TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................................1
37. City of Manila v. Cabangis, G.R. No. L-3898, Feb. 18, 1908..................................................3
38. People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242, 1959.......................................................................................4
39. Capital Shoes Factory v. Traveler Kids, Inc. G.R. No. 200065, September 24, 2014.............6
40. Heirs of Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010.............................................................7
41. Nissan v. United Phil. Scout, G.R. No. 179470, April 20, 2010...............................................9
42. Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018...............................................................11
43. Vda. De Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014.......................................13
44. Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966......................................15
45. MCMP Construction v. Monark, G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014...............................16
46. > PetitioCitibank v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003...................................18
47. Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, February 8, 2012.......................................21
48. Pacasum v. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009..........................................................23
49. Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56866, June 27, 1985..................................................25
50. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014..............................................................26
51. People v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 167147, August 3, 2005.......................................................28
52. Kuwait Airways, v. The Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance, G.R. No. 213931. November 17,
2021.............................................................................................................................................30
53. Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Fidelity & Surety Co., G.R. No. 26743, October 19, 1927.........32
54. Lechugas v. C.A., G.R. No. L-185240, January 20, 2010.....................................................34
55. Salimbangon v. Tan, G.R. No. 185240, January 20, 2010....................................................38
56. Sps. Paras v. Kimwa Construction, G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015.....................................40
57. Cruz v. C.A., G.R. No. 79962, December 10, 1990...............................................................43
58. BPI Express v. Armovit, G.R. No. 163654, October 8, 2014.................................................45
59. Philippine National Bank v. Cua, G.R. No. 199161, April 18, 2018.......................................47
60. Southeast Asia Shipping Corp v. Seagull Maritime Corp., G.R. No.144439, Oct 24, 2003. .49
61. Tarapen v. People, G.R. No. 173824, August 8, 2008 (MEDILLO).......................................51
62. People v. Obogne, G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014..........................................................53
63. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013.................................................54
64. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 250903 April 26, 2021...................................................................56
65. People v. Corpuz G.R. No. 208013 July 3, 2017...................................................................58
66. People v. XYZ, G.R. No. 246458 Nov 11, 2021....................................................................59
67. People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015..............................................................60
68. People v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-568, July 16, 1947.............................................................62
69. Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005......................................................64
70. U.S. v. Antipolo, G.R. No. L-13109, March 6, 1918...............................................................66
71. Josieline Chan v. Johnny Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013.........................................67
72. People v. Carlos, G.R. No. 22948, March 17, 1925..............................................................68
73. Barton v. Leyte Asphalt, G.R. No. L-21237, March 22, 1924................................................70
74. Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996......................................71
75. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115439-41, July 16, 1997............................................72
76. Lim v. C.A., G.R. No. 91114, September 25,1992................................................................73
77. Krohn v. C.A., G.R. No. 108854, June 14, 1994...................................................................75
78. Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, G.R. No. L-70054, July 8, 1986......................................78
37. City of Manila v. Cabangis, G.R. No. L-3898, Feb. 18, 1908

Topic: Rule 130, B. Sec. 2 Documentary evidence

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case is assigned because it involves the presentation and evaluation of
documentary evidence to prove the facts asserted in the complaint. The City of Manila
used documents to establish the public nature of the river and the obstruction caused by
Cabangis.

One important aspect to consider in this case is the principle of public trust doctrine,
which holds that certain natural resources, like navigable rivers, are preserved for public
use and cannot be converted into private ownership or use. The City of Manila v.
Cabangis case demonstrates how this doctrine is applied in legal proceedings to protect
public resources from private encroachment.

What are the relevant facts?

A: The City of Manila filed a complaint against Tomas Cabangis, alleging that he
obstructed the course of a public navigable river, estero, or waterway known as Sunog-
Apog in the Gagalangin district of Tondo, Manila.

Cabangis converted the river into a private fishing pond (pesqueria) and continued to
possess it until the filing of the complaint.

The City of Manila claimed the right of possession and control of the river and sought
damages for the unlawful occupation, as well as the removal of the obstructions.

The City of Manila presented documents to prove the existence and public nature of the
river, Sunog-Apog, and to demonstrate the obstruction caused by Cabangis. These
documents included maps, records, and possibly other written materials that supported
their claim.

What do we learn from this case?

A: From this case, we learn about the importance of documentary evidence in proving
facts in a legal proceeding. The court relied on the documents presented by the City of
Manila to determine the public nature of the river and the unlawful obstruction by
Cabangis. This case highlights the role of documentary evidence in establishing facts
and supporting legal claims. It demonstrates how documentary evidence can be used
to establish ownership, possession, and control over property, as well as to protect
public interests.
38. People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242, 1959

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case was assigned to discuss the admissibility of duplicates or triplicates as
evidence.

The main question answered by the case is: Are duplicates or triplicates formed by the
use of carbon papers admissible in evidence? The answer is YES.

What are the relevant facts?

A: The respondents in the case were criminally charged with the crime of falsification of
public documents, in their capacities as public officials and employees. The allegation is
that the respondents made it appear that certain relief supplies were purchased and
distributed to calamity indigents when in fact and in truth, no such distributions had ever
been made.

In order to prove the charge of falsification, the prosecution presented a booklet of

receipts which contained triplicate copies. The presiding judge, however, held that the
triplicates are not admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and
cannot be produced.

The prosecution countered that the duplicate or triplicate copies, which were produced
by the use of carbon sheets, and which thereby produced a facsimile of the originals,
including the figures and the signatures on the originals, are regarded as duplicate
originals and may be introduced as such, even without accounting for the non-
production of the originals.

What do we learn from this case?

A: Duplicates or triplicates, being a carbon copy of the original and bearing as it does
the same signature as in the original, is admissible in evidence and possess all the
probative value of the original, and the same does not require an accounting for the
non-production of the original.

"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that
the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to
be charged thereby, produces two facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature
being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or
exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals
and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others."
39. Capital Shoes Factory v. Traveler Kids, Inc. G.R. No. 200065, September 24,
2014

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A: The case of Capital Shoes Factory, Ltd. v. Traveler Kids, Inc. (G.R. No. 200065,
September 24, 2014) is pertinent to the study of Rule 130, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, specifically the Original Document Rule, due to its examination of the
admissibility of duplicate originals as evidence in legal proceedings.

What are the relevant facts?

A: In 2000, Capital Shoes Factory Ltd. (CSFL), a foreign corporation specializing in

manufacturing children's footwear, entered into an agreement with Traveler Kids, Inc.
(TKI), a domestic corporation, for the importation of CSFL's products. Initially, TKI
fulfilled its payment obligations. However, by 2004, TKI began defaulting, accumulating
a debt of $325,451.39 to CSFL. CSFL filed a lawsuit to recover this amount, presenting
duplicate originals of pertinent documents as evidence. The Regional Trial Court
admitted these duplicates, but the Court of Appeals later excluded some of them. The
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the appellate court's decision, reinstating the trial
court's ruling on the admissibility of the duplicate originals.

What do we learn from this case?

A: This case underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of the Original
Document Rule under Rule 130, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. It illustrates that
duplicate originals can be admissible as evidence, provided they meet certain criteria.
The Supreme Court's decision emphasizes adherence to procedural rules and the
timely resolution of cases, highlighting the judiciary's role in ensuring that justice is
served efficiently.
40. Heirs of Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case presents what constitutes documentary evidence. The need for an original
copy of the articles of partnership relied on by the petitioners should be presented to the
court on whether there was a partnership created by Jose Lim, Norberto Uy, and Jimmy
Yu, to which there was none.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Jose, Norberto, and Jimmy formed a partnership to engage in the trucking business.
Jose managed the operations of his trucking business until his death in 1951. Then,
Elfledo, one of his heirs, and partners agreed to continue the business under his
management. The shares in the partnership profits and income that formed part of the
estate of Jose were held in trust by Elfledo, with petitioners’ authority for Elfledo to use,
purchase or acquire properties using the funds. When the partnership ceased to exist, it
had nine (9) trucks all in the name of Elfledo. He also acquired and purchased
numerous real properties and five (5) other motor vehicles. When Elfledo died, it left the
properties with respondent Juliet Villa Lim and took over the administration of the
properties belonging to the estate of Jose, without their consent or approval. The
petitioners claimed that, being co-owners, they required respondent to submit an
accounting of the income, profits and rentals received from the estate of Elfledo, and to
surrender the administration thereof. However, Juliet refused.

Respondent Juliet Villa Lim traversed the petitioners’ allegations and claimed that
Elfledo was a partner of Norberto and Jimmy. Other than the partnership, she and
Elfledo engaged in other business ventures. They were able to buy real properties and
to put up their own car assembly and repair business. The trucking business started to
falter when Jimmy was ambushed and killed in 1993. When Elfledo died in 1995 due to
a heart attack, Juliet talked to Jimmy and to the heirs of Norberto that she could no
longer run the business. Jimmy suggested that three (3) of the nine (9) trucks be given
to him as his share, and the other three (3) to Norberto, but Paquita Uy, the wife of
Norberto, was not interested. Instead, she sold the same to Juliet by paying in
installments. Juliet also averred that Jose left no known assets that could have been left
in trust and the partnership has ceased upon his demise. Respondent maintained that
all the properties involved in this case were purchased and acquired through her and
her husband's joint efforts and hard work, and without any participation or contribution
from petitioners or from Jose. Respondent submitted that these are conjugal partnership
properties; and thus, she had the right to refuse to render an accounting for the income
or profits of their own business.

What do we learn from this case?

A: The best evidence would have been the contract of partnership or the articles of
partnership. Unfortunately, there is none in this case, because the alleged partnership
was never formally organized. Nonetheless, we are asked to determine who between
Jose and Elfledo was the "partner" in the trucking business. The evidence presented by
petitioners falls short of the quantum of proof required to establish that: (1) Jose was the
partner and not Elfledo; and (2) all the properties acquired by Elfledo and respondent
form part of the estate of Jose, having been derived from the alleged partnership.
41. Nissan v. United Phil. Scout, G.R. No. 179470, April 20, 2010

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A:
This case is assigned because it involves the application (or misapplication) of the Best
Evidence Rule, which falls under Rule 130 on Documentary Evidence. Nissan invoked
the rule to argue that the service contract should have been presented as the best
evidence of its claim. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the rule applies only
when the contents of a document are in dispute, which was not the case here.

NOTE:
Nissan terminated United's security services without 30-day notice, alleging contract
violations. Courts ruled Nissan breached contract, awarding United damages for
unjustified termination.

The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence to prove
a disputed fact. However, the same applies only when the contents of a document are
the subject of the inquiry.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
● United Philippine Scout Veterans Detective and Protective Agency (United) is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing security services. It
entered into a contract for security services with petitioner Nissan North Edsa
(Nissan), and was able to post 18 security guards within Nissan’s compound
located in EDSA Balintawak, Quezon City.
● On 3 November 1995, United’s night supervisor and night security guard did not
report for duty. Then, on 16 January 1996, at noontime, the security supervisor
assigned at Nissan’s premises abandoned his post.
● In the morning of 31 January 1996, Nissan informed United, through the latter’s
General Manager, Mr. Ricarte Galope (Galope), that its services were being
terminated beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day. Galope personally pleaded with the
personnel manager of Nissan to reconsider its decision. When Nissan failed to
act on this verbal request, Galope wrote a Letter to Nissan’s general manager,
formally seeking a reconsideration of its action. As this was likewise ignored,
United’s President and Chairman of the Board wrote a Letter addressed to
Nissan’s President and General Manager, demanding payment of the amount
equivalent to thirty (30) days of service in view of Nissan’s act of terminating
United’s services without observing the required 30-day prior written notice as
stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service contract.
 ● As a result of Nissan’s continued failure to comply with United’s demands, the
latter filed a case for Sum of Money with damages before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Las Piñas City.
● In its Answer, Nissan maintained that the above-mentioned paragraph 17 of the
service contract expressly confers upon either party the power to terminate the
contract, without the necessity of a prior written notice, in cases of violations of
the provisions thereof. Nissan alleged that United violated the terms of their
contract, thereby allowing Nissan to unilaterally terminate the services of United
without prior notice.
MeTC:
- ruled in favor of herein respondent United.
- pronounced that Nissan has not adduced any evidence to substantiate its claim
that the terms of their contract were violated by United; and that absent any
showing that violations were committed, the 30-day prior written notice should
have been observed.
RTC:
- It denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

CA:
- affirmed the Decision of the RTC, with the modification that the award for
exemplary damages was deleted.

What do we learn from this case?

A:
This case clarifies that the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the contents of a
document are in question, not when its interpretation is at issue. Since both parties
agreed on the contract’s terms and only disputed their application, the rule did not
apply. The case also reinforces that a party alleging a contractual violation must present
concrete evidence of such a breach, not merely rely on assumptions or procedural
technicalities.
42. Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case was assigned to determine whether photocopies as evidence is
admissible.

In this case, petitioner contends that a mere photocopy of the alleged marked money is
inadmissible for not conforming to the basic rules of admissibility.

The court ruled that the absence of the original pieces of the marked money did not
militate against the cause of the prosecution. The marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
- France was involved in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney
- Petitioner Flores, a traffic enforcer, confiscated France’s driver’s license, issued a
Traffic Violation Receipt and demanded P2,000 from France as a condition for
the return of his driver’s license
- France reported the incident to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF), which conducted an entrapment operation.
- Marked money (P2,000 in four P500 bills dusted with ultraviolet powder) was
used in the operation.
- During the operation, petitioner received the money and was subsequently
arrested by PAOCTF operatives.
- Petitioner averred that the RTC incorrectly convicted him of simple robbery
(extortion) by giving weight on pieces of evidence in violation of the Best
Evidence Rule.
- He argued that the prosecution's exhibits were mere photocopies and the original
pieces of the marked money were never even presented. Hence, he must be
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to present the original pieces of marked
money which is the property subject of this criminal offense.

What do we learn from this case?

A: Non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked money is not fatal to the cause
of the prosecution.
In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose
of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence,
like a xerox copy thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
43. Vda. De Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case was assigned to us in order to illustrate the exception to the best evidence
rule and its corresponding elements in order to resort to the secondary evidence.

What are the relevant facts?

A: This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly
married to the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against

Peregrina on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio.

Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol. During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4)
children.

Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In
1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the
name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being
bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.

During the trial,Tecla presented as evidence:

(1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding and the testimony of the eldest son of
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father; and

(2) the pieces of documentary evidence showing the loss of the marriage contract.

The RTC denied Tecla’s petition.

CA ruled in favor of Tecla. It ratiocinated that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded.
What do we learn from this case?
A: We can learn from this case that the proof of due execution and the loss of the
original document are the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents. Therefore, while a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to
the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana and by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR
of Talibon, Bohol.
44. Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case is assigned because it shows a situation where the best evidence rule or
the original document rule, as embodied under Rule 130 sec.3 of the Rules of Court,
does not apply.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Defendant, Air France, issued to Plaintiff Carrascoso a first class round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in first class,
but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the “first class” seat
that he was occupying to make room for a white man. Hence, Carrascoso filed an action
for damages against Air France.

Carrascoso, in order to establish the fact that he was forced out of his seat against his
will, testified before the Court. He testified that after he was transferred to the tourist
class, he went to the pantry and the purser was there who told him that he had recorded
the incident in his notebook, which read “First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene.

Air France argued that the findings of the CA that the purser made such entry in his
notebook is predicated upon evidence (Carrascoso’s testimony) which is incompetent
because the best evidence would be the notes itself.

What do we learn from this case?

A: What we can learn from this case is that the testimony of the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule since the subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Hence, such testimony is admissible.
45. MCMP Construction v. Monark, G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A:
● This case is assigned to Rule 130, specifically the Original Document Rule (also
known as the Best Evidence Rule), because the core issue revolves around
proving the contents of a written contract (the Rental Equipment Contract). The
Best Evidence Rule dictates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the original document itself is the best evidence and must be
produced. Rule 130 outlines this rule and its exceptions, including when
secondary evidence (like a photocopy) can be admitted.

● Since Monark presented a photocopy of the contract, claiming the original was
lost, MCMP challenged this, arguing that Monark hadn't sufficiently proven the
loss of the original to justify using secondary evidence. Therefore, the case
hinged on whether the photocopy was admissible under the rules of evidence,
specifically the Best Evidence Rule and its exceptions.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
● MCMP leased heavy equipment from Monark.
● A Rental Equipment Contract (Contract) governed the lease.
● Monark delivered the equipment, evidenced by invoices and acknowledgment
receipts signed by MCMP representatives.
● MCMP failed to pay the rental fees within the agreed-upon period.
● Monark filed a suit to collect the unpaid fees, interest, penalties, and attorney's
fees.
● Monark presented a photocopy of the Contract, claiming the original was lost.
MCMP objected.
● MCMP argued it had an unwritten agreement with Monark that it would only be
charged for the actual time the equipment was used, not the entire time it was in
their possession.
● The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Monark, upholding the photocopy as evidence
and ordering MCMP to pay the amounts due.
● The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decision regarding the admissibility
of the photocopy but modified the interest rates, penalty charges, and attorney's
fees, deeming them excessive and unconscionable.
What do we learn from this case?
A:
This case teaches several important lessons about evidence and contracts:

● Best Evidence Rule and its Exceptions: It reinforces the importance of the
Best Evidence Rule and clarifies the requirements for admitting secondary
evidence when the original document is lost. The party seeking to use secondary
evidence must prove the existence, execution, and loss of the original, and
demonstrate their good faith in the loss.
● Burden of Proof: MCMP's failure to produce its copy of the contract, despite
being asked by the court, created a presumption against them. This illustrates
the importance of keeping records and being prepared to present evidence to
support one's claims.
● Contractual Interpretation: While MCMP claimed an unwritten agreement
modified the written contract, they failed to provide sufficient evidence to support
this claim. This highlights the importance of having all agreements clearly stated
in writing.
● Unconscionable Interest Rates: The Supreme Court's decision to reduce the
interest rates, penalties, and attorney's fees serves as a reminder that courts can
and will intervene when contractual terms are deemed excessive and
unconscionable. Even though parties are generally free to contract as they see
fit, this freedom has limits.
● Credibility of Witnesses: The Court reiterated its respect for the trial court's
assessment of witness credibility. Appellate courts are generally reluctant to
overturn factual findings based on witness testimony.
46. > PetitioCitibank v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

WON the photocopies of the sales invoices/charge slips are admissible as

evidence of debt.

A: Before secondary evidence is admissible to prove the contents of original

documents, the offeror must prove:
● Due execution of the original.
● Subsequent loss or unavailability of the original.

> Original sales invoices are the best evidence of the debt.
> Photocopies are secondary evidence and are generally inadmissible.
> In this case, the petitioner Citibank failed to meet the exceptions and conditions for
admissibility of secondary evidence under Rule 130, Sections 3 and 5.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
ner (Citibank) operates a credit card system.
> Respondent (Teodoro) was a Citibank cardholder (Citibank, N.A. Mastercard No.
5423-3920-4457-7009), having applied on December 14, 1990.
> Respondent used the card for various purchases, received billings, and made various
payments.
> As of January 20, 1995, respondent's outstanding obligation was P191,693.25
(including interest and charges).
> Petitioner demanded payment multiple times; respondent refused, disputing the
amount.
> Initial complaint was filed on January 25, 1996, in the RTC of Makati City (Civil Case
No. 96-092, Branch 133).
> Dismissed on April 23, 1996, for lack of jurisdiction (due to the amount involved).
> Case was transferred to MTC of Makati City (Civil Case No. 51586, Branch 66).
> MTC Decision:
● Ruled that statements of account alone were insufficient to prove the
P191,693.25 debt.
● Found the sales invoices, although only photocopies, persuasive evidence
of some debt.
 ● Acknowledged petitioner's admission that not all invoices were produced.
This created "a cloud of doubt" about the full amount claimed.
● Judgment:
● Ordered respondent to pay P24,388.36, plus 3.5% interest and a 5%
penalty fee per month (or fraction thereof) starting February 21, 1995, until
full payment.
● Ordered respondent to pay 25% of all amounts due as attorney's fees,
plus the cost of the suit.
● Stated that the Petitioner must prove its case with a preponderence of
evidence.
> Respondent's Appeal (RTC):
● Respondent appealed to the RTC of Makati City (Civil Case No. 00-1051,
Branch 146).
● The RTC, on October 30, 2000, affirmed the MTC Decision in toto.
> SC Ruling:
● Petition denied.
● Burden of Proof
○ Lies with petitioner (Citibank), as the plaintiff, to prove its case by a
"preponderance of evidence." The party alleging a fact must prove
it.
○ Petitioner failed to prove the P24,388.36 obligation because
the photocopied invoices were inadmissible and, even if
admissible, would have had low probative value.

What do we learn from this case?

A:
Best Evidence Rule & Secondary Evidence:

● Original sales invoices are the best evidence of the debt.

● Photocopies are secondary evidence and are generally inadmissible.
● Petitioner failed to meet the exceptions and conditions for admissibility of secondary evidence under Rule
130, Sections 3 and 5.

Rule 130, Section 5 (Unavailability of Original):

● "When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated."

● Requirements for Admitting Secondary Evidence (Applying the Rule)

1. The offeror (Citibank) must prove:
■ Existence or due execution of the original.
 ■ Loss, destruction, or reason for non-production of the original in court.
■ Absence of bad faith on the offeror's part regarding the original's unavailability.

● Correct Order of Proof:

1. Existence, execution, loss, and then contents.
■ (The court can change this order if necessary).

APPLYING TO THE CASE ABOVE:

Petitioner's Failure to Meet Requirements:

● Existence
○ Established by photocopies and Hernando's testimony.
● Loss/Unavailability
○ Not established. Hernando requested originals from Equitable but did not follow up. This fails the
"reasonable diligence" requirement.
● No bad faith was shown to be the reasoning for the unavailability.

Multiple Original Copies:

● When multiple original copies exist, all must be accounted for (lost, destroyed, or unavailable) before
secondary evidence of any copy is allowed.
● A photocopy cannot be used without accounting for the other originals.
○ Cited Case: Santos v. Santos - Reinforced the need to prove the loss/unavailability of all original
copies before secondary evidence is admissible.
● Triplicate Copies
○ In this case, sales invoices were produced in triplicate: one for the cardholder (respondent), one for
the merchant, and one for the bank (petitioner).
■ Each of these copies is considered an original under Rule 130, Section 4(b).
■ Petitioner failed to demonstrate that all three original copies were unavailable and that due
diligence was used to find them.
47. Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, February 8, 2012

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A:
This illustrates the best evidence rule. Original copies of the evidence must be
presented.

Photocopied documents are in violation of Rule 130, Section 3 of the ROC, otherwise
known as the best evidence rule, which mandated that the evidence must be the
original document itself.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
· This case involves P200 billion of the Marcos’ alleged accumulated ill-gotten
wealth.
· After the EDSA Revolution, the first executive act of then President Cory
Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG). Numerous civil and criminal cases were then filed. One
of the civil cases filed before the Sandiganbayan was the case to recover the
Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth.
· PCGG filed a complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution,
Accounting and Damages against the Marcoses.
· Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed impleading the following,
alleging active participation in the alleged amassing of ill-gotten wealth.
· PEA-PTGWO, a union of Pantranco employees, moved to intervene before
the Sandiganbayan. PEA-PTGWO contested the allegation that the assets of
Pantranco were ill-gotten because, otherwise, the assets would be returned to
the government and not to the employees.
· Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein
respondents. However, the respondents objected to the offer primarily on the
ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the ROC, as
these documents were unauthenticated: moreover, petitioner had not
provided any reason for its failure to present the originals.
· The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution admitting the pieces of evidence
while expressing some reservation.
· Imelda Marcos subsequently filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence. To
which the Sandiganbayan granted all except the one filed by Imelda Marcos.
· The court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was
never established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint their
involvement therein.
 · The court held that all presented evidence are hearsay, for being merely
photocopies and that the originals were not presented in court.
· Petitioner filed a partial Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that there was a
preponderance of evidence to prove the allegations.
· Petitioner also questioned the court’s ruling that the evidence previously
admitted was later held to be inadmissible in evidence against respondents,
depriving the former of due process.
· Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of Reconsideration and pointed out its
reservations/qualification in its previous resolution. Also held that even if
included, these were not substantial to hold respondents liable.

What do we learn from this case?

A:

Petitioners failed to observe the “best evidence rule” rendering the offered documentary
evidence futile and worthless in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as
the specific allegations herein were concerned.

The private documents in these case were also not authenticated, in violation of Rule
132, Section 20, which provides that before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
48. Pacasum v. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A:
This case illustrates that the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the
adverse party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best
evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document.

What are the relevant facts?

A:

Petitioner Normallah Pacasum, Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT)

in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), was charged with Falsification
of Public Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution
alleged that Pacasum falsified her Employee Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Y. Pangilan, the DOT-ARMM Supply Officer, to claim her salary for August and
September 2000.

The Sandiganbayan found Pacasum guilty. The prosecution presented witnesses,

including Subaida K. Pangilan (mother-in-law of Laura and ARMM Human Resource
Officer) who noticed the forged signature, and Laura Y. Pangilan herself, who confirmed
she did not sign the clearance. The prosecution also presented evidence of telegrams
sent to Pacasum and her staff regarding the original document. Pacasum argued that
she did not falsify the document. But a person in possession of a falsified document
who benefits from it is presumed to be the author of the falsification, absent satisfactory
explanation. She also contested the admissibility of the photocopy of the clearance.

What do we learn from this case?

The Court ruled that the photocopy of the Employee Clearance was admissible as
secondary evidence. The prosecution had made reasonable attempts to obtain the
original document, sending telegrams to Pacasum and her staff, but they failed to
produce it. This justified the presentation of the photocopy to prove the contents of the
original.

The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees

Clearance.
To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in
the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:

Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. – If the

document is in the custody or control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he
fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of
loss.

Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document which may be in the form of a
motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the
original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary
evidence may be admitted.
49. Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56866, June 27, 1985

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

The case is assigned to us because the material issue or the key point that needs to be
resolved by the court to reach a decision in relation to our topic is whether or not the
admission of secondary evidence is proper in case the original document is lost or
cannot be found.

What are the relevant facts?

● In 1974, Eden Tan was one of the passengers of Cathay Pacific Airway Flight
903 from Hong Kong. Upon examination by the customs examiner when she
arrived in Manila, various jewelry, stones and other valuable items were found in
her baggage without the required declaration. Seizure proceedings were
instituted by the BOC in connection with the articles brought by her.
● During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, the defense alleged that
the baggage declaration was not presented by the prosecution as evidence.
Instead, the prosecutor manifested that the said declaration cannot be found.
● Also, the defense alleged that the prosecution did not prove first the loss of the
baggage declaration before proving the contents thereof by secondary evidence
(statements of witnesses), and that the prosecution has proved the contents to
be such that appellant stated only “personal effect” in her baggage declaration,
thus, the evidence is insufficient to sustain conviction based on the required
quantum of evidence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
● After trial following the plea of not guilty upon arraignment, Eden Tan was
convicted of violating the Tariff and Customs Code, sentenced to 12 years
imprisonment, and to pay the fines and the costs. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration, the penalty was reduced to 4 years imprisonment and one-half
of the amount of the fine. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The SC
sustained the ruling of the CA resulting in the dismissal of the petition.

What do we learn from this case?

In the case at hand, we learned that when the original document is lost or cannot be
produced in court, secondary evidence can be admitted by the court, which may include
recollection of witnesses.
50. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case is assigned for us to be informed that objections to evidence must be made
during the trial and not for the first time on appeal. Failure to object can result in a
waiver of the right to challenge the evidence's admissibility.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
Facts:

On May 2, 1991, private complainant Danilo Tangcoy entrusted Lito Corpuz with jewelry
worth P98,000 to sell on a commission basis at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo
City. The agreement stipulated that Corpuz had to either remit the sale proceeds or
return the unsold items within 60 days. Corpuz failed to do either and did not pay
Tangcoy despite repeated demands. Consequently, Corpuz was charged with estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

Corpuz pleaded not guilty and claimed the receipt in question was for a loan obtained in
1989 from a third party, which was falsely dated and used against him. Nevertheless,
the RTC found him guilty of estafa and imposed a penalty involving imprisonment and
indemnification. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction with a modification
regarding the prison term. Corpuz then took his case to the Supreme Court, raising
issues over the admissibility of evidence, the alleged defect in the information, the proof
of demand, and the credibility of the private complainants.

Issues:

1. Whether photocopies of prosecution evidence admitted by the lower courts violate

the best evidence rule.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied Corpuz’s petition, finding no merit in his arguments. The
records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at
the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The
CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his
Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed
the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a
timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection
shall be considered as waived.

What do we learn from this case?

A: We learn from this case the Best Evidence Rule- That Original document must be
produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.

Likewise, if you want to object to evidence being presented, do so at the time it is

offered in court. Otherwise, you may be considered to have waived your objection.
51. People v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 167147, August 3, 2005

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 2 documentary evidence, 1. Original

Document Rule

1. Original document Rule

Why is this case assigned?

 This case was assigned to prove the credibility of witness testimony, particularly that of
a child victim, and the sufficiency of evidence (including medical evidence) to prove the
crime of rape. While documentary evidence (like the birth certificate to establish the
victim's age and the medical reports) played a role, the case's significance lies in how
the court evaluated that evidence in conjunction with the testimonial evidence.

 Rule 30, on the other hand, deals specifically with proving the contents of a document.
The Original Document Rule (also known as the Best Evidence Rule) states that the
original document is the best evidence of its contents, and generally must be presented
unless certain exceptions apply.

What are the relevant facts?

 Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced to death for the rape of six-year-old Alpha
Jane Bertiz.
 The incident occurred on August 7, 2001, when Alpha Jane was home alone with her
younger siblings while her parents were away.
 Appellant lured Alpha Jane under the pretense of teaching her arithmetic, then forcibly
undressed her and committed the act of rape.
 Alpha Jane screamed in pain, prompting the appellant to use tear gas before fleeing the
scene.
 The victim reported the incident to her mother, who sought medical assistance and
reported the crime to local authorities.

What do we learn from this case?

Credibility of Witness Testimony

 The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the trial court's assessment of
witness credibility, particularly in cases involving minors.
 Alpha Jane's testimony was detailed and consistent, identifying the appellant as her
assailant despite attempts by the defense to suggest extortion motives.

Medical Evidence Supporting the Victim's Testimony

  The medico-legal report corroborated the victim's account, indicating evidence of trauma
consistent with rape.
 Expert testimony clarified that the injuries sustained by the victim were compatible with
the act of penetration.

Legal Standards for Proving Age in Rape Cases

 The Supreme Court reiterated the legal standards for establishing the age of a victim in
rape cases, emphasizing the necessity of presenting credible evidence.
 In this case, the prosecution successfully established that Alpha Jane was six years old
at the time of the incident through her birth certificate, which the defense did not
contest.
52. Kuwait Airways, v. The Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance, G.R. No. 213931.
November 17, 2021

Topic: Rule 130, B. documentary evidence, Sec. 4 Original of document

1. Why is this case assigned Rule 130, Section 4?

This case deals with the admissibility of evidence, specifically photocopies of the
MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt and the Japan Cargo Delivery Receipt.
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence pertains to documentary evidence. Section 4
of Rule 130, both in the 1997 version and the 2019 revised version, discusses
what constitutes an original document. The court discusses whether the
photocopies presented qualify as originals or if they are considered secondary
evidence, which requires different rules for admissibility. The court ultimately
decided that the photocopies were not properly authenticated and thus
inadmissible, effectively applying principles related to original documents vs.
copies.

2. What are the relevant facts?

● Fujitsu Europe Limited (FEL) hired O'Grady Air Services (OAS) to ship disk
drives from the UK to the Philippines.
● The shipment was insured by Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.
(TMFICL), with Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (TMMICI) acting as
their settling agent.
● Kuwait Airways Corporation (KAC) transported the shipment by air.
● Upon arrival in the Philippines, there were notations on a MIASCOR Storage and
Delivery Receipt suggesting damage to the cargo.
● The consignee, Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines
(FCPCP), filed an insurance claim.
● TMMICI paid the claim and then, as subrogee, sued KAC for damages.
● The RTC dismissed the case due to lack of evidence.
● The CA reversed the RTC's decision, applying res ipsa loquitur.

3. What do we learn from this case?

This case provides several key learnings regarding evidence and common carrier
liability:

● Admissibility of Evidence: Photocopies of documents, even if they appear to

show damage, are not automatically admissible as evidence. They must be
properly authenticated as required by the Rules of Evidence. Simply presenting a
photocopy without proper authentication is insufficient. The case highlights the
 importance of adhering to the rules regarding original documents and secondary
evidence.
● Burden of Proof: The plaintiff (in this case, the insurer as subrogee) bears the
burden of proving the damage to the goods. This includes not just the existence
of damage, but also that the damage occurred while the goods were in the
possession of the common carrier. Hearsay or unauthenticated documents are
not enough.
● Res Ipsa Loquitur: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself)
cannot be applied if the plaintiff fails to adequately establish the fact of the injury
or damage in the first place. It is not a substitute for proving the basic elements of
a negligence claim. The mere fact that goods were shipped and later found
damaged does not automatically mean the carrier was negligent.
● Extraordinary Diligence of Common Carriers: While common carriers are
presumed negligent if goods are damaged, this presumption only arises after the
damage has been proven. The plaintiff must first establish the damage. The case
underscores the high degree of care expected from common carriers but also the
importance of proper evidence to establish liability.
● Negative Pregnant: A denial that is evasive and does not specifically deny the
material allegations of the complaint, but implies an admission of what is not
denied, can be considered a "negative pregnant." However, in this case, the
court determined that the petitioner's denial, while perhaps poorly worded, was
not actually an admission of damage.

In essence, this case emphasizes the importance of meticulous record-keeping, proper

evidence presentation, and a clear understanding of the burden of proof in cases
involving damaged goods and common carrier liability. It serves as a reminder that
even in situations where negligence might be suspected, solid evidence is crucial for a
successful claim.
53. Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Fidelity & Surety Co., G.R. No. 26743, October 19,
1927

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A:

A: Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states: Sec. 9. Evidence of written
agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he or she puts in issue in a verified pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.

What are the relevant facts?

A:

1. Promissory Note Execution

On April 26, 1920, the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. executed a promissory note in
favor of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc., for P50,000, payable one
month after the date. The note included provisions for interest and attorney's fees
in case of non-payment.
2. Guaranty Notation
On May 3, 1920, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands made
a notation on the note, obligating itself to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co.
harmless against loss for discounting the note.
3. Endorsement to the Bank
On May 4, 1920, the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company endorsed the note in
blank and delivered it to the Bank of the Philippine Islands. However, it was
unclear whether the bank actually discounted the note.
4. Non-Payment and Insolvency
After the note matured, demand for payment was made on the Laguna Coconut
Oil Co., the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, and the Fidelity and Surety
 Company, all of whom refused to pay. The Laguna Coconut Oil Co. was
insolvent.
5. Legal Proceedings
The Bank of the Philippine Islands filed multiple actions against the Fidelity and
Surety Company to enforce the guaranty. The case had been remanded twice
before reaching the Supreme Court again.
6. Claim of Mutual Mistake
The Bank sought reformation of the guaranty instrument, alleging a mistake in
the notation where "Laguna Coconut Oil Co." was mistakenly used instead of
"Bank of the Philippine Islands."

What do we learn from this case?

A: The Court emphasized that the mistake must be mutual, meaning both parties must
have shared the same misunderstanding. The Bank failed to demonstrate that the
Fidelity and Surety Company was party to the alleged mistake.

The evidence presented by the Bank, including bookkeeping entries and

correspondence, was deemed insufficient to meet the strict standard of proof required
for reformation. The Court found the evidence speculative and inconclusive.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a written agreement is presumed to contain all the
terms of the agreement. Reformation of a contract based on mutual mistake requires
clear and convincing evidence that the writing does not express the true intent of the
parties.
54. Lechugas v. C.A., G.R. No. L-185240, January 20, 2010

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A:
Rule 130, sec. 10 Evidence of Written Agreements, which states that when an
agreement is reduced to paper, it is deemed to contain all of the terms agreed upon, is
the basis for this case. When at least one party to the lawsuit is not a party or privy to
the relevant written document, the Parol evidence rule cannot be applied. The rule
cannot be used against another party by a person who is not privy to the contract.

When at least one of the parties to the lawsuit is not a party or a privy of a party to the
written document in question and does not base a claim on the document or assert a
right originating in the document or the relationship established by it, the parol
evidence rule does not apply and may not be properly invoked by either party against
the other. According to law, extrinsic evidence may be admissible in situations when
strangers to a contract are not bound by it.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
This petition for review invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court for admitting and giving credence to the
testimony of the vendor regarding the sale of the disputed lot. The testimony is contrary
to the contents of the deed of sale executed by the vendor in favor of the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the private
respondents, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern
portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. She alleged
that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and refused to surrender
the possession of the same despite demands made by the petitioner. The complaint was
dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo where
the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5055.

The petitioner testified that she purchased the land from Leoncia Lasangue, supported
by a public deed of sale. The land was surveyed and declared in her name, and she had
taken possession through tenants. The respondents countered by asserting that the
land sold to the petitioner was different from the land in dispute, presenting evidence of
prior ownership.

Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the land which plaintiff bought from
Leoncia Lasangue in 1950 as evidenced by the deed exhibit A, is different from the land
now subject of this action, and described in paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint. To
prove this point, defendants called as their first witness plaintiff herself, to elicit from
her the reason why it was that although her vendor Leoncia Lasangue was also residing
at the municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, plaintiff did not care to call her to the witness
stand to testify regarding the identity of the land which she (plaintiff) bought from said
vendor Leoncia Lasangue.

Defendant's evidence in chief, as testified to by Carmelita Loza shows that on April 6,

1931 Hugo Loza, father of Carmelita Loza and predecessor-in-interest of the rest of the
heirs of herein defendants, purchased a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor as
evidenced by the deed "Venta Definitiva". This land, containing 53,327 square meters is
bounded on the north by Ramon Lasangue, on the south by Emeterio Lasangue; that
immediately after the sale, Hugo Loza took possession of the said parcel of land and
declared the same in his name starting the year 1935.

On March 17, 1941, Hugo Loza bought from Emeterio Lasangue a parcel of land with an
area of four hectares more or less, adjoining the land Loza had earlier bought from
Victoria Limor, and which sale was duly evidenced by a public instrument. After the
execution of the deed of sale, Hugo Loza caused the transfer of the declaration in his
own name beginning 1945, and started paying the taxes on the land.

These two parcels of land (that purchased by Hugo Loza in 1941 from Emeterio
Lasangue, and a portion of that bought by him from Victoria Limor sometime in 1931)
were consolidated and designated, during the cadastral survey as Lot No. 5456; while
the remaining portion of the lot bought from Victorina Limor, adjoining Lot 5456 on the
east, was designated as Lot No. 5515 in the name of the Heirs of Hugo Loza. Defendants
claim that the lot bought by plaintiff from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by the deed of
sale, is situated south of the land now subject of this action and designated during
cadastral survey of Lambunao as Lot No. 5522 , in the name of Victoria Lechugas.
Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor in the deed of sale, testifying for defendants
declared that during his lifetime her father, Emeterio Lasangue, owned a parcel of land
in Lambunao, Iloilo, containing an area of 36 hectares; that said Emeterio Lasangue sold
a slice of 4 hectares of this property to Hugo Loza, evidenced by a deed of sale; that
other sales were made to other persons, leaving only some twelve hectares out of the
original 36; that these 12 hectares were transferred by her parents in her (witness)
name, being the only child and heir; that on December 8, 1950, Leoncia Lasangue sold
six hectares (south side) of her inherited property to Victoria Lechugas under a public
instrument which was prepared at the instance of Victoria Lechugas and thumbmarked
by herself (the vendor). She testified that the six hectares sold to Lechugas was not part
of the land subject of the litigation.

RTC: dismissed both cases

CA: Affirmed

On the basis of the above findings and the testimony of vendor Leoncia Lasangue
herself, who although illiterate was able to specifically point out the land which she sold
to the petitioner, the appellate court upheld the trial court's decision except that the
deed of sale was declared as not null and void ab initio insofar as Leoncia Lasangue was
concerned because it could pass ownership of the lot in the south known as Lot No.
5522 of the Lambunao Cadastre which Leoncia Lasangue intended to sell and actually
sold to her vendee, petitioner Victoria Lechugas.

Now, petitioner contends that the CA had no legal justification when it subjected the
true intent and agreement to parol evidence over the objection of petitioner and that to
impugn a written agreement, the evidence must be conclusive. Petitioner maintains,
moreover, that the CA relied so much on the testimony of the vendor who did not even
file a case for the reformation of the deed of sale.

What do we learn from this case?

A:
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, concluding that parol evidence
might be used to ascertain the parties' true intentions regarding the land that was actually sold.

The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not
applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and
third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria
Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioners and the
private respondents.

When at least one of the parties to the lawsuit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written
document in question and does not base a claim on the document or assert a right originating in
the document or the relationship established by it, the parol evidence rule does not apply and
may not be properly invoked by either party against the other.
55. Salimbangon v. Tan, G.R. No. 185240, January 20, 2010

Topic:Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence Sec.9

Why is this case assigned?
A: Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states: Sec. 9. Evidence of written
agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

What are the relevant facts?

A:· Guillermo Ceniza died intestate, leaving a parcel of land in Mandaue City.

· His children executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition in 1973,

dividing the land among themselves.

· The partition included easements of right of way for certain lots, specifically Lots
A, B, D, and E, to provide access to interior lots.

· The heirs later modified the partition to eliminate the easement along Lots A, D,
and E, establishing a new easement exclusively along Lot B.

· Victoria Salimbangon, one of the heirs, later acquired Lot A and constructed a
residential house with garages, utilizing the easement on Lot B.

· The Tans purchased Lots B, C, D, and E and built improvements that

encroached on the easement, leading to a dispute.

What do we learn from this case?

A:Ratio:

1. Parol Evidence Rule:

· The parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of evidence to alter or

contradict the terms of a written agreement. However, exceptions exist,
such as when the true intent of the parties is in issue, or when there is
a mistake or ambiguity in the agreement. In this case, the Tans
properly raised the issue of the true intent of the heirs, making Eduardo
Ceniza's testimony admissible.

2. Extinction of Easement:
 · An easement of right of way is extinguished when the ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in one person. This is
because the purpose of the easement—to provide access to the
dominant estate is no longer necessary when both estates are owned
by the same person.

· The heirs' modification of the agreement, which shifted the easement

exclusively to Lot B, further supported the conclusion that the
easement was intended solely for the benefit of Lots D and E.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision, ruling that the
easement of right of way on Lot B was extinguished when the Tans acquired ownership
of Lots B, D, and E. The Court also upheld the admissibility of Eduardo Ceniza's
testimony under the parol evidence rule.
56. Sps. Paras v. Kimwa Construction, G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A:
This case is assigned to give a jurisprudential example of an exception to the Parole
Evidence Rule.
In this case, the SC ruled that even if in general no evidence other than what the
agreements have already been contracted can be shown or used. However there
exception like when the contract does not show the true intentions of the parties.

What are the relevant facts?

A:

● In this case, there was an agreement between Lucia Paras (lucia) who was a
concessionari of sand and gravel permit and kimwa corp who is construction firm
that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers ,to haul 40,000
aggregates made on dec 6 1994

● In the agreement, it did not explicitly state of a deadline for this. However, there
was a special permit attached to the agreement that stated that Lucia is only
allowed until may 15 1995 to haul aggregates.

● Lucia Paras, a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit, entered into a

contract with Kimwa on December 6, 1994, for the supply of 40,000 cubic meters
of aggregates

● After hauling only 10,000 cubic meters, Kimwa ceased operations, prompting
Lucia to file a Complaint for breach of contract.

● They claimed that Kimwa had assured them that the entire quantity would be
extracted before May 15, 1995, when Lucia's Special Permit was set to expire.

● Kimwa countered that the 40,000 cubic meters was merely a maximum limit and
denied any obligation to complete the hauling by the specified date.

Issue
WON Kimwa was liable for the failure to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregate by may
15, 1995.
WON the special permit should be considered in considering the deadline of the haul,
even if it was not mention in the agreement

Ruling:
YES
YES

● We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate that of the
Regional Trial Court. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder
of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras.

● In Philippine National Railways v. Court of First Instance of Albay,42 this court

noted that "if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract
mentioned in the complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties,
then parol evidence is admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties

● two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that
the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the
parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.

● Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded

in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the
Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to express the true intent of the
parties.

● Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioners

Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case
allowing admission of parol evidence

● Considering how the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to

express the parties’ true intent was successfully put in issue in petitioners
Spouses Paras’ Complaint (and even responded to by respondent Kimwa in its
Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary
parol evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras

● Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent

Kimwa was well aware that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted area, and
 that petitioner Lucia Paras’ operations cannot extend beyond May 15, 1995,
when the Special Permit expires

What do we learn from this case?

A:
We learn that although as a general rule, there can be no evidence of such terms other
than those written in the agreement, there are exceptions. One of which is when the
intent of the parties are not truly expressed.
57. Cruz v. C.A., G.R. No. 79962, December 10, 1990

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: This case was assigned to clarify the application of Rule 130, Section 10 of the Rules
of Court on the parol evidence rule and determine whether oral testimony can modify or
expplain written agreements, specifically in cases involving receipts and contracts.

What are the relevant facts?

A:Private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a case for collection and damages against
petitioner Lucio Cruz due to the latter’s failure to deliver the agreed fish harvest and
settle his financial obligations.

During the trial, the parties stipulated the following facts:

● In May 1982, Salonga and Cruz verbally agreed on a "pakyawan" contract

regarding the fish in a fishpond Cruz was leasing. The agreed price was
P28,000.00.
● Cruz requested Salonga to advance P35,000.00 instead of P28,000.00 to help
settle his obligations to the fishpond owner.
● Salonga delivered the P35,000.00, which Cruz acknowledged through a signed
receipt dated May 4, 1982 (Exhibit D).
● After the harvest, Salonga and Cruz entered into another verbal agreement
where Cruz subleased the fishpond to Salonga for P28,000.00 for a one-year
period starting August 15, 1982.

Salonga later claimed that aside from the amounts mentioned in the stipulation, he also
delivered another P28,000.00 to Cruz on May 14, 1982, as consideration for their
"pakyawan" agreement. This was evidenced by another receipt, Exhibit I.

Cruz denied receiving this additional P28,000.00 and argued that Exhibit I was merely
an explanation of the earlier Exhibit D transaction.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Cruz, ordering Salonga to pay him.
However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision, ruling that Exhibit I was a
separate and independent transaction from Exhibit D. The CA held that Exhibit I was
clear in its language and should not be treated merely as an explanation of Exhibit D.

Cruz then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals
erred in disregarding parol evidence to clarify the relationship between Exhibits D and I,
despite the exceptions provided in Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling of the court:

What do we learn from this case?

A: That the parol evidence rule does not apply in this case because Section 7, Rule 130
presupposes a written document that fully embodies the terms of an agreement.
However, Exhibit D is merely a receipt that acknowledges Cruz’s receipt of P35,000.00
from Salonga on May 4, 1982. It does not contain the terms of their agreement nor does
it indicate that it was meant to be the sole and complete record of their contract.
Furthermore, Exhibit D does not even reference the underlying transaction that led to its
issuance.

On the other hand, Exhibit I explicitly refers to the "pakyawan" contract and states that
Cruz received P28,000.00 as consideration for the agreement. The testimonies of Cruz
and his witnesses were admitted not to alter or contradict Exhibit I but to clarify the
circumstances surrounding the receipt of the amount. Moreover, while Exhibit I is dated
May 14, 1982, it does not categorically state that the P28,000.00 was received on that
same date.

The Supreme Court emphasized that a written document is not conclusive evidence of
all the facts it contains. A receipt is merely an acknowledgment of a transaction and
does not necessarily contain the entire agreement between the parties.

Additionally, even assuming that Exhibits D and I were covered by the parol evidence
rule, the Court of Appeals erred in its application. The private respondent (Salonga)
failed to object when Cruz introduced evidence to clarify the execution and issuance of
the documents. Under the rules of evidence, an objection must be raised immediately,
or it is deemed waived.
58. BPI Express v. Armovit, G.R. No. 163654, October 8, 2014

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: Section 10. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he or she puts in issue in a verified pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.

What are the relevant facts?

A:
● On November 21, 1992, Armovit treated her British friends from Hong Kong for
lunch. Upon paying using her BPI credit card, the payment was unsuccessful.
She called BPI and was informed that her credit card was cancelled.

● On February 3, 1993, Armovit demanded compensation for the shame,

embarrassment and humiliation she had suffered in the amount of
₱2,000,000.00.
● On February 5, 1993, BPI that telegraphic message was sent on March 19, 1992
informing here her 3 months of arrears and the credit card will be cancelled if not
paid on March 31, 1993. While acknowledging that Armovit settled the obligation
on April 1992, BPI contended that Armovit failed to submit the required
application for reactivation.
● On March 12, 1993, Armovit received a telegraphic message from BPI Express
Credit apologizing for its error of inadvertently including her credit card in Caution
List No. 225 dated March 11, 1993 sent to its affiliated merchants.

What do we learn from this case?

A: The petition lacks merit.

The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card
membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the
parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant
is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a
conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity. However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be present
because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
Hence, bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of the Civil Code includes gross
negligence.

The Court disagrees with the contentions of BPI Express Credit. The Terms and
Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Express Credit Card printed on
the credit card application form spelled out the terms and conditions of the contract
between BPI Express Credit and its card holders, including Armovit. Such terms and
conditions determined the rights and obligations of the parties. Yet, a review of such
terms and conditions did not reveal that Armovit needed to submit her new application
as the antecedent condition for her credit card to be taken out of the list of suspended
cards.
59. Philippine National Bank v. Cua, G.R. No. 199161, April 18, 2018

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: This case supports the matter of written agreements as evidence that may be
submitted in court as stipulated in Sec. 10 of Rule 130 on Parol Evidence Rule
and that a promissory note is the best evidence to substantially prove that two
parties are legally bound to an agreement.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Respondent James T. Cua averred that he and his brother maintained a US Dollar
Savings Time Deposit with PNB with a face value of USD50,860.53. Respondent also
noted that he and his brother had practiced pre-signing loan applications with PNB for
the purpose of having a standby loan available anytime.

James learned that he had a loan obligation with PNB. James alleged that despite the
pre-signed documents for pre-arranged loans with his time deposit as collateral, he
never availed of its proceeds. James thus filed a complaint for sum of money against
PNB to return the entire amount of his account.

PNB submitted into evidence various documents, among them were promissory notes
where James affirms that it was signature on such documents.

The lower court, as well as the Court of Appeals, awards the case in favor of
respondent Cua, affirmed with the decision that since PNB alleges affirmative defense,
it falls upon PNB to prove such defense and had failed to do so. Thus, PNB files a
petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals
decision.

What do we learn from this case?

A:In this case, The Supreme Court grants the appeal as meritorious. Claiming that the
lower courts observation that PNB had failed to provide substantial support for its claims
against respondent. However, the SC also notes that PNB's evidence of promissory
notes wherein it states that respondent had willingly received such loans and submits
his time deposit as collateral, supported by respondent himself that it was his signature
on such notes. The SC also notes that respondent's default on such loans despite the
promissory notes subjects respondent under scrutiny of the court and does not afford
him the defense of having no knowledge of availing of such proceeds.
This case essentially conveys Sec. 10 of Rule 130 of the ROC as the basis in
supporting that written agreements are binding upon parties involved and is best
evidence as to the existence of such loan or agreement. Only stipulating that parties
may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of a written agreement in
instances of ambiguity, validity, and existence of other terms. Thus, the promissory note
being supported by both parties as the instrument of their agreement for the loans, is
the best evidence that binds both parties, and wherein respondent fails to see as
evidence only stacking against him.
60. Southeast Asia Shipping Corp v. Seagull Maritime Corp., G.R. No.144439, Oct
24, 2003

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: This case provides that when interpreting contracts, specifically an Affidavit of
Undertaking, courts should consider not only the literal wording but also related
agreements (like the Manning Agency Agreement and Special Power of Attorney) and
the surrounding circumstances to determine the true intent of the parties. It
demonstrates that a literal interpretation can be disregarded if it contradicts the evident
intention of the parties as gleaned from the whole context of their dealings.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Nerry Balatongan was hired by Philimare Shipping (PHILIMARE), the manning agent
in the Philippines for Navales Shipmanagement and Marine Consulting Pte, Ltd.
(NAVALES), acting on behalf of Turtle Bay Shipping Pte. Ltd.

Balatongan was injured and his claim for disability benefits was denied as time-barred.
Seagull Maritime Corporation later replaced PHILIMARE as NAVALES' manning agent,
assuming responsibility for seamen deployed by PHILIMARE.

Balatongan sued both PHILIMARE and SEAGULL and won. SEAGULL paid the
judgment and then sued Southeast Asia Shipping Corporation to recover the amount.
Prior to this, SEASCORP had become NAVALES’ manning agent, but specifically for
Arawa Bay Shipping Corporation Pte Ltd. SEASCORP, as required by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, executed an Affidavit of Undertaking stating it
assumed liabilities for seamen recruited by SEAGULL for NAVALES.

SEAGULL argued this affidavit made SEASCORP liable for the Balatongan judgment.
SEASCORP contended its liability under the affidavit was limited to seamen recruited
for Arawa Bay Shipping, not Turtle Bay Shipping (the entity related to Balatongan's
case).

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of SEAGULL, based on the literal wording of the
Affidavit of Undertaking. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. However, the
Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision, holding that while the Affidavit of
Undertaking appeared to hold SEASCORP liable, the surrounding circumstances,
including the Manning Agency Agreement and the Special Power of Attorney between
NAVALES and SEASCORP (which pertained specifically to Arawa Bay Shipping),
demonstrated that SEASCORP's assumption of liability was only with respect to
seamen recruited for Arawa Bay Shipping, not for other vessels or shipping entities for
which NAVALES acted as agent. The SC emphasized that the intent of the parties, as
evidenced by the related documents and circumstances, should prevail over the literal
wording of the Affidavit of Undertaking.

What do we learn from this case?

A: Where it is necessary to determine the correct interpretation of a document for the
purpose of making the intention of the parties to prevail, the Rules of Court instructs that
the circumstances under which it was made may be shown.

Thus Rule 130 provides:

Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. - For the proper

construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language
he is to interpret.

Applying this Rule, since the Affidavit of Understanding stated that SEASCORP had
been appointed as the manning agent of NAVALES to recruit Filipino seamen for its
ships, reference to the Manning Agency Agreement between the two is in order.

Blindly applying the literal meaning of a contract, without considering the broader
context, can lead to unfair results that defeat the true intentions of the parties. The
court's decision in this case demonstrates a commitment to achieving a just resolution
by looking beyond the surface of the documents.
61. Tarapen v. People, G.R. No. 173824, August 8, 2008 (MEDILLO)

Topic:

1. Why is this case assigned?

When identifying the qualifications of your witnesses, it is important that they are
credible and able to help prove the commission of the crime. Well-settled is the rule that
the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in another,
depending on the corroborative evidence or the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case. Where a part of the testimony of a witness runs counter to the medical evidence
submitted, it is within the sound discretion of the court to determine which portions of
the testimony to reject as false and which to consider worthy of belief.

2. What are the relevant facts?

· Petitioner Peter Tarapen was charged before the RTC of Baguio City with
Frustrated Homicide for attacking and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden. Peter
Tarapen a garbage collector employed under the Local Government of City of
Baguio, while James Lacbao Pangoden, the victim, was a sidewalk vendor.

· When Peter Tarapen and his colleagues were collecting garbage along the road of
Hilltop Market, they accidentally bumped into a display of vegetables belonging to
one of the co-vendors of the victim. When petitioner helped the vendor, it angered
the victim since it was moved to his side, soiling the products of the victim. An
argument ensued between the petitioner and the victim, during which Peter Tarapen
struck James with a shovel, hitting him twice. The incident was witnessed by two of
the victim's fellow vendors. James was initially taken to Baguio General Hospital, but
Dr. Cala declared his condition critical, making surgery difficult. The victim's wife
opted to transfer him to a nearby private hospital, where Dr. Mensalvas shared the
same assessment. Left with no other choice, the wife took James home, where he
later died.

· The testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, two co-vendors of the Victim, Dr.
Cala, the victim’s wife, and the police officer had a different version from the
defense’s testimonies (Truck Driver, one garbage collector and Dr. MaryJane). The
trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution to be the most credible and
supported by reasonable evidence at hand. Therefore, the trial court found the
petitioner guilty of Homicide and ordered him to pay the damages specified by the
court. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
though with amendments.
 3. What do we learn from this case?

It was emphasized in this case that the mere relationship of a witness to the victim does
not necessarily impair the witness’ credibility. On the contrary, a witness’s relationship
to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it would
be unnatural for a relative, or a friend as in this case, who is interested in vindicating the
crime, to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.

A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such
that they have an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, suppress
or pervert the truth, or state what is false.To warrant rejection of the testimony of a
relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the
testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had
moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.
62. People v. Obogne, G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014

Topic: Section 21. Witnesses; their qualifications. All persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. (20a)

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime,
unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case is assigned because being mentally retarded does not automatically make
the testimony incredible and therefore disqualified to be a witness.

What are the relevant facts?

A:This case involves an appeal by Jerry Obogne who was convicted of rape against
“AAA”, 12-year old mentally retarded person. Obogne appealed arguing that AAA’s
testimony deserves no credence because she was incapable of intelligently making
known her perception to others due to her mental disability.

What do we learn from this case?

A: Rule 130, Section 21 states that all persons who can perceive and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be a witness. Mental retardation does not
affect a witness’ credibility. AAA’s was able to perceive, to make her perception to
others and to remember traumatic incidents as in this case.
63. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013

Topic: Rule 130, sec. 21 Witnesses; Their Qualifications

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case discussed the qualifications and disqualifications of witnesses as provided
in Sec. 20 of Rule 130 and Sec. 21 to 24 of Rule 130, respectively.

This case emphasized that generally, a handwriting expert is qualified to be a witness

except if he possesses disqualifications mentioned in Sec. 21 to 24 of Rule 130.

Rule 130 (1989 Revised Rules on Evidence)

● Sec. 20 - qualified witnesses are all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, except as provided in Sec. 21 to 24
of Rule 130.
● Sec. 21 – disqualification due to mental incapacity or immaturity. (deleted in 2019
Amendments)
● Sec. 22 – disqualification by reason of marriage.
● Sec. 23 – disqualification by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party
● Sec. 24 – disqualification by reason of privileged communication

What are the relevant facts?

A: Luisa Marcos, one of the children of late Sps. Andres Sr. and Concepcion Navarro,
believed that the signature of her father in the Deed of Donation executed in favor to her
brother, Late Andres Jr. was forged.

The handwriting expert, PO2 Alvarez, found that the signatures in question was not
written by one and the same person.

Luisa filed for annulment of the Deed of Donation.

The heirs of Andres Jr. moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as witness. They argued that
the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the deed of donation and add
that this will violate their constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to
them before the examination of the signatures were conducted.

RTC disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness because her supposed testimony would be
a hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres Sr.

CA likewise denied the petition.

SC ruled in favor of Luisa Marcos. PO2 Alvarez is qualified to be a witness. As a
handwriting expert, she can surely perceive and make known her perception to others,
thus, she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be also disqualified as a witness since
she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.

What do we learn from this case?

A: The General Rule is that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. (now Sec. 21 of Rule 130)
Exception is when he or she possesses either of the disqualifications mentioned in the
Rules.

Good to know:
Qualification of the witness is not the same with the credibility and weight of his
testimony. For instance, in the testimony of an expert, he may be qualified as a witness
but the credibility and weight of his testimony will depend upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies between
the genuine and false specimen of writing.
64. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 250903 April 26, 2021

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A:

This case is assigned in order to know that a person would still qualify as a witness
despite his or her mental illness so long as he or she is capable of perceiving, and
perceiving, can make known his or her perception to others at the time of examination.

What are the relevant facts?

A:

Accused-appellant XXX was charged with two (2) counts of rape defined under Article
266-A (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution established the presence of
the elements of the crime of rape to a moral certainty here.

During the trial, AAA (the victim), testified on the incident saying that it was her father
XXX, who forcibly removed her clothes because he threatened her. Verily, AAA was
forced to retell the sordid details of the bestial act and relive the twin rapes all over
again when she took the witness stand.

As AAA narrated, she was alone in the living room of their house on March 21, 2001,
around 11 o’clock in the evening when an appellant suddenly appeared, led her into her
room, warned her not to tell anyone about the incident, then forcibly undressed her. She
resisted, but to no avail. He then mounted her and inserted her penis into her vagina.
After the ordeal, he warned her again not to tell anyone of the incident, so she kept
silent out of fear.

A similar incident occurred on July 17, 2001. He went to her room, undressed himself,
and ordered her to remove her clothes and spread her legs. He got on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. Though she tried to resist, she failed to stop the
lustful advances of her father who not only exercised moral ascendancy over her, but
also warned her twice not to tell anyone of the rapes.

Appellant, nevertheless, attempts to discredit AAA because the latter allegedly had
hallucinations due to a mental condition she developed when she underwent surgery for
her hydrocephalus when she was just three (3) months old. Further, he claims that AAA
gabe conflicting statements on how she got undressed during the alleged rape
incidents. At any rate, the charges against him were merely fabricated by his wife’s
relatives who have been trying to separate them for years.
What do we learn from this case?
A:

The assessment of credibility is best undertaken by the trial court since it has the
opportunity to observe evidence beyond what is written or spoken, such as the
deportment of the witness while testifying on the stand. Hence, the trial court’s factual
findings on the credibility of witnesses are binding and conclusive on the reviewing
court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

AAA’s mental condition did not diminish her qualification or credibility as a witness.
Section 21, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence pertinently reads:

Section 21. Witness; their qualifications — All persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be a witness.

Notably, Section 21 of the present Rule was renumbered from Section 20. Prior to Rule
130’s amendment, the now deleted Section 21 formerly read:

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. — The

following person cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making know their perception to others;

The deletion, however, had no substantial effect on Section 21 as presently worded. For
the rule remains, as it was, that a person would still qualify as a witness despite his or
her mental illness so long as he or she is capable of perceiving, and perceiving, can
make known his or her perception to others at the time of examination.

As the courts aptly noted, AAA showed her capacity to perceive and make known her
perceptions when she testified on four (4) different trial dates. Obviously, AAA’s
condition was no obstacle for her to communicate her harrowing experiences in the
hands of her own father. Furthermore, a certain Dr. Soriano also vouched for AAA’s
capacity to testify.

AAA’s mental condition does not appear to have been caused by her surgery, contrary
to appellant's claim. For AAA testified that her mental illness only started to manifest
after the rape incidents.
65. People v. Corpuz G.R. No. 208013 July 3, 2017

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: This case assigned because in rape cases involving mentally incapacitated victims,
the focus is not on physical force or intimidation but on the victim’s capacity to consent.
Intellectual disability does not inherently discredit a witness’s testimony if they can
meaningfully recount their experiences.

What are the relevant facts?

A: The case involved Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores, charged with four counts of rape
committed against AAA, a 14-year-old with a mental capacity of a 5-year-old and 8-
month-old child. The incidents occurred in Barangay Puelay, Villasis, Pangasinan,
across various dates in 2002. Corpuz pleaded not guilty. During the trial, witnesses for
the prosecution included AAA’s family members and medical professionals who attested
to her mental condition and the sexual assaults. The defense argued that the charges
were fabricated, stemming from a personal grudge by AAA’s family. The Regional Trial
Court found Corpuz guilty, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals, leading to an
appeal to the Supreme Court.

What do we learn from this case?

A: We learn from this case that intellectual disability does not preclude one from being a
credible witness if they competently recount their experience. AAA’s coherent
testimony, despite her disability, was deemed credible and sufficient for Corpuz’s
conviction. The Court reiterated that physical force or intimidation need not be proven in
cases where the victim is incapable of giving consent, as in AAA’s situation.
66. People v. XYZ, G.R. No. 246458 Nov 11, 2021

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: The case shows that while a mentally incapacitated person may be disqualified as a
witness under Section 21 of Rule 130, they are not, solely by reason of their mental
incapacity, ineligible from testifying in the court.

What are the relevant facts?

A: XYZ was convicted of qualified statutory rape against AAA. Upon examination by the
psychologist of the PHMA, Dr. Manao, testified that AAA is considered as having a mild
retardation level of cognitive functioning and that her capacity to independently perform
the tasks befitting of her age was significantly delayed.

What do we learn from this case?

A: An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying
in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or
she knows. If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is
admissible in court. Verily, notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified
to take the witness stand. A person with a low intelligence quotient may still perceive
and is capable of making known his or her perception to others.

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of mentally
deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is
shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently.
67. People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015

TOPIC: Rule 30 Sec/ 21 Witness; Their Qualifications

Why is this case assigned?

Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15

December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut
this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's
competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child
to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child

What are the relevant facts?

Facts of the Incident:

● The appellant was charged with robbery with homicide, alleging that he attacked
and killed Josephine Castro y Barrera while stealing cash from her.
● The incident occurred on October 22, 2003, in Mandaluyong City, where the
appellant allegedly used a bladed weapon to inflict fatal injuries on the victim.

Arrest:

He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help around
two o'clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he
had then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police
officers had, later on, approached him to inquire what he knew about the killing
because they told him that Carl, the young son of the victim, had pointed to him
as the perpetrator, making him the primary suspect; that he had replied that he
had had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had assured the police officers
that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his years of living in the
neighborhood.

What do we learn from this case?

The appellant did not object to Carl's competency as a witness. He did not
attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the
child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions,
or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. After
the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant
extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense
did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the
Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or
to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge
favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
68. People v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-568, July 16, 1947

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: The issue in this case revolves around the application of Rule 130, Section 23
(formerly Section 26(d) of Rule 123), which disqualifies spouses from testifying
for or against each other in criminal proceedings. The case was assigned to
address the question of whether this rule applies when one spouse imputes a crime to
the other, thereby potentially opening the door for the other spouse to testify in rebuttal.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Juan Francisco was accused of parricide for killing his son and wounding his wife.

During the trial, Francisco testified in his defense, claiming that his wife was responsible
for the death of their son.

The prosecution, in rebuttal, presented the wife's testimony, contradicting her husband's
claim and stating that he was the one who killed their son.

The defense argued that the wife's testimony was inadmissible under the rule
prohibiting spouses from testifying against each other.

What do we learn from this case?

A: The Supreme Court ruled that the wife's testimony was admissible in this case. The
Court reasoned that:

○ The rule of marital incompetency can be waived. This waiver can occur
when one spouse introduces new matter in their testimony that imputes a
crime to the other spouse.

“Since the husband had testified that it was his wife who caused the death
of the little boy, she should be allowed to say that it was really her
husband who did it. We hold that it is not necessary, to justify such
rebuttal evidence, and to declare the existence of the waiver upon which it
was based, that the wife be in jeopardy of punishment in the same case
by reason of such testimony of her accused husband. The rule of waiver
of objection to the competency of witnesses generally does not require
this prerequisite in the case between husband and wife. Rather the rule
makes the determination of the question hinge around the consequences
 which by common sense, in justice and in fairness, should be deemed to
have been expected by the spouse who first testified naturally to flow from
his act of giving that testimony.”
○ The State has a right to present rebuttal evidence. When one spouse
imputes a crime to the other, the State has a right to rebut that imputation,
even if it means calling the other spouse as a witness.
“The State being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the
guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right
to offer the rebutting testimony in question, even against the objection of
the accused, because it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity. It may be said that the accused husband thought that he would
have more chances of convincing the court of his pretended innocence if
he pointed to his wife as having caused the death of their child, instead of
simply denying that he was the author of the fatal act. To this we would
counter by saying that if he was to be allowed, for his convenience, to
make his choice and thereby impute the act upon his spouse, justice
would be partial and one-sided if both the State and the wife were to be
absolutely precluded from introducing the latter's rebutting testimony.”
○ The wife's testimony was necessary for justice. The wife's testimony
was essential to counter her husband's claims and to ensure a fair and
balanced presentation of the evidence.
A decent respect and considerate regard for the feelings of an average
mother will tell us that such a moral and social stigma would be no less
injurious to her than a criminal punishment. And if the wife should, in such
a case and at such a juncture, be allowed to testify upon rebuttal, the
scope of her testimony should at least be the same as that of her
husband. This is only simple justice and fairness dictated by common
sense.
The Court emphasized that the husband's testimony, by implicating his wife, essentially
waived the privilege against her testifying. This waiver was necessary to prevent
injustice and to ensure that the truth was revealed.
69. Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005

Topic: Rule 130, sec. 23 Disqualification by Reason of Marriage

Why is this case assigned?
A: This was assigned to discuss a situation where the Marital Disqualification Rule
does not apply; or in other words, this case discusses one of the exceptions to the
general rule that neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse.

What are the relevant facts?

A: The case arose when respondent Susan Ramirez filed a criminal complaint for arson
against petitioner Maximo Alvarez. Maximo Alvarez is the husband of Esperanza
Alvarez, sister of Susan.

During trial for the criminal case of arson, Esperanza was called as witness against her
husband Maximo. Maximo and his counsel raised no objection at that time.

Esperanza testified to the acts committed by Maximo to prove the allegation of arson.
Esperanza alleged that she was inside the house burned by Maximo and that she was
his estranged wife. The records show that Maximo and Esperanza were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident.

Maximo filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

The trial court granted the motion and disqualified Esperanza from further testifying and
deleting her testimony from the records. On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and
set aside the trial court’s order.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals.

What do we learn from this case?

A: The Marital Disqualification Rule under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides for exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal
cases for offenses committed by one against the other.

One instance where the Marital Disqualification Rule will not be applied is when the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed when a spouse testifies
against the other.

When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it
comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee by one against the other.

In this case, the act of respondent Maximo in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law
Susan, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of
injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act
complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It
underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between Esperanza and
Maximo have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to
be preserved. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the
law aims to protect (thru the Marital Disqualification Rule) are nothing but ideals which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Maximo’s act
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and
love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes. Thus, there is no
longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.
70. U.S. v. Antipolo, G.R. No. L-13109, March 6, 1918

Topic:Rule 130, sec. 23 Disqualification by Reason of Marriage

Why is this case assigned?
A: This case is assigned to show whether a wife may testify in court with regard to the
dying declaration of his husband.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Dalmacio was charged with the murder of Fortunato. The defense wanted to present
Susan, the widow of Fortunato, as a witness concerning the alleged dying declaration of
Fortunato that the cause of his death was due to a fall and not to the acts imputed to
Dalmacio.

The trial court refused to permit Susana from testifying, on the ground that she, as the
wife, is not competent to testify under the rules of procedure, unless it be with the
consent of her husband; and as he is already dead, he cannot grant that permission and
it follows that she is disqualified from testifying in the case in which her husband is the
injured party.

What do we learn from this case?

A: We learn from this case that the purpose of the disqualification of a witness by
reason of marriage is to protect accused persons against statements made in the
confidence engendered by the marital relation and to relieve the spouse to whom such
confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing
them to the prejudice of the other spouse.

In lieu of that, when a person at the point of death, as a result of injuries he has
suffered, makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those
injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary,
such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated
after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of
his death.

Hence, in this case, the testimony to be made by the widow is not a confidential
information that is covered by the rules on the disqualification of a witness by
reason of marriage. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to permit the widow’s
testimony.
71. Josieline Chan v. Johnny Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A:The case was assigned in order for us to know that persons who are authorized to
practice to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics are not allowed to disclose
information without the consent of the patient.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Josieline Chan herein petitioner (Josie) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against his husband Johnny Chan herein respondent (Johnny). Josie claimed
that Johnny failed to care and support his family and was diagnosed as mentally
deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs by a
psychiatrist. Johnny resisted the action claiming that Josie was the one who failed her
wifely duties. Josie filed a request for the subpoena duces tecum (shall bring with you)
addressed to Medical City covering Johnny’s medical records accompanied by a motion
to be allowed to submit in evidence. Respondent argued that the medical records were
covered by physician-patient privilege, hence the question whether the lower court erred
in denying the subpoena duces tecum of Johnny’s medical records due to physician-
patient communication. The court ruled in favor of Johnny stating that the motion was
prematurely made and under the physician-patient privilege that to allow the disclosure
of hospital records would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient’s express consent.

What do we learn from this case?

A:We learned that under Rule 130 Sec. 24 (c) persons who are authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient
disclose testimonies and hospital records or any information acquired by the physician
in his profession capacity. The consent of patient is required in disclosing information.
72. People v. Carlos, G.R. No. 22948, March 17, 1925

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: This is assigned because it discusses an evidentiary - the admissibility of a letter
written by a wife. The court made a point that for this case the letter is inadmissible as
hearsay, as the wife did not testify and the husband’s possession of the letter did not
imply agreement with its contents. While the court discussed marital privilege and
illegally obtained evidence, the hearsay rule was the decisive factor. Because the letter
was excluded, the prosecution could not prove premeditation (a requirement for
murder), leading to the lesser conviction of homicide.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Fausto Carlos was accused of murdering Dr. Pablo Sityar. Carlos's wife had been
operated on by Dr. Sityar. Carlos claimed that Dr. Sityar had sexually assaulted his wife
during a post-operative visit. Carlos visited Dr. Sityar's clinic multiple times after the
alleged assault, even seeking treatment for himself. On the day of the killing, Carlos
went to Dr. Sityar's office. He admits to stabbing Dr. Sityar, but claims it was in self-
defense after Dr. Sityar insulted him and attacked him with a knife. The prosecution
presented evidence, including a letter written by Carlos's wife to him, which suggested
Carlos was planning an act of violence against Dr. Sityar. This letter was seized by
police during a search of Carlos's belongings.

What do we learn from this case?

A: While the majority of the Court opined that a privileged communication from one
spouse to another loses its privileged character when it comes into the hands of a third
party without collusion, in this case, the letter should be excluded on the ground that it is
hearsay. The wife did not testify, and the letter was not offered to impeach her
testimony. The fact that Carlos possessed the letter did not indicate his agreement with
its contents. Admitting the letter would violate Carlos's constitutional right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him. The Court distinguished this from a third
party testifying about an overheard conversation between spouses, as in that case, both
spouses participated in the conversation, and the defendant's silence could imply
assent. In this case, it was an unanswered letter.

Because the letter was inadmissible, the Court found insufficient evidence to prove
premeditation, a necessary element for murder. The Court also rejected the claim of
alevosia (treachery). Therefore, the Court convicted Carlos of simple homicide instead
of murder.
73. Barton v. Leyte Asphalt, G.R. No. L-21237, March 22, 1924

Topic: Rule 130, Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication

Why is this case assigned?
A: This is assigned in connection to Rule 130, Section 24 that even if the letter was
within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this
privilege was lost when the letter came to the hand of the adverse party and it makes no
difference how the adversary acquired possession.

What are the relevant facts?

- Plaintiff James Barton (Barton) filed an action to recover from defendant Leyte
Asphalt &Mineral Co. (Leyte Asphalt) as damages for the breach of contract in
the sum of $318,563.30.
- Leyte Asphalt offered in evidence Exhibit 14, which consists of a carbon copy of
a letter, written by the Plaintiff to his attorney
- When it was offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant, the counsel of
the plaintiff announced that had no objection to the introduction of the letter in
evidence if counsel would explain where this copy was secured.
- The counsel informed the court that he received the letter from the former
attorneys of the defendant without explanation how they got the letter.
- Counsel of the Plaintiff objected to its admission on the ground that it is a
confidential communication between client and lawyer.

What do we learn from this case?

A: We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the
letter was within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and
client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse
party and it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law
protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the
confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions
of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is
admissible in evidence.
“Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the client's
hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and
should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third
persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the
communication, whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the
protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously
reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy.”
74. Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996

Topic: Rule 130, sec. 24 Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communications.

Why is this case assigned?

A: This case illustrates that the attorney-client privilege communication shall extend to
disclosure of identity of the client by the attorney which in effect will implicate said client
to the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.

What are the relevant facts?

A: This case was connected from PCGG case No. 33 filed by PCGG against Eduardo
Cojuanco Jr. for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which includes shares of stock in the
corporation. Petitioners are partners in ACRAA law firm performing legal services to
their clients and the organization and acquisition of business association and acting as
nominee shareholders for their clients. In this particular case, the PCGG offered a deal
that if petitioners would disclose the identity of their client regarding the corporation
subject of PCGG Case No. 33, they will be excluded as respondent in such case.
Petitioners argued that they cannot reveal the identity of their client, since it is subject to
the attorney-client privilege communication. The issue in this case is whether, PCGG
can compel the disclosure of the identity of the client of petitioners.

The SC held that PCGG cannot compel the disclosure the identity of the client of
petitioners. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing
the client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer’s advice.

The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.

What do we learn from this case?

A: Attorney-client privilege communication ensures that the client shall disclose all the
facts necessary for the case. It is a matter of public policy for the effective and free
administration of justice. Hence, the law affords protection from disclosure of this
communication. This extends to the identity of the client which such revelation would in
effect implicate said client to the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
75. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115439-41, July 16, 1997

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A: This is assigned in connection to Rule 130, Section 24 and to our present evidentiary rule
was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by
a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made
by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means.

What are the relevant facts?

A: This case revolves around the falsification of public documents to support a motion for
reconsideration aimed at dismissing graft charges against respondent Paredes. The sequence
of events began with Paredes’ fraudulent acquisition of a land title through a free patent
application but was nullified. Subsequently, there criminal proceedings for perjury, but still
dismissed due to prescription, a new set of criminal charges was initiated against Paredes for
abuse of his former governmental position.

Sansaet, a practicing attorney and counsel for Paredes, was involved in creating falsified
documents to support a claim of double jeopardy to dismiss the graft charges against Paredes.
These documents were exposed as falsifications prompting new charges against Honrada,
Paredes, and Sansaet for falsification of public documents, leading to their indictment in the
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution sought to discharge Sansaet as a state witness, emphasizing
his crucial role in proving the contrived falsification. However, the Sandiganbayan denied this
motion, citing the attorney-client privilege, prompting the prosecution’s appeal to the Supreme
Court through a certiorari action, questioning the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and
Sansaet’s eligibility as a state witness.

What do we learn from this case?

A:
76. Lim v. C.A., G.R. No. 91114, September 25,1992

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A:Rule 130, sec. 24 Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communications

What are the relevant facts?

A: Private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and
after the marriage and until the present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial
was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent presented three (3)
witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. On 11
January 1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his
next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia
Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith
orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado
to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s counsel opposed the motion on the
ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged
since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.

What do we learn from this case?

A: The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he
attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be emphasized
that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making
a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations,
are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not
stated."

One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
requisites.

Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action
but to agree with the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to
discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as
an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose
anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not
refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained
while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s
answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were
influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert
opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which
was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As
an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule
on this point is summarized as follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory
physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician
to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a
lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended
professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated,
excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have
concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege
where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the
facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal
knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he
cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of
the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion."

There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a
physician in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of
the privilege:

Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the
confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys
the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts
have reached a contrary result."

Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given by Dr.
Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it
appear in the eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from a
mental disturbance called schizophrenia — which caused, and continues to cause,
irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family," — which is
based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that
indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s
"character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained
from the petitioner regarding the latter’s ailment and the treatment recommended
therefor.
77. Krohn v. C.A., G.R. No. 108854, June 14, 1994

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?

A: This case is assigned to illustrate the physician-patient privilege under Rule 130,
Section 24(c) of the Rules of Court, which prohibits a physician from testifying
about information acquired in a professional capacity unless the patient consents.

The Supreme Court clarified that the privilege applies only to the physician and
does not extend to third parties, such as a spouse. Additionally, the Court
emphasized that failure to timely object to hearsay evidence waives the right to
challenge it.

This case also highlights procedural rules, such as:

1. The limits of the physician-patient privilege – It applies only to medical

professionals.
2. The concept of waiver – Privileged communication may be waived by express
or implied consent.
3. The principle that objections must be timely raised – Failure to object to
hearsay testimony constitutes waiver.

What are the relevant facts?

A: Facts of the Incident

● Marriage and Separation:

○ Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married on June 14, 1964
and had three children.
○ Their relationship became strained, leading to their separation in 1973.
● Psychiatric Report:
○ In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing due to marital
issues.
○ A Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report was prepared by Drs.
Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes.
○ Edgar later obtained a copy of this report.
● Annulment Proceedings:
○ In 1978, Edgar presented the psychiatric report before the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale, leading to the nullification of their
church marriage.
 ○ In 1990, Edgar filed a petition for civil annulment of their marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
○ He cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report as evidence.

Court Proceedings

● Objection to Testimony:
○ At trial, Edgar attempted to testify about the contents of the
psychiatric report.
○ Ma. Paz objected, invoking physician-patient privilege under Rule 130,
Section 24(c).
● Trial Court Ruling:
○ The RTC admitted the report, ruling that:
1. The issue was psychological incapacity, making the report
relevant.
2. Ma. Paz did not object in her Answer but only questioned the
report’s relevance.
3. Edgar could testify on the report, but the psychiatrist could
still be cross-examined.
● Court of Appeals Ruling:
○ The CA upheld the RTC’s decision, ruling that the physician-patient
privilege applies only to physicians and does not prevent the husband
from testifying.
○ The CA also struck out Ma. Paz’s Statement for the Record, stating it
was an amendment to her Answer that failed to follow procedural rules.
● Petition to the Supreme Court:
○ Ma. Paz filed a petition for review, arguing that allowing Edgar to testify
on the psychiatric report circumvented the physician-patient privilege.
○ She also sought to reinstate her Statement for the Record

What do we learn from this case?

A: 1. Physician-Patient Privilege (Rule 130, Section 24(c))

● Rule 130, Section 24(c) of the Rules of Court (In Toto):

“A surgeon or a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery, or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired
in attending to such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient.”
 ● SC Ruling:
○ The privilege applies only to medical professionals and not to third
parties like a spouse.
○ Jurisprudence (Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91114, September
25, 1992, 214 SCRA 273):
“The person against whom the privilege is claimed must be one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery, or obstetrics.”
○ Since Edgar was not a physician, his testimony did not violate the
rule.

2. Waiver of Privilege

● Waiver of physician-patient privilege can be express or implied.

● SC Ruling:
○ Ma. Paz waived the privilege by allowing the psychiatric report to be
used in the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale proceedings.
○ Jurisprudence (Salita v. Judge Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, May 16,
1994):
“Failure to object to evidence on privileged matters at the earliest
opportunity may be construed as an implied waiver.”
○ Ma. Paz’s failure to object immediately in her Answer was an implied
waiver.

3. Hearsay Objections Must Be Timely Raised

● SC Ruling:
○ The defense only objected to privileged communication, not hearsay.
○ Since no hearsay objection was made at trial, it was waived.
○ Jurisprudence (Vitangcol v. New Vista Properties, Inc., G.R. No.
176014, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 82):
“Failure to object to hearsay evidence waives the right to challenge its
admissibility.”

4. Striking Out Pleadings Must Follow Procedural Rules

● SC Ruling:
○ The Statement for the Record was improperly filed , as it effectively
amended the Answer without compliance with procedural rules.
○ Jurisprudence (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong
Pi, G.R. No. 142239, 2003):
“A party must comply with procedural rules for amending pleadings.”
78. Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, G.R. No. L-70054, July 8, 1986

Topic:
Why is this case assigned?
A:

Respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states:

Section 21. Privileged Communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest
would suffer by disclosure.

But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers
but for the protection of public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest
that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.

The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in
official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure question. ... ,( Agnew vs. Agnew,'52 SD 472, cited in Martin
Rules of Court of the Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 199).

What are the relevant facts?

A:

● RTC Makati granted the motion of Banco Filipino based on Section 1, Rule 27, of the
Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records
which are claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments,
objections, and exceptions to the Conservator's report. They contend that these papers
are relevant and material in relation to the assailment of the impartiality during
deliberations made by respondents. Two of those subject documents are the: (1) copy of
attachments of reports; and (2) the tape/recordings of Monetary Board deliberations, in
relation to the foreclosure of Banco Filipino.

● In issuing the challenged order, the court below took the view that the Supreme Court's
resolution referring to it the matters relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the
petitioner from availing of this mode of discovery as an additional means of preparing for
the hearing. It considered the documents sought to be produced as not privileged
 because these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues into by the
Court.

● Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the said order and
pray in their petition before the Supreme Court for the reversal and setting aside of the
same. The grounds recited in support of their petition includes that the tapes and
transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13
and 15 of the Central Bank Act.

What do we learn from this case?

A:

The deliberations by the Monetary Board may be confidential but not necessarily absolute
and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Sections 13
and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said
deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending
before it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is
no indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to
third parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it
considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the
matter being inquired to by the court.