Appeal In General

Custodio v. CA G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Doctrine:In general, the appeal process allows parties to seek a review of a lower
court’s decision by a higher court. This ensures that errors or injustices can be
corrected, and it provides a mechanism for the development and clarification of
the law.

Facts:
This case involves a dispute over the grant of an easement of right of way and the
corresponding damages related to the blockage of said access.

August 26, 1982: Pacifico Mabasa filed Civil Case No. 47466 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, seeking the grant of an easement of right of way against
Cristino Custodio, Brigida Custodio, Rosalina Morato, Lito Santos, and Maria
Cristina Santos.
1981: Mabasa purchased a parcel of land with a two-door apartment situated in Tipas,
Taguig. The land was surrounded by properties owned by the aforementioned
defendants.
February 1982: Defendants Santoses and Morato built adobe fences that effectively
enclosed a critical passageway, making it narrower and eventually blocking it off
entirely. This led to Mabasa’s tenants vacating the premises.
February 27, 1990: The RTC decided to grant Mabasa permanent access to the public
street through the passageway and ordered him to pay the Custodios and Santoses
PHP 8,000 as indemnity.
Post-RTC Decision: Mabasa passed away, and his heirs continued the case, appealing
the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) on the ground that the trial
court failed to award damages.
November 10, 1993: The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification,
awarding the Mabasas PHP 65,000 as actual damages, PHP 30,000 as moral damages,
and PHP 10,000 as exemplary damages.
July 8, 1994: CA denied Custodios’ and Santoses’ motion for reconsideration.
Supreme Court: Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting both the grant
of the right of way and the award of damages.

Issues:
1. Whether the grant of the right of way to the Mabasas was proper.
2. Whether the award of damages to the Mabasas by the Court of Appeals was proper.

Ruling:

Issue 1: Grant of Right of Way

The Supreme Court did not entertain the issue of granting the right of way, as the
petitioners did not appeal the RTC decision on the right of way to the CA, and
thus it became final. The non-appeal indicated they were satisfied with this part
of the decision.

Issue 2: Award of Damages

The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s award of damages, determining it lacked
substantial legal basis. The Court elucidated the concept of “damnum absque
injuria,” which translates to “damage without injury.” The decision explained that
although Mabasa’s heirs suffered financial losses, these did not result from a legal
wrong by the petitioners (Custodios and Santoses).

The petitioners merely exercised their lawful property rights by enclosing and
building on their land, which was not subject to any servitude at the time, as
definitively established by the trial court’s later decision. The Supreme Court
found no malicious intent or unlawful act in the petitioners’ actions to justify the
damage awards of the CA.

Notes:

Easement of Right of Way: Legal pathway established through the court requiring
an adjoining property owner to provide access to a landlocked property.
Damnum Absque Injuria: Loss without wrongful conduct by another party.
Exercise of Property Rights: Rights of ownership include the right to enclose or
fence property.
Article 430, Civil Code: Establishes the fundamental right of property owners to
enclose their land without prejudice to servitudes. Legal remedies often hinge on the
existence of both legal damage and a corresponding duty breached by the defendant.

The case Republic of the Philippines vs. Capital Resources Corporation (G.R. No.
217210) involves a procedural process under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
is an appeal by certiorari. This means that the petitioner, the Republic of the
Philippines, sought to review the decision of the Court of Appeals by bringing the
case to the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The case involves a parcel of land situated in Barangay Pugo, Bauang, La Union. The
land was originally covered by Homestead Patent granted to Vitaliano Dumuk in
1924, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1371.

The land was subsequently transferred to spouses Cecilio and Laura Milo,
resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-6603. Capital
Resources Corporation and Romeo Roxas later acquired the property from the
Milos, leading to the issuance of TCT No. T-23343 in 19821.

The property was subdivided into several blocks, including Block 35 and Block 36.
The subdivision plan indicated that Block 35 was a “salvage zone” and a portion
of Block 36 overlapped with the China Sea.

The subdivision plan was approved in 1988 but was later cancelled by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in 2005 due to the identification of
Block 35 and Block 36 as foreshore land and seabed, respectively.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought the reversion of
the land to the state, arguing that the land was foreshore land and could not be
privately owned. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA)
both ruled in favor of the Republic.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to the Supreme Court.
This type of appeal is used to review the decisions of lower courts based on legal
errors.

Issue: Whether the land should revert to the state.

Ruling: The Supreme Court reviewed the case and ultimately affirmed the decisions
of both the RTC and the CA, upholding the reversion of the land to the state.

The Court held that the land in question was foreshore land, which is part of the
public domain and cannot be privately owned. Under the Public Land Act,
foreshore lands are reserved for public use and cannot be subject to private
ownership.

Ineligibility of Corporations: The Court reiterated that corporations are generally

ineligible to acquire public lands under the Public Land Act. Since Capital
Resources Corporation is a corporate entity, it was not eligible to own the foreshore
land1.

Discrepancies in Land Area: The Court found significant discrepancies between the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and the subdivision plan, which further supported
the argument that the land was improperly titled and should revert to the state.
The Court emphasized the importance of protecting foreshore lands for
environmental and public policy reasons, reinforcing the need to revert such
lands to the state.

Neypes et al. v. Court of Appeals et al. (G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005)

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court established the “fresh period rule,” which allows a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. This “fresh period rule” applies to appeals from the RTC following a
denial of a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration.

Facts:
A detailed complaint for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction was filed by Domingo
Neypes et al. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.
Several motions were filed during the trial, including motions for default against the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development, as well as dismissal motions
by the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo and the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Eventually, the RTC dismissed the petitioners’ complaint on the grounds of
prescription. Upon receiving the order of dismissal, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and, after its denial, a notice of appeal. The RTC declared the appeal
submitted out of time. Subsequently, the petitioners sought relief from the Court of
Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari and mandamus, claiming that their notice of
appeal was timely filed. However, the CA dismissed their petition, holding that the
period to appeal began when they received the original order of dismissal, not
the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners then filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court, challenging the CA’s decision and interpretation of the
appeal period.

Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining the “final order” triggering the
appeal period.
2. Whether the petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed out of time.
3. Whether the “fresh period rule” is applicable.

Ruling:
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt
of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the
notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.

A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the
"final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

The Supreme Court granted the petitioners’ appeal, holding that the CA erred in its
determination of the “final order” and that the petitioners filed the notice of appeal
within the “fresh period rule”. The relevant “final order” was deemed as the July 1,
1998 order denying the motion for reconsideration, and not the February 12, 1998
order dismissing the complaint. Therefore, the 15-day period to file an appeal began
after the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Notes:
1. Procedural posture matters: the chronological steps and motions in the lower courts
can significantly impact the outcome on appeal.
2. “Fresh period rule”: a litigant has 15 days from receipt of an order denying a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration to file a notice of appeal
(applicable to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43, and Rule 45). The “fresh period rule”
established in Neypes v. Court of Appeals is applicable to Rule 41. This rule
allows a fresh period of 15 days to file a notice of appeal from the receipt of the
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration1. This means that after a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is denied, the appellant has a new 15-day
period to file their appeal, rather than being limited to the remaining days of the
original appeal period.

If you have any more questions or need furt

3. Notable Sections:
BP 129, Sec. 39: Defines the period for appeal as 15 days from notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision.
Rule 41, Sec. 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Establishes the 15-day period
for an ordinary appeal and interruption by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
4. Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.

Ligaya Ang vs. Court of Appeals and Warren T. Gutierrez

Whether the appellate docket fees were duly paid is the principal issue in this Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals'
(CA) Resolutions dated September 22, 20171 and February 20, 20182 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 152427-UDK.

Doctrine:

The full payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory and
necessary for the perfection of an appeal. Non-payment is a ground for dismissal.
However, the Directive for dismissal due to failure to pay these fees gives courts
discretionary, rather than automatic, authority to do so, considering justice and fair
play.

Facts:

In 2016, Warren Gutierrez filed an action for unlawful detainer against Ligaya Ang
and her spouse before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), alleging ownership of a
lot sold to the Angs, who failed to complete payment, prompting Gutierrez to seek
their eviction. Warren alleged that he is the owner of a 94-square meter lot registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 013-2015003219. On December 29, 1998,
Warren sold the lot on installment basis to Spouses Ang. They agreed that the contract
shall be extinguished in case of non-payment of monthly amortizations. After giving
the initial payment, however, Spouses Ang refused to settle the balance of the
purchase price despite repeated demands. In their answer, Spouses Ang moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They also
claimed that the ejectment case must fail because the contract was not validly
cancelled in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 6552 or the Realty Installment
Buyer Protection Act. The MeTC favored Gutierrez, a decision affirmed by the
RTC upon appeal. Ligaya Ang moved to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) but faced dismissal for non-payment of appellate docket fees. Ligaya’s
attempt to assert payment and seek reconsideration was rejected by the CA, citing an
absence of proof of such payment and discrepancies in Ligaya’s claims.

After the MeTC and RTC rulings, Ligaya Ang’s petition for review to the CA
was dismissed due to unpaid docket fees, despite her claim of having enclosed the
cash with her motion for extension. The CA’s refusal to consider her petition led
Ligaya to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, challenging the CA’s resolutions
as grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:

1. Whether the appellate docket fees were duly paid.

2. The appropriateness of the CA’s dismissal of Ligaya’s motion for non-payment of
docket fees.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed Ligaya Ang’s petition, reaffirming that the right to
appeal is not automatic and must comply with procedural requirements—
specifically, the payment of docket fees. The Court found Ligaya’s claims of having
paid the fees unsubstantiated, noting procedural discrepancies and a lack of
compelling reason for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The decision underscored
the importance of strict adherence to procedural requirements for appellate review.

Similarly, In Mendoza v. Court case , Ligaya failed to establish that the appellate
docket fees were duly paid. Foremost, the messenger's affidavit is insufficient to
establish payment. The affidavit merely stated the reason why the messenger opted to
enclose the docket fees together with the motion for extension. Yet, there is no
evidence such as photocopies of the money bills to prove that the envelope containing
the motion has the actual cash payment. The affidavit is likewise suspect since it was
executed only after the CA denied the motion. At any rate, the CA had conducted an
investigation and confirmed that no payment was actually remitted. The personnel
assigned to the appellate court's receiving section corroborated this finding.
Moreover, Ligaya's manifestation to pay again the docket fees is inconsistent with her
claim of payment.

The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Ligaya's motion for
extension of time and refused to admit her petition for review for non-payment of the
required docket fees. It is only when persuasive reasons exist that the rules may be
relaxed to spare a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. In this case, Ligaya is under no threat of suffering an
injustice if her prayer is not granted.
Notes:

1. Right to Appeal: A statutory privilege subject to procedural compliance,

including the payment of docket fees.
2. Rule 42, Rules of Court: Governs the appellate procedure to the CA, including
docket fee payment requirements.
3. Grounds for Dismissal: Non-compliance with procedural requirements,
including docket fee payment, can result in dismissal of an appeal.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Carpio

Facts:

The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) filed a petition for review on
certiorari against Hon. Emmanuel C. Carpio, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 16, Davao City, and other respondents, including Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and several individuals represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Manuel L. Te.
On August 21, 2001, Dabay Abad and others (Abad, et al.) filed a complaint for the
delivery of certificates of title, damages, and attorney's fees against DBP and the
Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC.
Abad, et al. alleged that DBP unlawfully detained their certificates of title, which
were submitted for safekeeping under a loan agreement, and subsequently turned
them over to GFSME.
The RTC issued a writ of seizure on August 24, 2001, accompanied by a bond from
CBIC.
DBP filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint due to improper venue, which
the RTC granted on September 25, 2001.
Post-dismissal, DBP and GFSME sought the return of the certificates of title, which
the RTC ordered on January 27, 2003.
Abad, et al. did not comply, prompting DBP to file a motion to call on the plaintiff's
surety bond for damages. The RTC denied this motion on May 17, 2004, and again on
July 9, 2004, upon reconsideration.

The CA Ruling

In its July 9, 2008 Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and
mandamus. It noted that DBP did not move for reconsideration of the September 25,
2001 Order of dismissal. It considered the RTC decision as final and executory. It
added that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provided that the claim for
damages against the bond must be filed before trial or before appeal was perfected or
before the judgment became executory.[20]

DBP then filed the present petition.

Issue:

The court of appeals erred in its blind adherence to and strict application of section
20, rule 57 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure.
Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

The trial court did not reach the residual jurisdiction stage

Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for
the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by
indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are done prior
to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even if the
appeal has already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on
appeal[24] or in case of a petition for review under Rule 42, before the CA gives
due course to the petition.

The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the
court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject
matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either
instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.[26]

From the foregoing, it is clear that before the trial court can be said to have residual
jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted; the court
rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom.

In this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to
improper venue and respondents could not have appealed the order of dismissal
as the same was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure states that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an
action without prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to speak of where no
appeal has even been filed.[27]

Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on

paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action
or claim.

Briefly stated, dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that
the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(2) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the claim on which the
action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds,
bar the refiling of the same action or claim.

Here, the RTC dismissed the replevin case on the ground of improper venue. Such
dismissal is one without prejudice and does not bar the refiling of the same action;
hence, it is not appealable. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have
reached, the residual jurisdiction stage as the case was dismissed due to improper
venue, and such order of dismissal could not be the subject of an appeal. Without the
perfection of an appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of appeal, the RTC
did not acquire residual jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC
may rule on DBP's application for damages pursuant to its residual powers.

Equity cannot supersede the Rules of Court

DBP admits that it filed the application for damages after the order of dismissal had
become final and executory. In seeking relief from this Court, however, it invokes
equity and argues that a strict application of Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
would prejudice its right to recover damages arising from the improper attachment of
the certificates of title.

DBP, however, must be reminded that equity, "which has been aptly described as a
'justice outside legality,' is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure.[30] The pertinent positive rules
being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity."[31] As the Court has stated in Lim Tupas v. CA,[32] "[e]motional
appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify
disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable
maxim, which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists — and is now still
reverently observed - is 'aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.'"[33]

Rule 40 Appeal from MTC to RTC

Victoriano M. Encarnacion Vs.Nieves Amigo

DOCTRINE:If petitioners are indeed the owners of the subject lot and were
unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should present their claim
before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria,
and not before the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the
possession thereof cannot be taken from another who had been in physical or material
possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for
ejectment.

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the
merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without
prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in
the interest of justice.

Facts:
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of 2 LOTS located at
District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela wherein he acquired by virtue of an
affidavit of waiver executed by Anita N.Magpantay on April 11, 1995 in favor of him
(son-in-law), waiving her right over the property of the decedent Victoriano
Magpantay. These two lots originally form part of a single track of land owned
byRogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan and thereafter he sold to
Victoriano Magpantayon March 21, 1985.Thereafter, Encarnacion caused the
subdivision of the land into two lots and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18,
1996. Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession
of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then
owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation by respondent continued even after
TCT’s were issue to petitioner in 1996.On February 1, 2001 a demand letter was sent
to the respondent to vacate the properties which was received by him on February 12,
2001 but he still refused to vacate the subject properties hence petitionerVictoriano
M. Encarnacion filed a complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and
prayer for restraining order with the MTC. Respondent claims that he has been in
actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that
the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with
irregularities.
MTC: Ruled in favor of the Plaintiff and order defendant to vacate the properties and
pay damages and rentals.

RTC: Dismissed the case on the ground that MTC had no jurisdiction over the case
and RTC did notacquire appellate jurisdiction.

CA: Remanded the case to the RTCEncarnacion filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, which remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings.

Encarnacion brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the proper action in this
case is accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer as determined by the allegations in
the complaint filed by petitioner.

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property are:

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for

forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary
action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for
more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and

3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the

recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial
Court.

Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper
action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the
length of time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. These remedies afford the person
deprived of the possession to file at any time within one year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. Thus, if the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior
court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more
than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should
be brought to the proper Regional Trial Court.

After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the proper action in
this case is accion publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional
Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.

Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its
filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court
is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted. On its face, the complaint must show enough ground for the
court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the
owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights
executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2,
2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter
vacate the premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand letter was
received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the
complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last demand for
complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the
owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a
portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to his
filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The
length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of
action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion
publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in
the Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of
the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after
the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.

Canlas vs. Tubil

Doctrine:

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction BUT shall decide the case without prejudice to the
admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence”.

Unlawful Detainer - an action to recover possession of real property from one who
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the
defendant in unlawful detainer was originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

-summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the
date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.

Accion Publiciana - action to recover the right of possession which should be

brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. If at the time of the filing of the
complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion
publiciana.

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari is the June 12, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99736, which reversed the April 11, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 50, in
Special Civil Case No. G-06-544, and ordered said Regional Trial Court to decide the
case on merits, pursuant to Section 8, par. 2 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The
RTC affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guagua,
Pampanga, Branch 2, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3582 for unlawful detainer
filed by respondent Iluminada Tubil. Also assailed is the September 1, 2008
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Iluminada Tubil was the owner of a residential lot in Guagua, Pampanga.
Rudy, Victoria and Felicidad Canlas erected a house on the aforementioned lot and
occupied it as their residential house upon mere tolerance by the owner. Tubil now
wanted to use the land fruitfully, so demands were made to vacate the lot.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Upon the receipt of the demand letters, Canlas refused,
so a complaint for unlawful detention was filed by Tubil before the MTC. Canlas filed
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the MTC was without jurisdiction over the
subject matter and that the parties were not the real parties-in-interest. Motion to
Dismiss was denied. Canlas filed an answer stating that they were in open,
continuous, and exclusive possession of the land; that Tubil’s title over the land issued
by a Free Patent was dubious; that the action was actually accion publiciana which is
beyond MTC’s jurisdiction. MTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer on
the grounds that Tubil failed to show that there was mere tolerance. RTC affirmed.
The Respondent filed a petition for review with the CA which reversed the MTC’s
decision and ordered the RTC to decide on the merits of the case. Canlas filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for
review onertiorari contends that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the
subject matter, thus, it cannot validly decide on the merits pursuant to Rule 40,
Section 8, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court .

Issue : Whether or not Rule 40, Section 8 is applicable in this case.

Ruling: NO. Rule 40, Sec 8, par 2 states that “If the case was tried on the merits
by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on
appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction BUT shall decide
the case without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional
evidence…” The Supreme Court held that the case was of unlawful detainer to
which the MTC has original jurisdiction over the subject matter, not accion
publiciana where the RTC has original jurisdiction. Having ruled that the MTC
acquired jurisdiction, it properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the
complaint for failure of the respondent to prove mere tolerance by sufficient
evidence. Rule 40, Section 8 of the RoC has no application in this case

Rule 41 Appeal from RTC to CA

Vios v. Pantangco, Jr

Facts:
The case "Vios v. Pantangco, Jr." involves a dispute over residential land on
Sampaguita St., Barangay Pasong Tamo, Quezon City.
Manuel Pantangco, Jr., the respondent, filed a complaint for ejectment and damages
against the petitioners, Charlie Vios and the Spouses Rogelio and Teresita Antonio, in
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 32, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 37-8529.
Pantangco claimed he purchased the property and asked the petitioners to vacate,
which they refused.
The petitioners argued that the property was public land and Pantangco's title was
invalid.
On July 12, 1996, the MTC ruled in favor of Pantangco, ordering the petitioners to
vacate.
The petitioners did not appeal within the reglementary period, leading Pantangco to
file for a writ of execution, which the MTC granted.
Vios then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 224, Quezon City, which annulled the MTC decision and the writ of
execution.
Pantangco filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the RTC decision with the
Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled that the RTC had exceeded its jurisdiction.
This CA decision was brought before the Supreme Court for review.

Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Hon. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017
Doctrine:
In Salvan v. People, this Court held that the power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is
limited to the instances specified in the afore-quoted provision. In other words, the
RTChas no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely different ground —
such as"that an appeal is not a proper remedy." The authority to dismiss an appeal for
being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the RTC.

Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint for collection of a sum of money filed by
PBCOM against private respondents before the RTC of Makati City. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint alleging that their obligation
had already been paid in full and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case
because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket fees.
On September 29, 2010, the RTC issued an Order directing PBCOM to pay additional
docket fees within fifteen days from receipt of thereof. On October 21, 2010, PBCOM
paid the additional docket fees but filed its compliance with the RTC only on
November 11, 2010.
In the interim, however, the RTC issued an Order dismissing PBCOM's Complaint.
PBCOM filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that it had paid the additional
docket fees within the period prescribed by the court. The RTC denied PBCOM's
motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, PBCOM timely filed a Notice of Appeal. On June 2, 2011, the RTC
issued an denying due course to PBCOM's Notice of Appeal on the ground that said
appeal is not the proper remedy.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, PBCOM filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus with the CA. The CA denied PBCOM's Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus and affirmed the order of the RTC. The CA reasoned that, apart from
availing itself of a wrong mode of appeal, PBCOM failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of a motion for reconsideration. The CA emphasized that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a petition for
certiorari to prosper PBCOM filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the CA for having been filed out of time. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari and mandamus.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing its Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

Ruling:
YES. The CA appears to have confused the RTC Order dismissing PBCOM's
complaint with the RTC Order denying PBCOM's notice of appeal, and mistakenly
ruled that the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by PBCOM was a wrong
mode of appeal. Notably, in its petition before the CA, PBCOM assailed the RTC
Order denying due course to its notice of appeal. In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, this Court
ruled that a trial court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which is tantamount to a
disallowance or dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final order from
which an appeal may be taken. The suitable remedy for the aggrieved party is to
elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to the
CA's finding, PBCOM availed itself of the correct remedy in questioning the
disallowance of its notice of appeal.
Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent
court; 30 there are well-defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The first exception applies in this case.

Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 13. Ȁ Dismissal of appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of the original record or
the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on
motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for nonpayment
of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

In Salvan v. People, this Court held that the power of the RTC to dismiss an
appeal islimited to the instances specified in the afore-quoted provision. In other
words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely
different ground — such as"that an appeal is not a proper remedy."
The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically
vestedupon the CA and not the RTC. Rule 50, Section 1 of the same Rules states:
SECTION 1. Ȁ Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed
by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on thefollowing
grounds:
xxx
(i) Ȁ The fact that [the] order or judgment appealed from is not appealable.
In fine, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to PBCOM's notice of
appeal on the ground that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.