Foundations of Bargaining Theory
This framework doesn’t just see war as a breakdown of diplomacy, but just another kind of negotiation —
sometimes violent, always strategic. It says that war isn't an alternative to diplomacy, but a continuation
of bargaining through force. The theory roots itself in the idea that war is costly and rational actors—
states, —would prefer to resolve disputes without conflict whenever possible.
Bargaining theory emerges from game theory. Applied to war, it treats conflict as a negotiation process
where parties—states or other actors—dispute the division of resources, territory, or power.
It's not that there isn't room for negotiation. The problem is that there are so many obstacles in the way
that it becomes impossible to agree before the costs of conflict make peace seem like a better option.
Core Assumptions of Bargaining Models
James Fearon identifying war as a failure of bargaining, primarily due to three conditions:
Incomplete Information When states misrepresent their military capabilities or resolve, they create
uncertainty that can lead to miscalculation. Miscalculation happens when states don’t have full
information about each other’s capabilities or willingness to fight. In the world of international politics,
countries often keep secrets. They might hide their true military strength, exaggerate their resolve, or
bluff to scare off potential threats. This secrecy is a strategy, but it comes with risks.
Commitment Problems Future power shifts or lack of trust make states reluctant to agree to terms they
fear. If one side thinks the other will become stronger in the future, it might take action now to prevent
being overpowered later. If a country agrees to a deal today but gains power tomorrow, what’s stopping it
from breaking that deal? Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union both built massive nuclear
arsenals partly because they couldn’t trust each other to disarm. Each feared the other might renege on
any agreement in the future, so they kept escalating. These issues of commitment create situations in
which countries may prefer to fight the battle now rather than risk being at a disadvantage at a later date.
Indivisible Issues Some stakes, such as control over holy territories or ideological dominance or national
identity-sovereignty are seen as non-negotiable. If two countries claim the same sacred city, dividing it
might not satisfy either side. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a good example of this. Disputes over
Jerusalem remain a central barrier to peace because both sides view it as fundamental to their identity and
nationhood.
Rationality: States are looking to make the highest gains with the Least amount of costs.
War is a costly process. Both parties face losses during war, so it would be better to have an agreement
in place before it starts.
Bargaining Dynamics Before and During War
War is a destructive, but sometimes necessary, process of communication. Classical views see war as the
breakdown of diplomacy. Modern views: On the battlefield, countries reveal their true strength,
resilience, and willingness to endure costs. This information reshapes the bargaining table which can help
them to change their minds and come to an agreement during a conflict. Losses or unexpected resistance
can shift expectations and create room for settlement.
Korean War. Despite intense fighting, the ultimate resolution was a negotiated armistice. The war showed
us which side was ready to fight and what they were capable of. This is what we call "intra-war
bargaining"—the idea that war is a dialogue where each side communicates through actions on the
battlefield. The fighting itself was part of the bargaining process—it adjusted expectations and made
compromise possible.
Pre-War Negotiations: States often attempt to resolve disputes diplomatically. Failure here leads to war,
but the diplomatic groundwork influences how wars unfold.
Intra-War Bargaining: Conflict itself serves as a bargaining process, where victories and defeats change
each side's expectations and willingness to settle.
Termination of Wars and Negotiation
Rarely do conflicts conclude with total victory for one side and complete destruction of the other. More
often, wars end in negotiated settlements. Because continued fighting becomes costlier than compromise.
During World War II, Japan didn’t surrender simply because of the atomic bombings; it also recognized
that continued war was no longer sustainable. War had clarified the bargaining positions of both sides,
making surrender the rational choice.
Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner highlight that wars give us critical information, first like the true
strength of our opponents, which helps us align expectations and make agreements. Second when there is
a shifting in power dynamics resources begin to decline, the stronger side may find it easier to enforce
terms, or the weaker side may push for an end to hostilities.
Critiques of Bargaining Models
Cognitive Psychology: It is criticised that leaders may take irrational decisions and maintain prejudices
despite new information.
Local Politics and the Role of Leaders: Some leaders may favour war for domestic political gains. For
example, they may incite conflict to mobilise nationalist sentiments.
Cultural and Identity Factors: War is not only a conflict of interests or the sharing of resources, but
also a process shaped by identity and culture.
Overemphasis on Rationality: The theory assumes actors are always rational, always weighing costs
and benefits. But emotions, ideology, and domestic politics can complicate decisions. In cases like ethnic
conflicts or terrorism, where values can’t be easily quantified, the theory struggles to provide answers.
For example, during the Vietnam War, the United States stayed in the fight long after it became clear that
military victory was unlikely, partly because of domestic pressures and the fear of appearing weak.
Non-State or Proxy Actors: The theory also struggles to explain conflicts involving non-state actors,
like terrorist groups, where the goals are often ideological or symbolic rather than material. Groups like
ISIS or Al-Qaeda challenge traditional state-based bargaining frameworks by prioritizing ideological
goals over tangible outcomes.
Interdisciplinary Integration: Combining bargaining theory with cognitive psychology or
organizational theory enriches its explanatory power, especially for understanding miscalculations and
group decision-making.
Bargaining theory is not just for understanding traditional wars—it applies to modern, asymmetric
conflicts and issues like cyber warfare.
Asymmetric Conflicts: In Afghanistan, the Taliban used guerrilla tactics not to achieve outright victory
but to negotiate from a position of strength.
Cyber Warfare: Attacks can serve as signals in bargaining processes, revealing capabilities and
intentions while avoiding full-scale war.
Consider the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Both Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a brutal war, but
negotiations are still happening in the background, and the outcomes on the battlefield influence what
each side might accept at the table.
Conclusion
Traditionally, war was often seen as the failure of politics or diplomacy. The bargaining theory challenges
that view. It says war isn’t separate from politics—it’s deeply connected to it. When diplomacy breaks
down, war becomes another way for states to bargain. Even the act of fighting communicates information
and reshapes the stakes.
Despite these challenges, the bargaining theory gives us a powerful framework for understanding why
wars happen and how they end. It teaches us that war is never just chaos—it’s a strategic process where
states negotiate, even if the terms are written in blood.
Bargaining theories of war provide invaluable insights into the dynamics of conflict, emphasizing
negotiation's centrality even amidst violence. They challenge us to rethink war not as a failure of politics
but as a harsh extension of it.
To summarize, the bargaining theory of war reframes conflict as a strategic process intertwined with
negotiation. By understanding why negotiations fail—due to incomplete information, commitment issues,
or indivisible stakes—we can better analyze and predict both the onset and resolution of wars.
