Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRA-ORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) No 12612 of 2022

X .... Petitioner(s)

Versus

The Principal Secretary

Health and Family Welfare Department & Anr ....Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1 Issue notice.

2 Ms Aishwarya Bhati, Additional Solicitor General, with Mr G S Makker, AOR,

accepts notice on behalf of the second respondent.

3 We have heard Dr Amit Mishra, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner.

We have requested Ms Aishwarya Bhati to assist the Court on the interpretative

aspects of Section 3(2)(b) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971 1 and

Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules 2003 2.

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by

4 The petitioner is a permanent resident of Manipur and is stated to be currently

Sanjay Kumar
Date: 2022.07.22
16:39:40 IST
Reason:

residing in Delhi. The petitioner has averred that she was in a consensual

1 “MTP Act”
2 “MTP Rules”
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relationship and, in the month of June 2022 she learnt that she was pregnant. On

5 July 2022, an ultrasound scan revealed a single intrauterine pregnancy of a

term of twenty-two weeks. The petitioner decided to terminate the pregnancy;

her relationship has failed. She has stated that she is the eldest amongst five

siblings and her parents are agriculturists. The petitioner has stated that she

holds a BA degree and, in the absence of a source of livelihood, she would be

unable to raise and nurture a child. She moved a writ petition before the High

Court of Delhi.

5 The Division Bench of the High Court, by an order dated 15 July 2022, issued

notice restricted only to prayer C of the petition, in which the petitioner has

sought a direction for the inclusion of an unmarried woman within the ambit of

Rule 3B of the MTP Rules for the termination of pregnancy in terms of the

provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the MTP Act.

6 No notice has been issued by the High Court on prayer A or prayer B of the

petition which effectively stand rejected.

7 For convenience of reference, prayers A, B and C of the petition before the High

Court are extracted below:

“A. Permit the Petitioner to terminate her ongoing

pregnancy through registered medical practitioners at
any approved private or government center or
Hospital before 15.07.2022 as her relief will be
infructuous after that as the pregnancy will be of
around 24 Weeks by that time;

B. Restrain the Respondent from taking any coercive

action or criminal proceedings against the Petitioner
or any Registered Medical Practitioner terminating the
pregnancy of the petitioner at any approved private
center or hospital registered by Govt NCT of Delhi;

C. Direct the Respondent to include unmarried woman

also within the ambit of the Rule 3B of the Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Rules 2003 (as amended on
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21.10.2021) for termination of pregnancy under

clause (b) of sub-section (2) Section 3 of the MTP Act,
for a period of up to twenty-four weeks;

The petitioner has completed 24 weeks of her pregnancy on 18 July 2022.

8 Section 3 of the MTP Act reads as follows:

“3. When pregnancies may be terminated by registered

medical practitioners. -

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal

Code (45 of 1860), a registered medical practitioner shall
not be guilty of any offence under that Code or under
any other law for the time being in force, if any
pregnancy is terminated by him in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), a pregnancy

may be terminated by a registered medical practitioner,
—

(a) where the length of the pregnancy does not

exceed twenty weeks, if such medical practitioner
is, or

(b) where the length of the pregnancy exceeds twenty

weeks but does not exceed twenty-four weeks in
case of such category of woman as may be
prescribed by rules made under this Act, if not less
than two registered medical practitioners are, of
the opinion, formed in good faith, that—

(i) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a

risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave
injury to her physical or mental health; or

(ii) there is a substantial risk that if the child were

born, it would suffer from any serious physical or
mental abnormality.

Explanation 1.—For the purposes of clause (a), where

any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device
or method used by any woman or her partner for the
purpose of limiting the number of children or preventing
pregnancy, the anguish caused by such pregnancy may
be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental
health of the pregnant woman.

Explanation 2.—For the purposes of clauses (a) and (b),

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where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman

to have been caused by rape, the anguish caused by the
pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury
to the mental health of the pregnant woman.

(2A) The norms for the registered medical practitioner whose

opinion is required for termination of pregnancy at
different gestational age shall be such as may be
prescribed by rules made under this Act.

(2B) The provisions of sub-section (2) relating to the length of

the pregnancy shall not apply to the termination of
pregnancy by the medical practitioner where such
termination is necessitated by the diagnosis of any of the
substantial foetal abnormalities diagnosed by a Medical
Board.

(2C) Every State Government or Union territory, as the case

may be, shall, by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute a Board to be called a Medical Board for the
purposes of this Act to exercise such powers and
functions as may be prescribed by rules made under this
Act.

(2D) The Medical Board shall consist of the following,

namely:—

(a) a Gynaecologist;

(b) a Paediatrician;

(c) a Radiologist or Sonologist; and

(d) such other number of members as may be notified

in the Official Gazette by the State Government or
Union territory, as the case may be.

(3) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy

would involve such risk of injury to the health as is
mentioned in sub-section (2), account may be taken of
the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable
environment.

(4) (a) No pregnancy of a woman, who has not attained the age
of eighteen years, or, who having attained the age of
eighteen years, is a mentally ill person, shall be
terminated except with the consent in writing of her
guardian.

(b) Save as otherwise provided in clause (a), no pregnancy

shall be terminated except with the consent of the
 5

pregnant woman.”

9 Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 permits the termination of pregnancy

where the length of pregnancy does not exceed twenty weeks. Clause (b)

permits termination where the length of pregnancy exceeds twenty weeks but

does not exceed twenty four weeks for such categories of women “as may be

prescribed by Rules made under this Act”. However, an opinion must be formed

by not less than two registered medical practitioners that inter alia “the

continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant

woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health”.

10 Explanation 1 to Section 3 stipulates that for the purpose of clause (a), where a

pregnancy has occurred as a result of a failure of any device or method used by

any woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the number of children or

preventing pregnancy, the anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed

to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.

Explanation 1 evidently qualifies clause (a) but not clause (b).

11 Rule 3B of the MTP Rules has been made in pursuance of the provisions of clause

(b) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the MTP Act. Rule 3B is as follows:

“3B. Women eligible for termination of pregnancy up to

twenty-four weeks.- The following categories of
women shall be considered eligible for termination of
pregnancy under clause (b) of sub-section(2) section 3
of the Act, for a period of up to twenty-four weeks,
namely:-

(a) survivors of sexual assault or rape or incest;

(b) minors;

(c) change of marital status during the ongoing

pregnancy (widowhood and divorce);
 6

(d) women with physical disabilities [major disability

as per criteria laid down under the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016)];

(e) mentally ill women including mental retardation;

(f) the foetal malformation that has substantial risk

of being imcompatible with life or if the child is
born it may suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities to be seriously handicapped; and

(g) women with pregnancy in humanitarian settings

or disaster or emergency situations as may be
declared by the Government.”

12 The High Court held that since the petitioner is an unmarried woman whose

pregnancy arose out of a consensual relationship, her case is “clearly not

covered” by any of the above clauses of Rule 3B and, as a consequence, Section

3(2)(b) is not applicable.

13 On the submission that Rule 3B, insofar as it excludes an unmarried woman, is

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, the High Court has issued notice on the

writ petition. However, it held that as of the date of its order, it was not open to

itto traverse beyond the provisions of Rule 3B in the exercise of the jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution.

14 Prima facie, quite apart from the issue of constitutionality which has been

addressed before the High Court, it appears that the High Court has taken an

unduly restrictive view of the provisions of clause (c) of Rule 3B. Clause (c)

speaks of a change of marital status during an ongoing pregnancy and is

followed in parenthesis by the words “widowhood and divorce”. The expression

“change of marital status” should be given a purposive rather than a restrictive

interpretation. The expressions “widowhood and divorce” need not be construed

to be exhaustive of the category which precedes it.

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15 The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the words of a

statute must be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and

ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act and the intent of the

legislature. Parliament by amending the MTP Act through Act 8 of 2021 intended

to include unmarried women and single women within the ambit of the Act. This

is evident from the replacement of the word ‘husband’ with ‘partner’ in

Explanation I of Section 3(2) of the Act.

16 Explanation 1 expressly contemplates a situation involving an unwanted

pregnancy caused as a result of the failure of any device or method used by a

woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the number of children or

preventing pregnancy. The Parliamentary intent, therefore, is clearly not to

confine the beneficial provisions of the MTP Act only to a situation involving a

matrimonial relationship. On the contrary, a reference to the expression “any

woman or her partner” would indicate that a broad meaning and intent has been

intended to be ascribed by Parliament. The statute has recognized the

reproductive choice of a woman and her bodily integrity and autonomy. Both

these rights embody the notion that a choice must inhere in a woman on

whether or not to bear a child. In recognizing the right the legislature has not

intended to make a distinction between a married and unmarried woman, in her

ability to make a decision on whether or not to bear the child. These rights, it

must be underscored, are in consonance with the provisions of Article 21 of the

Constitution.

17 In this case, the petitioner submits that she was deserted by her partner at the

last stage in June 2022 causing her immense mental agony, trauma, and

physical suffering. Excluding unmarried women and single women from the

ambit of the statute goes against the purpose of the legislation. The Statement

of Objects and Reasons of the MTP Act seeks to “liberalise certain existing
 8

provisions relating to termination of pregnancy … (1) as a health measure—

when there is danger to the life or risk to physical or mental health of the

woman”.

18 A comparison between the two provisions before and after the 2021 amendment

is tabulated below:

MTP, 1971 MTP Amendment 2021

Explanation 2: Where any Explanation 1: For the purposes of clause
pregnancy occurs as a result of (a), where any pregnancy occurs as a result
failure of any device or method of failure of any device or method used by
used by any married woman or any woman or her partner for the
her husband for the purpose purpose of limiting the number of
of limiting the number of children or preventing pregnancy, the
children, the anguish caused by anguish caused by such pregnancy may be
such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the
presumed to constitute a grave mental health of the pregnant woman.
injury to the mental health of the
pregnant woman.

The above table shows that the phrase ‘married woman’ was replaced by ‘any

woman’ and the word ‘husband’ was replaced by ‘partner’. But evidently, there

is a gap in the law : while Section 3 travels beyond conventional relationships

based on marriage, Rule 3B of the MTP Rules does not envisage a situation

involving unmarried women, but recognizes other categories of women such as

divorcees, widows, minors, disabled and mentally ill women and survivors of

sexual assault or rape. There is no basis to deny unmarried women the right to

medically terminate the pregnancy, when the same choice is available to other

categories of women.

19 A woman’s right to reproductive choice is an inseparable part of her personal

liberty under Article 21 of Constitution. She has a sacrosanct right to bodily

integrity. In Suchita Srivastava v Chandigarh Administration3, this Court

has recognized that a woman’s right to reproductive autonomy is a dimension of

3 (2009) 9 SCC 1
 9

Article 21 of the Constitution:

“22. There is no doubt that a woman's right to make

reproductive choices is also a dimension of “personal
liberty” as understood under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. It is important to recognise that
reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate as
well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial
consideration is that a woman's right to privacy, dignity
and bodily integrity should be respected. This means
that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the
exercise of reproductive choices such as a woman's right
to refuse participation in sexual activity or alternatively
the insistence on use of contraceptive methods.”

In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr v. Union of India and Ors,4 the

decision of a woman to procreate or abstain from procreating has been recognized

as a facet of her right to lead a life with dignity and the right to privacy under

Article 21 of the Constitution:

“298. [p]rivacy of the body entitles an individual to the

integrity of the physical aspects of personhood. The in-
tersection between one’s mental integrity and privacy
entitles the individual to freedom of thought, the free-
dom to believe in what is right, and the freedom of self-
determination. When these guarantees intersect with
gender, they create a private space which protects all
those elements which are crucial to gender identity. The
family, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation are
all integral to the dignity of the individual. Above all, the
privacy of the individual recognises an inviolable right to
determine how freedom shall be exercised.”

The Bombay High Court in High Court on its Own Motion v. State of Maha-

rashtra,5 observed as follows:

“14. A woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy is

not a frivolous one. Abortion is often the only way out
of a very difficult situation for a woman. An abortion is
a carefully considered decision taken by a woman who
fears that the welfare of the child she already has, and
of other members of the household that she is obliged
to care for with limited financial and other resources,

4 (2017) 10 SCC 1
5 2017 Cri LJ 218 (Bom HC); (2016) SCC OnLine Bom 8426
 10

may be compromised by the birth of another child.

These are decisions taken by responsible women who
have few other options. They are women who would
ideally have preferred to prevent an unwanted preg-
nancy, but were unable to do so. If a woman does
not want to continue with the pregnancy, then
forcing her to do so represents a violation of the
woman’s bodily integrity and aggravates her
mental trauma which would be deleterious to
her mental health”
(Emphasis Supplied)

20 Denying an unmarried woman the right to a safe abortion violates her personal

autonomy and freedom. Live-in relationships have been recognized by this Court.

In S Khusboo v. Kanniammal,6 this Court observed that criminal law should

not be weaponized to interfere with the domain of personal autonomy. It was ob-

served:

“46. While there can be no doubt that in India,

marriage is an important social institution, we must
also keep our minds open to the fact that there are
certain individuals or groups who do not hold the
same view. To be sure, there are some indigenous
groups within our country wherein sexual relations
outside the marital setting are accepted as a normal
occurrence. Even in the societal mainstream,
there are a significant number of people who
see nothing wrong in engaging in premarital
sex. Notions of social morality are inherently
subjective and the criminal law cannot be used
as a means to unduly interfere with the domain
of personal autonomy. Morality and criminality
are not co-extensive.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

21 On the above premises, we are inclined to entertain the Special Leave Petition.

In the meantime, we are of the view that allowing the petitioner to suffer an un-

wanted pregnancy would be contrary to the intent of the law enacted by Parlia-

ment. Moreover, allowing the petitioner to terminate her pregnancy, on a proper

6 (2010) 5 SCC 600.

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interpretation of the statute, prima facie, falls within the ambit of the statute and

the petitioner should not be denied the benefit on the ground that she is an un-

married woman. The distinction between a married and unmarried woman does

not bear a nexus to the basic purpose and object which is sought to be achieved

by Parliament which is conveyed specifically by the provisions of Explanation 1

to Section 3 of the Act. The petitioner had moved the High Court before she had

completed 24 weeks of pregnancy. The delay in the judicial process cannot work

to her prejudice.

22 In the above background, we pass the following ad interim order:

(i) We request the Director of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi

to constitute a Medical Board in terms of the provisions of Section 3(2D) of

the Act, extracted in the earlier part of this order, during the course of 22

July 2022; and

(ii) In the event that the Medical Board concludes that the fetus can be

aborted without danger to the life of the petitioner, a team of doctors at

the All India Institute of Medical Sciences shall carry out the abortion in

terms of the request which has been made before the High Court and

which has been reiterated both in the Special Leave Petition and in the

course of the submissions before this Court by counsel appearing on

behalf of the petitioner. Before doing so the wishes of the petitioner shall

be ascertained again and her written consent obtained after due

verification of identity.

23 The report shall be furnished to this Court after compliance with this order within

a period of one week thereafter.

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24 For considering the report of the Medical Board, list the Special Leave Petition on

2 August 2022.

25 The ad interim direction of the High Court of Delhi declining to grant interim

relief shall stand modified in the above terms.

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
[Surya Kant]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
[A S Bopanna]

New Delhi;
July 21, 2022

-S-