 10.3.1.2 (a) and (b),
respectively. Therefore, a threshold can be used to make a decision; if the TDOA difference is
smaller than the threshold, the position is determined as valid. If the TDOA difference is larger than
the threshold, the position is determined as anomalous (spoofing).

Hyperbola of Emitter Hyperbola of Emitter

Hyperbola Emitter Hyperbola
of ADS-B Position of ADS-B Position
Emitter
ADS-B Position ADS-B Position

Deviation: Anomaly Position Agreement: Valid Position

(a) (b)
Figure 10.3.1.2 Illustration of (a) case of spoofing, and (b) case of legitimate aircraft

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Appendix 2
Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis
of ADS-B Avionics Performance

1 Introduction

1.1 The APANPIRG has endorsed the following Conclusion during its 24th Meeting to
encourage States/Administration to exchange their ADS-B performance monitoring
results and experience gained from the process :

Conclusion 24/45 - Exchange ADS-B Performance Monitoring Result

“That, States be encouraged to exchange findings/result of their ADS-B performance
monitoring including experience gained in conducting the required performance
monitoring.”

1.2 Since the ADS-B mandate for some airspace in the Region became effective in
December 2013, monitoring and analysis on avionics performance of ADS-B
equipped aircraft has become an increasingly important task for concerned States. The
fully functional ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database (APRD) was launched
on the 21 July 2017. The database is placed at ICAO APAC website in the restricted
area with name: APAC ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database accessible via
https://applications.icao.int/ADSB-APRD/login.aspx. States are encouraged to make
full use of the APRD for reporting ADS-B avionics problems and sharing experience
as well as follow-up actions through the APRD web-page.

1.3 This document serves to provide guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of
avionics performance of ADS-B equipped aircraft, which is based on the experience
gained by States.

2 Problem Reporting and Feedback

2.1 For ADS-B avionics problems, it is critical that an appropriate reporting and feedback
mechanism be established. It is highly desirable that those discovering the problems
should report them to the appropriate parties to take action, such as study and analyse
the problems, identify the root causes, and rectify them. Those action parties
include :-

(a) Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) – upon detection of any unacceptable
ADS-B reports from an aircraft, report the observed problem to the performance
monitoring agent(s), if any, and the Aircraft Operators for investigation. In
addition, ANSPs should take all actions to avoid using the ADS-B reports from
the aircraft until the problem is rectified (e.g. black listing the aircraft), if usage of
such reports could compromise safety.
(b) Regulators – to initiate any appropriate regulatory action or enforcement.

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(c) Aircraft Operators – to allow avionics specialists to examine the causes and as
customers of the avionics manufacturers ensure that corrective action will take
place.
(d) Avionics Manufacturers and Aircraft Manufacturers – to provide technical
evidence and knowledge about the problem and problem rectification

2.2 Incentives should be received by those parties acting on the problems including :-

(a) Regulations that require deficiencies to be rectified

(b) Regulatory enforcement
(c) Consequences if conduct of operations with problematic equipment (e.g. no access
to the airspace requiring healthy equipment)

2.3 When an ADS-B avionics problem is reported, it should come along with adequate
details about the problem nature to the action parties. In addition, the problem should
be properly categorised, so that appropriate parties could diagnose and rectify them
systematically.

3 Problem Categorisation

3.1 Regarding ADS-B avionics, their problems are quite diversified in the Region but can
be categorized to ensure they will be examined and tackled systematically.

3.2 Based on the experience gained from States, the common ADS-B avionics problems
in the Region are summarized under different categories in Attachment A. It is noted
that only a relatively minor portion of the aircraft population exhibits these problems.
It must be emphasized that aircraft transmitting incorrect positional data with NUC =
0 or NIC = 0 should not be considered a safety problem. The data transmitted have no
integrity and shall not be used by ATC. This situation exists for many aircraft when
their GNSS receivers are not connected to the transponders.

4 Managing the Problem

4.1 There are two major approaches to manage the problems :-

(a) Regulatory approach

Regulations which require non-approved avionics to disable ADS-B transmission
(or transmit “no integrity”), and the concerned operators to file flight plans to
indicate no ADS-B equipage. APANPIRG has endorsed this approach which is
reflected in the Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).

(b) Blacklist approach

Filtering out (“black listing”) any airframes that do not comply with the
regulations or transmitting bad data, and advising the regulator of the non-

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compliance. This approach is temporary which allows the ANSP to protect the
system whilst regulatory action is underway.

While deciding on whether an aircraft transmitting erroneous ADS-B data should

be added into the blacklist, the following factors will be critically assessed:

i. Impact and risk to ATC operational safety

Use of erroneous ADS-B data to maintain separation may potentially
contribute to loss of separation or ATC coordination error.
ii. Frequency of erroneous position
Whether it is occasional or frequently broadcast of erroneous position.
iii. Amount of deviation
This can be a track jumping problem which is of significant safety impact to
ATC or just an occasional small position jump which is not detectable in ATC
with insignificant impact.
iv. Others
Such as the ICAO aircraft address received from ADS-B being inconsistent
with the aircraft registration, Flight ID entered via cockpit interface
mismatched with aircraft callsign in the Flight Plan, etc.

After deciding to put an aircraft into the blacklist list, the following procedures will be
carried out:

i. Informing the concerned aircraft operator/regulatory authority

The concerned aircraft operator/regularity authority will be notified of the
decision and the rationale before putting the aircraft into the exclusion list.

ii. Pre-processing of flight plan concerned

As the blacklist mechanism involves filtering out the ADS-B data of the
subject aircraft, from operational perspective, air traffic controllers need to be
aware in advance that the concerned aircraft plans to operate in their FIR. A
flight plan pre-processing system may locate the flight plan by checking
against the 24-bit address or aircraft registration in the blacklist, and issue an
alert to the air traffic controllers if appropriate, such as automatically insert a
remark in the Item 18 of the concerned flight plan before feeding the flight plan
into the ATC Automation System, and the ATC Automation System may issue
an alert to the air traffic controllers with a specific label annotated in the
corresponding electronic flight strips.

iii. Coordinate with adjacent Area Control Centre (ACC)

Upon posting of pending inbound flights with corresponding electronic flight
strips indicating non-ADS-B equipage or in the blacklist, the air traffic
controllers shall inform the upstream ACC that transfer of that particular flight
will not be accepted at the ADS-B exclusive airspace. It is important to carry
out this coordination action as early as possible as the upstream sector may
have difficulty to adjust the flight route at the transfer stage.

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iv. Handling of an aircraft for removal from the blacklist once rectification action
had taken place
Once notification from the aircraft operators/regulatory authorities is received
that the problem has been rectified, performance of the aircraft will be closely
monitored when it flies to the concerned FIR. If the aircraft shows the observed
problem has been resolved, the aircraft will be removed from the blacklist.
The aircraft operator/regulatory authority will also be notified accordingly.

5 Systematic Monitoring and Analysis of the Problem

States using ADS-B should have in place systematic ways to identify and manage
ADS-B deficiencies similar to that described below :-

5.1 Reporting Deficiencies

States using ADS-B should have in place systematic ways to identify ADS-B
deficiencies including :-
(a) Systematic capture of ATC reported events and engineering detected events into a
database; and
(b) Manual or automatic detection of anomalous avionics behavior independent from
controller reports

5.1.1 ATC Reported Deficiencies

ATC procedures should exist that allow services to continue to be provided safety, as
well as to capture relevant information for later analysis. This should include :-

(a) ATC request for the pilot to select the alternate transponder; and
(b) ATC to adequately record the circumstances including Flight ID, ICAO Aircraft
Address (if readily available) accurate time, Flight plan, and pilot provided
information.

5.1.2 Non ATC reported deficiencies

5.1.2.1 Where capability is available, States should also identify non ATC reported
deficiencies.

5.1.2.2 Without overlapping radar coverage: ADS-B data may be examined for the
following :-
(a) NUCp of each ADS-B reported position is smaller than required for service
delivery for more than 5% of total number of ADS-B updates;
(b) NIC, NACp, SIL are smaller than required for service delivery for more than 5%
of total number of ADS-B updates;

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(c) ICAO Aircraft Address (i.e. I021/080) is inconsistent with the flight planned
registration (REG) based on each state’s ICAO Aircraft Address allocation
methodology;
(d) Flight ID entered via cockpit interface and downlinked in ADS-B data (i.e.
I021/170 in Asterix CAT 21) is a mismatch1 with aircraft callsign in the ATS
Flight Plan;
(e) Inconsistent vertical rate compared to flight level change; and
(f) Inconsistency of position reports and presence of "jumps.

5.1.2.3 Overlapping radar coverage: For States that have overlapping radar coverage, a
systematic means to monitor and analyze ADS-B could be considered in addition to
relying on ATC to report the problem, or utilising the evaluation criteria in 5.1.2.2
above.
This can be achieved by comparing radar information with ADS-B reported position,
velocity, flight level and vertical rate change data as well as examining the ADS-B
quality indicators and Flight Identification (FLTID) contained in the ADS-B reports.

For each ADS-B flight, its ADS-B data could be compared with its corresponding
radar information. For example, this would allow analysis to determine if the
following pre-defined criteria are met :-

(a) Deviation between ADS-B reported position and independent referenced radar
position is greater than 1NM2, with the indication of good positional quality in the
quality indicators for more than 5% of total number ADS-B updates. A sample
screen shot of a system performing the analysis automatically is given at
Attachment B for reference.

5.2 Managing and Processing Deficiencies

Whether detected by ATC or not, all deficiencies should trigger:

(a) Systematic recording of the details of each occurrence such as date/time of

occurrence, ICAO aircraft address and flight plan information should be obtained.
Graphical representations such as screen capture of radar and ADS-B history

1
A missing Flight ID, or a Flight ID with only “spaces” should not be considered a mismatch.
2
For example, the deviation between ADS-B and radar tracks could be set to 1NM in accordance with
ICAO Circular 326 defining position integrity (0.5NM < HPL < 1NM) for 3NM aircraft separation use,
on assumption that radar targets are close to actual aircraft position. The values of ADS-B quality
indicators (NUCp, NACp, SIL, NIC) could be chosen based on the definition in ICAO Circular 326 on
Position Accuracy and Position Integrity for 3NM aircraft separation minimum. A threshold of 5% is
initially set to exclude aircraft only exhibiting occasional problems during their flight journey. The

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tracks, graphs of NUCp/NIC value changes versus time and deviation between
radar and ADS-B tracks along the flight journey would be desirable. Examples of
typical graphical representations are shown below :-

(b) Systematic technical analysis of each detected issue using ADS-B recorded data,
to ensure that all detected issues are examined and addressed. Typically this will
need:
 systems to record ADS-B data, replay ADS-B data and analyze ADS-B data
 staff and procedures to analyze each report
 A database system to manage the status of each event and to store the results of
each analysis

above criteria should be made configurable to allow fine-turning in future. Evaluation of ADS-B vs
radar may alternatively expose radar calibration issues requiring further investigation.

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(c) Procedures to support engagement with operators (domestic & foreign),

regulators, other ANSPs, Airframe OEMs and avionics vendors to ensure that
each issue is investigated adequately and maximize the probability that the root
cause of the event is determined. The procedures could include :-
 Data collection procedures;
 Telephone & email contact details; and
 Mechanisms for reporting, as appropriate, to the Asia Pacific ADS-B Avionics
Problem Reporting Database (APRD)

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Attachment A – List of known ADS-B avionics problems

Ref. Problem Cause Safety Implications to ATC Recommendations

(Yes / No)

1. Track Jumping problem Software issue with TPR901 Yes. Rockwell Collins has successfully
with Rockwell Collins transponder initially only introduced a Service Bulletin that
TPR901 affecting Boeing aircraft. Will present as a few wild/large solves the problem in Boeing
(See Figure1) Does not occur in all aircraft positional jumps. Nearly all reports aircraft.
with this transponder. are tagged as low quality (NUC=0)
and are discarded, however, some The problem is known to exist on
Subsequent investigation by occasional non zero reports get Airbus aircraft. Rockwell has
Rockwell Collins has found through. advised that a solution is available in
that the particular their DO260B upgrade.
transponder, common to all Problem is very “obvious”. Could
of the aircraft where the result in incorrect longitudinal Rockwell Collins may not have a fix
position jumps had been position of Flight Data Record for some time. Workaround solutions
observed, had an issue when track. Can trigger RAM alerts. are being examined by Airbus,
crossing ±180 degrees Operators and Airservices Australia.
longitude.
The only workaround identified at
On some crossings (10% this time is to power down the
probability), errors are transponders before flight to states
introduced into the position using ADS-B – after crossing
longitude before encoding. longitude 180. It can be noted that in
These errors are not self- Airbus aircraft it is not possible to
correcting and can only be safely power down the transponder
removed by a power reset of in flight.
the transponder. The
problem, once triggered can Airbus have prepared a procedure to
last days, since many support power down before flight.
transponders are not Airservices Australia have negotiated
routinely powered down. with 2 airlines to enact this
procedure prior to flights to

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Australia.

An additional partial workaround is :

to ensure that procedures exist for
ATC to ask the pilot to changeover
transponders if the problem is
observed. Since there is a 10%
chance of the problem occurring on
each crossing of ±180 degrees
longitude, the chance that both
transponders being affected is 1%.

There is no complete workaround

available for flights that operate
across 180 degrees longitude directly
to destination without replacing the
transponder. Airbus advised that a
new TPR901 transponder compliant
with DO260B is available from
December 2015. This new
transponder does not have such
problem.

2. Rockwell Collins TDR94 Old software typically Yes. Problem well known. Particularly
Old version. before version -108. The affects Gulfstream aircraft which
design was completed before
Will present as a few wild unfortunately leave the factory with
The pattern of erroneous the ADS-B standards were positional jumps. Nearly all reports ADS-B enabled from this
positional data is very established and the message
are tagged as low quality (NUC=0) transponder model.
distinctive of the definitions are different to
and are discarded, however, some
problem. the current DO260. occasional non zero reports get Rockwell has issued a service
(See Figure 2) through. Also causes incorrect bulletin recommending that ADS-B
Rockwell has recommended altitude reports. be disabled for aircraft with this

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that ADS-B be disabled on transponder software. See Service

these models. Problem is very “obvious”. Information Letter 1-05 July 19,
2005. It is easy to disable the
transmission.

If a new case is discovered, an entry

needs to be made to the black list
until rectification has been effected.

3. Litton GPS with proper Litton GNSSU (GPS) Mark No. This GPS is installed in some older,
RAIM processing 1 design problem. (Does not typically Airbus, fleets.
apply to Litton Mark II). Perceived GPS integrity changes
GPS does not output correct seemingly randomly. With the GPS Data appears “Correct” but integrity
messages to transponder. satellite constellation working value can vary. Performance under
properly, the position data is good. “bad” satellite conditions is a
However the reported integrity is problem.
inconsistent and hence the data is
sometimes/often discarded by the Correction involves replacing the
ATC system. The effected is GNSSU (GPS) which is expensive.
perceived extremely poor
“coverage”. The data is not If a new case is discovered, an entry
properly “protected” against needs to be made to the black list
erroneous satellite ranging signals – until rectification has been effected.
although this cannot be “seen” by
ATC unless there is a rare satellite
problem.

4. SIL programming error Installers of ADS-B avionics No. Would NOT be included in a “black
for DO260A avionics using the newer DO260A list”.
standard mis program “SIL”. First report of detection appears
good (and is good), all subsequent Aircraft with “Dynon avionics”
a) This problem appears for reports not displayed because the exhibit this behavior. They do not

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DO260A transponders, with data quality is perceived as “bad” have a certified GPS and hence
SIL incorrectly set to 0 or 1 by the ATC system. Operational always set SIL = 0. This is actually
(instead of 2 or 3) effect is effectively no ADS-B data. correct but hence they do not get
Hence no risk. treated as ADS-B equipped.
b) As the aircraft enters
coverage, the ADS-B ground
station correctly assumes
DO260 until it receives the
version number.

c) The transmitted NIC

(DO260A) is interpreted as a
good NUC (DO260) value,
because no SIL message has
yet been received. The data
is presented to ATC.

5. Garmin “N” Flight ID Installers of Garmin Yes. Can be corrected by installer

problem transponder incorrectly set manipulation of front panel. Does
(See Figure 3) “Callsign”/Flight ID. This is Flight ID appears as “N”. Inhibits not warrant “black list” activity.
caused by poor human proper coupling.
factors and design that
assumes that GA aircraft are
US registered.

6. Flight ID corruption issue TPR901 software problem Yes. Affects mainly B747 aircraft. Boeing
1 – trailing “U” interfacing with Flight ID SB is available for Rockwell
Flight ID’s received : source. Results in constantly Flight ID changes during flight transponders and B744 aircraft.
GT615, T615U ,NEB033, changing Flight ID with inhibits proper coupling or causes
NEB033U, QF7550, some reports having an extra decoupling. Rockwell Collins have SB 503 which
QF7550U, QF7583, “U” character. upgrades faulty -003 transponder to -
QF7583U, QF7585, 005 standard.

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QF7585, QF7585U,
QF7594, QFA7521, If a new case is discovered, an entry
QFA7531, QFA7531, needs to be made to the black list
QFA7531U, QFA7532, until rectification has been effected.
QFA7532U, QFA7532W,
QFA7550, QFA7552,
QFA7581
7. Flight ID corruption issue ACSS software problem Yes. Software upgrade available.
2 results in constantly
changing Flight ID. Flight ID changes during flight If a new case is discovered, an entry
inhibits proper coupling or causes needs to be made to the black list
Applies to ACSS XS950 decoupling. until rectification has been effected.
transponder Pn 7517800-
110006 and Honeywell FMC
(pn 4052508 952). ACSS fix
was available in Sept 2007.

8. No Flight ID transmitted Various causes No. Aircraft could “fail to couple with
Flight Data Record”. Not strictly
Flight ID not available. Inhibits misleading – but could cause
proper coupling. controller distraction.

9. ACSS Transponder Yes. Not approved and hence not

10005/6 without Mod A compliant with CASA regulations.
reports NUC based on Appears good in all respects until
HFOM. there is a satellite constellation If known could be added to black
problem (not normally detectable list. Configuration is not permitted
by ground systems). by regulation.

10. Occasional small position For some older Airbus No. ATC ground system processing can
jump backwards aircraft, an occasional report eliminate these.
(See Figure 4) may exhibit a small “jump Not detectable in ATC due to

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back” of less than 0.1 nm extrapolation, use of latest data and

screen ranges used.
Root cause not known

11. Older ACSS transponders Design error reports No. Can be treated in the same manner as
report integrity too integrity one value worse a loss of transponder capability.
conservatively than reality In poor GPS geometry cases the
ATC system could discard the data
when the data is in fact useable.
Will be perceived as loss of ADS-B
data.

12. Intermittent wiring GPS ADS-B transmissions switch Yes. If a new case is discovered, an entry
transponder intermittently between INS needs to be made to the black list
position and GPS position. Normally the integrity data goes to until rectification has been effected.
zero when INS is broadcast, but
sometimes during transition
between INS and GPS, an INS
position or two can be broadcast
with “good” NUC value.

Disturbing small positional jump.

13. Wrong ICAO Aircraft Installation error No. This is not a direct ADS-B problem,
Address but relates to a Mode S transponder
No direct ATC impact unless a rare issue that can put TCAS at risk.
duplicate is detected.
Cannot be fixed by black list entry.
Needs to be passed to regulator for
resolution.

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14. Toggling between high Faulty GPS receiver/ADS-B No. While it is normal for NUC value to
and low NUC transponder switch between a high and low figure
(See Figure 5) ATC will see tracks appear and based on the geometry of GPS
disappear discretely. No safety satellites available, it is of the view
implications to ATC. that more should be done to examine
this phenomenon. It is observed that
such switching between high and low
NUC occurs on certain airframe and
not on others. The issue was raised to
the airlines so as to get a better
understanding. On one occasion, the
airline replied that a module on their
GPS receiver was faulty. On another
occasion, the airline replied that one
of the ADS-B transponder was
faulty. Good NUC was transmitted
when the working transponder was in
use and poor NUC was transmitted
when the faulty ADS-B transponder
was in use.

15. Consistent Low NUC GNSS receivers are not No. Not considered a safety problem but
(See Figure 6) connected to the ADS-B a common phenomenon in the
transponders. Data shall be filtered out by the Region – the concerned aircraft will
system and not detectable in ATC be treated equivalent to “aircraft not
equipped with ADS-B”.

While it is normal for aircraft to

transmit low NUC, it is of the view
that “consistent low NUC’ could be
due to the avionics problem (e.g.
GNSS receiver is not connected to

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the ADS-B transponder).

It is recognised that operators may

not be aware that their aircraft are
transmitting unexpected low NUC
/ NIC values, due to equipment
malfunction. Hence, it is desirable
for States to inform the operators
when unexpected low NUC values
are transmitted, where practicable.

Concerned airline operators are

required to take early remedial
actions. Otherwise, their aircraft will
be treated as if non-ADS-B equipped
which will be requested to fly
outside the ADS-B airspace after the
ADS-B mandate becomes effective.

16. ADS-B position report Faulty ADS-B avionics Yes. The problem should be immediately
with good integrity (i.e. reported to the concerned
NUC >= “4”) but ADS-B As the ground system could not CAA/operators for problem
position data are actually "automatically" discard ADS-B diagnosis including digging out the
bad as compared with data with good integrity (i.e. NUC root causes, avionics/GPS types etc.,
radar (met criteria 5.2(a)) value >=4), there could be safety and ensure problem rectification
implications to ATC. before the ADS-B data could be used
by ATC.

Consider to “blacklist” the aircraft

before the problem is rectified.

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17. FLTID transmitted by Human errors Yes. Issue regulations/letters to concerned

ADS-B aircraft does not operators urging them to set FLTID
match with callsign in Could lead to screen clutter - two exactly match with callsign in flight
flight plan target labels with different IDs (one plan.
(see Figures 7a – 7d) for radar and another for ADS-B)
being displayed, causing potential
confusion and safety implications
to ATC.

18 B787 position error with Issue 1: Yes. Boeing performed a change to the
good NIC Software issue - surveillance B787 Type Certificate for
system inappropriately Misleading position presentation incorporation of the upgraded ISS
“coasts” the position when which is typically detected by ATC software in March of 2017. All B787
data received by the observing aircraft “off track” when aircraft delivered after Line number
transponder is split across in fact it is “on-track”. 541 have the upgraded ISS software
multiple messages. which corrects this issue.

System seems to self correct Boeing released Service Bulletin

after some time. Can be B787-81205-SB340036-00 on 30
corrected by surveillance June 2017. Note that this Service
system power off. Bulletin is available at no cost to the
operator, and includes the concurrent
Issue 2: requirement to implement Boeing
Data packets were not being Service Bulletin B787-81205-
distributed to the transponder SB340005-00.
when the internal timing
between different elements On 5 Nov 2018, FAA issued
of the Integrated Airworthiness Directive 2017-NM-
Surveillance System became 118-AD, effective 10 Dec 2018,
synchronized. which requires application of Boeing

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SB B787-81205-SB340036-00 by 10
Dec 2019. EASA has invoked this
AD for States under its jurisdiction.
States and Operators are urged to
implement the service bulletin
immediately and report to FAA or
ICAO APAC Office.

As of 9 Sep 2020, 32 B787 aircraft

were on the NSAL; 18 of these
aircraft have been detected within
U.S. ADS-B coverage during 2020.
The FAA is coordinating with State
Regulators who have operators with
B787 aircraft on the NSAL.

19 A number of airlines have Being actively investigated. No. Aircraft must be managed
reported or experienced One airline has implemented procedurally if outside radar
ADS-B outages for on-board recording which Equivalent to a failed transponder. coverage.
complete flight sectors in confirms that the MMRs are
A330 aircraft. Appears as not providing HIL/HPL to
low reliability ADS-B and the transponder whilst
has afflicted both A & B continuing to provide
side at same time. HFOM, GPS alt etc

20 A380 flight ID lost after For the A380 fleet, it has No. The correction to this logic is
landing been confirmed that for some planned for next AESS standard
seconds after landing, the release; planned for 2017.” Only a
flight ID is set as invalid by problem for arriving aircraft on
FMS to AESS. surface surveillance systems.
Consequently, the current
AESS design uses, as per

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design, the Aircraft

Registration Number as a
back-up source for A/C flight
identification field in ADS-B
broadcast messages.
21 A350 ADS-B On-ground On departure, A350 aircraft Yes. where ADS-B is used for Airbus is in discussion with FAA
Performance will initially use INS derived surface movement display and EUROCONTROL about this
position for ADS-B reports issue.
when taxying and only use
GNSS when entering the
runway. INS positions can
drift leading to inaccurate
position reports.

22 Incorrect Ground Bit Occasionally, some airborne Yes. Misleading information States/Administrations contact the
Setting (GBS) in both aircraft will incorrectly set shown on ATC system. Aircraft concerned airline operators for
Mode S Interrogation ground bit as “1” meaning not visible to TCAS and will not remedial actions.
Reply and ADS-B they are on ground, while reply to all-call interrogations.
Downlink some landed aircraft
incorrectly set ground bit as
“0” meaning they are
airborne. This could confuse
the ATC system, by not
showing the airborne targets
as the system thought they
are on ground, or forming
tracks for landed targets
triggering alarms against
other taking-off aircraft.

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23 Rockwell TSS-4100 track The TSS-4100 shares Yes. Misleading position FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD)
extrapolation issue. software with the Rockwell presentation which is typically 2017-22-14 was issued on 20 Dec
Collins ISS transponder in shown on ATC system. 2017.
the B787, and the software The compliance date for this AD is
defect in the B787 ISS 20 Dec 2018 (or 750 hours in
reported at SURICG/2 also service, whichever occurs first).
exists in the TSS-4100.
FAA has not detected any aircraft
with this issue since the AD
compliance date and will not further
report on it, as it is considered
resolved.

24 Embraer 170 track Unknown as being a random, Yes. Misleading position In all of the cases of this issue to
jumping issue occasional issue with no presentation which is typically date, removing and replacing the
clear fault diagnosis shown on ATC system. transponders cleared whatever the
available from Honeywell. issue was. This issue has never
FAA has decided that when recurred on the same aircraft. Bench
the next E170 aircraft is testing by Honeywell avionics
detected with this issue, it engineering of the removed
will be immediately placed transponders has revealed no faults
on the FAA’s No Services or anomalies. As such,
Aircraft List (NSAL). States/Administrations to consider
Simultaneously, FAA will removing and replacing the
notify Embraer and transponders concerned if issue
Honeywell of the affected observed.
aircraft and request that
appropriate engineering The FAA has since learned from
personnel be sent to inspect discussions with the OEM that most
and test the affected aircraft. recent events detected by FAA
generated an “ADS-B NOT AVAIL”
Crew Alerting System (CAS)

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message. When flight crews report

this message, airline maintenance
replaces the transponder(s), which
resolves the problem. To date, this
has consistently occurred before
FAA monitoring detected the
problem and engaged with the
airline. The root cause for this issue
remains unknown.

25 Airbus Single Aisle FAA has observed 17 Airbus No. Airbus released three Service
production wiring issue Single Aisle aircraft from Bulletins to correct this issue, which
two airlines with missing existed in 128 Airbus Single Aisle
Length-Width Codes (LWC aircraft.
is a message element in DO- As of 1-Dec-2018, all of the aircraft
260B/ED-102A that is which operate at US airports with
required by both the US and ADS-B surface surveillance were
European mandates). FAA corrected. The FAA will not further
believes that this was a report on this issue.
production line wiring issue.

26 Boeing 777-300ER FAA has observed at least 10 No. On 7 July 2017, Boeing released
production wiring issue Boeing B777-300ER aircraft Service Bulletin SB 777-34-0281 to
with missing or improper correct this issue. Boeing has
NACv/SDA/eCat/LWC informed FAA that all affected B777
message elements (these are operators have been notified. The
message elements in DO- FAA will not further report on this
260B/ED-102A that are issue.
required by both the US and
European mandates (eCat is
FAA shorthand for Emitter
Category). After notification,

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Boeing reported to FAA that

this was a production line
parity pin wiring issue.

27 Rockwell TSS-4100 This issue exists in any TSS- Yes. At present, the FAA regulator has
Geometric Altitude 4100 installed with TSSA- determined that this issue occurs too
Reporting as Pressure 4100 software RCPN 810- rarely to warrant issuing an
Altitude 0052-100, RCPN 810-0052- Airworthiness Directive or a Special
101, or RCPN 810-0052-102. Airworthiness Information Bulletin
All of the following must be (SAIB).
true for the issue to occur:
Rockwell Collins has released
(1) TSS is the selected updated software, RCPN 810-0052-
transponder; 110, to address this issue. Refer to
(2) TSS is receiving valid SIL TSSA-4100-10-1 titled, "TSSA-
pressure altitude; 4100 Field Loadable Software",
(3) TSS is receiving valid RCPN 523-0818785.
GPS data with an
integrity of NIC 9 or
better; and
(4) The mode of operation
for the transponder
must be "ALT OFF".

Note that in an SBAS service

area, only condition (4)
would be considered
uncommon.

When the issue exists, the

TSS will insert geometric
altitude information into the

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ADS-B Airborne Position

Squitter, but this altitude will
be encoded as if it were
pressure altitude. The net
effect is that, when this issue
occurs, the TSS-4100 reports
geometric altitude
information as if it were
pressure altitude. In many
cases, this will be incorrect
altitude information.

28 NACv reporting greater The FAA has detected a No. While there is no known urgent issue
than 2 number of aircraft which with these findings, as no known
consistently report NACv = 3 ATC or airborne application requires
and NACv = 4. NACv values exceeding two, FAA
does have long-term intentions of
Per FAA AC 20-165B deploying surveillance tracking and
section 3.3.3.7.3, “A NACv alerting prediction algorithms in
= 3 or NACv = 4 should not ATC automation which will use real-
be set based on GNSS time NACv values. ICAO States
velocity accuracy unless you planning to make similar
can demonstrate to the FAA improvements should be aware of
that the velocity accuracy this situation.
actually meets the
requirement.” EASA CS-
ACNS states that “There is
currently no established
guidance on establishing a
NACv performance of

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‘three’ or better.” Therefore,

it appears that there are
improperly configured ADS-
B installations operating in
the U.S.

29 B787 NACv = 0 Issue FAA noted certain B787s No. The erroneous NACv=0 condition
exhibiting a relatively high clears at the next power up of the
percentage of NACv =0 ISSPU.
reports.
Boeing has issued guidance urging
Starting with line number B787 operators to not intermix INR
442 (June 2016), Honeywell P/N 940-2001-002 or -004 (which do
Integrated Navigation not output HFOMv) with INR P/N
Receiver (INR) P/N 940- 940-2001-008 (which does output
2001-008 was introduced, HFOMv) until the ISSPU software
which has an HFOMv has been updated per an available
output. Boeing investigations Boeing Service Bulletin. This
revealed a software flaw in guidance was provided in Boeing
the ISSPU that causes an Fleet Team Digest 787-FTD-34-
erroneous NACv=0 reporting 19005 (dated 21 Dec 2019).
condition on B787s equipped
with a mixed set of As of 9-Aug-2020, FAA has
Honeywell INR part observed no significant occurrences
numbers. This condition of this issue within U.S. ADS-B
occurs when the ISSPU coverage during the prior two
switches between an INR months.
with an HFOMv output and
an INR without an HFOMv
output.

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Figure 1 - Track Jumping problem with TPR901 Figure 3 - Garmin “N” Flight ID problem

Figure 2 - Rockwell Collins TDR94 Old version. The pattern of Figure 4 - Occasional small position jump backwards

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erroneous positional data is very distinctive of the problem

NUC always 0

Figure 5 - NUC value toggling Figure 6 – Consistent low NUC

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ADS-B
ADS-B

Radar

NUC always 0 Radar

Figure 7a - Additional zero inserted Figure 7b - ICAO Airline Designator Code dropped

ADS-B
ADS-B

Radar
Radar

Figure 7c - Wrong numerical codes entered Figure 7d - IATA Airline Designator Code used

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Attachment B - Sample screen shot of a system to monitor and analyse performance of ADS-B avionics

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Appendix 3

A Template for ADS-B Mandate/Regulations for Aircraft Avionics

(1) On and after dd/mm/yyyy, if an aircraft carries 1090MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B
transmitting equipment for operational use in xxxxxxxx territory, the equipment must have been
certificated as meeting :1

(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in
Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ
Extended Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
(b) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Subpart D —
Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B), or
(c) Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or later versions)
Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Systems, or
(d) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.

(2) On and after dd/mm/yyyy, if an aircraft operates on airways (insert routes)…………at or above
FLXXX………(or in defined airspace boundaries ……………. at or above FLXXX): 2

The aircraft must carry serviceable 1090MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B transmitting
equipment that has been certificated as meeting :-

(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in
Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ
Extended Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
(b) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Subpart D —
Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B), or
(c) Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or later versions)
Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Systems, or
(d) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.

(3) An aircraft carrying 1 090 MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B equipment shall disable
ADS-B transmission unless:

(a) the aircraft emits position information of an accuracy and integrity consistent with the
transmitted value of the position quality indicator; or

1
This paragraph ensures all aircraft operating in the airspace, if equipped with ADS-B, are compliant
to standards.
2
This paragraph provides mandate requirements within certain parts of the airspace

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(b) the aircraft always transmits a value of 0 (zero) for one or more of the position quality
indicators (NUCp, NIC, NACp or SIL); or
(c) the operator has received an exemption granted by the appropriate ATS authority.

Note: States are urged to include at least the standards stated in the template. States may include
other standards allowed by the State’s regulations.

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Appendix 4

An Example of Advice to Operators Concerning Inconsistency Between ADS-B

Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

1 Background

Newer technologies for aircraft surveillance are now available – such as Mode S and
ADS-B – which in many aircraft are installed as replacements for older Mode A/C
transponders.

Air Traffic Control makes use of these new capabilities, and uses the Flight Plan
information as a decision support tool – to allow the Air Traffic Controller to predict
the surveillance capability of a particular aircraft before it enters radar or ADS-B
coverage.

Requirements for ADS-B and Mode S (insert local reference document if

applicable) may mean that if flight planning does not accurately reflect the aircraft
capability, services may be withheld (for example if ADS-B is mandatory, but not
indicated on the flight plan – this section to be modified for local requirements).

2 Flight Planning Requirements for Transponder and ADS-B

The flight planning requirements for aircraft are described in (local document
reference or ICAO DOC 4444 Appendix 2) and repeated below.

Surveillance Equipment
N if no surveillance equipment for the route to be flown is carried, or the equipment is
unserviceable
OR
INSERT one or more of the following descriptors, to a maximum of 20 characters, to
describe the serviceable surveillance equipment and/or capabilities on board:

SSR Modes A and C

A Transponder — Mode A (4 digits — 4 096 codes)
C Transponder — Mode A (4 digits — 4 096 codes) and Mode C

SSR Mode S
E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and
extended squitter (ADS-B) capability
H Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and
enhanced surveillance capability

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I Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, but no pressure-altitude

capability
L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude,
extended squitter (ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability
P Transponder — Mode S, including pressure-altitude, but no aircraft identification
capability
S Transponder — Mode S, including both pressure altitude and aircraft identification
capability
X Transponder — Mode S with neither aircraft identification nor pressure-altitude
capability
Note : Enhanced surveillance capability is the ability of the aircraft to down-link
aircraft derived data via a Mode S transponder.

ADS-B
B1 ADS-B with dedicated 1 090 MHz ADS-B “out” capability1
B2 ADS-B with dedicated 1 090 MHz ADS-B “out” and “in” capability1
U1 ADS-B “out” capability using UAT
U2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using UAT
V1 ADS-B “out” capability using VDL Mode 4
V2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using VDL Mode 4

3 Additional information

The capability of your aircraft transponder, and ADS-B capability, will typically be
available in the transponder manual, or in the aircraft flight manual for the aircraft.
For General Aviation aircraft, the most common configurations for filing in the flight
plan item10b will be (listed in order of capability).

EB1 – An ADS-B equipped aircraft would typically file this to indicate the Mode S
transponder capability with ADS-B out.

S – The majority of Mode S transponders (without ADS-B) will support pressure

altitude information and Flight ID transmission.

C – For aircraft with an older Mode A/C transponder – most of which provide
pressure altitude capability.

Less common configurations in General Aviation will include:

1
Based on current version of ICAO Doc 4444

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H, LB1 or LB2 – Enhanced surveillance capability is more usually associated with

higher end aircraft. ADS-B IN (B2) is relatively rare at this time, but may be available
for some aircraft.

I, P or X – Most Mode S transponders will support Flight ID and pressure altitude, so

these configurations are not common.

A – some low end GA aircraft may not provide pressure altitude information.

U1 or U2 – these ADS-B technologies are only authorized in a limited number of

countries in the Asia Pacific Region.

Planning designations not to be used in Asia Pacific:

V1 or V2 – these ADS-B technologies are not authorised for use in Asia Pacific
Region.

Remember:
Always flight plan the correct surveillance capability for your aircraft. If in doubt,
consult the transponder manual, aircraft flight manual, or your Licenced Aircraft
Maintenance Engineer.

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Appendix 5

Checklist of Common Items or Parameters for the Monitoring of ADS-B System

1 ADS-B Ground Station

Site Monitoring
 Receiver Sensitivity
 Antenna Cable
 GPS Health
 Coverage Check
 Probability of Detection
 Station Service Availability
 Receiver Status

Remote Control & Monitoring (RCMS)

 CPU Process Operation
 Temperature
 ASTERIX Output Load and Link Status
 Time Synchronization
 GPS Status
 Power Status
 Site Monitor Status
 Memory Usage
 Software Version (Operating System and RCMS Application)

Logistic Support Monitoring

 Record all failures, service outage and repair/return to service times

2 ADS-B Equipage Monitoring

 Update and maintain list of ADS-B equipped airframe details database

 Identify aircraft non-compliant to regional mandate

3 ADS-B Avionics Monitoring

 Track Consistency
 Valid Flight ID
 Presence of NACp/NIC/NUC Values
 Presence of Geometric Altitude

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 Correctness of ICAO Aircraft Address

 Avionics Configuration and Connections
 Update and maintain list of aircraft with faulty avionics

4 ADS-B Performance Monitoring

 Percentage of aircraft with good integrity reports

 Accuracy of ADS-B Horizontal Position (Based on a reference sensor)
 Deviation between Geometric and Barometric Height
 Monitor the number of position jumps
 Message interval rate

5 ADS-B Display on ATC Display

 Split Track – ADS-B reported position might be off

 Coupling Failure – Wrong aircraft ID
 Duplicated ICAO Aircraft Address
 Display of data block

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Appendix 6
BASELINE ADS-B SERVICE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

The following table provides guidelines for various performance requirements of ADS-B Category (Tier) 1, 2 or 3 services that States may consider when acquisition of an ADS-B managed
service agreement with a service provider:

Service Parameter Guidance Category 1 (Tier 1) Category 2 (Tier 2) Category 3 (Tier 3)

5Nm separation capable commensurate with Situational awareness similar to ADS-C Position Reporting with Enhanced Flight
Radars (safety-net alerts, SAR, supports Operation
(separation/vectoring/high performance procedural separation without voice, not
with reliability, integrity & latency) 5nm separation)
Aircraft Recommended 0.5 second < Interval < 5 0.5 second < Interval < 20 0.5 second < Interval < 60
Updates seconds as Operationally seconds as Operationally seconds as Operationally
required required required
Maximum 0.5 second < Interval < 10
seconds as Operationally
required
Network Recommended 95%: < 2 seconds of 95%: < 15 seconds of 95%: < 60 seconds of
Latency receiver-station output receiver-station output receiver-station output

Reliability 1 Recommended 2 autonomous receiver-stations including 1 unduplicated receiver-station including 1 unduplicated receiver-station including
antenna, each providing data, no common point antenna antenna
of failure
Reliability 2 - Recommended Each receiver-station Each receiver-station Each receiver-station
MTBF including antenna to have including antenna to have including antenna to
MTBF >10,000 hrs MTBF >10,000 hrs have MTBF >10,000 hrs

Reliability – Recommended Completely duplicated, no common point of Unduplicated, MTBF > 400 hrs Unduplicated, MTBF> 200 hrs
Communications failure
Infrastructure
Reliability – Recommended Total Service MTBF >50,000 hrs Total Service MTBF > 400hrs Total Service MTBF> 200 hrs
Total ADS-B
Service

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Service Parameter Guidance Category 1 (Tier 1) Category 2 (Tier 2) Category 3 (Tier 3)

5Nm separation capable commensurate with Situational awareness similar to ADS-C Position Reporting with Enhanced Flight
Radars (safety-net alerts, SAR, supports Operation
(separation/vectoring/high performance procedural separation without voice, not
with reliability, integrity & latency) 5nm separation)
Availability – Recommended Total Service Availability > .999 Total Service Availability >.95 Total Service Availability >.90
Total ADS-B
Service
Integrity – Recommended Site monitor Site monitor System Monitoring
Ground Station System Monitoring System Monitoring
Minimum System Monitoring Not required Not required
Integrity – Data Recommended All systems up to ATM system, All systems up to ATM system, errors < 1 x All systems up to ATM system,
Communications & errors < 1 x 10E-6 10E-6 errors < 1 x 10E-6
Processing

The choice of category (tier) could be based upon a number of factors including the following,

a) The desired service

b) The available budget
c) The available ATC automation system & its capabilities and/or interim display systems
d) ATC training and ratings
e) Availability of appropriately tailored ATC procedures

States could initially choose one level and transition to another at a later time. For example, Category (Tier) 2 could be used to add additional safety nets/situational awareness and gain
operational experience during the initial stage, moving later to a full separation service using Category (Tier) 1.

Note: The Performance Based Surveillance Sub Group of the ICAO Surveillance Panel is reviewing performance standards for surveillance systems generally. A future update to the requirements
in the above table may be based on the outcomes of that panel.

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Appendix 7
GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON
GENERATION, PROCESSING & SHARING of ASTERIX
CATEGORY 21 ADS-B MESSAGES
(Including Attachments A, B, C & D)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The “All Purpose Structured Eurocontrol Surveillance Information Exchange”

(ASTERIX) Category 21 is a data format standard globally accepted by the Air Traffic Management
(ATM) system manufacturing industry for sharing of ADS-B data with ATM automation system.8 Asterix
Category 21 data is used to convey ADS-B data from ADS-B receiver stations to ATC processing and
display system. This guidance material discusses various aspects of this process. Since the ASTERIX
Category 21 edition 0.23 was issued in November 2003, it has undergone continuous revisions with some
19 subsequent editions. The focus of this guidance material is to concentrate on 1090ES ADS-B data
using:

a) RTCA DO-260 (Version 0);

b) RTCA DO-260A (Version 1); and
c) RTCA DO-260B (Version 2)

1.2 The ASTERIX Category 21 edition 1.0 issued in August 2008 fully incorporated the
DO260A standard while edition 2.1 issued in May 2011 fully incorporated the latest DO260B standard.
The latest edition (as at April 2018) is edition 2.4.

2. ASTERIX CAT 21 IN ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONS

2.1 To ensure interoperability of ADS-B receiver stations in the Asia Pacific (ASIA/PAC)
Regions, during the 16th APANPIRG Meeting held in August 2005, the ASTERIX Category 21 edition
0.23 which had incorporated DO260 standard was adopted as the baselined ADS-B data format for
deployment of ADS-B receiver stations and sharing of ADS-B data in the ASIA/PAC Regions. At that time
DO260A and DO260B standards were not defined.

3. CHOICE OF ASTERIX VERSION NUMBER

3.1 The Asterix standard has been developed over many years. Stability in the standard is
desirable so that ADS-B receiver station designers and ATM automation designers and manufacturers
can build interoperable systems with confidence. Because ADS-B technology has been evolving over the
years, and will continue to do so, it is not surprising that the Asterix standard has also developed along
with the ADS-B link technology standards to grasp the best benefits of its intended design.

3.2 During 2005, Asia Pacific decided to use Ed0.23 as the edition for sharing ADS-B data
between states. This version provides adequate information so that useful ATC operational services can be
provided including ATC 3 nautical mile and 5 nautical mile separation services. Ed0.23 can be used with

8
FAA utilise Asterix Cat 33 for ADS-B message distribution.

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DO260, DO260A and DO260B ADS-B avionics/receiver stations to provide basic ATC operational
services. However, Ed0.23 cannot fully support all the capabilities offered by DO260A and DO260B.

3.3 Nearly all Ed0.23 data items can be “re-constructed” from a received Ed2.1 data stream.
However, most of the special DO260A/B data items cannot be “re-constructed” from an Ed0.23 data
stream. In terms of domestic use and data sharing with other ANSPs concerning ADS-B data, several
options exist for ANSPs as follows:

Option Domestic use Data sharing

1 Ed0.23 Ed0.23. This is the default and basic standard.

2 Ed2.1 Ed0.23. This will require some conversions to occur, probably

through an ADS-B format conversion and filter system (see
Paragraph 11), between a domestic system and a foreign system.
Difficulties may exist if the domestic ATM system requires special
DO260A/B data items, since they cannot all be re-constructed from the
external foreign Ed0.23 data stream.

3 Ed2.1 Ed2.1. Must negotiate bilaterally with data sharing partner regarding
exact version to be used to achieve the intended functions.

Note: In this table, Ed2.1, a later DO260B compliant Asterix Cat 21 edition, is chosen as a representation of an
Asterix Cat 21 edition after Ed0.23. There exists other Asterix CAT 21 editions (e.g. 0.26, 1.3, 2.4 etc.) after
Ed0.23 that could be used by ANSPs for domestic and data sharing use.

4. SPECIFICATION OF ASTERIX MESSAGE PROCESSING

4.1 Care is needed to understand the difference in specifications :

4.2 Asterix Cat 21: Defines the characteristics of the data ON the interface including fields
that are mandatory on the interface.

4.3 ADS-B receiver station specifications: To define the Asterix standard, the ANSP must
also define which optional Asterix data items are required to be delivered on the Asterix interface, when
the appropriate data is received from the aircraft. It is desirable that suppliers be required to:

a) indicate how the receiver station processes and outputs every received DO260,
DO260A and DO260B data element into an Asterix data element/field; and

b) indicate which and how each Asterix data element and field presented at the output are
populated.
4.4 ATM automation system specifications: Defines which received Asterix data element
and fields are processed and how they are processed. Also defines which Asterix optional data fields are
required by the ATM automation systems (if any). ANSPs that specify ADS-B receiver stations and ATM
automation systems need to consider carefully and clearly about what they desire to achieve.
Specifications which simply require compliance with a particular Asterix edition will be inadequate in
most circumstances. In particular ANSPs, together with their suppliers should :

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a) Specify the Asterix standard edition to be used. This defines the message formats that are
placed on the link between ADS-B receiver station and downstream systems like ATM
automation, recording & analysis systems, bypass ATC systems and foreign ANSPs. The
edition will define which messages elements are mandatory in each message (very few
fields) and a large number of optional fields. The optional fields can only be filled if
relevant data is received from the aircraft. The optional fields will only be filled if the
receiver station specification requires them to be filled.

b) Specify the ADS-B receiver station behaviour so that when data is received from the
aircraft, the receiver station is required to fill appropriate optional Asterix data fields.

c) Specify the ATM automation system behaviour including appropriate semantic and
syntax checks applied to the Asterix data, including any triggers for the system to discard
data. The processing applied to each received Asterix data field should be specified. The
ATC system should discard any messages with unexpected Asterix categories without
discarding messages with known and defined Asterix categories.

5. MANDATORY FIELDS : ASTERIX AND 1090ES ADS-B

5.1 Asterix Cat 21 has been designed to support multiple datalinks. It has been defined to
support data fields which are not available in the 1090ES standards. Therefore some data items and fields
are not relevant when 1090ES is used.

5.2 The standard itself defines various items as optional or mandatory. This is defining what
is ON the interface. It does NOT specify the behaviour of the transmitting receiver station nor the
behaviour of the receiving ATM automation system.

5.3 When a single link technology has been chosen it may be sensible to diverge from the
formal Ed0.23 standard to reduce the required Asterix datalink bandwidth. E.g.: in an environment with
only 1090ES, it is unnecessary to transmit “Link Technology Indicator”. Asterix Cat 21 Ed 2.1 allows
this selection.

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Data Description Mandatory (M) or Optional (O) items as per

Items ASTERIX Category 21
Version 0.23 Version 2.1
Specification Specification
I021/010 Data Source Identification M M
I021/030 Time of Day M N/A
I021/071 Time of Applicability of N/A One of these is must be
or I021/073 Position or transmitted
Time of Message
reception for position
I021/040 Target Report Descriptor M M

I021/080 Target Address M M

I021/210 Link Technology Indicator/ M O
MOPS version

6. GENERATION OF ASTERIX AT AN ADS-B RECEIVER STATION

6.1 The following general principles should be adopted:

6.2 Commensurate with link bandwidth availability, transmit all mandatory Asterix data
items and also transmit those Asterix data items that are operationally desirable. That is, when the
appropriate aircraft transmission is received by the ADS-B receiver station, the data should be
transmitted to the ATC system for operational use or for technical recording and analysis use. If no
aircraft transmission data is received to fill an Asterix data item during any update cycle, the data item
should not be included in the Asterix data stream to reduce bandwidth requirements.

6.3 Group 1 (Mandatory Data Items): An Asterix Cat21 message should not be
transmitted unless the mandatory data items defined in Appendix A are all present.

6.4 Group 2 (Desirable Data Items) : The data items defined in Appendix B are
operationally desirable which should always be transmitted in the Asterix Cat 21 messages whenever the
data are received by the 1090ES receiver station from aircraft (if allowed by the relevant Asterix
standard chosen).

6.5 Group 3 (Optional Data Items) : The data items defined in Appendix C are considered
optional and may or may not need to be transmitted depending on availability of such data from aircraft
and/or other specific operational needs.

6.6. Group 4 (Future Data Items): The following data are defined in the DO260A and
DO260B standards but are not yet defined in the Asterix standard. This group is provided for information
only. It illustrates the need for system designers to provide for future adaptability when possible and
when cost effective to do so. Not only will the Asterix standard continue to evolve, but changes to
DO260 can also be anticipated within the decade.

a) Target heading: Information from DO260A/B Target state and status messages

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(On condition messages). These could be used for detection of pilot errors in
selection of heading/altitude; and

b) GPS Offset: Could be used to more accurately display aircraft position on an

airport surface, or better detect that an aircraft has passed an airport hold point.

6.7 When developing a specification for an ADS-B receiver station, it is considered

necessary that the specification requires the transmission of all data items that are operationally desirable
(Group 2), when such data are received from the aircraft, in addition to the data items that are mandatory
(Group 1) in Asterix messages. Whether Group 3 optional data items will need to be transmitted or not
should be configurable on item-by-item basis within the ADS-B receiver station depending on specific
operational needs.

7. PROCESSING OF ASTERIX ADS-B DATA AT THE ATC SYSTEM

7.1 An Asterix Cat21 message should not be accepted by the ATC system for processing
unless it includes at least all the Group 1 data items.

7.2 The ATC system should process all received Asterix Cat21 message data items that bring
operational benefits (i.e. Group 2 data items). An ATM automation specification should require that the
system appropriately process those Group 2 data items depending on specific operational need. Whether the
ATC system will process Group 3 optional data items will depend on specific operational needs.

8. DATA SHARING OF ASTERIX ADS-B DATA

8.1 In principle, all data receiving from the shared ADS-B receiver station should be delivered to the
receiving party as far as practicable without filtering, unless owing to technical reasons such as the need
to convert the data from one ASTERIX format to another, or it is requested by the receiving party of the
data.

8.2 It is considered necessary that all data items that are mandatory in Asterix messages (i.e.
Group 1 data items) and operationally desirable (i.e. Group 2 data items) when such data are received
from aircraft, should be included in data sharing. In the event that the data have to be filtered, the list of
optional data items (i.e. Group 3 data items) needs to be shared will be subject to mutual agreement
between the two data sharing parties concerned.

9. ISSUE RELATED TO DO260A

9.1 Support of DO260A using Asterix Cat 21 Ed0.23

a) DO260A was developed after Ed0.23 of Asterix was defined. Therefore, Ed0.23
does not directly support DO260A. However, receiver station software can
generate useful Ed0.23 Asterix data from DO260A reports through use of the
following techniques;

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b) A useful I021/090 Figure of Merit can be generated from DO260A messages.

Some implementations have a table, which defines the FOM/PA to be generated
for each combination of SIL, NIC and NAC. The contents of the table can be
offline defined to generate the appropriate FOM/PA values. The downstream
ATC system can then process DO260A reports as if they were DO260 reports;
and

c) If there is a particular need for the ATC system to have access to the NIC/NAC
or SIL or other data item that exist in DO260A (but not in DO260), then users
may need to consider a more recent version of Cat 21.

9.2 Support of DO260A using Asterix Cat 21 Ed 1.0 or Ed2.1 (or later versions)

a) When DO260A is used, then the ANSP could decide to use Asterix Cat 21
Ed1.0 (or later versions) or Ed2.1 (or later versions); and

b) Readers are invited to carefully examine the DO260A fields (see Appendix D) to
determine if the benefits of additional DO260A fields are large enough to
warrant adoption of Asterix Cat 21 Ed1.0 (or later versions) or Ed2.1 (or later
versions).

10. ISSUE RELATED TO DO260B

10.1 Support of DO260B using Asterix Cat 21 Ed0.23

a) DO260B was developed some years after DO260A. Therefore, Asterix Cat 21,
Ed0.23 does not directly support DO260B;

b) The same techniques used for processing DO260A can be used for processing
DO260B, however, the table used must account for NIC supplement B & NIC
supplement C, and may also wish to account for SDA; and

c) If there is a particular need for the ATC system to have access to the new data
items offered by DO260B, then users may need to consider a more recent
version of Cat 21 (e.g. Ed2.1 or later versions).

10.2 Support of DO260B using Asterix Cat 21 Ed2.1 or later versions

a) If DO260B is used, then the ANSP could decide to use Asterix Cat 21 Ed2.1 or
later; and

b) Readers are invited to carefully examine the DO260B data items (see Appendix
D) to determine if the benefits of additional DO260B data items are large
enough to warrant adoption of Asterix Cat 21 Version 2.1 or later.

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11. ADS-B FORMAT CONVERSION AND FILTER SYSTEM

11.1 It is clear that the evolution of 1090ES ADS-B transmission will continue. Avionics
software will be upgraded to provide additional or changed functionality. As a result Asterix standards will
also continue to evolve, and ATC systems will need to be adaptable to be able to cope with new
functionality requirements and new message standards.

11.2 The use of an ADS-B format conversion & filter (ADS-B FC&F) system between
domestic ADS-B systems and data shared with other states is a cost-effective way to provide the
necessary protection and flexibility in this evolution. Such a system provides ADS-B format conversion
between domestic and foreign ADS-B systems. While decoupling one ADS-B Asterix environment from
another, the system allows information that meets specific sharing criteria to be passed through for data
sharing. By doing so, loading on the ATM automation systems to process ADS-B data and bandwidth
requires to transmit the ADS-B data could then be reduced. The system also allows independent
domestic format changes without disruption to the foreign environment. A typical structure could be as
shown below:

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7 Attachment A - Group 1 (Mandatory Data Items)

Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/010 Data Source Identification X X Identifies source of data. Important if validity checks
are performed as an anti spoofing capability.
Validation that the data is received from an approved
ADS-B receiverstation. Data received from a receiver
station should not be processed if the position of the
reported aircraft is an unreasonable distance away
from the known location of the ADS-B receiver
station. Where space based ADS-B is used and a
nominal station location is defined, such range
processing limits will need to account for the coverage
supplied.
I021/030 Time of Day X Necessary to extrapolate the ADS-B data to time of
display. Data received with a Time of Day too far in
the past should be
discarded. This data is too old.
I021/071 Time of Applicability of X Necessary to extrapolate the ADS-B data to time of
or I021/073 Position or display. Data received with a Time of Day too far in
Time of Message the past should be
reception for position discarded. This data is too old.
I021/040 Target Report Descriptor X X Indicates if report is a duplicate, on the receiver, is a
simulated target, is a test target. This needs to be
checked by ATC system prior to processing. If the
data indicates that the report is a test target or a
simulated target, it is normally processed differently
to “real” targets.

I021/080 Target Address X X Included in all 1090ES downlink messages, so always

available. Used for report/report
linkage in ATC tracking.
I021/090 Figure of Merit/Quality X X Position cannot be used without quality indicator. If
Indicators the quality of the positional data does not meet the
requirements the data
should be discarded.
I021/130 Position in WGS-84 X X Report cannot be used without position
co-ordinates

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Attachment B - Group 2 (Desirable Data Items)

Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/008 Aircraft operational status X TCAS capability, Target state reporting

capability, CDTI capability, Single/dual aircraft
antenna.
It is desirable to have immediate
knowledge of RA event.
I021/020 Emitter Category X X Aircraft or vehicle type
I021/140 Geometric Altitude/Height X X Useful for RVSM monitoring. Not normally used
for ATC application. Could perhaps be used as an
indicator of
correct QNH setting in aircraft.
I021/145 Flight Level X X Flight level is an important information
to ATC
I021/155 Barometric Vertical Rate X X Used for predictive tools and safety nets. Either
I021/157 Geometric Vertical Rate X X Barometric vertical rate or Geometric vertical
rate is provided by the aircraft – not both.

However, the ATC system can calculate vertical

rate from multiple flight level reports if these
data items are not
available.

I021/160 Ground Vector X X Provides excellent vector to support

extrapolation of positional data to time of
display.

However, the ATC system can calculate the

velocity vector (ground vector) from multiple
position reports. I021/160 however, is normally
far superior that
ATC system calculation.
I021/170 Target Identification X X This is the callsign/Flight ID is extremely useful
for ATC and matching to the flight plan (if any).

Target identification is only sent once per 5

seconds. Some receiver stations designs attach
the target identification (if known from previous
recent downlinks) even if not received in the last 5
seconds.

The field can be missing at the edge of

ADS-B coverage – for flights inbound to
coverage.

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I021/200 Target Status X X This is the emergency type and is highly

desirable.

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Attachment C - Group 3 (Optional Data Items)

Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/077 Time of report transmission X Time of applicability is relevant for

ATC system processing. Time of transmission
is less relevant.
I021/032 Time of Day Accuracy X Maximum error in Time of day.
Normally the maximum value is known
by the ANSP because of
station design.
I021/095 Velocity Accuracy X If using GPS, velocity accuracy will be
adequate if the Position quality is
accurate.
I021/072 Time of applicability of X Can be managed by a velocity data
velocity time out in receiver station.
I021/075 Time of message reception of X Normally velocity is in the same Asterix
velocity message as position. Velocity
data time out in receiver station.
I021/161 Track number X Tracking can be performed by ATC system.
Also the 24 bit code (aircraft address) could
be used as a pseudo
track number.
I021/110 Trajectory Intent X X Defined in DO260 but not transmitted by any
known product. Not defined in
DO260A or DO260B
I021/146 (Intermediate) Selected X X Target altitude :
Altitude Information from DO260A/B Target state
I021/148 Final State Selected Altitude X X and status messages (On condition
messages). These could be used for
detection of pilot errors in
selection of heading/altitude.
I021/015 Service identification X Type of Service (VDL4, Ext Squitter, UAT,
TIS-B VDL4, TIS-B Ext Squitter, TIS-B
UAT, FIS-B VDL4,
GRAS VDL4, MLT). Not useful to
most ATC systems.
I021/016 Service management X Update rate or whether data driven
output from GS. Normally known by
receiver.

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Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/074 Time of message reception of X High resolution is designed to support MLAT

position – high resolution system processing by receiver.
Not required for pure ADS-B.
I021/076 Time of message reception of X High resolution is designed to support
velocity – high resolution MLAT system processing by receiver. Not
required for pure ADS-B.
I021/210 MOPS version/ Link Technology X X Maybe useful for statistics about equipage.
Indicator Not operationally relevant

I021/070 Mode 3/A code X Could be used for legacy ATC system
that do not use Flight ID
I021/165 Rate of Turn/Track Angle rate X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/271 Surface capabilities and X
characteristics
I021/132 Message amplitude X Useful for technical analysis. Not
operationally relevant
I021/250 Mode S MB data X
I021/260 ACAS resolution advisory X
report
I021/400 Receiver ID X
I021/295 Data ages X
I021/150 Air Speed X X Defined in standards but only sent in absence
I021/151 True Air Speed X X Ground vector information. Can’t be used for
extrapolation unless wind speed known.

I021/152 Magnetic Heading X X Defined in standards but only sent in

absence Ground vector information.
I021/220 Met Report X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/230 Roll Angle X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/131 Position in WGS-84 X
coordinates, high resolution

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 7 - 12

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

Attachment D - Differences among DO260, DO260A, DO260B

DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information
Asterix CAT 21

Introduction of NUCP is used. NIC is used to More levels of NIC is shown in Ed1.0 The additional quantum levels of NIC would
Navigation Integrity replace NUCP. NIC available. and above. More levels allow the ANSP more flexibility in deciding
Category (NIC) to Vertical of NIC (shown as PIC) whether the NIC is considered as ‘good’ (if
replace Navigation component are available in v2.1. required)
Uncertainty Category removed.
(NUCP) However, for 3 NM & 5 NM separation with HPL
1Nm and 2 Nm respectively, this additional
quantum is not useful.

Quality Indicator for NUCR is used. Replaced with Vertical Available in Ed0.23 and Vertical component is not available for DO260B.
Velocity (NUCR and NACV. component above.
NACV) Definition removed.
remains the
same.
Surveillance Integrity Not available. Surveillance Renamed as Available in Ed1.0 and The SIL will allow the user to further assess the
Level and Source Integrity Level Source Integrity above. integrity of the reported position (if required).
Integrity Level (SIL) is used. Level. Definition
is changed to NB: An implied SIL exists for DO260 aircraft if
exclude avionics they always use GPS. However DO260 aircraft
fault. do not provide SIL.

System Design Not available. Not available. To address Available in Ed2.1. The SDA will indicate the robustness of the
Assurance (SDA) probability of system. ANSPs may decide on a minimum SDA
avionics fault. for ADS-B services.
If this action is taken then DO260 and DO260A
aircraft will be unable to meet the criteria.

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 7 - 13

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Navigation Accuracy Not available. Derived from Relies only on Available in Ed1.0 and A reported accuracy is not provided by DO260.
Category (NACP) HFOM and HFOM. above. However, an estimated accuracy can be derived
VFOM. from NUC – assuming that NUC is HPL based.

Geometric Vertical Not available. Not available. Derived from Available in Ed2.1. Geometric altitude accuracy is not normally
Accuracy (GVA) VFOM. required for operational purposes.

Barometric Altitude Not available. To indicate Same as Available in Ed1.0 and The NICBARO indicates the integrity of the
Integrity Code integrity of DO-260A above. barometric height.
(NICBARO) barometric
altitude. ANSPs could indicate to the controller that
Barometric data has not been verified, however,
aircraft without dual barometric systems/air data
computers may be unable to provide a non zero
NICBARO as data could be unnecessarily
discarded.

Length / Width of Not available. Provide an Same as Available in Ed1.0 and The width / length indicate the size of the
Aircraft indication of DO-260A above. aircraft. This information may be used as an
aircraft size. input for generating alerts on airport surface
movement control.

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 7 - 15

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Indication of Only show More Additional Available in Ed1.0 and Indication on the availability of 1090ES in /
capabilities status of information information on above, except UAT in may allow the controller to anticipate a
TCAS and available type of ADS-B in availability of potential request for in-trail procedure clearance.
CDTI. including (i.e. 1090ES in or 1090ES/UAT in and NB: ITP requires decision support aids which are
capability to UAT in). information on GPS more complex than ADS-B IN alone.
send Air antenna offset.
Reference
Velocity, Target
State and
Trajectory
Change reports.
Status of
Identity
Switch.
Status of Resolution Not available. Information on Same as Available in Ed1.0 and Indication of the resolution advisory status
Advisory whether DO-260A above, allows the controller to know whether the pilots
Resolution were alerted about the potential conflict.
Advisory is
active.
GPS offset Not available. Indication on Information on GPS offset status is Indication on GPS offset may be one of the
whether GPS GPS antenna available in Ed1.0 and inputs for generating alerts on airport surface
offset is offset is above. Information on movement control.
applied. provided. GPS offset is not
available in ASTERIX
Intention Not available. Able to Same as Intended altitude is The intended heading and flight level can be
indicate DO-260A available in Ed0.23. used as an input to the trajectory prediction
intended Intended heading is not algorithm in the Short-Term Conflict Alert.
altitude and available in ASTERIX.
heading.

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 7 - 16

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Target Status Not available. Not available. Indication of Vertical Navigation The target status allows the controller to know
Autopilot mode, mode, Altitude Hold the mode that the aircraft is in. i.e.: It could be
Vertical mode and Approach presented to ATC.
Navigation mode, Mode are available in Ed
Altitude Hold 0.23 and above
mode, Approach
Mode and LNAV LNAV Mode is
Mode. available in Ed2.1

Resolution Advisory Not available. Not available. Availability of Available in Ed1.0 and The Resolution Advisory will help the controller
Active above. know the advisories that are provided to the
Resolution pilots by the ACAS. This helps prevent the
Advisories; controller from giving instructions that are in
Resolution conflict with the ACAS.
Advisory
complement
record,
Resolution
Terminated;
Multiple Threat
encounter; Threat
Type indicator;
and Threat
Identity data.

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 7 - 17

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Mode A DO260 Broadcasted Broadcasted Available in Ed0.26 and The Mode A allows flight plans to be coupled
change 1, using test worldwide as a above. with the ADS-B tracks (supports legacy ATM
allows this message in regular message. automation system).
using test USA only.

message in
USA only.
This was not
implemented
in actual
products.

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 7 - 18

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

Appendix 8

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 8 - 1

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 8 - 2

 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

_____________

Edition 13.0 September 2020 Appendix 8 - 3

 SURICG/5
Attachment 1 to the Report

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

1. AUSTRALIA (2)
1. Mr. Adrian Shalley Senior Engineering Specialist Adrian.Shalley@airservicesaustralia.com;
Airservices Australia

2. Mr. Jeffrey Bollard Service and Asset Performance Supervisor jeffrey.bollard@airservicesaustralia.com;

Airservices Australia

2. CHINA (9)
3. Mr. Zhang De Principal Staff Member zhangde@caac.gov.cn;
Civil Aviation Administration of China

4. Ms. Susu Cao Assistant of CNS Division caosusu@atmb.net.cn;

CNS Division of Air Traffic Management Bureau of
CAAC

5. Mr. Yuan Yao Assistant of CNS Division yaoyuan@atmb.org;

Middle South Regional Air Traffic Management
Bureau of CAAC

6. Mr. Yanjie Gao Assistant of CNS Division 2281120313@qq.com;

East China Regional Air Traffic Management Bureau
of CAAC

7. Mr. Ting Jiang Senior Engineer jt_caac@163.com;

Aeronautical Affairs Management Division of
CAAC

8. Mr. Xin Zhao Engineer zhaox@atmb.net.cn;

Technical Centre of Air Traffic Management Bureau
of CAAC

ATTM. 1 - 1
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

9. Mr. Siyuan Rong Deputy Director of CNS Division rosy992@aliyun.com;
North China Regional Air Traffic Management
Bureau of CAAC

10. Mr. Guangming Zhang Professor gmzhang@cafuc.edu.cn;

Civil Aviation Flight University of China (CAFUC)

11. Mr. Deng Sheng Ji Project Manager dengshengji@caacsri.com;

The Second Research Institute of CAAC

3. HONG KONG, CHINA (6)

12. Mr. Hui Man Ho Acting Assistant Director-General of Civil Aviation mhhui@cad.gov.hk;
(Air Traffic Engineering Services)
Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

13. Mr. How Sze Lung Electronics Engineer dslhow@cad.gov.hk;

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

14. Ms. Mak Yuet Yan, Annie Evaluation Officer ayymak@cad.gov.hk;

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

15. Mr. Kwok Ching Ho, Daniel Project Officer dchkwok@cad.gov.hk;

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

16. Mr. Suen Hoi Tak, Ava Project Officer ahtsuen@cad.gov.hk;

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

17. Mr. Chung Ho Yin Air Traffic Control Officer II jhychung@cad.gov.hk;

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

4. MACAO CHINA (5)

ATTM. 1 - 2
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

18. Mr. Sun Shabo Consultant sbsun@aacm.gov.mo;
Civil Aviation Authority of Macao, China

19. Mr. Lo Veng Tong, Freeman Senior Safety Officer freemanlo@aacm.gov.mo;

Civil Aviation Authority of Macao, China

20. Mr. Pun Sio Kuong, Samson Safety Officer samsonpun@aacm.gov.mo;

Civil Aviation Authority of Macao, China

21. Mr. Wong Pui Man, Cecil Head of ICT Division cecilwong@aod.macau-airport.com;
Macau International Airport Co, Ltd.

22. Mr. Sun Keng Chong Senior ICT Engineer sonnysun@aod.macau-airport.com;

Macau International Airport Co, Ltd.

5. DPR KOREA (5)

23. Mr. Kim Kun Ju Chief, Air Navigation Aids Section, Air Traffic gaca@silibank.net.kp;
Management Department
General Administration of Civil Aviation

24. Mr. Pak Tong Chol Senior Officer, Air Navigation Aids Section gaca@silibank.net.kp;
Air Traffic Management Department
General Administration of Civil Aviation

25. Mr. Kim Thae Ryong Officer, International Organizations Department gaca@silibank.net.kp;
General Administration of Civil Aviation

26. Mr. Ho Kwang Sung Engineer, Air Navigation Aids Section gaca@silibank.net.kp;
Air Traffic Management Department
General Administration of Civil Aviation

27. Mr. Pak Hyon Chol Engineer, Air Navigation Aids Section gaca@silibank.net.kp;
Air Traffic Management Department
General Administration of Civil Aviation

ATTM. 1 - 3
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

6. FIJI (2)
28. Mrs. Sereima Bolanavatu Air Navigation Service Inspector (CNS) sereima.bolanavatu@caaf.org.fj;
Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji

29. Mr. Shailendra Pandaram CNS/ATM Specialist ShailendraP@fijiairports.com.fj;

Fiji Airports Limited

7. INDIA (2)
30. Mr. Sudhamay Maiti General Manager (CNS) sudhamay@AAI.AERO;
Airports Authority of India Sudhamay1964@gmail.com;
gmcnser@aai.aero;

31. Mr. Tony C. Tharayil Joint General Manager (CNS) tctharayil@AAI.AERO;

Airports Authority of India

8. INDONESIA (11)
32. Mr. Taruna Jaya Chief of Navigation Aid, Surveillance and taruna_jaya@yahoo.com
Automation System Facilities

33. Mr. A.Budi Fathoni Air Navigation Inspector bfathoni@yahoo.com;

Directorate of General Civil Aviation

34. Mrs. Emi Astuti Air Navigation Inspector emiastuti.atc6@gmail.com;

Directorate of General Civil Aviation

35. Mr. Guntur Wirayuda Air Navigation Inspector gw.yudha@gmail.com;

Directorate of General Civil Aviation

36. Mr. M. Riza Semaryan Lubis Air Navigation Inspector mrizaslubis@gmail.com;

Directorate of General Civil Aviation

37. Mrs. Mardiana Air Navigation Inspector dhy_en@yahoo.com;

Directorate of General Civil Aviation

ATTM. 1 - 4
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

38. Mr. Dedy Iskandar Surveillance and ATC Automation Readiness dedy.nav7@gmail.com;
AirNav Indonesia Headquarter

39. Mr. Lanang Wibisono Manager of System Planning and Service Facility – lanang.wibosono@gmail.com;
Operation Directorate
AirNav Indonesia

40. Mr. Mohamad Ali Said Junior Manager Design Facilities of Surveillance, mohamad.ali@airnavindonesia.co.id
ATC Automation and Instrument Landing System
AirNav Indonesia

41. Mr. Herdianto ATS System Specialist herdi.anto5717@gmail.com;

AirNav Indonesia

42. Mr. Sudrajat Wiharyoko Specialist ATS System sudrajatwiharyoko@gmail.com;

AirNav Indonesia

9. JAPAN (6)
43. Mr. Yasuhiro Otani Special Assistant to the Director ohtani-y48ae@mlit.go.jp;
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau

44. Mr. Kenji Uehara Chief Officer uehara-k46qj@mlit.go.jp;

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau

45. Mr. Hiromi Miyazaki Principal Officer hiro@enri.go.jp;

Electronic Navigation Research Institute

46. Mr. Junichi Naganawa Senior Researcher naganawa@enri.go.jp;

Electronic Navigation Research Institute

47. Mr. Shigcru Ozeki Technical Advisor ozeki-s200@jransa.or.jp;

Japan Radio Air Navigation Systems Association

ATTM. 1 - 5
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

48. Mr. Takeo Fujimori Chief Engineering Analyst fujimori-t183@jransa.or.jp
Japan Radio Air Navigation Systems Association

10. LAO PDR (1)

49. Mr. Moukphamay Thammavongsa Air Navigation Systems Engineer moukth@msn.com;
Lao Air Navigation Services (LANS)

11. MALAYSIA (3)

50. Mr. Mohd Shahrul Azree Bin Remly Assistant Director shahrulazree@caam.gov.my;
Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia

51. Mr. Mohd Fitri Bin Ishak Senior Assistant Director fitri@caam.gov.my;
Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia

52. Mr. Mahyuddin Sajuri Principal Assistant Director mahyuddin@caam.gov.my;

Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia

12. MYANMAR (3)

53. Mr. Win Maw Deputy General Manager (CNS) winmaw@dcamyanmar.aero;
Department of Civil Aviation (Myanmar)

54. Mr. Htet Arkar Executive Engineer (CNS) kohtetarkar@gmail.com;

Department of Civil Aviation (Myanmar)

55. Mr. Han Tun Aung Assistant Engineer (CNS) hantunaung@dcamyanmar.aero;

Department of Civil Aviation (Myanmar)

13. NEPAL (3)

56. Mr. Devendra Joshi Deputy Director dswoyambhu@yahoo.com;
Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

57. Mr. Sanjeev Singh Kathayat Deputy Director kathayat@hotmail.com;

CNS Standards Division

ATTM. 1 - 6
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

58. Ms. Aastha Pandey Deputy Manager aastha_pandey03@yahoo.com;
Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

14. PHILIPPINES (4)

59. Mr. Joferand Joseph Y. Torrefranca Acting Division Chief III, CNS/MET Division joferand@yahoo.com;
ANPPDD
Airways Navigation Service
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines

60. Mr. Julius Ruel D. Resquir CNSSO V/ANS-FIC, Manila ATM Center jresquir2003@yahoo.com;
Airways Navigation Service
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines

61. Mr. Ariel J. Carabeo Chief, Manila ACC arielcarabeo@yahoo.com;

Air Traffic Service
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines

62. Mr. Joseph Tyrone R. Arias Air Traffic Management Officer V jtrakx06@gmail.com;
Air Traffic Service Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines

15. REPUBLIC OF KOREA (9)

63. Mr. Lee Jung Yoon Deputy Director ljyun@korea.kr;
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport

64. Ms. Jeong Mi Jin Assistant Manager mj.jeong@korea.kr;

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport

65. Mr. Lee Jung Assistant Director of Air Navigation Facilities outpost@korea.kr;
Division
Incheon Air Traffic Control Regional Office

ATTM. 1 - 7
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

66. Ms. Cha Yu Jin Assistant Director of Air Navigation Facilities yjcha8@korea.kr;
Division
Incheon Air Traffic Control Regional Office

67. Mr. Kang Ho Deak Assistant Director of ATC Division duke999@korea.kr;

Incheon Air Traffic Control Regional Office

68. Mr. Sung Yo Han Assistant Director of ATC Division yh9130@korea.kr;

Incheon Air Traffic Control Regional Office

69. Mr. Yang Hyun Bae General Manager yanghb@airport.co.kr;

Korea Airport Corporation

70. Mr. Lee Soo Ho Assistant Manager lsh1208@airport.co.kr;

Korea Airport Corporation

71. Mr. Jung Yong Woo Assistant Manager jyw0213@airport.co.kr;

Korea Airport Corporation

16. SINGAPORE (8)

72. Mr. Yeo Cheng Nam Consultant (Aeronautical Telecommunications & yeo_cheng_nam@caas.gov.sg;
Engineering)
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

73. Mr. Ho Wee Sin Deputy Director (Technical Standards and Support) ho_wee_sin@caas.gov.sg;
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

74. Ms. Ng Mei Chin Head (Surveillance Projects) ng_mei_chin@caas.gov.sg;

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

75. Mr. Chua Eng Leong Senior Engineer (Surveillance Systems) chua_eng_leong@caas.gov.sg;
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

ATTM. 1 - 8
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

76. Mr. Joe Chua Wee Jui Chief (Systems Planning) joe_chua@caas.gov.sg;
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

77. Ms. June See Air Traffic Control Manager (Systems Planning) june_see@caas.gov.sg;
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

78. Mr. Aloysius Ang Air Traffic Control Manager (Systems Planning) aloysius_ang@caas.gov.sg;
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

79. Mr. Bryan Cheng Principal Engineer (Surveillance Projects) Bryan_CHENG@caas.gov.sg;

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

17. SRI LANKA (7)

80. Ms. Sarojanie S.A.N. Civil Aviation Inspector – AIS caiais@caa.lk;
Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka

81. Mr. Angage Upula Ranaraja Perera Assistant Air Traffic Safety Electronics Engineer upula.eane@airport.lk;
Airport & Aviation Services (S/L) Ltd.

82. Mr. H.A. Priyantha Electronics Engineer priyantha.eane@airport.lk;

Airport & Aviation Services (S/L) Ltd.

83. Mr. Prasanna Wijeratne Electronics Engineer prasannaw.eane@airport.lk;

Airport & Aviation Services (S/L) Ltd.

84. Mr. K.S.P.K Patrinrana Assistant Air Traffic Safety Electronics Engineer kithmini.eane@airport.lk;
Airport & Aviation Services (S/L) Ltd.

85. Mr. Asanga Senarath Bandara Senior Electronics Engineer asanga.eane@airport.lk;

Airport & Aviation Services (S/L) Ltd.

86. Mr. Jananath Konara Rathninda Deputy Head of Electronics and Ai Navigation ananath.eane@airport.lk;
Engineering
Airport & Aviation Services (S/L) Ltd.

ATTM. 1 - 9
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

18. THAILAND (4)
87. Mr. Krisanapon Paisal CNS Officer krisanapon.p@caat.or.th;
Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

88. Mr. Nattapol Witsuwat CNS Officer nattapol.w@caat.or.th;

Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

89. Mr. Chanyut Phrukkumwong Director, Air Traffic Engineering Research and chanyut.ph@aerothai.co.th;
Development Department
Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd.

90. Mr. Ponlawat Wattayatin Air Traffic Engineer ponlawat.wa@aerothai.co.th;

Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd.

19. USA (3)

91. Mr. Michael Watkins Senior Air Traffic Representative, Asia Pacific michael.w.watkins@faa.gov;
Federal Aviation Administration
Air Traffic Organization, System Operations

92. Mr. Paul VonHoene Aviation Safety Inspector paul.vonhoene@faa.gov;

Federal Aviation Administration
Aviation Safety
Flight Technologies and Procedures Division
Flight Operation Group

93. Mr. Alejandro Rodriguez Senior Technical Advisor Alejandro.Rodriguez@faa.gov;

Federal Aviation Administration

20. VIET NAM (12)

94. Mr. Ho Sy Tung Deputy General Director tunghosy@vatm.vn;
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

ATTM. 1 - 10
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

95. Mr. Pham Hung Son Deputy Director of Technical Department sonph@vatm.vn;
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

96. Mr. Nguyen Xuan Nhu Deputy Director of Project Management Department nxnhu@gmail.com;
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

97. Mr. Dinh Nhat Minh Deputy Director of ATTECH minhdn@attech.com.vn;

Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

98. Mr. Duong Thanh Nam Deputy Director of Technical Division, ATTECH namdt@attech.com.vn;
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

99. Mr. Trinh Van Nghia Deputy Chief of CNS service Technical Supervision nghiatv@attech.com.vn;
and Management Center, ATTECH
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

100. Mr. Nguyen Viet Cuong Chief of CNS Unit, Technical Department cuongnv_bkt@vatm.vn;
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

101. Mr. Pham Cong Nam Officer of CNS Unit, Technical Department cnampham284@gmail.com;
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

102. Mr. Tran Duc Phong Chief of Specialized Division, Project Management phongtd@vatm.vn;
Department
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

103. Mr. Ho Ngoc Thang Officer of Specialized Division, Project Management thanghn@vatm.vn;
Department
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management (VATM)

104. Mr. Nguyen Manh Tuan CNS Official, Air Navigation Department tuannm@caa.gov.vn;
Civil Aviation Administration of Viet Nam (CAAV)

ATTM. 1 - 11
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

105. Mr. Vu Ngoc Tuan CNS Official, Air Navigation Department vungoctuan@caa.gov.vn;
Civil Aviation Administration of Viet Nam (CAAV)

21. AIREON (1)

106. Mr. Greg Dunstone Sales Engineer greg.dunstone@aireon.com;
Aireon LLC
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace
Industries Associations (ICCAIA)

22. CANSO (1)

107. Mr. Hai Eng Chiang Director Asia Pacific Affairs hai.eng.chiang@canso.org;
Civil Air Navigation Services Organization
(CANSO)

23. EUROCARE (2)

108. Mr. Christian Schleifer Secretary General christian.schleifer@eurocae.net;
EUROCAE

109. Ms. Anna von Groote Director Technical Programme anna.vongroote@eurocae.net;

Director Technical Programme EUROCAE

24. IATA (5)

110. Mr. Honghai Yang Regional Director of Safety & Flight Operations Yanghh@iata.org;
International Air Transport Association (IATA)

111. Mr. David Rollo Assistant Director – Safety and Flight Operations – rollod@iata.org;
ASPAC
International Air Transport Association (IATA)

112. Mr. John Moore Assistant Director – Safety and Flight Operations moorej@iata.org;
ASPAC

ATTM. 1 - 12
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

113. Capt. Angadeep Singh Chopra Head – International Affairs and Investigations Angadeep.chopra@airvistara.com;
Vistara

114. Mr. Bin Hu Manager, Safety and Flight Operations, North Asia hub@iata.org;
International Air Transport Association (IATA)

25. IFATCA (1)

115. Mr. Anthony Ang EVP Asia Pacific anthony.ang@ifatca.org
International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers'
Associations (IFATCA)

26. PCCW (4)

116. Mr. Raymond Luk Vice President, Strategic Account Management, raymondl@pccwglobal.com;
Global Presales and Technology Engagement
PCCW Global Limited

117. Mr. Benny Cheng Assistant Vice President, Strategic Account benny.hf.cheng@pccwglobal.com;
Management
PCCW Global Limited

118. Mr. Eddy Lee Assistant Vice President, Strategic Account elee@pccwglobal.com;
Management, Global Presales
PCCW Global Limited

119. Mr. Bono Ng Senior Business Development Manager, Aviation & bcng@pccwglobal.com;
Special projects
Strategic Account Management
PCCW Global Limited

27. ICAO (2)

ATTM. 1 - 13
 Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/FAX/E-MAIL

120. Mr. Luo Yi Regional Officer CNS Tel: +66 (2) 537 8189 ext. 155
International Civil Aviation Organization Fax: +66 (2) 537 8199
Asia and Pacific Office E-mail: yluo@icao.int
252/1, Vibhavadi Rangsit Road
Ladyao, Chatuchak
Bangkok 10900
THAILAND

121. Ms. Bhabhinan Sirapongkosit Programme Assistant (CNS/MET/ENV) Tel: +66 (2) 537 8189 ext. 49
International Civil Aviation Organization Fax: +66 (2) 537 8199
Asia and Pacific Office E-mail: bsirapongkosit@icao.int
252/1, Vibhavadi Rangsit Road
Ladyao, Chatuchak
Bangkok 10900
THAILAND

ATTM. 1 - 14
 SURICG/5
Attachment 2 to the Report

LIST OF PAPERS

WP/IP/SP Agenda Subject Presented by

and Flimsy Item
No.

LIST OF WORKING PAPERS

WP/01 - Provisional Agenda Secretariat

WP/02 2 Outcomes of Relevant Meetings on Surveillance Secretariat

WP/03 3 Additional System Area Codes (SAC) for Surveillance Secretariat

Systems in APAC and Update on Regional Supplement to
ASTERIX Interface Control Document (ICD)

WP/04 4 Action Items from SURICG/4 Secretariat

WP/05 6 Review Report of SEA/BOB ADS-B WG/15 Meeting Chairperson and

Secretariat

WP/06 7 Outcome of the Mode S DAPS WG/3 Co-chairs and Secretariat

WP/07 5 Example of ADS-B Position Verification Performance Japan/ENRI

WP/08 3 Proposed Solutions for Sharing of Surveillance Data Singapore

LIST OF INFORMATION PAPERS

IP/01 - Web-conference Bulletin Secretariat

IP/02 5 Update on ATC Surveillance Activities in Australia Australia

IP/03 5 The Implementation of New Surveillance System within Democratic People’s

Pyongyang FIR Republic of Korea

IP/04 5 Recent ADS-B Avionics Issues Observed in the United USA/FAA

States

IP/05 5 Revisions to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-114, ADS-B USA/FAA

Operations

IP/06 5 ADS-B Equipage and Quality Performance in the U.S. USA/FAA

IP/07 2 1090 MHz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issues Secretariat
with UAS

IP/08 3 PNG Deployment of Space based ADS-B PNG and ICCAIA/Aireon

IP/09 3 FAA’s Operational Evaluation of Space-Based ADS-B in USA/FAA

the Caribbean

IP/10 9 SSR Reception Malfunction Caused by UAV Video Republic of Kora

Transmitter

ATTM. 2 - 1
 Attachment 2 to the Report

WP/IP/SP Agenda Subject Presented by

and Flimsy Item
No.

IP/11 5 Airspace Applicability of the U.S. 2020 ADS-B Equipage USA/FAA

Mandate

IP/12 3 Long-range Air Traffic Surveillance Display System for Hong Kong China
Air Traffic Flow Management

IP/13 3 Space based ADS-B Update ICCAIA/Aireon

IP/14 4 The ICAO Aircraft Address Monitoring in Japan Japan

IP/15 5 Update on Surveillance Facilities in Indonesia Indonesia

IP/16 5 Discussion on Technical Methods to Prevent Runway China

Incursion with Operation Verification

IP/17 4 Introduction to the Management and Application of 24-bit China

Aircraft Addresses for Chinese Civil Aviation

IP/18 4 Mode S Radar Survey to Support II/SI Mixed Operation in China

China

IP/19 5 Update on ADS-B Implementation Project in Republic of Republic of Korea

Korea

IP/20 3 The SAC SIC Code Allocation Management and Using in China
China

IP/21 5 Updates the Action Plan for Surveillance in China China

LIST OF FLIMSY

Flimsy_01 2 Proposal for Amendment of Annex 10. Volume IV Secretariat

regarding Airborne Collision Avoidance System X
(ACAS X)

Flimsy_02 3 (b) CRV and SWIM Presentation PCCW Global

Flimsy_03 5 ADS-B Out Mandate in Europe Hong Kong, China

Flimsy_04 9 Update of Surveillance Panel (ASWG) Singapore

Flimsy_05 6 Discussion on Future SEA-BOB ADS-B WG Secretariat

LIST OF PRESENTATION

SP/01 5 Standards to Support Global Interoperability EUROCAE

_____________

ATTM. 2 - 2