CASE LAWS

1. Matter of Colorado Springs Air Crash , 867 F. Supp. 630, 634 (N.D.
Ill. 1994)
Facts of the case:
A Colorado victim sued an Illinois defendant over a fatal air crash in Colorado.
Plaintiff favouring Illinois rule imposing joint and several liability among
tortfeasors applied over a defendant-favouring Colorado rule apportioning
liability. On March 3, 1991, about 0944 mountain standard time, United Airlines
flight 585,
A Boeing 737-291 (737-200), N999UA, crashed while manoeuvring to land on
runway 35 at Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Flight 585 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Denver,
Colorado, to Colorado Springs. Numerous witnesses reported that, shortly after
completing its turn onto the final approach course, the airplane rolled steadily
to the right and pitched nose down until it reached a nearly vertical attitude
before hitting the ground. The 2 flight crewmembers, 3 flight attendants, and 20
passengers aboard were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces
and fire. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the
crash but “could not identify conclusive evidence to explain the loss of United
Airlines flight 585. In its probable cause statement, the Board indicated that it
considered the two most likely explanations for the sudden uncontrollable upset
to be a malfunction of the airplane’s directional control system or an encounter
with an unusually severe atmospheric disturbance. The Board further indicated
in its probable cause statement that, although anomalies had been identified in
the accident airplane’s rudder control system, it was unable to identify a
condition under which any such anomaly would have produced a rudder
movement that the pilots could not have easily countered by the airplane's roll
controls. Additionally, the Board concluded that weather conditions in the
Colorado Springs area at the time of the accident were conducive to the
formation of a horizontal axis vortex (rotor) and that some witness observations
supported the existence of a rotor at or near the time and place of the accident.
However, the Board determined that too little was known about the
characteristics of rotors to conclude whether a rotor was a factor in the
accident.
Questions for the Court to consider:
1. Whether the government’s settlement with the plaintiffs is subject to
good faith review under Illinois law, Colorado law, or Washington law.
2. Whether the plaintiff’s award is to be reduced by the actual amount paid
by a settling defendant as opposed to the settling defendant’s
proportionate share of fault.
3. Choice of Law determination.
The Court’s Findings:
1. The non-settling defendant’s liability to the plaintiff will be reduced by
the actual amount paid in settlement.
 2. The effect of the government's settlement on the remaining defendants is
based on plaintiffs’ claims against those defendants.
3. The court in applying the choice of law rules of the forum state, Illinois
ruled that:
a) The principal place of business of the defendants (Illinois) was the
most significant contact for the question of whether applying joint
and several liability will deter negligent behaviour. Holding a
defendant corporation accountable to its principal place of business
"serves choice of law interests in certainty, predictability and
expectation."
b) Applying the joint and several liability principles of tortfeasors, the
Illinois Contribution Act encourages settlement of suits pending in
court.
4. The court, in applying the Illinois Contribution Act to the government’s
settlement with the plaintiffs, held the defendants jointly and severally
liable for the consequences of their negligence.

2. Erwin v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 229, 238 (D. Del. 2018)
Facts of the case:
This case arose out of a fatal accident in Florida, where a side airbag in a Ford
Edge being driven by Plaintiff Dennis Erwin's wife failed to deploy, allegedly
because of a defect in design. The accident occurred in March 2014, as the
Erwins were traveling from Port Charlotte, starting a journey back to their
permanent residence in Ohio. Plaintiff's decedent, Susan Erwin, was driving the
Ford and executing a U-turn when she was struck by an oncoming car. The
Erwins were Ohio citizens, but their visit to Florida was not a casual one. The
record reflects that over the winter, they spent several months in Florida as part
of the population colloquially known as "snowbirds," as they had for 13 years
before. The striking driver, Albert McClinton, against whom Ford has asserted a
crossclaim, was a Florida citizen at the time of the accident. Mrs. Erwin had
surgery in Florida for injuries sustained in the accident, but tragically died a
month later. The Erwins acquired the car through what is best described as the
stream of commerce. Ford's principal place of business is Michigan, where the
design process occurred, but the vehicle itself was fabricated in Ontario,
Canada in 2009. Ford's vehicles are sold by dealerships all across the United
States, with over a hundred of those dealerships in Florida alone. This
particular vehicle was sold to an independent dealership in Watsonville,
California, and thereafter purchased by a rental car company. That company
then transferred ownership to a Sidney, Ohio resident in April 2010, from whom
the Erwins acquired it in July of that same year. They registered it in Powell,
Ohio, but regularly used the vehicle in Florida over the winter months.
The Legal issue in Context:
 Whether Florida or Michigan Laws apply in determining the standard of
fault in comparative negligence cases.
The Court’s Findings:
The matter having been moved from the state court to Federal Court in
Delaware, the Delaware’s choice of law rules applied and the law of the state
where the injury occurred presumptively applied.
The court applied the rules set out in the Restatement(Second) of Conflicts of
Laws and concluded that Florida law would apply to the case.
The principle brought out in the case was that the state where the manufacturer
is headquartered cannot assert a dominant interest when the effects of any
product defect are felt elsewhere.
3. Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 1985)
Facts of the case:
Plaintiff-appellant was the personal representative of the Estates of Almon O.
Thompson and Doris E. Thompson, a Florida couple, who were killed in a plane
crash in Lake Michigan. At the time of their deaths, they were on a journey from
West Palm Beach, Florida, to Oshkosh, Wisconsin in a plane which was partially
owned by Mr. Thompson, in order to attend the Experimental Aviation
Association Annual Convention. Plaintiff-appellant, as the personal
representative of the estate, filed this complaint alleging that the defendant-
appellee, the United States, was negligent in providing air traffic control
services to the Thompsons. The district court, applying the conflicts laws of the
State of Illinois, (the place of the alleged misconduct), determined that the
Florida wrongful death statute should be applied in this case. It was the
plaintiff's position that the Illinois wrongful death statute should be used. In
Florida, unlike Illinois, the representative of the decedents' estate may recover
on behalf of non-minor children only if they are "partly or wholly dependent on
the decedent for support."
A bench trial was conducted on the issue of dependency. The court determined
that the plaintiff-appellant had not met the burden of establishing that Beth
Ann, the decedents' sole heir, was partly or wholly dependent upon the
decedents' for support or services and ruled that the defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff-appellant appealed.
Questions for the Appellate Court to consider:
 Whether the district court's conclusion, using Illinois conflicts of law
principles, that the Florida Wrongful Death Act instead of the comparable
Illinois provision should be applied in this case, was erroneous.
 Whether the Illinois or Florida Wrongful Death Statute should be applied
pursuant to the Illinois Conflicts Law.
The Court’s Findings:
In applying the Second Restatement, the court in principle ruled that:
i. Choice of law principles should neither penalize a plaintiff for making
an otherwise advantageous move nor award forum shopping.
ii. A limit on recovery should not be applied when there is no domiciliary
defendant because it advances no policy behind the limitation.
The court ruled in favour of the decedent’s lineal descendant place of domicile
(Illinois) as opposed to the personal representative’s place of domicile (Florida)
by finding that the Illinois’ interests in deterring tortious conduct in Illinois and
in compensating its citizen (Beth Ann) was greater than Florida’s interest in
limiting recovery.
The court found, through using the Illinois’ most significant relationship test,
that the district court erred in choosing the Florida Wrongful Death Statute.
4. Re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 750 F.
Supp. 793, 799 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
Facts of the case:
On August 16, 1987, Northwest Airlines Flight 255, a DC-9 aircraft which was
designed and manufactured by MDC, crashed shortly after take-off from Detroit
Metropolitan Airport and resulted in the death of one hundred fifty-six persons.
Cecelia Cichan, four years of age, was the sole surviving passenger of the crash.
Punitive and exemplary damage claims except those cases that were filed in
California against MDC, in which case, the law of California shall apply, and the
parties must rebrief the choice of law issues concerning the Plaintiffs' claims for
compensatory damages on a date which shall be established by this Court.
Less than two weeks later (August 28, 1987), the first case was filed in the
Eastern District of Michigan. On December 9, 1987, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ordered the transfer of all Flight 255 federal cases to the
district court of Michigan for consolidated pretrial proceedings. On August 18,
1989, the district court of Michigan issued an Order in which it transferred and
consolidated all cases relating to the Flight 255 matter, separated the issue of
liability from the issue of damages, and scheduled the commencement of a joint
liability trial, which was designed to resolve all liability issues, for October 2,
1989. As of the date of the Order, one hundred fifty-seven cases have been filed
in this matter on behalf of the passengers and flight attendants on the accident
aircraft who died or were injured in the crash, and those persons who were
killed or injured as a result of being present at the accident site at the time of
the crash. These cases were originally filed in Michigan, Arizona, California, and
Florida. The Defendants, Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Northwest) and McDonnell
Douglas Corporation (MDC), have also filed cross claims and third-party claims
against each other.
This has come to be known as one of the most complex choice of law cases of all
times.
The Legal issue in Context:
Whether a choice of law issue exists between the states of Michigan, Arizona,
California and Florida in the below contested matters:
i. MDC’s potential liability for the alleged design defects.
ii. Northwest’s and MDC’s potential liability for punitive or exemplary
damages.
iii. The Plaintiff’s individual claims for compensatory damages.
This prompted the famous quote by Judge Pierson M. Hall:
 The law on "choice of law" in the various states and in the federal courts is a
veritable jungle, which, if the law can be found out, leads not to a "rule of action"
but a reign of chaos dominated in each case by the judge's "informed guess" as
to what some other state other than the one in which he sits would hold its law to
be.

Principles established in the Case:

1. Michigan’s choice of law rule was applied as a matter of trite law.
2. Michigan courts pure negligence risk-utility test to product liability cases.
3. The Michigan choice of law doctrine centres on whether there is a
rational reason to displace its own law in favour of law of a foreign state.
Applying the Michigan Negligence Risk-Utility Liability Law:
The court considered the following factors:
a. Michigan's negligence risk-utility products liability law reflects a
producer protective policy.
- Such a doctrine is designed to induce companies to conduct business in
Michigan by protecting domiciled producers from excessive financial
liability.
b. The Strict Product Liability Laws of California and Missouri reflect a
consumer protective and a producer regulatory policy.
- First, these laws are intended to encourage the design of safe products,
thereby reducing the incidence of injuries by making the producer incur
the monetary consequences that are associated with defective goods.
- Second, the strict liability reflects a determination that the costs of
damaging events, which result from defective products, can best be
borne by the entities that produce and sell the products.
The Court’s Findings:
1. With respect to the Plaintiffs’ design defect claims against MDC, the
court found that there was a rational reason to displace the Michigan
Product Liability Law.
2. With regard to whether the defendants were liable for punitive or
exemplary damages, the court concluded that the choice of law rule of
Arizona was to apply in determining the substantive product liability
issue since most of the plaintiffs domiciled or resided in Arizona.
Consequently, it was held that an Arizona court was to apply the products
liability law of California to design defect contentions of the Arizona
claimants since California was the place of the alleged misconduct.
3. With regard to all Plaintiffs who filed their individual product liability
claims in Florida, the court found that the law of California shall also
apply to those claims.
4. With regard to the issue of punitive damages, the court laid down the
following principles:
a. A determination on this relies on either the state where the injury
occurred or the state where the alleged misconduct occurred or the
state where the defendants have their principal place of business.
b. In cases of product liability, the domicile or residence of the plaintiff is
not relevant to the evaluation of the choice of law issues concerning
punitive damages because the decision by the state on whether to
 allow punitive damages focuses solely on corporate regulatory
laws/policies versus corporate protective laws/policies.
c. States that allow the award of punitive damages do so in furtherance
of regulatory and deterrent policies. However, once a plaintiff is
compensated for their injuries and made whole by the recovery of
compensatory damages, the interest of the plaintiff’s state of domicile
is usually considered satisfied.
Based on the above principles, the court found that punitive damages were not
available under the Michigan Wrongful Death Act and concluded that the
plaintiffs were not in a position to pursue such damages under Michigan Law.
5. Wert v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 634 F. Supp. 401, 404 n.3 (E.D.
Mo. 1986)
Facts of the case:
This cause of action arises out of an accident in which Major Larry I. Wert was
killed after an unsuccessful ejection from an F-4C Phantom Fighter. The
accident aircraft, assigned to and maintained by the Indiana Air National Guard,
apparently caught fire and subsequently crashed near the Air Force's Gila Bend
Tactics Range in Maricopa County, Arizona. Major Wert, at the time of the
accident, was flying with his Indiana National Guard Unit (122nd Tactical
Fighter Wing, 163rd Tactical Fighter Squadron) on a training mission from Luke
Air Force Base, Arizona.
Plaintiffs filed this action under Arizona's wrongful death statute in state court
under theories of products liability and negligence. Defendants are contractors
who were involved in producing the F-4C Phantom aircraft pursuant to
Government contracts. McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) designed and
produced the air frame. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd. (Martin-Baker) designed
and produced the ejection seat. General Electric (GE) designed and produced
the F-4C's J-79-15A engines. Defendants removed the action to the Arizona
federal district court and, on defendants' motion, were granted a change of
venue to the District Court in Missouri.
The defendants sought to dismiss all or part of plaintiffs' complaint. The
defendants first alleged that both counts of the complaint were barred by the
Indiana statute of repose. In the alternative, the defendants alleged that under
Arizona law, products liability is barred by the Arizona statute of limitations.
The plaintiffs, in response, asserted that the Court should apply Missouri law,
which would bar neither products liability nor negligence of the plaintiffs'
complaint.
The Court applied the conflicts-of-laws rules of Arizona, the state from which
the action was transferred. Arizona has adopted the conflict rules of the
Restatement(Second) of Conflict of Laws.
The Legal issue in Context:
Whether the product liability laws of Arizona(place of injury) can be favoured as
opposed to the product liability laws of Indiana(place of domicile of the
decedent) and in turn allow the statute of repose of the chosen state to apply.
Principles established in the Case:
1. In instances where the decedent’s presence is centered in a certain state,
the flyover(fortuitous)theory of the place of injury in air crash cases is
overlooked.
2. A state cannot purport to have an interest in the application of its statute
of repose to bar all recovery by the resident of that state on actions that
occurred outside that state due to the conduct of defendants that are not
residents of that state.
3. The court denied applying the substantive laws of the place of
manufacture of the defective product(airplane) where there was more
than one defendant, and no tortious acts were committed in the forum
state.
4. A motion to dismiss will not be granted merely because the complaint
does not state every element necessary for recovery with precision.
5. It is unfair to subject a stranger(non-resident) to less protection than that
afforded to a resident.
The Court’s Findings:
The Court found that Arizona law applies to the cause of action. The Court
further found that even under Arizona law, defendants' motion to dismiss the
product liability count of the Plaintiff must be denied.
6. Schoeberle v. United States, 2000 WL 1868130, at *12 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 18, 2000) , aff’d and adopted, 2001 WL 292984 (N.D. Ill.
2001)
Facts of the case:
These three related cases arise from an air crash that killed a pilot and his two
passengers on April 29, 1996. The plaintiffs are Mary Leiske, personally, and
representing the estate of her deceased husband, the pilot, Roy Leiske, and
Kevin Leiske ("the Leiske plaintiffs"); Mary C. Schoeberle, individually and
representing the estate of her deceased husband, Andrew P. Schoeberle ("the
Schoeberle plaintiffs"); and Alison Cook, individually and representing the
estate of her deceased husband, James Cook ("the Cook plaintiffs"). All plaintiffs
have sued the United States of America ("United States") under the Federal Tort
Claim Act ("FTCA") based on alleged conduct by air traffic controllers employed
by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), and Signature Flight Support
Corporation ("Signature Flight") under state common law, based on its alleged
conduct as an aircraft maintenance facility. In addition, the Schoeberle plaintiffs
have asserted state common law claims against Monarch Aviation Services
("Monarch"), which owned the aircraft, and the Leiske Estate, based on the
alleged conduct of the deceased pilot.
The plaintiffs in all three cases moved for a choice of law determination on
liability and damage issues.
Non-contested Issues:
i. All the parties agreed that Illinois choice of law rules governed the
case.
 ii. All parties agreed that the alleged governmental negligence by the
FAA air traffic controllers occurred solely in Illinois, and that
Illinois choice of law rules govern the FTCA claims made against
the United States.
iii. All parties also agreed that a district court sitting in diversity in the
Northern District of Illinois was obligated to apply the choice-of-
law rules for the State of Illinois.
iv. All parties agreed that the Illinois Supreme Court uses the "most
significant relationship” test for choosing the appropriate law in
tort cases.
v. All parties agreed that the law of Iowa controls the liability issues
raised by the plaintiffs against Signature Flight, thus rendering
unnecessary any choice of law determination on that liability issue.
Contested Issues:
 Which laws apply to the plaintiff’s diverse liability claims, compensatory
and punitive damages.
Principles established in the Case:
1. In determining compensatory damages in air crash cases, the law of the
injured person’s domicile has the greatest interest as the said state is
concerned that its residents are appropriately compensated.
Consequently, the state where the injury occurred has relatively little
interest in the relief afforded to non-residents.
2. In choice of law determinations with respect to punitive damages, the
state with the most significant interest is the place of the injury and the
place of most of the alleged misconducts by the defendant/s.
The Court’s Findings:
The Court, in applying the doctrine of depecage, found that:
a. Illinois law applied to the Leiske plaintiffs' liability claim against the
United States.
b. Iowa law applied to plaintiffs' liability claims against Signature Flight,
Monarch and the Leiske Estate.
c. Wisconsin law applied to plaintiffs' compensatory damages claims against
the United States, Signature Flight, Monarch, and the Leiske Estate.
d. Iowa's law of punitive damages applied to the Schoeberle plaintiffs'
claims against Signature Flight, Monarch and the Leiske Estate.

7. Greenfield v. Monroe Clinic, Inc., 2019 WL 2225982, at *5 (N.D. Ill.

2019)
Facts of the case:
The plaintiffs Alivia Greenfield ("Ms. Greenfield") and Joshua Greenfield ("Mr.
Greenfield") were a married couple who resided in Illinois. The defendant, The
Monroe Clinic, Inc. ("TMC") was a Wisconsin corporation that has its principal
place of business in Wisconsin but operated multiple clinics in different states.
TMC did business in Freeport, Illinois as a medical clinic under the name
"Highland Women's Care" ("the Illinois Clinic"). The defendant, Dr. Joseph Ehle
was an obstetrician and gynaecologist who practiced medicine in both Illinois
and Wisconsin. Dr. Ehle was an employee of TMC and practices at both the
Illinois Clinic and another one of TMC's clinics in Monroe, Wisconsin ("the
Wisconsin Clinic").
In January of 2015, Ms. Greenfield went to the Illinois Clinic, seeking treatment
for irregular menstruation. Her Complaint did not specify which doctor she saw
on that visit. Ms. Greenfield returned to the Illinois Clinic in June and July of
2015, during which visits Dr. Ehle treated her. On July 2, 2015, Dr. Ehle ordered
Ms. Greenfield an ultrasound that revealed that she had an enlarged uterus and
an abnormal endometrium. Based apparently on the concern that Ms.
Greenfield might have endometrial cancer, Dr. Ehle recommended that she
undergo a Laparoscopic Supracervical Hysterectomy ("LSCH"), in which a
woman's uterus is removed. Ms. Greenfield consented to this procedure.
On July 22, 2015, Dr. Ehle performed the LSCH on Ms. Greenfield in the
Wisconsin Clinic. Dr. Ehle removed her uterus through a process called
morcellation—breaking the uterine tissue down into tiny fragments and then
removing as much of the fragmentation as possible. Dr. Ehle sent some of those
fragments for testing; the pathologist concluded Ms. Greenfield had an
endometrial tumour. Dr. Ehle then referred Ms. Greenfield to a gynaecological
oncologist. Ms. Greenfield saw the oncologist on September 15, 2015, and
underwent a procedure to remove approximately 30 sarcomatous tumours
throughout her abdominal cavity.
The plaintiffs asserted that Dr. Ehle's decision to morcellate Ms. Greenfield's
uterus with potentially malignant cells therein (rather than remove the uterus
intact) caused malignant tumours to metastasize throughout her abdomen. The
plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Ehle's negligence caused Ms. Greenfield's malignant
sarcoma to advance from stage I to stage III, which is not curable.
The Legal issue in Context:
 Whether the Wisconsin law applies to the claim rendering it time barred.
 Whether the Illinois law applies to the claim rendering it timely.
Principles established in the Case:
1. Section 142 of the Second Restatement contains a presumption that the
forum state will apply its own statute of limitations. [ “An action will be
maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, even
though it would be barred by the statute of limitations of another state”]
2. Even when the substantive law of a non-forum state applies, Illinois
courts apply the Illinois statute of limitations 'because statutes of
limitations are procedural, fixing the time in which the remedy for a
wrong may be sought rather than altering substantive rights.
The Court’s Findings:
The Court found in favour of applying Illinois statute of limitations to the
medical negligence count.
8. Thornton v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 2013 WL 4011008, at *6
(N.D. Ill. 2013)
Facts of the case:
This case arose from a 2005 airplane crash near Lockhart River in Queensland,
Australia.
The plaintiffs bring wrongful death negligence and strict liability claims against
the defendants, Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation, Honeywell International
Inc., Jeppesen Sanderson Inc., and Matthew Hier (collectively "the
Defendants"). The defendants, in turn, brought contribution and indemnity
claims against Airservices Australia ("Airservices").
The plaintiffs are the representatives of decedents who were killed in the crash
of a Fairchild SA227-DC Metro 23 Aircraft on May 7, 2005. Transair operated
the flight as an Aero Tropics Airservices Flight from Bamaga to Cairns with an
intermediate stop in Lockhart River, Australia. The decedents were all residents
of Australia, Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. ("Hamilton Sundstrand") was a
Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Connecticut, Jeppesen
Sanderson, Inc. ("Jeppesen") was a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
in Colorado. Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell") was a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Matthew Hier, an
engineer manager for Hamilton Sundstrand, was a resident of Illinois.
Airservices was a statutory body corporate that is wholly owned by the
Australian government, and which provided aeronautical information for
aircraft that fly into, out of or through the Australian Flight Information Region,
or the Australian airspace.
The Legal issue in Context:
 Whether the settlement between the Airservices and the Plaintiffs was
made in good faith under the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act
(IJTCA)
 Whether the Australian or Illinois Laws of settlement apply to the case in
a matter filed in an Illinois Court.
 Whether a good-faith settlement discharges a settling tortfeasor’s
contribution liability to a non-settling tortfeasor.
Principles established in the Case:
Australian decided cases confirm that:
1. Settlement against one concurrent tortfeasor absolving it from further
liability to the plaintiff will not defeat a claim for contribution by another
defendant because the settling defendant would have been liable prior to
the settlement.
2. A tortfeasor who has settled is exposed to a claim for contribution from a
tortfeasor who is held liable by judgement, or settles latter than the first,
and believes that the first tortfeasor has not borne that tortfeasor’s full
share of the loss.
The Court’s Findings:
The Court found that the law of Queensland, Australia governed the effect of the
settlement between Airservices, and the Plaintiffs on the Defendant’s third-
party contribution and indemnity claims against Airservices.
The Court, consequently, declined to apply the IJTCA to dismiss the third-party
claims against Airservices.
9. Martinez v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 2000 WL 1741910, at *4
(N.D. Ill.
2000)
Facts of the case:
In December 1998, Ernest and Victoria Martinez were passengers in a motor
vehicle driven by Ernest Martinez, Sr. The plaintiffs were driving from Denver,
Colorado to Idaho. While driving through Wyoming, the plaintiffs were involved
in an auto vehicle accident with a semi-truck owned by the defendant. Following
the accident, Ernest and Victoria Martinez received medical treatment in
Cheyenne, Wyoming and subsequently returned to Colorado where Ernest
continued to receive medical treatment. At the time of accident, the plaintiffs
were of Denver, Colorado. The defendant was an Iowa corporation
headquartered in Fort Dodge, Iowa and did business in Illinois with a terminal
in Chicago, Illinois. The plaintiffs brought suit in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, and the case was removed to the district court in Illinois premised upon
diversity jurisdiction. Counts I and II of plaintiffs' complaint alleged Ernest and
Victoria Martinez received injuries from the defendant's negligence. Count III
alleged loss of consortium by Ernest's wife, Yvonne Martinez.
The defendant brought a motion seeking the application of Colorado law to the
issue of damages.
The Legal issue for the Court’s determination:
The applicable law to the issue of damages (Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, or
Wyoming).
Principle established in the Case:
The place of domicile of the plaintiffs is considered of primary importance when
addressing choice-of-law issues of damages because the domicile state is the
state which will feel the social and economic impact of the recovery or non-
recovery.

The Court’s Findings:

The Court concluded that Colorado had the most significant relationship to the
issue of compensatory damages. While other states, principally Wyoming, had
some connections to and interests in the applicable law, those connections and
interests related most significantly to issues not presently before the Court.
The defendant’s motion was granted.
10. La Plante v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 27 F.3d 731, 743 (1st Cir.
1994)
Facts of the case:
The plaintiff-appellee Arthur LaPlante was rendered quadriplegic from a fall
sustained while riding an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) designed, manufactured, and
distributed by the defendants-appellants Honda R D Co., Ltd., Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., and American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (collectively "Honda"). A jury found
Honda liable and awarded the plaintiff $9,652,000 in compensatory damages.
This amount was reduced to $8,204,200 to account for the plaintiff's
comparative negligence. In a separate proceeding, the district court granted
judgment as a matter of law for Honda on the plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages. Honda appealed from the judgment of liability and compensatory
damages. The plaintiff cross-appealed on its punitive damages claim.
On Saturday, March 11, 1989, the course of Arthur LaPlante's life was
dramatically and irreversibly altered. On that morning plaintiff, a twenty-four-
year-old army mechanic stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, and three friends,
Kelly Kallhoff, Randy Leib, and Mike Mohawk, ventured to nearby Pikes Peak in
order to ride Kallhoff's three-wheel ATV, a 1982 Honda ATC200. This ATV is a
three-wheeled motorized vehicle intended for off-road use. The vehicle has
handlebar steering and large low-pressure tires, two in the rear, and one in
front. The plaintiff, who had never before ridden an ATV, was the third to ride
after Kallhoff and Leib. After climbing to the top of a knoll, plaintiff began to
descend at a speed of 5-10 m.p.h. When the plaintiff was unable to negotiate a
left-hand turn onto a twelve-foot-wide dirt road, he fell over a steep
embankment and broke his neck, resulting in permanent paralysis from the
neck down.
The defendants denied liability on the grounds that the ATV ridden by the
plaintiff was altered or modified after its original sale.
The Legal issues for the Court’s determination:
 Whether Honda was liable for product liability under the Rhodes Island
laws.
 Whether the district court’s failure to submit the statutory defense of
subsequent alteration to the jury amounted to a reversible error.
 Whether the district court’s determination to apply Rhode Island instead
of Colorado law to the issue of compensatory damages was erroneous.
 Whether the damages for pain and suffering(punitive and nominal
damages)fall within the scope of the prejudgment interest as prescribed
in the Rhode Island Prejudgment Interest Statute.
Principle established in the Case:
1. An instructional error requires reversal only where the error is
determined to be prejudicial based on a whole-record review.
2. An error is prejudicial if it could have affected the result of the jury’s
deliberations.
3. In a case where the liability issues are so distinct and separable from the
damages issues then a partial trial of the liability issues may be sustained
in a retrial without an injustice being committed.
4. Domiciliary states have a strong interest in the welfare of their plaintiffs
and seeing that they are adequately compensated for their injuries.
 5. The law of the place of injury is often applied in issues of liability whereas
the interests of damages are best served by applying the law of the
plaintiff’s domicile to the measure of compensatory damages.
6. The damages for pain and suffering are in the nature of compensatory
damages.
The Court’s Findings:
The court found that:
a. The trial court had made a reversible error by not instructing the jury on
the statutory defence under the Rhode Island’s subsequent alteration
statute and the judgment of liability was vacated and the case remanded
for a new trial on all liability issues.
b. The district court made a proper pronouncement on applying the Rhode
Island laws as to compensatory damages and upheld their decision.
c. The prejudgment interest should be assessed on the entire damages
award.

11. Guillory v. United States, 699 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1983)
Facts of the case:
Diana Deville Guillory, individually and on behalf of her minor son, David
Guillory, Jr., initiated this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
alleging that her husband, and the young boy's father, David Guillory, Sr., died
as a result of the negligence of the United States through the Veterans
Administration (VA) and its agents in the VA hospital in Houston, Texas. The
case was tried before a federal district court in Louisiana, which applied Texas
law and awarded the plaintiff $1200 for funeral expenses, noting that additional
damages were not recoverable under Texas law.
Texas choice of law rules determined which state's substantive law governed
the rights of the litigants.

The Legal issues for the Court’s determination:

 whether the district court erred by concluding that Texas law was
applicable to the controversy in the case as opposed to Louisiana law.
 Whether the district court erred by concluding that Texas law bore the
most significant relationship to the occurrence in question.
Principle established in the Case:
1. In choice of law cases, the ultimate resolution centres around the
determination of which state's law will most effectively advance the
recognized policy interests of all/both the conflicting states.
2. The court should factor in the burden of the state that will suffer the
expense of providing for the widow and her child should a meaningful
recovery not be possible.
The Court’s Findings:
The court found that:
 a. The district court erred by concluding that Texas law bore the most
significant relationship to the occurrence in question.
b. The district court erred by applying Texas law to the case sub judice.
c. The application of Louisiana law most effectively promoted the needs of
the interstate system, the relevant policies of Louisiana and Texas law.
d. There was no conflict of laws between Texas and Louisiana on the issue of
Liability and upheld it.
The case was remanded to the district court for a new trial on the issue of
damages as provided for under Louisiana law.
12. Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 865, 872
(E.D.N.Y. 1990)
Facts of the case:
This action arose out of an airplane accident on September 17, 1987, at
Barksdale Air Base in Louisiana which resulted in the death of Sgt. Joseph M.
Burgio. On September 16, 1988, Sgt. Burgio's widow, Ann M. Burgio, suing
under letters of administration issued in Suffolk County, New York, as executrix
of his estate and in her individual capacity, brought this wrongful death action
in the Supreme Court of the State of New York against defendants McDonnell
Douglas, Inc., a Maryland corporation with a principal place of business in
Missouri, and Douglas Aircraft, Inc., a division of McDonnell Douglas, Inc.
located in California. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The parties
stipulated that defendants would not contest liability, thereby leaving at issue
only damages.
The defendants have moved for an order in limine determining which state's law
should apply to the issue of damages. They argued that the court should look
first to Louisiana choice of law rules, and that these dictate application of New
York internal law. The plaintiff contends that the court should look only to
Louisiana's internal law of damages. Unlike New York, Louisiana allows
damages for loss of consortium and for emotional grief or psychological injury
and does not require that collateral benefits received by plaintiff on account of
the death be deducted from any judgment.
The Legal issues for the Court’s determination:
 Whether the Louisiana or New York substantive laws were to apply on the
matter of loss of consortium and damages in a wrongful death action
Principle established in the Case:
1. A party’s domicile does not change as a result of military assignment,
even for a prolonged period, to a different country or state.
2. Domicile once acquired shall not be forfeited by absence on business of
the State or of the United States.
3. A person does not usually acquire a domicile of choice by his presence in
a place under physical or legal compulsion.
4. Compensation of an injured plaintiff is primarily a concern of the state in
which the plaintiff is domiciled.
5. Where the interests of domiciliary plaintiffs are found to be less
favourable to the plaintiffs, the court is obliged to apply the law of the
 domiciliary state regardless of whether it limits recovery of the plaintiff's
damages. The state’s interest is not merely that which will bring its
citizens the greatest benefits.
The Court’s Findings:
The Court found that New York (place of domicile) had a more significant
interest which overcame the presumption that Louisiana law (place of injury)
applies. Therefore, the court concluded that New York law applied to the
plaintiff’s loss of consortium claim and damages claims for wrongful death.