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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, HOUSTON DIVISION

CYNTHIA HOPKINS and GEOFFREY § PLAINTIFFS' ORIGINAL

HOPKINS, individually and on behalf of the § COMPLAINT
ESTATE OF MARK HOPKINS, Deceased; § JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
and §
§
ALYSSA MICHELLE WILSON; §
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-00473
§
CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS; §
§ For the following causes of action:
CHIEF OF POLICE BILLY COUCH; §
§ COUNT 1: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
OFFICER DAKOTA NORRIS; § Unreasonable Search and Seizure
§
OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR CHRISTIAN § COUNT 2: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
TAYLOR LOVELACE; § Excessive, Deadly Force
§
OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR JONATHAN § COUNT 3: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
D. HUTH; § Excessive Force
§
OFFICER, SGT. RICHARD BENTON § COUNT 4: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
KEOUGH; § Supervisor or Bystander Liability
§
OFFICER PATRICK S. MCCLUNG; § COUNT 5: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
§ Invasion of Privacy
OFFICER, OPERATION COMMANDER §
STEVE BROCK; § COUNT 6: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
§ Failure to Train, Supervise, or
OFFICER LONG V. LE; § Discipline & Ratification
§
OFFICER KELBY PEREZ; §
§
OFFICER PATRICK J. MCCARTHY; §
§
OFFICER, BUREAU COMMANDER, and §
ASSISTANT CHIEF MICHAEL H. §
PAVELKA; §
Defendants. §

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PLAINTIFFS’ ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs Cynthia Hopkins and Geoffrey Hopkins, individually as the biological parents of

Mark Hopkins, and on behalf of the Estate of Mark Hopkins, deceased and Alyssa Michelle Wilson

(“Plaintiffs”) file this Original Complaint and Jury Demand regarding the conduct of Defendants

the CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS (more particularly the College Station Police

Department (“CSPD”)); CHIEF OF POLICE BILLY COUCH; OFFICER DAKOTA NORRIS;

OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR CHRISTIAN TAYLOR LOVELACE; OFFICER,

INVESTIGATOR JONATHAN D. HUTH; OFFICER, SGT. RICHARD BENTON KEOUGH;

OFFICER PATRICK S. MCCLUNG; OFFICER, OPERATION COMMANDER STEVE

BROCK; OFFICER LONG V. LE; OFFICER KELBY PEREZ; OFFICER PATRICK J.

MCCARTHY; and OFFICER, BUREAU COMMANDER, and ASSISTANT CHIEF MICHAEL

H. PAVELKA (collectively referred to as “Defendants”), in their individual capacities and for

Plaintiffs’ Monell Claims; and would show the Honorable Court as follows:

“If we would have known it was the cops, BUT WE DIDN’T… [Mark] thought
he was protecting me from a crazy person, like, someone breaking in the house.
He was like, “Hide! CALL 911! Hide!” 1

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. The Horrific and Tragic Scene. In the early morning hours of February 8, 2023,

residents Mark Hopkins, Alyssa Wilson, and Lauren Decoux were violently awakened by the

explosion of their front door, coupled with the deafening detonation of a flash-bang grenade. The

1
CSPD Interview of Alyssa Michelle Wilson.
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blast shattered the night’s silence, followed immediately by the sound of the intruders’ heavy boots

crashing quickly through the house toward the bedrooms. Mark, believing they were under attack

by burglars, grabbed his shotgun and shouted, “Hide! CALL 911! Hide!”, as he and his girlfriend,

Alyssa, ran to the bedroom’s closet. Without warning, the bedroom door is kicked in, followed

almost instantly by a hail of gunfire – killing Mark Hopkins.

2. No Adequate Announcement. In the seconds before the hail of gunfire, not one

single resident heard, “Police!”; not one single resident saw blue and red lights; and not one single

resident believed or had any reason to believe that their home intruders were the police. Alyssa

believed they were being robbed or worse, Lauren believed she was about to get “gangbanged,”

and Mark believed he needed to protect them all. It was only after the hail of gunfire, after the

blinding flashlights were removed from Alyssa’s face, and as she was being cuffed that she realized

her intruders’ identity; and, it was only after the hail of gunfire, after the breaking and entering of

Lauren’s bedroom, and after she was able to see their faces that Lauren realized her intruders’

identity. Tragically, Mark was never given the opportunity to realize that the intruders were

members of the College Station Police Department.

3. Patently Incompetent, Grossly Excessive, and Unreasonably Unnecessary

Military-Style Raid. This violent military-style raid was part of a botched search for Abraham

Escobar, a small-time seller of marijuana to college students. Escobar did not live at the residence,

his vehicle was not parked at the residence, and he was some 2200 miles away in Oregon at the

time of the assault. Despite these numerous glaring red flags, the College Station Police

Department (“CSPD”) launched a military-style, predawn assault, deploying a flash-bang, and

armed officers in tactical gear, despite the peaceful, off-campus setting. In all, three such raids

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were conducted in succession that morning in a patently incompetent process-of-elimination

search for a low-level, college-student-pot-dealing target.

4. Plaintiffs’ Action and Prayer. Mark Hopkins died defending himself, his

girlfriend, his roommate, and his home – a right to defend enshrined in Texas’s Castle Doctrine.

Mark’s parents now bring this action against Defendants alleging the violation of Mark’s civil

rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Alyssa Michelle Wilson brings this action against

Defendants alleging the violation of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including, inter

alia: unreasonable search and seizure; invasion of privacy; excessive force; wrongful death; and

the failures of CSPD officers in their individual capacities and failures of the City of College

Station and its CSPD. The College Station City Council, the City of College Station’s final

policymaker for the CSPD, vested with all powers of the City and the determination of all matters

of policy and Chief of Police, Billy Couch, with the authority for setting policies, including training

of the CSPD Officers, made this possible and probable. The City of College Station, through the

CSPD, had a duty, but failed to implement and enforce such policies, practices, and procedures for

the CSPD that respected their constitutional rights to protection and equal treatment under the law.

The College Station City Council and Chief Couch’s failure to implement the necessary policies

and the (de facto) implementation of unconstitutional policies, caused Mark to experience an

unwarranted and excruciating physical assault and mental anguish before his ultimate death. For

these civil rights violations and other causes of action discussed herein, Plaintiffs seek

accountability and compensation for their respective damages.

II. PARTIES
5. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

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6. Plaintiff Cynthia Hopkins is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Comal

County, Texas. Ms. Hopkins is acting as a personal representative of the Estate of Mark Hopkins

and also brings this lawsuit in her individual capacity as the biological mother of Mark Hopkins.

7. Plaintiff Geoffrey Hopkins is a citizen of the United States and a resident of

Comal County, Texas. Mr. Hopkins is also acting as a personal representative of the Estate of

Mark Hopkins and also brings this lawsuit in his individual capacity as the biological father of

Mark Hopkins.

8. Plaintiff Alyssa Michelle Wilson is a citizen of the United States and a resident of

Montgomery County, Texas and brings this lawsuit in her individual capacity.

9. Defendant CITY OF COLLEGE STATION is a municipality located in Brazos

County, Texas. The City of College Station may be served with citation herein by and through

its agent for service of process, Adam C. Falco, City Attorney, City Attorney’s Office, 1101 Texas

Ave., College Station, Texas 77840.

10. Defendant CHIEF OF POLICE BILLY COUCH, upon information and belief,

is a resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was a police officer

allegedly acting in the course and scope of his employment for The City of College Station and

CSPD. Defendant Couch is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity and as policymaker

for The City of College Station and CSPD on issues of law enforcement. Defendant Couch may

be served with citation at the College Station Police Department, 800 Krenek Tap Road, College

Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be found.

11. Defendant OFFICER DAKOTA NORRIS, upon information and belief, is a

resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was a police officer allegedly

acting in the course and scope of his employment for The City of College Station and CSPD.
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Defendant Norris is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity. Defendant Norris may

be served with citation at the College Station Police Department, 800 Krenek Tap Road, College

Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be found.

12. Defendant OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR CHRISTIAN TAYLOR

LOVELACE, upon information and belief, is a resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times

material herein, was a police officer allegedly acting in the course and scope of his employment

for The City of College Station and CSPD. Defendant Lovelace is being sued in this lawsuit in

his individual capacity. Defendant Lovelace may be served with citation at the College Station

Police Department, 800 Krenek Tap Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be

found.

13. Defendant OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR JONATHAN D. HUTH, upon

information and belief, is a resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was

a police officer allegedly acting in the course and scope of his employment for The City of College

Station and CSPD. Defendant Huth is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity.

Defendant Huth may be served with citation at the College Station Police Department, 800

Krenek Tap Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be found.

14. Defendant OFFICER, SGT. RICHARD BENTON KEOUGH, upon

information and belief, is a resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was

a police officer allegedly acting in the course and scope of his employment for The City of College

Station and CSPD. Defendant Keough is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity.

Defendant Keough may be served with citation at the College Station Police Department, 800

Krenek Tap Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be found.

15. Defendant OFFICER PATRICK S. MCCLUNG, upon information and belief,

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is a resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was a police officer

allegedly acting in the course and scope of his employment for The City of College Station and

CSPD. Defendant McClung is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity. Defendant

McClung may be served with citation at the College Station Police Department, 800 Krenek Tap

Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be found.

16. Defendant OFFICER, OPERATION COMMANDER STEVE BROCK, upon

information and belief, is a resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was

a police officer allegedly acting in the course and scope of his employment for The City of College

Station and CSPD. Defendant Brock is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity.

Defendant Brock may be served with citation at the College Station Police Department, 800

Krenek Tap Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be found.

17. Defendant OFFICER LONG V. LE, upon information and belief, is a resident of

Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was a police officer allegedly acting in the

course and scope of his employment for The City of College Station and CSPD. Defendant Le is

being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity. Defendant Le may be served with citation at

the College Station Police Department, 800 Krenek Tap Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or

wherever he may be found.

18. Defendant OFFICER KELBY PEREZ, upon information and belief, is a resident

of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was a police officer allegedly acting in

the course and scope of his employment for The City of College Station and CSPD. Defendant

Perez is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity. Defendant Perez may be served with

citation at the College Station Police Department, 800 Krenek Tap Road, College Station, Texas

77840 or wherever he may be found.

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19. Defendant OFFICER PATRICK J. MCCARTHY, upon information and belief,

is a resident of Brazos County, Texas, and, at all times material herein, was a police officer

allegedly acting in the course and scope of his employment for The City of College Station and

CSPD. Defendant McCarthy is being sued in this lawsuit in his individual capacity. Defendant

McCarthy may be served with citation at the College Station Police Department, 800 Krenek

Tap Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or wherever he may be found.

20. Defendant OFFICER, BUREAU COMMANDER, and ASSISTANT CHIEF

MICHAEL H. PAVELKA, upon information and belief, is a resident of Brazos County, Texas,

and, at all times material herein, was a police officer allegedly acting in the course and scope of

his employment for The City of College Station and CSPD. Defendant Pavelka is being sued in

this lawsuit in his individual capacity. Defendant Pavelka may be served with citation at the

College Station Police Department, 800 Krenek Tap Road, College Station, Texas 77840 or

wherever he may be found.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

21. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

22. Jurisdiction exists in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 as this

action is brought under, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities.

23. This Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they reside

and/or work in College Station, Brazos County, Texas, and over the City of College Station

because it is a Texas municipality located within this Division and District.

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24. This Court has specific in personam jurisdiction over Defendants because this case

arises out of conduct that caused the death of Mark Hopkins, which occurred in City of College

Station, Brazos County, Texas, within the Southern District of Texas.

25. Venue is proper in this court because the causes of action occurred within the

Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY TO DATE

26. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

27. Prior to this instant action, on October 9, 2023, the Hopkins filed a “Petition

Pursuant To Tex., R. Civ. Pro. 202 For Depositions To Investigate Claims” in Cause No. 23-

002880-CV-85; Cynthia Hopkins, et al. v. City of College Station; In the 85th Judicial District

Court of Brazos County, Texas (hereinafter “TRCP 202 Pre-suit Deposition”).

28. The product of that TRCP 202 Pre-suit Deposition resulted in the production of

documents, but no depositions have taken place to date. Nevertheless, the limited discovery and

document production produced under the TRCP 202 Pre-suit Deposition supports Plaintiffs’

factual allegations stated herein and below. Specifically, a video was produced titled,

“CONFIDENTIAL_Norris_BWC_CS0010.mp4.”

29. TRCP 202 Pre-suit Deposition proceedings are not separate lawsuits; they are

considered ancillary proceedings. As such, upon filing this complaint, said TRCP 202 Pre-suit

Deposition is hereby moot. See, e.g., Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Yeo, No. 01-22-00210-CV, 2022

WL 3363943, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2022, no pet.).

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V. EXHIBIT ATTACHED

30. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

31. Attached and incorporated by reference, as though set forth fully herein, is a 03:12

video of Defendant Norris’s body camera, which shows the raid and shooting death of Mark

Hopkins, which video is attached as:

• Exhibit A: CONFIDENTIAL_Norris_BWC_CS0010

The video of the incident has been attached as an exhibit, but due to the inability of counsel to

attach that video electronically, a copy has been delivered to the Federal District Clerk to be

attached to this case, as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint And Jury Demand.

VI. FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL COUNTS

32. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

33. Plaintiffs – the Hopkins & Alyssa. Cynthia Hopkins and Geoffrey Hopkins are

the loving and grieving parents of their late son, Mark Hopkins, and bring this lawsuit seeking

justice and accountability against Defendants for their unconstitutional violations resulting in the

wrongful death of Mark Hopkins; and, Plaintiff Alyssa Michelle Wilson (“Alyssa”) brings this

lawsuit seeking justice and accountability against Defendants for their unconstitutional violations

resulting in her own injuries and damages.

34. Defendant CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS and more particularly

the College Station Police Department (“CSPD”) (hereinafter, any reference to CSPD

refences and implicates Defendant CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS). The City of

College Station funds and operates the CSPD, which, along with the College Station City Council,
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College Station City Manager’s office and Chief of Police Billy Couch, are responsible for the

implementation of the CSPD’s budget, policies, procedures, practices, customs, and usages, as

well as the acts and omissions, challenged by this suit. The CSPD is also responsible for

preventive, investigative, and enforcement services for all citizens of the City of College Station.

All actions that form the basis of this lawsuit were performed pursuant to policies and procedures,

customs, practices, and usages of Defendant, the City of College Station. The City of College

Station’s responsibility and duty is to promulgate, implement, train, and enforce policies and

procedures prohibiting unlawful searches, seizures, detentions, arrests, invasions of privacy, and

exercises of excessive and deadly force, in violation of minimum constitutional and statutory

requirements; to properly hire, fire, discipline, train, and supervise police officers and to not hire

or retain police officers with a known propensity for police misconduct. Defendant City of College

Station and CSPD failed in those regards, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and Plaintiffs

bring their claims and causes of action, including Monell claims against said defendant.

35. Defendant CHIEF OF POLICE BILLY COUCH is the Chief Executive Officer

and Chief of Police for the College Station Police Department; he is the policymaker in charge of

drafting, implementing, and enforcing all policies, procedures, practices, customs, and usages of

CSPD; he is ultimately responsible for the hiring, firing, disciplining, training, and supervision of

CSPD’s police officers; and he is to ensure that he and his officers maintain their duty and

responsibility to treat all persons in compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements and

in compliance with the CSPD’s rules, regulations, policies and procedures, customs and/or

practices relating to, inter alia, searches, seizures, detentions, arrests, invasions of privacy, and

exercises of excessive and deadly force – that is, “to not act incompetently and unconstitutionally.”

Defendant Couch failed in his duties, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and ratified, as the
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City of College Station’s policymaker on law enforcement concerns, the “Defendant Raid

Officers” conduct herein.

36. “Defendant Raid Officers.” Those CSPD officers whose action and omissions

were incompetent and unconstitutional with respect to the raid on 925 Spring Loop include the

following: Defendants CHIEF OF POLICE BILLY COUCH; OFFICER DAKOTA NORRIS;

OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR CHRISTIAN TAYLOR LOVELACE; OFFICER,

INVESTIGATOR JONATHAN D. HUTH; OFFICER, SGT. RICHARD BENTON KEOUGH;

OFFICER PATRICK S. MCCLUNG; OFFICER, OPERATION COMMANDER STEVE

BROCK; OFFICER LONG V. LE; OFFICER KELBY PEREZ; OFFICER PATRICK J.

MCCARTHY; and OFFICER, BUREAU COMMANDER, and ASSISTANT CHIEF MICHAEL

H. PAVELKA (collectively referred to as “Defendant Raid Officers”). At all times relevant to this

lawsuit, said Defendant Raid Officers were acting within the course and scope of their employment

as police officers and were acting under color of state law for CSPD. Said Defendant Raid Officers,

each of them, had a duty and responsibility to not act incompetently and unconstitutionally. Said

Defendant Raid Officers had a duty to constitutionally train, supervise, and intervene. Said

Defendant Raid Officers had a duty to not ratify unconstitutional conduct. Said Defendant Raid

Officers, each of them, failed in those regards and violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, as more

specifically complained of herein and below.

37. Defendant OFFICER DAKOTA NORRIS. Defendant Norris was the point lead

on the raid of 925 South Loop, conducted the incompetent “knock and announce” complained of

herein, permitted the use of a mechanical breach complained of herein, permitted the use of a flash-

bang device complained of herein, failed to train, supervise, and intervene in the patently

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incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid, and shot and

killed Mark Hopkins.

38. Defendant OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR CHRISTIAN TAYLOR

LOVELACE. Defendant Lovelace conducted the 3 ½ year investigation of Abraham Escobar,

and he set the stage for and failed to intervene in the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and

unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid. What’s more, Defendant Lovelace arrived at 925

South Loop prior to SWAT’s arrival and had 13 minutes to assess the absence of Abraham

Escobar’s vehicle and the absence of any activity inside 925 South Loop suggesting the presence

of Abraham or any threat therein before the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and

unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid and shooting death of Mark Hopkins.

39. Defendant OFFICER, INVESTIGATOR JONATHAN D. HUTH. Defendant

Huth prepared the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary

military-style raid’s Operation Plan; briefed the Defendant Raid Officers on the Operation Plan;

and permitted the incompetent “knock and announce” complained of herein, permitted the use of

a mechanical breach complained of herein, permitted the use of a flash-bang device complained

of herein, and failed to train, supervise, and intervene in the patently incompetent, grossly

excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid.

40. Defendant OFFICER, SGT. RICHARD BENTON KEOUGH. Defendant

Keough was the supervisor of the Special Investigation Unit (“SIU”); assisted Defendant Lovelace

in the 3 ½ year investigation of Abraham; was assistant team leader of the SWAT team that raided

925 Spring Loop; was responsible for the insufficient count, the command for if and when to force

entry into the location, and then entry into the location to assist in securing it; was cover for

Defendant Le in the stack, the number 4 position that would be entering the structure; supervisor
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of the entry; and permitted the incompetent “knock and announce” complained of herein, permitted

the use of a mechanical breach complained of herein, permitted the use of a flash-bang device

complained of herein, and failed to train, supervise, and intervene in the patently incompetent,

grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid.

41. Defendant OFFICER PATRICK S. MCCLUNG. Defendant McClung was in

charge of making announcements and turning on the blue and red lights to warn the residents of

925 Spring Loop that a search warrant was being conducted by police; he arrived to the raid late;

by the time he stopped, turned on his lights, and made an announcement, the Defendant Raid

Officers had already breached the door, were inside, and were in the process of shooting Mark

Hopkins; and contributed to the in the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably

unnecessary military-style raid, incompetent “knock and announce” complained of herein, and

failed to train, supervise, and intervene as complained of herein.

42. Defendant OFFICER, OPERATION COMMANDER STEVE BROCK.

Defendant Brock signed off on the false, exaggerated, and unreasonable Threat Matrix on 925

Spring Loop; permitted the incompetent “knock and announce” complained of herein, permitted

the use of a mechanical breach complained of herein, permitted the use of a flash-bang device

complained of herein, and failed to train, supervise, and intervene in the patently incompetent,

grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid. What’s more, Defendant

Brock, as a supervisor, ratified Defendant Norris’s actions and the actions of Defendant Raid

Officers after the fact.

43. Defendant OFFICER LONG V. LE. Defendant Le was the Defendant Raid

Officer that set off and threw the flash-bang inside 925 Spring Loop – without looking to see who,

if anyone was nearby who could be injured and whether anything flammable was nearby that could
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start a fire; was part of and permitted the incompetent “knock and announce” complained of herein,

permitted the use of a mechanical breach complained of herein, permitted and executed the use of

a flash-bang device complained of herein; and failed to train, supervise, and intervene in the

patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid.

44. Defendant OFFICER KELBY PEREZ. Defendant Perez was the Defendant Raid

Officer that conducted the mechanical breach; was part of and permitted the incompetent “knock

and announce” complained of herein, permitted and executed the use of a mechanical breach

complained of herein, permitted the use of a flash-bang device complained of herein; and failed to

train, supervise, and intervene in the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably

unnecessary military-style raid.

45. Defendant OFFICER PATRICK J. MCCARTHY. Defendant McCarthy was

the immediate supervisor of Defendant Norris; permitted the incompetent “knock and announce”

complained of herein, permitted the use of a mechanical breach complained of herein, permitted

the use of a flash-bang device complained of herein, and failed to train, supervise, and intervene

in the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid.

What’s more, Defendant McCarthy, as a supervisor, ratified Defendant Norris’s actions and the

actions of Defendant Raid Officers after the fact.

46. Defendant OFFICER, BUREAU COMMANDER, and ASSISTANT CHIEF

MICHAEL H. PAVELKA. Defendant Pavelka was head of the SIU and SWAT; was a supervisor

of Defendant Norris; permitted the incompetent “knock and announce” complained of herein,

permitted the use of a mechanical breach complained of herein, permitted the use of a flash-bang

device complained of herein; and failed to train, supervise, and intervene in the patently

incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid. What’s more,
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Defendant Pavelka, as a supervisor, ratified Defendant Norris’s actions and the actions of

Defendant Raid Officers after the fact.

47. Mark Hopkins (“Mark”). Prior to and on February 8, 2023, Mark was a 22-year-

old student at Blinn Junior College, preparing to transfer to Texas A&M. Mark was in a committed

relationship with his girlfriend Alyssa Michelle Wilson, who was a houseguest on February 8,

2023. Prior to the raid, CSPD learned that Mark had no Computerized Criminal History (CCH)

or gang-related affiliation whatsoever, and there was no evidence linking or probable cause to

suggest that Mark was linked to any illegal drug activities. That is, there was zero evidence or

probably cause to suggest that Mark was dangerous, posed a security threat to officers or others,

had any prior history of violence, and that any exigent circumstances existed to warrant a military-

style raid of his apartment. Furthermore, there is zero evidence indicating whether, prior to

February 8, 2023, CSPD ever looked into whether Mark was a gun owner.

48. Alyssa Michelle Wilson (“Alyssa”). Prior to and on February 8, 2023, Alyssa was

a 24-year-old, recent college graduate of Texas A&M, was in a committed relationship with Mark

Hopkins, and was a houseguest of Mark’s. Prior to the raid, CSPD learned that Alyssa had no

Computerized Criminal History (CCH) or gang-related affiliation whatsoever, and there was no

evidence linking or probable cause to suggest that Alyssa was linked to any illegal drug activities.

That is, there was zero evidence or probably cause to suggest that Alyssa was dangerous, posed a

security threat to officers or others, had any prior history of violence, and that any exigent

circumstances existed to warrant a military-style raid of the apartment.

49. Lauren Nicole Decoux (“Lauren”). Prior to and on February 8, 2023, Lauren was

in a dating relationship with Abraham Eli Escobar and was a roommate of Mark Hopkins. Prior to

the raid, CSPD learned that Lauren had no Computerized Criminal History (CCH) or gang-related
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affiliation whatsoever. The sum total of evidence linking Lauren to any alleged illegal drug activity

was her dating relationship with Abraham and a handful of small Venmo payments for rent.

Regardless, there was zero evidence or probably cause to suggest that Lauren was dangerous,

posed a security threat to officers or others, had any prior history of violence, and that any exigent

circumstances existed to warrant a military-style raid of the apartment.

50. Abraham Eli Escobar (“Abraham”). Prior to February 8, 2023, CSPD had been

investigating Abraham since August of 2019. In the 3 ½ years spent investigating Abraham before

the incompetent raid, CSPD allegedly learned that Abraham allegedly sold marijuana (a drug that

is legal in 39 of 50 states for medical use and legal in 24 states for recreational use) by the ounce,

then allegedly sold same by the pound, and allegedly sold Adderall (a prescription drug to treat

ADHD and a known, off-label study aid) to college students; drove a red Chevrolet Pickup Truck;

was in a dating relationship with Lauren; and lived at 1811 George Bush Drive E., College Station,

Texas. Through multiple investigative tools and surveillance leading up to the incompetent raid,

CSPD knew Abraham did not live at 925 Spring Loop and that his vehicle was not present within

day(s) of the incompetent raid on February 8, 2023. Prior to the raid, CSPD learned that Abraham

had one Computerized Criminal History (CCH) hit for Driving While Intoxicated and no gang-

related affiliation. Regardless, Abraham was not physically at 925 Spring Loop, his truck was not

at 925 Spring Loop, and there is no evidence to suggest that Abraham was dangerous, posed a

security threat to officers or others, had any prior history of violence, and that any exigent

circumstances existed to warrant a military-style raid of his girlfriend’s apartment when he was

some 2200 miles away in Oregon at the time of the incompetent raid.

51. The Apartment. 925 Spring Loop, College Station, Texas is a 1036 sq. ft., 2

bedroom / 2 bath, single-family home that was rented by Mark and Lauren. It is 1.5 miles from
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Texas A&M, situated in a neighborhood of similar multi-family homes and townhouses. It is a

popular choice for students and university staff given its proximity to Texas A&M, has a lower

crime rate and property crime rate than Texas and national averages, and being in the northeast

part of town, it is generally considered the safest part of College Station. The Apartment appears

and is laid out as follows:

In this tiny, 1036 sq. ft. apartment, Mark’s bedroom (“BR #1) was adjacent to living room area

and closest to the front door. 925 Spring Loop – its neighborhood, its closeness to other family

homes, its low crime rate area, its tiny size, and the residents being early-20s-something college

students make it unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances for a military-style raid.

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52. 4 Planned Raids – Overview. On February 8, 2023, 3 raids were to be conducted

on the following addresses in the following order: (i) 1775 Greens Prairie Rd. W., a 2789 sq. ft.

5/3 home, and situated on 20 acres – the alleged stash house for Abraham’s illegal drugs; (ii) 3934

Tranquil Path Dr., a 1538 sq. ft. 3/2 home – the alleged residence of Abraham; (iii) 925 Spring

Loop Dr., a 1036 sq. ft. 2/2 home – the residence of Abraham’s girlfriend, Lauren; and (iv) 1711

N. Earl Rudder Freeway #930, Bryan, Texas – a storage unit. The raid on 1775 Greens Prairie Rd.,

the alleged stash house, was executed in the hopes of finding illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia;

the raid on 3934 Tranquil Path Dr., the alleged residence of Abraham, was executed in the hopes

of finding Abraham; and, the raid on 925 Spring Loop was executed in the hopes of finding

electronic devices that could be examined to uncover the alleged illegal drug enterprise.

Ultimately, at or around 5:00 am, that raid on 1775 Greens Prairie Rd. was productive in

uncovering marijuana alleged to be owned by Abraham. That is, prior to the raid on 925 Spring

Loop an hour later, CSPD had in their possession illegal drugs, and the threat of complete

destruction of any illegal drugs was gone. While there were 4 planned raids, upon information and

belief, 3 raids were conducted – excluding the storage unit.

53. Threat Assessment for Warrant Service – CSPD’s Policy. The policy regarding

threat assessments for CSPD is as follows:

The completed Threat Assessment SHALL be routed to the Division Commander,

or his designee, for review prior to the service of the warrant. If the case agent,
Supervisor, or Division Commander determines SWAT should be utilized, or in the
case of a mandatory SWAT activation, the Threat Assessment and an Operations
Plan shall be forwarded to the SWAT Commander, or his designee. This should
occur no less than 12 hours prior to the expected warrant service, unless exigent
circumstances exist. The case agent shall also brief the SWAT Commander or his
designee regarding, the details of the investigation.

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The Threat Assessment allows officers to allocate points (“Yes” = 1 point, “No” = 0 points, and

“Unknown” = 0.25 points) for various threat issues including Suspect Assessment, Offense

Assessment, Weapon Assessment – which also requires the responding officer to write out “How

intelligence was obtained:”, Site Assessment, and Historical Information. Finally, based on the

point totals, a threat assessment score is given, which total concludes:

1-4 POINTS = IF REQUESTED, SWAT MAY BE USED AT THE DISCRETION

OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER; 5-9 POINTS = SWAT
COMMANDER SHALL BE CONSULTED. SWAT SHOULD BE USED AS THE
PRIMARY CONTACT OR IN SUPPORT OF ALTERNATIVE PLANNING
ENTRY, RAPID REACT, OR SUPPORT; 10+ POINTS = SWAT ACTIVATION
REQUIRED.”

54. Threat Assessment for the 4 Raids. All four raids, determined by Defendant

Lovelace, carried the same 2-point base assessment of 1 point for “suspect is a drug or alcohol

abuser” and 1 point for “offense is a felony.” Where the four differ is in the Weapon Assessment

and Site Assessment. The Threat Assessment further identified the following:

• The 1775 Greens Prairie Rd. raid had a Threat Matrix of 7.25;

• The 3934 Tranquil Path Dr. had a Threat Matrix of 6;

• The 925 Spring Loop had a Threat Matrix of 5 with the 2-point base and adding
2 points for “scoped rifle/hunting rifle/semi-auto/shotgun (if Escobar is
present)” and 1 point for “pistol (if Escobar is present)”; and

• The 1775 Greens Prairie Rd. had a Threat Matrix of 3.25.

55. Threat Assessment for 925 Spring Loop – Specifically. CSPDs policies were

violated in this assessment, as follows:

• First, a total of 3 points are falsely allocated for the Weapon Assessment to
bring the threat level of this tiny college apartment from a 2 to a 5 and to falsely
and unreasonably justify the use of SWAT’s patently incompetent, grossly
excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid;

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• Second, the false and unreasonable point allocation and escalation from a 2 to
a 5 was only applicable “if Escobar is present,” which he was not;

• Third, given the conditional, “if Escobar is present,” the presence of a “scoped
rifle/hunting rifle/semi-auto/shotgun” and “pistol” should have been given the
point allocations of 0.25 for “unknown” – which, had the policy been followed
the threat assessment would have been a 2.5 at highest;

• Fourth, Defendant Lovelace was inconsistent with his point allocation for
Abraham’s Weapon Assessment, giving Abraham’s storage unit a 1.25, his
stash house a 2, his residence a 3, and his girlfriend’s apartment a 3. However,
the 3-point allocation for his residence was not conditional on “if Escobar is
present” – 925 Spring Loop was;

• Fifth, the Site Assessment is zero (0). There are no geographic barriers or
considerations, no upstairs or terrain features, no multiple habitable structures,
no site fortification, no lookouts, and no security cameras. That is, the
Apartment was not a threat;

• Sixth, it states CSPD will be obtaining a knock and announce search warrant
for 925 Spring Loop, “the primary residence of Lauren Decoux” and “through
means of investigation Mark Hopkins and Alyssa Wilson” may be additional
residents, which confirms that the target was Lauren and computers – not drugs
and the possibility of other college student residents; and

• Seventh, against policy, the Threat Assessment concludes that “Tactical

Commander [was] Consulted” and specifically that “SWAT [was] Not [to be]
Activated.” That is, despite the Supervisor, Division Commander, and the
Tactical Commander stating otherwise, Defendant Lovelace proceeded with
SWAT’s patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably
unnecessary military-style raid on a Threat Assessment Score of 2 (or at most
2.5) in violation of orders and policy.

56. The 925 Spring Loop Search Warrant. Defendant Investigator Christian Taylor

Lovelace drafted the Affidavit and Search Warrant for 925 Spring Loop. Therein, he makes the

following unreasonable and unconstitutional errors:

• Defendant Lovelace falsely stated under oath and identified Mark and Alyssa
as “Suspected Part[ies]” – neither Mark nor Alyssa participated in any illegal
activities of any kind;

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• Defendant Lovelace falsely stated under oath that, “Said Suspected Party #1
[(Abraham)] sending Said Suspected Party #2 [(Mark)] money.” That is,
Defendant Lovelace falsely claimed under oath that Abraham had transferred
money to Mark Hopkins via Venmo, a popular money transfer computer app,
and Defendant Lovelace made these false statements under penalty of perjury
to Judge Ed Spillane of the College Station Municipal Court to secure his search
warrant;

• Defendant Lovelace’s primary objective in the search of 925 Spring Loop was
his “Request to Search for Digital Evidence,” as stated in his Affidavit as a
section header and as stated in the Search Warrant and capable of being
discovered under items 2, 3, 4 (“computers”), 6, 7, 8, and 10 (forensic analysis
of “computer”) of his 10 numbered requests. Ultimately, the return of the search
resulted in the following: “HP laptop, Apple iPhone, ‘drug paraphernalia’,
‘marijuana’, Apple iPhone, blk laptop, and silver MacBook”; and

• Defendant Lovelace stated nowhere in the Affidavit and Search Warrant that
CSPD would be using SWAT officers armed with AR-15s (5.56 NATO caliber
Colt model SMG assault rifles with a silencer, scope, light, and laser
attachments, and a 5.56 NATO caliber magazine carrying NATO rounds) and
using a flash-bang grenade (DD) in the execution of a search warrant on a 1036
sq. ft. apartment occupied by college students in a peaceful college
neighborhood at 6:00 in the morning.

57. Operations Plan. The Operations Plan was prepared by Defendant Jonathan Huth

who briefed the CSPD responding officers on February 7, 2023 at 5:00 pm with a target time for

execution of 5:00 am on February 8, 2023. That is, by the time of the incompetent raid at

approximately 6:00 am, CSPD had 13 hours from the briefing to discover whether Abraham was

present at 925 Spring Loop and failed to do so. Abraham’s presence would be the only basis for

the “possibility” of a firearm inside the home, as briefed by CSPD. CSPD further briefed, “It is

unknown if there are other occupants at this location.” That is, CSPD incompetently did not assess

whether other civilians – namely, college students – would be in the crossfire, when a simple call

to the property owner, drive by of the premises in an unmarked vehicle, or a stakeout would have

easily revealed same.

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58. Operations Plan – cont. As for the first raid, the “Special Notes” states that an

“AR-15 believed to be in each location” and “No knock”; the second raid states, “AR-15 believed

to be in each location” and “Knock and Announce”; and the 925 Spring Loop raid’s “Special

Notes” states only, “Knock and Announce.” That is, there is no mention of, “AR-15 believed to

be in each location.” Nevertheless, SWAT officer defendants planned to use their own AR-15s.

59. Operations Plan – the “planned” execution. The plan further states:

The Team will disembark their vehicles and begin moving down the A side of the
structure and stack on the front door. The point pair will begin knocking and
demanding entry. After a reasonable amount of time the door will be mechanically
breached and the house secured. A DD will be deployed at the threshold to the front
door if it is mechanically breached.

As this is being done, McClung will pull in front of the house and begin announcing
“We are the College Station Police Department! We are serving a search warrant
at 925 Spring Loop!” McClung will have on his red and blue flashing lights.

60. Execution – See Exhibit A. To understand CSPD’s patently incompetent, grossly

excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid, please watch Exhibit A.

61. Execution – “Knock & Announce” is Incoherent. While CSPD’s plan was

incompetent from the start, the actual execution was even more so. The knock and announce was

incompetent, unreasonable, and incoherent. The policy and constitutional requirements of the

“knock and announce rule” is meant to give occupants a meaningful opportunity to: (i) hear the

announcement, (ii) process the information, and (iii) have the opportunity to voluntarily comply.

Here, the knock was accomplished by Defendant Officer Dakota Norris loudly pounding on the

door multiple times in rapid succession. In synchronicity with the loud pounding, Defendant Norris

states something that is incoherent even to a casual listener after repeatedly watching and listening

to the raid video multiple times because his announce is completely muffled out. The overlapping

of Defendant Norris’s pounding, the knock, and the incoherent speech, the announce, make the
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executed knock and announce incompetent, unreasonable, incoherent, and thus, unconstitutional

because the only thing that could be heard is the loud pounding. That is, there was a knock; there

was no announce, and CSPD agrees. Later, it reflected, “The knock and announce should be

separate, not simultaneous.” Upon information and belief, a review of prior CSPD SWAT raids

will reveal the policy, practice, custom, and usage of the constitutionally inadequate, simultaneous

knock and announce. Had CSPD executed the knock and announce constitutionally – that is,

“separate, not simultaneous,” Mark Hopkins would still be alive.

62. Execution – “Knock and Announce” Time is Unreasonable. From the “knock and

announce” to physical entry of 925 South Loop, a total of a mere 20 seconds elapsed; a mere 10

seconds later, Mark Hopkins was shot and killed. Again, first, the primary objective of the 925

Spring Loop raid was the seizing of computers – not drugs. The allegations from Defendant

Lovelace’s investigation alleged that Lauren may be involved in laundering money for Abraham

and that computers and electronic devices would identify that information. Destruction of

computers (especially in the age of solid-state drives) is difficult and takes time; computers can’t

be flushed down the toilet like weed. Accordingly, any concern over destruction of evidence was

minimal. Second, the Threat Matrix was low – either a 2 or 2.5. Even assuming the exaggerate

threat score of 5, had policy and the Threat Matrix been followed, SWAT would not have been

involved. Third, the time of the raid at 6:00 am requires more time when conducting a knock and

announce, as the occupants could be – and were – asleep. Clearly established case law regarding

time of day requires officers to use more patience when conducting raids at 6:00am. Indeed, as

Alyssa and Lauren stated, they were asleep and “no college student is awake at 6 in the morning.”

Fourth, the time day is also critical under clearly established case law because more time is

necessary to “give occupants a reasonable chance to answer the door,” “avoid unnecessary harm,
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panic, or embarrassment” (e.g., if occupants are undressed or otherwise unprepared), and to

“minimize property damage.” Had residents had an opportunity to respond to this instant raid, they

would have walked right into a flash-bang being thrown at them and exploding on them because

the time was unreasonable and Defendant Lee did not look where he was throwing. Fifth, there

were no exigent circumstances that would justify a short period of time (e.g., the destruction of

evidence). Sixth, the size of the home may require more time to answer the door. While small in

square footage, the Defendant Raid Officers had a layout of the rooms, and not knowing whether

anyone was in the furthest bedroom or undressed, more time would have been appropriate.

Seventh, the purpose of the knock-and-announce rule is to respect the privacy and dignity of

individuals, such as ensuring someone has time to dress if undressed, and at 6:00 am, more time

would be needed to respect this constitutional right of privacy. Indeed, females Alyssa and Lauren

were scantily dressed. Eighth, the policy, reasoning, and requirement of the knock and announce

under the Fourth Amendment is to “announce police’s presence and purpose clearly.” As set forth

above, the announce was incompetent, unreasonable, incoherent, and unconstitutional because

“police’s presence and purpose” was not clearly stated – it was muffled out. Indeed, Alyssa and

Lauren did not know it was the police – each of them thinking they were being robbed, about to

be raped, or worse. When the destruction of evidence is not a concern as it was not a concern here,

the knock and announce rule emphasizes reasonableness in the waiting period. Courts expect

officers to consider factors such as the time of day, size of the residence, visible occupant activity,

and absence of exigent circumstances, among other factors, in assessing a reasonable time and

have found reasonable wait times up to 1 minute may be reasonable in low-risk cases, especially

where occupants might be in situations requiring time to respond (e.g., dressing or waking up).

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Less than 20 seconds was unreasonable under the circumstances. Had CSPD waited a

constitutionally reasonable amount of time, Mark Hopkins would still be alive.

63. Execution – Announce “As this is being done…” Defendant McClung was in

charge of making announcements and turning on the blue and red lights to warn the residents of

925 Spring Loop that a search warrant was being conducted by police. That is, he was part of the

“knock and announce” to “announce police’s presence and purpose clearly,” pursuant to Fourth

Amendment requirements. However, he arrived at the raid late and by the time he stopped, turned

on his lights, and made an announcement, the Defendant Raid Officers had already breached the

door, were inside, and were in the process of shooting Mark Hopkins. Had CSPD initiated this part

of the “announce” “as this [the knock] [was] being done,” Mark Hopkins would still be alive.

64. SWAT’s Use and Military-Style Raid is Unreasonable and Unconstitutionally

Excessive. First, as set forth above, SWAT was not approved for 925 Spring Loop and therefore,

its need and its use was unnecessary and excessive – to wit:

Regardless, in its use, the Defendant Raid Officers were decked out in full tactical gear and carried

5.56 NATO caliber Colt model SMG assault rifles with a silencer, scope, light, and laser

attachments, and a 5.56 NATO caliber magazine carrying NATO rounds – to wit:

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CSPD decided to use this style of an AR-15 assault rifle, used by the US military in conflicts such

as the Vietnam War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. CSPD decided to use this style of an AR-15 assault

rifle not against Pablo Escobar, the deceased Colombian drug lord and narco-terrorist but against

Abraham Escobar, an unrelated, small-time college-student pot dealer; and not in a war, terrorist,

or hostage situation but against college students in a densely packed neighborhood of single-family

homes. The setup of the raid of 925 Spring Loop from the start created a highly predictable chance

that severe injury or death would occur, and it did occur. Had CSPD not conducted a SWAT

military-style raid, Mark Hopkins would still be alive.

65. Mechanical Breach is Unreasonable and Unconstitutionally Excessive. As set

forth herein and above, the mechanical breach by use of a battering ram was unreasonable,

unnecessary, and unconstitutional. Indeed, given the ineffective “knock and announce” stated

above, Alyssa and Lauren state they were awakened by the mechanical breach – not the “knock

and announce.” As such, from breach to death, Mark Hopkins had approximately 10 seconds

before his life was taken. Had CSPD not conducted a mechanical breach and when it did, Mark

Hopkins would still be alive.

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66. Flash-bang Use is Unreasonable and Unconstitutionally Excessive. CSPD

officers entered the home by force, using a battering ram followed immediately by an M84 stun

grenade or “flash-bang” (also known as a “Destructive Device” or “Diversionary Device” or “DD”

for short) – the same used by the United States Armed Forces. Upon detonation, the flash-bang

generates an intense heat, emits an intensely loud “bang” of 170–180 decibels, and a blinding flash

of more than one million candlepower. The combination of visual and auditory stimuli enables the

flash-bang to render temporary blindness, loss of hearing, disorientation, confusion, and loss of

coordination and balance within a radius of ten yards for an extended period of time. Flash-bang

grenades are classified as “destructive devices” with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,

and Explosives (ATF), under the National Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f), and are

subject to strict regulation outlined in 27 C.F.R. § 479.11. Flash-bangs are known to destroy

property, cause fires and burns, and have resulted in fatalities to officers, suspects, and civilians.

And for the reasons set forth below, as used in the 925 Spring Loop raid, its use was incompetent,

excessive, unreasonable, and unconstitutional. Had CSPD not used a M84 stun grenade or “flash-

bang,” Mark Hopkins would still be alive.

67. Flash-bang Use – Clearly Established Law on Unreasonableness. Courts have

consistently held that the use of flash-bang devices during search warrant executions must be

justified by specific, credible threats that necessitate such force. In cases involving non-violent

drug offenses, where no substantial risk to officer safety is present, deploying flash-bangs has been

deemed improper and a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Law enforcement agencies are

advised to exercise caution and thoroughly assess the necessity of using flash-bangs, ensuring that

their deployment is proportionate to the actual risks involved. More specifically, several federal

courts have held that “the use of flash bang devices should be limited and is not appropriate in
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most cases.” The knock and announce facilitates a “brief interlude between announcement and

entry with a warrant,” which may be the opportunity that an individual has to put on clothes or get

out of bed. On the other hand, the flash bang device is a tactical expression of forceable entry –

the force authorized by the no-knock entry. That is, in a no-knock warrant, force is being used and

no “brief interlude” is required. It follows then that the use of a flash-bang device is antithetical to

and irreconcilable with the public policy grounds supporting a knock and announce warrant. Thus,

it was inappropriate and unconstitutional here. Additionally, courts and legal scholars critical of

flash-bang use against civilians have found the following: flash-bangs should not be used without

explicit judicial authorization tied to the warrant application process, which was not done here;

judges should evaluate the necessity of flash-bangs based on specific risks, such as threats to

officer safety or destruction of evidence, which was not done here; flash-bangs should be

categorically prohibited in knock-and-announce warrant executions unless exigent circumstances

arise, which no such reasonable exigent circumstances existed here; and flash-bangs may be

allowed in no-knock warrants, but only with a higher showing of necessity and detailed planning

(e.g., ensuring no children or elderly are present, having fire extinguishers ready, etc.), which was

not only not done here but also did not apply at 925 Spring Loop because it was not a no-knock

raid. Had CSPD not used a M84 stun grenade or “flash-bang” and followed clearly established

law, Mark Hopkins would still be alive.

68. CSPD’s Training and Policy on Flash-bangs – None. To be clear, when asked

whether CSPD had any policies and procedures regarding flash-bangs, they responded: “None”

and produced zero (0) documents. As there are no policies and procedures, aside from the “how”

to use a flash-bang, there is no training or supervision on the who, what, where, when, and why to

use flash-bangs consistent with constitutional standards or even law enforcement guidance and
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authorities. What’s more, flash-bang or DD was not stated in the search warrant. Accordingly,

there was zero judicial oversight of CSPD’s use of the flash-bang because no one other than the

CSPD knew they would use a destructive device on college students at 6:00 am. If police maintain

a supply of military-style weaponry, they are likely to perceive circumstances to implement its

use, as was the case here. Sadly, the police were left in charge of policing the police because CSPD

has zero policies and procedures on proper, constitutional use of flash-bang devices. And, CSPD’s

supervisors, Defendant Couch, and City Counsel knew there were no policies and no training

regarding the constitutional use of flash-bang grenades on civilians. Had CSPD not used a M84

stun grenade or “flash-bang” and had constitutional policies on proper flash-bang use, Mark

Hopkins would still be alive.

69. What CSPD’s Training and Policy on Flash-bangs Should Look Like – See

NTOA. CSPD claims to be accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement

Agencies, Inc. (CALEA). CALEA establishes comprehensive standards for law enforcement

agencies to promote professional excellence. While CALEA's standards encompass various

aspects of law enforcement operations, including the use of force and compliance with

constitutional requirements, they do not provide explicit guidelines on the deployment of specific

devices such as flashbang grenades during civilian raids. Given the absence of specific CALEA

guidelines on flashbang devices, law enforcement agencies often refer to recommendations from

other authoritative bodies. For instance, the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA)

provides guidance on the use of flash-bangs or “Flash Sound Diversionary Devices (FSDDs)” as

NTOA calls them, advising that their deployment should be limited to situations where there is a

clear tactical advantage, and emphasizing the importance of thorough risk assessment and

adherence to established protocols. NTOA is a prominent organization that provides training,

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resources, and guidelines for law enforcement agencies, particularly in tactical operations.

Regarding the use of flash-bang grenades, NTOA emphasizes the following points:

• Situations Requiring a Clear Tactical Advantage: Flash-bangs should only be

used in operations where their deployment provides a specific and critical
benefit, such as:

o Disorienting armed or dangerous suspects to reduce the risk of harm to

officers and civilians;

o Gaining a split-second tactical advantage in high-risk situations like hostage

rescues, active shooter scenarios, or raids targeting heavily fortified
locations; and

o The devices are not appropriate for routine operations or situations lacking
a clear and immediate threat.

o Instant Case: Here, there was no specific and critical advantage because
the residents were not “dangerous suspects,” it was not a “high risk
situation,” and there was no “clear and immediate threat.”

• Thorough Risk Assessment: Before deploying flash-bangs, a detailed

evaluation of potential risks and benefits must be conducted. This includes:

o Assessing the target environment: Are there flammable materials, children,

elderly individuals, or people with known medical conditions that could be
harmed by the device?

o Considering unintended consequences: Could the device cause property

damage, physical injuries, or fatalities? Could it escalate the situation
unnecessarily?

o Weighing alternatives: Can the tactical objective be achieved using less

force or alternative tools?

o Instant Case: Here, there was no investigation into whether the residents
had any medical condition or other houseguests that could be harmed, there
was no consideration as to whether “it [could] escalate the situation
unnecessarily” – which it did, and less force and other tools could have
accomplished the same objective without the death of Mark Hopkins.

• Adherence to Established Protocols: Proper deployment requires strict

adherence to policies and training to minimize risks and ensure accountability.
This includes:
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o Pre-deployment planning: Ensuring officers are trained in using flash-bangs

and understand the circumstances in which they should be deployed.

o Command oversight: Tactical commanders should approve the use of

FSDDs in specific operations, except in emergencies requiring immediate
action.

o Documentation and review: Agencies should record the use of FSDDs,

including the circumstances, decision-making process, and post-incident
outcomes, for accountability and potential legal review.

o Instant Case: Here, there were no policies and procedures regulating,

training, and supervising appropriate use of flash-bangs – none. CSPD was
free to use at will, with no constitutional oversight.

• Underlying Principles:

o Minimizing Harm: The goal is to use flash-bangs as a non-lethal method to

reduce threats, not to cause harm or escalate the situation unnecessarily.
Careful deployment minimizes the risk of injuries, fatalities, or
constitutional violations.

o Proportionality: The use of force, including flash-bangs, must be

proportional to the threat posed by the situation. Deploying these devices in
low-risk scenarios, such as routine drug raids without evidence of armed
resistance, is strongly discouraged.

o Public Trust and Accountability: Excessive or inappropriate use of flash-

bangs can erode community trust in law enforcement. Strict protocols and
transparent review processes help maintain public confidence.

o Instant Case: Here, the clearly established authority on proper use of flash-
bangs dictates that it should not have been used in the 925 Spring Loop raid
because it was disproportional to threat posed and created a highly
predictable tendency to “escalate the situation,” which is exactly what
happened.

Had CSPD not used a M84 stun grenade or “flash-bang,” had constitutional policies on proper

flash-bang use, and relied on authoritative bodies like the National Tactical Officers Association’s

guidance on proper flash-bang use, Mark Hopkins would still be alive.

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70. Flash-bang’s Physical Effects. Flash-bangs cause disorientation. The duration of

disorientation caused by a flash-bang (flash sound diversionary device, or FSDD) depends on

several factors, including the design of the device, the individual's proximity to it, and

environmental conditions. However, general research and tactical guidelines suggest the

following:

• Immediate Effects (Seconds):

o Blinding Flash: The intense flash of light (~6–8 million candela) overwhelms the
photoreceptors in the eyes, causing temporary blindness that typically lasts 5–15
seconds, depending on the lighting conditions and proximity to the device.

o Deafening Bang: The sound pressure, often exceeding 170-180 decibels, disrupts
the inner ear, leading to temporary hearing loss or ringing (tinnitus) that can last a
few minutes to hours. The shockwave also disorients balance and spatial
awareness. By way of comparison of 170-180 decibels, see below:

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Here, even in an adjacent room, 20 feet away, with a closed standard interior door,
the sound level of a flash-bang could be approximately 126-142 dB. Even at these
reduced levels, the sound would still be extremely loud and capable of causing
temporary or permanent hearing damage. For context: 125 dB: threshold of pain
and 130-140 dB: similar to a jet engine at close range or a gunshot. The sound level
would still be high enough to cause significant disorientation, particularly if the
occupants were unaware of the flash-bang’s detonation.

• Secondary Effects:

o Cognitive Disruption: The sensory overload causes confusion and inability to

process information, typically lasting 10–20 seconds after detonation. In stressful
scenarios, this period can extend due to heightened adrenaline and fear.

o Physical Recovery: Some individuals may experience lingering effects such as

headaches, nausea, or disorientation for minutes or longer, especially if they are
in close proximity to the blast.

• Factors Influencing Disorientation:

o Dark environments amplify the disorienting effects of the flash.

o Confined spaces enhance the sound and pressure effects, increasing disorientation.

Had CSPD not used a M84 stun grenade or “flash-bang” with its known disorienting effects, Mark

Hopkins would still be alive.

71. CSPD’s Use of the Flash-bang on Mark, Alyssa, and Lauren. As confirmed by

Alyssa in every statement since the killing of Mark Hopkins, Mark and Alyssa were asleep at 6:00

am. Both were awakened and stunned by the mechanical breach and simultaneous explosion of the

flash-bang grenade. During the commotion, they never heard any knocking or attempt by the

Defendant Raid Officers to identify themselves as police officers. Instead, Mark and Alyssa

believed that burglars or worse had broken into their home. Mark told Alyssa to call 911, and she

struggled to find her phone in a panic. Alyssa hid in the closet as Mark grabbed his shotgun. CSPD

forced the bedroom door open, and Alyssa did not hear the unknown persons assaulting the home

announce or identify themselves as police officers as they entered the room. Alyssa then heard
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shots fired immediately upon entry of the bedroom and witnessed Mark fall to the ground after he

was repeatedly struck in the face by gunfire.

Question: How is it possible that Mark and Alyssa did not know it was the
police when, as alleged by CSPD, they stated “police” loudly, multiple times?

Answer: CSPD’s flash-bang worked as intended. It produced it’s intended design

and result of disorienting Mark and Alyssa when they were awakened to the
sound of a “jet engine” going off in their tiny bedroom, a “confined space,” “in
the dark,” having been startled from sleep, without their glasses on, “disrupting
their inner ears,” “disorienting their balance and spatial awareness,”
“overloading their senses,” and “causing confusion and an inability to process
information for 10-20 seconds.” Indeed, from detonation of the flash-bang to the
death of Mark Hopkins, a mere 11 seconds elapsed. While Mark Hopkins cried
out to “Call 911!,” what he didn’t know, couldn’t know, but desperately need to
know, because of CSPD’s flash-bang, was that he was about to be killed by the
very 911 from whom he was crying out for help. Clearly, Mark and Alyssa were
disoriented. Who hides in the closet and attempts a shootout with law enforcement?
No one.

CSPD’s use of the flash-bang on Mark and Alyssa in the 925 Spring Loop raid was incompetent,

excessive, unreasonable, and unconstitutional. And, had CSPD not used a M84 stun grenade or

“flash-bang,” Mark Hopkins would still be alive and Alyssa would not have been injured.

72. Aftermath – Interrogation. Mark died as a result of the gunfire. Alyssa and Lauren

were handcuffed by officers, detained, and questioned for at least eight hours. During the detention

and interrogations, the CSPD offices repeatedly, and falsely, accused Mark of being engaged in

criminal conduct, in an effort to justify the killing of Mark.

73. Aftermath – Norris Lawyers-Up and Makes False Statements. Following

Defendant Norris’s killing of Mark Hopkins, he meets with his lawyer who then prepares him for

his statement to the Texas Rangers, and, upon information and belief, watches his body cam

footage multiple times to craft his statement. Therein and under oath, Defendant Norris states the

following:

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The briefing included reviewing the floor plan of 925 Spring Loop and cautions
that the occupants of the locations to be searched are known to carry or possess
firearms.

While making entry, I scanned the bedroom until I observed an adult male inside the
connecting closet aiming a long gun of some sort at me. I observed the male shoot
a round off from the gun, while also hearing the gun go off and feeling the
percussion of the firearm discharging. At this point, I was in fear for my life, the
life of my fellow officers inside the structure, and the lives of any innocents left
inside the structure as this subject had not only exhibited a deadly weapon but also
used deadly force. Due to this, I aimed my SWAT issued AR rifle at the adult male
with a gun, and I returned fire multiple times until I observed the male drop the gun
and fall to the ground. My use of deadly force was immediately necessary to prevent
the further threat of serious bodily injury or death to myself or others.

Emphasis added. The above statements are false for the following reasons:

• First, the briefing did not state anything about “occupants” – plural. The only
discussion regarding the “unknown” possibility of guns was “if Escobar is present.”
CSPD knew Abraham Escobar was not present. However, if it is now CSPD’s position
that “occupants” – including Mark Hopkins “are known to carry or possess firearms”
despite no Threat Assessment or PowerPoint slide corroborating same, then CSPD
further knew that it would be inappropriate to use a flash-bang given the highly
predictable chance of escalating the situation to deadly force, which it did. That is,
either Defendant Norris is lying about this alleged knowledge being attributable to
Mark Hopkins, or CSPD is admitting to their incompetent use of the flash-bang.

• Second, in his paragraph beginning with, “While making entry…” and ending with
“…fall to the ground,” Defendant Norris is suggesting that some considerable time
elapsed for deliberative thought – perception, contemplation, decision, and execution.
However, upon review of Exhibit A, the shooting of Mark Hopkins was less than one
second upon entry of the bedroom – a speed that is wholly unsupported by any human
factors perception reaction study. There was no deliberative process; the shooting was
simultaneous with entry.

• Third, upon information and belief, Defendant Norris fired first and the return-firing of
Mark’s shotgun was the result of an involuntary muscle contraction or neurological
shock or disruption followed by an involuntary muscle contraction upon being hit by a
bullet or bullets.

74. Aftermath – No Discipline, No Termination, and No Training. Despite the

unlawful search and seizure, and the ultimately fatal shooting of Mark, none of the Defendant Raid

Officers were terminated or even disciplined. Furthermore, none of the Defendant Raid Officers
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were trained before or after this patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably

unnecessary military-style raid.

75. Aftermath – Ratification. Despite the unlawful search and seizure, excessive

force, invasion of privacy, and the ultimately fatal shooting of Mark, all of the action and inactions

of the Defendant Raid Officers – including Defendant Norris’s constitutionally inadequate knock

and announce, use of a battering ram, shooting of Mark, and Defendant Le’s use of the flash-bang

– were ratified and approved by all supervising officer, Defendant Crouch, and CSPD.

76. CSPD – Policies, Practices, Customs, and Usage. CSPD’s actions and inactions

are further unconstitutional for the following reasons:

• The CSPD’s officers’ actions tragically took Mark’s life and those actions were the
logical and unconstitutional consequence of the CSPD’s unlawful and illegal pattern,
practice, custom, and de facto policy of using unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasion of privacy, and excessive force on suspects.

• The CSPD’s written policy on searches and seizures or use of force is not the de facto
policy of the CSPD. The de facto policy is that which these officers employed when
they inadequately knocked and announced their presence at Mark’s apartment and
instead decided to immediately enter the apartment by breaking down the door,
detonating a flashbang device, and immediately start shooting, without any
constitutionally adequate warning or making any effort to de-escalate the situation.

• The CSPD has a pattern, practice, history, and custom of conducting such illegal
searches and seizures and using excessive force, including conducting searches with
guns drawn, when there is no imminent threat of bodily harm or other justifiable reason
to do so. In short, the CSPD train its officers to enter a residence like it is a war zone
and to shoot on sight. The CSPD does not provide adequate training to its officers as
it relates to proper searches and seizures, whether with a warrant or without one. The
CSPD also does not provide adequate training to its officers as it relates to the use of
deadly force and the use of non-deadly force.

• The College Station City Council, the City's final policymaker, Chief Couch and the
City knew or should have known that the training provided to its officers was
inadequate or nonexistent.

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• The officers should have been trained to deal with citizens posing no threat of
imminent bodily harm to them, other officers or the general public.

• The officers entered the apartment by breaking the door down, and detonating a flash-
bang device, with their weapons drawn, without any evaluation of the situation, before
or after entering the apartment. The officers simply opened fire without having any
knowledge of the true situation. Because these officers were ill-trained, they all
defaulted to the defective CSPD policy: enter a residence like it is a war zone and to
shoot on sight.

• This terrible tragedy was 100% preventable. Mark and his girlfriend were asleep in
Mark’s room. They had no idea what was happening. They were not engaged in any
illegal activity and were not attempting to harm anyone. Nonetheless, because of the
reckless and intentional violations of Mark’s constitutional rights, Mark is now dead.

• Mark posed no risk to any of the officers or any other person in the immediate area.
Mark did not attempt to harm the officers and was not committing a crime when
Defendant Officer Norris shot him multiple times. Instead, Mark was legally defending
himself and others against an unknown intruder.

• The officers unlawful and unwarranted acts, lack of training and the official customs
or policies of the CSPD were the proximate cause of Mark’s death. At all times material
hereto, the CSPD officers were acting in the scope of their employment as agents,
servants, and employees of the CSPD, a part of Defendant, the City of College Station,
under color of state law.

77. Mark Hopkins’s Death And Its Impact On His Family. As a direct and

proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs have sustained substantial permanent damages.

Mark was twenty-two (22) years old when he was murdered by Defendant Officer Norris. Mark

leaves behind his parents, his sister, and the love of his life, Alyssa. Mark’s parents have suffered

a significant loss from the death of their son by virtue of the destruction of the parent-child

relationship, including the right to love, affection, solace, comfort, companionship, society,

emotional support, and happiness. Mark’s parents have suffered and will continue to suffer

anguish, grief, and sorrow as a result of Mark’s death and are likely to continue to suffer those

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losses for a long time in the future. For these losses, Plaintiffs seek damages in a sum in excess of

the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court.

78. Alyssa’s Injuries and Damages. Alyssa was in the Apartment, was a target of the

unconstitutional battering ram and flash-bang use, and in the line of fire at the time of the shooting

of Mark Hopkins. Indeed, the only thing separating her from CSPD’s bullets was Mark’s courage

and drywall. What’s more, Alyssa experienced CSPD’s flash-bang, was awakened to the sound of

a “jet engine” going off in her vicinity, experienced sound pressure that disrupted her inner ears,

experienced temporary hearing loss and ringing, experienced balance-disorientation and spatial

awareness, was startled from sleep, experienced overloading of her senses, and experienced

confusion and an inability to process information when CSPD’s M84 grenade exploded near her.

While Alyssa was not ultimately shot, being the victim of CSPD’s flash-bang, being in the line of

fire, and witnessing the death of her boyfriend – the man she woke up next to for months – caused

her to be traumatized and in shock and suffer direct personal injury in the form of pain, mental

anguish, and severe emotional distress. In short, CSPD’s and Defendant Raid Officers’ excessive

force is no different from those of the Hopkins. Alyssa was not a mere “witness to police action,”

she was as much a target of CSPD’s and Defendant Raid Officers’ excessive force as Mark; the

only difference is that Alyssa was not hit by CSPD’s bullets—though CSPD’s bullets missed her

by a few feet. For her physical pain and her psychological damages, Plaintiffs seek damages in a

sum in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court.

VII. CLAIMS

79. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

80. Plaintiff hereby makes the following claims and invokes the following federal
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statutes and Constitutional rights – to wit:

81. 42 U.S.C 1983. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.”

82. Monell Liability. A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an

official policy or custom which is the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Monell v.

Dep’t of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

83. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. “The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.”

84. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Section 1. “All persons

born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Specifically, Plaintiff invokes his

Constitutional rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution to be

free from, inter alia, unreasonable searches and seizures, invasion of privacy, and excessive force.
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85. 42 U.S.C 1988(b). “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections

…1983, [and] 1985 … of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other

than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except that in any action

brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity

such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was

clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.”

86. Vicarious Liability. Defendants’ conduct, actions, and/or inactions, individually

and in concert with others are liable under theories of individual liability, direct liability, Monell

liability, and vicarious liability including but not limited to: Aiding & Abetting; Assisting &

Participating; Concert of Action; Joint Cooperation; Actual Authority; Apparent Authority;

Conspiracy; and Ratification. Defendants, each of them individually, jointly, and/or collectively,

hid behind the authority of the law and were acting under color of state law, ordinance and/or

regulation, statutes, custom, and usages of CSPD.

87. Conspiracy 10. Conspirators in this case include Defendant Raid Officers,

10
See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). A civil conspiracy is a “combination of two or
more persons acting in concert to commit an individual act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful
means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties “to inflict a wrong
against or injury upon another,” and “an overt act that results in damage.” In order to prove the
existence of a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff is not required to provide direct evidence of the
agreement between the conspirators; “[c]ircumstantial evidence may provide adequate proof of
conspiracy.” Thus, the question whether an agreement exists should not be taken from the jury in
a civil conspiracy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can “infer from the
circumstances [that the alleged conspirators] had a ‘meeting of the minds’ and thus reached an
understanding” to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives … A plaintiff seeking redress need not prove
that each participant in a conspiracy knew the “exact limits of the illegal plan or the identity of all
participants therein.” … An express agreement among all the conspirators is not a necessary
element of a civil conspiracy. The participants in the conspiracy must share the general
conspiratorial objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan designed to achieve the
objective or possess the same motives for designing the intended conspiratorial result. To
demonstrate the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, it simply must be shown that there was
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Defendant Crouch, and CSPD.

88. Clearly Established. At all times material hereto, the laws regarding, inter alia,

unreasonable searches and seizures, invasion of privacy, and excessive force were clearly

established within both the Fifth Circuit, Southern District of Texas, and state and federal law prior

to the time of Defendants’ patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary

military-style raid.

89. Causation. Defendants’ conduct, actions, and/or inactions were the moving force,

directly caused, proximately caused, and/or were a substantial factor in causing the

Constitutionally-violative injuries and damages as suffered by Plaintiffs, as set forth more fully

below.

90. Texas Wrongful Death and Survivorship Claim. Plaintiffs are the surviving

parents of Decedent Mark and are beneficiaries entitled to bring this action under the Texas

Wrongful Death Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §71.002. Mark was not married and had

no children; thus, his parents are his heirs. An Heir is entitled to bring this action under the Texas

Survival Statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §71.021, and as heirs, Plaintiffs are entitled

to Decedent’s estate under the statutes of descent and distribution. Tex. Prob. Code § 38, §45, et

seq.

VIII. CAUSES OF ACTION

A. COUNT 1: Cause of Action against Defendant Raid Officers under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for Violation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free
from Unreasonable Search and Seizure.

91. Plaintiffs re-allege all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

“a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which [was] known to each person who is
to be held responsible for its consequences.”
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set forth herein.

92. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Reasonableness is the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment and among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a

search or seizure is an officer’s method of entry into a home. Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d

368, 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)). Before

police officers can attempt a forcible entry of a dwelling, they “must knock on the door

and announce their identity and purpose.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387

(1997) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)).

93. This “knock-and-announce” rule incorporates common-law principles that

a resident should have the opportunity to: (1) comply with the law and obey an officer's

lawful demand to enter; (2) avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible

entry; and (3) pull on clothes or get out of bed. Trent, 776 F.3d at 379 (quoting Richards,

520 U.S. at 393 n.5). The rule therefore requires officers to knock and announce their

presence and wait a reasonable amount of time before a forcible entry. Only “when law

enforcement concerns outweigh personal privacy interests” are officers not required to

comply with the rule. United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 2000). To justify

an exception to the knock-and-announce rule, “the police must have a reasonable

suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular

circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective

investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” United

States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at
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394). The rule and its exception has been clearly established for nearly 30 years. Trent,

776 F.3d at 383 (“Any reasonable officer would understand that, because the knock-and-

announce rule serves to alert the occupants of a home of an impending lawful intrusion,

the futility justification requires reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the home to

be searched are already aware of the officer’s presence” and “any reasonable officer

would know that he was violating the rule if he did not have reasonable suspicion that

knocking and announcing would be dangerous or futile or that it would inhibit effective

investigation of the crime.”).

94. The CSPD officers engaged in an unreasonable search of Mark’s apartment

on February 8, 2023 when they failed to, without any justification, to constitutionally

knock and announce their presence. Despite a constitutional obligation to do so, the

CSPD officers instead broke down the front door of the apartment and detonated a flash-

bang device inside the apartment.

95. Having done so, all of the CSPD officers immediately entered the apartment

with their guns drawn. Even inside the apartment, the CSPD officers made no effort to

determine who was inside the apartment and whether their target was present. Instead,

they surged forward into Mark’s bedroom and immediately shot him dead.

96. The obligation to knock and announce their presence was clearly

established on February 8, 2023. Thus, the CSPD officers knew what they were doing

was wrong when they did it.

97. The failure to constitutionally knock and announce their presence was the

moving force, directly caused, proximately caused, and/or was a substantial factor in causing the

violation of Mark’s and Alyssa’s constitutional rights.

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98. As a result of the CSPD officers’ violations of the constitutional standards set forth

herein, Plaintiffs seek compensation from the Defendants as set forth more specifically in the

section of this Complaint entitled “Damages.”

B. COUNT 2: Cause of Action against Defendant Officer Norris under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for Violation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free
from Excessive, Deadly Force.

99. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

100. Defendant Officer Norris, acting under color of law, used unreasonably excessive

and deadly force and killed Mark without any justification for doing so.

101. Defendant Officer Norris’s actions violated Mark’s constitutional, Fourth

Amendment right to be free from excessive, deadly force. This right was clearly established

at the time of the shooting.

102. Nothing that Mark did pose an imminent threat to the safety of Defendant Officer

Norris or anyone else.

103. Defendant Officer Norris’s conduct was objectively unreasonable as Mark

presented no physical threat to either Defendant Officer Norris, his fellow officers, or anyone else

and Mark did nothing which could have placed a reasonable officer in fear for his life or the life

of anyone else.

104. As a result of Defendant Officer Norris’s unjustified actions, Mark suffered an

injury, which resulted directly and only from the use of force, that was clearly excessive and the

force used was objectively unreasonable and in violation of clearly established law.

105. Defendant Officer Norris’s duties and responsibilities on February 8, 2023 were

well defined by applicable law and he knew or reasonably should have known that his conduct
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was below the standard prescribed by such law. Defendant Officer Norris’s conduct violated a

clearly established constitutional right—the right to be free from excessive force—that was

established well before Norris shot and killed Mark. See, e.g., Reyes v. Bridgewater, 362 Fed.

Appx. 403, 409 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The cases on deadly force are clear: an officer cannot use deadly

force without an immediate serious threat to himself or others.”).

106. As a result of Defendant Officer Norris’s violation of the constitutional standard

set forth herein, Plaintiffs seek compensation from the Defendants as set forth more specifically

in the section of this Complaint entitled “Damages.”

C. COUNT 3: Cause of Action against Defendant Raid Officers under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for Violation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from
Excessive Force.

107. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

108. Defendant Raid Officers, acting under color of law, used unreasonably excessive

force in using the battering ram and M84 flash-bang grenade against Mark and Alyssa without

any justification for doing so.

109. Defendant Raid Officers actions violated Mark’s and Alyssa’s constitutional,

Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. This right was clearly established

at the time of the shooting.

110. Nothing that Mark and Alyssa did pose an imminent threat to the safety of

Defendant Raid Officers or anyone else.

111. Defendant Raid Officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable as Mark and

Alyssa presented no physical threat to either Defendant Officer Norris, Defendant Raid Officers,

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or anyone else and Mark and Alyssa did nothing which could have placed a reasonable officer in

fear for his life or the life of anyone else.

112. As a result of Defendant Raid Officers’ unjustified actions, Mark and Alyssa

suffered an injury, which resulted directly and only from the use of force, that was clearly

excessive and the force used was objectively unreasonable and in violation of clearly established

law.

113. Defendant Raid Officers’ duties and responsibilities on February 8, 2023 were well

defined by applicable law and they knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct was

below the standard prescribed by such law. Defendant Raid Officers’ conduct violated a clearly

established constitutional right—the right to be free from excessive force—that was established

well before the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably unnecessary military-

style raid, use of a battering ram, and use of a flash-bang that injured Alyssa and was the moving

force behind Mark’s death.

114. As a result of Defendant Raid Officers’ violation of the constitutional standard set

forth herein, Plaintiffs seek compensation from the Defendants as set forth more specifically in

the section of this Complaint entitled “Damages.”

D. COUNT 4: Claim against Defendant Raid Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as

Supervisors or Bystanders for violation of Mark’s and Alyssa’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from Excessive Force.

115. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

116. All of the Defendant Raid Officers are likewise liable for the illegal and

unreasonable search and Defendant Officer Norris’s use of excessive, deadly force as

either a supervisor or as a bystander. A claim of bystander liability requires the claimant

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to prove (1) the by-standing officer knew that a fellow officer was violating an

individual’s constitutional rights, and (2) the officer had a reasonable opportunity to

prevent the violation but chose not to act. Supervisory liability requires a showing that

the supervisor acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to their subordinates’

constitutional violations. Both supervisory and bystander liability under Section 1983 are

based on the principle that, by choosing not to intervene and prevent unconstitutional

conduct, the passive officer effectively participates in unconstitutional acts.

117. All of the CSPD officers, Defendant Raid Officers here, knew or should have

known that they were required to constitutionally knock and announce their presence

before executing the warrant. But none of them did. And the failure to do so was not

only obvious, but pre-planned. All of these officers were involved with the planning or

knew of the plan to enter Mark’s and Alyssa’s apartment, yet none of them made any

effort to stop it.

118. The same is true with regard to Defendant Officer Norris’s use of force.

The CSPD officers, Defendant Raid Officers here, knew that Defendant Officer Norris was

entering the apartment with his gun drawn. Knowing of the plan as to how the apartment

would be entered, along with the plans to break down the door and use a flash-bang

device, it should have come as no surprise that the officer, with his gun drawn, would use

it. Yet, no officer made any effort to stop it.

119. At all times, there was adequate time and opportunity for all of the CSPD

officers to intervene to prevent the illegal search and entry into the apartment and the use

of plainly excessive force and to prevent Mark’s death and Alyssa’s injuries.

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120. By choosing not to intervene, all of the Defendant Raid Officers effectively

participated in the unconstitutional acts.

121. Since at least 1995, it has been clearly established in the Fifth Circuit that

an individual officer is subject to bystander liability under Section 1983 if he or she knew

a constitutional violation was being committed by a fellow officer and had a reasonable

opportunity to prevent the harm. Hamilton v. Kindred, 845 F.3d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 2017)

(citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 918 (5th Cir. 1995), for principle that “it was clearly

established in the Fifth Circuit that an officer could be liable as a bystander in a case

involving excessive force if he knew a constitutional violation was taking place and had

a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm.”). Likewise, it was clearly established at

the time of the incident that a supervisor is subject to liability under Section 1983 where

the supervisor, with deliberate indifference, failed to act or otherwise prevent the

constitutional violations perpetrated by their subordinates. See, e.g., Porter v. Epps, 659

F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011).

122. As a direct and proximate result of all of the CSPD officers’ failures to

prevent the violations of Mark’s and Alyssa’s constitutional rights, Plaintiffs incurred

extreme pain and injuries for which they seek compensation as set forth more specifically

in the section of this Complaint entitled “Damages.”

E. COUNT 5: Claim against individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violation of Mark’s and Alyssa’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
Invasion of Privacy.

123. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

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124. Defendant Raid Officers did not constitutionally knock and announce

before entering Mark’s and Alyssa’s apartment.

125. Adequately and constitutionally knocking and announcing their presence

and purpose would not have endangered Defendant Raid Officers.

126. Defendant Raid Officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that knocking

and announcing would be dangerous or futile or inhibit the investigation of a crime.

127. Defendant Raid Officers violated Mark’s and Alyssa’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering the apartment without adequately and

constitutionally knocking and announcing and entering without consent and pursuant to

a false search warrant.

128. As a direct and proximate result of all of the CSPD Defendant Raid

Officers’ unconstitutional invasion of Mark’s and Alyssa’s privacy, Mark was fatally

shot, Alyssa was injured, and Plaintiffs incurred extreme pain and injuries for which they

seek compensation as set forth more specifically in the section of this Complaint entitled

“Damages.”

F. COUNT 6: Cause of Action against the City of College Station under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights for Failing To
Train, Supervise, or Discipline Its Officers and for Ultimately Ratifying their
conduct.

129. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

130. The City of College Station is liable for all damages suffered by the Plaintiffs

pursuant to Monell and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on official policies or customs of the CSPD of

which the City Council, the City Manager, the Mayor, and the Chief of Police all had actual or

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constructive knowledge, and which were moving forces behind the constitutional violations

alleged herein. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

131. The City of College Station and the CSPD, by and through the College Station City

Council, have an inadequate policy of training officers regarding the following areas of law

enforcement:

a. The use of proper and appropriate search and seizure procedures.

b. The use of excessive and/or deadly force.

c. The proper use of less deadly force.

132. Defendant Raid Officers at the scene of the shooting incident were acting under

color of law and acting pursuant to customs, practices, and policies of the City of College Station

and the CSPD in regard to their search of Mark’s and Alyssa’s apartment and use of deadly force,

all as authorized and/or ratified by the College Station City Council and Chief Couch. Mark and

Alyssa were deprived of rights and privileges secured to him by the United States Constitution and

by other laws of the United States, when the City of College Station failed to provide proper

training, adequate supervision, or discipline in dealing with individuals such as Mark in violation

of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and related provisions of federal law and in violation of the above cited

constitutional provisions.

133. The City of College Station’s policy of inadequate and improper training of police

officers on proper search procedures and the use of excessive and/or deadly force, resulted in the

constitutional deprivations and damages alleged herein.

134. The City of College Station and the CSPD failed to adequately train and failed to

adequately supervise or discipline the officers, despite their unlawful conduct.

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135. The CSPD officers’ lack of training led to the unreasonable search and

immediate use of excessive and deadly force, all of which was the moving force behind the death

of Mark, injuries to Alyssa, and Plaintiffs’ damages.

136. The City trains its officer on search and seizure procedures, and this training serves

as the foundation for the methods employed in any situation the officers may encounter. The City

trains its officers that so long as they have a warrant, there is no requirement on their part to

constitutionally knock or announce their presence. In other words, the City trains its officers to

default to constitutionally unreasonably search methods when there is a warrant. Since the knock-

and-announce rule has been a clearly established requirement of any search for at least thirty years

and is the rule (as opposed to an exception) to be followed in all cases, the City’s training of its

officers to perform searches in this manner is unconstitutional.

137. The City also trains its officers on threat assessment and that threat assessment

serves as the foundational analysis for the level of force to be used in any particular situation. In

doing so, the City trains its officers that they may use deadly force when they believe a suspect

poses a threat of serious bodily harm or death to the officer or others. In other words, the City

trains its officers that the use of deadly force is objectively reasonable even when based on the

officers’ subjective evaluation, meaning that officers may use deadly force when no immediate

threat of harm actually exists, so long as they subjectively perceive such a threat. Since deadly

force is not justified “[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to

others,” Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985), training its officers in such a way is unconstitutional.

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138. The CSPD has longstanding records of not providing its officers with adequate

training on search procedures, flash-bang use, or use of force techniques all of which are intended

to prevent instances of excessive and deadly force and extrajudicial killings by CSPD officers.

139. The actual practice or custom of the CSPD regarding the use of deadly force is to

encourage officers to enter a residence like they are in a war zone and immediately start shooting.

140. As a result of the lack of training and the official custom or policies of the CSPD,

there have been a number of deadly police shootings of unarmed suspects.

141. There exists a persistent, widespread practice of police shootings that result from

the training or lack thereof, received by CSPD officers. Upon information and belief, CSPD

officers are trained by individuals with little or no experience working in the field.

142. Moreover, even assuming there is no pattern and practice of CSPD officers to

bypass constitutional “knock-and-announce” search procedures and immediately employ deadly

force, the City’s failure to train its officers regarding search procedures, flash-bang use, and the

use of excessive and/or deadly force qualifies for the “single-incident exception” to Monell’s

requirements because the failure to train its officers in these areas presents an obvious potential

for a constitutional violation. In short, the failure to train CPSD’s officers in these areas made it

apparent to the City’s policymaker that the constitutional violations at issue here were the highly

predictable outcome of the City’s conduct.

143. The City then ratified its officers’ conduct by failing or refusing to discipline these

officers or even provide them additional training. All officers involved in the raid on and death of

Mark Hopkins remain employed by CSPD today. The CSPD’s after-the-fact ratification shows

that the City supported these unconstitutional actions at the time they occurred.

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144. CPSD’s conduct confirms that it affirmatively acquiesced in, adopted, or

sanctioned these officers’ conduct and failed to actively enforce its own policies and procedures.

It also tends to suggest that it and other policymakers found no inadequacies in the officer’s

conduct. Such affirmative official action lends itself to the distinct possibility that similar situations

that present the potential for constitutional rights violations will occur again in the future because

the City has tacitly approved of this type of conduct.

145. When CSPD failed and refused to discipline the officers for their clearly established

constitutional violations, it approved of and ratified that conduct, which itself establishes a custom

of CSPD. See World Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 755 (5th

Cir. 2009). When an entity like CSPD approves a subordinate’s conduct and the basis for it,

liability for that conduct is chargeable against the entity because it has “retained the authority to

measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,

485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion); Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 284 (5th

Cir. 2016); see also Balle v. Nueces Cty., Tex., 690 F. App’x 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2017). Under

Praprotnik, “post hoc ratification by a final policymaker is sufficient to subject a city to liability

because decisions by final policymakers are policy.”

146. The failure of CSPD to punish the officers or to make any reasonable attempt to

implement meaningful changes in light of Mark’s death emphasizes the point that this is how

things have always been done and the CSPD approves of it. These officers, Defendant Raid

Officers here, violated Mark’s and Alyssa’s constitutional rights in an egregious manner, which

resulted in Mark being killed. This inexcusable use of deadly force resulted in no disciplinary

action, no retraining, and no reevaluation of policies by CSPD. By doing nothing, CSPD ratified

these officers’ conduct.

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147. These constitutional violations by CSPD were the moving force behind the death

of Mark and Alyssa’s injuries. As a result of Defendant Raid Officers’ violation of the

constitutional standard set forth herein, Plaintiffs seek compensation from the Defendants as set

forth more specifically in the section of this Complaint entitled “Damages.”

IX. DAMAGES

148. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

149. Actual damages. Defendants’ acts and/or omissions were a proximate cause of the

following Injuries suffered by Plaintiffs:

a. Estate of Mark Hopkins (Survival Claim; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
71.021):

1. Conscious pain and mental anguish suffered by Mark Hopkins prior to his
death; and

2. Funeral and burial expenses.

b. Cynthia Hopkins (as wrongful death beneficiary of Mark Hopkins; Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.004):

1. Mental anguish—the emotional pain, torment, and suffering experienced by

Cynthia Hopkins because of the death of her son, Mark—that Cynthia
Hopkins sustained in the past and that she will, in reasonable probability,
sustain in the future;

2. Loss of companionship and society—the loss of the positive benefits

flowing from the love, comfort, companionship, and society that Cynthia
Hopkins would have received from Mark had he lived—that Cynthia
Hopkins sustained in the past and that she will, in reasonable probability,
sustain in the future; and

3. Pecuniary loss—loss of the care, maintenance, support, services, advice,

counsel, and reasonable contributions of a pecuniary value that Cynthia
Hopkins would have received from Mark had he lived—that Cynthia
Hopkins sustained in the past and that she will, in reasonable probability
will sustain in the future.
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c. Geoffrey Hopkins (as wrongful death beneficiary of Mark Hopkins; Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.004):

1. Mental anguish—the emotional pain, torment, and suffering experienced by

Geoffrey Hopkins because of the death of his son, Mark—that Geoffrey
Hopkins sustained in the past and that he will, in reasonable probability,
sustain in the future;

2. Loss of companionship and society—the loss of the positive benefits

flowing from the love, comfort, companionship, and society that Geoffrey
Hopkins would have received from Mark had he lived—that Geoffrey
Hopkins sustained in the past and that he will, in reasonable probability,
sustain in the future; and

3. Pecuniary loss—loss of the care, maintenance, support, services, advice,

counsel, and reasonable contributions of a pecuniary value that Geoffrey
Hopkins would have received from Mark had he lived—that Geoffrey
Hopkins sustained in the past and that he will, in reasonable probability will
sustain in the future.

d. Alyssa Michelle Wilson:

1. Physical injuries: Damages to Plaintiff’s ears and for any injuries resulting
from Defendant Raid Officers’ unconstitutional search and seizure,
excessive force, and invasion of privacy—that Alyssa sustained in the past
and that she will, in reasonable probability, sustain in the future;

2. Pain and suffering: Compensation for the emotional distress, mental

anguish, and physical pain experienced from Defendant Raid Officers’
unconstitutional search and seizure, excessive force, and invasion of
privacy—that Alyssa sustained in the past and that she will, in reasonable
probability, sustain in the future;

3. Mental anguish—the emotional pain, torment, and suffering experienced by

Alyssa because of the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and
unreasonably unnecessary military-style raid she experienced; witnessing
the death of her boyfriend, Mark; and the violation of her own constitutional
rights and consequent injuries—that Alyssa sustained in the past and that
she will, in reasonable probability, sustain in the future;

4. Medical expenses: Any medical costs resulting from injuries sustained from
Defendant Raid Officers’ unconstitutional search and seizure, excessive
force, and invasion of privacy—that Alyssa sustained in the past and that
she will, in reasonable probability, sustain in the future;
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5. Lost wages: Any missed work due to injuries or time spent dealing with the
consequences of Defendant Raid Officers’ unconstitutional search and
seizure, excessive force, and invasion of privacy—that Alyssa sustained in
the past and that she will, in reasonable probability, sustain in the future;

6. Property damage: Damages for any property that was damaged or destroyed
during the patently incompetent, grossly excessive, and unreasonably
unnecessary military-style raid, including her cell phone and computer(s).

150. Punitive/Exemplary Damages against Defendant Officer Norris and Defendant

Officer Le. Punitive/exemplary damages are recoverable under Section 1983 when the conduct is

shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference

to the federally protected rights of others. Here, the conduct of Defendant Officer Norris (for the

shooting death of Mark Hopkins) and Defendant Officer Le (for the detonation of a destructive

device – an M84 flash-bang grenade) were done with evil motive or intent, or at the very least, were

done recklessly or callously indifferent to the federally protected rights of Mark Hopkins and Alyssa

Wilson. As such, Plaintiffs request punitive and exemplary damages to deter this type of conduct

in the future.

151. Injunctive Relief. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring the City of College

Station to draft, implement, train, enforce, and supervise constitutional policies regarding the use

of flash-bangs, specifically restricting their deployment to no-knock search warrants, including the

use of flash-bangs in any application for a no-knock search warrant only, and to provide training,

supervision, and ongoing monitoring and reporting to ensure compliance with these policies and to

prevent future constitutional violations.

152. Prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

153. Costs of Court.

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154. Reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and litigation costs 2 incurred by

Plaintiffs through trial, and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that may be incurred by

Plaintiffs for any post-trial proceedings, or appeal, interlocutory or otherwise, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988.

155. Nominal damages.

156. Unliquidated damages. Plaintiffs seek unliquidated damages in an amount that is

within the jurisdictional

limits of the court.

X. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

157. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

158. Plaintiffs reserve their right to plead and prove the damages to which they are

entitled to at the time of trial. All conditions to Plaintiffs' recovery have been performed or have

occurred.

XI. TRIAL BY JURY

159. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

160. Plaintiffs have paid a jury fee and demand trial by jury.

2
As part of litigation costs, various courts have awarded Plaintiffs prevailing in a §1983 case with
attorney’s fees (42 U.S.C. § 1988); expert witness fees, if deemed reasonable and necessary (see
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)); court costs and filing fees (see Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc.
v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)); deposition and
transcript costs (see Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012)); travel costs (see
Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 630 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2011)); and other necessary litigation
costs such as postage, photocopying, and investigator fees (see id.)).
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XII. PRAYER

161. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the allegations in the previous paragraphs, as though fully

set forth herein.

162. For these reasons, Plaintiffs pray that Defendants be cited to appear and answer

herein; that upon final trial hereof Plaintiffs have and recover judgment from Defendants; actual

damages, exemplary damages, pre-judgment interest at the legal rate; interest on said judgment at

the legal rate; costs of court; attorney’s fees; injunctive relief; and for such other and further relief,

both general and special, at law and in equity, to which Plaintiffs may show they are justly entitled.

Filed this 4th day of February, 2025.

Respectfully submitted:

GILDE LAW FIRM, PLLC

__________________________________________
Bradford J. Gilde | TSB#: 24045941 | FID#. 4010300
Bradley G. Ertl | TSB#: 24110896
Chelsea N. Gillespie | TSB#24144221
GILDE LAW FIRM, PLLC
Mailing: 5535 Memorial Drive, Suite F #154,
Houston, TX 77007
Phone: 281-973-2772
Facsimile: 281-973-2771
Email: bjg@gildelawfirm.com
bertl@gildelawfirm.com
cng@gildelawfirm.com

—AND—

DURHAM, PITTARD & SPALDING, LLP

/s/ Thad D. Spalding

__________________________________________
Thad D. Spalding | State Bar No. 00791708
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Shelby J. White | State Bar No. 24084086

DURHAM, PITTARD & SPALDING, LLP
P.O. Box 224626
Dallas, Texas 75222
(214) 946-8000 – Office
(214) 946-8433 – Facsimile
tspalding@dpslawgroup.com
swhite@dpslawgroup.com

—AND—

AARON PERRY LAW FIRM

/s/ Aaron William Perry

__________________________________________
Aaron William Perry | State Bar No. 24068270
AARON PERRY LAW FIRM
4545 Bissonnet, Suite 202, Bellaire, TX, 77401
(713) 393-7788 Phone
(713) 586-0380 Fax
Aaron@aaronperrylawfirm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS CYNTHIA

HOPKINS and GEOFFREY HOPKINS,
individually and on behalf of the ESTATE OF
MARK HOPKINS, Deceased; and ALYSSA
MICHELLE WILSON

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