Legal Article

JOINT LIABILITY
SUBMITTED BY: AVINITHA KK

Law of crimes Assingmentignment

Class: 3/5 A

Roll No: 22

Submitted to: Faculty of

crime

1/4/2025
 Joint Liability

Contents
I. Indian Penal Code- An Outline
II. Joint Liability
A. Introduction
B. Liability on the Basis of Common Intention
C. Liability on the Basis of Common Object
D. Common Intention
E. Criminal Conspiracy
F. Common Object
III. Summary

I. Indian Penal Code – An Outline

The Indian Penal Code 1860, the basic law of the country, was created as a statute in 1860. It
came into force on 1 January 1862, replacing the various rules and regulations on the
criminal law statute prevailing in British India.

Assault, battery, theft, robbery, false evidence, slander, libel, criminal breach of trust,
adultery, gambling and homicide, recognized as crimes by Manu1, are the principle offences
against persons and property that occupy a prominent place in today‟s Indian Penal Code
1860 (IPC).

The Indian Penal Code, a comprehensive piece of legislation, originally, had 23 chapters and
511 sections. However, in the course of time, three chapters-V- A (Criminal Conspiracy), IX-
A (Offences Relating to Elections) and XXA (Cruelty by Husband or Relatives of Husband)
and a number of sections have been added numbering 550, and a few sections deleted. The
Indian Penal Code embodies the general penal law of the country, and it is the sole authority
on the general conditions of liability, the definitions of specific offences in the IPC, and the
conditions of exemptions from the criminal liability. Some crimes are recognizable and some
are not.

.”

1
Manu was the famous law giver who framed a comprehensive code. The roots of criminal jurisprudence can
be traced to Manu.
MEANING OF CRIME: Wrong takes place in two ways viz, by commission of an act or by
omission of an act. Crime is a public wrong. It is an offence against the community or society
as a whole. It causes threat to social security and creates social disorder.

The word crime is derived from Greek word “Krimos”, which means “social order” and it is
applied “to those acts that go against social order and are worthy of serious condemnation

II. Joint Liability

A. Introduction
A crime may be committed by an individual or in collaboration with others. An individual
committing a crime would be punished according to the nature of the offence committed.
However, the difficulty arises when several persons are engaged in the commission of an
offence in different capacities. While one of them might be engaged in the actual commission
of the offence, say murder, the other might have assisted the assailant by placing a knife in
his hand, and another might have chalked out the plan but stayed away from the scene of
occurrence throughout the commission of the act. In such cases, a distinction is drawn
between the acts of each of such individuals according to their mode and degree of
participation or involvement in the commission of the offence for ascertaining guilt and
awarding punishment. Such persons may broadly be classified into principals2 and abettors3.

When two or more persons commit a crime jointly, each one of them is equally liable as if he
alone has committed such offence. Their liability is called joint liability or constructive joint
liability. The liability is joint in the sense, all of them are equally liable and are awarded the
same positions.

E.g: A, B and C went to D‟s house to kill him. In fact, B alone fired at D and killed him.
However, A , B and C are equally liable and the same punishment is awarded to all of them.
Sections 34 to 38, 114, 149, 396 and 460 of the Indian Penal Code deal with joint liability.

The provisions relating to joint liability have been elaborately dealt with in ss 34-38, 120A,
149, 396 and 460 of the IPC. These provisions maybe classified into three categories:

2
Principle is a person who either actually commits a crime or aids in the commission of a crime while being
present at the place of the occurrence.
3
Abettor is a person who directly or indirectly aids, assists, counsels, procures or encourages another to
commit a crime.
First, where the offence is committed with the common intention of the group (ss 34-38);

i. Secondly, where the accused is a member of the conspiracy to commit an offence (ss
120A, 120B); and
ii. Thirdly, where the offence is committed with the common object of a unlawful
assembly (s 149).4

B. Liability on the basis of common intention

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code speaks about common intention. According to
Section34 of the Penal Code, when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of
the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as
if it is done by him alone. This liability is called joint liability.

In 1870 by the IPC (amendment) Act 27 of 1870 section 34 was amended by the insertion of
the words „in furtherance of the common intention of all‟, so as to make the object of the
section clear the original section 34 has been given below;

“When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such person is liable for that act
in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.”

CASE LAW
Reg v. Cruse: In this case, a police constable along with his assistants went to A‟s house in
order to arrest him. On seeing the police constable, B, C, D and others came out of the house,
gave him a blow and drove n off the constable and his assistants. The court evolved the
doctrine of joint liability and held that each of the members of the group B, C and D were
equally responsible for the blow, whether one actually struck it or not.

To constitute the joint liability under Section 34, the following ingredients are to be
satisfied-

1. There must be several persons

2. They must have a common intention to commit the offence.
3. The criminal act must have been done in the furtherance of the common
intention.
4. Participation in the action by all the accused.

ILLUSTRATION

A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of
poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z
dies from the effects of the several doses of the poison administered to him. Here A and B

4
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The law of Crime, twenty fourth edn, 1997, pp 396-414; the Indian Penal Code 1860,
also incorporates the principle of joint liability. Section 396 and 460 joint liability where a person is conjointly
engaged in the commission of dacoity with murder, and section 460 where a person is concerned in the
commission of lurking, house-trespass or house-breaking by night where death or grievous hurt is caused.
intentionally cooperate in the omission of the murder and as each of them does an act by
which the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.

C. Liability on the Basis of Common Object

According to Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, “When five or more persons commit a
crime in prosecution of common object, each member of such group will be liable for that act
in the same manner as if it was done by him alone”.

149. Every member of unlawful assembly is guilty of offence committed in prosecution of

common object- If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly knew to
be likely to be committed of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of
that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

Section149 of the Penal Code deals with the joint liability of the members of an unlawful
assembly. For application of section 149, there must be an unlawful assembly as defined
under section 141 of the Penal Code:

To constitute unlawful assembly under section 141;

i. There must be an assembly of not less than five persons

ii. They must have common object in committing the offence
iii. The object must be in the nature as specified in items 1 to 5namely;
1. Overawing the government by using criminal force or show of criminal force;
2. Resisting the execution of law or legal process.
3. To commit any mischief, criminal trespass or other offence.
4. Forcible possession or dispossession of property and
5. Illegal compulsion.

CASE LAW

Queen vs Sahib Ali,(11 B.L.R. 347):It was held in this case that, to constitute liability
under section 149, all the members must know the common object of that assembly. Any
sudden and unpremeditated act done by member of an unlawful assembly would not render
all other members liable unless they knew that the offence would be committed.

Musa Khan vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 733: 1977 SC (Cri) 164:In this
case, the Supreme Court held that “mere presence/innocent presence in an assembly of
persons does not make the accused a member of an unlawful assembly, unless it is shown by
direct or circumstantial evidence that the accused shared the common object of the
assembly.”

D. Common Intention
Sections 34-38 in ch II of the IPC dealing with „General Explanations‟ state the conditions
which a person may be held constructively liable for the acts committed by the other
members of a group.

Section 34 does not create any specific offence; it only lays down the principle of criminal
liability. The two necessary conditions for the application of s34 are:

(a) Common intention to commit an offence and

(b) Participation by all the accused in doing such act or acts constituting the offence in
furtherance of that common intention.

Hence, if two or more persons, with a common intention to commit murder participated in
the acts done in furtherance of that common intention, would all be guilty of murder5.

The essence of joint liability, under s 34, lies in the existence of a common intention, an
overt act indicative of a common intention to do a criminal act in furtherance of common
intention of all of them.6 The word common intention implies a prior meeting of the minds
and participation of all the members of the group in the execution of that plan.7 The acts
done by each of the participants may be different and may vary in their character but they
must be actuated by the same common intention. For example: A, an accused along with
other two co-accused B and C proceeded to D‟s house in order to take revenge of an insult by
the brother of D. They opened fire on the members of D‟s family. It was found that the shots
of A did not hit anybody but the shots of B and C succeeded in killing D. Since the act of
firing was done in furtherance of the common intention of the group to take the revenge, A is
as much liable for the offence of murder as are B and C.

In the absence of common intention, the criminal liability of the members of the group
might differ according to the degree and mode of the individual‟s participation in the act.

Section 35 complimentary to 34, deals with cases where a criminal act is done by reason of
participation in action and s 34 deals with cases where a criminal act is done by virtue of
participation in intention. Section 35 states that when an act is criminal by reason of its
being done with a criminal intention or knowledge, each of such persons who joins in the act
with the same knowledge or intention is, responsible for the act in the same manner as if it
were done by him alone. In other words, the measure of liability is dependent on the basis of
intention or knowledge of the accused.

Section 36 states that when an offence is the effect partly of an act of commission and partly
of an act of omission, the legal consequences would be the same.

Section 37 provides that when an offence is committed as a result of several acts or

omissions, the doing of any one of such acts or omissions with an intention to o-operate in
the offence would make the doer liable for the commission of the offence.

Section 38 speaks of a situation where persons engaged in the omission of criminal act
might be guilty of different offences, by reason of the act being done without a common

5
Gurdatta Mat v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 257, 1965 Cr LJ 242
6
Shiv Prasad Chunni Lal Jain v State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 264[1964] 6 SCR 920
7
Mathulal Sheikh v State of West Bengal AIR 1965 SC 132
intention. In other words, s 38 deals with those cases where the act is done with different
intentions, unlike s 34, where the act is committed with a common intention.

CASE LAW

Khacheru Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh: In this case, several persons attacked a
man with lathis when he was passing through a field. The man eluded them and they gave
chase; on overtaking him they once again attacked him. Held, these facts were sufficient to
prove that the accused had been actuated with the common intention to assault the victim.
Conviction under Section 326 read with section 34 was sustained.

E. Criminal Conspiracy
Section 120A of the IPC, holds members of a group of criminal conspirators jointly liable for
the conspiracy to commit an offence and s 120B provides for punishment in such cases. The
parties to an agreement are guilty of criminal conspiracy, irrespective of the fact whether the
illegal act has been accomplished or not. The gist of the offence of criminal conspiracy is an
agreement to break the law, whereas the commission of an criminal act is the gist of the
offence under s 34 of the IPC.

F. Common Object
Section 149 of ch VII of the IPC dealing with the offences against public tranquility creates a
specific offence and declares that a member of an unlawful assembly is liable for any offence
committed by the other fellow members of that assembly. However, it is not that a member
of an unlawful assembly is answerable for every offence committed by one of its associates
during the time they are engaged in the commission of an offence. It is only in two cases,
where a person is held criminally liable for the offence committed in prosecution of the
common object of the unlawful assembly, and secondly, where the members of the unlawful
assembly knew that such an offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that common
object.

In other words, in order to invoke s 149 of the IPC, the accused must be guilty either of
rioting or of being a member of an unlawful assembly, that is, he must be convicted either
under s 147 (punishment for rioting)nor under s 143 (punishment for being member of an
unlawful assembly ); and the accused must be aware of the likelihood of the commission of
the offence.

The essence of joint liability under s 149, therefore, is that criminal act must have been done
with a view to fulfill the common object of an unlawful assembly. In the absence of proof of a
common object, a member of an unlawful assembly cannot be held liable for the offence
committed by another member of such an assembly.

ILLUSTRATION

Twenty members of a group X, decide to beat the members of the opposite group Y with the
intention to take revenge. During the course of the quarrel A, one of the member of the
group X, stabbed B in his heart who was one of the member of group Y, as a result of which B
died. Since the act of stabbing by A, was not an act done in furtherance of the common object
of the assembly, nor were the members of the assembly aware that such an act would take
place, as it was not the common object of the group, therefore, the members of the assembly
could not be held liable for the act of A. A alone would be liable for the murder of B. The
other members of the assembly would not be liable for causing hurt.

Similarly any sudden and unpremeditated act done by a member of an unlawful assembly
would not render the other members of the assembly liable. Again, mere presence at the
scene of occurrence, without proof having done anything more is not enough for conviction
under s 49.

Distinction Between Section 34 and Section 149 of the Indian

Penal Code
Both ss 34 and 149 hold person(s) acting in concert with others to accomplish an unlawful
object, criminally responsible for such acts on the principle of joint and constructive
criminal liability. However, there is a clear distinction between the elements and scope of s
34 and s 149. Some of the distinguishing points are as follows:

First, s 34 is an explanatory section, that is, of general nature, and enunciates a principle of
criminal liability but creates no offence, whereas s 149 creates a specific offence in the
membership of an unlawful assembly itself for which the participants may be liable for
punishment.

Secondly, s 34 imposes liability on the basis of participation of the members in the execution
of common intention of the group, whereas s 149 lays stress on the membership of an
unlawful assembly. In other words, the element of participation in action, which is the
leading feature of s 34, is replaced in s 149n by membership of the assembly at the time of
the commission of the offence.

Thirdly, the scope of s 34 is limited to the extent of those acts only, which are committed in
the furtherance of the common intention of the group, whereas s 149 renders every member
of an unlawful assembly liable for not only those acts for which there had been deliberation
but also for those acts which could have been committed in prosecution of the common
object of such an assembly.

Fourthly, there is a difference in the scope of „intention‟ and „object‟ used in ss 34 and 149.
The former requires much more deliberation than the latter. A common intention pre-
supposes prior concert and meeting of minds, whereas a common object maybe formed
without that. There may be cases where the object of a group is one, but intention of the
participants differs.

Lastly, s 34 can be invoked even if two persons are involved in a crime, whereas s 149
postulates the existence of an unlawful assembly, which can be formed only if the members
of the group are in five in number.8

Section 34 IPC- All are equally liable for acts done in furtherance of common
intention- Appeal dismissed, Accused convicted- Privy Council-1925

8
Bharwad Mepa Dana v State of Bombay [1962] 1 SCR 172.
 Barendra kumar Ghosh v King Emperor

Facts: A sub-postmaster counting money at his table while at Sankuntalla post office in
Bengal was shot and he died almost at once. The accused ran without taking the money and
one man was caught while the others escaped. He was sentenced to death by the sessions
court which was confirmed by the High Court. Hence, the appeal to Privy Council.

Per Lord Summer, Lord Atkinson and Sir John, JJ:

The effect of s 34 IPC is that, where each of several persons does something criminal, all
acting in furtherance of a common intention, each is punishable for what he has done, as if
he had done it by himself. Such a proposition was not worth enacting, for if a man has done
something criminal in itself, he must be punishable for it, and none the less so that others
were doing other criminal acts of their own at the same time and in furtherance of an
intention common to all. In effect, this means that, if three assailants simultaneously fire at
their victim and lodge three bullets in his brain, all must be murderers, but, if one bullet only
grazes his ear, one of them is not a murderer and, each being entitled to the benefit of the
doubt, all must be acquitted of murder, unless the evidence inclines in favour of the
marksmanship of two or of one.

This argument evidently fixes attention exclusively upon the accused person‟s own act.
Intention to kill and resulting death accordingly are not enough, there must be proved an
act, which kills, done by several persons and corresponding to, if not identical with, the same
fatal act done by one. The answer is that, if this construction is adopted, it defeats itself, for
several persons cannot do the same act as one of them does. They may do act identically
similar, but the act of each is his own, and because it is his own and is relative to himself, it is
not the act of another or the same as that other‟s act. The result is that s 34, construed thus,
has no content and is useless…. Suppose two men tie a rope around the neck of a third and
pull opposite ends of the rope till he is strangled. This they said really is an instance of a case
under s 34. Really it b is not. Obviously each is pulling his own end of the rope, with his own
strength, standing in the position that he chooses to take up, and exerting himself in the way
that is natural to him. In effect each pulls as hard as the other and at the same time and that
both equally contribute to the result. Still the act, for which either would be liable, if done by
himself alone is precisely not the act done by the other person. There are two acts, for which
both actors ought to suffer death, separately done by two persons, but identically similar.

Ghanshyam v State of Uttar Pradesh

Facts: In an accidental occurrence three persons including K a 15 year old boy attacked D
Who died as a result of the attack. The question before the court was whether k shared the
intention of his father and elder brother in beating up D.

It was held that the meeting of K at a pace where the incident is alleged to have occurred was
purely accidental because there is no evidence to show that the accused knew in advance that
he deceased and his own companions were to pass by that route, and that might have been
present at the time of occurrence, but mere presence in the circumstances of this case is not
indicative of sharing the intention of the father and brother. Therefore, the judges were
satisfied that there is no convincing and reliable evidence to hold that the present appellant
shared the common intention of his father and brother and participated in the assault on the
deceased and hence his conviction and sentence was therefore, unsustainable.

III. SUMMARY
Joint Liability in the Indian Penal Code refers t0 situations where more than one person is
held collectively responsible for a criminal act. This concept is primarily governed by
sections 34, 35, 149,and 120B of the IPC.

1. Section 34- Acts done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention:
 When a criminal act is committed by multiple persons in furtherance of a
common intention, each person involved is equally liable.
 Common intention implies a prearranged plan and active participation in the
act.
 Example: If three individuals plan and execute a robbery, all are equally
liable, regardless of who performed the primary act.
2. Section 35- Criminal act without knowledge or intent
 It an act requires criminal knowledge or intention and is done by multiple
people with that mindset, all are liable for the offence.
3. Section 149- Every member of an unlawful assembly guilty of an offence:
 If an offense is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly, in
prosecution of the common object of the assembly, every member is liable.
 The liability extends even if all members did not actively participate, as long
as they were aware of the common object.
4. Section 120B- Criminal Conspiracy:
 When two or more people conspire to commit an offense, all are liable for the
offense, even if the act has not been fully executed.
 Example: If a group plans to murder, all participants in the conspiracy can be
charged under section 120B.

Key aspects.

 Joint Liability ensures accountability for collective criminal actions.

 Active participation, common intention or common object is a crucial factor.
 Mere pressure without knowledge or intent generally does not attract liability.

This doctrine aims to prevent individuals from escaping liability under the guise of collective
action.

Bibliography
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS: KD GAUR

LECTURES ON CRIMINAL LAW: DR. REGA SURYA RAO

LAW BHOOMI