Plan: The United States federal government should deploy space solar power

PLAN

ADVANTAGE 1
Advantage one is the Economy

The Economy remains on the verge of downturn: Government action is key and unemployment is a key factor

Weller 1-27-2012 Christian E.. Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and an associate professor of public policy at the University of Massachusetts Boston. He is also a research
scholar at the University of Massachusetts Amhersts Political Economy Research Institute, and served in the banking sector in Germany, Belgium, and Poland. Dr. Weller is a respected academic with more than 100 academic and popular publications http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/01/econsnap0112.html Economic Snapshot for January 2012 Christian Weller on the State of the Economy

The economy is gradually gaining strength, creating more jobs, and reducing the unemployment rate. Economic

pain for American families, though, remains significant with relatively high unemployment, persistent long-term unemployment, lingering household wealth losses, and crushing debt burdens. The economy will have to grow much faster for much longer to restore economic security for Americas middle class. The private sector drives growth and job creation, but the current economic recovery would be weaker and delayed had policymakers not taken steps in the past few years to invest in infrastructure and help the most vulnerable. Smart economic policy can continue to strengthen the economic recovery and help accelerate private-sector job creation. The right steps can strengthen the economy, such as by increasing infrastructure spending on schools, roads, bridges, and more, and by extending key middle-class tax cuts, such as the temporary payroll tax cuts for an additional year. And policymakers can lend a helping hand to millions of unemployed workers who cannot find a job and need extended unemployment insurance benefits until the economy and the labor market improve significantly further. 1. Economic growth remains low. Gross domestic product, or GDP, grew at an annual rate of 2.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2011. Business investment dropped sharply by 14 percentage points from the third quarter 2011 to 1.7 percent, while export growth remained unchanged at 4.7 percent. Consumption grew at 2.0 percent, and government spending fell by 4.6 percent, the second largest drop since the start of the recession. Economic growth is relatively weak because of low consumer demand, due to high unemployment and households crushing debt burden, but also because of slow demand for U.S. exports in the wake of European economic turmoil and the fiscal struggles of federal, state, and local governments. 2. The trade deficit stays high. The
U.S. trade deficit stood at 3.8 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2011, slightly above the 3.7 percent recorded in the third quarter of 2011, and still substantially higher from its last trough of 2.4 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2009. U.S.

export growth, even when it was strong in recent years, has not been enough to overcome even larger import increases, following in part higher oil prices and thus
larger oil imports. The crisis in Europe could slow U.S. export growth, while turmoil in the Middle East has kept oil prices hightwo trends that could result in expanding U.S. trade deficits in the near future. 3. The labor market recovery is slow. The economy has added jobs continuously since October 2010. There were more than 100,000 jobs each month for six months in a row, from July to December 2011, marking the first such six-month period since late 2005 to early 2006. And the private sector continuously added jobs from March 2010 to December 2011 for a total of 3.2 million jobs. But state and local governments are cutting jobs for teachers, bus drivers, firefighters, and police officers, among others, reflecting governments budget troubles. A total of 447,000 state and local government jobs were lost between March 2010 and December 2011. The

bottom line is that job creation is a top policy priority since private-sector job growth is still too weak to overcome other job losses and to improve the economic fortunes of Americas middle class. 4. Unemployment stays high amid weak job growth. The unemployment rate stood at 8.5 percent in December 2011. And long-term unemployment has ballooned in recent years as the unemployment rate stayed high. In December 2011, 42.6 percent of the unemployed have been out of and looking for a job for more than six months. The average length of unemployment stayed near new record highs with 40.8 weeks in December 2011. The long-term unemployed are struggling due to a weak economy, making extended unemployment benefits necessary until the economy and the labor market substantially improve. (see Figure 1) 5.
Labor market pressures fall especially on communities of color, young workers, and those with less education. The African American unemployment rate in

December 2011 stayed well above average with a high 15.8 percent, and the Hispanic unemployment rate stayed high with 11 percent, while the white unemployment rate was 7.5 percent. Youth unemployment stood at 23.1 percent. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate for people without a high school diploma stayed high with 13.8 percent, compared to 8.7 percent for those with a high school degree and 4.1 percent for those with a college degree. Vulnerable groups have struggled disproportionately more amid the weak labor market of the past few years than white workers, older workers, and workers with more education. But even those groups that fare better than their counterparts in the weak labor market suffer tremendously from high and long-term unemployment. 6. Household incomes continue to drop amid prolonged labor market weaknesses. Median inflation-adjusted household income half of all households have more and the other half has lessstood at $49,445 in 2010, its lowest level in inflation-adjusted dollars since 1996. It fell by 2.3 percent in 2010, an accelerated decline after median income dropped by 0.7 percent in 2009. American families saw few gains during the recovery before the crisis hit in 2008 and experienced no income gains during the current economic recovery after 2009. 7.

Income inequality [is] on the rise. Households at the 95th percentile, with incomes of $180,810 in 2010, had incomes that were more than nine times 9.04 times, to be exactthe incomes of households at the 20th percentile, with incomes of $20,000. This is the largest gap between the top 5 percent and the bottom 20 percent of households since the U.S. Census Bureau started keeping record in 1967.
Extinction results Auslin 09
(Michael, Resident Scholar American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman, Resident Fellow American Enterprise Institute, The Global Economy Unravels, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

the souring of the political environment must be expected to fan the corrosive protectionist tendencies and nationalistic economic policy responses that are already all too much in evidence. After spending much of 2008 cheerleading the global economy, the International Monetary Fund now concedes that output in the world's advanced economies is expected to contract by as much as 2% in 2009. This would be the first time in the post-war period that output contracted in all of the world's major economies. The IMF is also now expecting only a very gradual global economic recovery in 2010, which will keep global unemployment at a high level. Sadly, the erstwhile rapidly growing emerging -market economies will not be spared by the ravages of the global recession. Output is already declining precipitously across Eastern and Central Europe as well as in a number of key Asian economies, like South Korea and Thailand. A number of important emerging-market countries like Ukraine seem to be headed for debt default, while a highly oil-dependent Russia seems to be on the cusp of a full-blown currency crisis. Perhaps of even greater concern is the virtual grinding to a halt of economic growth in China. The IMF now expects that China's growth rate will approximately halve to 6% in 2009. Such a growth rate would fall far short of what is needed to absorb the 20 million Chinese workers who migrate each year from the countryside to the towns in search of a better life. As a barometer of the political and
Conversely, global policymakers do not seem to have grasped the downside risks to the global economy posed by a deteriorating domestic and international political environment. If the past is any guide, social tensions that this grim world economic outlook portends, one needs look no further than the recent employment forecast of the International Labor Organization. The ILO believes that the global financial crisis will wipe out 30 million jobs worldwide in 2009, while in a worst case scenario as many as 50 million jobs could be lost.

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the

country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The

A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.
xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe.

Only aerospace stimulus solves Nackman 09 (Mark J,- J.D. from George Washington The Case for Aerospace and Defense Spending as Economic Stimulus)
Furthermore, the currently proposed Department of Defense budget would result in an actual 1.1 percent or .9 billion dollar net reduction of Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropriations from the previous year; to be distinguished from the slightly less significant decline that a 1% spending baseline16 reduction would represent.17 Thus in the Aerospace and Defense

, the impact of the expiration of the tax credit would certainly not be made up by any increased appropriations for government funded Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. In fact, the 1.1 percent reduction would compound the problem by reducing a potential second source of research funding.
sector

Congress hodgepodge approach of occasionally passing retroactive tax credits for research and development not only results in the short term risk of magnifying the current economic downturn, it is also incredibly disruptive to companies attempting to plan their research efforts over the longer term , which in turn inhibits efforts to perform large scale, high payoff research and
development projects that require multiple years to complete. Perhaps even more significant is the relative disadvantage in which this places U.S. companies, and consequently the U.S. as a whole, vis-vis foreign companies and Governments. As highlighted in a 10 December 2008 letter to the Senate and House majority and minority leaders from a collection of 12 Aerospace representing organizations and associations: An increasing amount of research funding is being committed in countries such as Ireland, Canada and China because more attractive Research and Development (R&D) tax incentives are available outside the United States. Thus, the U.S. has already fallen out of the top rank of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries offering tax incentives for private sector R&D. The R&D tax credit provides a critical and effective incentive for companies to increase their investment in U.S.-based research and development.18 The facts clearly

demonstrate that and Defense in two important areas. Areas that President Eisenhower saw fight to highlight as significant in his 1961 farewell address. The cold war is over, but new threats have taken its place. While Secretary Gates admonished that [t]he United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything,19 his observations were focused in the context of the National Defense Strategy20, and not in consideration of the potential utility of Aerospace and Defense spending as U.S. economic stimulus. This paper will examine the economic, policy, and legal arguments in favor of Aerospace and Defense spending as a useful form of federal economic stimulus spending. It will conclude with two recommendations to that end. II. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE AS STIMULUS In early 2009, as the 44th President of the United States administration transitioned into the oval office, incoming President Barrack Obama and his staff began articulating strategies for stimulus spending in an

Americas Aerospace

industry has declined

economic stimulus proposals; that should be: 1) timely (rapidly infuse money into economic circulation), 2) targeted (represent clear value to the United States), and 3) temporary (not establish any new mandatory budget entitlement programs or other programs that require such continued
attempt to curb the impending global economic recession. During that time, three tenets were advanced as the administrations guiding principles for such spending spending that adds to the long-term fiscal problems already facing the United States).21 Assuming these three principles are indeed valid and that they continue to be the guiding principles for future

Yet during this period of critical public discourse, increased Aerospace and Defense spending as a form of economic stimulus is seemingly off the table. As some astute commentators noted, [i]n all the talk of economic stimulus in the White House and on Capitol Hill, one element has been conspicuously
federal stimulus spending, Aerospace and Defense spending fits squarely into the box as timely, targeted, and temporary and thus appropriate stimulus spending. absent: defense programs.22 As the Harvard University economist and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Martin Feldstein testified in a statement for the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee: Since the defense budget is as large as all of the other discretionary spending combined

, it is surprising that defense is not proposed as part of the overall stimulus package . It is surprising also to read in the press that there will be reductions in military spending because, according to those stories, of the weakness of the economy. That logic is exactly backwards. The overall weakness of demand in the economy implies that the next two years are a time when military spending and other forms of spending should rise ....Buying military supplies and equipment, including a variety of off-the-shelf dual use items, can
easily fit this surge pattern.23 A. TIMELY As Professor Feldstein also wrote, [i]f rapid spending on things that need to be done is a criterion of choice, the plan should include higher defense outlays, including replacing and repairing supplies and equipment, needed after five years of fighting. The military can increase its level of procurement very rapidly.24

Aerospace and Defense spending is capable of providing a rapid infusion of dollars into economic circulation25 because funds are already being appropriated and allocated, and can simply continue to be. As a matter of Congressional timing, increasing those amounts is a far more straightforward and expedient matter as opposed to the creation of new programs , with new appropriations. In fact, existing federal government contracts can be utilized immediately as a vehicle for injecting stimulus dollars . In the case of Cost-Reimbursement and Indefinite
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, it is a simple matter of adding funding or placing new orders.26 As a matter of administrative timing, using existing contracts to inject stimulus has the important benefit of avoiding the loss of time required to announce, compete, and award new contracts because all of that work has already been accomplished. This is especially relevant after a year that saw a 17% increase in the volume of contract award bid protests at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to include the Boeing Companys high profile and successful Government Accountability Office (GAO) bid protest of the United States Air Forces would-be 100 billion dollar plus KC-X contract award to Northrop Grumman.27 In examination of how current Aerospace and Defense programs may be utilized to channel economic stimulus spending, take the case of the United States Air Forces F-22 Raptor program, which Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, John Young decided not to certify for further production on 3 March 200928, and Secretary Gates forwarded a Defense Budget to the White House recommending the end of F-22 Raptor production, phasing out total production at 187, an increase of only four total aircraft over previous production plans.29 According to advertisements placed by the F-22 Raptor Team (including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, BAE Systems, Curtiss-Wright, GE, GKN, Goodrich, Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell, Northrop Grumman, Parker Aerospace and Raytheon) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, the F-22 program employs some 95,000 workers.30 There are few stimulus options more timely than the continued employment of 95,000 workers. Yet, the White House is putting forth a budget that would do just the opposite. In addition, because the decision to cease production of the F-22 Raptor for U.S. orders logically would require the shutdown of that production line; it also almost guarantees that the multirole fighter will never be produced for export, or sold to even the closest of U.S. allies; denying the F-22 Raptor Team of a significant source of downstream revenues, to say nothing of the lost potential for increased return on the research and development investment for the U.S. Air Force and American taxpayers, or the increased international security our allies could be helping to provide with the F- 22 Raptor in their air forces.31 Furthermore, the decision to bring the program to an end will fail to fully capitalize on the ever increasingly efficient production the F-22 program has seen, with a unit flyaway cost that has already decreased by 35% since full-rate production began.32 The F-22 Raptor is just one of many potentially timely stimulus levers available to the Federal Government. Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Future Combat Systems (FCS), Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), NASAs Constellation program, and

many other Aerospace and Defense programs have similar or even larger economies of scale. The timeliness aspect of Aerospace and Defense programs should be viewed in stark contrast to even shovel ready infrastructure programs being put forth by the White House. As commentators have already noted , proposed infrastructure programs require lengthy planning, design and approval processes whereas extending efficient, already running defense procurements would have brief, as the military says, flash-to- bang times.33 Federal funds spent on existing defense programs would have impact beyond the immediate infusion of money to the prime defense contractors. Such expenditures would yield a multiplying effect throughout the domestic supply chain and thus U.S. economy, as can be partially observed just by the extensive list of F-22 Raptor Team defense contractors.34 Furthermore, as elucidated in a 16 January 2009 U.S. Senate letter to then Presidentelect Barrack Obama, signed by a bi-partisan group of 44 United States Senators, The F-22 program annually provides over $12 billion of economic activity to the national economy...35 Therefore, as viewed through the lens of just the F-22 Raptor program alone, Aerospace and Defense industry spending has the potential to be among the most timely forms of expenditure available for a would-be stimulus planner to utilize. B. TARGETED

Defense spending could well be the most precisely targeted form of stimulus spending.36 Unlike the billions of dollars in grant money that will flow from the Federal Government to state and local Governments, as a result of rigorous accounting and auditing standards37 and the existence of dedicated federal agencies such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the Federal Government already has well structured insight into how Aerospace and Defense contract dollars are spent.
Further, there are well established forums in the Boards of Contract Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims where the Federal Government can ultimately enforce its rights and resolve contract disputes. Granted, those systems of accounting and auditing do not always work perfectly or instantaneously, there has been a longtime deficiency in the size of the government acquisition workforce, and there are the occasional cases of misconduct and fraud. However,

the federal acquisition systems is vastly superior in comparison to the patchwork of tracking processes the various state and local Governments may or may not have in place for federal grants. As highlighted by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), an industry trade association formed in 1919 representing the nations leading manufacturers and suppliers of
technology,38

civil, military, and business aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial systems, space systems, aircraft engines, missiles, materiel, and related components, equipment, services, and information

the U.S. Aerospace and Defense industry includes over 30,000 companies in all 50 states.39 Furthermore, Aerospace and Defense companies account for over 2 million middle class jobs.40 As a targeted industry, Aerospace and Defense represents access to the entire country for potential stimulus dollars to trickle down through the supply base. In addition to its vast reach across the entire country, Aerospace and Defense is also the United States leading manufacturing export industry, with 97 billion dollars in exports last year.41 Furthermore, the types of careers that exist in this industry are decisively high tech, science and engineering positions, in contrast to many of the types of jobs shovel ready construction projects would potentially create. As AIA explains: Our people bring a diverse set of skills and capabilities to their jobs: engineers on the
cutting edge of advanced materials, structures and information technology; machinists fabricating complex shapes and structures, utilizing the latest fabrication technologies; and technicians from

almost every degree field, testing, applying and integrating the latest technologies. Most of these positions are high-skill, quality jobs, . Production workers average $29.37 an hour;42 entry-level engineers average more than $74,000 a year, with more senior engineers well into six figures.43 And that employment has grown steadily for years. Many of these jobs are unique, and require skills that take time to develop. It takes ten years for a degreed aerospace engineer to master the intricacies of aerospace vehicle designs. Technicians skilled in applying stealth coatings, programmers fluent in satellite-control algorithms, metallurgists expert in high-temperature jet engine design -- these skills and many more are very hard to replace.44 The Aerospace and Defense industry is also one of the U.S. healthiest, even in the current harsh financial environment. Unlike the financial or automotive industries, Aerospace sales increased last year by 2.1 percent; as AIA president and CEO Marion Blakey stated, [w]e anticipate this to continue, and we expect our industry will continue to be an asset to the U.S. economy as we climb out of our current

paying above average wages

Aerospace and Defense is also one of the soundest industries the Federal Government can turn to right now as an engine of stimulus. The economic analysis of Aerospace and Defense spending as targeted stimulus is further strengthened by the clear value it represents to the United States when one considers the national security benefits of maintaining: 1) a state-of-the-art inventory and arsenal, 2) our position as the dominant leader in space, 3 ) the industrial production capability of the United States, and 4) the intellectual base of educated and skilled workers neces+sary to build future Aerospace and Defense products. Furthermore, as Professor Feldstein notes, [r]eplacing the supplies that have been
financial hardships.45 Thus depleted by the military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of something that might be postponed but that instead should be done quickly. The same is true for replacing the military equipment that has been subject to excessive wear and tear. More generally, replacement schedules for vehicles and other equipment should be accelerated to do more during the next two years than would otherwise be economically efficient.46 These benefits will be further examined under Policy Arguments for Aerospace and Defense as Stimulus; however it is clear from the above analysis that the target-able nature of Aerospace and Defense spending is well established. C. TEMPORARY Aerospace and Defense spending as a form of economic stimulus can easily be accomplished in a manner that does not establish any new mandatory budget entitlement programs or other programs that require such continued spending so as to add to the long-term fiscal problems already facing the United States.47 As some commentators have already recognized, [i]n the post-Cold War drawdown, the active- duty military was reduced by 700,000, and weapons buys were cut by at least one-third thats what produced the so-called peace dividend of the 1990s.48 As quickly as Aerospace and Defense programs can be continued, they can cease to be so as well. Going back to the F-22 Raptor program example, the continued production of such a program for just one or two additional years would be just that, one or two years of additional temporary stimulus spending. As easily as

programs such as the F-22 Raptor, Airborne Laser (ABL), FCS, and GMD are being removed from the budget now, programs could be scaled back latter, thus making increased Aerospace and Defense spending truly temporary in nature and not exacerbating any long-term fiscal constraints already affecting the United States.49 INCREASING MILITARY RECRUITING NOT TRULY TEMPORARY Some pundits have championed increased military recruiting as an
additional avenue for potential economic stimulus spending and engine of job creation.50 Such a plan would potentially have the benefits of providing a reduction in unemployment, the eventual creation of a larger, more skilled civilian workforce, and also potentially expand the military reserves.51 Others have gone even one step further, asserting that [i]ncreasing the size of the armed forces would have an even more direct and immediate effect on employment: Almost all military spending on personnel occurs within the year of appropriation.52 While these arguments appear persuasive from the perspective of reducing unemployment, it should be noted that simply because all military personnel or MilPers appropriations (which are used to fund military members pay and benefits) are one-year appropriations53, it does not necessarily follow that military members do not have costs beyond a single given budgetary year. That would be a gross oversimplification. In fact, increasing military recruiting is not as temporary a solution as simply continuing to fund active Aerospace and Defense programs for additional time. The reason is twofold. First, not all newly recruited military members will leave the service after a convenient temporary stimulus period on active duty, and even those that stayed in the reserves would generate a continued cost. Second, there is a significant tail of benefits that follow honorable military service. Primarily administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, such benefits include: educational benefits, housing loans, death and burial benefits, and of course, potential medical and disability payments. To the extent that at least some of the new stimulus recruits would tap into these benefits in the long- erm, they would establish new mandatory budget entitlements requiring continued spending so as to add to the long-term fiscal problems already facing the United States.54 Conversely, while most major systems acquisitions come with a logistics and maintenance tail; it can be priced into the cost of the procurement up front. Increasing military recruiting as a form of stimulus goes against the stated criteria of temporary. Therefore, increased military recruiting is not recommended as appropriate stimulus spending as it fails to comply with the White Houses principles for proper economic stimulus. III. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE AS STIMULUS On February 17, 2009, President Barrack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), commonly known as the stimulus package.55 A few months prior, in late 2008, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), commonly known as the bailout, was established with the passing and signing of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 by President George W. Bush.56 During the discussion and debates surrounding the bailout and stimulus plans, two major topics continually arose in the public discourse: 1) so-called But American provisions57, and 2) executive compensation.58 Aerospace and Defense expenditures by the Federal Government are uniquely positioned to satisfy both of these policy objectives without additional regulation, extraordinary steps taken to recoup executive compensation, or violation of any international treaties that especially some Buy America requirements had the potential to raise. Finally, there is a third policy reason to consider the case for Aerospace and Defense spending as appropriate stimulus. That reason is the inherent national security benefit. A. BUY AMERICAN Domestic preferences are nothing new in the world of U.S. federal spending; such requirements have long and often found their way into the federal procurement policy and regulations.59 It was at the center of the public policy controversy surrounding the Boeing protest of the KC-X contract to Northrop Grumman and their major subcontract partner, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) although the legal basis of the GAO protest had nothing to do with it.60 Even on the presidential campaign trail, then candidate Obama commented that he had a difficult time believing that an American company that has been a traditional source of aeronautic excellence was not selected and that he was committed to fight to ensure that public contracts are awarded to companies that are committed to American workers.61 The Buy American public policy agenda again surfaced in the context of the stimulus packages ARRA when 1605 of that act created the requirements that all iron, steel and manufactured goods, purchased under ARRA for the use in public works and buildings, must be produced within the United States.62 This requirement was importantly qualified in the U.S. Senate version of the ARRA, partially in response to numerous procurement and international trade experts warning of the potential to violate current international treaties and spark a trade war.63 The Senate version added the caveat in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements.64 1. BUYAMERICANPROVISIONSATODDSWITHTRADEAGREEMENTS The problem with the original ARRA language and Buy America provisions in general, is that they run the risk of violating the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which has 40 signatory members, including the United States and 27 European Union countries.65 The matter is additionally controversial in light of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the United States.66 The results of the trade agreements like GPA and NAFTA are that signatory nations are supposed to give each other reciprocal access in public procurements.67 The United States was able to negotiate exceptions to the GPA regarding U.S. federal highway and transit projects, as part of existing Buy American statutes dealing with both.68 However federal highway and transit projects are only one of many categories of GPA and NAFTA public procurements. This has led some experts within the procurement law community, such as Professors Steve Schooner and Chris Yukins of the George Washington University Law School, to sound the alarm that the Buy American requirements in the ARRA remain extremely controversial.69 Specifically they advise, [t]he optimal approach seems to be the most simple: to fold new procurement under the Recovery Act into the existing FAR regulatory structure, which, in keeping with the Recovery Act, accommodates the U.S. many trade agreements.70 2. AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE SPENDING CONSISTENT GPA AND NAFTA, YET RESULTS IN STRONG DOMESTIC PROCUREMENT PREFERENCES As Professors Schooner and Yukins go on to recommend, [t]he simplest, most expeditious and elegant approach would be to fold Recovery Act procurement, when under-taken by federal agencies, into the existing regulatory structure in FAR pt. 25... as a means of complying with the GPA and NAFTA requirements.71 The existing structure in FAR pt. 25 provides a pragmatic solution, for FAR pt. 25 both permits and excludes foreign vendors.72 FAR 25 also expressly prohibits foreign acquisition from certain countries without open-market agreements with the U.S., such as China, and creates a (so-called) walled garden for vendors from the U.S. and from nations with open-market agreements.73 Therefore, federal procurement of Aerospace and Defense programs would both comply with the U.S. Trade Agreements, to the extent they are subject to FAR 25,74 and not run the risk of triggering an international trade war by drawing international attention to new protectionist, Buy American statutory language. As a result of this, and as Professor Feldstein and others have already

procurement has the further advantage that almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the United States, creating demand and jobs here at home.75 There are several additional reasons for
taken note of, [m]ilitary

this result, in addition to the complicated government procurement decision tree set forth in FAR Part 25. Many of the larger U.S. Aerospace and Defense procurements and programs require those contractors working not them to have U.S. security clearances for their facilities and employees, which require U.S. citizenship.76 Even more of those procurements and programs, including subcontracts down through the entire supply chain, are subject to the U.S. export controls regime, which restricts access to sensitive facilities, materials and information identified on the United States Munitions List (USML)77 to U.S. Persons only, without prior license or other approval from the U.S. Department of State.78 Finally, many of the U.S. Aerospace and Defense contractors are unable to be acquired by would-be foreign investors as a result of regulation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).79 The result is a strong preference for domestic companies in federal Aerospace and Defense procurements. However, all of this is an already well established and excepted reality under the trade agreement regime. Thus, federal Aerospace and Defense spending would include innate Buy American preferences, without the controversy or potential for setting off an international trade war. B. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION Few issues seemed to agitate Americans worse than exorbitant executive compensation, especially for executives of financial companies that would otherwise have failed without receiving bail out funds under TARP. However, unlike the U.S. financial industry, the Aerospace and Defense industry already has checks in place to limit executive compensation. This is because the White Houses Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), part of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), pursuant to their authority under Section 39 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act as amended,80 and in consult with the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency, determined that the executive compensation benchmark for government contractors in government fiscal year 2009 shall be capped at $684,181.81 While this determination does not strictly limit what government contractor executives may receive in compensation from their companies or organizations; it does limit the amount of executive compensation that will be considered allowable, and thus ultimately able to reimbursed as allocated overhead under government cost accounting standards, a significant disincentive for government contractors to set executive compensation over the OFPP benchmark.82 Thus there will be no discussion in Congress of passing retroactive, draconian measures to reclaim portions of executive compensation paid by government contractors. Aerospace and Defense contractors are subject additional regulations that enable to Federal Government to prevent excessive and unreasonable executive compensation and thus head-off potential public controversies stemming from stimulus funds being spent on Aerospace and Defense. Without any new or additional statutory provisions,

Aerospace and Defense spending would be concordant with two of the most recently and intensely contested public policy concerns surrounding the Federal Governments recent efforts to prevent further economic collapse and stimulate market growth. Aerospace and Defense spending as

stimulus is therefore both economically advantageous, and compatible with public policy. IV. RECOMMENDATION ONE: INCREASE DEFENSE OUTLAYS BY TEN PERCENT FOR BOTH PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AND FIVE PERCENT FOR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE Rather than call out specific major programs to be funded or continued, which only comprise a small minority of the total Department of Defense budget, this papers more general recommendation is like those of Professor Feldstein and others advocating general increases in defense outlays in focused areas. This is partially because the general notion of increasing any spending in this area of appears to be the most controversial part of the entire recommendation to use Aerospace and Defense spending as economic stimulus. As Professor Feldstein recommends that for the next two years: [a] 10% increase in defense outlays for procurement and for research would contribute about $20 billion a year to the overall stimulus budget. A 5% rise in spending on operations and maintenance would add an additional $10 billion. That

targeted increases would have maximum economic impact by stimulating the prime and subcontractors on the procurement side, the sagging research and development sector and the logistics and maintenance industries, at a total additional outlay of $40 billion over two years.
spending would create about 300,000 additional jobs.83 These

New space stimulus is key to the Aerospace industry, solves econ and hege --- the certainty of the plan is key Slazer 11 (Frank,- MBA from UC Irvine Frank Slazer Statement: Hearing on Contributions of Space to National Imperatives)

Space programs are essential to our national, technological and economic security. U.S.-developed space technology and its many spin-offs have fueled our economy and made us the unquestioned technological leader in the world for two generations. U.S. economic and technological leadership enabled us to prevail in the Cold War and emerge as the world leader in a new era. AIA was disappointed
that the president's fiscal year 2012 budget proposal underfunds NASA by nearly $800 million below its authorized level--$19.4 billion--agreed upon just last fall. Given the current fiscal environment, AIA believes that the level of funding proposed by the administration for NASA provides at least the minimum required for its important programs. It is therefore imperative that NASA receive the full amount of the president's fiscal year 2012 budget request of $18.7 billion. When allocating this funding, AIA's position is that funding for NASA should reflect the budget priorities as outlined in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 as closely as possible. The Need for Program Stability Despite the clear bipartisan direction provided in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and in the fiscal year 2011 Continuing Resolution (CR),

substantial uncertainty remains over the direction NASA will take--most specifically on the new heavy-lift space the current budget climate and the impending gap in America's ability to launch crews into space--after decades of ever increasing capability--are causing ripple effects throughout the space industrial base and highly trained space workforce in both private and public sectors. Fluctuating budgets and delayed programs take their toll on schedule, production and maintaining a skilled workforce--exacerbated by the winding down of the space shuttle program. This funding and programmatic instability may result in the permanent loss of this highly skilled , unique human capital by reducing the options for retaining this specially
launch system. The impact of the long delayed fiscal year 2011 CR,

trained and skilled workforce. Our nation's aerospace workforce is a perishable national treasure; experienced aerospace talent, once lost, may be unrecoverable and new workers without this critical experience may take years to train. Unfortunately, the on-again off-again plans for the Shuttle's replacement over the past decade have led to considerable uncertainty not only at NASA--where civil service positions are protected--but across the entire industrial base where firms are faced with wrenching decisions to let highly skilled personnel go because of the lack of clear direction. At a time when the space shuttle is being retired and the United States is paying Russia over $60 million a seat to get crews to the International Space Station, it is critical that NASA's new programs for exploration and crew transportation be adequately funded to remain on track. Fifty years after astronaut Alan Shepard became America's first man in space, two generations of Americans have never known a time when we were not engaged in human space flight. But let us be clear, this is a legacy not an entitlement-- without continued investment, this could become the last generation of Americans

In addition to workforce impacts, failure to stick to a space program funding plan makes it difficult to manage them effectively; sends mixed signals to an industry making long term investments; and places these programs at risk of overruns or cancelation--jeopardizing the investments already made by taxpayers. NASA's research and development efforts have consistently produced ground-breaking technologies with benefits for nearly everyone on the planet. Investments made in NASA have produced invaluable benefits to our national security, economic prosperity and national prestige and should be pursued as sound economic stimulus. NASA Space Investment Benefits All Sectors, Including National Security The U.S. military and national security communities rely on the space industrial base to provide them with capabilities required to keep our nation secure. Our space industrial base designs, develops, produces and supports our spacecraft, satellites, launch systems and supporting infrastructure. These systems are often produced in small or even single numbers. We need to keep this base healthy to maintain our competitive edge. Interruptions or cancellations negatively impact large companies and can be catastrophic to smaller firms--often the only entities with the unique abilities to produce small but critical components on which huge portions of our economy, infrastructure and security depend. As an example, only one firm in the United States produces ammonium perchlorate--a chemical used in solid rocket propellants including the space shuttle solid rocket motors, other
being members of a space faring society. space launchers and military applications. Retiring the shuttle will impact all these other users as costs rise due to a smaller business base. The U.S. military and national security communities rely on

Due to export restrictions on space technology and limited commercial markets for space systems, key elements within industry often must depend on stable government programs for survival. This two-way, symbiotic relationship means that in order to keep our overall national security strong, both sides of this relationship are critical. Given the lack of a large external space market, such as exists in civil aviation, if government spending pulls back from investing in the space domain--be it in NASA, the Defense Department or Intelligence Community--the industrial base will shrink accordingly. This will mean capacity loss and potentially leaves the United States incapable of building certain national security assets in the future. Investing in NASA Benefits STEM Education Developing the aerospace workforce of the future is a top issue for our industry. NASA's space programs remain an excellent source of inspiration for our youth to study the STEM disciplines--science, technology, engineering and math--and to enter the aerospace workforce. In fact, the exciting periods of our space program history are
the space industrial base to provide them with capabilities they require to keep our nation secure. reflected in the demographics of our industry and the influx of young workers they engendered. Unfortunately, the state of education for our young people is today in peril, including poor preparation for STEM disciplines. American students today rank 25th in math and 17th in science internationally. Low graduation rates of students in those fields and an overall lack of interest in STEM education contribute to a looming shortage of workers qualified to become professionals in our high tech industries. A recent study, Raytheon found that most middle school students would rather do one of the following instead of their math homework: clean their room, eat their vegetables, go to the dentist or even take out the garbage. This lack of interest extends into interest in aerospace. For example, in a 2009 survey 60 percent of students majoring in STEM disciplines found the aerospace and defense industry an unattractive place to work.2

One of the reasons for the lack of interest in aerospace and defense could be the uncertainty of NASA programs .3 Just as the recent Wall Street crisis turned young people away from financial careers, lack of job security in aerospace will hurt recruiting efforts . The video gaming industry has captured the magic to
attract young people, while space--despite its history and potential--has lagged behind. In some instances, our own employees discourage their children from pursuing careers in aerospace engineering due to the uncertainty of future programs and career prospects. A commitment to a robust human spaceflight program will help attract students to STEM degree programs and help retain the current workforce--which also benefits national security space programs, many of which are not in the open. While AIA and NASA are vigorously engaged in the "supply" side of the equation-- exciting and inspiring students to study math, science and engineering--it's

the "demand" side that needs Congressional action by providing the resources needed for visible and inspiring aerospace projects . These, in turn, provide young people with exciting programs to work on in the near future and on an ongoing basis. A robust and sustainable space exploration program is essential to building a future aerospace workforce capable of technological innovation and economic competitiveness. Investments in NASA Have Increased Economic Prosperity Since its beginnings, NASA has been at the forefront in developing new technologies to meet the challenges of space exploration and much of what has been developed has had benefits in other areas. The list of NASA-derived innovations is impressive and wide-ranging, including memory foam cushions, video image stabilization technology, cordless power tools, power sources for heart defibrillators,
ventricular assist pumps for heart disease, portable breathing systems for firefighters and many others. These NASA-enabled innovations are not just old history; for example, today the International Space Station is enabling us to develop new vaccines to protect people from Salmonela and MRSA pathogens by exploiting the organism's response to the weightless environment. Past NASA investments such as the Apollo moon landing program stimulated technology development like the miniaturization of electronic circuits. Electronic computers were first created during World War II, but miniaturization in the 1960's enabled the first personal computers to be created in the late 1970's and early 1980's-- by a generation of inventors who grew up during the Apollo era. In fact, today a number of new commercial space systems are being developed by entrepreneurs who have made their fortunes in information technology or other fields, but whose intellectual development was inspired during Apollo. NASA is a Source of National Pride And then there are space program benefits that don't have a dollar figure attached-- those unquantifiable "know it when you see it" benefits that reap long-term rewards-- increasing our nation's pride in our abilities and garnering attention from across the globe. These include the already mentioned Apollo program, the space shuttle and International Space Station, numerous planetary spacecraft which have revealed the wonders of our solar system as well as spacecraft which have helped us understand our home planet and the

The future of U.S. space investments are threatened due to our constrained fiscal environment . While cutting the federal deficit is essential to assuring our economic future, cutting back on exploration investments is a penny-wise but pound-foolish approach that will have an infinitesimal impact on the budget deficit. Cutting exploration any further threatens our economic growth potential and risks our continued national technical leadership overall--even as emerging world powers increase their investments in this important arena. China, India, South Korea and other rapidly developing economies are investing
universe. If there is one area where the world unquestionably looks to the U.S. for leadership, it is in our space program. Conclusion in space technology.

Heg is key to global stability and accesses every major impact Prevents Great Power War Thayer, 6, Professor of Strategic Studies Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study @ Missouri State University, Former Research Fellow @ International Security Program @ Harvard Belfer Center
of Science and International Affairs (Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, November/December) A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power-the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But profound strategic mistake that in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensur ing

retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a would lead to far greater instability and war

American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's
worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan

retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If
or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a phys ical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global common"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space-allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent ca pabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable

in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192
fact about international politics today-countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements-and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.

U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect-has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effec tiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and ac tions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, re sort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba-it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider

the current international order - free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents
seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons:

Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States
because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition,

once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states
are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's crit ics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40

percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the glob al economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The and that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well -being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin -offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free due to the economic prosperity it provides.

economic stability

prosperity

market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy SSP uniquely solves --- government investment is key.

NSSO 07 (National Security Space Office, Report to the Director, Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security; Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study October 10, 2007,
http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf)

SBSP does appear to address a significant number of security concerns across the political spectrum but suffers from a lack of strategic economic competitiveness, to maintenance of our industrial base, to energy security and addressing climate change, SBSP is at the intersection of our nations present concerns, providing a synergy seldom found in other initiatives. FINDING:The SBSP Study Group found that while the United States requires a suite of energy options, and while many potential options exist, none offers the unique range of ancillary benefits and transformational capabilities as SBSP. It is possible that the worlds energy problems may be solved without resort to SBSP by revolutionary breakthroughs in other areas, but none of the alternative options will also simultaneously create transformational national security capabilities, open up the space frontier for commerce, greatly enable space transportation, enhance high paying, high tech jobs, and turn America into an exporter of energy and hope for the coming centuries. FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that SBSP offers a path to address the concerns over US intellectual competitiveness in math and the physical sciences expressed by the Rising Above the Gathering Storm report by providing a true Manhattan or Apollo project for energy. In absolute scale and implications, it is likely that SBSP would ultimately exceed both the Manhattan and Apollo projects which established significant workforces and helped the US maintain its technical and competitive lead. The committee expressed it was deeply concerned that the scientific and technological building blocks critical to our economic leadership are eroding at a time when many other nations are gathering strength. SBSP would require a substantial technical workforce of highpaying jobs. It would require expanded technical education opportunities, and directly support the underlying aims of the American Competitiveness Initiative. FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that SBSP directly addresses the concerns of the Presidential Aerospace Commission which called on the US to become a true spacefaring civilization and to pay closer attention to our aerospace technical and industrial base, our national jewel which has enhanced our security, wealth, travel, and lifestyle. An SBSP program as outlined in this report is remarkably consonant with the findings of this commission, which stated: The United States must maintain its preeminence in aerospace research and innovation to be the global aerospace leader in the 21st century. This can only be achieved through proactive government policies and sustained public investments in longterm research and RDT&E infrastructure that will result in new breakthrough aerospace capabilities. Over the last several decades, the U.S. aerospace sector has been living off the research investments made primarily for defense during the Cold War...Government policies and investments in longterm research have not kept pace with the changing world. Our nation does not have bold national aerospace technology goals to focus and sustain federal research and related infrastructure investments. The nation needs to capitalize on these opportunities, and the federal government needs to lead the effort. Specifically, it needs to invest in longterm enabling research and related RDT&E infrastructure, establish national aerospace technology demonstration goals, and create an environment that fosters innovation and provide the incentives necessary to encourage risk
FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that visibility. From international taking and rapid introduction of new products and services. The Aerospace Commission recognized that Global U.S. aerospace leadership can only be achieved through investments in our future, including our industrial base, workforce, long term research and national infrastructure, and that government must commit to increased and sustained investment and must facilitate private investment in our national aerospace sector. The Commission concluded that

the nation will have to be a space faring nation in order to be the global leader in the 21st centurythat our freedom, mobility, and quality of life will depend on it, and therefore, recommended that the United States boldly pioneer new frontiers in aerospace technology, commerce and exploration. They explicitly recommended hat the United States create a space imperative and that NASA and DoD need to make the investments necessary for developing and supporting future launch capabilities to revitalize U.S. space launch infrastructure, as well as
provide Incentives to Commercial Space. The report called on government and the investment community must become more sensitive to commercial opportunities and problems in space. Recognizing the new realities of a highly dynamic, competitive and global marketplace, the report noted that the federal government is dysfunctional when addressing 21st century issues from a long term, national and global perspective. It suggested an increase in public funding for long term research and supporting infrastructure and an acceleration of transition of government research to the aerospace sector, recognizing that government must assist industry by providing insight into its longterm research programs, and industry needs to provide to government on its research priorities. It urged the federal government must remove unnecessary barriers to international sales of defense products, and implement other initiatives that strengthen transnational partnerships to enhance national security, noting that U.S. national security and procurement policies represent some of the most burdensome restrictions affecting U.S. industry competitiveness. Privatepublic partnerships were also to be

without constant vigilance and investment, vital capabilities in our defense industrial base will be lost, and so recommended a fenced amount of research and development budget, and significantly increase in the investment in basic aerospace research to increase
encouraged. It also noted that

opportunities to gain experience in the workforce by enabling breakthrough aerospace capabilities through continuous development of new experimental systems with or without a requirement for production. Such experimentation was deemed to be essential to sustain the critical skills to conceive, develop, manufacture and maintain advanced systems and potentially provide expanded capability to the warfighter. A top priority was increased investment in basic aerospace research which fosters an efficient, secure, and safe aerospace transportation system, and suggested the establishment of national technology demonstration goals, which included reducing the cost and time to space by 50%. It concluded that, America must exploit and explore space to assure national and planetary

the United States must overcome the obstacles that jeopardize its ability to sustain leadership in space. An SBSP program would be a powerful expression of this imperative.
security, economic benefit and scientific discovery. At the same time,

Prefer our economic model Stimulus is key to economic recovery economic restrictions will fail high tech jobs must be maintained history proves

Newberry 08- Economist and Political Analyst, Wikipedia Pioneer and advisor to various governmental organizations (Stirling, How Keynesian Stimulus Works, The AgonistThe Agonist,
November 2008, http://agonist.org/stirling_newberry/20081115/how_keynesian_stimulus_works//JC ) One of the most important ideas of 20th century economics was Keynes demonstration that

Say's Law does not hold for whole economies. Say's law argued that economies will right themselves - tend to equilibrium - at full production . Keynes
showed that will economies tend to equilibrium, they don't tend to equilibrium at what is called a "Pareto Optimal" state. That is the point where there are no "win-win" situations left, in specific terms no one's utility can be increased without an exactly equal decrease in someone else's utility.

Sometimes the ship of an economy rights itself, by sinking to the bottom. This conclusion, that economies can stabilize after a shock at a lower level of production was his reason for calling for "priming the pump" stimulus: spending which would encourage people not to defer purchases , or businesses not to defer investment based on fears about the economy. This later leads to General Equilibrium Theory of Kenneth Arrow. The idea is this: the market depends on people making decisions based on obvious and present information, and transmitting the results of that decision by purchasing or not purchasing. This will be reflected in price, and since price information travels, if not immediately, then faster than anything else, the whole of production and consumption will move to a point where everything that people can produce, will be sold, and everything people want to buy can be obtained. However, if people worry about inflation, they will buy earlier than they want, and if they worry about deflation they will buy later. This means the job of government is to make it so that people balance the risks to growth and inflation, and, on net, buy when they want to buy, and save when they want to save. A deflationary spiral begins with the expectation of future earnings drops, and people both defer buying and businesses defer investing. In Keynesian terms the economy's liquidity preference rises, and becomes a vicious circle. People want to be liquid, because they see everyone else wanting to be liquid. Money disappears under the mattress of the economy, the velocity of money drops. Keynes observed that "one man's expenditure is another man's income ." That means if everyone stops buying, businesses don't expand capacity, but wait for capacity to fall in price so they can buy it cheaply, and that means fewer jobs, which means less income, which means less buying, which means even more incentive for businesses to wait for cheaper labor and production. Prices never fall enough to get buying going again. Malthus hypothesized that eventually holders of rent would begin spending. Keynesians countered that holders of rent will not buy production, but will instead buy rents, or buy unproductive labor. That is, they will buy things like paintings and art objects and land, because these things are rents, or buy, and put out of production, competitors. Or they will buy servants and other forms of labor which do not increase the wealth of the society. Thus, sayeth the Keynesians, government, as the ultimate rent holder, is a better "buyer of last resort" than the wealthy holders of rents . Not to put too fine a point on it, the Malthusian solution was tried in the 1930's - by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Militarist Japan. The holders of rent in those societies got together and began spending when labor got cheap enough. On weapons. So how does this work? How can you "just print money?" Well you can't. But there's a reason why you can run the printing presses and it works here. Let me explain. What is money worth? Well it is worth holding money if
there is something in the future that you want to buy. Thus, anyone's willingness to hold currency is going to be predicated on that currency being able to buy something in the future. Now, inflation risk is one people get - your money won't buy as much in the future, and you can't rent that money out for enough interest to keep up with that inflation. However, there is another risk, that is the risk of collapse. That risk shows up in two forms, closely related. One is hyper-inflation. A government that is on the verge of collapse runs the presses, people see collapse is coming, and demand higher and higher amounts of money. The government responds by printing even more money. If collapse is not staved off, a spiral begins. It doesn't matter if the government ran the presses first, or prices shot up first, the result is the same. The other risk is the risk of depressionary collapse, where the very fabric of the economy disintegrates, and there is no future. The reason both of these are related is that in

a government is faced with a "spend or die" decision. For example, during a total war. The government must spend to win the war, or the government is, well totaled. It doesn't matter what the long term implications are, because lose the war, and there is no long term . Governmental regimes that get into this situation often aren't very competent to begin with, and printing more money tends to get spent on the very things that got them into trouble in the first place . It doesn't matter how many checks Chang Kai-Shek wrote, he wasn't going to win his war, because he was a
such circumstances, terrible Commander in Chief. Regimes often face a spend or die situation that is not in the national interest: the country will still be there, but the regime will not be. High inflation becomes hyperinflation when the tendency to equilibrium is broken.

Governments that fail to spend in such circumstances collapse . This situation is the converse of the death bet. The death bet is that the actor making the bet will be gone before the negative consequences come to pass. The deflation/high inflation/hyper-inflation bet is that if the government doesn't make the bet, it's dead anyway. In finance, this is sometimes called the "eat babies" case. That is, if the bet fails, we will all be eating babies and previous money won't be worth anything any way . This is why stimulus, properly applied can work. Because not spending isn't going to lead to equilibrium , as Krugman pointed out in his "Depression Economics" op-ed, the default isn't stability that will be disrupted by government changing demand, the default is a downward spiral that will destroy economic arrangements and connections, that will have to be rebuilt at higher cost. Such circumstances are like burning down a house - it is much cheaper and faster to burn down a house, than it is to rebuild it. In normal cases allowing some part of a house to fail and then replacing it is better than replacing everything in the house all the time, but if the house is burning, it is better to put out the fire before it consumes the house. This is why economists worship equilibrium: in equilibrium situations, one can let unsustainable things continue, because sooner or later they will stop, and the economy will right itself. Covnersely, economists are professional worries, they worry about things that will puncture equilibrium, and the wise ones advise taking steps to prevent disequilibrium, and as importantly,
remove even the fear of disequilibrium from people's minds. Again Krugman neatly points out way: in disequilibrium, one has gone through the looking glass. Sanity is insanity, caution is crazy, timidity is termity. This means,

from an economic stand point, that in disequilibrium, all the habits of rational economic actors

become destructive to the economy, as opposed to constructive. People can no longer make good decisions, because the very Bayesian backdrop against which they weigh decisions, becomes wrong. By the time enough evidence has piled up that their experience is wrong, it is too late . For this reason when disequilibrium takes hold, it is necessary to ameliorate, bail out, and provide relief to people who made "bad decisions" - because they weren't making "bad decisions" in the same sense. Perhaps they were doing things that were unwise in the context of equilibrium, perhaps not, but in disequilibrium many people who made somewhat risky, but acceptable, decisions, are suddenly faced with the loss of everything. Imagine you are playing poker, you win a bit, and gloat. Gloating is perhaps unwise. The person you are playing against pulls out a gun and shoots you in the face. This is a penalty out of proportion to your mistake . Since it is

impossible, or at least very expensive, to go through and decide on a case by case basis whether a person made a risky, but reasonable, decision given expectations of equilibrium, it is better to set rules within which most people were reasonable, and then have relief even for those who might have been outside those boundaries, but who were probably being unreasonable. Within the rules give restructuring, basically wipe the slate clean and set results where they are sustainable in the current environment. This usually means cramming down all of the actors in the decision. Outside, provide relief so that while the people involved might lose all or most of what they have, they are not so wiped out as to be out of the game entirely. People who are out of the game are the source of an economy downshifting to a lower level. The reason that pump priming works then is because there isn't some fixed and knowable amount of money in an economy. Instead, much of "money" is that the whole ant hill is working in the first place. It is activity which money controls and directs, and if there is less activity in the future, there is less money. Avoiding the "down shift" - even if it means inflation taxing

Governments should be careful and balanced in good times, saving. Governments should spend in bad times . Now this upsets people who are hoping for deflationary collapses, it creates a built in upward spiral on prices. But then, that is better, because it means that fewer people are waiting for prices "to go down" and will work and spend now. However, the win for the people who are prudent in bad times is still quite substantial. By not participating in the bubble, they have not lost. I have clients who have seen their portfolios drop
some of the actors involved - is better because there is more money on the other side. One problem we have had is that Keynesian economics is counter-cyclical. by 70%. And worse, they are in investments that are not going to recover. Had a bad year? I know people who have seen more money vanish in the last year than most Americans will earn in their lifetimes. That's their personal money. The sensible people come through far better off.

The policies of the Republicans, on the other hand, have been pro-cyclical. Run deficits when times are good, throw fuel on the inflation fire, and create bubbles that people can chase. This is because much of the economy has been static for 30 years. It literally is impossible to get ahead in most of the economy except by driving other people out. Thus, people have demanded bubbles, because in these overheated ares of the economy, money is spent freely and fortunes can be made . Pro-cyclical policies, liberals have been pointing out, are unsustainable, because when crisis comes, counter-cyclical action will be needed anyway. This is why hearing from the deficit reduction people now is insanity - where were they when it was time to reduce deficits? Many were calling for "tax cuts" to "return money to the tax payers." Calling for deficit reduction now means that the cheap dollars borrowed for tax cuts, will have to be paid back in expensive illiquid dollars. Borrowers should borrow expensive and pay back cheap, not the other way around . Thus the key to pump priming is to divide it into very different kinds of spending. One is pure amelioration: just keep people from going bankrupt and not being ever able to participate in the middle class again . One of the massive failures of the Bush executive was that it allowed the tech bust to happen, and many extremely bright well trained people essentially never went back to earning as much as they had been before. The second is restructuring. This is what incompetent governments get wrong. It is what the last year of the Bush executive has gotten wrong. It is what Obama might well get wrong. Remember, the economy is in disequilibrium, it isn't enough just to get back to where things were before, because where things were before was what created the mess in the first place. This is why liberals and progressives right now are calling for broader action, to remove the sources of disequilibrium from society, and balancing the cost of doing this with reasons for people to continue to stay in society. The wealthy just want the instability removed, and they want someone else to pay the cost, and then have things go back to the way they were before. Keynesian stimulus isn't simply spending, it is spending with an eye to restoring equilibrium, and then recapturing enough to pay back the stimulus. That is, collect taxes on the increased economic activity that preventing a downshift creates, and both paying back that debt, and having a cushion of borrowing power for the next occurance.

Next is solvency

SOLVENCY

Government investment is key to stimulate the private sector --- your DAs are all wrong, multiple reasons Smith 08

(M.V.,- Lt. Col, PhD student in the strategic studies program under Professor Colin Gray at the University of Reading in the UK, winner of the National Space Societys 2008 Space Pioneer Award, Chief of Future Concepts (Dream Works) the Pentagon Weaponization, Environmental Risk, and Multinational Approaches) Your concern about weaponization of the system and environmental risks are proper and deserve solid answers . For the answers
(and a whole bunch of other great information) let me point you to a special edition of Ad Astra magazine produced by the National Space Society. If you look on page 29 youll see the answers as to why space-based solar power satellites cannot be weaponized. Let me add to that list the following items: The

DoD will not own or operate SBSP satellites. Energy production and distribution is outside of its

Title X authority. In my opinion the DoD merely wants to be a customer of safe, clean energy and is most comfortable purchasing its energy from commercial vendors, just as it does today. The interest shown by the National Security Space Office (NSSO) in hosting the work done by the Space-Based Solar Power Study Group was largely because NASA does not do energy and the DoE does not do space. In other words, it was a ball being dropped along organizational lines. The security-related interest of the NSSO as it stepped in to host the study was three fold: Provide more energy sources to hopefully alleviate energy competition as a trigger for war between the major powers in the 21st Century Achieve American energy independence from foreign oil suppliers who attract US vital interests in areas and with peoples with whom we really would prefer to interact with in ways other than a dependent customer-supplier relationship. Provide a source of clean energy that provides America with broader options regarding carbon contamination and clean-up, as well as improved ability to make progress on treaties such as Kyoto. Simple inspections of the waveguides for either laser or

microwave transmitters on the satellites can easily verify that the beam cannot be focused narrowly to create a weapons effect. Such inspections can and likely will be conducted at time of insurance inspection, licensing, and registration before launch. International inspectors would be welcome and encouraged. The goal is to have international corporations own and operate these satellites and provide power to international customersthats the key to defense of these huge birds deterrence by mutual defense through broad international ownership and international customershipan attack on a satellite is an attack against all. As for environmental safety, especially when transmitting power into disaster areas and feeding power to forward bases, I envision spreading the several kilometer in diameter rectifying antenna on air bases or other relatively secure areas in the theater of operations and using ground broadcasting from there to the forward forces, first responders, or relief workers. That way we keep the beam from space very broad and desaturated. No way do we want ANY accusation of this being a weapon. Keep in mind that there are two forms of power broadcasting that can be done from satellites. The first form is by microwave at 2.45 GHz and 5.8 GHz. These are the same frequencies that are used by internet wifi, cordless phones, and blue tooth. Since the beam is fairly well focused
on the rectifying antenna we will prevent interference with those systems. In addition, the intensity of a cellular telephone placed next to the head delivers more radiation to the user than space-based solar power possibly can. The second form of power transmission from space is by laser at 1.0 microns (silicon) or 0.86 microns (Galium Arsinide). Laser

transmissions are obviously more focused than microwave, but still must be spread to prevent overheating of the system, which also removes the risk of weaponization. As for multinational approaches, when it comes to space, government-led multinational ventures are risky for a very strange and almost counterintuitive reason. The International Space Station (ISS) is a case in point. We assembled it with our very best allies and partners, but everybody
got their feelings hurt in the process. In my opinion, it is far less likely that we will cooperate on such projects government-to-government in the near future because of the miserable experience of the ISS. Everybody was waiting for various governments to cut their red tape and

stood around tensely waiting for last-minute funding and various approvals for go-aheads. Budgets changed frequently which drove some dramatic
redesigns that impacted several other players. As a result, the project had all the joy of loaning money to relatives with gambling problems. I personally believe that in order to make space-based solar power a reality that business must lead the way. However, government does have a role.

Governments should conduct some R&D to improve efficiencies inherent to the system, remove bureaucratic barriers, and fund experiments to incrementally buy down some of the risk that business must take on. Examples
include increasing the efficiencies of solar cells, lowering the cost and increasing the turnaround rate for launch vehicles, advancing the development of an international space traffic control system, securing the orbital parking slots and frequency allowances for these satellites, and conducting concept demonstrators. It is also my opinion that it is best if commercial companies take government research and lead the development effort for space-based solar power, and then own and operate such systems. In the first instance, they partner more broadly and far easier than governments do. Take a Boeing aircraft for example. Nearly 40% of the components on the latest Boeing aircraft are made by Airbus. Conversely, nearly 40% of the components on the latest Airbus aircraft are made by Boeing. That did not take massive government negotiations. Business is international by its very nature. Take a look at the products in your home. They are likely a hodgepodge of gadgets with parts made all over the world and assembled somewhere else. Its nothing personal, its just business. The problem with government leadership is that it often gets personal. Best of all, when business is enabled to get the job done, they do so on their own dime, not the taxpayers. I like it when the taxpayers get a break. I want space-based solar power in the worst way, but not on the backs of the taxpayer, and only when the business case is sufficiently made that industry can profitably sustain the effort over the long run. We must avoid the fits and starts in industry that did such great damage to the overall space industry in the 1990s when wild enthusiasm collided with reality on several projects. In the end, I want the commercial sector to do it, and I want my government to clear the obstacles, such as ITAR (which I hate with a passion), out of the way so Americans can work with their international business partners to start bending the steel to make it happen! Space-Based Solar Power is a huge undertaking. I need fleets of reusable rockets and spaceplanes to get er done. Since these birds MUST be launched into a prograde orbit, I need lots and lots of lift coming out of Florida and hopefully other domestic launch sites to make it happen. That said, current sites cannot accommodate the full compliment of launches that I will need without massive expansion. I will need launches from international partners as well . If led by American industry,

this will make America the hub of commercial space launch once againwith the busiest launch industry in the

world. Think jobs, jobs, jobs. The shuttle is peanuts compared to this project. I want to hit on the fact that space-based solar power
transcends other projects because it crosses the lines of 6 major policy areas; Energy, Environment, Commerce, Space, Education, and Defense. Every dollar spent on SBSP addresses six sets of policies. Where else can government and the business sector collaborate to get a 6-to-1

return on investment for our future? As you see, there is no bureaucratic home for SBSP inside any single government organization. Perhaps
this is another argument why this is best done in the business sector.

SSP tech exists and it will be ready by the next decade will become cost competitive doesnt hurt the environment World Future Society, 11/14/11, (Space-Based Solar Power Could Arrive in Ten Years and Create Millions of Jobs, Say Researchers, http://www.wfs.org/content/space-based-solar-power-could-arrive-ten-years-and-create-millions-jobs-saysresearcher SW) A space-based solar power (SSP) system capable of meeting the energy needs of millions of people could be "deployed within a decade using technologies that are today in the laboratory," says John C. Mankins, a former manager of the Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight for NASA and widely considered one of the worlds leading experts on space-based solar power. On Monday (November 14th) Mankins took to the podium of the National Press Club in downtown Washington, D.C. to reveal the findings of a new report Space Solar Power: The First International Assessment of Space Solar Power: Opportunities, Issues and Potential Pathways Forward (IAA, 2011).The U.S. Department of Energy has previously suggested that sending solar-collecting satellites to space would continue to be prohibitively expensive and that less than 1% of global energy use would come from space-based solar projects by 2035. Mankins says that engineers will be able to demonstrate multi-megawatt power transmission, with an energy cost of $1 to $5 per kilowatt hour, within 10 to 15 years. "Its something that can be accomplished by this generation of engineers. This initial demonstration could be done without the development of a new reusable launch system." The report served as a very public endorsement from the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) of Mankinss longstanding proposal for spaced-based solar power. As previously covered in THE FUTURIST, the Mankins plan calls for "Many thousands of small, identical solar-gathering modules [coming] together to form a much larger whole, the same way that thousands of similar ants come together to form colonies and millions of quite similar Web sites and Web servers form the Internet... The logistics of building and launching a type A mini-satellite 9,000 times (then type B, then type C) is less daunting than figuring out how to launch a few extremely complex, independently functioning machines." The satellites would beam energy to Earth using microwaves. Mankins points out that the energy transfer would be completely safe, harming neither humans nor wildlife that passed beneath them. The energy would be collected on Earth via rectennas that could be composed of a simple mesh, rather than bulky panels, and would have a low impact on the surrounding environment. "The consensus is that [SSP] is technically achievable. But because of Mankinss new approach, it appears the model will be economically viable in a much shorter time frame than previously thought possible," said Mark Hopkins, the Senior Vice President of the National Space Society and one of the sponsors for the event. "The networked approached really suggests that a breakthrough is possible in terms of schedule, and with the modular program a breakthrough in terms of cost," said Mankins. He suggested that a pilot demonstration could be launched for $10 billion dollars, within ten years, and could generate ten megawatts electricity, comparable to small terrestrial solar plants today. The advantages of space-based solar power over conventional solar designs are efficiency and reliability. Solar power collection in space is seven to ten times more efficient than is collection on Earth, and, of course, harnessing the Suns power in space can happen twenty four hours a day with no interruption. Future space-based solar power projects could lead to jobs for five million people, who would build and launch the satellites, according to the study. "These are high tech jobs. Space based solar power could be more important than the railroads in the 19th Century and automobiles in the 20th," said Hopkins. Mankins and Hopkins were careful to point out that SSP would not suffice as a replacement for terrestrial solar power programs. But the two could compliment one another. They believe that SSP could comprise up to 5% of the Earths future energy consumption. "If it works well we can become net energy exporters," said Hopkins. Mankins says that because the satellites would use microwaves rather than lasers, they couldn't be used as weapons. But he concedes that there is some geostrategic advantage to being the first county to implement SSP. "This was an international study. My personal belief is the first one to get there realizes the benefits of building the infrastructure and the capability." Japan has long been a thought leader in this field of research and the list of reviewers of the Mankins report is heavy with Japanese names. Hopkins points out that there is now

growing interest in space-based solar power China, as well. "The development of a solar power station in space will fundamentally change the way in which people exploit and obtain power," Chinese space technology expert Xiji Wang said at event in August. "Whoever takes the lead in the development and utilization of clean and renewable energy and the space and aviation industry will be the world leader."

Advantage two is cooperation

ADVANTAGE 2

Obamas NSP provides no tangible areas for cooperation, US leadership in space is key to its success Krepon 10 Co-founder of the Stimson Center
Michael, co-founder of the Stimson Center and the co-author and co-editor of Space Assurance or Space Dominance: The Case Against Weaponizing Space (2003), Open Skies, Arms Control and Cooperative Security (1992) and Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security (1990)., The Obama Administrations National Space Policy, http://www.stimson.org/summaries/the-obama-administrations-national-space-policy/ After much delay, the Obama administration unveiled the unclassified version of its National Space Policy on June 28th. The crafting of specific diplomatic initiatives will follow. The administration has accentuated the differences between its space posture and that of the George W. Bush administration, most notably with a renewed openness to consider diplomatic initiatives. "W" and his team were opposed to anything that could conceivably limit U.S. military options in space. This stance backfired when a collision between two spacecraft and an egregious Chinese KE-ASAT test happened on Bush's watch. The value of norms for space traffic management and against KE-ASAT testing have been clearer ever since. The Pentagon has come a long way since the Bush administration, which demonstrated the habit of warning others not to do what it reserved the right to do in space. Like the European Union's Code of Conduct, the Obama administration's NSP appears to endorse the norm of no harmful interference, asserting that "Purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nation's rights." The new NSP is extremely shy about foreshadowing the kinds of diplomatic initiatives worthy of subsequent endorsement. The Pentagon and the Intelligence Community - the two primary players in this stage of the administration's prolonged, multi-stage approach to space diplomacy - endorsed transparency and confidence-building measures, but there is only so much sustenance to be had in this thin gruel. Piecemeal approaches will yield, if successful, piecemeal results. A larger

construct is required to pull the pieces together and to achieve the NSP's goal of strengthened US international leadership on space issues.

Leadership in SSP development is key to tangible coop NSSO 07

(National Security Space Office, Report to the Director, Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security; Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study October 10, 2007, http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf) FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that SBSP

directly supports the articulated goals of the U.S. National Space Policy and Vision for in exploration that furthers U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests, and extends human presence across the solar system.
Space Exploration which seeks to promote international and commercial participation No other opportunity so clearly offers a path to realize the Vision as articulated by Dr. Marburger, Science Advisor to the President: As I see it, questions about the vision boil down to whether we want to incorporate the Solar System in our economic sphere, or not. Our national policy, declared by President Bush and endorsed by Congress last December in the NASA authorization act, affirms that, The fundamental goal of this vision is to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program. So at least for now the question has been decided in the affirmative. No

other opportunity is likely to tap a multi trillion dollar market that could provide an engine to emplace infrastructure that could truly extend human presence across the solar system and enable the use of lunar and other space resources as called for in the Vision. FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that SBSP offers significant opportunities for positive international leadership and partnership, at once providing a positive agenda for energy, development, climate, and space. If the United States is interested in energy, sustainable development, climate change, and the peaceful use of space, the international community is even hungrier for solutions to these issues. While the US may be able to afford increased energy prices, the very availability and stability of energy is a threat to other countries internal stability and ability for development. SBSP offers a way to bypass much terrestrial electrical distribution infrastructure investment and to purchase energy from a reliable source at receiver stations that can be built by available domestic labor pools without significant adverse environmental effects, including greenhouse gas emissions. Finding: The SBSP Study Group found that one immediate application of spacebased solar power would be to broadcast power directly to energy deprived areas and to persons performing disaster relief, nation building, and other humanitarian missions often associated with the United Nations and related nongovernmental organizations. o Recommendation: The SBSP Study Group

recommends that during subsequent phases of the SBSP feasibility study opportunities for broad international partnerships with nonstate and trans state actors should be explored. In particular, cooperation with the United Nations and related organizations to employ SBSP in support of various humanitarian relief efforts support consistent with the U.N. Millennium Objectives must be assessed with the help of affiliated professionals. FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that SBSP is an idea that appears to generate significant interest and support

across a broad variety of sectors.

Impact is miscalc, debris, arms races- SPS solves

MacDonald 09
(Brian,- Senior Director of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. He is based at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC. Steps to strategic security and stability in space: a view from the United States http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2907.pdf)

Although the United States has been a spacefaring nation for over 50 years, the essential and growing role that space plays as a fundamental enabling feature of conventional and strategicmilitary posture and the strength of advanced civilian economies around the world is too littleunderstood. The rivers of information and other services that space assets provide allow economies to function more efficiently and provide ever increasing benefits to people around the world, assatellite navigation systems and international cellphones, to name but a few applications, attest.These space information services are also key to the verification of arms control agreements, and they permit military

systems, and military decision-making, to be far more effective than in the pastvital advantages across the spectrum of national
security concerns. It is no wonder that current US space policy for the first time calls US space assets vital to its national interests. More serious than this lack of public understanding about space is the serious shortfall inunderstanding the larger implications of the importance of space. Threats to the

worlds space assets,and hence to the worlds vital national interests, come in many formssome hostile, some not. One of the biggest threats is what we just do not know: about objects in space, the intentions of those who put the objects there, and the strategic landscape of space itselfhow it operates, where it poses strategic dangers, and what needs to be monitored and managed. We need to understand how China,the Russian Federation, the United States and others see space stability. How will this shape their space
doctrine, acquisition, strategies and diplomacy? There is much we should know and understand, butdo not, about this new space-enabled military era the world has recently entered. The strategic problem Given the vital and growing role that space plays in modern life, the world has an overriding interest inmaintaining the safety, survival and function of space assets so that the profound civilian, commercial,and military benefits they enable can continue to be available.These vital space assets face three forms of threat, all of them worrisome and growing. First, the

proliferation of space and other technologies, and specifically the anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilitiesdemonstrated within the past three years, call attention to the risk that an advanced country could exploit this fast-growing world dependence on space in a war.1 Second, space traffic is heavier thanit has ever been and getting heavier still, in terms of both vehicles and communications, but there is no space traffic control authority. The current level of simply monitoring space objects is widely regarded as far below what is needed: there is a substantial and growing need for space traffic management capabilities, including enforceable rules of the road and codes of conduct, and space situational awareness to inform a space traffic management capability. Third, space debris poses an insidious and growing threat to all space assets. Debris in space does not quickly fall to the ground: at
all but the lowest orbits, debris can stay aloft for centuries and more. In addition to the 19,000 orbiting objects the United States Air Force is tracking, there are hundreds of thousands of potentially lethal objects in orbit, and millions of smaller objects that pose at least some risk.2 If current space debris trends continue, there will be almost 1000% more debris than today within 25 years.3 This would greatly increase the

risk of satellite collisions and force satellite operators into making frequent, costly and satellite-lifetime shortening manoeuvres. The collision earlier this year between a US Iridium satelliteand an older Russian Cosmos dramatically illustrates the problem.4The
core of the space security problem is that the substantial economic and national security benefits that space assets provide is accompanied by their substantial vulnerability to both natural andman-made threats. In addition to the increasingly worrisome threats of orbital

debris, as well as physical and electromagnetic traffic in space, military writings in several countries make clear that developing offensive capabilities against space assets has significant appeal to some
military planners.5 Global space policy needs to address key space stability issues In 2006, the Bush Administration issued a revised space policy that declared for the first time thatUS space assets are vital to its national interests, in recognition of the extraordinary and growingUS military and economic dependence on them.6 This phrase carries much heavier national security implications than have ever before been attributed to space.The 2006 US policy also reserves the right to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests. But attacking others space capabilities invites attacks on ones ownspace capabilities. Since evolving technology guarantees that more nations will depend even more onspace assets in the future and that these vital assets are also likely to face greater threats, current US space policy faces an inherent contradiction and

instability. Failure to address this contradiction will allow instabilities to grow over time, as technology and growing space dependence will make space assets ever more desirable military targets. There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest defence efforts can create disproportionate danger to a potential
adversary, as with space offence. The technical challenge and cost for nations that already have advanced space capabilities to develop credible anti-satellite andother offensive counter-space capabilities are not unreasonable for the potential military benefits such capabilities would provide. And if a

country perceived that space conflict was inevitable, a disabling first strike against an adversarys space assets would be far preferable to, and easier to execute than,retaliating against the space assets of the side that struck first. This is the essence of crisis instability,when pre-empting pays far greater benefits than retaliating. We dont know what would happen in a crisis, but the potential for space instability seems high and likely to grow. Sadly, this growing instability problem is largely overlooked in discussions of space security policy. This must change, and wise spacepolicy, and diplomatic initiatives, must take these new strategic space realities into account.A new perspective on space is needed to understand and more fully appreciate the strategiclandscape
that space presents. With this strategic understanding, it should be possible to craftapproaches that would make space a safer and more stable environment, with the ever-increasing bounty of its benefits available to all states that abide by a common compact of responsible spacebehaviour. Fortunately, the Obama Administration is conducting a review of US space policy, which provides the United States with an opportunity to

address space stability issues more fully.

The mirage of space dominance It would be unwise for any country to seek space dominance, for quite practical and strategic reasons.There are many ways to attack space assets, and it is easier and cheaper to attack than to defend them,which would likely frustrate any sustained attempt at dominance and leave every country worse off. Intrying to maintain dominance, any country would be at the mercy of unpredictably advancing spacetechnologies that could favour another country. In the face of likely resistance to such a provocativeand hegemonic posture, any country seeking to dominate in space would constantly be trying tostay ahead technologically to maintain this dominance, demanding large expenditures that would be a growing burden on other national security and economic needs. Such a situation would also bevery unstable, especially if another country achieved a technological breakthrough that threatened toupset the previously dominant countrys hegemony. A crisis occurring in this context could provide acompelling incentive to the about-to-be-dethroned country to pre-empt before its space dominance slipped away. In the years ahead, the United States will remain a pre-eminent space power, though othercountries, most especially China, will very possibly diminish the margin. US space policy of therecent past has exhibited an incomplete appreciation of this new strategic environment and has beenincautious in some policy dimensions. This is because of the absence of both a clearly thought-outspace doctrine and a coherent national space security strategy. Other countries, though in differentways, have also exhibited an incomplete appreciation of the new strategic landscape of space.To avoid the dangers inherent to seeking dominance, the United States could aim instead fora posture of space excellence: the most capable in space, a space leader. The United States couldseek a nonhegemonic best-in-class posture: a state with more advanced space capabilities thanother countries, deriving substantially more benefits from space than

others, but which would notdominate in space. This space excellence would provide leverage in commercial, civilian and military applications, but would not make space a new battleground. A national stabilizing space protection strategy The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, led by two former USSecretaries of Defense, recognized the importance of space stability when it recommended in itsfinal report that the United States should develop and pursue options for advancing U.S. interests instability in outer space includ[ing] the possibility of negotiated measures.7This recommendation is relevant to other countries as well. It would allow everyone to continue to reap the civilian, commercial and military advantages of space and safeguard the continuing commercial development and utilization of space. It would give space and non-space powers a like avested interest in avoiding space conflict .A stabilizing space protection strategy for a country would:focus on stability, avoidance of conflict in space, and transparency;4incentivize nations to avoid destabilizing, irreversible actions in space;4provide back-ups to assure availability of key space services in the event of satellite outages4from whatever causes, benign or hostile;discourage all nations from initiating space attacks;4encourage agreements that constrain the most destabilizing dimensions of space competition4and provide ground rules for normal space operations; and 4 expand dialogue among nations to promote better understanding and reduce chances formisunderstanding and miscalculation, always dangerous in a crisis.Creating a stable space domain requires countries to respond to space threats in a responsiblemanner, one that ideally does not provoke other nations to greater counter-space efforts than theywould otherwise pursue. All nations should be careful to avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy andshould refrain from activities and public communications that invite the build-up of the counter-spacecapabilities of others. Diplomacy and arms control Diplomacy and arms control have major roles to play in providing for a safe and stable spaceenvironment. Such initiatives on space need to take into account the strategic realities of space inorder to enhance space stability in ways that allow all countries to benefit.While diplomacy and arms control cannot by themselves solve space security problems, theycan help mitigate the risks. Space diplomacy and arms control should play a stronger role in the future,a view that the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States stated earlierthis year. While noting that the specific promise of space arms control was not clearit is, after all, inits infancy in many waysthe Commission recommended that:The United States should seriously study these issues and prepare to lead an international debate about how to craft a control regime in space that serves its national security interestsand the broader interests of the international community.8Diplomatic activity on space should seek to strengthen stability in space, encourage the prevention ofspace conflict, and be verifiable. Diplomacy should promote behaviour that maximizes the worldsability to utilize space and minimize operational and other problems associated with space operations.US space policy in the recent past has explicitly rejected spacearms control, eroding US international leadership in this areaand allowing some to credibly mischaracterize the US stance asprovocative and hostile. The Bush Administration was interestedin voluntary steps such as a code of conduct and rules of theroad, especially regarding space debris, which was commendable but should have been given moreemphasis. The Obama Administration has expressed greater willingness

to consider arms control as an important tool in addressing space security issues: a welcome and encouraging signal of a shift in US policy, at the First Committee of the Sixty-fourth Session of the UNGeneral Assembly in 2009,
inter-agency review of space diplomacy andarms control is apparently taking place within the ongoing space policy review. In the US representative noted that:In consultation with allies, the Obama Administration is currently in the process of assessingUS space policy, programs, and options for international cooperation in space as a part ofa comprehensive review of space policy. This review of space cooperation options includesa blank slate analysis of the feasibility and desirability of options for effectively verifiablearms control measures that enhance the national security interests of the United States andits allies.9There are several classes of agreement that can be considered for space, one of which includescodes of conduct and rules of the road. These kinds of agreement have been proposed in various formsfor several years and are designed to ensure that those who operate in space do so responsibly, withdue regard for the rights of others in space, and with an appreciation that space should be available for the benefit of future generations as well as the present one. Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center hasdone valuable work in this area, and the European Union has issued a commendable draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.10 One value of this kind of approach is that the agreements need not be in treaty

form, which takes longer to negotiate. There have been relevant ongoing discussionsand meetings on the subject of space debris, a growing problem that
cannot be entirely resolved by the voluntary guidelines recently approved by COPUOS.11 Other issues that could be covered by this category of agreement include space situational awareness, space traffic management, and furtherdebris mitigation measures. A ban on KE-ASAT weapons One option deserving special attention, which could be in treaty form or not, is a ban on any testing inspace that creates significant debris, explicitly including kinetic energy ASAT (KE-ASAT) weapons. KE-ASAT weapons are designed to destroy a satellite by high-speed impact, either through direct ascentfrom Earth to the satellite (as China and the United States have demonstrated) or by hitting it withshrapnel from a nearby planned explosion (as with the older Soviet ASAT system).The continued testing of KE-ASAT weapons could seriously interfere with space operations andspace traffic management. Space debris is growing by about 10% per year, even without space conflict. Already satellites must occasionally be moved because of debris near-misses: one satellite operator has said that one of its fleet of satellites must be moved every three months because of debris. At this rate, in 25 years there will be ten times as much debris in orbit as we have today. Cascading effects,where debris collides with other debris in space to create still more, known as the Kessler Syndrome,is also a matter of growing concern. Even a modest space war, involving the destruction of 30 satellites, could increase the levelof space debris by almost a factor of four, if each destroyed satellite produced the same level ofdebris as the Chinese satellite event of 2007.12 A larger conflict, involving the destruction of 100satellites, would quickly increase space debris by over 1250%, and that does not include KesslerSyndrome effects, which would increase the debris level still further. We could make the most useful orbits in space useless to future generations. The inability to

use space-based assets could threaten international security in other ways, as states would be unable to use their satellites to verify arms control agreements (for example the Russian Federation and the United States verification of
StrategicArms Reduction agreements).A logical extension of concerns over space debris, the option proposed here would seek to discourage the development of KE-ASAT weapons by banning testing against orbiting objects. (Withcarefully crafted language, missile defence testing could be allowed to continue.) By banning such ASAT tests, states could never have the level of confidence in such weapons that they would probably need in order to rely upon them in a major conflict. The ban could potentially be expanded to coverall major debris-producing events in space. Some point out possible problems with this approach. A ban on debris-creating KE-ASAT weapontests would not prevent planned near-miss testing, which could still allow improved confidence in such ASAT weapons. The ban could bring to a halt promising new areas of space operations technologyfor example, replenishment and repair missions to satellites, and orbital docking. These challenges,however, could be overcome. Keep-out zones could be defined that would ban approaches withina certain distance of a satellite, perhaps with a closing velocity restriction to permit peaceful purposeapproaches. These and other negotiating obstacles could be overcome in good faith discussions.A ban on testing KE-ASAT weapons would bring many benefits. One of the most important is toput states on record as recognizing the major threat that orbital debris poses to all spacefaring nations and agreeing that, whatever one thinks of offensive space weapons, kinetic energy-based weaponsare unacceptable. Without an explicit ban on such weapons, there is no official sanction against thedeliberate creation of debris for military purposes. This would be a serious mistake.Such a ban would be verifiable by national technical means. While a ban on the weaponsthemselves would be difficult to verify without exceptionally intrusive inspections, destructive KE-ASAT weapon tests, even those involving near misses, can be observed. It is difficult to hide satelliteintercepts in space.A KE-ASAT agreement would be no panacea: it would address only a modest sliver of the muchlarger space security issue, and would not even guarantee that KE-ASAT weapon capabilities wouldbe completely stopped. The United States shootdown of an errant satellite in 2008 with a sea-based missile defence interceptor demonstrated the truism that ballistic missile defences have inherent antisatellite capabilities. But such an agreement would make much more difficult a countrys attempt todevelop a force of such weapons in which it could have high confidence during conflict, which wouldbe a significant step toward space stability. A country would be running very serious risks with anuntested system if it sought to use a large number of missile defence interceptors in a role for whichthey were neither developed nor tested. (The alternative to a ban on testing and use of KE-ASATweapons would be to allow such testing, which would pose a serious threat to space security.) AcceptAbility The United States has no plans to develop a KE-ASAT weapon, meaning such a testing ban would haveminimal programmatic impact. Conversations the author has had with Russian and Chinese specialistsindicate that while they prefer the proposal their governments have presented, they see merit in apartial approach that might be feasible if their broad-ranging proposal is not possible.13It should be noted that a special task force sponsored by US think-tank the Council on

ForeignRelations specifically endorsed a KE-ASAT weapon ban:The Task Force believes that the United States has a clear interest in beginning discussions withChina on space weapons, including proposals to ban tests of kinetic antisatellite weapons.The United States and China, along with Russia, should take the lead in implementing atrilateral test ban, which could form the basis for expansion to a global ban.14Indeed, this approach has been proposed before by the author and others.15Some countries have called for a ban on space weapons without providing credible orconvincing ways to verify such a ban. Such farreaching proposals are troubling because they seemto demonstrate a disregard for the profound risks these proposals, if enacted, would pose, basedin part on their major verification challenges. When the stakes involved are low, where violation ofan agreement by one party would pose no serious threat to another party to the agreement, such a verification problem may not be a major obstacle. If Country A violated a fishing agreement, itwould be a matter of concern, but it would not pose a major threat to the security of Country B.Yet space is so interwoven into the economic and military fabric of some spacefaring states that sudden major damage to its space infrastructure could result in economic and

military devastation. Aban on space weapons understandably must demand a much higher and more reliable standard ofverification before
such an agreement could be seriously considered. Failure to provide such credibleapproaches to verification demonstrates a misunderstanding of the new strategic landscape of space.It also suggests a diminished level of seriousness of the proposal that is not commensurate with thesecurity stakes involved. Some suggest that the opposition of the Bush Administration to all space armscontrol is behind the US objections to this approach, yet the verification problems of such a ban were raised many years before, for example, by the Congressional Office of Technologys 1985 assessmentAnti-satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control.16 A graduated approach There is a larger point at work here as well. Space arms control is an important new subject area onthe international agenda, and with which the world has little experiencethe Outer Space Treaty is now 42 years old, and there have been no such new agreements since that time. Accordingly,smaller steps that have less risk associated with them and can buildconfidence should be preferable to grand far-reaching ones aboutwhich serious concerns exist. Precisely because a ban on all spaceweapons, or ability to interfere with weapons in space, is a broadapproach, characterized by important verification shortcomings, and has profound implications forthe security interests of potential signatories, it represents a limiting and perhaps indigestible approach to some countries. In getting from the first floor to the second floor of a building, one climbs a staircase with multiple steps. Trying to do so in one big step is a formula for making no progress at all.Accordingly, a more modest step in space arms control could help pave the way to greater progress,and give all participants the opportunity to accustom themselves to options for progress in this area.Achieving greater security in space will take time, given the stakes involved, and should beachieved incrementally. Neither strategic arms reductions, nor controls on nuclear testing, achievedprogress all at once, but rather have made progress through a graduated series of steps. Given thesecurity stakes involved, progress on space diplomacy is unlikely to be achieved any differently. Thisdoes not mean that important progress cannot be made, just that it should not be sought all at once.Clearly, more thoughtful review of space arms control options is needed, but there is ampleroom to move forward, with broad civilian and commercial backing, in the areas of space trafficmanagement and space debris. Such steps would be an affirmative US response to Chinas andRussias space arms control proposals at the United Nations and would position the United States toplay a major leadership role in shaping a more responsible space regime.In addition to diplomatic steps, countries can help reduce the vulnerability of their space assetsby reducing incentives to attack them. For example, having more distributed capabilities spread acrosslarger numbers of smaller satellites, and maintaining non-space back-up capabilities, although thiscould aggravate the problem of space traffic. Enhanced space situational awareness and incidentattribution techniques could also help.Beyond negotiations toward specific agreements, the dialogue that has begun on space

issues should be expanded. Again, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the UnitedStates offers advice, recommending a strategic dialogue with Russia broader than nuclear treaties,to include space systems and that there are other serious civilian issues such as space situationalawareness, space debris, and space traffic management that could be used to develop international discussion and working relationships.17A no first use policy should also be considered, as it could be a useful adjunct to other
spaceagreements. Countries that derive major benefits from space should generally be loath to initiate spaceconflict, as they would only put at great risk their own space assets, at least when their adversariesare themselves major space powers. While such declarations could always be reversed, they

could provide a stabilizing context in which mutually beneficial agreements could be sought.It appears that there will be an opportunity to make important progress on making space more stable and secure in the coming year, given that the United States looks forward to discussing insights gained from this Presidential [space] review next
year at the Conference on Disarmament duringsubstantive discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space agenda item as a part of aconsensus program of work.18 It seems likely that steps can be taken that would improve security in space, if

countries are willing to set aside overly ambitious grand proposals and begin building a step-by-step staircase of practical agreements to greater security and stability in space.
Accelerating this dialogue alone solves extinction Hays 10

(Peter, PhD and director of the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, Space Law and the Advancement of Spacepower 12-13 http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch28.html) Other impediments to further developing space law are exacerbated by a lack of acceptance in some quarters that sustained, cooperative efforts are often the best and sometimes the only way in which humanity can address our most pressing survival challenges. Cosmic threats to humanity's survival exist and include the depletion of resources and fouling of our only current habitat, threats in the space environment such as large objects that could strike Earth and cause cataclysmic damage, and the eventual exhaustion and destruction of the Sun. The message is clear: environmental degradation and space phenomena can
threaten our existence, but humanity can improve our odds for survival if we can cooperate in grasping and exploiting survival opportunities. Law can provide one of the most effective ways to structure and use these opportunities. Sustained dialogue of the type this volume seeks to foster can help raise awareness, generate support for better space law, and ultimately nurture the spacepower needed to improve

our odds for survival.

Miscalc from space debris causes nuclear war with Russia warning systems mistake collision Lewis, 4 postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Metods of Cooperative Study Program; worked in the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
[Jeffrey, Center for Defense Information, What if Space were Weaponized? July 2004, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf]

This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for Americas opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a

Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted
in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabiliz- ing. For all the talk about a new relationship between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands

of nuclear forces on alert and congured to ght a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear
forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked What do we need all these weapons for?43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Rus- sian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the countrys declining military might. In the mid1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the rst use of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reiter- ated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons preemptively in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack.44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile elds in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satel- lite might malfunction, the ofcer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: When people start a war, they dont start it with only ve missiles. You can do little damage with just ve missiles.45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a

sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were
launched to blind Russian radars with a high altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his nuclear football a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident.46 In both cases, Russian observers were con-dent that what appeared to be a small attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, space-based

sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The
Russian command sys-tem, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating attack cor-ridors through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines.47 Further, Russias constellation of early-warn-ing satellites has been allowed to decline only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving

Russia with early warning for only six hours a day.

Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia

will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack.48 As the previous section explained, the Penta- gon is contemplating military missions in space that
will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited ef- fort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct early deterrence strikes to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation.49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes to disable Russias nuclear deterrent before the Rus- sian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of

space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satel-lite under these conditions? Could the Russian military
distinguish between an accident in space and the rst phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difcult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warn-ing of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russias warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difcult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to denitively deter-mine the cause of the satellites failure. Even

the United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distin- guish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for col-lision with debris are speculative,
particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how condent could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike oc-curred shortly after a false alarm showing a mis-sile launch? False alarms are appallingly common according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 moderately seri-ous false alarms between 1977 and 1983 an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable.51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of co- incidences is difcult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously early- warning data is taken by Russian leaders. More- over, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it

occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a
threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreas- ing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government.53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a t of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an earlywarning satellite would be extremely suspi-cious. It is any militarys nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For ex- ample, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response

to unidentied aircraft penetrat- ing its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were ying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian eet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the conuence of events might trigger off the NATO operations plan that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The jets over Turkey were a ock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Mos- cow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difculties; and the Soviet eet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not coincidences but rather different manifestations of a common failure human er- ror resulting from extreme tension of an interna- tional crisis. As one author noted, The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the rst major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own. Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major war scare during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortied by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American ofcials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American rst strike during this period.56 All of these incidents have a common theme that confidence is often the

difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady ow of reli-able information. When that information flow is disrupted whether by a deliberate attack or an accident confidence collapses and the re- sult is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this
mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the condence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.

Unilateral action is key to start the cooperation Stone, 11 --- space policy analyst and strategist near Washington, DC (3/14/11, Christopher, American leadership in space: leadership through capability, www.thespacereview.com/article/1797/1 , JMP)
Recently, Lou Friedman wrote a piece where he articulated his view on what American leadership in space means to many and what it means to him (see American leadership, The Space Review, February 14, 2011). I would like to respond by providing some context that I think is lacking from the discussion. First, let me start by saying that I agree with Mr. Friedmans assertion that American leadership is a phrase we hear bandied about a lot in political circles in the United States, as well as in many space policy discussions. I have been at many space forums in my career where Ive heard the phrase used by speakers of various backgrounds, political ideologies, and nation. Like Mr. Friedman states, it has many different meanings, most derived from cultural or political biases, some of them contradictory. This is true: many nations, as well as organizations and individuals worldwide, have different preferences and views as to what American leadership in space is, and/or what it should be. He also concludes that paragraph by stating that American leadership in space could also be viewed as synonymous with American hegemony. I again will agree that some people within the United Stats and elsewhere have this view toward American leadership. However, just because people believe certain viewpoints regarding American leadership does not mean that those views are accurate assessments or definitions of what actions demonstrate US leadership in the space medium. When it comes to space exploration and development, including national security space and commercial, I would disagree somewhat with Mr. Friedmans assertion that space is often overlooked in foreign relations and geopolitical strategies. My contention is that while space is indeed overlooked in national grand geopolitical strategies by many in national leadership, space is used as a tool for foreign policy and relations more often than not. In fact, I will say that the US space

program has become less of an effort for the advancement of US space power and exploration, and is used more as a foreign policy tool to shape the strategic environment to what President Obama referred to in his National Security Strategy as The World We Seek. Using space to shape the strategic environment is not a bad thing in and of itself. What concerns me with this form of shaping is that we appear to have changed the definition of American leadership as a nation away from the traditional sense of the word. Some seem to want to base our future national foundations in space using the important international collaboration piece as the starting point. Traditional national leadership would start by advancing United States space power capabilities and strategies first, then proceed toward shaping the international environment through allied cooperation efforts. The United States goal should be leadership through spacefaring capabilities, in all sectors. Achieving and maintaining such leadership through capability will allow for increased space security and opportunities for all and for America to lead the international space community by both technological and political example. The world has recognized America as the leaders in space because it demonstrated technological advancement by the Apollo lunar landings, our deep space exploration probes to the outer planets, and deploying national security space missions. We did not become the recognized leaders in astronautics and space technology because we decided to fund billions into research programs
with no firm budgetary commitment or attainable goals. We did it because we made a national level decision to do each of them, stuck with it, and achieved exceptional things in manned and unmanned spaceflight. We have allowed ourselves to drift from this traditional strategic

definition of leadership in space exploration, rapidly becoming participants in spaceflight rather than the leader of the global space community . One example is shutting down the space shuttle program without a viable domestic spacecraft chosen
and funded to commence operations upon retirement of the fleet. We are paying millions to rely on Russia to ferry our astronauts to an International Space Station that US taxpayers paid the lions share of the cost of construction. Why would we, as United States citizens and space advocates, settle for this? The current debate on commercial crew and cargo as the stopgap between shuttle and whatever comes next could and hopefully will provide some new and exciting solutions to this particular issue. However, we need to made a decision sooner rather than later. Finally, one other issue that concerns me is the view of the world hegemony or superiority as dirty words. Some seem to view these words used in policy statements or speeches as a direct threat. In my view, each nation (should they desire) should have freedom of access to space for the purpose of advancing their security, prestige and wealth through exploration like we do. However, to maintain leadership in the space environment, space superiority is a worthy and necessary byproduct of the traditional leadership model. If your nation is the leader in space, it would pursue and maintain superiority in their mission sets

and capabilities. In my opinion, space superiority does not imply a wall of orbital weapons preventing other nations from access to space, nor does it
preclude international cooperation among friendly nations. Rather, it indicates a desire as a country to achieve its goals for national security, prestige, and economic prosperity for its people, and to be known as the best in the world with regards to space technology and astronautics. I can assure you that many

other nations with aggressive space programs , like ours traditionally has been, desire the same prestige of being the best at some, if not all, parts of the space pie. Space has been characterized recently as congested, contested, and
competitive; the quest for excellence is just one part of international space competition that, in my view, is a good and healthy thing. As other nations pursue excellence in space, we should take our responsibilities seriously, both from a national capability standpoint, and as country who desires expanded international engagement in space. If America wants to retain its true leadership in space, it must approach its space

programs as the advancement of its national security, prestige and wealth by maintaining its edge in spaceflight capabilities and use those demonstrated talents to advance international prestige and influence in the space community. These energies and influence can be channeled to create the international space coalitions of the future that many desire and benefit mankind as well as America. Leadership will require sound, long-range exploration strategies with national and international political will behind it. American leadership in space is not a choice. It is a requirement if we are to truly lead the world into space with programs and objectives worthy of a great nation.
US development spurs US-India co-op --- solves Indian growth, energy shortages, and leadership Rajagopalan 11

(9-21 Dr. Rajeswari Pillai,- Senior Fellow and Rahul Prakash a Research Assistant at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi China Walks the US-India Space Solar Power Dream) While India and the US make pledges about potential collaboration on space, others walk those promises and potentials. In the India-US context, space has remained a potential area of cooperation for the last decade or so whereas China, which has studied the Indo-US joint communications carefully, has made fast progress on space-based solar power (SBSP), in terms of devoting financial and human resources
into the project. The need of the hour is for democracies like India, US and may be even Japan to come together, structure large collaborations around space and capture the political space in this regard. The political leadership in both India and the US should recognise the importance of it and act accordingly before it is too late. Recognising the spin-off benefits of space-based solar power, China recently unveiled a plan to

build and orbit a solar power station for commercial use by 2040. The Chinese plan drawn by one of its space pioneers Wang Xiji is an ambitious
one and aims to look at various aspects of space-based solar power applications, designs and key technologies that would make the option economically feasible in the first instance and sustainable by 2020. Detailing the research conducted by the China Academy of Sciences, Wang said at the fourth China Energy Environment Summit Forum: "The development of solar power station in space will fundamentally change the way in which people exploit and obtain power. Whoever takes the lead in the development and utilization of clean and renewable energy and the space and aviation industry

will be the world leader."

Given China's rising energy requirements, it is imperative that Beijing look at alternate sources of energy to meet its enormous demand. By 2050, it is estimated that China would have an energy gap of approximately 10.5 percent which it would seek to fill in by exploring alternate sources of energy such as fusion and space power stations. Also, the greenhouse gas emissions and climate change considerations have become serious enough concerns for the international community. These factors have also pushed Beijing to invest more in low-carbon energy sources. SBSP is possibly on top of the options list for China given the safety concerns vis--vis nuclear energy, particularly after the Fukushima crisis. According to

the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), the Solar Power Satellites (SPS) and solar power applications will help China in sustaining its
economic and social development, disaster prevention and mitigation and would also assist in retention of qualified personnel. China has been working on this concept for several years with CAST spearheading its research work. After the initial feasibility report compiled by CAST, a concept design for the SPS was submitted to China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which eventually gave the approval and funding for the design. According to CAST, the SPS development includes four parts - satellite launching, in-orbit construction/multi-agents, efficient conversion of solar energy and wireless transmission. Apart from the launch factor, an area where China has excelled significantly, other parts of the project will demand greater effort for development. While China's lead in the SBSP could provide for a co-operative framework in Asia, the geopolitical realities and the inherent problems in Asia - competition,

rivalry and mistrust - may hamper such collaboration in the near future. Under such a scenario, there lies a strong imperative for India, the US and other like-minded democracies to come together and realise the SBSP utilisation dream. This will not only provide economic gains but also give a strategic advantage in the changing security environment in Asia. For India, such collaboration would meet its growing energy demand and provide other spinoff benefits like job creation and access to advanced technology, much-needed for sustaining India's growth story. It is estimated that India's energy requirements would double by 2030, making it imperative for it to explore other feasible options. Also, if India becomes a part of the process of realising the SBSP dream, it will augment India's position in Asia as well as the world as a responsible leader. The political consensus for India and the US to collaborate in space already exists although it appears that each side has been leaving it to the other to take the initiative and materialise the potential. The
US-India Agreement to establish an S&T Board and an endowment for research provides the apparatus needed for starting the SBSP research and development. This fund can finance a broad number of issues of mutual interest such as bio technology, advanced materials and nanotechnology science, clean energy technologies, basic space, atmospheric and earth science. SBSP easily fits into the sphere of issues supported by this fund. As far as other funding options are concerned, private sector companies on both sides have shown interest in exploring the SBSP option. US companies like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Tata in India have shown positive signs. Other countries like Japan have also done considerable research in this field. Japan's Aerospace Exploration Agency has done decade-long research on SBSP in collaboration with high-end technological companies such as Mitsubishi. Collaboration among these countries would also facilitate funding for this ambitious project. While China may not have developed the best model in terms of cost effectiveness, it will surely send out a strong message to the international community about China's capabilities in developing such technologies and its ambitions to become the global leader in space solar power harnessing. If China wins the race in developing SBSP as a feasible source of energy, which would meet the world's growing energy demand, it

will result in huge economic and strategic gains for China. It is now time for both India and the US to explore the opportunity seriously and not let prospects for cooperation remain only as prospects. Hopefully, the
advent of China into the picture would give the much-needed push for both countries to actually start real-time development work on SBSP.

Indian energy shocks cause miscalc with China Singh 08

(Ajay Kumar,- Major, Indian Army How Does Indias Energy Security Affect Her National Security) Michael T. Klare in his writings has predicted an enormous mismatch between global supply and demand of energy resources, fueled by the enormous increase in demand in India and China. 24 Quoting the US DOE, Klare has predicted that oil consumption in the developing world will increase by 96 percent between the periods 2001 to 2025. 25 In the case of India, there is expected to be an unprecedented 152 percent increase in oil consumption in the same period. 26 Weighing this surge in demand against the limited supply sources in the Middle East, Nigeria, Russia and Venezuela, it seems inconceivable that this huge supply demand gap can be bridged in the future. 27 In his testimony to the US Senate, Herberg has hinted at a growing clash of interests between India and China as they seek to secure their energy requirements. 28 In his book Resource Wars, Klare has stated that it is impossible for any government, especially in thriving democracies like India, to ignore energy security and have domestic political and social stability. 29 Klare, in his article The Intensifying Global Struggle for Energy, has quoted the current Indian Prime Minister as saying I find that we have fallen

behind China in planning for the future in the field of energy security. 30 Klare has also hinted that once this happens and Generals plan for contingencies and emergencies, there then emerges the possibility of small incidents evolving into crises and crises into wars. 31 Analysis. Logically it may be questioned as to why energy security should be so important to a nation. The
answer lies in the second and third order effects created by energy insecurity as has been discussed in the analysis of the six dimensions of energy security earlier in this chapter. It can be safely assumed that in this age of information networking, citizens in countries like India will invariably question their governments failure to secure their basic needs and energy is central to all basic needs. The growing demand of energy in developing countries like India and China cannot be met by the dwindling resources of oil in some of the major oil producing countries like Saudi Arabia. Having established the fact that there is indeed a race to secure energy resources due to the supply demand gap, there emerges the distinct possibility of national interests

clashing as nations strive to secure their energy requirements either through source

diversification or through purchase of oil and gas supply rights from major oil and gas producing countries. Moreover as India seeks to deal with countries like Iran and Myanmar to secure gas supply, her relations with the USA could also be possibly adversely affected. The enormity of energy security has grown to such an extent that in India the government has taken it up on itself to develop and pursue a policy to achieve energy security. It is possible that as energy security today is such a

massive concern in India, it may well pass from the realm of economics and statecraft into that of military policy.

From the above assessment it is evident that Indias energy security is undeniably an essential element of its national security and shall continue to be so in the foreseeable future. In this context it is pertinent that an analysis be made to study the effects of Indias energy security on its national security.

Goes nuclear Kanwal 2K

(Brigadier (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal is currently a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, London and Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade in the high-altitude Gurez Sector on the Line of Control with Pakistan (during Operation Parakram, 2001-03) and an artillery field regiment in counter-insurgency operations in the Kashmir Valley (during Operation Rakshak, 1993-94). He also served as Deputy Assistant Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff at HQ Integrated Defence Staff, New Delhi and as Director MO-5 in the Directorate General of Military Operations at Army Headquarters (dealing with threat, strategy and force structure). He is the author of several books including Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, Pakistans Proxy War, and Artillery: Honour and Glory. Does India Need Tactical Nuclear Weapons?, CIAO Net, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_may00kag01.html) Jasjit Singh has stated that, "The non-strategic category of weapons, which constitute 96 percent (if warheads on SLBMs are taken into account, the proportion drops to a little over 93 percent) of China's nuclear arsenal, even after 34 years, have relevance only for China's immediate neighbours."26 Besides some ICBMs and IRBMs, China has deployed a large number of medium-and short-range nuclear-tipped missiles and nuclear capable aircraft in Tibet.27 As China has already signed a de-targeting agreement with Russia and the US, it is not clear where these nuclear weapons are aimed or intended to be aimed. These deployed nuclear weapons constitute a 'threat-in-being' to India. Also, China has lately modified its original no-first-use doctrine. "China's military strategists do not consider the use of nuclear weapons in their own territory as violating their NFU (no-first-use) doctrine."28 Though China has never bothered to clarify the ambiguities inherent in this stand as it suits its purpose to play a guessing game, it can be deduced that since China clearly considers Taiwan as its own territory, the use of China's nuclear weapons during a war over Taiwan would not violate its no-first-use doctrine. As a corollary, Indian analysts are justified in concluding that as China has not renounced its claim over Arunachal Pradesh, or for that matter is still to recognise Sikkim, it may

seriously consider the first use of tactical nuclear weapons during a border conflict with

India in the future.

China is continuing to modernise its nuclear and missile forces and tactical nuclear weapons,29 including by acquiring Western technology through clandestine means. The US has claimed that China has acquired the technology for its W-88 nuclear warhead through illegal means. Notwithstanding the US claim and China's vigorous denial, it is clear that China is continuing to place immense emphasis on tactical

nuclear weapons. It naturally follows that China's concept of fighting a 'limited war under high-tech conditions' includes a nuclear warfighting strategy. Hence, India may expect to witness Chinese mushroom clouds over the high Himalayas during a future Sino-Indian border war, particularly if the Chinese Military Region commander is convinced that Indian forces are gaining advantage at the
operational level. Due to India's affinity and long-standing cultural links with the Tibetan people, India would naturally like to ensure that collateral damage in Tibet is scrupulously avoided. In fact, even more worrisome would be the long-term contamination of the Himalayan water sources. Since most of the Tibetan rivers drain into the Indian plains, it is in India's interest to ensure that nuclear exchanges over the Himalayan watershed are not allowed to occur. It is also for this reason that India must ensure that ADMs are not employed by either side during a Himalayan conflict, contrary to the proposals made by Bharat Karnad,30 et al. How, then, is such a threat to be countered? Some Indian analysts argue that India must retaliate in kind on China's forward troops, firepower assets, headquarters, logistics support areas and communications choke points and that raising the ante and targeting Chinese cities would prove to be counter-productive as China has a much superior nuclear arsenal. In the unlikely event that China employs battlefield nuclear weapons against the Indian army on the grounds that it is justified in using them on the territory that it claims in 'self-defence', India will really

have no option but to retaliate massively against Chinese cities and economic centres on China's well developed eastern seaboard. Only
such a declaratory policy and matching operational plans will make the first use cost for China prohibitive. It is a moot point whether the loss of a single Chinese city would be acceptable to the proponents of the first use of battlefield nuclear weapons within the Chinese Central Military Commission.

SSP inspires a new wave of STEM graduates

Mahan 06
(Rob,- degree in mechanical engineering former employee of a major U.S. aerospace contractor http://c-sbsp.org/sbsp-faq/ Date last cited)

Are there other reasons you believe we should be developing space-based solar power? Yes, several very important ones. U.S. manufacturing and technology companies are concerned about being able to hire enough capable employees to replace the experienced workforce, a large percentage of which will be elgible to retire within the next ten years. Our domestic intellectual feedstock is very low, which is one of many reasons we havent built any new nuclear facilities in the last twenty-five years. Like the Apollo and other U.S. space programs did so many years ago, space-based solar power will inspire new generations of U.S. science and technology graduates. The U.S. domestic manufacturing base is badly eroded, and while some economists say that we are moving towards a service-based economy, common sense tells me that we should regain our independence and self-sufficiency in many areas necessary to support our society. Now that what seems like the majority of our clothing, computers, cars, oil, toys and electronics are imported, spacebased solar power will support the development of new domestic manufacturing industries. We will also benefit from spin-offs similar to the original space program (microelectronics, internet, velcro, Tang, etc.) Better earth-based solar power efficiencies will be gained. Low cost and reliable access to space will support many new industries. Perhaps a space tourism industry will be the forerunner of space colonization. Manufacturing in zero gravity and the hard vacuum of space will yield new materials and new products. Moon and asteroid based operations, such as the mining of natural resources from the Moon and asteroids will provide a platform for planetary protection from NEO (meteor / asteroid) strikes. The U.S. could become a major exporter of affordable energy and of energy and conservation technologies. But most importantly, the development of space-based solar power would demonstrate our nations belief in democracy and freedom for the entire human race. Space-based solar power gives the United States a great opportunity to regain a respected leadership role, not by force, but by example.
Boosting STEM is key to solve nuclear terrorism and deterrence Chiles 08
(Henry G,- chairman of the Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills) Americas nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons expertise resides in what the task force terms the nuclear security enterprise. This enterprise includes not only those nuclear activities in the Departments of Defense and Energy, but also in the Intelligence Community and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). All activities within the enterprise need to be driven by and connected to strategy, policy, and

experts available to work on the emerging challenges of proliferation and terrorism . In todays environment of reduced work forces and minimal systems development activities, some skills are only being sustained by work one-step- removed from actual nuclear efforts. Understanding the interconnections and relationships across this enterprise, depicted in Figure 1, is an important step towards developing capable and sustainable nuclear deterrent skills for the future.
assessment of future threats. The nuclear weapon system programs historically and to a great extent still train and support the majority of Our approach was intended to further this understanding. The changing political and threat environments have and will continue to challenge the nuclear skills needed for the future. Increasingly,

nuclear skills to support non-proliferation, intelligence, countering nuclear terrorism, and response to use of nuclear weaponsboth on the battlefield or domestically are at the center of ensuring the nations security. To date, these fields

have been largely managed independently from the nuclear weapons programs, though they draw on many of the same core knowledge and skill sets. Figure 1 depicts the nuclear skills community and functions. Prior Applicable Studies In the last ten years, two significant Defense Science Board (DSB) studies were conducted in the last ten years on nuclear deterrence including expertise within DOD that apply to the current study: the October 1998 Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence (referred to as 1998 DSB Task Force) and the March 2006 Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Skills (referred to as 2006 DSB Task Force). Neither was cited in the Terms of Reference for this study as a specific benchmark. The current status of applicable, abbreviated recommendations for each study is provided in Tables 1 and 2. At the request of the Congress, a detailed analysis of DOE nuclear weapons expertise was conducted in the 19981999 timeframe. The resultsin the Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise, March 1999provides the reference point for this (2007/2008) assessment of DOE nuclear weapons expertise. The abbreviated recommendations of the report are highlighted in Table 3, along with a brief assessment of the progress made in the last decade toward implementing the recommendations. The necessity for the mission is seldom articulated by senior government officials. The national commitment to the mission and the vital role it plays in the security of the nation remain weak at best. Most notably, implementation of an integrated, comprehensive, and long-term stockpile life extension plan has been slow. In the past 15 years, only one major stockpile life extension program has been completed for Minuteman and one has just begun for Trident. There have always been plans, but the reality is that the design-development-production work for the nuclear weapon complex has been far from steady and predictable over the last 15 years. This issue is a major stumbling block to ensuring NNSA proficiency over the long term. Since the 1999 Commission report, the nuclear weapon complex has made progress in recruiting, training, and retaining the right level of technical talent for the mission, including making use of retirees. However, the NNSA workforce of government and contractor personnel is old relative to the U.S. workforce. The weapons laboratory contractors are old relative to the U.S. population of PhD scientists and engineers in the workforce. Across all NNSA sites, the population over 40 is in the 70 to 80 percent range. The percent of the workforce eligible to retire has grown since the Commission report in 1999, but not as fast as had been projected. Recent compared to the pool of eligible retirees at the NNSA facilities and the rate at which people could retire in the next five years. In general, across a wide range of survey questions (similar or the same as those used in 1998), employee responses to the current survey strongly indicate that the NNSA government and contractor workforce attitudes are more positive than reported in 1999. Attitudes are distinctly more positive at the NNSA production plants than reported in 1999. However, attitudes about the future are more negative at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in the face of impending workforce layoffs, most notably at Los Alamos. There is concern about recruitment in specific knowledge fields as discussed in this report. However, this task forces view is that the lack of national commitment to the nuclear weapons program and the lack of a stable base workload of design-development-production work will eventually erode the capability to attract the right level technical talent across a wide spectrum of skills needed to maintain competence. NNSA Defense Programs does not have an advisory committee. In general, Congressional interest, oversight, and support of the nuclear weapons program continues to need invigoration. Methodology To cover the range of nuclear skills identified in the Terms of Reference, the scope of this effort was necessarily broad. The task force investigation extended to the entirety of personnel whose responsibilities include the evaluation, management, or execution of any element of nuclear weapon systemsthat is, the integrated nuclear weapon, launch, or carrier vehicle, and supporting command, control, communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3/ISR) infrastructure These elements span policy, research, development, testing, production, acquisition, deployment (including security), operational training, and operational employment. Also included are those personnel responsible for understanding and, where possible, defeating potential nuclear weapons threats to U.S. interestsnuclear weapons effects such as electromagnetic pulse, shock, overpressure, and neutron, x-ray and gamma radiation; collateral damage and other fallout; as well as nuclear weapons or materials being smuggled out of legitimate repositories for illegal transfer to adversaries hostile to the United States and its allies. Table 4 captures the actors and areas that the study addressed. To accomplish this extensive study of nuclear deterrence skills, the task force embarked on a four-part fact-finding effort that included:2 briefings to the task force from the range of organizations and facilities identified in Table 4 site visits to key installations and facilities data requests workforce survey Through this approach, the task force was able to draw insights from those involved in most aspects of the weapons programs and from many levels of the organization. Site visits included not only briefings from senior officials but focus groups and one-on-one sessions with individuals in the nuclear career field. Their experiences and observations, combined with survey results of an even larger population of the workforce, provided important inputs into the task force assessment, directly influencing its findings and recommendations. After highlighting, in the section below, the principal observations that emerged from the task force investigation, the remainder of this report will detail the findings and recommendations of this study. It begins with an overview of the nuclear threat and the need for a national commitment in response. The report then focuses on the task force findings which fall into eight areas: DOD nuclear weapons work, NNSA expertise, intelligence, military operational competencies, weapons effects, domestic nuclear event response capability, reorganizations and staff reductions, and personnel management. The final chapter provides recommendations for the way ahead. Findings and recommendations are highlighted in bold print. Principal Observations The cumulative work conducted by the task force has lead to the following principal observations: The task force is concerned that adequate nuclear deterrence competency will not be sustained to meet future challenges. National strategy has not been emphasized and, as a consequence, there is disillusionment that could lead to decline in the remaining critical skills. Existing and emerging WMD threats and adversary intentions are not well understood. Intelligence assessments lack the needed focus and expertise. The perception exists that there is no national commitment to a robust nuclear deterrent, reflected in downgrading activities within OSD policy, the Joint Staff, STRATCOM, U.S. Air Force, and congressional action on the RRW. Management and work force in industry and the nuclear weapon contractors believe that sustainment programs (e.g. life extension programs [LEPs]) will not retain skills necessary to competently solve major problems with existing systems or initiate new programs. Pessimism exists about follow-on nuclear deterrence systems becoming a reality. Priorities have shifted strongly, and to a degree appropriately, but the pendulum has swung too far. Now we are faced with about $100 billion of decisions (RRW, Complex Transformation, landbased strategic deterrent, sea-based strategic deterrent), with an eroded capability to think about these issues. Chapter 2. Nuclear Threats and National Commitment The Threat Environment At the start of World War II, the most urgent nuclear threat was the possibility that Nazi Germany was secretly pursuing a nuclear weapon and might acquire that capability in the short term. During the Cold War, the most urgent threat was posed by the Soviet Union. The most urgent nuclear threats facing the nation today are nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. As well, all other nation states with nuclear weapons are still developing weapons or continuing technology initiatives. While it is difficult to predict what the most urgent nuclear threat will be in the future, it is prudent to assume that there will continue to be nuclear threats. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons were produced around the globe since the advent of the nuclear age. We cannot know with certainty where all of the weapons or their components are. Even if all nuclear weapons were somehow eliminated today, the knowledge of how to make them and the fissile materials required for their construction would still remain, as well as the ability to develop radiological weapons (dirty bombs). The nuclear dimension, in short, cannot be removed from the threat equation now or in the conceivable future. It can at best be managed. And we cannot rule out the

hiring rates are a trickle

a significant number of nuclear weapons again could be directed at the United States, our forces abroad, and/or our allies and friends. Todays overall threat environment is increasingly complex. Globalization has broadened the number of threats and challenges facing the
possibility that in the decades ahead

United States. To cope with the new complexity, the Defense Department in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) shifted its military planning from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach.3 Senior American officials continue to think and talk in terms of threats, however. The National Security Strategy, issued under the Presidents signature, states that the first duty of the government is to protect the American people and American interests. This duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats [emphasis added], using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave

terrorists and states of concern (also sometimes called rogue states). In the most recent annual threat statement by the Director of National Intelligence to the Congress, the ongoing efforts of states and terrorists to acquire (and if they already possess them, to improve) nuclear weapons/postures are highlighted. Al-Qaida and its affiliates are discussed extensively, Iran and North Korea are identified as specific concerns, and the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is discussed briefly (as is the question of Pakistan nuclear security given the ongoing political uncertainty in Pakistan). Further, the judgment is advanced that Chinas nuclear capabilities will increase rapidly in terms of range, lethality, and survivability over the next ten years, and the revival of Russian national power (to include its military power) is noted.5 The National Security Adviser spoke at Stanford University on February 11, 2008, stating that the threat of a nuclear attack on the American homeland remains very realalthough the nature of the
damage.4 The strategy argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to national security and acknowledges that nuclear weapons have a special appeal for

threat has changed dramatically over the last two decades, and focusing on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials into the hands of nations or individuals who would do us harm.6 Major nations other than the United States, including Russia and China, continue to modernize their nuclear postures, sustain and extend nuclear expertise, and develop new doctrines for nuclear forces. The

threats extends across the full spectrum from nuclear terrorists, to hostile regional powers, to hostile major powers. Even if nuclear weapons were somehow banished by political agreement, a latent nuclear threat would remain. In todays world, given the dynamics of proliferation, a regional nuclear confrontation not initially involving the United States can threaten vital U.S. interests as well. It is important to acknowledge that the threat environment in which nuclear threats exist also includes other high-priority military capabilities (cyber warfare and counter-space),
range of current and potential nuclear systems. In short, our nations ability to deal with

potent non-military capabilities (the use of financial or energy leverage to achieve political ends), other weapons of mass destruction (especially biological weapons), and advanced military technologies and

the current and anticipated threat environment calls for a base of nuclear expertise that is even broader than it was during the Cold War. The challenge of sustaining nuclear expertise in such a diffuse and rapidly evolving threat environment is daunting. Deterrence and nuclear operations can turn
out to be far different from those supported by the nuclear enterprise during the Cold War. The detonation of a single terrorist nuclear weapon in a major city is a strategic problem demanding a rigor to technically informed analysis that once was devoted to civilization-threatening arsenal exchanges.7

China and Russia now appear to consider nuclear attack options that,

unlike their Cold War plans, employ electromagnetic pulse ) as a primary or sole means of attack.8 However, they have at their disposal hundreds and even thousands of weapons that can be used as they see appropriate when the time comes. Tactical and regional use of nuclear weapons is a demanding and quite plausible problem. So is detecting, capturing, and rendering safe a nuclear weapon that is being smuggled for terrorist use. Nuclear Weapons Consensus Conditions of the Cold War helped foster a strong national commitment and consensus on developing, maintaining, and operating a nuclear deterrent force and preserving nuclear expertise that was second to none. That consensus allowed for considerable disagreement on details and priorities, but it was sufficiently coherent and deep-rooted across political and intellectual divides that it helped underwrite a clear national commitment to the nuclear deterrence mission. U.S. allies and foes knew this. So did the men and women in the American nuclear weapons enterprise. They lived in a culture that continually refreshed the reservoir of nuclear deterrence expertise. There also was a consensus during the Cold War to oppose nuclear proliferation, although in practice this consensus allowed for many compromises. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the fundamental framework of todays nuclear nonproliferation regime was the result of American leadership exercised on a number of occasions by a number of different administrations and Congresses, spanning decades of time.9 Nobody wants to return to the Cold War. As the American Secretary of Defense told Russias leaders in 2007, one Cold War is enough in anyones lifetime. It arguably was inevitable with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the superpower confrontation that the role for nuclear weapons would devolve away from center stage, at least for the United States with its strong armed forces across the board. What was not inevitable was the steep decline in national consensus in the United States as to what was needed for the nuclear deterrence mission. In part, the lack of national consensus results from the more complicated threat environment. Attention is paid to core nuclear issues, but they are not the same core nuclear issues that animated consensus in an earlier era. Nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism today are the primary focus of American policy, not deterrence of majorpower nuclear war. This task forces finds that the extent to which a national nuclear weapons consensus still exists in this country, it resides in the propositions that the United States should not renounce its nuclear weapons while other countries have them, that Americas nuclear weapons should be as safe and secure as possible, and that nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are near-term threats requiring high-priority responses. It may also extend to other propositions as well. One is that the United States should have the strongest possible intelligence capabilities for understanding foreign nuclear weapons activities. Another is that a major improvement is needed in technical and operational capabilities to detect nuclear weapons being smuggled into or toward the country, and to attribute responsibility for a nuclear explosion. The limited consensus does not extend to what should be a bedrock propositionnamely, that so long as anyone on earth has a nuclear weapon or has the ability to get a nuclear weapon, American nuclear expertise should be second to none. Today there appears to be deep disagreement in the American body politic on almost every nuclear weapons issue: the role of nuclear weapons, retention of nuclear alert operations, whether to declassify nuclear stockpile numbers, the wisdom of nuclear modernization plans such as the Reliable Replacement Program, whether to ratify and use American influence to bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and whether the regime built around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can be relied on in the future. This situation contributes to political deadlock and drift and to the continued decline in nuclear expertise documented in this study. There also continues to be a lack of appreciation by senior American leaders that this decline is serious. A necessary, although far from sufficient condition for reversing that decline is for the Executive Branch and Congress to arrive at a new national consensus and commitment on the need for nuclear weapons, a connected strategy for dealing with all issues raised by nuclear weapons, and a determination of the specifically nuclear deterrent requirements that flow from these. This is not the first study to identify erosion of national consensus as a fundamental issue for the health of the U.S. nuclear expertise endeavor. The capstone recommendation of the 1999 Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise was a call to reinforce the national commitment and fortify the sense of mission.10 In a similar vein, the initial key issue identified by the 2006 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities was the absence of a national consensus on the nature of the need for and the role of nuclear weapons.11 During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was at the heart of American national security strategy. Some of the best minds inside and outside of government were devoted to this topic. Although the details of the nuclear deterrent strategy changed over time through a succession of administrations, the Executive Branch and Congress largely agreed on the imperative to keep the nuclear deterrent strong. After the Cold War nuclear deterrence no longer played the central role it once did in American security affairsa well documented fact that requires little elaboration. This state of affairs naturally required a broad range of adaptation in the American nuclear enterprise. So did the congressionally mandated end to nuclear testing in 1992, followed by negotiation (but not formal entry into force) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.12 Geopolitically, the threat environment shifted as nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism evolved in disturbing new directions. Nuclear issues became more, not less, complex in a rapidly changing world. The United States has invested heavily in the transformation of its armed forces into a powerful instrument that many would argue can achieve a number of effects that nuclear deterrence once offered, with Americas unmatched non- nuclear means. This outcome is welcome in many ways, but it further contributes to the erosion of nuclear expertise as those who once would have devoted their careers to being expert in nuclear affairs turned their attention elsewhere. As for the evolution of the public face of nuclear deterrence policy guidance, on May 1, 2001, the President gave a major speech at National Defense University where he argued that we need new concepts of deterrence and that deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. He called for a new framework incorporating missile defenses that would strengthen deterrence, reduce the incentive for nuclear proliferation, and allow for further reductions in nuclear weapons. The President argued that nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies but did not further elaborate that role.13 In addition to the Presidents speech, other announcements later in 2001, that took place after the traumatic events of 9/11, further shaped the nuclear frameworkthe nations intent to reduce its operationally deployed nuclear weapons to 1,700 to 2,200 in number14 and formal notification to Russia of its intent to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.15 The new imperatives of combating global terrorism intersected the QDR and NPR of 2001 to provide an evolving vision, framework, and strategic priorities for defense planning, albeit a framework that left unclear in the public mind what specifically would henceforth define nuclear deterrence. The associated framework for combating WMD that was outlined in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002) and the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (February 2006) is elaborate, still evolving, and further submerges thinking about nuclear deterrence and its requirements in a broader set of issues. The Report to the President by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (March 2005) and the QDR report of February 2006 is very broad as well. Hence, thought specifically addressing nuclear deterrence and its requirements has become defocused and has been shifted to ever-lower levels in the national security establishment over time. The task force believes that this combined set of factors contributes to the current state of affairs across all sectors of national security expertisefrom policy to planning (intelligence and targeting), from project management and acquisition to weapons effects, from design and logistics to safety and security, from command and control to operations and executionin Congress as well as the executive branch. The result is that a number of the personnel engaged in the nuclear weapons enterprise believe their work is important and underappreciated. In 2007, in the midst of the debate over the future of the RRW, the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and State submitted a short statement on U.S. national security and nuclear weapons entitled Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century.16 This high-level engagement did not create support for the RRW, and in its FY 2008 defense authorization and appropriation actions, the Congress now has called for a new NPR, a commission on the strategic posture of the United States, and a commission on the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism. At the same time, a distinguished community of retired senior American national security officials has helped spearhead the call for a new strategic vision of American nuclear requirements.17 All of this takes place against the backdrop of an upcoming presidential election where national security affairs are playing a prominent role and where a strategic vision of a different nuclear future is being addressed explicitly by leading candidates. The task force concludes that

(EMP

The industrial base skills that created and sustained DODs nuclear deterrent capabilities over the past 60 years are substantially less than they once were, and are in danger of significant further erosion in the area of ballistic missiles. DOD programs are managed by the services and they rely upon a program management structure
the erosion of U.S. nuclear deterrent expertise cannot be reversed absent a renewed national commitment and strong leadership. Chapter 3. DOD Nuclear Weapons Work featuring a program office responsible for implementing national guidance through design, development, sustainment, and operations of the weapon systems, including integration of the NNSA- supplied weapons. The service program management team typically relies upon a contractor team (prime and its subs or an associate contractor arrangement) to achieve its goals. In the absence of continuing development programs, it is increasingly dubious whether the DOD nuclear deterrence infrastructure, especially its human capital, can be characterized as responsive as called for in the 2001 NPR. Any new programs will require time for recruiting and training new employees; dependence upon inexperienced employees is likely to stretch out development times and even then result in program delays and developmental failures on the way to program completion. The magnitude of the problem will vary by weapon system type but appears to be most significant with respect to ballistic missiles. Industry is uniformly emphatic that expertise can only be maintained by the exercise of skills requiring funded programs for which the skills are necessary. The skills that are being exercised today for nuclear-capable deterrent forces are almost exclusively related to the less demanding sustainment of the systems first deployed many years ago: Minuteman III, Trident D5, B-52, B-2, air-launched cruise missile (ALCM),

The nuclear deterrence industrial base for aircraft and standoff weapons now depends on non-nuclear weapon system activities for its sustainment , but in important areas no surrogates exist. The industries that have
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N), F-16, and F-15.

supported the nations long-range ballistic missile capability are clear that design and system engineering skill in areas unique to strategic missiles will disappear in the near term in the absence of new programs. Even the life extension programs that exist for some of these systems are scheduled to conclude in the near future. The program management structure used by the services to conduct the weapons systems programs (design, develop, produce, deploy, and sustain) relies upon a variety of management models. For example, the Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program from inception in 1954 used an associate contractor structure with individual contractors having responsibilities (deliverables) for specific elements of the weapon system. The contractor team was integrated by the program office with the assistance of a systems engineering contractor. In 1997, the ICBM program shifted to a smaller program office that engaged a prime contractor to integrate and manage the elements of the life

extension programs. The Navy submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program from inception has had not only acquisition but also operational responsibility. A dedicated industry team with defined responsibilities for missile system, guidance, fire control, etc., has been integrated by the program office to meet operational requirements. The Air Force bomber and cruise missile programs have historically used program office/prime integrating contractor arrangements in which the small program offices are located with the acquisition commands and the prime integrating contractors manage the design, development, and production of the elements of the system from facility locations around the country. The continuous modernization of nuclear capable forces (e.g. for ICBMs Thor, Atlas, Titan I, Titan II, Minuteman I, Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX) that existed until the early 1990s ensured that the skills needed for the job were rigorously exercised, and kept pace with evolving technology. The challenge of new systems brought a continuing stream of eager, intelligent workers into the force to work side-by-side with experienced mentors. New systems exercised the skills needed for research, design and system engineering, development, testing, and production. Even system concepts that were never deployed (such as, for ICBMs, deep underground, rail mobile, off-road mobile, air-launched) fully engaged the design and engineering skills while the concepts were evaluated. Today, there are no new funded nuclear deterrent systems or exploratory development programs for which to recruit, develop, and exercise relevant skills. New non-nuclear system concepts, like the Air Forces Common Aero Vehicle and Navys Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) program would have contributed significantly to keeping some nuclear-relevant design and system engineering skills alive. The 2008 defense legislation deleted funding explicitly requested for these programs (prohibited use of funds for CTM). It did, however, allocate half the total $200 million sought to a defense- wide account that could be applied to propulsion and guidance systems, mission planning, re-entry vehicle design, modeling and simulation efforts, command and control, launch system infrastructure, intermediate-range missile concepts, advanced non-nuclear warheads, and other mission-enabling capabilities. To a certain extent, these funds may sustain programs previously funded by the Application Programs in Re-Entry, Propulsion, and Guidance that had been drastically cut by the Air Force and Navy, despite their long-term advocacy by those concerned with the demise of industrial base personnel competency in these crucial and uniquely nuclear-related areas. While application of funding to technology in these areas via the Application Programs was helpful, industry had always been clear that these programs alone could not sustain competency. The 2008 $100 million program managed by OSD could continue to be helpful to skill preservation in areas important to nuclear ballistic missile systems, depending upon how funds are applied. The delay in commitment to specific system development programs poses the threat that employees who once brought the current systems into existence will retire before they can train a next generation of work force on any new systems. The remainder of this chapter addresses each nuclear deterrent system capability in more detail. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile The first version of the Minuteman III (MMIII) entered the force in 1970. An extensive life extension program has been underway that includes replacement of the aging guidance system; remanufacture of the solid-propellant rocket motors; replacement of standby power systems; repair of launch facilities; and installation of updated, survivable communications equipment, and new command and control consoles to enhance immediate communications. With these changes, the projected lifetime of MMIII calls for retirement beginning in 2020. Speculation about extended retention of MMIII until 2030 has begun. To date no analysis has been performed to support such a retirement extension nor has funding been provided that would permit surveillance sufficient for early enough detection of incipient failures in time to develop and deploy a replacement before major problems developed in the deployed system. Expertise that provided the designs for hardened and survivable launch control facilities, silos, communication, launch systems, reentry systems, and offensive countermeasures is not now available. It is estimated that fewer than 5 percent of those once responsible for assessing the damage effectiveness of ICBM targeting remain available. The Air Forces Land-Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives study to address the successor to MMIII was completed in 2005. No action has been taken since on a replacement system. It was reported that the Air Force has not undertaken any effort to reassess the state of industrial skills needed to sustain, let alone undertake, new ICBM programs, nor has it motivated or provided incentives to industry to evaluate the state of its critical skills or propose programs that might sustain expertise in the most critical areas. Under these circumstances, the industries that supported the ICBM force have no motivation to preserve design and system engineering critical skills or recruit new talent to this task. An evaluation performed by the Air Force ICBM Program Office in 2004, concluded that skills would be below a critical mass in the areas of guidance, re-entry, and propulsion no later than 2010, and reconstitution would carry significant risk. No subsequent action has been taken to reverse these conclusions. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile The Navys Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) organization manages the SLBM activities from cradle to grave and has been cognizant of the challenge to maintaining excellence in industrial skills in all technical areas relevant to SLBM since the early 1990s. The current SLBM capability is 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) outfitted with Trident-II (D5) missiles. A D5 Life Extension program currently underway is expected to extend the service life of the weapon system until 2042. Thus, a next generation SLBM design and engineering effort is at least 1015 years in the future. As a result, some shipboard systems based on commercial off-the-shelf components, such as fire control and submarine navigation, have been planned for periodic refresh cycles that exercise relevant critical skills. Industrial partners have incentives to track critical skills and develop critical skill preservation programs, although compliance has been mixed. The life extension program has been sufficient for training and transferring knowledge to the next generation of inertial guidance and electronic engineers. However, in the areas of propulsion and re-entry, the life extension program has not offered the opportunity to train another generation of designers and system engineers. A most promising recent development is the proposal to continue D5 missile motor production at the rate of 12 per year. This proposal would ensure that some large diameter rocket motor production skills, that were once predicted to die as early as 2012, would be sustained and available for future SLBM and ICBM application. However, essential expertise for the design and development of hardened reentry systems remains at risk. Aircraft and Air Breathing Systems The B-52H (delivered to Air Force 1962) and B-2 (first flown 1989) are the current long-range aircraft capable of nuclear delivery via lay-down bombs and cruise missile (ALCM). Until the June 2006 announcement that the Air Force would begin to examine a next generation strategic bomber, it had been expected that the existing aircraft would be the sole capability until 2040. It remains unclear how soon the replacement aircraft will be available, although 2018 has been stated as an objective by the Secretary of the Air Force. Effects of nuclear engagements (surface-to-air missile encounters, fratricide, etc.) on aircraft performance are now, at best, a low priority for the Air Force. The Air Force Weapons Laboratory, once responsible for leading analysis and experimentation, no longer exists. Unlike the missile area, industry has remained confident that the production of large body commercial aircraft and tactical military aircraft has retained the critical skills needed to design, develop, and produce a new nuclear-capable strategic aircraft. The task force finds no reason to doubt these conclusions by industry with the exceptions of two areas: aircraft survivability to nuclear effects and meeting nuclear surety requirements. With respect to the latter, modern technology might make this task much simpler and less expensive than it was in the past. It is not too soon to aggressively explore this possibility to understand what can actually be achieved. The Navys nuclear-capable TLAM-N (delivered in 1984) and the Air Forces nuclear-capable ALCM (delivered in 1981) have both been allowed to wither technologically, as there have been no upgrades since initial production two decades ago. (The more recent nuclear-capable Advanced Cruise Missile is being retired.) However, very aggressive conventionally armed cruise missile development has kept pace with technology (most recently TACTOM Block IV for the Navy and JASSM-ER for the Air Force). This development provides an experienced skill base in virtually all relevant technical areas should a next-generation sea-based or air-delivered nuclear-capable standoff missile be required. As noted in the above discussion of long-range bombers, most glaringly the design and system engineering skills important to nuclear-armed standoff missile surety and survival to nuclear effects are not being exercised in current cruise missile programs and, hence, would introduce risks in any future development. The F-15 (delivered in 1974) and F-16 (delivered in 1979) are nuclear- capable, while the more modern F-22 is not. The next generation nuclear-capable short-range aircraft is scheduled to be the F-35 Block 4 which would come on- line in 2020 as the F-15 and F-16 retire. Ongoing design and engineering efforts for the F-22 and F-35 and similar commercial aircraft activities continually exercise most of the skills needed to accomplish a nuclear-capable F-35 Block 4, with the same exceptions noted above regarding skills for survival to nuclear effects and to meet nuclear surety requirements. Chapter 4. NNSA Nuclear Weapons Expertise The DOE/NNSA relies upon a management structure for implementing its responsibilities to national guidance that is based upon a government owned/contractor operated arrangement across the weapons program sites developed during and shortly after WWII (the weapons complex). In practice, the work force, though contractors, actually functions as pseudo government employees with only the top management of the sites representing a contractor interest. That is, management teams operate the laboratories, production plants, and test sites for NNSA, but the resident work force typically remains in place as the contractor management leadership changes through contract awards. NNSA competency begins with the quality of the technical staff it can attract and retain at headquarters and within the contractor workforce for its nuclear deterrence mission. For this purpose, NNSA competency is defined as the demonstrated ability of the agency to execute its mission to provide the United States with a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. This definition of competency also requires a judgment about the timeliness of mission execution; proficiency is perhaps a better word to describe this attribute. The framework used for assessing NNSAs competence to perform its mission is comprised of three main elements: basic educational

there does not appear to be a current problem in recruiting high caliber technical graduates to the NNSA and its contractors. There are two main areas of concerncomputer science/engineering and nuclear engineering. Graduates in computer science/engineering are in high demand both nationally and internationally. This talent is most critical for the NNSA weapons laboratories. While the weapons laboratories may not be able to compete with private industry salaries,
qualifications, workforce training to acquire nuclear weapons knowledge, and experience gained by actually performing the mission. Basic Educational Qualifications In general, they do offer the opportunity to work with some of the most advanced computation and simulation capabilities in the world. Graduates in nuclear engineering are scarce because the demand has been low since the United States stopped building new civilian nuclear power plants several decades ago. Current plans for building new nuclear power plants in the United States may create the demand that will expand the nuclear engineering programs offered by U.S. universities. On the other hand, growth in the civilian nuclear power industry could also siphon away graduates from nuclear national security missions. Today, NNSA and the contractors report that they are able to find qualified recruits for critical positions. There is concern that, in the long term,

recruitment of high caliber technical talent for the NNSA and its contractors will be challenged by the general decline in the proportion of U.S. citizens acquiring post-graduate degrees in science and engineering at U.S. universities (Figure 2). A DOE Q clearance is required for virtually all nuclear weapons mission-critical skills, and U.S. citizenship is a requirement. This diminishes the talent pool available to the NNSA for its nuclear weapons mission, and it is particularly troublesome for the weapons laboratories that need the
highest caliber technical talent.

Thats two scenarios for nuclear war --- 1st --- Deterrence IFPA 10
(The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis @ International Security Studies Program of The Fletcher School, Tufts University,- a conference report summarizing the consenus of experts at Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century Prepared by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. President, IFPA and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University) In marked contrast, the second nuclear age is characterized by multiple, independent nuclear decision-making centers. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential adversar- ies, some are rivals, and some are friends, all of whom Washington will seek to influence, signal, and restrain. In addition, the Unit- ed States may need to continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends and

warfare where, for example, an American ally such as Israel, or a third party such as China could initiate action that might escalate to include the United States.5 [Footnote] Catalytic to refer to the notion that some third party or nation might for its own reasons deliberately start a war between two major powers. According to Kahn, the widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons would make many na- tions able, and in some cases also create the pressure, to aggravate an on- going crisis, or even touch off a war between two other powers for purposes of their own. See Herman Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable, (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 57, 217. In such a scenario, the United States would not have been directly a party to the decision chain to initiate such escalation, even though it could be drawn into the escalating conflict. By the same token, there is likely to be a learning curve between nuclear weapons acquisition and the determination of how, when,
allies. It may face the possibility of cata- lytic or whether the weapons will be used. What is the learning curve, for example, for a nuclear North Korea or a nuclear Iran? Will either or both be prepared actually to use nuclear weapons? In the absence of a definitive answer to such questions,

the U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider variety of actors today than it did during the Cold War. Deterrence functions by denying benefits, imposing costs, and encouraging restraint. An effective deterrence posture requires a range of capabilities and the capacity to orient forces to address specific
challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurances sufficient to prevent the initiation of catalytic war- fare by an ally, while deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation.

As Dr. Bracken pointed out, compared to the exten- sive literature on deterrence, there has been little recent attention devoted to the dynamics of escalation in a multi-nuclear world. For example, how does one measure escalation? What are the different escalation frameworks? Is escalation the intensification of the use of force? Is it about crossing thresholds? What is counter-escalation when one party escalates against another? In short, there is abun- dant need for developing and understanding the strategic interac- tions and therefore escalation in a multinuclear world. In light of the complexities of todays security environment, General Kevin Chilton, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), described his efforts to develop a broader, whole- of-government approach to deterrence. This combines military, economic, diplomatic, political, and information resources to dissuade or deter potential adversaries from making decisions that put Americas vital national interests at risk. General Chilton spoke about the need not only to define vital interests as clearly as possible, but also to understand which actors have the capabilities or might be developing the means to hold these interests at risk, understanding the key decision makers and their processes as well as what they value the most and, just as important, what they fear. Elaborating on deterrence requirements, General Chilton em- phasized the importance of four critical elements: early warning, command and control, delivery systems, and weapons. In each, the Air Force plays an indispens- able role. In the early warning area, the United States relies on the Air Force through satellites and radar network. In command and control, key elements are provided by the Air Force, including Milstar satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high fre- quency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of delivery systems, as not- ed earlier, two legs of the strategic triad, ICBMs and bombers, are furnished by the Air Force. For nuclear weapons, the Air Force has crucially important responsibilities to ensure the safety and secu- rity of the current stockpile. General Chilton outlined the continu- ing need for a comprehensive stockpile management program that ensures that warheads have built into them the requisite safety and security measures while ensuring their continued reliability. The discussion of nuclear weapons and deterrence included a detailed consideration of extended deterrence in a multinuclear world. As Dr. Clark A. Murdock, Senior Adviser, International Se- curity Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, sug- gested, the United States faces a three-dimensional problem: how to reduce its reliance on nuclear deterrence while assuring allies that extended deterrence can be trusted, and maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. America will need both to

The United States also faces the need to deter use of biological or chemical weapons. The United States has demonstrated in the post-Cold War era (in Iraq for ex- ample) that it is not deterred by the prospect that its adversaries may have biological or
deter potential adversaries while it assures allies of the reliability of an extended security guarantee.

chemical weapons. However, America has sought to prevent nuclear acquisition by potential adversaries out of fear that it might be deterred if they possess nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist, extended deterrence and as- commitments. This means sustaining a robust nuclear weapons capability. The logic set forth by Dr. Murdock in- cluded the assumption that global re- ductions in nuclear inventories can only be achieved if nations lessen their reliance on nuclear weapons. Yet we have nations seeking nuclear weapons not necessarily to use them in war but instead to prevent or even threaten their use. Nuclear weapons may be acquired not only for defen- sive or deterrent purposes but also for offensive uses, including nuclear blackmail. If in the second nuclear age there are increasing numbers of nuclear weapons states, this means that such states are becom- ing more dependent on nuclear weapons. Therefore, striking the proper balance between reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and maintaining credible extend- ed deterrence and assurance becomes an imperative for U.S. secu- rity policy. Building on the theme of sharp differentiation between the bipo- lar Cold War era and the emerging multinuclear world, Dr. Ca- mille Grand, Director, Fondation Dr. Camille Grand, Director, Fonda- pour la Recherche Stratgique in tion pour la Recherche Stratgique France, underscored the fact that

nuclear proliferation is accelerating and could cease to be manageable. The quickening pace of nuclear proliferation is evident in the fact that in the first fifty years of the nuclear age we had on av- erage one new nuclear power per decade. In the last twelve years alone four additional nuclear players have emerged, in this case from regions where international tensions are great, namely East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. In addition to the problem of a growing number of
nuclear-weapon states is the proliferation of missiles and other WMD. The discussion of nuclear deterrence, according to Dr. Grand, is complicated by the nuclear abolitionist debate, which has attract- ed widespread attention. This contrasts sharply with the paucity of thinking about the future of deterrence. The need to rethink deterrence may have been inhibited by the abolition debate. The is- sues are intertwined, especially if we retain nuclear weapons but rely less on such capabilities. Dr. Grand suggested that we cannot disconnect the various aspects of the nuclear debate, missile de- fense, space policy, and conventional strike capabilities. Added to this mix is a global civilian

nuclear energy renaissance that is likely to lead additional countries to acquire expertise that could evolve toward nuclear weapons if they choose to take that path. Among the effects of such trends will be the weakening of the nonproliferation regime. Dr. Grand observed that the NPT will not survive the withdrawal of a second country (in addition to North Korea) that cheats within the treaty and subsequently withdraws. Contrary to the wishes of nuclear abolitionists, we may see the re-nuclearization of international relations, with increased risk of use. Dr.
Grand warned that delegitimizing nuclear weapons would lead to the de-legitimization of deterrence, which would create the very instability that is contrary to the goals of the abolitionists. He pointed to the need to think about and define the key features of an interim world order that will remain stable and safe even as we hold out the long-term vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

2nd --- Nuke terrorism Speice 06

(Patrick, JD Candidate College of William and Mary, Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation: Eliminating the Current Liability Barrier to Bilateral U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Assistance Programs, William and Mary Law Review, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, February, Lexis)

Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 [Footnote 42] n42 Allison et al., supra note 2, at 55-62 (identifying a number of simple nuclear weapon designs that are within the reach of terrorists with fissile material); Bunn et al., supra note 2, at 12 (citing several studies that confirm the ease with which
construct a nuclear device). [End Footnote] Moreover,

terrorists could construct a nuclear weapon after stealing fissile material); Bill Keller, Nuclear Nightmares, N.Y. Times Mag., May 26, 2002, at 22 (articulating the ease of acquiring knowledge detailing how to

the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 [Footnote 43, supra note 2] Matthew Bunn of the Belfer Center for International Affairs at Harvard University writes that [i]f stolen or built abroad, a nuclear bomb might be delivered to the United States, intact or in pieces, by ship or aircraft or truck, or the materials could be smuggled in and the bomb constructed at the site of its intended use. Intercepting a smuggled nuclear weapon or the materials for one at the U.S. border would not be easy . The length of the border, the diversity of means of transport, and the ease of shielding the radiation from plutonium or highly enriched uranium all operate in favor of the terrorists. The huge volume of drugs successfully smuggled into this country provides an alarming reference point.Matthew Bunn et al., Project on Managing the Atom & Nuclear Threat Initiative, Securing Nuclear Weapons
and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action, at v (2002), available at http://www.nti.org/e research/securing nuclear weapons and materi als May2002.pdf; see also Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material 12-13 (1996) (

describing the porous border and "essentially infinite" means of delivering a nuclear device into the United States). [End supra note 2, from footnote 43] Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing
terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat,

there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 [Footnote 50] Albright, supra note 32 ("The desire for revenge may lead the United States, or perhaps its allies, to respond with nuclear weapons, eliminating the perpetrators if they could be immediately identified, but likely causing untold suffering to civilian populations."); Greenfield At-Large: America's New War: Nuclear Threats (CNN television broadcast Nov. 1, 2001)
retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists (statement of Gregg Easterbrook, Writer and Visiting Scholar, Brookings Institute), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/ gal.00.html ("[I]f an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, ... in the 24 hours that followed, Muslims on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries."). [End Footnote] In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51

a hundred million

would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down

This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United

States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that

regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use

of nuclear weapons. 53