Chapter 14: Protection
Goals of Protection
Principles of Protection
Domain of Protection
Chapter 14: Protection
Access Matrix
Implementation of Access Matrix
Access Control
Revocation of Access Rights
Capability-Based Systems
Language-Based Protection
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Objectives Goals of Protection
Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern In one protection model, computer consists of a collection of
computer system objects, hardware or software
Explain how protection domains combined with an access Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through
matrix are used to specify the resources a process may a well-defined set of operations
access Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed
Examine capability and language-based protection systems correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so
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Principles of Protection Principles of Protection (Cont.)
Guiding principle – principle of least privilege Must consider “grain” aspect
Programs, users and systems should be given just Rough-grained privilege management easier, simpler,
enough privileges to perform their tasks but least privilege now done in large chunks
Limits damage if entity has a bug, gets abused For example, traditional Unix processes either have
Can be static (during life of system, during life of abilities of the associated user, or of root
process) Fine-grained management more complex, more
Or dynamic (changed by process as needed) – domain overhead, but more protective
switching, privilege escalation File ACL lists, RBAC
“Need to know” a similar concept regarding access to Domain can be user, process, procedure
data
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Domain Structure Domain Implementation (UNIX)
Domain = user-id
Access-right = <object-name, rights-set>
where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can Domain switch accomplished via file system
be performed on the object Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit)
Domain = set of access-rights When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is
set to owner of the file being executed
When execution completes user-id is reset
Domain switch accomplished via passwords
su command temporarily switches to another user’s
domain when other domain’s password provided
Domain switching via commands
sudo command prefix executes specified command in
another domain (if original domain has privilege or
password given)
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Domain Implementation (MULTICS) Multics Benefits and Limits
Let Di and Dj be any two domain rings
Ring / hierarchical structure provided more than the basic
If j < I Di Dj kernel / user or root / normal user design
Fairly complex -> more overhead
But does not allow strict need-to-know
Object accessible in Dj but not in Di, then j must be < i
But then every segment accessible in Di also
accessible in Dj
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Access Matrix Use of Access Matrix
View protection as a matrix (access matrix) If a process in Domain Di tries to do “op” on object Oj, then
Rows represent domains “op” must be in the access matrix
Columns represent objects User who creates object can define access column for that
object
Access(i, j) is the set of operations that a process
executing in Domaini can invoke on Objectj Can be expanded to dynamic protection
Operations to add, delete access rights
Special access rights:
owner of Oi
copy op from Oi to Oj (denoted by “*”)
control – Di can modify Dj access rights
transfer – switch from domain Di to Dj
Copy and Owner applicable to an object
Control applicable to domain object
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Use of Access Matrix (Cont.) Access Matrix of Figure A with Domains as Objects
Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy
Mechanism
Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by
authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced
Policy
User dictates policy
Who can access what object and in what mode
But doesn’t solve the general confinement problem
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Access Matrix with Copy Rights Access Matrix With Owner Rights
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Modified Access Matrix of Figure B Implementation of Access Matrix
Generally, a sparse matrix
Option 1 – Global table
Store ordered triples <domain, object,
rights-set> in table
A requested operation M on object Oj within domain
Di -> search table for < Di, Oj, Rk >
with M ∈ Rk
But table could be large -> won’t fit in main memory
Difficult to group objects (consider an object that all
domains can read)
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Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.) Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)
Option 2 – Access lists for objects
Each column = Access-control list for one object
Each column implemented as an access list for one Defines who can perform what operation
object
Domain 1 = Read, Write
Resulting per-object list consists of ordered pairs
Domain 2 = Read
<domain, rights-set> defining all domains with Domain 3 = Read
non-empty set of access rights for the object
Easily extended to contain default set -> If M ∈ default Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
set, also allow access For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects
Object F1 – Read
Object F4 – Read, Write, Execute
Object F5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy
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Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.) Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)
Option 3 – Capability list for domains Option 4 – Lock-key
Instead of object-based, list is domain based Compromise between access lists and capability lists
Capability list for domain is list of objects together with operations Each object has list of unique bit patterns, called locks
allows on them
Each domain as list of unique bit patterns called keys
Object represented by its name or address, called a capability
Process in a domain can only access object if domain
Execute operation M on object Oj, process requests operation and
specifies capability as parameter
has key that matches one of the locks
Possession of capability means access is allowed
Capability list associated with domain but never directly accessible
by domain
Rather, protected object, maintained by OS and accessed
indirectly
Like a “secure pointer”
Idea can be extended up to applications
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Comparison of Implementations Comparison of Implementations (Cont.)
Many trade-offs to consider Most systems use combination of access lists and
Global table is simple, but can be large capabilities
Access lists correspond to needs of users First access to an object -> access list searched
Determining set of access rights for domain non- If allowed, capability created and attached to
localized so difficult process
Every access to an object must be checked – Additional accesses need not be checked
– Many objects and access rights -> slow After last access, capability destroyed
Capability lists useful for localizing information for a given Consider file system with ACLs per file
process
But revocation capabilities can be inefficient
Lock-key effective and flexible, keys can be passed freely
from domain to domain, easy revocation
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Access Control Revocation of Access Rights
Protection can be applied to non-file Various options to remove the access right of a domain to an
resources object
Oracle Solaris 10 provides role- Immediate vs. delayed
based access control (RBAC) to Selective vs. general
implement least privilege
Partial vs. total
Privilege is right to execute
Temporary vs. permanent
system call or use an option
within a system call Access List – Delete access rights from access list
Can be assigned to processes Simple – search access list and remove entry
Users assigned roles granting Immediate, general or selective, total or partial,
access to privileges and permanent or temporary
programs
Enable role via password to
gain its privileges
Similar to access matrix
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Revocation of Access Rights (Cont.) Capability-Based Systems
Capability List – Scheme required to locate capability in the Hydra
system before capability can be revoked Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system
Reacquisition – periodic delete, with require and denial if i.e. read, write, or execute each memory segment
revoked User can declare other auxiliary rights and register those with
Back-pointers – set of pointers from each object to all protection system
capabilities of that object (Multics) Accessing process must hold capability and know name of
operation
Indirection – capability points to global table entry which points
Rights amplification allowed by trustworthy procedures for a
to object – delete entry from global table, not selective (CAL)
specific type
Keys – unique bits associated with capability, generated when Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's
capability created program; system provides access protection for use of these rights
Master key associated with object, key matches master key Operations on objects defined procedurally – procedures are
for access objects accessed indirectly by capabilities
Revocation – create new master key Solves the problem of mutually suspicious subsystems
Policy decision of who can create and modify keys – object Includes library of prewritten security routines
owner or others?
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Capability-Based Systems (Cont.) Language-Based Protection
Cambridge CAP System Specification of protection in a programming language
Simpler but powerful allows the high-level description of policies for the
Data capability - provides standard read, write, execute allocation and use of resources
of individual storage segments associated with object – Language implementation can provide software for
implemented in microcode protection enforcement when automatic hardware-
Software capability -interpretation left to the supported checking is unavailable
subsystem, through its protected procedures Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on
Only has access to its own subsystem whatever protection system is provided by the hardware
and the operating system
Programmers must learn principles and techniques
of protection
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Protection in Java 2 Stack Inspection
Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by
the JVM
The protection domain indicates what operations the class
can (and cannot) perform
If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged
operation, the stack is inspected to ensure the operation can
be performed by the library
Generally, Java’s load-time and run-time checks enforce type
safety
Classes effectively encapsulate and protect data and
methods from other classes
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End of Chapter 14
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