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Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
Case Studies from Lebanon in the
Aftermath of the 2006 War
© 2010 Selection and editorial material: Howayda Al-Harithy; individual chapters: the
contributors
This book was commissioned and edited by Alexandrine Press, Marcham, Oxfordshire
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized
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Acknowledgements xi
Index 214
Foreword
This book lies at the intersection of many fields but it could easily be classified
as belonging to or starting a new subfield called reconstruction studies.
This new specialty, which may be loosely situated within the larger field
of interdisciplinary urban studies requires an engagement with other fields
like migration studies, refugee studies, post-war studies, social movements,
political mobilization, physical planning, and urban design. While the field
of urban studies itself has always paid attention to the processes of urban
development and construction, it has not paid adequate attention to the
politics and the impact of reconstruction in the making of the city, particularly
after periods of major destruction, be they natural or human-made disasters.
For more than three decades, Lebanon has been besieged by every possible
form of brutality and collective terror including sectarian factionalism,
religious bigotry, militia takeover, civil war, state sponsored war, and foreign
occupation. These have in turn generated endless carnage and different
forms of the destruction which required both popular remedies and official
responses. In war, and under such difficult conditions, urban space develops
its own logic and the inhabitants of war-ravaged cities invent new forms of
survival and existence. Lebanon as a country is accustomed to turmoil and
Beirut as its prime city is accustomed to destruction. That fact alone makes
them an appropriate site from which to launch such a field. Indeed, as far
as the second half of the twentieth century is concerned, few places have
undergone similar cycles of destruction and reconstruction. Yet, few scholars
have attempted to survey, document, analyze and explain the process through
which Lebanon has rebuilt after successive waves of social upheaval, civil
unrest, military raids, military attacks, terrorist bombings, and wars.
The few books that have been published on the subject have often
concentrated on Beirut, and particularly on the reconstruction phase initiated
in the last decade of the twentieth century following the end of the fifteen-year
Lebanese sectarian civil war in 1990. The now infamous project to rebuild the
almost totally destroyed down town, implemented by the Lebanese Company
for Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District – Solidere
– received considerable attention from scholars and practitioners. The more
recent and very different effort to rebuild, not only Beirut but other parts of
Lebanon that were destroyed in the Israeli attack in summer of 2006, is only
now beginning to register as a subject worthy of serious attention.
viii Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
The earlier initiative to rebuild war-torn Beirut began with the passage
of a 1991 law which gave municipalities the authority to create real estate
development companies to handle war-damaged areas. In a classic neoliberal
strategy, the law also entrusted these companies with the capacity to act
on behalf of the public good in all matters of marketing, development, and
implementation of the reconstruction schemes. In this earlier reconstruction
period, the role of the Lebanese state was limited to the formation of these
companies; the designation of specific geographic areas for development; and
often the provision of subsidy to facilitate the construction of infrastructure.
In some respects this amounted to a total privatization of the reconstruction
scheme. The parallel reconstruction of the southern region by another
company – Elisar – and the redevelopment of the northern coast line were not
substantially different. The privatization of the reconstruction effort became
the main method through which state institutions articulated their role.
This would later result in a huge public debt born by the Lebanese people
with servicing requirements often consuming 25 per cent of all government
revenues. Some may argue that the golden time for post-war reconstruction
schemes pursued with great success in many parts of Europe after World War
II is gone forever. Indeed the resources that made those efforts possible at the
height of an industrial modern world may no longer available. In the absence
of grand state-sponsored Marshall-like programmes, some have argued that
privatization was indeed inevitable.
The construction efforts following the 2006 war allow us to test this claim
and to interrogate this hypothesis. In this second phase of reconstruction, the
Lebanese government, still adopting a neoliberal stance, conceptualized its
role in reconstruction as a form of humanitarian relief. Much of the money
donated to it was used as part of compensation programmes leaving the
planning of the reconstruction efforts to international organizations and donor
states. European nations and Western-backed financial institutions focused
their attention on providing aid primarily in the form of programmes for
better governance. As principle donors Arab and Gulf States provided some
aid in the form of physical reconstruction schemes with an emphasis on large
projects with high visibility. There is a belief in some quarters that the latter
approach received better reception within Lebanon’s political culture. But here
it is important to remember that better governance schemes take a long time
to develop as they often require fundamental changes in culture itself.
After the war ended, a group of architects and planners, both practitioners
and academic, from the American University in Beirut, the premier
educational institution in the country, came together and formed what they
named the Reconstruction Unit. They were eager not only to help but also
Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction ix
to envision new ways of going about reconstruction that would avoid the
pitfalls of past practices. They were interested in processes that would be
more grass-root based; that would involve participatory procedures; and that
would bring to the table issues like identity, memory, and heritage; aspects
that are often forgotten in the haste of urgently needed reconstruction. Their
efforts are detailed in this book with its in-depth case studies and their
coverage of both the process and politics of reconstruction from the local to
the global scale. One of the most interesting aspects of the second phase of
reconstruction schemes is the role played by Hezbollah which seems to have
trumped both the UN and the Lebanese government by pouring hundreds
of millions of dollars into the wreckage of Southern Lebanon and Beirut’s
destroyed southern suburbs. Its massive new reconstruction effort has won
the loyalty of many Lebanese, particularly its Shi‘a population, and the book
explores some of these efforts too.
This we learn is a reconstruction effort from the ground up and it shows
that informed and politically conscious socially active architects, contrary
to popular belief, are able to get involved in positive ways with the public
and to arouse public passion and discourse around issues of rebuilding. But
while this book provides coverage of projects that many of the authors were
personally involved with, it still does so with a critical perspective and self
awareness. What is admirable is that this group academics and practitioners
was not overwhelmed by the scale or the nature of destruction and was not
discouraged under seemingly impossible conditions. Their work is a good
lesson for the new generation of architects and planners, not only in Lebanon
but in any other war-torn region.
Nezar AlSayyad
University of California, Berkeley
January 2010
Acknowledgements
This book is the product of dedicated individuals who decided to take an
active role in the post-war reconstruction effort despite all the difficulties and
the politics. I would like to start by thanking them for an inspiring journey.
But our work and this book would not have been possible without the
inspiration, help and support of so many people. I would like to take this
opportunity to thank, on behalf of all the authors, all the inspiring individuals
we encountered from the southern suburbs of Beirut to the villages in Southern
Lebanon; individuals like Haitham Bazzi, who was not only inspiring but a
true partner from the local community in Bint Jbeil, and Ahmad Hatoum, Vice
President of the Municipality of Haret Hreik. We would also like to thank all
the wonderful people who helped us along the way and volunteered their
time and effort in relief and reconstruction, all the dedicated students who
took part in the reconstruction studios and all the research assistants who
helped produce this book.
Sincere thanks go to our partners in the Reconstruction Unit who
contributed to the debate, efforts and the offered studios on post-war
reconstruction: Souheir Mabsout, Mona Kheshen, Abdulhalim Jabr, and
Robert Saliba. The work of the Reconstruction Unit was supported by many
individuals who helped particular task teams. Special thanks go to Yasmine
Makaroun, Hala Akl, Lynn Osman, Amr Saadeldine, Fahed Dalloul, Nizar
Mortada, and Youssef Srour.
Parts of the work of the Reconstruction Unit and the research for this
book were supported by funds from the AUB Reconstruction Task Force and
two URB research grants from AUB, for which we are extremely indebted.
I am personally grateful for the research assistants who helped me with the
preparation of the manuscript of the book: Leila Solh, Zahra Khanqir and Abir
Al-Tayeb.
Howaya Al-Harithy
Beirut
February 2010
The Contributors
Hana Alamuddin is the Principal of Al-Mimariya, Architects and Designers.
She earned her Masters from MIT in 1987 after completing her professional
qualifications at the University of Greenwich, London. Alamuddin lectures at
the American University of Beirut, serves as a technical reviewer for the Aga
Khan Awards for Architecture and is a member of the executive committee of
the Association pour la Protection des Sites et Anciennes Demeures au Liban.
Nadine Bekdache is a graphic designer. She earned her degree from the
American University of Beirut and practiced for three years while working
at Mind the Gap, a design studio in Beirut. She volunteered in relief efforts
during the war on Lebanon in July 2006, and later as a member of a team
that participated in the reconstruction process in Aita el Chaab. Bekdache is
currently working on her MA in urban studies at King’s College, London.
Habib Debs is a civil engineer (AUB), architect (ALBA) and planner (École des
Ponts et Chaussées). His firm, URBI, has worked on major projects in Lebanon
(reconstruction of Beirut city centre, rehabilitation of the Old City of Tripoli,
Lebanon’s Industrial Zones Master Plan) and in different Arab countries
(North Bahrain New Town, Eastown in Cairo, Tandabawi district in Makkah).
Debs also teaches at the American University of Beirut, ALBA and Lebanese
University.
Ismael Sheikh Hassan is an architect and urban planner. He earned his degree
in architecture from Mississippi State University and his Masters from the
Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven, Belgium. He worked as an activist and planner in Palestinian Refugee
Camps and in reconstruction projects in Lebanon both after the July 2006 war
and after the war in Nahr el Bared Refugee Camp in the north of Lebanon.
Abir Saksouk Sasso is an architect and activist. She graduated from the
American University of Beirut in 2005 and worked as a research assistant
on tracing the history of informal settlements in the southern and eastern
suburbs of Beirut. Saksouk worked in the post July 2006 war reconstruction
projects in Aita Chaab and Bint Jbeil. She is currently working to earn her
Masters in Urban Development Planning at the Bartlett School at University
College London.
Rabih Shibli received his bachelor degree in architecture in 2002 and Masters in
Urban Design in 2006 from the American University of Beirut. He is currently
teaching at the Department of Landscape Design and Eco Management and
directing Beit Bil Jnoub, a nonprofit organization established in the aftermath
of July 2006 war and is currently the regional technical officer in the Union of
Municipalities of Sour and collaborating on projects with UN-HABITAT and
AUB.
Chapter One
Israel transformed a relatively minor border skirmish with Hizbullah – of the kind that had
been taking place intermittently since Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000
– into a full scale war on Lebanon. Its objective was to neutralize Hizbullah once and for
all, and to assist in the imposition of a Pax Americana in the Middle East. (Makdisi, 2006,
p. 20)
became known as the July War, the 33-Day War and the Sixth Arab-Israeli
war. It resulted in a great deal of destruction and renewed the post-war
reconstruction process at a time when the country had barely recovered from
a brutal civil war that had ravaged it for fifteen years, ending in 1990, and the
Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon between 1978 and 2000. Israel held
the Lebanese government responsible in addition to the communities within
which Hezbollah operates, thus unleashing a war on the entire country,
specifically targeting Lebanese infrastructure and residential neighbourhoods
in the southern suburbs of Beirut,2 Southern Lebanon and the Beqa‘ valley
(figure 1.1).
waged on Lebanon. And in terms of the political landscape, the war came at
a time when local Lebanese political polarization was at an extreme, brought
about and exacerbated by the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in
February 2005 and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon shortly
thereafter. The polarization between pro-Syrian and pro-American factions
was, as such, at its highest.
The assassination in February 2005 of the late prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, the symbol
of post-war reconstruction, led to massive protests, resulting in the withdrawal of Syrian
troops in April 2005 that had been present in the country since 1976 and had been
the main enforcer of the Taif Accords that ended the civil war in 1990. New elections
were held in May and June 2005, bringing an anti-Syrian majority into parliament and
government. (Dibeh, 2007, p. 1)
This was the costliest Arab-Israeli war in Lebanon’s history – more devastating even than
Israel’s 1982 invasion. Economic losses were initially estimated at around $7 billion, or 30
percent of GDP. For a country still paying for a decade of laborious reconstruction and
with a debt burden equal to 180 per cent of GDP, the war dealt a staggering blow. (Salem,
2006, p. 18)
If all these indirect costs together are taken into account (i.e. the loss of tourism revenue,
export revenue, government revenue, loss of foreign investment flows, the cost of
stabilizing the currency, and failure to achieve a positive growth rate), there appear to
be good reasons to adopt the estimate of total war damages in excess of $9.5 billion.
However, the United Nations (UN) reportedly offered an even higher estimate of the
overall economic costs by mentioning a figure of ‘at least $15 billion, if not more’. (Fattouh
and Kolb, 2006, p. 101)
4 Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
Figure 1.2. The nations which adopted the reconstruction of villages in Southern Lebanon.
(Map: European Commission – Humanitarian Aid; see http://www.un.org.lb/Library/Files/
Recovery_Activities/South%20Lebaqnon/Maps/Miscellaneous/Adopted%20villages%20in%2
0Southern%20Lebanon_28Feb07.pdf)
The Politics of Post-War Reconstruction in Lebanon 5
Western political and media sources voiced concern that Hezbollah’s apparent
reconstruction efficiency was due to Iranian funding. Quickly, post-war reconstruction
emerged as a site of contestation. While few Arab, Gulf and Western actors publicly
justified their reconstruction assistance in terms of matching or thwarting Iranian
ambitions, this was an implicit strain running through Lebanon’s post-2006 reconstruction.
A week after Nasrallah’s pledge to compensate war victims, then United States President
George W. Bush announced that the US would provide USD 230 million in reconstruction
assistance. Aid pledges at the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery on
31 August 2006 elicited USD 900 million in reconstruction pledges from EU members,
Arab countries, and Japan. The major donors were the Gulf States [figure 1.2], while
the European Commission (EC)’s contributions – European Commission Humanitarian
Aid Office (ECHO) and non-ECHO – represented 10 per cent and those of the US
approximately six per cent of the total, making them relatively minor players (Ministry of
Finance, 2006). (Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2009, pp. 3–4)
In addition to the fact that the funds that were raised were insufficient, the
government was blamed for its weak role and for the history of accumulated
debt, incomplete post-war reconstruction efforts and underdevelopment.
Lebanon has a history with war and reconstruction that must be highlighted
for contextual purposes.
A review of the physical and human losses – such as loss of output estimated at US$24
billion in 1986; reduction in GDP per capita by around 67 per cent; 131,000 war deaths,
and the emigration of 500,000 inhabitants, mainly high-skilled workers – points to the
huge challenges that were confronted in the immediate postwar period of economic
reconstruction…’. (Dibeh, 2007, p. 1)
Syria, which had intervened to end the civil war in 1976, continued its military
presence in the country even after the Taif Agreement, which set a time frame
of two years for the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon. As previously stated,
6 Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
the troops would eventually leave in 2005 in the midst of the crisis that was
set into motion by the assassination of Hariri.
Lebanon has served as a battleground for regional battles ever since the
beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the occupation of Palestine in 1948,
as well as the arrival of 110,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Military
confrontations escalated after the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
was forced out of Jordan, basing itself in Lebanon in 1970. Due to these
developments, the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon reached some
300,000. Israel attacked Lebanon on several occasions. In 1968, ‘Operation Gift’
was marked by the raid on Beirut International Airport on 28–29 December;
in 1972, there was an air raid and destruction of the Nabatiyeh refugee camp;
in 1973, ‘Operation Spring of Youth’ was marked by the assassination of three
PLO leaders; in 1978 Operation Litani saw the invasion of Southern Lebanon
and the retreat of the PLO further north; and finally in 1982, ‘Operation Peace
of the Galilee’ was a full-scale invasion. It began on 6 June and was marked by
the siege of Beirut during the summer of 1982, the departure of the PLO from
Lebanon to Tunis and Israeli occupation of parts of Southern Lebanon which
lasted until 2000. A new phase of war began after the Israeli invasion of 1982
and the subsequent founding of the Lebanese resistance.
Under the guise of expelling the PLO from Lebanon, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982.
Israeli troops attacked West Beirut, killing 20,000 civilians, destroying homes and
businesses, and displacing 400,000 people. This is the context out of which Hizballah was
created. Following 1982, a number of small groups organized under the banner of Islam,
dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation troops. By 1985, they officially coalesced into
Hizballah. That year, Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, but continued to occupy
Southern Lebanon (in violation of UN resolutions that affirm that Lebanon is a sovereign
country). (Naber, 2006, p. 12)
Between 1982 and 2000, several military conflicts between Israel and the
Lebanese resistance fighters occurred. The most severe of those conflicts was
‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ in 1996, which was marked by the Qana massacre
of 18 April. The conflict lasted for 16 days and left 162 dead, including 100
children who died in the Qana massacre, and 338 wounded (Kronfol, et
al., 2007). In the midst of this ongoing violence, there was little room for
reconstruction and development.
Lebanon’s long history of war and its experience in reconstruction could
not prepare it for the challenges of 2006. The Lebanese government was
neither prepared nor capable of handling the reconstruction project. Its
former experiences were dependent on the private sector and were largely
concentrated in the capital, Beirut. In 1977, during a lull in the civil war, the
The Politics of Post-War Reconstruction in Lebanon 7
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) was created. The council
became active in the post-war reconstruction programme that began in 1992
under the leadership of the late Prime Minster Hariri, who emphasized the
rebuilding of the infrastructure and the strengthening of the service economy
(Fattouh and Kolb, 2006, p. 102).
The main reconstruction projects were envisioned in the Horizon 2000 Plan that went
through different forms during 1992–95. Public investments, totaling US$17.7 billion, were
to be allocated to physical infrastructure, social infrastructure and public services. As of
December 1997, foreign financing of the 1992 reconstruction programme totaled US$4.0
billion, with US$3.5 billion in loans and US$0.5 billion in grants… (Dibeh, 2007)
This was well in line with the post-civil war reconstruction of the country where public
efforts were concentrated in large-scale developmental projects (e.g. redevelopment of
Beirut downtown, the construction of an international airport) while social policy was
8 Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
essentially reduced to paying indemnities to households displaced during the war. (Fawaz,
2007, p. 23)
Southern Lebanon was the most marginalized region during the post-war
reconstruction efforts. It was under Israeli occupation until the liberation in
2000, but continued to be marginalized in reconstruction efforts until 2006. The
territory that Israel had left behind after its twenty-two year occupation of the
region had experienced massive military aggression, neglect, environmental
degradation and the displacement of its people.8
Southern Lebanon constitutes about 20 per cent of Lebanese territory. The
region is divided administratively into seven qada’, or districts: Saida, Sour,
Jezzine, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Marji‘youn and Hasbayya. It has a population of
about half a million, which is roughly 15 per cent of the Lebanese population,
with an average household size of 4.8 persons and an average annual income
of $2,400 (Soliman, 2004, p. 387). According to the Central Administration
of Statistics, the population of Lebanon in 2005 was estimated at 3,755,034
inhabitants, with 879,854 households and a population density of 359
inhabitants per square kilometre. The population of Southern Lebanon was
at that time 622,683 (16.5 per cent). According to a more recent study by the
Central Administration for Statistics, the Lebanese population in 2007 stood at
3,759,136, with 17.5 per cent residing in Southern Lebanon and 13 per cent in
the Beqa‘ (Central Administration for Statistics, Lebanese Republic, 2007 ).9
The impact of years of conflict left 15 per cent of the population in the South
disabled: 16.5 per cent of households headed by females and 21.2 households
headed by individuals older than 65 (Ministry of Social Affairs, Central
Administration of Statistics and the UN Development Program, 2004).
The socio-economic profile is of a younger population with a higher
illiteracy and unemployment rate than the rest of the country, with 25 per cent
living under the poverty line (Soliman, 2004, p. 387). One can safely say that
when the July war broke out, Lebanon was still recovering from the civil war,
and that a large area of Southern Lebanon was still in the post-occupation
recovery.
As soon as the fighting came to a halt in August 2006, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
appeared on television, pledging that his organization would help to rebuild homes and
compensate those whose homes had been destroyed. Well in excess of USD 100 million
in cash was distributed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities. Hezbollah seemed
the most effective on-the-ground actor as it directed bulldozers to raze damaged buildings
and its volunteers staffed registration centres to assess the needs of returnees. The party
justified its reconstruction activities as another part of its ‘war of resistance’ and, for many
Lebanese, Hezbollah’s reconstruction activism contrasted with the seeming inefficiency of
the state. (Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2009, p. 4)
Fawaz (2007, p. 23) argues that the government, with its neo-liberal
tradition in public governance, ‘conceptualized its role in reconstruction as
“relief”’. In light of the government’s position, a major role was also played
by international organizations and external donors, particularly Gulf States.
The financial assistance was either provided in the form of compensation
for private homeowners or for the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure
and public institutions (Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2009, p. 5). Saudi Arabia
donated $500,000 to the compensation programme. Qatar, Kuwait and Iran
financed both. Qatar and Iran, however, paid directly for projects and for
the reconstruction of homes, without channelling the donations through
government institutions. Donors even competed for visible public impact that
focused on the rebuilding of infrastructure, places of worship, schools and the
adoption of entire villages for their reconstruction (Ibid., p. 10) (figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3. Qatari flag on a school in Bint Jbeil as Qatar financed the reconstruction in Bint
Jbeil. (Photo: Anoud Zaben)
10 Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
Still, the absence of an active role by the government beyond that of relief was
a serious handicap in the reconstruction process.
This was further aggravated by the fact that nearly half the damage incurred
was in housing stock; the greatest burden fell on individual citizens,
specifically homeowners. ‘Housing compensation was estimated by the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the largest direct cost of
the war, accounting for 53 per cent (or USD 1.1 billion) of losses’ (Ibid., p. 5).
The evidence strongly suggests that the extensive destruction of public works, power
systems, civilian homes and industry was deliberate and an integral part of the military
strategy, rather than ‘collateral damage’ – incidental damage to civilians or civilian property
resulting from targeting military objectives… The widespread destruction of apartments,
houses, electricity and water services, roads, bridges, factories and ports, in addition to
several statements by Israeli officials, suggests a policy of punishing both the Lebanese
government and the civilian population in an effort to get them to turn against Hezbollah.
Israeli attacks did not diminish, nor did their pattern appear to change, even when it
Figure 1.6. Houses in Bint Jbeil severely damaged in Israeli air raids..
became clear that the victims of the bombardment were predominantly civilians, which
was the case from the first days of the conflict. (Amnesty International, 2006)
12 Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
I reiterate all this to emphasize that this attack on Lebanon clearly targeted a civilian
population and a civilian infrastructure. Yet it was also a selective civilian targeting. While
Lebanon and its population as a whole suffered tremendously during this attack and con-
tinue to bear the burdens of environmental hazards and rebuilding (a UNDP spokesperson
noted a setback 15 years of rebuilding after the civil war), the brunt of civilian deaths and
infrastructural destruction took place in the south of the country, the Beqa‘ Valley, and the
southern suburbs of Beirut. The purported reasoning behind this selective wreckage was
that these regions are ‘Hizbullah strongholds’. (Deeb, 2006, p. 115)
spontaneous efforts were initiated to aid the displaced, the wounded and
those who were stranded in their villages with no transportation, water or
medication. Following the ceasefire, international and local actors mobilized
to assess and control damage made to the built and natural environment.
Given the limited role of the government, the severity of the damage and
the impact on housing, a group of architects and planners at the American
University of Beirut (AUB) decided to take part in the recovery process and
to contribute to reconstruction efforts after the war. On 18 August 2006, they
founded the Reconstruction Unit (RU), and affiliated it with the Department
of Architecture and Design at AUB, a move that would allow the unit to
operate more effectively as an entity. The group was multidisciplinary. It
began operations with eight founding members and later expanded to include
many others.11
The mission was articulated as follows:
The Reconstruction Unit conducts its work within a larger framework and a comprehensive
vision that integrates physical reconstruction with social and economic revitalization. The
work is therefore intended to be participatory and community based. It seeks to operate
both at the level of conceptual planning and technical aid and the level of assessment and
problem definition on the ground. The Unit also aims to work with individuals and agencies
on the ground, especially municipalities, conduct surveys and assess needs – immediate,
medium and long term. Accordingly, it formulates problem definitions, objectives and
intervention strategies. This comes with a complete awareness that each site has its
particular set of problems and issues to respond to with the proper approach and tools.
Thus, the Unit’s role is to guide the process of reconstruction towards an effective, site-
specific and sustainable integrated product. (Reconstruction Unit, 2006)
The Reconstruction Unit’s first task was to visit sites and to assess the
situation on the ground, both in the southern suburb of Beirut and in
Southern Lebanon, before returning to set objectives, define agendas and
form task teams. Through their many visits, members of the unit connected
with agents on the ground and became actively engaged in the reconstruction
process at various sites. The RU formed four task teams to work on sites
that were considered in critical need of assistance: Haret Hreik (coordinated
by Mona Fawaz and Mona Harb – see chapter 2); Bint Jbeil (coordinated by
Howayda Al-Harithy and Habib Debs – see chapters 4 and 5); ‘Aita al-Cha‘b
(coordinated by Nadine Bekdache, Amro Saadeddine, Abir Saksouk-Sasso
and Ismael Sheikh-Hassan – see chapter 7); and al-Qleileh and Siddiqine
(coordinated by Jala Makhzoumi and Rabih Shibli – see chapter 6).
Members of the RU played different roles that yielded varying results,
from studio projects12 to design proposals to critical debates and writing.
14 Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
sentations of the Urban Space’, also focuses on the southern town of Bint Jbeil,
addressing it from a different angle. It recognizes that, unlike the other war
torn villages of Southern Lebanon, the Municipality of Bint Jbeil rapidly took
the initiative to elaborate a reconstruction plan for the old city, proposing a
functionalist view and a radical tabula rasa solution. Alternatively, the RU at
AUB proposed a culturalist view, planning to rescue the urban heritage of the
old city. The chapter engages both scenarios and argues that these different
solutions are rooted in diverse ideological backgrounds and that they were
rejected by a large part of the local community because they considered
them ‘alien’ to their own mental representation of the desirable dwelling and
urban space. A semiotic approach is used in the reading of the three different
social representations of the urban space that emerged in Bint Jbeil, as
conflicting discourses and projects were at work. The chapter further argues
that Hezbollah, after the abandonment of the Municipality’s ‘functionalist’
plan, accepted integrating into its own rhetoric on resistance and social
representation the preservation of traditional architectural heritage in the
village as a celebration of the deeply-rooted identity and social memory of the
community, in contrast with the short history of the nearby Israeli villages.
In chapter 6, ‘Marginal Landscapes, Marginalized Rural Communities:
Sustainable Post-war Recovery in Southern Lebanon’, Jala Makhzoumi
argues that the unprecedented scale of destruction following the July 2006
war and the fact that the war was fought in the villages, fields and orchards
in Southern Lebanon questions the validity of the prevailing, urban-
dominated discourse on reconstruction in Lebanon and its suitability to rural
peripheries. Destruction was not simply limited to homes and villages; rather
it engulfed the entire countryside, damaging the agricultural livelihoods of
a predominantly subsistence rural economy. Top-heavy post-war agendas
and their externality to rural culture inadvertently undermine local valuation
and aspirations in a region that has been politically and economically
marginalized since the inception of the Lebanese state. The central argument
of this chapter is that sustainable post-war recovery in Southern Lebanon
should be developmental, long term and multifaceted if it is to address the
economic, social and environmental adversities that are endemic to rural
peripheries. A landscape approach is used to provide a dynamic framework
which humanizes recovery by integrating tangible, physical reconstruction,
and intangible community needs. The landscape approach proposes post-war
recovery narratives in al-Qleileh village in Southern Lebanon that prioritize
long-term development to provide local livelihoods, protect the environment
and natural resources, acknowledging and reaffirming local identities and
village rural heritage.
18 Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction
Notes
1. Hezbollah’s operation was called ‘Operation Truthful Promise’ in reference to Secretary
General of Hezbollah Hasan Nasrallah’s public pledge to release Lebanese held in
Israeli prisons.
2. The population in al-Dahiya was a mix of Shi‘i Muslims and Maronite Christians in
the 1960s. Due to reasons that include rural migration, the civil war and the Israeli
occupation of Southern Lebanon, the population increased in density and became 80
per cent Shi‘i Muslim. See Deeb, 2006.
3. In Israel, 42 civilians were killed and half a million were displaced.
4. The Taif Agreement, or Document of National Accord, was negotiated in Taif, Saudi
Arabia and signed in October of 1989. It was designed to end the civil war in Lebanon
by accommodating the demographic shifts within the political structure of power, and
it set a time-frame of two years for the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon.
5. According to the World Health Organization, there were ‘150,000 war-related deaths
(5%), 200,000 to 360,000 wounded (6.7% to 12%), 210,000 serious injuries (7%), half
of them left with lifetime disability, and around 17,400 missing and presumed dead
(0.6%)’. For more details see Kronfol et al., 2007, pp. 1–65.
6. For a detailed account and review of the process see Makdisi, 1997.
7. For details on the evolution of the master plan see Gavin and Maluf, 1996 and Tabet,
1993.
8. According to Soliman (2004, p. 387) ‘The territory that was under occupation constitutes
9% (850 km2) of the total area of Lebanon (10, 452 km2) and about 50% of the total area
of southern Lebanon (2045 km2)’.
9. These are estimates. No official census has been conducted since 1932, so as not to
disturb the power sharing structure between Muslims and Christians.
10. For further discussion see Fattouh and Kolb, 2006; Fawaz, 2007; and Hamieh and Mac
Ginty, 2009.
11. The first meeting was attended by the initial eight founding members: Mona Harb,
Howayda Al-Harithy, Jala Makhzoumi, Hana Alamuddine, Habib Debs, Rabih Shibli,
Abdulhalim Jabr, and Robert Saliba. Upon the establishment of the Reconstruction Unit,
the group grew to include: Ismael Sheikh Hassan, Abir Saksouk, Nadine Bekdache,
Mona Fawaz, Souheir Mabsout, Mona Khishin and others.
12. The reconstruction of Bint Jbeil was a subject of a studio offered by Howayda Al-
Harithy and Habib Debs. The proposals of the studio were adopted partially by the
Municipality as a basis to develop its future reconstruction plans. The reconstruction
of al-Qleileh and Siddiqin was tackled in a landscape studio offered by Professors
Jala al-Makhzoumi and Rabih Shibli. The outputs were adopted partially by a local
environmental NGO.
13. See Khalaf and Khoury, 1993; Rowe and Sarkis, 1998; Franck et al., 2003; Saliba, 2004;
Nagel, 2002; Makdisi, 1997; and Fricke, 2005.
14. See Fattouh and Kolb, 2006; Barakat and Zych, 2008; and Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2009.
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Newspaper Articles
htt p://www.al-akhbar.com/fi
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Interviews
Fatt ouh, B., and Kolb, J. (2006) The outlook for economic
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Newspaper Articles
Quilty, Jim (2007) The ins and outs of helping people get
what they want. Putt ing Bint Jbeil back together. The
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Interviews
Interviews
Reports