Entrepreneurship, Transaction

Costs, and Resource Attributes

Kirsten Foss
Nicolai J. Foss
SMG WP 7/2006

April 2006

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SMG Working Paper No. 7/2006
April 2006
ISBN: 87-91815-23-1

Center for Strategic Management and Globalization

Copenhagen Business School
Porcelænshaven 24
2000 Frederiksberg
Denmark
www.cbs.dk/smg

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 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TRANSACTION COSTS,
AND RESOURCE ATTRIBUTES

Kirsten Foss and Nicolai Foss

Center for Strategic Management and Globalization
Copenhagen Business School
Porcelainshaven 24B, 2.fl; 2000 Frederiksberg; Denmark
kf.smg@cbs.dk; njf.smg@cbs.dk

Forthcoming, International Journal of Strategic Change Management

6 April, 2006

ABSTRACT
This paper responds to Kim and Mahoney’s “How Property Rights Economics
Furthers the Resource-Based View: Resources, Transaction Costs and
Entrepreneurial Discovery” (a comment on Foss and Foss, 2005). While we agree
with many of their arguments, we argue that they fail to recognize how exactly
transaction costs and property rights shape the process of entrepreneurial
discovery. We provide a sketch of the mechanisms that link entrepreneurship,
property rights, and transaction costs in a resource-based setting, contributing
further to the attempt to take the RBV in a more dynamic direction.

KEYWORDS
Entrepreneurship, transaction costs, property rights, the resource-based view.

JEL CODE: B5, M2.

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 INTRODUCTION

We are grateful to Kim and Mahoney (2006) for their friendly critique of our 2005 paper,
“Resources and Transaction Costs: How Property Rights Economics Furthers the Resource-
based View.” We agree with most of their arguments and in particular with their attempt to
link ideas on entrepreneurship to ideas on property rights and transaction costs. However,
their linking of these ideas does not go sufficiently far.

It has been argued that “… in transaction cost economics, the functioning market is as much a
black box as is the firm in neoclassical microeconomic theory” (Holmström and Roberts
1998: 77). In particular, entrepreneurship ⎯ a crucial part of “the functioning market”⎯ is
missing from current thinking on property rights and transaction costs, and Kim and Mahoney
go some way in linking these. However, we argue that Kim and Mahoney do not go
sufficiently far in linking ideas on transaction costs, property rights, and entrepreneurship.
Kim and Mahoney rightly point to “… how property theory … in conjunction with resource-
based theory [can] allow us to understand economic rent generation as a dynamic process”
(p.2). However, we believe that it is possible to be more precise with respect to how exactly
property rights and transaction costs shape the process of entrepreneurial discovery. In this
paper, we provide a sketch of the mechanisms that link entrepreneurship, strategic rents, and
transaction costs in a resource-based setting, thus contributing further to the attempt to take
the RBV in a more dynamic direction.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TRANSACTION COSTS

Entrepreneurship as Judgment

Like Kim and Mahoney (2006), we consider Austrian economics to be a natural complement
to notions of property rights and transaction costs (see also Littlechild, 1986; Foss and Foss,
2000; Kim and Mahoney, 2002; Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein, 2006). Modern Austrian
economists (such as Kirzner 1973; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985; Littlechild 1986) view
economic activities as ongoing processes of discovery. In this conception, agents’ plans are
based on incomplete, imperfect and subjectively held knowledge about the plans of other
agents. This results in behavior that is off the equilibrium path and in the emergence of
disequilibrium prices. Also, equilibria may be upset by Schumpeterian entrepreneurs
(Schumpeter, 1934). However, alert arbitraging entrepreneurs “… grasp the opportunities for

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pure entrepreneurial profit created by temporary absence of full adjustment” (Kirzner 1997:
69), and restore a tendency towards equilibrium.

Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein (2006) develop the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment
drawing on Knight (1921), Mises (1949) and Casson (1982). This view traces its origins to
the first systematic treatment of entrepreneurship in economics, Cantillon’s Essai sur la
nature de commerce en géneral (1755). It conceives entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making
when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is
generally unknown (what Knight terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk). More
generally, judgment is required “when no obviously correct model or decision rule is available or
when relevant data is unreliable or incomplete” (Casson, 1982: 17). Judgment must be exercised
even in mundane circumstances, as Knight (1921) emphasized, for ongoing operations as well
as new ventures.1

Knight (1921) introduced judgment in order to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Judgment
primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming estimates of future events in situations in
which the relevant probability distributions are themselves unknown. Entrepreneurship
represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot,
accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight, 1921: 311). In other words, there is no market for the
judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires the person
with judgment to start a firm. Of course, judgmental decision makers can hire consultants,
forecasters, technical experts, and so on. However, in doing so they are exercising their own
entrepreneurial judgment. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-
making is ultimately decision-making about the employment of resources (or, as we shall later
argue, of resource attributes).

The notion of entrepreneurship as judgment implies an obvious link with the theory of the
firm, particularly those theories (transaction cost economics and the property-rights approach)

1
Somewhat in contrast, in Kirzner’s treatment, entrepreneurship is characterized as “… a responding agency. I
view the entrepreneur not as a source of innovative ideas ex nihilo, but as being alert to the opportunities that
exist already and are waiting to be noticed” (Kirzner, 1973: 74).

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that put asset ownership at the forefront of firm organization (Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995)
(cf. also Langlois and Cosgel, 1993).2 However, there is also close link to Penrose’s (1959)
theory of the firm, and particularly to her notion of the management team that based on
heterogenous and path-dependent experience formulates an image of the firm’s “productive
opportunity set” (Kor and Mahoney, 2000).

Entrepreneurship and Transaction Costs

Foss and Foss (2005) asked what would happen to resource value and resource-based
strategies in a world of zero transaction costs, and then discussed the implications of
introducing transaction costs. Consider the same kind of thought experiment, this performed
with respect to entrepreneurship.

What does it mean to say that transaction costs are zero? In one interpretation, “… zero
transaction costs includes the assumption that information about others’ characteristics is
common knowledge” (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001: 531). In Coase’s (1988) own
interpretation (as well as in Barzel, 1997), zero transaction costs include this, as well as
considerable (perhaps perfect) foresight. Thus, zero transaction costs literally means that
present and future resource uses are known to decision-makers. In such a world, there is no
scope for entrepreneurship.

However, such a world implies unrealistic cognitive powers on the part of decision-makers.
And

... given the constraints affecting the availability of information and human
cognitive capacity, each decision-maker has only partial understanding of the
options extant in society, and it is no longer possible to assume that each person
knows everything about current technological alternatives, the nature and
availability of all productive resources, the existence and true properties of every
commodity in the system” (Furubotn, 2002: 75).

A world of positive transaction cost is therefore one in which judgment has to be exercised
with respect to future resource uses. This cognitive capacity is not necessary in a world of

2
The firm is defined as the entrepreneur plus the alienable assets he owns and therefore ultimately controls. As
Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein (2006) The theory of the firm then becomes a theory of how the entrepreneur
arranges his heterogeneous capital assets—what combinations of assets will he seek to acquire, what (proximate)
decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how will he provide incentives and use monitoring to see that his
assets are used consistently with his judgments, and so on.

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zero transaction costs, as all resource uses will effectively be mediated by the price system.
In this sense, the existence of transaction costs makes possible the exercise of
entrepreneurship conceived of as judgment. However, there are further links between
transaction costs and entrepreneurship on this fundamental level.

Assume that the economy is initially in a state of equilibrium, but with positive transaction
costs. All entrepreneurial activities have ceased. Some shock then disturbs the economy, for
example, some essential input that is used in the production of several products becomes
scarce (as in Hayek, 1945). In a zero transaction cost world, “… when equilibrium is
disturbed a new equilibrium is instantaneously attained because, given zero transaction costs,
the cost of adjustment is zero” (Barzel, 1997: 11). In particular, there is no need for
entrepreneurs to equilibrate markets. However, the economy under examination is one where
transaction costs are zero. And “[w]hen equilibrium is disturbed in a positive transaction cost
world, price adjustment is not expected to be instantaneous” (Barzel, 1997: 12). “Menu
costs,” contractual costs of all sorts, costs of searching for alternative exchange partners, etc.
imply that price adjustment is sluggish. In this world, (Kirznerian) entrepreneurs step in to
equilibrate markets based on their alert perception of profit opportunities. In sum, transaction
costs and entrepreneurship can be neatly linked. The next step is linking entrepreneurship to
property rights.

DISCOVERING RESOURCE ATTRIBUTES

In order to see how entrepreneurship connects to issues of property rights, it is convenient to

take the work of Barzel (1997) as a starting point. He consistently defines notions of property
rights in terms of expectations in a way that is consistent with the Austrian emphasis on
subjectivism (e.g., O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985). Thus, Barzel (1994: 394) defines a property
right as “... an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume
the services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly through exchange.” Property rights can be
hold to attributes of an asset Attributes are characteristics and possible uses of assets.

In Foss and Foss (2005) we make use of the idea in property rights theory that resources are
bundles of attributes.3 Although Barzel stresses property rights to known attributes of

3
Kim and Mahoney (2006: 10) instead define resources as bundles of property rights. While resource value is
determined by the property rights that are held to the attributes of a resource, we think that resources should be
defined in terms of attributes.

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resources as the relevant units of analysis, we think it is important to stress that most assets
have multiple non-specified and not yet discovered attributes. For example, a parcel of land
can be used for building houses or a factory, for recreational purposes and so on. The owner
of the parcel buys the rights to exploit a bundle of attributes. Some of the attributes will be
known to buyer and seller at the time of trade while some will be unknown. Thus, the buyer
may acquire the parcel to build a factory and as the builders prepare the foundation of the
building, they may discover an oil well (an unknown attribute). The owner earns a pure
windfall profit from this discovery. The value to the resource owner of the attribute depends
on whether he holds secure property rights to the relevant attribute.

Thus, property rights matter even in the case of pure luck. However, the discovery of many
resource attributes is not a matter of pure luck; it is part of an entrepreneurial discovery
process (as argued above) and this process is strongly influenced by property rights because
they influence which of the attributes that are known to entrepreneurs they will explore and
therefore their judgment and their entrepreneurial actions. However, the discovery of resource
attributes often is path dependent and when entrepreneurs decide not to explore certain
attributes, they implicitly cut themselves off from the discovery of a number of other
attributes.4 In other words, property rights steer the entrepreneurial discovery process. For
example, if the entrepreneur cannot hold (sufficiently) secure property rights to certain
resource attributes, he will not explore these and certain resource attributes may therefore
never be discovered and explored.

The general idea is that property rights and the transaction costs involved in defining and
securing property rights strongly influence an entrepreneur’s expectations regarding the value
of the attribute that he can appropriate. If the entrepreneur is able to discover ways of
reducing the relevant transaction costs, such discovery influence his expectations regarding
the value he can appropriate from resources. For this reason we expect entrepreneurs to be
engaged in searching for ways of reducing transaction costs. This is the kind of
entrepreneurship that was implicitly addressed in Foss and Foss (2005). For example, new
ways of defining (e.g., better ways of measuring attributes), protecting (e.g., ways of
protecting credit card information in virtual exchanges), and exchanging (e.g., internet trade)
property rights result from entrepreneurial action.

4
They may still know that these attributes exist although they do not explore their precise characteristics.

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However, we recognize that entrepreneurship involves more than reducing transaction cost
impediments to the definition, protection and exchange of property rights. Entrepreneurship
also involves discovering new resource attributes themselves, as stated above. However, our
main point here is that these two aspects of entrepreneurship are highly interdependent! Thus,
reduction of the costs of defining, protecting and exchanging property rights brought about by
entrepreneurial action can be expected to impact the entrepreneurs’ judgment with respect to
the value of hitherto unexplored attributes.

As an example, consider the firm. The firm arguably lowers the costs of combining and
recombining knowledge resources relative to market exchange (as recognized by Kim and
Mahoney, 2006). One reason is that property rights to such resources are better protected
inside firms than in markets. Arguably, firms may also have advantages in measuring
knowledge resources (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). “Combinative capabilities” (Kogut and
Zander, 1992) have a significant transaction cost dimension. These transaction costs
advantages allow for more entrepreneurial exploration of the attributes of knowledge assets
than markets do. Thus, the modern firm allowed for an exploration of attributes that would
not have taken place in its absence. In fact, much the same can be argued for the institutions
that support market exchange (cf. Casson, 1982; Loasby 1994). Contracts, reputation
mechanisms, contract law, product warranties, standards, etc. reduce the costs of combining
and recombining (typically, non-knowledge) resources. Such entrepreneurial institution-
making may be seen as representing discontinuities in terms of reducing the costs of exploring
numerous resource combinations (of course, there are also more incremental processes taking
place in the interstices of established institutions; Langlois, 1992).

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW

Kim and Mahoney (2006: 14) extend Foss and Foss (2005) to include “… not only
economizing on transaction costs, but also the dynamic search for increasing entrepreneurial
rent.” Our contributions in this comment on Kim and Mahoney is to point out that
economizing on transaction cost and entrepreneurship are intertwined, and to suggest some
ways in which transaction costs shape the process of entrepreneurial discovery. Several
implications for the resource-based view follow from our discussion.

Implications for strategic factor markets. In an important contribution to the RBV, Barney
(1986) argued that luck or asymmetrical information on the demand side of input markets

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(“strategic factor markets”) are necessary for competitive advantage. If the supply and
demand side of the market hold identical information sets, they will arrive at identical
estimates of the contribution of a resource to value creation. With reasonably competitive
input markets, the price of a resource will equal its discounted net present value. However,
this argument abstracts from entrepreneurial judgment and how it is linked to transaction
costs. Judgment goes beyond the asymmetrical information paradigm assumed in Barney
(1986). Thus, other agents are fundamentally ignorant about the contents of the entrepreneur’s
vision (Knight, 1921; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993); they don’t know that there are things they
don’t know (whereas in the asymmetrical information paradigm, agents know what they lack
information about, cf. Littlechild, 1986; Kirzner, 1997). Moreover, we have argued that
transaction costs influence the exercise of judgment; for example, entrepreneurs may refrain
from forming judgments over the use of resource attributes that are costly to protect. This
means that the expectations entrepreneurs form over the values of resource attributes are
influenced by transaction cost. Equilibria on strategic factor markets are therefore constrained
by transaction costs. A further implication is that if the costs of protecting a certain resource
attribute are lowered, this attribute may become more attractive for the entrepreneur. It may
become part of entrepreneurial judgment. For example, the invention of barbed wire
introduced a number of new uses of land, including new ways of raising cattle. Entrepreneurs
that understand the implications of changing transaction costs for resource uses may be in a
position to beat the supply side on strategic factor markets in the sense of acquiring resources
at a price below the discounted net present value.

Resource value. The role of the entrepreneur is to discover valuable attributes. He will tend to
look for attributes that give rise to rents. We argue that firms’ ability to earn rents is
intimately linked with to the creation and enforcement of property rights over attributes (Foss
and Foss, 2005). In turn creation and enforcement of property rights depend on the transaction
costs involved in these activities. For these reasons the value of resources is partly an outcome
of the process of discovering attributes of the resource and partly of economizing with
transaction costs incurred in exploiting these attributes. Foss and Foss (2005) concentrated on
how economizing with transaction costs influences resource value. Kim and Mahoney (2006)
argued that the understanding of the discovery of new resource uses should be integrated with
the RBV. However, as we have argued, reducing transaction costs and discovering new

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resource attributes are closely related phenomena, and both are important for understanding
resource value.

Sustainability and the dynamics of rents. The sustainability of competitive advantage and/or
rents is usually treated as an equilibrium phenomenon (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney,
1991). This is partly because differential rents are ill-defined outside equilibrium (Lippman
and Rumelt, 2003), and partly because the interpretation of sustainability as a situation in
which all attempts at imitating (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) or substituting (Barney, 1991) a
successful firm’s resource portfolio have ceased is in itself an equilibrium conception.
Technological changes are commonly seen as the factor that changes the distribution of
competitive advantages in an industry. However, changes in transaction costs may play this
role. First, a reduction of transaction costs is also a reduction of the costs of combining and
recombining resources, which in turn makes it more attractive for entrepreneurs to try to
substitute the resource bundles of successful firms. Second, the reduction of the costs of
combining and recombining resources imply that the cost of innovation are lowered. Third,
changes in transaction costs imply changes in the costs of imitation (see Foss and Foss, 2005).

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10

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 SMG – Working Papers
www.cbs.dk/smg
2003
2003-1: Nicolai J. Foss, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova, and Torben Pedersen:
Governing Knowledge Processes: Theoretical Foundations and Research
Opportunities.
2003-2: Yves Doz, Nicolai J. Foss, Stefanie Lenway, Marjorie Lyles, Silvia Massini,
Thomas P. Murtha and Torben Pedersen: Future Frontiers in International
Management Research: Innovation, Knowledge Creation, and Change in
Multinational Companies.
2003-3: Snejina Michailova and Kate Hutchings: The Impact of In-Groups and Out-
Groups on Knowledge Sharing in Russia and China CKG Working Paper.
2003-4: Nicolai J. Foss and Torben Pedersen : The MNC as a Knowledge Structure: The
Roles of Knowledge Sources and Organizational Instruments in MNC Knowledge
Management CKG Working Paper.
2003-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss and Xosé H. Vázquez-Vicente: “Tying the Manager’s
Hands”: How Firms Can Make Credible Commitments That Make Opportunistic
Managerial Intervention Less Likely CKG Working Paper.
2003-6: Marjorie Lyles, Torben Pedersen and Bent Petersen: Knowledge Gaps: The Case
of Knowledge about Foreign Entry.
2003-7: Kirsten Foss and Nicolai J. Foss: The Limits to Designed Orders: Authority under
“Distributed Knowledge” CKG Working Paper.
2003-8: Jens Gammelgaard and Torben Pedersen: Internal versus External Knowledge
Sourcing of Subsidiaries - An Organizational Trade-Off.
2003-9: Kate Hutchings and Snejina Michailova: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing in
Russian and Chinese Subsidiaries: The Importance of Groups and Personal
Networks Accepted for publication in Journal of Knowledge Management.
2003-10: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen and Markus Verzin: The impact of knowledge
management on MNC subsidiary performance: the role of absorptive capacity
CKG Working Paper.
2003-11: Tomas Hellström and Kenneth Husted: Mapping Knowledge and Intellectual
Capital in Academic Environments: A Focus Group Study Accepted for
publication in Journal of Intellectual Capital CKG Working Paper.
2003-12: Nicolai J Foss: Cognition and Motivation in the Theory of the Firm: Interaction or
“Never the Twain Shall Meet”? Accepted for publication in Journal des Economistes
et des Etudes Humaines CKG Working Paper.
2003-13: Dana Minbaeva and Snejina Michailova: Knowledge transfer and expatriation
practices in MNCs: The role of disseminative capacity.
2003-14: Christian Vintergaard and Kenneth Husted: Enhancing selective capacity through
venture bases.

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 2004
2004-1: Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge and Organization in the Theory of the Multinational
Corporation: Some Foundational Issues
2004-2: Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM practices and MNC knowledge transfer
2004-3: Bo Bernhard Nielsen and Snejina Michailova: Toward a phase-model of global
knowledge management systems in multinational corporations
2004-4: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J Foss: The Next Step in the Evolution of the RBV:
Integration with Transaction Cost Economics
2004-5: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Methodological Individualism and the
Organizational Capabilities Approach
2004-6: Jens Gammelgaard, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova: Knowledge-sharing
Behavior and Post-acquisition Integration Failure
2004-7: Jens Gammelgaard: Multinational Exploration of Acquired R&D Activities
2004-8: Christoph Dörrenbächer & Jens Gammelgaard: Subsidiary Upgrading? Strategic
Inertia in the Development of German-owned Subsidiaries in Hungary
2004-9: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Resources and Transaction Costs: How the
Economics of Property Rights Furthers the Resource-based View
2004-10: Jens Gammelgaard & Thomas Ritter: The Knowledge Retrieval Matrix:
Codification and Personification as Separate Strategies
2004-11: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of
the Firm: Any Gains from Trade?
2004-12: Akshey Gupta & Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Sharing in Knowledge-Intensive
Firms: Opportunities and Limitations of Knowledge Codification
2004-13: Snejina Michailova & Kate Hutchings: Knowledge Sharing and National Culture:
A Comparison Between China and Russia
2005
2005-1: Keld Laursen & Ammon Salter: My Precious - The Role of Appropriability
Strategies in Shaping Innovative Performance
2005-2: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A
Stocktaking and Assessment
2005-3: Lars Bo Jeppesen & Lars Frederiksen: Why Firm-Established User Communities
Work for Innovation: The Personal Attributes of Innovative Users in the Case of
Computer-Controlled Music
2005-4: Dana B. Minbaeva: Negative Impact of Hrm Complementarity on Knowledge
Transfer in Mncs
2005-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein & Sandra K. Klein: Austrian Capital
Theory and the Link Between Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm

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2005-1: Nicolai J. Foss: The Knowledge Governance Approach
2005-2: Torben J. Andersen: Capital Structure, Environmental Dynamism, Innovation
Strategy, and Strategic Risk Management
2005-3: Torben J. Andersen: A Strategic Risk Management Framework for Multinational
Enterprise
2005-4: Peter Holdt Christensen: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing: A Conceptual
Framework
2005-5 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Hands Off! How Organizational Design Can Make
Delegation Credible
2005-6 Marjorie A. Lyles, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: Closing the Knowledge Gap
in Foreign Markets - A Learning Perspective
2005-7 Christian Geisler Asmussen, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: How do we
capture “Global Specialization” when measuring firms’ degree of
internationalization?
2005-8 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Simon on Problem-Solving: Implications for New
Organizational Forms
2005-9 Birgitte Grøgaard, Carmine Gioia & Gabriel R.G. Benito: An Empirical
Investigation of the Role of Industry Factors in the Internationalization Patterns of
Firms
2005-10 Torben J. Andersen: The Performance and Risk Management Implications of
Multinationality: An Industry Perspective
2005-11 Nicolai J. Foss: The Scientific Progress in Strategic Management: The case of the
Resource-based view
2005-12 Koen H. Heimeriks: Alliance capability as a mediator between experience and
alliance performance: An empirical investigation into the alliance capability
development process
2005-13 Koen H. Heimeriks, Geert Duysters & Wim Vanhaverbeke: Developing Alliance
Capabilities: An Empirical Study
2005-14 JC Spender: Management, Rational or Creative? A Knowledge-Based Discussion
2006
2006-1: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Emergence of the Modern Theory of the Firm
2006-2: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Individuals and Organizations: Thoughts on a
Micro-Foundations Project for Strategic Management and Organizational
Analysis
2006-3: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen & Markus Venzin: Does Knowledge Sharing
Pay? An MNC Subsidiary Perspective on Knowledge Outflows
2006-4: Torben Pedersen: Determining Factors of Subsidiary Development

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=982103

2006-5 Ibuki Ishikawa: The source of competitive advantage and entrepreneurial
judgment in the RBV: Insights from the Austrian school perspective
2006-6 Nicolai J. Foss & Ibuki Ishikawa: Towards a dynamic resource-based view:
Insights from Austrian capital and entrepreneurship theory
2006-7 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Entrepreneurship, Transaction Costs, and
Resource Attributes

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=982103