INTERPLEADER

An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the
rent due for the property leased.135 This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her from "double
vexation in respect of one liability."136 He or she may file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her
obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants’dispute, and compel the parties
with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves. March 12, 2014

G.R. No. 193494

Xxx

[ G.R. No. 204226. April 18, 2022 ]

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. TICO INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,

GLOWIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., AND PACIFIC MILLS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Glowide and PMI assert that TICO's complaint for interpleader is improper since it collaterally
attacks a final and executed judgment in favor of Glowide and PMI.43 The BIR counters that the suit
for interpleader is proper since it is only intended to determine which of TICO's creditors had a better
right to its condominium units, which are the only properties left that TICO may dispose of to pay its
outstanding debts to different creditors, in contrast to the earlier case which only determined TICO's
liability to Glowide and PMI.44

The special civil action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double vexation in
respect of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter)
who claims no interest whatsoever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants. Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a
single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of
having to pay more than once on a single liability. "In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper,
merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in
an action."45

However, a successful litigant who has secured a final judgment in its favor cannot later be
impleaded by its defeated adversary in an interpleader suit, and compelled to prove its claim anew
against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.46 In
other words, an action for interpleader may not be utilized to circumvent the immutability of a final and
executory judgment. It is settled that when a decision has attained finality, it "may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law."47 The doctrine is grounded on the public policy that at the risk of occasional errors, litigation
should end at some definite date fixed by law.48 "This is a fundamental principle in our justice system,
without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such
principle, must be immediately struck down."49 While the rule admits of exceptions, none obtains in
this case.

xxxxx

G.R. No. 127913 September 13, 2001

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION, respondent.

In the case before us, it is undisputed that METROCAN filed the interpleader action (Civil Case No.
4398-V-94) because it was unsure which between LEYCON and RCBC was entitled to receive the
payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was claiming payment of the rentals
as lessor of the property while RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title
of the property in its name.

It is also undisputed that LEYCON, as lessor of the subject property filed an action for unlawful
detainer (Civil Case No. 6202) against its lessee METROCAN. The issue in Civil Case No. 6202 is
limited to the question of physical or material possession of the premises.3 The issue of ownership is
immaterial therein4 and the outcome of the case could not in any way affect conflicting claims of
ownership, in this case between RCBC and LEYCON. This was made clear when the trial court, in
denying RCBC's "Motion for Inclusion x x x as an Indispensable Party" declared that "the final
determination of the issue of physical possession over the subject premises between the plaintiff and
the defendant shall not in any way affect RCBC's claims of ownership over the said premises, since
RCBC is neither a co-lessor or co- lessee of the same, hence he has no legal personality to join the
parties herein with respect to the issue of physical possession vis-a-vis the contract of lease
between the parties."5 As aptly pointed by the MeTC, the issue in Civil Case No. 6202 is limited to
the defendant LEYCON's breach of the provisions of the Contract of Lease Rentals. 6

Hence, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment in Civil
Case No. 6202 whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON "whatever rentals due on
the subject premises x x x." While RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case No. 6202, could not be
bound by the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision. When the decision in
Civil Case No. 6202 became final and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative left but to
pay the rentals to LEYCON. Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to METROCAN,
there was no more reason to continue with Civil Case No. 4398-V-94. Thus, METROCAN moved for
the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no longer interested but because there is no
more need for it to pursue such cause of action.

It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against
double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.7 It requires, as an
indespensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."8 The decision in Civil Case No.
6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned.

xxxxx

DECLARATORY RELIEF

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his
rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of the provisions in an instrument or statute.
It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: 1] the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; 2] the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; 3] there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4]
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse; 5] the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6] adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. G.R. NO.
174129 July 5, 2010

(This action is resorted when questioning the constitutionality of the law).

Xxx

Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. 38 Corollary thereto, by
"ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute
may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion,
and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating
imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.39 G.R. No. 204603 September 24, 2013

xxx

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that
an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for
quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive
and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-
48386 is only ₱410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to and possession of the said
property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. 25

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more
jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed
before the institution of the action.26 G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009
The grant of declaratory relief is discretionary on the courts. Courts may refuse to declare rights or to
construe instruments if it will not terminate the controversy or if it is unnecessary and improper under
the circumstances. A discretionary act cannot be the subject of a petition for mandamus.

Although the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for declaratory
relief, the Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of the trial court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals may, in appeals of actions for declaratory relief, apply Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court in resolving the appeal.

Mandamus, however, may issue only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. It cannot be
issued to compel the performance of a discretionary act. In Metro Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay:

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty
is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." Mandamus is available to compel
action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.50 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

[ G.R. No. 194461, January 07, 2020 ]

Note: Quiting of Title, Reformation – Declaratory Relief

Xxxx

G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO,
LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their
Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND
MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action
for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an
action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to
consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

[ G.R. No. 238263, November 16, 2020 ]

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND ITS BUREAU OF PRODUCT STANDARDS,

PETITIONERS, VS. STEELASIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
A similar ruling was pronounced in Ferrer v. Bautista,21 DOTR v. PPSA,22 and most recently
in Bureau of Internal Revenue v. First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corp23 As the Court
invariably held in these cases, the party assailing the validity of a statute or administrative issuance
may only do so via declaratory relief when there has yet been no breach of the rights involved.
Otherwise, the party should invoke the expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Section 1 of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

REVIEW OF COA AND COMELEC

G.R. No. 213525 January 27, 2015

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN
VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections 22 that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As
such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh
period rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an
injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.24 Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

PROHIBITION

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination
of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court
and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future
action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ
of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a
quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse
of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a
writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, . . . .

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.36 G.R. No.
210500

XXX

MANDAMUS

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. 14 This definition
recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted
to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. 15 The
writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by
the Constitution.16 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station.17

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his
duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law.18 Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. 19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the
absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom
the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled.20 On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
respondent to perform the act required.21
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations.22 Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public
or quasi-public duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual.24 The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice
would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the
government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.25 To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. 26

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked.27 In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.28 Although classified as a legal
remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable
principles.29 Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty,
rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes
of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings
for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. G.R. No.
176831 January 15, 2010

xxx

The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction, and punishment of tax offenses is a
discretionary quasi-judicial matter that cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. It is not a legally
mandated ministerial duty. This reward cannot be given to a person who only makes sweeping
averments about undisclosed wealth, rather than specific tax offenses, and who fails to show that
the information which he or she supplied was the undiscovered pivotal cause for the revelation of a
tax offense, the conviction and/or punishment of the persons liable, and anactual recovery made by
the State. Indiscriminate, expendable information negates a clear legal right and further impugns the
propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus.

A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original jurisdiction over
petitions for mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without exhausting
administrative remedies, in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of
hierarchy of courts, and when their filing amounts to an act of forum shopping.

A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; second, "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled."
The first situation demands a concurrence between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a
correlative duty incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them
by law.

Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot be a prospective
entitlement that is yet to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals, 18 this Court emphasized that
"[m]andamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is already
established." 19 In Pefianco v. Moral, 20 this Court underscored that a writ of mandamus "never issues
in doubtful cases."21

Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform the act mandated by law.
Clear in the text of Rule 65, Section 3 is the requirement that respondents "unlawfully neglect" the
performance of a duty. The mere existence of a legally mandated duty or the pendency of its
performance does not suffice.

The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary. 22 A court cannot subvert
legally vested authority for a body or officer to exercise discretion. In Sy Ha v. Galang:23

[M]andamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.24

This Court distinguished discretionary functions from ministerial duties, and related the exercise of
discretion to judicial and quasi-judicial powers. In Sanson v. Barrios:25

Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law
of acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgments and
consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or
duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. ... Mandamus
will not lie to control the exercise of discretion of an inferior tribunal ..., when the act complained of is
either judicial or quasi-judicial. . . . It is the proper remedy when the case presented is outside of the
exercise of judicial discretion. 26 (Citations omitted)

Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it, is shown that "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."27 This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule 65,
i.e., certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. JULY 23, 2018

Xxx

The Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction however should not be taken to
mean that the parties have an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which they
will file their application or petition. There is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with
concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on to the next highest, and ultimately to the
highest. This hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise determinative of the
proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is
a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent the further
clogging of the Court’s docket.34 G.R. No. 143797 May 4, 2006

Xxxx

G.R. No. 247806. November 09, 2021 ]

VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, YEN MAKABENTA, MARY WENDY A. DURAN, MANOLITO

CORONADO, SOCORRO MARICEL NAMIA NEPOMUCENO, JEF NALUS AQUINO, ANTONIO
SANTOS, AND CESAR EVANGELISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

The rules further provide that a writ of mandamus shall be issued only upon a showing that "there is
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 75 A writ of mandamus is
an "extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of
procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to
the performance of the act to be compelled." 76

As admitted by the petitioners, they have alternative and prompt remedies before the Commission
on Elections, Senate Electoral Tribunal, or House of Representative Electoral Tribunal. Failing to
avail these remedies operates against them. Recourse to these agencies are plain, speedy, and
adequate remedies. Moreover, it does not escape our attention that petitioners violated the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before this Court. This Court's original jurisdiction
over petitions for mandamus is not a license to immediately file a petition before this Court. The
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts are similarly given the jurisdiction over petitions
for mandamus

Respondent's duty to give due course to certificates of candidacy is a ministerial duty. However, in
this case, respondent did not unlawfully neglect its duty precisely because it gave due course to the
certificates of candidacy.

Under Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, respondent has the "ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy."78 It cannot, by itself, deny due course or cancel
a certificate if it was filed in due form.

Xxxx

[ G.R. No. 222731. March 08, 2016 ]

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, AS CHAIRMAN OF

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

Petitioners claim that the Commission on Elections refuses to implement the VVPAT function based
on fears that the security feature may aid in vote-buying, and that the voting period may take
longer.28 On February 9, 2016, petitioners read from ABS-CBN News Online that with a vote of 7-0,
the Commission on Elections En Banc decided not to implement the VVPAT for the 2016
Elections.29 Petitioners attached a copy of the article.30 Other news reports state that the
Commission on Elections ruled similarly against the voting receipts in 2010 and 2013.

Nonetheless, the inaction of the Commission on Elections in utilizing the VVPAT feature of the
vote-counting machines fails to fulfill the duty required under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.

Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of the
laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system to have the capability of
providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.

xxx

QUO WARRANTO

G.R. No. 192223

Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the ouster
of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", while impeachment
affords "removal."

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 11 It is the proper action to inquire into a public
officer's eligibility12 or the validity of his appointment. 13 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo
warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office.

Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to determine
whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. 14 It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or challenge the
legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the
removal of the impeachable official from office. 15

xxxxxx

The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with, acknowledges that the Constitution in fact
allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers, albeit respondent limits them to the
President and Vice-President. This admission refutes the very position taken by respondent
that all impeachable officials cannot be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a
"privileged class" of officers who can be removed only through impeachment.25 To be
sure, Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish between elected and appointed impeachable officers.
Indeed, contrary to respondent's claim, Section 4 of Article VII is not meant to limit the Court's quo
warranto jurisdiction under Article VIII of the Constitution. In fact, We held that "[t]he power wielded
by PET is "a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to the courts of law, expressly provided
in the Constitution."26 Thus, the authority under Section 4 of Article VII to hear quo warranto petitions
assailing the qualifications of the President and Vice-President is simply a component of the
Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under Article VIII. This finds support in the nature of quo
warranto as a remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office, 27 which is not confined
to claims of ineligibility but extends to other instances or claims of usurpation or unlawful holding of
public office as in the cases of Lota v. CA and Sangalang,28 Moro v. Del Castillo,
Jr.,29 Mendoza v. Allas,30 Sen. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr. 31 and Estrada. It will be
recalled that in Estrada, the Court took cognizance of, and ruled upon, a quo warranto challenge to a
vice-president's assumption of the presidency; the challenge was based, not on ineligibility, but on
therein petitioner's claim that he had not resigned and was simply a president on leave. To sustain
respondent's argument, therefore, is to unduly curtail the Court's judicial power and to dilute the
efficacy of quo warranto as a remedy against the "unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto."3

By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo warranto action
questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. These qualifications include
age, citizenship and professional experience - matters which are manifestly outside the purview of
impeachment under the above-cited provision.

Section 2 of Article XI provides that the impeachable officers may be removed from office on
impeachment for and conviction of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Lack of qualifications for appointment or
election is evidently not among the stated grounds for impeachment. It is, however, a ground for a
quo warranto action over which this Court was given original jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article
VIII. The grant of jurisdiction was not confined to unimpeachable officers. In fact, under Section 4,
paragraph 7 of Article VII, this Court was expressly authorized to pass upon the qualifications of the
President and Vice-President. Thus, the proscription against the removal of public officers other than
by impeachment does not apply to quo warranto actions assailing the impeachable officer's eligibility
for appointment or election. June 19, 2018

G.R. No. 237428

Section 5(1),15 Article VIII of the Constitution provides that the Court exercises original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. It shares this
original jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA as provided for under Sections 9(1)16 and 21(1)17 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129. By reason of the shared jurisdiction, the immediate and direct recourse
to the Court is frowned upon following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.18

Specifically, the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts guides litigants on the proper forum of their
appeals as well as the venue for the issuance of extraordinary writs. As to the latter, even if the RTC,
the CA, and the Court have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, litigants must, as a rule, file their
petitions, with the court below and failure to do so will be sufficient for the dismissal of the case.19

This doctrine serves as a "constitutional filtering mechanisms" to allow the Court to focus on its more
important tasks. The Court is and must remain the court of last resort. It must not be burdened with
the obligation to deal with suits which also fall under the original jurisdiction of lower-ranked
courts.20 Moreover, direct recourse to the Court is allowed only in exceptional or compelling
instances. There being no extraordinary circumstance that was established here, then the non-
observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants the dismissal of the case.21

[ G.R. No. 240056, October 12, 2020 ]