#1 Title De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corp.

Case G.R. No. 194751

Decision Date Nov 26, 2014

Dispute over land ownership in Antipolo; improper summons service invalidated jurisdiction; annulment
petition barred after prior remedies failed.

Facts:

Background of the Case​

Aurora N. De Pedro (petitioner) and Romasan Development Corporation (respondent) were involved in a
dispute over a parcel of land in Antipolo City. Respondent alleged that petitioner unlawfully fenced a
portion of its property and claimed ownership based on a free patent and Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-691. Respondent filed a complaint to nullify petitioner’s title, arguing that the land had
already been segregated from public domain and could not be legally issued as a free patent.

Issuance of Free Patents and Titles​

Respondent discovered that several free patents, including the one issued to petitioner, were irregularly
granted. The land was already covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 236044, derived from
OCT No. 438 issued in 1937. Respondent sought the nullification of these titles and free patents, claiming
bad faith and irregular issuance.

Service of Summons and Default Judgment​

Attempts to personally serve summons on petitioner failed, and the sheriff’s return stated that petitioner
could not be found at the given address. The trial court allowed service by publication. Petitioner failed to
file an answer, leading to a default judgment against her. The court nullified her title and awarded
damages to respondent.

Motion for New Trial and Appeals​

Petitioner filed a motion for new trial, arguing improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The
motion was denied. She subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was
also denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for annulment of judgment, which was likewise rejected.

Issue:

1.​ Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner due to improper service of summons.
2.​ Whether filing a motion for new trial and a petition for certiorari barred petitioner from filing a
petition for annulment of judgment.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition, affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held
that:

1.​ The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner due to improper service of summons.
The sheriff’s return did not detail the efforts made to personally serve summons, rendering the
substituted service invalid.
 2.​ Petitioner’s filing of a motion for new trial and a petition for certiorari barred her from filing a
petition for annulment of judgment. She had already availed of these remedies and could not use
annulment to revive a final judgment.

Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction and Service of Summons: Personal service of summons is the preferred mode.
Substituted service or service by publication is only valid if the sheriff’s return shows diligent
efforts to personally serve summons and the impossibility of doing so. The sheriff’s return in this
case was defective, rendering the service invalid.
2.​ Finality of Judgment and Annulment: A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary
remedy and cannot be invoked when other remedies, like a motion for new trial or certiorari, have
already been availed of and lost. Petitioner’s actions constituted an abuse of legal remedies.
3.​ Collateral Attack on Title: An action for annulment of title is a direct attack on a certificate of title
and does not violate Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which prohibits collateral
attacks on titles.

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of proper service of summons to establish jurisdiction
and the finality of judgments. It also reiterated the limitations on petitions for annulment of judgment,
especially when other remedies have been exhausted.

#2 Title Bilag vs. Ay-ay

Case G.R. No. 189950

Decision Date

Apr 24, 2017

Dispute over 159,496 sqm Baguio land; RTC dismissed quieting of title case, citing lack of jurisdiction
over public land. SC upheld dismissal, ruling jurisdiction lies with Director of Lands.

Facts:

Background of the Case

The case originated from a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction filed
by respondents (Estela Ay-Ay, Andres Acop, Jr., Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio Ap-Ap, John Napoleon A.
Ramirez, Jr., and Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez) against petitioners (Bernadette S. Bilag, Erlinda Bilag-Santillan,
Dixon Bilag, Reynaldo B. Suello, Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of Leticia Bilag-Hanaoka, and Heirs of
Nellie Bilag) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 61. The dispute involved a
159,496-square meter parcel of land in Sitio Benin, Baguio City, designated as Approved Plan No.
544367, Psu 189147.

Respondents' Claims

Respondents alleged that Iloc Bilag, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, sold various portions of the land
to them through Deeds of Sale, which were registered with the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. They
claimed that Iloc Bilag acknowledged full payment and guaranteed that his heirs would honor the sales.
Respondents further asserted that they had been in continuous possession of the land since 1976 and
had introduced improvements. However, petitioners refused to recognize the sales and allegedly
harassed respondents, prompting the filing of the complaint to quiet title and remove the cloud on their
ownership.

Petitioners' Defense

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on three grounds:

1.​ Lack of Jurisdiction: They argued that the land was untitled, unregistered, and part of the
Baguio Townsite Reservation, making it public land. Thus, the RTC lacked jurisdiction, and the
Land Management Bureau should resolve ownership issues.
2.​ Prescription/Laches/Estoppel: They contended that respondents waited over 27 years to
enforce the Deeds of Sale, making the action barred by prescription or laches.
3.​ Res Judicata: Petitioners pointed out that respondents had previously filed a similar case (Civil
Case No. 3934-R) in 1998, which was dismissed for lack of merit. The dismissal was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals (CA) and became final, barring the current action.

RTC Ruling

The RTC dismissed the case, agreeing with petitioners on all three grounds:

1.​ It lacked jurisdiction over the untitled public land.

2.​ The Deeds of Sale did not confer title, and respondents failed to assert ownership for 27 years.
3.​ The case was barred by res judicata due to the final dismissal of Civil Case No. 3934-R.

CA Ruling

The CA reversed the RTC's dismissal, holding that:

1.​ Res Judicata did not apply because the previous case (Civil Case No. 3934-R) was an action for
injunction, while the current case was for quieting of title.
2.​ The action to quiet title was imprescriptible since respondents had been in possession since
1976.

Issue:

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the CA correctly set aside the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 5881-R and remanded the case for trial.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the RTC's dismissal of the case. It held that:
 1.​ The RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case because the subject land was part of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation and remained public land. The authority to determine ownership of
public lands lies with the Director of Lands, not the RTC.
2.​ The CA erred in not addressing the jurisdictional issue, which was a threshold matter. Any
judgment rendered without jurisdiction is null and void.
3.​ The Court did not need to address the other grounds (res judicata and prescription/laches) since
the lack of jurisdiction was dispositive.

Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction Over Public Lands: The RTC has no jurisdiction over untitled and unregistered
public lands. The Director of Lands has the exclusive authority to determine ownership and
disposition of such lands.
2.​ Nullity of Judgment Without Jurisdiction: A court's lack of jurisdiction renders its actions void
and without legal effect. The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
3.​ Res Judicata and Prescription: While the CA addressed these issues, they were rendered moot
by the jurisdictional defect. The Court emphasized that jurisdictional issues must be resolved first
before addressing other grounds.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision and dismissed Civil Case No. 5881-R for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC had no authority to hear the case because the subject land was public land, and
jurisdiction over such matters lies with the Director of Lands.

#3 Title Tagalog vs. Vda. de Gonzales

Case G.R. No. 201286

Decision Date Jul 18, 2014

A dispute over Lot No. 1595-A in Cebu led to a jurisdictional error; the SC ruled the RTC lacked authority,
as the case was for unlawful detainer, falling under MTC jurisdiction.

Facts:

Subject of Litigation

The case involves Lot No. 1595-A, a parcel of land in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu, with an area of 27,551
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-57604.

Parties Involved

Petitioner: Inocencia Tagalog​

Respondents: Maria Lim Vda. de Gonzalez, Gaudencia L. Buagas, Ranulfo Y. Lim, Don L. Calvo, Susan
C. Santiago, Dina C. Aranas, and Rufina C. Ramirez.
Initial Complaint

On 5 February 2003, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with Damages and Attorney’s Fees against
Tagalog. Respondents alleged they were co-owners of the land and that Tagalog occupied a portion as a
lessee under a verbal month-to-month lease. Tagalog built a house on the land, which was damaged by a
typhoon, after which she stopped paying rent and vacated the premises.

Demand to Vacate and Construction of New House

In December 2002, respondents demanded Tagalog remove debris and vacate the land, asserting the
lease was terminated. However, in January 2003, Tagalog constructed a two-story residential house on
the land without respondents' consent or a building permit. Despite warnings from the Municipal Engineer
and Barangay Captain, Tagalog continued the construction.

Tagalog’s Defense

Tagalog claimed the lease was still valid and subsisting, denied being notified of respondents' intent to
use the land, and stated she had permission to repair her dwelling without enlarging the area. She prayed
for the dismissal of the case, arguing it was for unlawful detainer, which was beyond the RTC’s
jurisdiction.

RTC Decision

On 5 May 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering Tagalog to vacate the premises, pay
moral damages, and attorney’s fees.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

Tagalog appealed, but the CA dismissed the case for failure to file the required brief. Her motion for
reconsideration was also denied.

Issue:

The main issue is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the RTC lacked jurisdiction. The case was for
unlawful detainer, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). The RTC’s decision
and subsequent resolutions by the CA were set aside, and the case was dismissed without prejudice.

Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction Determined by the Nature of the Complaint: The jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the nature of the action pleaded in the complaint.
2.​ Unlawful Detainer Defined: Unlawful detainer involves withholding possession of land or
building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under a contract,
express or implied.
 3.​ MTC’s Exclusive Jurisdiction: Ejectment suits, including unlawful detainer, are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC if dispossession has lasted for not more than one year.
4.​ RTC’s Error in Taking Jurisdiction: The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the case, as it was
clearly an unlawful detainer suit based on the expiration of a month-to-month verbal lease.
5.​ Void Proceedings: Proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its decisions, are
null and void.

#4 Title Spouses Sanchez vs. De Aguilar

Case G.R. No. 228680

Decision Date Sep 17, 2018

Dispute over 600-sqm lot near Lake Sebu; MCTC ruled heirs of Aguilar in prior possession, no alluvium.
SC upheld CA: MCTC had jurisdiction, laches barred annulment, judgment final.

Facts:

Background of the Case

●​ On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold a 600-square-meter portion of his 33,600-square-meter lot
(Lot No. 71, Pls 870) in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato, to petitioners Spouses Francisco and Delma
Sanchez.
●​ On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar fenced the boundary line between the
600-square-meter lot and an alleged alluvium (land formed by natural accretion) on the northwest
portion of the land by Lake Sebu.
●​ The Spouses Sanchez protested the fencing and filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake Sebu, claiming ownership of the alluvium.
The heirs of Aguilar denied the existence of the alluvium, asserting that the 800-square-meter
area beyond the 600-square-meter lot was in their possession and used by the Spouses Sanchez
with their tolerance.

MCTC Decision

●​ On June 7, 2006, the MCTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that the heirs of Aguilar were in prior
actual possession of the disputed area, evidenced by improvements like trees planted decades
earlier. The court also rejected the claim of alluvium, stating that Lake Sebu’s stagnant waters
could not form alluvium. It further held that the disputed area, being larger than the
600-square-meter lot, could not belong to the Spouses Sanchez and might instead be
government property as a foreshore or salvage zone.

Writ of Execution and Survey

●​ On May 27, 2008, the MCTC issued a Writ of Execution to define the boundaries of the
600-square-meter lot. The Sheriff’s survey, based on the District Engineer’s finding that the
national highway was 58.53 meters wide, determined that the lot extended to the edge of Lake
Sebu, leaving no excess land for the heirs of Aguilar.
 ●​ However, the Municipality of Lake Sebu issued a Notice in 2009 stating that the
150-square-meter lot along the lake belonged to the heirs of Aguilar, and the Spouses Sanchez
were ordered to demolish their fish cages.

RTC Decision

●​ On May 22, 2010, the Spouses Sanchez filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to annul the MCTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Sanchez, holding that the 600-square-meter lot extended to
the lake’s edge, leaving no alluvium for the heirs of Aguilar.

CA Decision

●​ On July 28, 2016, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC Decision, ruling that the MCTC
had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case and that the Spouses Sanchez’s complaint was
barred by laches, as it was filed four years after the MCTC Decision had been executed.

Issue:

1.​ Whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case.
2.​ Whether the Spouses Sanchez’s Complaint for Annulment of Judgment was barred by laches.
3.​ Whether the disputed area was an alluvium and who had rightful ownership or possession of it.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA Decision. The Court held:

1.​ The MCTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case, as it involved possession of the disputed
property, and the Spouses Sanchez themselves invoked this jurisdiction by filing the complaint.
2.​ The Spouses Sanchez’s Complaint for Annulment of Judgment was barred by laches, as they
waited four years to challenge the MCTC Decision, which had already been executed.
3.​ The MCTC’s ruling on possession was proper, and the Spouses Sanchez failed to timely appeal
the decision, allowing it to attain finality.

Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction of the MCTC: The MCTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case, as it is vested
with exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases under Republic Act No. 7691. The
Spouses Sanchez cannot deny the MCTC’s jurisdiction simply because the decision was
unfavorable to them.
2.​ Laches: The Spouses Sanchez’s delay of four years in filing the Complaint for Annulment of
Judgment constituted laches, barring their cause of action. Laches arises from the failure to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption of abandonment.
3.​ Finality of Judgments: The doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies. Once a judgment
attains finality, it becomes unalterable, and the courts cannot modify it even to correct errors of
fact or law.
4.​ Nature of Ejectment Cases: Ejectment cases, such as forcible entry, are summary proceedings
aimed at resolving possession (possession de facto) and not ownership (possession de jure). Any
determination of ownership in such cases is provisional and does not bar a separate action to
resolve title.
Conclusion:

The Supreme Court upheld the CA Decision, ruling that the MCTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry
case, the Spouses Sanchez’s Complaint for Annulment of Judgment was barred by laches, and the
MCTC’s decision on possession was proper. The petition was denied, and the CA’s rulings were affirmed.

#5 Title Aichi Forging Co. of Asia, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals

Case G.R. No. 193625

Decision Date Aug 30, 2017

AICHI prematurely filed a VAT refund claim without waiting for the mandatory 120-day BIR period,
rendering the CTA's decision void due to lack of jurisdiction and improper remedy.

Facts:

1.​ Corporate Background: AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (AICHI) is a domestic corporation
engaged in manufacturing steel products and automotive parts. It is registered with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer and with the Board of Investments (BOI).
2.​ Claim for Refund: On September 26, 2002, AICHI filed a claim for refund/credit of unutilized
input VAT amounting to P18,030,547.77 for the periods covering the third and fourth quarters of
2000 and all four quarters of 2001.
3.​ Premature Judicial Claim: AICHI filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
on September 30, 2002, just four days after filing its administrative claim with the BIR, without
waiting for the mandatory 120-day period for the BIR to act.
4.​ CTA Proceedings: The CTA partially granted AICHI’s claim for input VAT attributable to
zero-rated sales but denied the claim for input VAT on capital goods due to insufficient evidence.
The CTA En Banc affirmed the decision.
5.​ Certiorari Petition: AICHI filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, challenging the CTA En
Banc’s decision, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

1.​ Jurisdiction: Whether AICHI’s premature filing of its judicial claim deprived the CTA of
jurisdiction.
2.​ Correct Remedy: Whether AICHI availed of the correct remedy by filing a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 instead of a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
3.​ Substantiation of Claim: Whether AICHI sufficiently proved its entitlement to the refund or tax
credit.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition for the following reasons:

1.​ Lack of Jurisdiction: AICHI’s judicial claim was filed prematurely, as it did not wait for the
mandatory 120-day period for the BIR to act on its administrative claim. This violated Section
112(D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), rendering the CTA’s decision void.
 2.​ Wrong Remedy: AICHI improperly filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a
Petition for Review under Rule 45, which is the correct remedy for appealing decisions of the CTA
En Banc.
3.​ Void Judgment: The CTA’s decision was void for lack of jurisdiction, and no rights could be
obtained from it. The Court declined to address the issue of whether AICHI substantiated its
claim.

Ratio:

1.​ Mandatory and Jurisdictional Periods:

○​ The 120-day period for the BIR to act on an administrative claim and the 30-day period to
file a judicial claim after the BIR’s decision or inaction are mandatory and jurisdictional. A
premature judicial claim, filed before the expiration of the 120-day period, is void for lack
of cause of action.
○​ The only exception is for claims filed between December 10, 2003, and October 6, 2010,
based on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which allowed simultaneous filing of administrative
and judicial claims.
2.​ Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:
○​ Taxpayers must exhaust administrative remedies by waiting for the BIR to act within the
120-day period before filing a judicial claim. This ensures efficiency and proper
administrative review.
3.​ Proper Remedy:
○​ Decisions of the CTA En Banc must be appealed via a Petition for Review under Rule 45,
not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, unless there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy.
4.​ Void Judgments:
○​ A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and has no legal effect. It cannot create
or impair rights and must be disregarded.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court vacated the decisions of the CTA Division and CTA En Banc, holding that AICHI’s
premature judicial claim deprived the CTA of jurisdiction. The petition was denied for lack of jurisdiction
and improper remedy.

#6 Title Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. vs. Panlilio

Case G.R. No. 133365

Decision Date Sep 16, 2003

Platinum Tours sued PATC for unpaid airline tickets, leading to a default judgment. Execution irregularities
nullified a share sale, prompting a new case by Panlilio. Consolidation attempts were annulled, but
jurisdiction remained with the original court. Supreme Court upheld the decision, deeming Platinum’s
petition premature.

Facts:
Initial Complaint and Default Judgment

●​ On April 27, 1994, Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president, Nelida
G. Galvez, in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Platinum sought payment for airline tickets purchased by
PATC.
●​ On October 24, 1994, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a
default judgment in favor of Platinum, ordering PATC and Galvez to pay P359,621.03 in actual
damages, P50,000 in attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Execution of Judgment and Intervention Attempt

●​ On February 10, 1995, a writ of execution was issued, leading to the levy and sale of Manila
Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in Galvez’s name to Ma. Rosario
Khoo for P479,888.48.
●​ On June 2, 1995, Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634,
claiming that Galvez had executed a chattel mortgage over her Manila Polo Club shares in his
favor to secure a P1 million loan. The trial court denied his motion on June 9, 1995, stating that
a decision had already been rendered and intervention would delay the case.

Nullification of Execution Sale and New Case

●​ On January 29, 1996, the trial court declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities.
●​ On May 3, 1996, Panlilio filed a collection case against Galvez (Civil Case No. 96-365) in
Branch 146 of the RTC of Makati City, seeking to attach the disputed shares. He also sought to
consolidate this case with Civil Case No. 94-1634.

Consolidation of Cases

●​ On June 13, 1996, Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for
consolidation, subject to the approval of Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62. Judge Diokno
allowed the consolidation on July 23, 1996.
●​ Platinum moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

●​ On January 31, 1997, Platinum filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
challenging the consolidation order.
●​ On January 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals annulled the consolidation order but left it to Judge
Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or retain it as a separate
case in Branch 62.

Supreme Court Petition

●​ Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals on
April 2, 1998.
●​ Platinum then filed a petition with the Supreme Court, arguing that Branch 62 no longer had
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 after the consolidation order was annulled.

Issue:
 1.​ Whether the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, retained jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 after
the Court of Appeals annulled the consolidation order.
2.​ Whether the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 with Civil Case No. 94-1634 was proper.
3.​ Whether Platinum’s petition to the Supreme Court was premature.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied Platinum’s petition, holding that:

1.​ Jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 was not affected by the annulment of the consolidation
order. The RTC of Makati, Branch 62, retained jurisdiction over the case.
2.​ The Court of Appeals correctly left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No.
96-365 to Branch 146 or retain it as a separate case in Branch 62.
3.​ Platinum’s petition was premature and speculative, as Judge Diokno had not yet decided how
to proceed with Civil Case No. 96-365.

Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction refers to the authority of a court to hear and decide a case, not the correctness of its
decisions. The annulment of the consolidation order did not divest Branch 62 of its jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 96-365.
2.​ Consolidation of cases is discretionary and should not unduly delay the resolution of the original
case. The Court of Appeals properly left the decision on consolidation to the trial court.
3.​ Premature petitions waste judicial resources and should be avoided. Platinum should have
waited for Judge Diokno’s decision before seeking recourse from the Supreme Court.

#7 Title Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. vs. Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc.

Case G.R. No. 191527

Decision Date Aug 22, 2016

A dispute over land possession between two churches, BFBC and FCJBC, led to an unlawful detainer
case. Courts ruled the complaint defective, lacking jurisdiction due to insufficient allegations, requiring a
plenary action for recovery.

Facts:

Ownership and Initial Possession

●​ The case involves a parcel of land known as Lot 3, Blk. 35 of (LRC) PCS-2364, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 82587, located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subdivision,
Balibago, Angeles City, owned by Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC).
●​ On March 7, 1990, PBSBC entered into a contract of loan with Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc.
(BFBC) to enable BFBC to purchase the subject property. BFBC took possession of the property
and conducted religious activities there.

Dispute Over Possession

 ●​ Reynaldo Galvan and his companions began attending BFBC's religious activities at the property.
BFBC alleged that Galvan formed and incorporated Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc.
(FCJBC) and took control of the property.
●​ The Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC) upheld BFBC's right over the
property in a letter dated September 5, 2001, recognizing BFBC's pastor, Rev. Rolando T. Santos,
as the legitimate pastor.
●​ Despite this, FCJBC continued to occupy the property. BFBC sent a demand letter on September
4, 2002, asking FCJBC to vacate the property and pay P10,000.00 per month as reasonable
compensation for its use.

Legal Proceedings

●​ On September 24, 2003, BFBC and PBSBC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
against FCJBC and Galvan before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, Angeles City.
●​ FCJBC and Galvan countered that FCJBC had been in existence since 1984, formerly known as
"Faith Baptist Church" (FBC), and had moved to the subject property in 1990. They claimed that
FCJBC had paid installments on the property and that PBSBC refused to accept further
payments.
●​ FCJBC also filed a Petition for Consignation of Payment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62, Angeles City, seeking to compel PBSBC to accept P240,615.53 as full payment of the
loan.

MTC and RTC Decisions

●​ The MTC ruled in favor of BFBC, ordering FCJBC and Galvan to vacate the property and pay
attorney's fees and costs. The MTC classified the case as one of forcible entry, not unlawful
detainer.
●​ The RTC affirmed the MTC's decision on appeal. FCJBC moved for reconsideration, which was
denied, prompting FCJBC to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).

Court of Appeals Decision

●​ The CA reversed the RTC's decision, dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA
ruled that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

1.​ Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer and ruling
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
2.​ Whether the Court of Appeals erred in raising issues on the sufficiency of the complaint and the
MTC's jurisdiction, which were not raised by the parties.
3.​ Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint instead of deciding the case on
the merits under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the CA's decision. The Court held that:

●​ The complaint failed to sufficiently allege the elements of unlawful detainer, as it did not show that
FCJBC's possession was originally lawful or that BFBC and PBSBC tolerated such possession.
 ●​ The complaint also failed to meet the requirements for forcible entry, as it did not specify how and
when FCJBC's entry and dispossession occurred.
●​ Since the complaint did not establish jurisdiction for either unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the
MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
●​ The proper recourse for BFBC and PBSBC was to file a plenary action for recovery of possession
with the RTC.

Ratio:

●​ Unlawful Detainer vs. Forcible Entry: Unlawful detainer requires that the defendant's
possession was originally lawful and became unlawful upon the plaintiff's demand to vacate.
Forcible entry involves illegal possession from the beginning, with the issue being prior physical
possession.
●​ Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations: The nature of the action and the court's jurisdiction are
determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by its designation. The complaint must clearly
state facts that bring the case within the jurisdiction of the court.
●​ Defective Complaint: The complaint in this case failed to allege the necessary facts for either
unlawful detainer or forcible entry, rendering it defective and depriving the MTC of jurisdiction.
●​ Proper Remedy: When dispossession does not fall under forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the
proper remedy is a plenary action for recovery of possession filed with the RTC.

#8 Title Spouses Erorita vs. Spouses Dumlao

Case G.R. No. 195477

Decision Date Jan 25, 2016

Spouses Dumlao, owners of a property housing San Mariano Academy, sued Spouses Erorita for
possession and unpaid rent. RTC ruled for Dumlaos, but SC voided the decision, holding it was an
unlawful detainer case under MTC jurisdiction.

Facts:

Ownership and Acquisition of the Property

●​ Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the registered owners of a parcel of
land located at Barangay San Mariano, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, covered by TCT No. T-53000.
The property includes structures used for the San Mariano Academy.
●​ The Spouses Dumlao acquired the property through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale on April 25,
1990, after the former owners, Spouses Herminio and Editha Erorita (Spouses Erorita), failed to
redeem it. The title was subsequently consolidated in the Dumlaos' name.

Operation of the School

●​ The Spouses Dumlao allowed the Spouses Erorita to continue operating the San Mariano
Academy on the property. The Eroritas appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as administrators of
the school.
 ●​ The Spouses Dumlao claimed that the Eroritas agreed to pay a monthly rent of P20,000.00 but
failed to pay any rentals since 1990. The Eroritas countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to
operate the school without rent out of goodwill and friendship.

Demand to Vacate and Legal Action

●​ On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao demanded that the Eroritas vacate the property.
The Eroritas expressed willingness to comply but could not immediately close the school without
clearance from the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports.
●​ On March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the Eroritas and their administrators, Hernan and Susan
Erorita.

RTC Proceedings

●​ The Eroritas failed to appear during the pre-trial despite notice, leading the RTC to declare them
in default. The court allowed the Spouses Dumlao to present evidence ex parte.
●​ On June 4, 2007, the RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Dumlao, ordering the Eroritas to vacate
the property, pay accumulated rentals, damages, and attorney's fees, and refrain from accepting
new enrollees at the San Mariano Academy.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

●​ The Eroritas appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
because the complaint was for unlawful detainer, which falls under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
●​ The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, holding that the RTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed
value of the property, which exceeded P20,000.00, and that the case involved an action for
possession, not unlawful detainer.

Issue:

1.​ Jurisdiction: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case, given that the complaint allegedly
constituted an action for unlawful detainer, which falls under the MTC's jurisdiction.
2.​ Improper Impleadment: Whether Hernan and Susan Erorita were improperly impleaded as
parties to the case.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court partly granted the petition, ruling as follows:

1.​ Jurisdiction: The RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case. The complaint, although captioned as a
"recovery of possession," contained the essential elements of an unlawful detainer case, which
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. The RTC's decision was declared void for lack of
jurisdiction.
2.​ Improper Impleadment: The issue of whether Hernan and Susan Erorita were improperly
impleaded was not raised before the lower courts and could not be raised for the first time on
appeal.

Ratio:
 1.​ Jurisdiction Depends on Allegations in the Complaint:
○​ Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, not its caption or the
defenses raised in the answer.
○​ For an unlawful detainer case, the complaint must allege: (a) initial lawful possession by
the defendant, (b) termination of the defendant's right to possess, (c) refusal to vacate,
and (d) filing of the complaint within one year from the last demand to vacate.
○​ The complaint in this case contained all the elements of unlawful detainer, making it fall
under the MTC's jurisdiction.
2.​ Estoppel by Laches Does Not Apply:
○​ Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal, unless estoppel by laches
applies.
○​ Estoppel by laches requires a considerable delay in asserting jurisdiction, analogous to
the factual setting in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In this case, the petitioners timely raised the
issue of jurisdiction before the CA, and their failure to attend the pre-trial did not
constitute active participation in the proceedings.
3.​ Issues Not Raised Below Cannot Be Raised on Appeal:
○​ The issue of improper impleadment was not raised before the lower courts and was
raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process bar the Court from
addressing this issue.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision and declared the RTC's decision void for lack of
jurisdiction. The case should have been filed with the MTC as an unlawful detainer case.

#9 Title North Greenhills Association, Inc. vs. Morales

Case G.R. No. 222821

Decision Date Aug 9, 2017

Homeowners' association disputes park access, restroom construction, and unpaid dues; Supreme Court
affirms jurisdiction, reverses nuisance ruling, and dismisses counterclaim.

Facts:

1.​ Parties Involved:

○​ Petitioner: North Greenhills Association, Inc. (NGA), a homeowners' association in North
Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan City.
○​ Respondent: Atty. Narciso Morales, a resident of North Greenhills Subdivision.
2.​ Property in Dispute:
○​ McKinley Park, an open space/playground area owned and operated by NGA, donated
by Ortigas & Co. Ltd.
○​ Atty. Morales' house is adjacent to the park, with a side access door he built to enter the
park directly.
3.​ Construction of Pavilion and Restroom:
 ○​ In June 2003, NGA began constructing a pavilion with a public restroom near Atty.
Morales' property.
○​ Atty. Morales objected, claiming the restroom blocked his access to the park and violated
his rights under Presidential Decree No. 957 and the Deed of Donation.
4.​ Legal Proceedings:
○​ Atty. Morales filed a complaint with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), seeking the demolition of the pavilion and relocation of the restroom.
○​ The HLURB ruled in favor of Atty. Morales, ordering the removal of the pavilion and
relocation of the restroom.
○​ NGA appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which modified the decision,
ordering only the relocation of the restroom.
○​ The Office of the President (OP) and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the HLURB
Board's decision.
○​ NGA filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
5.​ Counterclaim by NGA:
○​ NGA sought payment of unpaid association dues from Atty. Morales, amounting to
P878,778.40, dating back to 1980.

Issue:

1.​ Whether the CA correctly ruled that the HLURB had jurisdiction over Atty. Morales' complaint.
2.​ Whether the CA correctly ruled that the restroom built by NGA in McKinley Park is a nuisance per
accidens.
3.​ Whether NGA has the right to block Atty. Morales' access to the park.
4.​ Whether the CA correctly ruled that NGA's counterclaim for unpaid association dues was a
permissive counterclaim.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court partly granted the petition, reversing the CA's decision on two issues but affirming
the dismissal of NGA's counterclaim.

1.​ Jurisdiction of HLURB:

○​ The Court held that the HLURB had jurisdiction over the case because Atty. Morales was
a member of NGA, as evidenced by NGA's counterclaim for unpaid dues.
2.​ Nuisance Per Accidens:
○​ The Court reversed the CA's finding that the restroom was a nuisance per accidens. The
CA's conclusion was based on speculation, as there was no evidence proving that the
restroom caused foul odors, sanitary issues, or discomfort to Atty. Morales.
3.​ Access to the Park:
○​ The Court ruled that NGA, as the owner of McKinley Park, has the right to fence and
protect its property under Articles 429 and 430 of the Civil Code. Atty. Morales failed to
prove any legal right to access the park through his side door.
4.​ Counterclaim for Unpaid Dues:
○​ The Court affirmed the CA's ruling that NGA's counterclaim for unpaid association dues
was permissive, not compulsory, as it did not arise from the same transaction or
occurrence as Atty. Morales' complaint.

Ratio:
 1.​ Jurisdiction:
○​ Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Atty. Morales' status as a
member of NGA was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the HLURB.
2.​ Nuisance Per Accidens:
○​ A nuisance per accidens requires factual evidence of harm or discomfort. The CA's ruling
was speculative and lacked evidentiary support.
3.​ Property Rights:
○​ As the owner of the park, NGA has the statutory right to fence and protect its property.
Atty. Morales failed to establish any legal easement or right of way to access the park
through his side door.
4.​ Counterclaim:
○​ A counterclaim is compulsory only if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence as
the main claim. NGA's claim for unpaid dues was unrelated to Atty. Morales' complaint
and was therefore permissive.

#10 Title Salvador vs. Patricia, Inc.

Case G.R. No. 195834

Decision Date Nov 9, 2016

Petitioners sought injunction and quieting of title over disputed land in Tondo, Manila, claiming City
ownership. SC affirmed CA, dismissing due to lack of jurisdiction, improper joinder, and failure to prove
legal interest. Boundary disputes require direct proceedings, not collateral attacks.

Facts:

1.​ Parties Involved:

○​ Petitioners: Guillermo Salvador, Remedios Castro (represented by Paz "Chit" Castro),
Leonila Guevarra, Felipe Mariano, Ricardo de Guzman, Virgilio Jimenez (represented by
Josie Jimenez), Asuncion Juamiz, Rolando Batang, Carmencita Samson, Augusto
Tortosa (represented by Fernando Tortosa), Susana Morante, Luzviminda Bularan, Luz
Orozco, Jose Sapico, Leonardo Palad, Abel Baking (represented by Abelina Baking),
Graciano Arnaldo (represented by Ludy Arnaldo), Judith Hidalgo, and Igmidio Justiniano,
Ciriaco Mijares (represented by Fredezwinda Mijares), Jennifer Morante, Teresita Diala,
and Anita P. Salar.
○​ Respondent: Patricia, Inc.
○​ Intervenors-Appellees: The City of Manila and Ciriaco C. Mijares.
2.​ Nature of the Case:
○​ The case involves an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine ownership
of a parcel of land occupied by the petitioners along Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin,
Tondo, Manila.
○​ The petitioners sought to prevent Patricia, Inc. from evicting them and collecting rentals,
claiming that the land belonged to the City of Manila.
3.​ Key Documents:
○​ Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44247 in the name of the City of Manila.
○​ TCT No. 35727 in the name of Patricia, Inc.
○​ Approved Plan PSD-38540 and Subdivision Plan PCS-3290 for Ricardo Manotok.
4.​ Procedural History:
 ○​ The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the petitioners, permanently enjoining
Patricia, Inc. from evicting them and collecting rentals.
○​ The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's decision, dismissing the complaint for lack
of merit.
5.​ Boundary Dispute:
○​ The RTC appointed geodetic engineers to determine the boundaries of the properties
covered by TCT No. 44247 (City of Manila) and TCT No. 35727 (Patricia, Inc.).
○​ The majority of the commissioners concluded that the land belonged to the City of
Manila.

Issue:

1.​ Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petitioners' complaint for quieting of title and injunction.
2.​ Whether the petitioners had the necessary legal or equitable interest to maintain the action for
quieting of title.
3.​ Whether the joinder of causes of action (injunction and quieting of title) was proper under the
Rules of Court.
4.​ Whether the boundary dispute between the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. could be resolved in
an action for quieting of title.
5.​ Whether the petitioners had a valid cause of action for injunction.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petitioners' complaint.
The Court held:

1.​ Jurisdiction:
○​ The RTC lacked jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title because the complaint did
not allege the assessed value of the property, which is essential to determine the proper
court with jurisdiction.
2.​ Joinder of Causes of Action:
○​ The joinder of the action for injunction (an ordinary suit) and quieting of title (a special
civil action) was improper under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
3.​ Real Party in Interest:
○​ The petitioners failed to prove they had legal or equitable title to the property. Their
possession was merely tolerated, and they did not claim ownership of the land itself.
4.​ Injunction:
○​ The petitioners did not establish a right to be protected by injunction. The boundary
dispute concerned only the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc., not the petitioners.
5.​ Boundary Dispute:
○​ A boundary dispute cannot be litigated in an action for quieting of title. Any alteration or
modification of a Torrens title must be done through a direct proceeding, not a collateral
attack.

Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction in Real Actions:

 ○​ Jurisdiction over a real action (e.g., quieting of title) depends on the assessed value of
the property as alleged in the complaint. The absence of this allegation renders the
complaint dismissible for lack of jurisdiction.
2.​ Joinder of Causes of Action:
○​ Special civil actions (like quieting of title) cannot be joined with ordinary actions (like
injunction) unless they fall under the same jurisdiction and venue.
3.​ Real Party in Interest:
○​ To maintain an action for quieting of title, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to
the property. Mere possession, even if long-standing, does not suffice.
4.​ Injunction Requirements:
○​ Injunction requires the existence of a right to be protected and a showing that the
defendant's acts violate that right. The petitioners failed to establish such a right.
5.​ Collateral Attack on Torrens Titles:
○​ A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked in an action for quieting of title. Any
challenge to the title must be made through a direct proceeding.

#11 Title Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy

Case G.R. No. L-21450

Decision Date Apr 15, 1968

Plaintiffs sued defendants for P1,908; Surety’s counter-bond executed after 15 years. Jurisdiction
challenged late; laches barred Surety. Writ upheld; participation estopped jurisdictional claim.

Facts:

Parties Involved:

●​ Plaintiffs-Appellees: Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog

●​ Defendants: Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio
●​ Defendant-Appellant: Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.

Case Background:​
On July 19, 1948, the plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover
P1,908.00 from the defendants. A writ of attachment was issued against the defendants' properties but
was dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by the defendant-appellant, Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc.

Procedural History:

1.​ The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

2.​ A writ of execution was issued against the defendants but returned unsatisfied.
3.​ Plaintiffs moved for execution against the Surety's counter-bond, which the Surety opposed,
raising two grounds: failure to prosecute and absence of demand.
4.​ The court denied the motion due to lack of demand. After demand was made, a second motion
for execution was filed.
 5.​ The Surety asked for time to answer the motion but failed to do so, leading to the issuance of a
writ of execution against the Surety.
6.​ The Surety moved to quash the writ, arguing the lack of a summary hearing as required under
Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. The motion was denied, and the Surety appealed.

Appellate Proceedings:

1.​ The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's orders.

2.​ The Surety, after receiving the adverse decision, filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction, arguing that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the case as the
amount involved (P1,908.00) fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts under the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
3.​ The Court of Appeals set aside its decision and certified the case to the Supreme Court due to
the jurisdictional issue.

Issue:

1.​ Whether the Court of First Instance of Cebu had jurisdiction over the case given the amount in
controversy.
2.​ Whether the Surety was barred by laches from raising the issue of jurisdiction at a late stage in
the proceedings.
3.​ Whether the writ of execution against the Surety was validly issued without a summary hearing.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

1.​ Jurisdiction: The Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction over the case as the amount involved
(P1,908.00) was within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts under the Judiciary Act of 1948.
2.​ Laches: The Surety was barred by laches from raising the issue of jurisdiction. It had actively
participated in the proceedings for nearly 15 years without raising the jurisdictional issue and only
did so after receiving an adverse decision.
3.​ Writ of Execution: The writ of execution against the Surety was validly issued. The Surety had
been given notice and an opportunity to be heard but failed to file an answer or objection within
the given period, waiving its right to a summary hearing.

Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be granted by
the parties. However, a party may be estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction if it actively
participates in the proceedings and only raises the issue after an adverse decision.
2.​ Laches: Laches applies when a party fails to assert a right for an unreasonable length of time,
causing prejudice to the other party. The Surety's delay in raising the jurisdictional issue for over
15 years constituted laches.
3.​ Summary Hearing: A summary hearing under Section 17 of Rule 59 does not require formal
proceedings. The Surety was given notice and an opportunity to be heard but failed to act,
thereby waiving its right to object.
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Court of Appeals, holding that the Surety was estopped by
laches from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and that the writ of execution was
validly issued.

#12 Title Torres vs. Aruego

Case G.R. No. 201271

Decision Date Sep 20, 2017

A final 1992 RTC decision declared Antonia Aruego as Jose Aruego's illegitimate child, entitling her to a
share in his estate. Petitioners sought reconsideration, but the Supreme Court upheld the decision, citing
the immutability of final judgments and res judicata.

Facts:

1.​ Parties Involved: Petitioners are Roberto A. Torres, Immaculada Torres-Alanon, Agustin Torres,
and Justo Torres, Jr. The respondent is Antonia F. Aruego.
2.​ Case Background: On March 7, 1983, Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by
their mother Luz M. Fabian, filed a Complaint for "Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights" against Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five minor children of Gloria A. Torres,
represented by their father Justo M. Torres, Jr.
3.​ Allegations: Antonia and Evelyn claimed to be the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M.
Aruego. They sought recognition and a share in his estate, listing various properties allegedly left
by Aruego.
4.​ Initial Decision: On June 15, 1992, the Regional Trial court (RTC) ruled in favor of Antonia,
declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of Aruego and entitled to a share in his estate. The court
also identified the properties constituting the estate.
5.​ Appeals and Motions: Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied.
They then filed a Notice of Appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. Subsequent petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition were also dismissed by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

1.​ Principal Issue: Whether the June 15, 1992 Decision of the RTC, which has attained finality, may
still be subject to review and modification.
2.​ Sub-Issues:
○​ Whether the doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies.
○​ Whether the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision are unclear and require interpretation.
○​ Whether the properties comprising the estate of Aruego were conclusively determined in
the Decision.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari, affirming the CA Resolutions. The Court
ruled that the June 15, 1992 Decision had long attained finality and could not be modified. The doctrine of
immutability of final judgments applies, and there were no compelling circumstances to justify a departure
from this doctrine. The Court also found that the properties comprising the estate of Aruego were
conclusively determined in the 1992 Decision, and petitioners had ample opportunity to present their
evidence during the trial.

Ratio:

1.​ Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments: A decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable. The only exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro
tunc entries, void judgments, and circumstances rendering execution unjust and inequitable.
None of these exceptions apply in this case.
2.​ Clarity of the Decision: The Court found the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision to be clear.
The properties comprising the estate of Aruego were conclusively determined, and Antonia's
share was explicitly stated.
3.​ Opportunity to Present Evidence: Petitioners had ample opportunity to present their evidence
during the trial but failed to do so. They cannot now seek to present evidence to modify a final
judgment.
4.​ Res Judicata: The principles of res judicata apply as the June 15, 1992 Decision is a final
judgment on the merits, and the issues raised in the present petition were already addressed
therein.
5.​ Binding Effect of Counsel's Actions: Petitioners are bound by the actions (or inactions) of their
counsel during the trial and subsequent proceedings. Negligence or mistakes of counsel are
binding on the client.

#13 Title Velasquez, Jr. vs. Lisondra Land, Inc.

Case G.R. No. 231290

Decision Date Aug 27, 2020

Joint venture dispute over memorial park development; HLURB jurisdiction upheld due to unsound real
estate practices; estoppel bars respondent from contesting jurisdiction after active participation; damages
modified with 6% interest.

Facts:

Background of the Case:

●​ In 1998, Perfecto Velasquez, Jr. (petitioner) and Lisondra Land Incorporated (respondent)
entered into a joint venture agreement to develop a 7,200-square meter parcel of land into a
memorial park.
●​ Lisondra Land failed to secure the required permit from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) within a reasonable time, delaying the project.
●​ Lisondra Land also failed to provide the necessary insurance coverage, pay its share of realty
taxes, and allegedly collected kickbacks from agents, contrary to the agreement to finance the
project using its own funds.

Initial Legal Proceedings:

 ●​ Perfecto filed a complaint for breach of contract against Lisondra Land before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 18146.
●​ Lisondra Land moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction
over the matter since it involved real estate trade and business practices.
●​ The RTC ruled in favor of Perfecto, asserting its jurisdiction over the case.
●​ Lisondra Land elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72463.
●​ The CA granted Lisondra Land's petition, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
the HLURB had exclusive authority over the matter under Section 1 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1344.

Subsequent Proceedings Before the HLURB:

●​ Perfecto filed a complaint before the HLURB, alleging that Lisondra Land engaged in unsound
real estate business practices, including selling memorial lots without the required permits and
failing to develop the project as planned.
●​ On July 20, 2007, the HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of Perfecto, rescinding the joint venture
agreement, transferring project management to Perfecto, and ordering Lisondra Land to pay
fines, damages, and attorney’s fees.
●​ Lisondra Land appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which initially dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, but later reversed its decision upon Perfecto’s motion for
reconsideration, affirming the HLURB Arbiter’s ruling with modifications.
●​ Lisondra Land then appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which denied the appeal and
affirmed the HLURB Board’s decision.
●​ Lisondra Land filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131359,
arguing that the HLURB lacked jurisdiction over the case.
●​ On December 28, 2016, the CA ruled in favor of Lisondra Land, dismissing Perfecto’s complaint
and holding that the HLURB’s jurisdiction is limited to cases involving buyers or owners of
subdivision lots and condominium units.

Issue:

1.​ Jurisdiction of the HLURB: Whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over disputes between joint
venture partners involving unsound real estate business practices.
2.​ Estoppel: Whether Lisondra Land is estopped from questioning the HLURB’s jurisdiction after
actively participating in the proceedings before the HLURB and the OP.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted Perfecto’s petition, reversing the CA’s decision and reinstating the OP’s
decision. The Court held that:

●​ The HLURB has jurisdiction over the case because the dispute involves unsound real estate
business practices, which fall under the HLURB’s authority under PD No. 1344.
●​ Lisondra Land is estopped from questioning the HLURB’s jurisdiction after actively participating in
the proceedings and seeking affirmative relief from the HLURB and the OP.
●​ The Court modified the damages awarded, ordering that moral and exemplary damages shall
earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the HLURB Arbiter’s decision until full payment.
Ratio:

1.​ Jurisdiction of the HLURB: The HLURB’s jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the cause
of action, the subject matter, and the parties involved. Under PD No. 1344, the HLURB has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving unsound real estate business practices, claims for
refund, and specific performance of contractual obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units. The dispute between Perfecto and Lisondra Land falls within this scope.
2.​ Estoppel: A party cannot question the jurisdiction of a tribunal after actively participating in the
proceedings and seeking affirmative relief. Lisondra Land’s participation in the HLURB and OP
proceedings bars it from raising the issue of jurisdiction at a later stage.
3.​ Damages and Interest: The Court upheld the award of damages and attorney’s fees but
modified the interest rate on moral and exemplary damages to 6% per annum from the date of
the HLURB Arbiter’s decision until full payment, in line with the ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames.