Working Paper

Agenda – Preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring disarmament.

Author – People's Republic of China
At present, the global security situation is undergoing profound and complex changes and the
international arms control system is facing unprecedented, serious challenges. Since 2010,
two consecutive rounds of the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (the Non-Proliferation Treaty), the success of which is of paramount
importance, have come up empty. China maintains that all parties should focus on the current
pressing issues in the nuclear field, push forward the three mainstays of nuclear disarmament,
nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a balanced manner and on
the basis of mutual respect, promote the current review process in order to achieve real results
and jointly safeguard the authority and effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.
China proposes the following issues with a view to reaching consensus on them and
incorporating them into the outcome document:
1. The nuclear disarmament process must follow the principles of “maintaining global
strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all” and must advance step-by-step.
The States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly fulfil their special
and priority responsibility for nuclear disarmament and continue to further
substantially reduce their nuclear stockpiles in a verifiable, irreversible and legally
binding manner, so as to create the conditions for the ultimate realization of complete
and comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
2. The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START) between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation is of great importance to the maintenance of global strategic stability and
the strengthening of world peace and security. The United States and the Russian
Federation should properly resolve their differences regarding implementation
through dialogue, promote the continued implementation of the treaty and seek to
extend it beyond its expiry in 2026 or negotiate a successor arrangement.
3. The nuclear-weapon States should commit to earnestly fulfilling their obligations
under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, abide by the consensus on nuclear
disarmament reached at previous Review Conferences and make an unequivocal
commitment not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons.
4. The nuclear-weapon States should abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence based on
the first use of nuclear weapons, commit themselves to a policy of “non-first-use of
nuclear weapons” and support the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the non-
first-use of nuclear weapons or issue a joint statement to that effect.
5. The nuclear-weapon States should support the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
in negotiating and concluding without delay a legal instrument on negative security
assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and should support the establishment of an
ad hoc committee and the start of substantive work in the Conference on
Disarmament.
6. The nuclear-weapon States should reaffirm that they will not target their nuclear
weapons at each other or at any other country, reduce the alert status of their nuclear
 weapons, refrain from developing a nuclear deterrence policy against other countries,
avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons and eliminate the
potential for accidents involving nuclear weapons.
7. The nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States participating in “nuclear
sharing” and “extended deterrence” arrangements should take practical measures to
diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security policies
and clarify whether such arrangements contravene their obligations under articles I
and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The relevant nuclear-weapon States should
withdraw nuclear weapons deployed outside their territories, refrain from replicating
nuclear-sharing arrangements in other regions and avoid nuclear exercises and nuclear
information exchange with non-nuclear-weapon States.
8. All countries should renounce the development and deployment of global anti-missile
systems, withdraw missiles and anti-missile systems deployed outside their territories
and refrain from deploying weapons systems undermining strategic stability outside
their territories
9. All countries should adhere to the concept of the peaceful use of outer space, refrain
from deploying any weapons in outer space, refrain from the threat or use of force
against outer space objects and support the Conference on Disarmament in initiating
negotiations on a legal instrument on outer space arms control.
10. The international community should continue to support the establishment by
countries concerned of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of negotiations on
their own terms and voluntary agreements among them. The nuclear-weapon States
should respect the legal status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and sign and ratify all
relevant additional protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, including the
Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, as soon as possibl
11. The international community should continue to support the establishment of a
Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
The nuclear-weapon States and countries of the region should participate in the
United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.
12. All parties should fully, faithfully and in a balanced manner fulfil their obligations
under the treaty, support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in fulfilling
its safeguards functions in accordance with the principles of objectivity, impartiality
and neutrality and continue to promote the universality of comprehensive safeguards
agreements and their additional protocols. States that have not yet done so should
accede to the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible and place all
their nuclear facilities under the Agency’s safeguards, as required.
13. The international community should support all IAEA member States in discussing
safeguards issues related to the nuclear submarine cooperation between Australia, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America (AUKUS) through a transparent, open and inclusive intergovernmental
process and by reaching decisions by consensus. The three countries in question
should not conduct cooperation on nuclear submarines until a consensus has been
reached on the relevant issues, and the Agency secretariat should not negotiate
safeguards arrangements with the three countries without authorization.
14. All parties should uphold the authority of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) and United Nations Security Council resolution 2231, support diplomatic
efforts to resume JCPOA, support IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran in resolving
outstanding safeguards issues through dialogue and cooperation and actively promote
the political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. As the party that
unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, the United States should thoroughly correct
its erroneous policy and actively respond to the legitimate and reasonable concerns of
the Islamic Republic of Iran.
15. The international community should persist in resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear
issue through dialogue and consultation. All of the parties should continue to explore
effective ways to address the concerns of all parties in a balanced manner, in
accordance with the “dual-track approach” and the principle of “phased and
synchronized development.” All parties concerned should exercise restraint and
refrain from taking any action that may lead to an escalation of tension so as to create
favourable conditions for promoting a political settlement of the Korean Peninsula
issue.
16. Efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not undermine the
legitimate right of all countries, in particular developing countries, to the peaceful use
of nuclear energy. The international community should refrain from the politicization
of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which disrupts and limits normal international
cooperation. We oppose the use by certain countries of ideological lines under the
banner of non-proliferation to generalize the concept of national security and their
consideration of export controls as a tool for breaking supply chains.
17. IAEA should continue to play a central role in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. The developed countries and IAEA should strengthen assistance to developing
countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in accordance with the actual needs of
those countries. Member States should actively support the Agency’s technical
cooperation activities and ensure the adequacy and predictability of technical
cooperation resources to meet the growing needs of Member States for technical
cooperation.
18. Every effort must be made to ensure the safety of peaceful nuclear facilities and
oppose armed attacks on nuclear power plants and other peaceful nuclear facilities.
There must be strict observance of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and
anthropogenic nuclear accidents must be vigilantly avoided. The active role of IAEA
in promoting the safety and security of peaceful nuclear facilities should be supported.
19. The responsibility of States for nuclear safety must be strictly fulfilled. The peaceful
use of nuclear energy must not be at the expense of the natural environment and
human health. The Government of Japan should properly address the issue of the
discharge of nuclear-contaminated water from Fukushima into the sea in a responsible
and constructive manner and cooperate by establishing independent and effective
long-term international monitoring arrangements, with the substantial participation of
stakeholders, including neighbouring countries, so as to prevent irreversible
consequences brought about by the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the
sea.