Police power-

Although the Constitution prohibits Congress from enacting laws that impair the obligation of contracts,
such provision is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State— in the interest of public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. Police power is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most
demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. Mineral production sharing agreements as well
as their offshoots partake the nature of both a permit and a contract, it may be validly regulated by virtue
of the State's police power.

Eminent Domain-

The power of eminent domain, which is also called the power of expropriation, is the inherent right of
the State to condemn private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. The power to
expropriate pertains primarily to the legislature.

However, the power to expropriate is not exclusive to Congress. The latter may delegate the exercise of
the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities.

With the right of eminent domain not being an inherent power for private corporations, whose right to
expropriate is granted by mere legislative fiat, the delegate's exercise of the right of eminent domain is
restrictively limited to the confines of the delegating law.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of ROC, the proper remedy of a defendant in an expropriation case who
wishes to contest an order of expropriation is not to file a certiorari petition and allege that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of expropriation. The remedy is to file an appeal
of the order of expropriation.

Mootness-

As a general rule, this Court will not decide moot questions, or abstract propositions, or declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.

Such rule, however, admits of exceptions. A court will decide a case which is otherwise moot and
academic if it finds that: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was
capable of repetition yet evading review.

The “capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception was limited to the situation where two
elements must concur: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action again.

The operative fact doctrine-

The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of a legal provision prior to its being
declared as unconstitutional and hence, legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto
because of considerations of practicality and fairness.
In this regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently declared as
unconstitutional by the Court cannot be anymore undone because it would be unfair to those who have
relied on the said legal provision prior to the time it was struck down.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. There are two concepts that
affect the existence of an actual case or controversy for the courts to exercise the power of judicial
review: the first is the concept of ripeness which relates to the premature filing of a case, while the
second is the concept of mootness which pertains to a belated or unnecessary judgment on the issues.
Thus, "an issue that was once ripe for resolution but whose resolution, since then, has been rendered
unnecessary, needs no resolution from the Court, as it presents no actual case or controversy and
likewise merely presents a hypothetical problem." In other words, a case, though once ripe for
adjudication, becomes moot and academic "when an event supervenes to render a judgment over the
issues unnecessary and superfluous.”

The doctrine of political agency provides that department secretaries are alter egos of the President and
that their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. In short,
acts of department secretaries are deemed acts of the President.

The Court clarified that the reduction of a prisoner's sentence is a form of partial pardon, which requires
the exercise of the President's constitutionally vested authority. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the
Constitution requires the President to act on such matter personally; thus, he may not delegate the same
in the form of doctrine of qualified political agency.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable
classification. To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. The
freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general wellbeing of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. And
under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because
they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner
would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment
will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it
cannot be enforced.

The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute. The Court cited two formulas that are used to
balance the constitutional guarantee of free speech and of the press, and judicial independence.
1. Clear and present danger rule. The evil consequence of the comment or utterance “must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the utterance can be punished. (What is
the substantive evil sought to be prevented?). Good faith or absence of intent to harm is a valid defense.
2. Dangerous tendency rule. “If the words uttered created a dangerous tendency which the state has a
right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” However, the SC disagreed with Canlas’ claim that his
article was written in good faith. The article created a doubt in the minds of the readers, against some of
the Justices, and in the process, the Court as a whole. While it is the duty of the press to expose all
government agencies and officials and to hold them responsible for their actions, the press cannot just
throw accusations without verifying the truthfulness of their reports. The article, directly or indirectly,
tends to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. False reports about a public official
or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the
Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of
falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.

In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against
him and given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. In such proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trialtype hearing is not
always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. The essence of due process,
therefore, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Thus, a violation of that right
occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving the person the opportunity to be
heard.

People v. CA (400 Phil 1247): The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime.
However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night,
when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. Section
7, Rule 126 states the rule on the right to break door or window to effect search. • The Officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute
the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. The
chain of custody rule must be applied regardless of whether the drugs were seized in a buy-bust
operation or pursuant to a search warrant.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. Administrative cases
are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability;
quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. The burden of proof for administrative cases
is only substantial evidence. It is more difficult to prove the guilt of the petitioner in a criminal case
against him involving the same set of facts. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case
may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. There was no violation of
appellant's right to counsel during custodial investigation. The records show that appellant was informed
of his constitutional rights when he was arrested. Since he chose to remain silent, he was not
interrogated and no statement or evidence was extracted from him; neither was any evidence presented
in court that was supposedly obtained from him during custodial investigation.

mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he/she: (1) unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or (2) unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. It is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only
in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and
speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act compelled. t bears
stressing that for a petition for mandamus to sufficiently allege a cause of action, petitioner must satisfy
the following elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant
to respect that legal right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right. The cause
of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with the
duty. It must be noted also that the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on Section 12, Article
VII wherein the proponent thereof, Commissioner Blas F. Ople, stated that: "We are called upon to be
more trusting with respect to the Office of the President that they will know what appropriate means to
take in order to release this information to the public in satisfaction of the public's right to know of the
presidency."
Writ of habeas corpus is a remedy for those restrained of their liberty. The essential object and purpose
of writ of habeas corpus is:
1. To inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
2. To relieve a person if such restraint is illegal.
Writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy is allowed only under the following exceptional
circumstances:
1. There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person.
2. The Court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence.
3. The imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence to such excess.
However, writ of habeas corpus is not allowed when (1) the person is in custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or (2) by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of record.

The three (3)-fold duty of the trial court in instances where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense
is as follows:
(1) conduct a searching inquiry,
(2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of culpability, and
(3) allow the accused to present evidence on his behalf. The searching inquiry requirement ensures that
the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and that the accused comprehends the consequences of his plea.

The reason behind second requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to produce
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a
finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The conviction of the accused no longer depends solely on his plea of guilty but rather on the strength of
the prosecution's evidence. The last requirement allows the accused to present exculpatory or mitigating
evidence to properly calibrate the correct imposable penalty.
This duty, however, does not mean that the trial court can compel the accused to present evidence. The
accused is free to waive his right to present evidence if he so desires. The Court has issued guidelines
regarding the waiver of the accused of his right to present evidence under this rule.
If a law has already been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, its
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. Once a law has been declared unconstitutional, it
remains unconstitutional unless circumstances have so changed as to
warrant a reverse conclusion.

In case of conflict between a provision of a treaty and a provision of the

Constitution, the
provision of the Constitution should prevail. Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the
1987
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty when it conflicts with the
Constitution.

An amendment to or a revision of the present Constitution maybe proposed

by a
Constitutional Convention or by the Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of
all
its members.

Constituent Assembly- vote by ¾ of all the members of Congress with both

Houses voting separately

Constitutional Convention- which is called into existence by 2/3 both of all its
members, with both Houses voting separately or by majority vote of all the
members of Congress with both Houses voting separately, submitted to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.

Peoples Initiative- Petition of at least 12% of the total of number of

registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least 3% of the registered voters therein.

The SC ruled that the people’s initiative method of amending the

Constitution is fatally defective and inoperative. This only leaves the
Constituent Assembly and Constitutional Convention as the valid ways to
amend the Constitution.
call
There is no third way of proposing revisions to the Constitution; however, the
people
through initiative upon petition of at least twelve per cent of the total
number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least
three per cent of the registered voters in it, may directly propose
amendments to the
Constitution. This right is not operative without an implementing law.
an amendment proposed by Congress must be approved by at least three-
fourths (3/4) vote of the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately. It is inherent in a bicameral legislature for
the two houses to vote separately. (II Record of the Constitutional
Commission493). Second,
the amendment shall be valid only when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a
plebiscite (Constitution, Art. XVII, sec. 4).

the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines cannot be
appointed as trustee of the Government Service Insurance System. Under
Section 5(4),
Article XVI of the Constitution, no member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in the
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active service shall at any time be appointed or designated in any capacity
to a civilian
position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

judicial review, power of the court to examine the actions of the

legislative, executive, and administrative arms of the government and
to determine whether such actions are consistent with the constitution.

Territorial Sea- The belt of the sea located between the coast and internal waters of the
coastal state on the one hand, and the high seas on the other, extending up to 12 nautical
miles from the low water mark.
Contiguous Zone- Extends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea. Although not
part of the territory, the coastal State may exercise jurisdiction to prevent infringement of
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws.
Calling out powers-
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the President may
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period not exceeding sixty
days or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall be presented to the
President before it becomes a law,
If the President approves the bill, he shall sign it; otherwise, the President shall veto
the bill and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it.
If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
the Members of that House, it shall become a law.
In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and
the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
Powers relating to ART Bills

If the President approves a bill, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it.
When a President vetoes a bill, he must veto the entire bill.
The President is allowed to partially veto particular items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill.

Generally, there are three ways for a bill to become a law.

First, when it is approved by the President.
Second, when the vote of the President is overridden by two-thirds of all the
members of both houses.
And third, upon failure of the President to veto the bill and to return it with his
objections, to the House where it originated, within 30 days after the date of receipt.

As a rule, partial veto is invalid. When a President vetoes a bill, he must veto
the entire bill. However, the President is allowed to partially veto particular
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.

The law says:

The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), 1987 Constitution)
The reason of the vetoed item must still be specified in the journal where
the yeas and nays of the voting are recorded.
However, while item veto is allowed in cases of appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bills, the President must still veto the entire line. The President cannot
disapprove one part of the line in an item while approving the other part of
the same line in the same item. Thus, line veto is not allowed.

Jurisprudence says:
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed.
The power to veto any item or items in an appropriate bill does not include
the power to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining part of the
same item. (Gonzales vs. Hon. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636. November 19,
1990)

Can the veto of the President still be overridden?

Yes. To override the President’s veto, at least 2/3 of all the members of each
house must agree to pass the bill. (Section 27(1), 1987 Constitution) In such
case, the veto is overridden and the bill becomes the law without need of
presidential approval.

Excusive Economic Zone- Body of water extending up to 200 nautical miles, within which
the state may exercise sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural
resources

The state in the EEZ exercises jurisdiction with regard to:

1. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures;
2. marine scientific research;
3. the protection and preservation of marine environment;

Archipelagic doctrine:

2 elements

a. The definition of internal waters

b. The straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea- consist of drawing
straight lines connecting the outermost points of the coast without departing from the
general direction of the coast.
Doctrine of transformation means that an international law form a part of
domestic law only if accepted as such by statute or judicial decisions.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies both deal
with the proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies where a claim is cognizable in the first
instance by an administrative agency alone. Judicial interference is withheld until the administrative
process has been completed.

The doctrine of primary Jurisdiction applies where a case is within the concurrent Jurisdiction of the
court and an administrative agency but the determination of the case requires the technical expertise of
the administrative agency. In such a case, although the matter is within the jurisdiction of the court, it
must yield to the jurisdiction of the administrative case.

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a case in court does not oust the court of
jurisdiction to hear the case. As held in Rosario vs. Court of Appeals. 211 SCRA 384, the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court but results in the lack of a cause of
action, because a condition precedent that must be satisfied before action can be filed was not fulfilled.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies means that when an adequate remedy is available
within the Executive Department, a litigant must first exhaust this remedy before he can resort to the
courts. The purpose of the doctrine is to enable the administrative agencies to correct themselves if they
have committed an error.

State Immunity from suit/ non-suability of State/ Doctrine of Royal prerogative of dishonesty
There can be no legal right as against the authority which makes the laws on which the right depends.

The state may not be sued without its consent- However, the State may give its consent expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be given by a general law or special. It is only the Congress which may
give a written waiver of immunity in the form a law. There is implied consent when the State commences
litigation, thus it opens itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract in proprietary capacity.

When the State enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-
suability. The State will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability only if it has entered into
contract on its proprietary capacity. When the contact involves its sovereign or governmental capacity,
no such waiver may be implied. Statutory provision waiving state immunity are construed strictissimi
juris. For, waiver of state immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.

An unincorporated agency without separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit
because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. It can validly invoke the defense of
immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly to be sued.

An incorporated agency may sue and be sued. They have charters which grants them separate juridical
personality. The provision in the charter constitutes express consent on the part of the State to be sued.
Ex. Municipal corporations, LGU.
The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their official functions.

A suit against a public official is a suit against the State if the judgment against the public official will
require an affirmative act on the part of the State, such as the appropriation of the needed amount to
satisfy the judgment, then the suit may be regarded as against the State.

Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of the judgment against it.

Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the court ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment, unless such disbursement is covered by corresponding appropriation as required by law.

It was held that where the municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order
to compel the enactment of the necessary appropriation ordinance and disbursement of municipal
funds to satisfy the money judgment.

Jurisprudence says:
In the case of Sanlakas v. Reyes (G.R. No. 19085, February 03, 2004), the
Supreme Court ruled that the commander-in-chief powers of the President
can is a sequence of graduated powers. As such:

“The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a

“sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise
of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety
requires the exercise of such power.”

In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora (G.R. No. 141284,
August 15, 2000), the Supreme Court held that:
“Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose
martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion
or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only
criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the
armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude
in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
  Executive privilege is the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
 Executive privilege is a right vested in the President which he
may validly exercise within his sphere of executive power.
 There are two kinds of executive privilege. First is the
Presidential Communication Privilege and second is the
Deliberative Process Privilege.

Executive privilege is the right of the President and high-level officials authorized by
her to withhold information from Congress, from the courts, and ultimately from the
public.

Jurisprudence says:
Simply put, executive privilege is “the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.” It is also defined
as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.” It
must be stressed that executive privilege is a right vested in the President
which she may validly exercise within her sphere of executive power. The
President can validly invoke executive privilege to keep information from the
public and even from co-equal branches of the Government, i.e., the
Legislature and the Judiciary. (Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on
Accountability and Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2007)

Since the executive power belongs to the President, only the President can
invoke it. The Executive Secretary, as an exception to the rule, can invoke
the privilege on behalf of the President.

Jurisprudence says:
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it
essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may
of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her
behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
“By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by
the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President
may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even
less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the
authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. (Senate of the Philippines
vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
In invoking the executive privilege, it requires a specific designation and
description of its scope.

Jurisprudence says:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific
designation and description of the documents within its scope as well as
precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this
specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure
of the very thing sought to be protected. (Senate of the Philippines vs.
Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

There are two (2) kinds of executive privilege. First is the Presidential
Communication Privilege. This kind of executive privilege applies to the
decision-making of the president and his staff and is rooted in the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers.

Jurisprudence says:
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-
door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power. (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9,
2002)

The second kind of executive privilege is the Deliberative Process Privilege.

The deliberative process privilege is lesser in scope than the presidential
communications privilege. Its coverage and duration are limited. It stands to
reason that the privilege may be waived unless the information concerns
national security, diplomatic relations, or public order.

Jurisprudence says:
The deliberative process privilege is a privilege that an officer of an
executive department may invoke to prevent public disclosure of any
information that may compromise its decision-making capability. Its purpose
“rests most fundamentally on the belief that were agencies forced to operate
in a fishbowl, frank exchange of ideas and opinions would cease and the
quality of administrative decisions would consequently suffer.” (Separate
Concurring Opinion of Justice Leonen in the case of Department of Foreign
Affairs vs. BCA International Corporation, G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016)
The purpose of the Deliberative Process Privilege is to prevent subjecting an
agency’s decision-making process to public opinion before any definite policy
action has been made.

Under this system of checks and balances, there is an interplay of power among the
three branches. Each branch has its own authority, but also must depend on the
authority of the other branches for the government to function.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies says that a

person challenging an agency decision must first pursue the agency’s
available remedies before seeking judicial review.