THE STANDARD

OF KNOWLEDGE
(Mi‘yar al-‘Ilm)


Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali

the royal islamic strategic studies centre

English Islam Series • Book Number 37

THE STANDARD
OF KNOWLEDGE
(Mi‘yar al-‘Ilm)


ABU HAMID MUHAMMAD IBN
MUHAMMAD IBN MUHAMMAD
AL-GHAZALI

Translated by
josef meri

the royal islamic strategic studies centre

English Islam Series • Book Number 37

 English Islam Series • Book Number 37

the standard of knowledge

by Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad
ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali

isbn 978-9957-635-75-6 (Ebook)

isbn 978-9957-635-74-9 (Paperback)

national library number

(2024/8/4915)

© 2024, The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre

Amman, Jordan

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 Contents

Contents

Translator’s Introduction vii

Translation Note xiii

THE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE (Mi‘yar al-‘Ilm) 1

[BOOK ONE]: SYLLOGISTIC PREMISES 18

[CHAPTER ONE] Concerning the Premises of Analogical
Reasoning (qiyas): On words’ signification, elucidating
the aspects of their signification (dalala) and their
relationship to connotational attributes (ma‘ani) 19
Guidance concerning the stumbling block in [knowing] the
difference between the equivocal (mushtaraka) and the
univocal (mutawati’a) and one measuring the other 32
Guidance concerning the stumbling block in the
dissonants (mutabayyinat) 36

Seventh division concerning the absolute expression

having in common dissimilar things 38

The second sub-division concerning existents 48

The third sub-division concerning the existents by

considering entification (ta‘ayyun) and non-entification 49

The fourth sub-division concerning the relationship

of some meanings to others 50

The fifth sub-division concerning the essential in itself

and the accidental in itself 55
 Fifth subdivision concerning the kinds of realities
mentioned in the reply of the questioner about quiddity 63
The first sub-division: The proposition 72
The second division of the proposition considering the
relationship of its predicate to its subject by negation or
affirmation 77
The third sub-division of the proposition considering its
generality or specificity 81
The fourth sub-division of the proposition considering
the mode (jiha) of the relationship of the predicate to
the subject by necessity (wujub) or permissibility (jawaz),
or impossibility (imtina‘) 84
The fifth sub-division of the proposition taking into
consideration that which contradicts it (naqid) 88
The sixth sub-division of the proposition taking
into account its opposite. 96

[BOOK TWO] THE SYLLOGISM (Kitab al-Qisas) 101

Substance and fallacies in syllogism 102

The second figure (shakl) 111
Third figure 115
[Second Type]: Conditional Conjunctive
(sharti muttasil) 128
The Third Type: The Conditional Disjunctive 134
The Fourth Type: Concerning the Impossible Syllogism
(qiyas al-khalf) 136
The Fifth Type: Induction 139

vi Contents
The Sixth Type: Analogy (Tamthil) 146
The Seventh Type: Concerning Compound and
Defective Syllogisms 168
The Second View (al-nazar al-thani) from the Book
of Syllogisms 175
Concerning the Matter (madda) of the Syllogism 175
First Sub-Division: [The Certain Premises that are
Suitable for Proofs] 181
Second Division: The Premises which are not certain
and are not suitable for proofs (barahin) 188
Third View: Concerning the Logical Fallacies
(mughallatat) in the Syllogism 210
Section One Concerning enumerating the inducers
of error (matharat al-ghalat) 210
Section Two: Concerning demonstrating the imagination
of the Sophists 225
Fourth view concerning: The concomitants (lawahiq)
of the syllogism 254
Chapter concerning demonstrating certitude (burhan
al- yaqin) 258
Chapter concerning the primary questions of
investigation (ummahat al-matalib) 262
Chapter concerning: Demonstrating the essential
meaning (dhati) and the primary meaning (awwali) 265
Chapter concerning that in which the matter of the
demonstrations (barahin) is combined 266
Chapter in resolving doubt (shubha) in the circular
analogy (al-qiyas al-dawri) 270

Contents vii
 Chapter concerning that in which the true
demonstration occurs 272
Chapter concerning the Divisions of the Cause (‘illa) 277

[BOOK THREE]: DEFINITIONS 282

The first [chapter] concerning demonstrating the need
for the definition 282
Second Discipline concerning the substance of the
definition and its form 286
Third discipline concerning ordering of seeking the
definition with a question 290
Fourth discipline concerning: Classifications to which
the name definition is applied 293
Fifth discipline concerning the definition not being
restricted with the demonstration 296
Sixth discipline concerning the inducers of error in the
definitions 301
Seventh discipline concerning the difficulty for the
human capacity (quwwa bashariyya) to define except
at the end of rolling up sleeves and [exerting] effort 305
The Second Category: Concerning the differentiated
definitions (al-hudud al-mufassala) 309
[The First Section which is employed in Metaphysics
(ilahiyyat)] 311
The [Second] Division: That employed in Physics
(al-tabi‘iyyat) 327
Third Section: What is employed in Mathematics 345

viii Contents
[BOOK FOUR]: DIVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES
OF EXISTENCE 348
First Aspect (fann): Concerning the Divisions
of Existence 349
Saying concerning Substance (jawhar) 350
Quantity (al-kam) 355
Saying concerning Quality (kayfiyya) 357
Saying concerning the possessive construction (idafa) 360
Saying concerning ‘where (al-ayna)’ 363
Saying concerning ‘when (mata)’ 364
Saying concerning position (wad‘) 365
Saying concerning the accident which is expressed
through ‘for it (lahu)’ 367
Saying concerning ‘to do (an yaf‘ala)’ 367
Saying concerning passivity (infi‘al) 368
Second Aspect (fann): Concerning the division
of existence with its essential accidents into its types
and states 371
Saying concerning division into cause and effect and
describing the existent with it being a principle (mabda’)
and a cause (‘illa) 372
Saying concerning division into that which is in potentia
and in actu 374
Saying about the divisions of the existent into
pre-eternal, temporally created, before and after 376
Saying concerning division of the existents into universal
and particular 379

Contents ix
 Saying concerning the division into One and Many and
their concomitants 385
Saying concerning division of existence into contingent
(mumkin) and necessary (wajib) 387

x Contents
 TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad

al-Ghazali (d. 505 H./1111 CE), who is known as Algazel in
the medieval West, is one of the most important Muslim
theologians and philosophers many of whose works have
already been translated into the English language.1 This is
the first complete translation ever produced in any western
language of Mi‘yar al-‘Ilm.
The present translation relies upon the 2013 Dar al-
Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah edition of Ahmad Shamseddin with oc-
casional corrections to the Arabic which are noted in the
footnotes. For easy reference the pagination of the Arabic
text is indicated in bold square brackets. On occasion ear-
lier editions have been employed where this edition is
deemed to be faulty. Echoing the view of a number of
scholars, a new authoritative edition based on all known
manuscripts of Al-Ghazali’s Mi‘yar is needed.
Herein we will briefly explore a number of salient fea-
tures of this work and its relationship to other works. The
Mi‘yar is one of a number of works Ghazali produced
which address aspects of Aristotelean logic, the other two
being: Aims of the Philosophers (Maqasid al-Falasifa),2
which he produced in 1094 and more comprehensive than
the latter, The Touchstone of Reasoning in Logic (Mihakk
1
For a biography of Ghazali, see Eric Ormsby, Ghazali. Oxford: One World,
2007.
2
Concerning the dating of this work, see Maurice Bouyges, Essai de chronologie
des œuvres de al-Ghazali (Algazel). ed. Michel Allard. Beirut: L’Institut de Lettres
Orientales de Beyrouth, 1959, pp.23–24.
al-Nazar fi Fann al-Mantiq), which he produced in 1095
prior to the Mi‘yar.3 However, the most detailed exposition
of Aristotelian logic in Ghazali’s works may be found in
the Standard of Knowledge.

Dating and purpose

Ghazali wrote The Standard of Knowledge in 1095 as a
logical introduction to his Tahafut al-Falasifa (Precipitance
of the Philosophers), the latter which he finished writing in
January 1095.4 It is a ‘supplement’ (madmum) to the Pre-
cipitance of the Philosophers, under the provisional titles
Standard of Reason (Mi‘yar al-‘Aql) and Documentary
Sources of the Intellects (Madarik al-‘Uqul).5 This is the
same year in which he experienced a spiritual crisis, re-
signed his teaching post at the Nizamiyya Teaching College
in Baghdad and left for Bilad al-Sham, or Historic Syria,
and the Hijaz where he spent two years. Griffel dates the
production of the Tahafut to January/Muharram 1095.6
Ghazali most likely produced the Standard of Knowledge
at this point, and his other major work on logic Touchstone
of Reason (Mihakk al-Nazar) as well as a number of other
works.
3
Bouyges, Essai de chronologie, p.27.
4
See Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009, p. 36. The title is commonly translated as Incoherence of the
Philosophers. The preferred translation of the title is Precipitance of the Philos-
ophers, see Kenneth Garden, The First Islamic Reviver: Abu Hamid al-Ghazali
and His Revival of the Religious Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014,
p.6 and n.31.
5
Michael Marmura, trans. Incoherence of the Philosophers. Provo: Brigham
Young University Press, 2000, pp. xvi-xvii. These titles are mentioned in Bouyges,
Essai de chronologie, pp.25–26.
6
Concerning the dating of this work, see Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical
Theology, p.xii and concerning his sojourn in Bilad al-Sham and the Hijaz,
pp.40–49.

xii the standard of knowledge

 The purpose of the Standard is to teach the syllogistic
method and acquaint readers with the language of the phil-
osophers.7 As Ghazali says:
The motivation for composing this book titled Stan-
dard of Knowledge is two-fold: First, to explain the
methods of systematic thinking and reasoning (al-fikr
wa-al-nazar), and to shed light on the ways of anal-
ogy (aqyisa) and reflection (i‘tibar).
Ghazali also elaborates on his purpose in the conclusion:
… to show the way to knowledge of the realities of
things, introducing the law of proper reflection, and
cultivating the standard of knowledge (tathqif mi‘yar
al-‘ilm) in order to distinguish between [knowledge]
and fancy (khayal) and supposition (zann) which are
near to it.8
Logic was a controversial tool in the hands of the phil-
osophers (falasifa) and the scholastic theologians (mutakal-
limun). However, Ghazali regarded logic as a neutral tool
that when used properly could be employed in the service
of the religious sciences and defence of the faith.9
Ghazali wrote this work for jurists and theologians who
would not necessarily be familiar with the use of logic in
jurisprudence. Throughout he refers to the mujtahid or the
jurist who is guided by God in his judgements.

7
See below, p.1.
8
See below, p.278.
9
See Michael Marmura, ‘Ghazali’s Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic,’
in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. George F. Hourani. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1957, p.101.

translator ’ s introduction xiii

Structure and primary themes
The Standard of Knowledge is divided into four primary
sections: 1) Book of Syllogistic Premises, 2) Book of the Syl-
logism, 3) Book of Definition,10 and 4) Book of the Divi-
sions and Principles of Existence.
Likewise in The Touchstone of Reasoning in Logic (Mi-
hakk al-Nazar fi Fann al-Mantiq) a similar order of the dis-
cussion of the syllogism followed by the definition is fol-
lowed. The types of syllogism may be classified as: categori-
cal, apodictic, dialectical and sophist.

Influences
Ghazali’s work shows extensive reliance on al-Farabi and
Ibn Sina which Jules Janssen has established in a detailed
study of the Mi‘yar’s influences.11 However, Ghazali occa-
sionally modifies the aforementioned authors’ presentations
of certain themes. In one instance he refers directly to Ibn
Sina’s Treatise on the Soul (Kitab al-Nafs), but does not
mention the author by name.12
Janssens clearly demonstrates Ghazali’s reliance on the
works of Ibn Sina such as the Book of Deliverance (Al-
Najat), Remarks and Admonitions (Al-Isharat wa-al-Tan-
bihat), Encyclopedia of Philosophical Knowledge (Danesh-
Nameh) and The Book of Definitions (Kitab al-Hudud)
as well as Al-Farabi’s Prior Analytics (al-Qiyas al-Saghir)
and Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle (al-Maqulat).
Despite this reliance on the works of others, the Mi‘yar was

10
Also syllogistic terms.
11
See Jules Janssens, «Al-Ghazzali’s mi‘yar al-‘ilm fi fann al-mantiq sources avi-
cenniennes et farabiennes», Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen
Âge 69:1 (2002), pp.39–66. https://www.cairn.info/revue-archives-d-histoire-doc-
trinale-et-litteraire-du-moyen-age-2002-1-p-39.htm
12
See below, p.224.

xiv the standard of knowledge

in a sense unique in upholding the permissibility of utilising
Aristotelian logic in the service of faith and the works of
other philosophers and thinkers provided Ghazali with the
tools to make his case.
The work is largely considered to be authored by
Ghazali, though scholars like Frank Griffel have demons-
trated that certain passages pertaining to the philosophers’
(falasifa) teachings while though similar to another of Gha-
zali’s works: The Aims of the Philosophers (Maqasid al-
Falasifa), suggest that these passages may not have been
written by Ghazali.13

Approach to the translation

We have attempted to make this translation as close as
possible to the original text while making it accessible to
non-specialists in so far as the subject matter permits.
Therefore, we have not burdened the reader with excessive
and exhaustive notes. Where possible we have referred to
relevant studies as well as primary sources in English trans-
lation such as Ghazali’s other works and the works of Ibn
Sina and al-Farabi. Where no accessible or reliable English
translations of a given work exists, the Arabic is cited.

Yousef Meri
Amman, 1 August 2018
19 Dhu’l-Qa‘ada 1439

13
Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, pp.271–72.

translator ’ s introduction xv
 TRANSLATION NOTE

In translating this work as other works in this volume, we

have sought to produce a more literal translation that is
accurate. Moreover, for philosophical concepts we have
generally referred to Lammer and Kretz’s On-line Diction-
ary of Philosophical Terms:
http://www.arabic-philosophy.com/dict/
In certain places more than one translation of a word is
employed to clarify the meaning of a sentence. For instance,
burhan is translated as ‘apodictic proof’ and also as ‘dem-
onstration.’ It may also be translated as ‘demonstrative
proof.’ Likewise, ‘ahkam’ is often translated as ‘judge-
ments,’ particularly in legal contexts or as ‘principles’ or
‘modalities’ depending upon the context. The word fann
which can denote a ‘section’ has been translated as ‘aspect.’
The word ‘nazar’ is translated as ‘proper reflection,’ ‘the-
oretical inquiry,’ and ‘rational inquiry.’ This translation at-
tempts to capture these nuances.
In order to further simplify matters, no transliteration
of Arabic and Persian words has been employed as with the
other works in this volume.
THE STANDARD
OF KNOWLEDGE
(Mi‘yar al-‘Ilm)


 In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
May God bless Muhammad and his Family

‘O God, show us the truth as truth and grant us success in

following it. Show us falsehood as falsehood and aid us in
avoiding it.’14 Amen.
Know and verify (tahaqqaq), O you whose vigilance and
will are exclusively directed at attaining the different kinds
of knowledge whose endeavour (himma) extends toward
the secrets of the intellectual truths (haqa’iq ‘aqliyya), and
whose effort and toil are removed from [it] the ornaments
of the worldly life and its base pleasures, and whose exer-
tion and endeavour in knowledge and worship [of God]
are dedicated to attaining happiness, [all] after the praise
of God, whose praise precedes every matter possessing
importance (dhu bal) and May God’s blessings be upon the
Prophet Muhammad, His Messenger and servant.
The motivation for composing this book titled ‘Standard
of Knowledge’ is for two important reasons: [p.26] First,
to explain the methods of systematic thinking and reason-
ing (al-fikr wa-al-nazar), and to shed light on the ways of
analogy (aqyisa) and reflection (i‘tibar). The theoretical
sciences (‘ulum al-nazar) are not innately and instinctively
given. [But rather] they are undoubtedly acquired and
sought. Not every seeker excels at seeking the object sought
or is guided to the path of the sought. Likewise, not
14
This hadith is not found in any of the Sunan. See for example Al-‘Iraqi, Al-
Mughni ‘an haml al-asfar. Riyadh: Maktabat Dar Tabariyya, 1995, #2406; See
also Ibn Kathir, Tafsir of Qur’an 2:213:
https://www.greattafsirs.com/Tafsir_Library.aspx?SoraNo=2&AyahNo=213&
MadhabNo=1&TafsirNo=7.

introduction 3
every wayfarer is guided to perfection nor protected from
self-deception by stopping short of reaching the peak of per-
fection. Nor is everyone who thinks he has attained the re-
semblance of correctness (shakilat al-sawab) safe from
succumbing to the mirage’s brilliance.
When lapses and the inherent qualities of man which
stimulate error (matharat al-dalal) increased in the intelli-
gibles and the mirror of the intellect (mir’at al-‘aql) did not
detach from the mixtures of illusions (takhlitat al-awham),
and the deceptions of the imagination (talbisat al-khayal)
which pollute it, we ordered this book to be a standard of
theoretical inquiry (nazar) and reflection (i‘tibar) and a bal-
ance of research and cogitation (iftikar), a hone (sayqal) for
the mind (dhihn), a whetstone (mishhadh) for the faculty
of thought and reason so it will be to the rational proofs
(adillat al-‘uqul) as metre is to poetry and grammar (nahw)
is to parsing (i‘rab), and the unrythmic change of poetry
from one foot to another (munzahaf al-shi‘r) is not known
from its metre (mawzun) except with the balance of pros-
ody (‘urud) and there cannot be a distinction between
sound and unsound parsing except with the touchstone (mi-
hakk) of grammar.
Likewise, it is not possible to distinguish between defec-
tive (fasid) and correct (qawim) proofs or sound (sahih) and
weak (saqim) ones except with this book.
[p.27] Every act of theoretical inquiry (nazar) that is not
balanced with this balance or gauged with this standard,
then know that it is badly measured and its conclusions
(ghawa’il) and bases (aghwar) are not trustworthy (ghayr
ma’mun).
The second motivation [for writing this book] is to
explain what we wrote in the book Precipitance of the

4 the standard of knowledge

Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifa) for we debated them
using their language and addressed them on the basis of
their terminology (istilahat) in logic that they have [coined]
and approved [among themselves]. In this book the ter-
minology will be revealed. This is the more specific of the
two motives, while the first is more general and more im-
portant. As for the reason why it is more important; surely
this is already patently familiar to you.
As for the reason for it being more general, it is because
its benefit encompasses all the theoretical sciences (al-‘ulum
al-nazariyya): the intellectual (‘aqliyya) and legal (fiqhiyya).
We shall demonstrate that theoretical inquiry (nazar) in the
legal sciences is not different from in the intellectual scien-
ces (‘aqliyyat) in its organisation, conditions, and measures;
but they only [differ] as to the sources of their premises
(ma’akidh al-muqaddimat).
In our age when the intentions (himam) were more dis-
posed to jurisprudence than the intellectual sciences, but
rather were restricted to it, until that urged us to author the
following on the ways of disputation concerning it in the
following order:

The Source of Disagreement (Ma’khadh al-Khilaf)

The Pith of Proper Reflection (Lubab al-Nazar)
Fortifying the Premises (Tahsin al-Ma’akhidh)
The Book of Principles and Goals (Al-Mabadi’
wal-Ghayat)

[p.28] [This book] is the ultimate goal in the present in-

vestigation into the methodology of rational inquiry (min-
haj al-nazar al-‘aqli) in its organisation and conditions even
if it should differ in its premises (muqaddimat).

introduction 5
 That prompted us to desire to display concerning the
methodology of theoretical inquiry (nazar) in this book,
legal examples, so that its benefits, usefulness, and gain will
encompass all other kinds [of knowledge].
Perhaps whoever sees with the defect eye with vilifica-
tion (ta‘n) and disdain and denies our deviating from estab-
lished customs concerning instructing definitive (qat‘i)
rational proofs (‘aqliyyat) with probable legal examples
(amthila fiqhiyya zanniyya), let him desist from his excess
in his vilification and disdain and let him bear witness over
himself that he is ignorant about the production of simile
and its benefit. [These examples] are not produced except
to provide understanding of a hidden matter with what is
familiar to the addressee who is seeking guidance so that
he makes an analogy of that which is hidden to that which
is known by him and the hidden matter resides in his self.
If the addressee was a carpenter, he does not know ex-
cept for carpentry and to use his tools. Then it is necessary
for his guide not to give him examples except from carpen-
try so that is an antecedent to his understanding (asbaq ila
fahmihi) and more compatible with his mind.
Likewise, it is not suitable to guide a learned human
being except with his own language or communicating in-
telligibles to his understanding except by examples that are
established in his knowledge (ma‘rifa).
Thus, we have made you to understand the object and
goal of this book by giving you an overview. Let there be a
commentary and elucidation (idah) to this work because of
the crucial need of the speculative theologians (nuzzar)15 for
this book.

15
Alternatively translated as ‘theoreticians.’

6 the standard of knowledge

 Perhaps you will say, o you who is deceived by the men-
tal forms of knowledge (‘ulum dhihniyya) you possess and
who is heedless of that toward which the rational proofs
(barahin ‘aqliyya) drive him. What is this pomposity and
aggrandizement? Why does the rational person need the
standard balance, the intellect being the correct balance and
the upright (qawim) standard and so the rational person
after the perfection of his mind does not need direction (tas-
did) or correction (taqwim). Then proceed deliberately and
carefully and verify the mishaps of the rational ways and
verify before everything that within you are the following:

[p.29] Sensorial judgement (hakim hissi)

Imaginative judgement (hakim wahmi)
Intellectual judgement (hakim ‘aqli)

The correct one of those judgements is the intellectual

judgement.
The soul at the start of the original disposition (fitra) is
more yielding and submissive to accepting the sensorial and
imaginative judgements since they were both antecedent in
the soul at its early formation (awwal al-fitra) and they both
approached it by ruling over it and their rule became fam-
iliar and the soul was on intimate terms with them both be-
fore the intellectual judgement attained it. The weaning
from its familiar and approaching as if it were a stranger
to the time of its creation became more intense.
Yet the soul continues to oppose (tukhalif) and deny (tu-
kadhdhib) the intellect and agree with the judgement of the
senses and imagination and believe them until such time
that it detects the ruse (hila) which we will later explain in
[this] book.

introduction 7
 Should you wish to know the veracity of what we say
concerning the slander (takharrus) and faltiness (ikhtilal)
by both judgements (i.e. the imaginative and sensorial), be-
hold the judgement of the senses, how it rules; if you should
look at the sun, it appears the width of a lintel [above a
door] (‘ard majarr) [p.30] and at the stars as if they are scat-
tered [golden] dinars on a blue carpet and in the sha-dow
of upright individuals overcast on the land that it is still, in-
deed, judging the form of a youth at the start of growing
up that he remains as he is (i.e. does not grow).
How does the intellect know with apodictic proofs (ba-
rahin)16 that the senses are unable to contend with that the
disc of the sun is many times larger than the earth, likewise
the planets?
How did the senses guide us to [the conclusion] that the
shadow which we see as stationery is actually perpetually
in motion and that it does not grow weak? And that the
youth’s height at the time of growth is continuous, but
rather he is perpetually and continuously in a state of
growth and progressing to greater growth in subtle degrees,
which the senses are too dull to perceive, but the intellect
witnesses it.
The errors of the senses of this sort are many, so do not
think you can them and be satisfied with this simple syn-
opsis of its happenings with which you can review its deceit
(ighwa’).
As for the imaginative judgement (al-hakim al-wahmi),
do not ignore its lying about an existence (takdhibihi bi-

16
Concerning the demonstrative proof (burhan), see for instance Ibn Sina,
Avicenna’s Deliverance: Logic, trans. Asad Q. Ahmed. Karachi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011; Al-Farabi, Al-Farabi’s Philosophical Lexicon, trans. I. Alon, vol.
2. Warminster: The E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2002, p.692.

8 the standard of knowledge

mawjud)—there is no indication of its direction—and its
denial or something that is not suited to the bodies of this
world by using the descriptions of division (infisal) and con-
tinuity (ittisal).17 Nor is it described as within this world
nor apart from it.
If it were not for the intellect’s stopping the evil of the
imagination in its misguidance (tadlil), evil beliefs would
have taken root in the souls of scholars, concerning the Cre-
ator of the Earth and Heaven as has taken root in the hearts
of the common people and stupid people.
We do not need this distancing in representing its mis-
guidance and fabrication (takhyil); it lies in a manner close
to the sensibilia (mahsusat) as we mentioned, for the reason
that if you showed it a single body which contains move-
ment, taste, colour, smell and suggested to it that it believe
that all that comes together in a single locus, it would cow-
ardly reject it and would imagine that part of that is an-
nexed to part and next to it and estimate each one adhering
to each other in the likeness of a thin curtain enclosing
another curtain and was not part of its constitution (jibilla)
for it to understand [p.31] its multiplicity (ta‘addud) except
by estimating the multiplicity of the place.
The imagination takes from the senses and at the end of
the matter the senses perceive multiplicity (ta‘addud) and
exclusivity (tabayun) in place or time.
If both should be suspended, it would be difficult for it
to believe its veracity with changing numbers in attribute
and reality [when] it is in a single space.

17
Concerning division and continuity, see for instance Andreas Lammer, The
Elements of Avicenna’s Physics: Greek Sources and Arabic Innovations (Berlin:
DeGruyter, 2018), esp. pp. 149–152.

introduction 9
 This and other fallacies of the imagination are innumer-
able. God the Exalted is to be thanked for the intellect that
is guided from error (dalala); [He is] the deliverer from the
darkness of ignorance who is the saviour with the light of
the proof (burhan) from the darkness of Satan’s whisperings.
Should you wish to further demonstrate the disloyalty
of both these judgements (i.e. the sensorial and imagin-
ative), then it is within your reach to take the study of what
appears in the divine law concerning the attributes of these
sophisms (tamwihat) to Satan, calling them whisperings
(wasawis), assigning them to him (i.e. Satan), and calling
the light of the intellect (diya’ al-‘aql) ‘guidance and light’
and attributing it to God the Exalted and His angels, as He
[the Exalted] says:
God is the Light of the heavens and the earth
(Qur’an 24:35)
[p.32] When the place of delusion (wahm) and the im-
agination (khayal) is believed to be in the brain—both are
sources [manipulated by the] Whisperer (i.e. Satan), Abu
Bakr, May God have mercy upon him, said to the person
applying the hadd punishment18 to one of the criminals:
‘Strike the head; for Satan[’s influence] is in the head.’19
When the imagining and delusional whisperings adhered
to the intellective faculty (al-quwwa al-mufakkira), an ad-
herence that makes it rare for someone to be independent
in getting rid of [the whisperings] to the extent that is like

18
Lit. prohibition. Punishment proscribed by the Qur’an and Hadith.
19
This tradition is weak and has discontinuity in the chain of narrators. See for
instance Ahmad ibn ‘Ali Muhammad al-Kinani al-‘Asqalani, al-Talhis al-Habir fi
Takhrij Ahadith Al-Rafi‘i al-Kabir, Kitab Hadd Sharib al-Khamr, no.2127:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=11&I
D=1506.

10 the standard of knowledge

blood mixing with our flesh and organs. The Prophet, May
peace be upon him, said: ‘Verily, Satans flows through the
human being like blood.’20
If you should take notice with the eye of the intellect
(‘ayn al-‘aql) of these secrets to which I alerted you, your
intense need to devise a stratagem to get rid of the error
(dalal) of the two judges will be awakened.
Should you inquire: What is the stratagem as a pre-
caution along with what you described of the intense at-
tachment to these pitfalls?
Then ponder the subtlety of the stratagems of the intel-
lect concerning it (i.e. error). The intellect gradually leads
the senses (hiss) and the imagination (wahm) to matters
which assist it in perceiving observed phenomena (musha-
hadat) that are in agreement with what is imagined (maw-
hum) and rationalised (ma‘qul).
Then it apprehends from these observed phenomena
premises (muqaddimat) in which the imagination assists it
and orders [the premises] in an undisputable order. Then it
necessarily deduces from the premises a conclusion which
it is not possible for the imagination to deny, since [the
premises] are apprehended from the matters which the im-
agination and the intellect did not fail to decide upon,
namely the necessary (daruriyyat) and sensorial (hissiyat)
sciences about which people did not disagree and received
them from the senses and imagination and apprehended
20
This hadith can be found for instance in Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-I’tikaf, Bab
hal yadra’u al-mu‘takifu ‘an nafsihi, no 1908:
http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=146&hid=1908&
pid=10ss0231
and with slight variation in Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Salam, Bab bayan annahu
yustahabbu li-man ru’iya khaliyan, no. 4047:
http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=158&hid=4047&
pid=107879.

introduction 11
from them [these sciences] as a security. [Therefore,] the
imagination and intellect believed that the necessary con-
clusion from [the premises] is true and real.
[p.33] Then the intellect transmitted [the premises] es-
sentially in order to that which the imagination disputes
and produced from it results. When the imagination denied
[the premises] and refused to accept them, it was easy for
the intellect to receive its provision. For the premises which
the intellect produced, the imagination believed them ac-
cording to the order which it ordered to produce the result.
[Therefore,] the imagination received the necessary con-
sequence of the result from [the premises]. Then the theor-
etician (nazir) reaches the conclusion that the imagination’s
refusal to accept the conclusion after believing the premises
and the soundness of the organisation of that which is pro-
duced, is truly a deficiency (qusur) in the nature of the im-
agination and its natural disposition (jibilliyya) in percei-
ving the conclusion, not because the conclusion is false, but
rather because the order of the premises is transmitted from
a place which the imagination assisted in believing it.
Therefore, our goal in this book is to take the sensibilia
(mahsusat) and the innate necessary propositions (al-daru-
riyyat al-jibilliyya) as a standard for inquiry; even if we
transmitted it (i.e. the standard) to the enigmas (ghawa-
mid), we did not doubt the veracity of the necessary sen-
sibilia and innate propositions.
Perhaps you now say, if what you mentioned [occurred]
with the inquirers, why then did they differ with respect to
the intelligibles (ma‘qulat)? And why don’t they agree about
[the intelligibles] [the same way] as they did about their geo-
metrical and arithmetical theories with which the imagin-
ation assists the intellect?

12 the standard of knowledge

 Your answer has two aspects:
First, that which we mentioned is one of the inducers
of error (matharat al-dalal), not all of them. Behind that
in inspecting the rational propositions (‘aqliyyat) are dan-
gerous obstacles. It is very rare among intelligent persons
who avoid them is given power and therefore is saved
from them.
Upon comprehending the totality of the conditions of
the demonstration (burhan), which produces certitude
(yaqin), you will not find remote that the faculty of most
of humankind will fall short in perceiving the latent realities
of the intelligibles (haqa’iq al-ma‘qulat).
Second: The estimative propositions (qadaya wahmiyya)
are divided into two types: That which is true and that
which is false with the latter exceedingly resembling the
former.
[p.34] I display concerning [the estimative propositions]
(qadaya wahmiyya) issues for which it is difficult for the
soul to distinguish from the fabricated and is unable to
overcome them except whoever God grants success and
honours with following the Path of Truth (minhaj al-haqq)
with His way.
The rational propositions may be divided into [the fol-
lowing]:
That for which it is easy for the majority to perceive.
That which defies (ista‘sa) the minds of the masses (ja-
mahir) except for the rare Friends of God the Exalted who
are supported by the Light of the Truth (al-mu’ayyadin bi-
nur al-haqq) except which the long ages do not permit ex-
cept for a few individuals from them to exist not to speak
of the huge number of [people].
Perhaps you now consider yourself from among the

introduction 13
crowd and recite over yourself the Chapter of Despair21 and
allege: ‘When will I be one of the age (wahid al-dahr),
unique in this era (farid al-‘asr), supported by the Light of
the Truth, freed from Satan’s strifes, in command of the
conditions of the apodictic proof? Being idle is more suited
to me, and being convinced of the belief inherited from the
ancestors is safer for me than riding on the back of danger;
I am not confident that I will attain the distant goal (qasiyat
al-watar).’
It is said about the likes of you that if this occurred to
you, then you are nothing more than a person who realises
the rank of ruler of the age (sultan al-zaman) whose power-
base (shawka), equipment (‘udda), [military] strength
(najda), fortune (tharwa), partisans and that helped him. I
think it unlikely that he will attain his rank or come near
to his degree. However, I believe that he will attain the rank
of wazir or leader (rutbat al-riyasa) or a lower rank. He
said: ‘I [now] know what is sound after being incapacitated
from the ultimate purpose (ghaya al-quswa) and the highest
peak which is the degree of the ruler of this world (sultan
al-dunya), namely that I am convinced of brooms which is
my ancestors’ craft.’
The broom maker is not incapable of attaining bread to
eat and clothes to wear, according to the poet:
Leave noble traits; do not set out to attain them.
Stay; for you have been fed and clothed.
[p.35] Should this short-sighted contemptible person
focus their thoughts more closely, contemplate and consi-
der, they will come to realise that between the degree of the

21
By employing the fictitious name of ‘Sura al-Ya’s Ghazali is being critical.

14 the standard of knowledge

broom maker and the sultan are stations. Not everybody
who is incapable of [reaching] the highest degrees (darajat)
ought to be convinced by the lowest levels of descending
(darakat).22
Rather should he alight, ascending from the rank of vile-
ness, that which he is elevated to, compared to that which
he is elevated from, is presidential.
It is thus you ought to regard the degrees of happiness
among the ulema. Everyone among us has a known station
which he does not exceed and a stage which he does not
transgress. Rather he ought to look forward to the highest
step and to bring forth from potentiality to actuality that
for which his faculties have the capacity.
Should you say: ‘I have now understood the intense need
for this book with respect to what you have clarified from
verification. I had an intense desire for what you cited out
of yearning, and [the book’s] objective and benefit became
clear. Then its contents became clear to me,’ know that
its contents [relate to] teaching how to move from the im-
ages occurring in your mind to matters unseen by you.
This [process of] moving has a form and order which if you
have taken into consideration, then you will have reached
the goal.
[However,] if they were neglected, then you will fall
short of the goal. That which is sound [in] its form and
order strongly resembles that which is unsound.
The contents (madmun) of this knowledge is thus sum-
marized succinctly or in detail: The goal is knowledge
which is divided into the following:

22
Darajat (upward stairs) lead to paradise while darakat (downward stairs) lead
to hell. Qur’an 15:44; See also C. Lange, Locating Hell in Islamic Tradition. Lei-
den: Brill, 2015, p.13.

introduction 15
 1) Knowledge of the essences of things (dhawat al-ash-
ya’) like your knowledge of the person, the tree, the s, etc.
This kind of knowledge is called: conception (tasawwur).23
2) Knowledge of the relationship of conceived essences
(al-dhawat al-mutasawwira) to each other either by means
of negation (salb) or belief (iman), as it is said:

[p.36] Man is an animal.

Man is not a stone.
Therefore, you understand ‘man’ and ‘stone’ through a
conceptualised understanding (fahm tasawwuri) of their es-
sences. Then you judge that one of them is negated by the
other (maslub) or fixed by it (thabit). This [process] is called
confirmation since it takes up assent (tasdiq) and denial
(takdhib).
The seeker’s reflective research (bahth nazari) either
heads in the direction of full knowledge of something’s real-
ity (tasawwur) or to assent (tasdiq). That which connects
to assent (tasdiq) is called an explanatory statement (qawl
sharih) and is of two types: definition (hadd) and descrip-
tion (rasm). That which leads to full knowledge of some-
thing’s reality is called proof (hujja) including analogical
reasoning (qiyas) and induction (istiqra’) etc.
The content of this book is as follows:
1) The principles of ‘the explanatory statement’ (al-qawl
al-sharih) for that which needs conceptualisation, whether
definition or description.
23
Concerning tasawwur and tasdiq, see Janssens, p.55 and n.49; M. Maroth,
‘Tasawwur and tasdiq’, ed. S. Knuuttila, R.Tyorinoja, and S. Ebbesen, Knowledge
and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, Helsinki, 1990, 2:265–274; Ibn Sina,
Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp.77–78; Ibn Sina, Avicenna’s Treatise on Logic
Danesh-Name Alai, trans. Farhang Zabeeh. The Hague: Martinus Nijhofl, 1971,
p.13.

16 the standard of knowledge

 2) Defining the principles of the proof (hujja) which
leads to assent, whether through analogical reasoning or
else with the forewarning concerning the condition of their
soundness and the impetus (mathar) for the error in them
both.
Should you say: How is a person ignorant of conceptual
knowledge (‘ilm tasawwuri) such that he needs a definition?
We say: Should a person hear a word (lit. noun) whose
meaning he does not understand, he is like whoever says:
What is ‘al-khala’ (void)? What is ‘al-mala’ (filling)? What
is an angel (malak)? What is Satan? What is wine (‘uqar)?
‘Uqar’ is wine (khamr). If he does not understand it by its
commonly known name, let him understand it by its defi-
nition (hadd), saying: ‘Wine (khamr) is a drink made of
pressed grapes, an intoxicant.’ [At that moment] he receives
conceptual knowledge (‘ilm tasawwuri) of the wine’s es-
sence (dhat).
As for assentual knowledge (‘ilm tasdiqi): The person is
ignorant, for instance, [of the fact] the world has a creator
and asks: ‘Does the world have a creator?’ and you reply
to him: ‘Yes, the world has a Creator’ and you inform him
of the truth of that through proof (hujja) and demonstra-
tion (burhan) as we shall elucidate.
Then this is the content of the book:
[p.37] Should you wish to know the list of chapters [con-
tent of this work], know that we have divided the saying
about logic (madarik al-‘ulum) into four:

1) Book of Syllogistic Premises

2) Book of the Syllogism
3) Book of Definition
4) Book of the Divisions and Principles of Existence

introduction 17
 [p.41] [BOOK ONE] 24

SYLLOGISTIC PREMISES

Let us then mention the aspect of a premise through which

reflection in analogical reasoning (qiyas) is divided into:
near and far.
We say that the farthest requirement in this section is
the apodictic proof (burhan) that yields indubitable knowl-
edge (‘ilm yaqini). The apodictic proof (burhan) is a kind
of analogical reasoning with ‘qiyas’ being the general name
and ‘burhan’ the name for a specific kind of it. ‘Qiyas’ is
not ordered except with two premises which are also or-
dered by: predicand (mukhbar ‘anhu) which is called
‘mawdu‘‘ (i.e. subject) and a khabar (predicate) which is
called ‘mahmul.’25
Every subject or predicate is mentioned in a proposition
and is an expression which inevitably indicates a meaning
(ma‘na). Qiyas (analogical reasoning) is compound (mur-
akkab) and everyone who reflects on something (nazir)
compound, his path is to analyse the compound to its com-
ponents, beginning with reflecting on the singular, then the
compound.
It necessarily follows that in reflecting on qiyas (analogi-
cal reasoning) to reflect on that which qiyas is broken down
to, namely the premises (muqaddimat).

24
Pages 38–40 of the Arabic edition do not contain text.
25
Greek: kategoroúmenon.

18 the standard of knowledge

 And reflection (nazar) on the premises (muqaddimat) is
followed by reflection on predicate and subject from which
the premises are composed.
[p.42] And reflecting on predicate and subject is fol-
lowed by reflecting on the utterances (also words) and the
individual connotational attributes (ma‘ani) with which the
predicate and subject are formed.
[Another essential aspect] of reflecting on the premises
(muqaddimat) is reflecting on their conditions (shurut). It
is necessary to reflect for each compound of substance
(madda) and form (sura) on their substance and form.
This is like whoever wants to build a house. He has a
right to concern himself with selecting the materials from
which it will be built, like fired brick, clay, and wood. Then
he occupies himself with the conceptualisation (taswir) and
the means of arrangement and assembly. Thus, is the case
with reflection in analogical reasoning. This is a demonstra-
tion of the need for these divisions. Let us take after it what
is intended.

[CHAPTER ONE]
Concerning the Premises of Analogical Reasoning (qiyas)
On words’ signification, elucidating the aspects of their
signification (dalala) and their relationship
to connotational attributes (ma‘ani)
Its exposition is in seven sections:
Section 1: We say that the expressions signify the connota-
tional attributes in three different (mutabayin) ways:
The first is the signification of congruence (mutabaqa)

book one 19
like in a name posited for an object, such as the signification
of the word ‘wall (ha’it)’ for the [actual] wall.26
The second is through inclusion (al-tadammun) such as
the signification of the word ‘house (bayt)’ for its walls or
the word ‘human (insan)’ for the ‘animal (hayawan).’ Like-
wise every particular description signifying the more general
substantive description (al-wasf al-a‘amm al-jawhari).
The third is signification by way of concomitance (ilti-
zam) or succession (ittiba‘) such as the signification of the
word ‘ceiling’ for the ‘wall.’ The two concur with one act-
ing as an accompanying concomitant that is external to the
other (al-rafiq al-lazim al-kharij ‘an dhatihi) and the signifi-
cation of the word ‘human (insan)’ for the potential for the
tailoring craft and learning it.
[p.44] Definitions established by personal reflection (al-
mu‘tabar fi’l-ta‘rifat) are the signification (dalala) of con-
gruence (mutabaqa) and inclusion (tadammun).27 As for the
signification of ‘concomitance (iltizam),’ it is not, for the
reason whoever posits a language did not posit it, unlike
congruence and inclusion; since that which is signified
(madlul) in it is not defined nor contained and the necessary
concomitants of things (lawazim al-ashya’) and the necess-
ary concomitants of its necessary concomitants (of con-
gruence and inclusion) (lawazim lawazimiha) are not
determined (la tandabit) nor are they finite (la tanhasir).
This would lead to the word being a signification of
connotational attributes (ma‘ani) that are endless which is
impossible.

26
Jurjani, Kitab al-Ta‘rifat (Beirut, 1985), p.233.
27
A useful chart which summarises the subdivisions of the significations is pro-
vided by Ahmad Shams al-Din, the editor of the Arabic edition, p.44.

20 the standard of knowledge

Section 2: Concerning the word ‘expression (lafz)’28 both
the general and specific meaning (ma‘na). The word ‘ex-
pression (lafz)’ is divided into the following:
1) Particular: That whose conceptualisation in itself pre-
vents other things from falling under its concept, such as:
‘Zayd,’ ‘this tree,’ and ‘this horse.’
2) [p.45] That whose conceptualisation in itself does not
prevent other things from falling under its concept, such as:
‘man,’ ‘horse,’ and ‘tree.’
If prevention should occur, it would be due to an external
[factor] apart from its understanding and entailed by its ex-
pression.
They are the names of genera and species and the general
universal meanings (al-ma‘ani al-kulliyya al-‘amma).
[The universal] exists in the Arabic language in every
name to which alif and lam (i.e the definite article) is added,
not in exhibiting a transference to prior specific understand-
ing like ‘the man (al-rajul)’ which is the genus. Perhaps you
would apply it and want a specific man whom the addressee
knows form before, so you say: The man (al-rajul) came.
The definite article (for specifying); that is the man who
came to me before. If there is not the like of this context,
the noun al-rajul (man) is a universal name under which all
other male persons are subsumed.
[Should we say]: The spherical form (al-shakl al-kurawi)
which surrounds the twelve constellations is a celestial
sphere and there is no other form (shakl) like it in existence
but one, then how is it that the noun is universal and the

28
Lafz may also be translated as ‘utterance.’

book one 21
designation is ‘one’?29 The necessary definite article was
added to attach a universal sense to it.
[p.46] It is said to you that this (i.e. the definite article)
is universal since we do not make conditional for that under
which it is subsumed for it to be present in actu. Rather, it
is permissible for it to be present in potentia and in possible
existent [state] (bi’l-imkan).
If its state was possible (qadara), it would undoubtedly
be subsumed under it, since in pre-existence it is in potentia.
Not like the singular noun ‘Zayd’ the occurrence of associ-
ation in actu and in potentia together is forbidden from oc-
curring.
Should you and we say: God the Truth is [One], how is
it that this is a universal and the occurrence of association
with Him is forbidden in actu and in potentia (together)?
And [the same question applies] to our expression ‘The
Sun”, according to the position of those who don’t permit
the existence of another sun. Just as the person of Zayd is
considered, it is included in the formation of the conception
(tasawwur) of the expression ‘Zayd.’ It is said to you—the
expression is universal and impossible for associationism
to occur in it, not because of the same manner of under-
standing the expression and its subject (mawdu‘), but rather
because of an external meaning, namely the impossibility
of the existence of another God for the world. We did not
make entirely conditional the expression, except the same
understanding of the expression and its subject does not
prevent the occurrence of associationism in it.
You then had two questions [posed] to you and their
answer is that the ‘universal’ can be divided into three parts.
29
The alif-lam (definite article) in Arabic grammar is known as ‘the universal’
because it includes all members of the genus to which it is attached.

22 the standard of knowledge

Part One
Associationism in actu as we said: ‘the person’ is a person
if other persons come into existence from him.

Part Two
Associationism exists in potentia, as we said: ‘the person:’
If it so happens that only one person remains and likewise
with the planet which is surrounded by twelve constella-
tions.

Part Three
There is no associationism neither in actu nor in potentia
as [in the case of] ‘the God’ since with that He is Universal
because the impossibility is not the subject of the expression
and [its understanding] opposite the expression ‘Zayd.’

Legal benefit
Scholars of the foundations of jurisprudence differed with
respect to the simple expression (ism mufrad) to which the
definite article is connected, [if] immersion (istighraq) is
necessitated. Does it constitute a generalisation, as it is said:
‘The dinar is better than the dirham,’ (i.e. gold is better than
silver) and ‘The man is better than the woman’?
[p.47] The doubters doubted: In so far as it exists the
simple expression (ism mufrad) does not necessitate exhaus-
tiveness (istighraq) per se (li-mujarradihi). However, the un-
derstanding of the general (fahm al-‘umum) is with the
indicator of pricing (qarinat al-tas‘ir)30 and the indicator of

30
Qarina: The connection between the two parts of a syllogism through which
one infers knowledge. See for instance Wael Hallaq, ‘Notes on the term qarina in
Islamic Legal discourse,’ Journal of the American Oriental Society 108:3 (1988),
pp.475–480.

book one 23
preference (qarinat al-tafdil) for the male over the female;31
rather we know that it is due to the deficiency of the state
of the dirham [relative] to the state of the dinar and the defi-
ciency of femaleness to maleness.
Should you ponder what we mentioned concerning ver-
ifying the meaning of the universal (ma‘na al-kulli), you will
have understood the lapses (zalal) of those people’s of the
universal expression (lafz kulli) necessitating exhaustive-
ness (istighraq) per se (bi-mujarradihi) and not requiring a
further indicator (qarina). Should you say: ‘From where did
this error of theirs come about?’ you will know this in sec-
tion three.
Section 3: Elucidating the levels of the expressions (alfaz)
from the stations of existence (maratib al-wujud).32 Know
that the levels concerning what we intend are four with ex-
pression (lafz) being at the third level. A thing has an exist-
ence:
[First], existence in the outer world (wujud fi’l-a‘yan).
Then in the inner-mental realities (adhhan). Then in the ex-
pressions (alfaz). Then in writing (kitaba).33

31
See Qur’an 4:34: ‘Men are in charge of women because of that with which
God has preferred the one over the other, and because of what they expend of
their property….’ Traditionally, though not exclusively, men have been the ex-
positors and transmitters of religious knowledge.
32
This system of existence elaborated in Ghazali’s The Decisive Criterion (Faysal
ßal-Tafriqa) ultimately relies on Ibn Sina’s various categories. A useful discussion
may be found in Frank Griffel, ‘Al-Ghazali’s concept of Prophecy: The Intro-
duction of Avicennan Psychology into Ash‘arite Theology,’ Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy 14 (2004), pp. 127ff. For Ibn Sina, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s
Metaphysics in Context. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, chap. 7. See
also al-Farabi’s categorisation of existents, Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.),
2:596–601.
33
The first two types of existence are real existences and the latter two are hy-
pothetical (wad‘i).

24 the standard of knowledge

 Writing is an indication (dalla) of expression (lafz).
The expression (lafz) is an indication of the connotational
attribute (alt. meaning)(ma‘na) in the soul and what is con-
tained in the soul is a representation (mithal) of the exist-
ence [of a thing] in the outer world (al-mawjud fi’l-a‘yan).
So long as a thing is not fixed in itself, a representation
of it is not inscribed in the soul. Whatever representation is
impressed in the soul, it is the knowledge (‘ilm) of [a thing].
There is no meaning to knowledge except for a representa-
tion (mithal) that occurs in the soul which corresponds
identically with that which is its representation in the sen-
sory [world] and it is that which is known (ma‘lum).
[p.48] So long as this effect (athar) does not appear in
the soul, an expression (lafz) which indicates that vestige is
not rightly ordered (la yantazim).
So long as the expression within which sounds and
letters are organised is not rightly ordered, writing that in-
dicates it is not inscribed.
Existence in the outer world (wujud fi’l-a‘yan) and in the
intellects (adhhan) does not differ in different lands and
among different nations, in contrast with the expressions
and writing which indicate conditionally (bi’l-wad‘) and
conventionally (bi’l-istilah).
At this we say: Whoever alleges that the singular noun
(al-ism al-mufrad) does not necessitate exhaustiveness, con-
siders that it is placed (mawdu‘) opposite that which exists
among tangibles (al-mawjud fi’l-a‘yan) which are specific
individuals (ashhkas mu‘ayyana). [For instance], the dinar
present represents a specified individual. If you should
gather the individuals, they are called ‘dinars.’
He did not know that the individual dinar etched on the
soul a trace of its similitude (mithal). In fact, he does not

book one 25
know that from the physical individual dinar is a represen-
tation (mithal) which resembles [the dinar] and which is the
knowledge of it and which is also a concept of it.
And that representation conforms with that individual
[dinar] and the rest of the existent and possible individual
dinars. Therefore, the form fixed in the soul which is in con-
cordance with each dinar presumes a universal rather than
individual form (yafrid sura kulliyya la shakhsiyya).
If you should believe that the name ‘dinar’ is an indicator
of the trace (athar) in the soul and not of the impressor
(mu’aththir) and that representation is universal, then it
[necessarily follows] the name is universal without doubt.
What we have presented of the order will inform you
that the expressions (alfaz) are indicators of what is in the
souls and that which is in the souls is a representation of
what is in the outer world (fi’l-a‘yan).
[p.49] A further exposition of the universal meanings
that are inscribed in the souls because of witnessing the par-
ticular individuals will follow in the Book of the Divisions
and Principles of Existence.34
The fourth division concerning the expression (lafz). I di-
vided it according to its simple and compound [states].
Know that the expression (lafz) is divided into ‘simple
(mufrad)’ and ‘compound (murakkab)’ and the compound
is divided into ‘imperfect (naqis)’ and ‘complete (tamm),’
bringing the total of divisions to three parts:
1) The simple (mufrad):35 It is not intended that a pa-
ticular part of it is an indication of something orig-
inally when it is [actually] a part of it, like saying:
34
See below, p.246.
35
Ibn Sina, Danesh-name (Zabeeh trans.), p.15.

26 the standard of knowledge

 Jesus (‘Isa) and person (insan). Both parts of the name
Jesus (‘Isa): ‘Je’ (‘I) and ‘sus’ (sa) and person (insan):
‘in’ and ‘san’ are not originally intended to indicate
something.36 Should you say: ‘What say you about
‘Abd al-Malik?’ Know that the name is also simple.
If you should make it a nomen proprium (i.e. a single
definite thing)(ism ‘alam) such as your saying ‘Zayd’,
by virtue of that you do not want the word ‘‘Abd’ as
an indictor of meaning (ma‘na) nor of ‘malik’ like-
wise. Each of them as a part (juz’) does not indicate
anything like the constituent elements of the name
Zayd are both names in external form and are made
a single name like Baalbek and Ma‘adiyakrib.
2) then this name is applied to him from two aspects:
First, in defining his essence (dhat) [in which case] it
is a simple [name]. Second, in defining his attribute
(sifa), [that is] worshipping the King (i.e. God), so
your saying ‘Abd al-Malik is a description of him,
and is compound, not simple.
Understand these fine details, [since] the source
of errors comes about in the theoretical sciences (na-
zariyyat) due to their neglect. Connective.
3) The complete compound (al-murakkab al-tamm):37
Each word from it indicates a meaning (ma‘na) such
that requiring no further addition (bi-haythu yasihhu
al-sukut ‘alayhi) on it is correct. It (the complete com-
pound) [p.50] is made up of two names and a name

36
See Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p.5.
37
Ibn Sina, Danesh-name (Zabeeh trans.), p.15; Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed
trans.), p.5.

book one 27
 and a verb. The logician (mantiqi) calls the verb a
word (kalima). Connector.
4) The incomplete compound (al-murakkab al-naqis) is
opposite of it, like saying: ‘Zayd walks,’38 and ‘The
speaker is an animal’—thus a complete compound
[construct] not from two nouns or a noun and a verb.
Your merely saying: ‘in the house (fi’l-dar),’ ‘or the
person (aw al-insan)’ is an incomplete compound
since it is composed of a name and a particle (adat),39
not of two names or a name and a verb. Your merely
saying: ‘Zayd in (Zayd fi)’ or ‘Zayd no (Zayd la)’,
does not indicate the meaning (ma‘na) for which the
intention in conversation is dessired, so long as he
does not say ‘Zayd is in the house (Zayd fi’l-dar),’
and ‘Zayd does not oppress (Zayd la yazlim).’ Thus
that relationship (iqtiran) and completion (tatmim)
give a complete indication (yadullu dalala tamma),
requiring no addition.

The fifth division is the independently singular expression

(al-lafz al-mufrad fi nafsihi). ‘The expression (lafz)’ is either
a noun, verb, or particle. Let us now give a definition of
each according to the condition of the logicians so that you
may discover its divisions: We say:
The name (ism): a sound that indicates out of collective
social agreement (bi-tawatu’) free from time. One part of it

38
See Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p.5. He does not mention the ‘in-
complete compound’ specifically.
39
“Adat”, in Arabic, is that part of speech which is neither a noun nor a verb.
It includes aticles, prepositions and conjunctions, etc. Its function is to connect
and render meaning to a sentence or a phrase. Concerning a discussion of these
terms, see for instance Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Assad trans.), pp. 10-13; Ibn Sina,
Danesh-Name Alai, p.16 (English).

28 the standard of knowledge

does not indicate its individuality, [rather] it indicates defi-
nite meaning (ma‘na muhassal). When the definition (hadd)
is composed of the genus (jins) and differentia (fasl)40 and
you mention the differentia (fusul) for taking precautions
(lil-ihtirazat) it was:
Our saying: Sound (sawt) is a genus (jins).
Our saying: Indicating (dall) is a differentia (fasl) differ-
entiated from sneezing (al-‘utas), clearing the throat (al-
nahnaha), the cough (al-su‘al) and the like.
We mentioned ‘univocally’ (bi’l-tawatu’) which differ-
entiates it from the dog’s barking which is a sound indicat-
ing the appearance of something incoming (wurud warid)
but not univocally.
And when we say: ‘does not succumb to time (mujarrad
‘an al-zaman),’ excluding (ihtirazan ‘an) the verb, like our
saying: He arises (yaqum), He arose (qama), and He will
arise (sa-yaqum). Each one is a univocal sound indicator
(sawt dall bi-tawatu’).
[p.51] And when we say: ‘A part of it does not indicate
its individuation (infirad), excluding the complete com-
pound (al-murakkab al-tamm), as we say: ‘Zayd is an ani-
mal (hayawan),’ this is called a ‘predicate (khabar)’ and
‘speech (qawl),’ not ‘a name (ism).’ Our saying: It indicates
a realised or definite meaning (ma‘na muhassal) excluding
names that are indefinite (laysat muhassala) or not realised,
like our saying: not a person (la insan). It is not called a
name (singular expression)(ism) with the existence of vari-
ous parts without this exclusion. Our saying ‘not a person’
(la insan) could [for instance] indicate a rock, the sky, a

40
Ibn Sina, Danesh-Name Alai, p. 16, defines ‘fasl’ as ‘the essential universal
(al-kulli al-dhati).’

book one 29
cow, and more generally everything that is not a person.
Therefore, it does not have a definite (realised) meaning.
Rather it is an indication of the negation of the person not
affirming (ithbat) something.
As for the action (fi‘l) which is the word (kalima), it is a
univocal sound that indicates the aspect which we men-
tioned concerning the singular expression (ism). Its exposi-
tion indicates the meaning of its occurrence in time, like
saying: He arose, and He arises. Pilgrim, pilgrim
It is insufficient for it being an action (fi‘l) to only indi-
cate time. If [we should say]: yesterday, today, tomorrow,
last year, the she-camel mating season, and pilgrim’s arrival
time (maqdam al-hajj), but is not a verb. A verb indicates
meaning (ma‘na) and time (zaman) in which meaning oc-
curs. Therefore, the verb is always an indicator of a mean-
ing borne by another [word](mahmul ‘ala ghayrihi)(i.e. the
predicate).
Therefore, the difference between the noun and the verb
is the [latter’s]inclusion of time only.
As for the particle (harf),41 it is everything which indi-
cates meaning but which cannot be understood alone if it
is not connected to something else, e.g. ‘min’ (from, among)
and ‘‘ala’ (from, about, to, above, according to, etc.) and
the like.42
41
See Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:668: ‘Particle (lit. Instrument) [Risalah,
35,11; Shuru‘, 270,10]: ‘The particle (lit. instrument) is an expression signifying
separate notion which cannot be understood all by itself without being connected
with a noun or verb.’ (See vol. I, 6). [Shuru‘, 270,10; Sharh, 43,9]: ‘The parts of
speech called “instruments”, and which the Arab grammarians call “particles (lit.
letters) of meaning”, indicate no notion whatsoever unless they are joined either
to a noun, or to a verb or to both.’ (See vol. I, 7).’ See also Ibn Sina, Deliverance
(Ahmed trans.), p.14.
42
Categoremate are words that derive their meaning from being connected to
other words. Farabi, Al-Mantiqiyyat (Qom, 1988), p.22; Chatti, ‘Syncategore-
mata,’ p.168.

30 the standard of knowledge

 [p.52] These definitions are summarised as follows:
Noun (ism): It is a singular expression which indicates
meaning (ma‘na) without indicating a time from [the three
tenses]: past, present and future. It includes the definite
(muhassal): e.g. Zayd, and indefinite (ghayr muhassal),43 as
for instance when a negative particle is added to it, e.g.: not
Zayd (la Zayd).
Word (kalima):43 The word (kalima) is a singular ex-
pression that indicates the meaning and the time in which
that meaning exists for an unspecified subject.
Particle (harf or adat): Indicates meaning when con-
nected with something else.

The Sixth Division: Relationship of the expressions (alfaz)

to the meanings (ma‘ani)
Know that the expressions from the meanings are in four
stations (manazil): 1) equivocal (mushtaraka); 2) univocal
(mutawati‘a); 3) synonymous (mutaradifa); and 4) diver-
gent (mutazayila).
As for the equivocal (mushtaraka),45 it is the only one
applied to the different existents by definition and reality
in an equitable way like ‘‘ayn’ applied to the seeing eye
(‘ayn basira), the water spring (yanbu‘ al-ma’) and the sun
disk (qurs al-shams).
These are the different definitions and realities.
As for the univocal (mutawati’a), it indicates concrete
things (a‘yan) with a single common meaning between
them, like the indication of the expression ‘person (insan)’

43
It is also referred to in relevant literature as “ma‘dul.”
44
Ahmed translates kalima as ‘verb,’ Ibn Sina, Deliverance, p.14.
45
See for instance, Al-Suyuti, Al-Muzhir fi ‘Ulum al-Lugha wa Anwa‘iha, 2 vols.
(Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, n/d), 1: 369–386.

book one 31
for Zayd and ‘Amr and the indication of the expression ani-
mal (hayawan) for a person (insan), a horse (faras), or a
bird (tayr) [for instance], because they participate in the
connotational attribute of ‘animal nature (hayawaniyya).’
The expression posited for that univocal participatory con-
notational attribute (al-ma‘na al-mushtarik al-mutawati’)
[can be] juxtaposed with ‘the eye’ for vision (al-basira) and
the water spring.
As for the synonymous (mutaradifa),46 it is the different
names which indicate a meaning which is subsumed be-
neath a single definition [p.53] like wine [for which there
are the following words:] khamr, rah and ‘uqar [and other
synonyms]. A single definition brings the designation of
these [names] together, namely the intoxicating liquid
squeezed from grapes.
As for the diverging (mutazayila), it is names that have
no relationship in common like horse, gold, and clothes.
They are different expressions which indicate different
meanings (ma‘an) in definition and reality.
The equivocal (mushtaraka) ought not to be employed
in formal addresses (mukhatabat) over the apodictic proofs
(barahin).

Guidance concerning the stumbling block in [knowing] the

difference between the equivocal (mushtaraka) and the uni-
vocal (mutawati’a) and one measuring the other
[Concerning] the equivocal in name (al-mushtaraka fi’l-
ism), [both expressions] will differ in meaning (ma‘na). [In
other words,] the [two expressions] are homonymous (mut-
tafiqan fi’l-ism), but do not agree in meaning at all.

46
See for instance Al-Suyuti, Al-Muzhir, 1:402-413.

32 the standard of knowledge

Its antithesis is the ‘univocal’ (mutawati’a) which means
that the two expressions are convergent in definition and
description in which they are equal [in them] such that the
name (ism) of one of them is not the meaning, except if the
other has that meaning. Therefore, both names are not dis-
similar in [the following]: worth and appropriateness (al-
awla wa’l-ahra),47 priority (taqaddum), posteriority (ta’akh-
khur), intensity (shidda), and weakness (da‘f). For example:
‘person (insan)’ for Zayd and ‘Amr and ‘animal (hayawan)’
for horse and ox.
Perhaps a single name will indicate two things with the
same meaning in itself (fi nafsihi). However, that meaning
between both expressions will differ from another perspec-
tive. Let us call it an ‘ambiguous name (ism mushakkak).’
Perhaps the meaning may not be one, but there will be
a resemblance (mushabaha) between them. Let us call it
‘similar (mutashabih).’
As for [the ambiguous name], it is like [the relationship
of] ‘existence (al-wujud)’ to ‘existents (al-mawjudat)’; the
essential meaning (ma‘na) is one in reality. However, when
added to the referents (al-musammayat), it differs; for it is
part of the substance (jawhar) before being part of accident
(‘arad),48 and to some of the accidenrs before others. This is
through priority (taqaddum) and posteriority (ta’akhkhur).

47
Concerning al-awla wa-al-ahra, see for instance ‘The Book of Categories’
from Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa’. Passage is translated in Alexander Treiger,
‘Avicenna’s Notion of Transcedental Modulation of Existence (Tashkik al-
Wugud, Analogia Entis) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources,’ Islamic Philosophy,
Science, Culture, and Religion. Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, ed. David Re-
isman and Felicitas Opweis. Brill: Leiden 2011, p.354.
48
In his discussion of substance (jawhar), Ghazali depends on Ibn Sina and Al-
Farabi. For a detailed discussion, see Griffel, ‘Ms. London, British Library Or.
3126: An Unknown Work by Al-Ghazali on Metaphysics and Philosophical The-
ology,’ Journal of Islamic Studies 17:1 (2006), pp.1–42.

book one 33
 As for ‘the more deserved and more appropriate (al-awla
wa-al-ahra),’49 it is like existence (wujud) also; some of the
things are from its essence (dhat) and others from else-
where.
That which is self-subsistent is more deserving and more
appropriate in name.
[p.54] As for saying ‘intensity (shidda) and weakness
(da‘f)’ [it is] like ‘whiteness’ for ivory and snow.50 They are
not referred to with equal absolute convergence (al-tawatu’
al-mutlaq al-mutasawi), but rather one of them is more in-
tense in it than the other.
As for [applying] ‘animal (hayawan)’ to Zayd, ‘Amr, a
horse, and an ox, nothing of this difference in state reaches
it. In this difference it appeared that it is another division.
The modulated (mushakkik):51 It is possible that it is ab-
solute (mutlaq) as previously [mentioned] and also accord-
ing to the relationship can be a single origin like our saying
‘medical (tibbi)’ about the book, the lancet, and medicine.
Or for subscribing to a single objective like our saying
healthy (sihhi) for medicine (dawa’), exercise (riyada), and
bloodletting (fasd).
It may be for the one principle and objective like our say-
ing: ‘all things are divine (ilahiyya).’
As for those (things) which are not united by a single
meaning, but rather between them is a sort of similitude,

49
See above, p.20 n.45.
50
Stephen Menn, ‘Al-Farabi’s Kitab al-Huruf and His Analysis of the Senses of
Being,’ Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18 (2008), p. 65; Ibn Sina, Najat (English),
pp.12–13.
51
Literally ‘ambiguous.’ For an explanation see Frank Griffel, ‘Isma‘ilite
Critique of Ibn Sina: Al-Shahrstani’s (d.1153) Wrestling Match with the Philos-
ophers,’ The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb
and Sabine Schmidtke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p.222.

34 the standard of knowledge

like ‘person (insan)’ for a likeness (sura) formed from clay
in the form of a person and ‘the true human being (insan
haqiqi).’ This is not convergence since both things differ in
definition (bi’l-hadd). The definition of the latter is a mor-
tal, rational, living being,52 while the former is man-made
form by which an image of a mortal rational living being is
imitated.
Likewise, the word leg (qa’ima) for an animal and a bed
defined as follow: First, it is the natural organ upon which
an animal stands and walks (i.e. leg). Second, it is a man-
made circular frame at the bottom of a bed for lifting it.
However, we find between both a semblance in form
and state. The like of this name is created in one of the
things prior to in the other (mawdu‘ wad‘ mutaqaddim)
and is transferred to the other.
If it is annexed to both of them, then it is called ‘obscure
(mutashabih al-ism).’ If it is annexed to the prior one, it is
called a subject (mawdu‘). If it is annexed to the latter, it is
called a predicate (manqul).
This kind of similitude (tashabuh) can be divided into
three:
First, that it is in an essential fixed attribute (sifa qarra
dhatiyya) like the human form (surat al-insan).
Second, that it is a non-essential annexed attribute (sifa
idafiyya ghayr dhatiyya) like [applying] the word ‘origin’
(mabda’) for ‘the beginning of the line (tarf al-khatt)’ and
‘the cause’ (‘illa).53

52
See Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:647; Al-Jahiz, Kitab al-Hayawan.
Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1938, 7:49.
53
Ibn Sina distinguishes between the internal cause (‘illa) and the external cause
(sabab). See Lammer, The Elements of Avicenna’s Physics, pp.163–164.

book one 35
 [p.55] Third, that the resemblance occurs in a remote
matter, e.g. the dog (kalb) for a specific star54 and for an
animal. There is no similarity between them except meta-
phorically speaking, since the star is seen as a follower to
the form (sura) which is like a person. Then the dog is the
most loyal of animals to the human and [thus] was called
by its name.
The likes of this ought to follow the pure equivocal term
(al-mushtarik al-mahd). There is no lesson in the like of this
ambiguity (ishtibah). In this division (i.e. the sixth division)
the names are six: Dissonant (mutabayina), synonymous
(mutaradifa), univocal (mutawati’a), equivocal (mushta-
raka), modulated (mushakkika), and similar (mutashabiha)
If the action divides the thing into six, it requires six out-
ward expressions (‘ibarat) for making [it] comprehensible
(tafhim).

Guidance concerning the stumbling block in the dissonants

(mutabayyinat)55
It is no secret that if there is dissonance (tabayanat) in the
subjects along with dissonance in definitions, then the
names will become dissonant and divergent (mutazayila)
like ‘horse’ and ‘stone’ but the subject may be defined and
the name multiplied according to the differing outward ex-
pressions (i‘tibarat).
[Then it is] conceived (yuzann) that they are synony-
mous (mutaradifa), but they are actually not.
Thus, from that, one of the two names belongs to it such
that it is the subject and the other its description.

54
Canis Major and Canis Minor.
55
Corrected from mutabayinat to mutabayyinat.

36 the standard of knowledge

 For instance, we say: ‘Sword (sayf)’ and ‘sharp (sarim).’
The [word] ‘sword (sayf)’ indicates a subject described as
‘sharp (sarim)’ as opposed to the sword.
Thus, [it can be concluded] that each one indicates a de-
scription of a single subject like ‘cutting’ and ‘made of In-
dian steel (muhannad).’56 One of them indicates its sharp-
ness and the other its origin. Therefore, from that one of
them is because of the description and the other because of
the description of the description like ‘speaking (natiq)’ and
‘eloquent (fasih).’57 Justicier

The dissonant (mutabayina) can be divided into:

Derivative (mushtaqq) and relative (mansub) and the vari-
ants [of a noun] derived from it (mushtaqq minhu) and a
[noun] related to it (mansub ilayhi) [p.56] like grammar
(nahw) and grammarian (nahawi), iron (hadid) and iron-
smith (haddad), money (mal) and owner of money (muta-
mawwil), and justice (‘adl) and justiciar (‘adil). If the jus-
ticiar is called just as justice is called just, that would have
been, as it is usually said, homonyms. However, the for-
mula was changed and the matter (madda) and the original
meaning (al-ma‘na al-awwal) remained and to it was added
that which indicates expanded meaning. Thus, it came to
be called ‘derivative (mushtaqq).’58
56
Originally, swords made in India.
57
See Jahiz, Kitab al-Hayawan, Alwaraq.net, p.10:
http://www.alwaraq.net/Core/SearchServlet/searchone?docid=16&searchtext=2
YHYtdmK2K0=&option=1&offset=1&WordForm=1&exactpage=9&total-
pages=5&AllOffset=1.
58
See for instance Shukri Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in
Alfarabi. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. 131-132; C.
Schöck, ‘Name (ism), Derived Name (ism mushtaqq) and Description (wasf) in
Arabic Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology and Arabic Logic,’ In S. Rahman,
T. Street and H. Tahiri, eds. The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science,
Logic Epistemology and their Interactions. Berlin: Springer, 2008, pp.329–360.

book one 37
Seventh division concerning the absolute expression having
in common dissimilar things
Know that the absolute expression (lafz mutlaq) has [dif-
ferent] meanings and can be divided into three:
Metaphorical (musta‘ara), transferred utterance (man-
qula) and distinguished by a common name (makhsusa bi-
ism al-mushtarik).
As for the metaphorical, it is when the name indicates a
thing’s essence (dhat al-shay’) by positing (bi’l-wad‘)—al-
ways from the first of the positing to the present. However,
another thing is called by it under certain conditions, not
always, due to its correspondence with the first, from one
aspect of the analogies (correspondences)(munasabat) with-
out the first making [a new] essence for the second, leaving
its imprint on it, and transferring to it, as for example the
word ‘mother (umm)’ which is posited for the one who
gives birth (al-walidah) and is a metaphor for the land of
which it is said that it is the mother of humankind (umm
al-bashar). But [when the name] is transferred (yunqal) to
the four elements (al-‘anasir al-arba‘a), they are called ‘um-
mahat (sing. umm)’(lit. mothers) with the meaning that they
are the ‘origins’ and the ‘umm’ is the originator (lit. origin)
of the child.
These meanings which were rendered in a metaphorical
way by the expression ‘mother (umm)’ have names particu-
lar to them. They are called by these names under certain
conditions metaphorically and the name ‘metaphor’ is des-
ignated [for it] since the loaned (al-‘ariyah) does not subsist.
Also this is a metaphor under certain conditions.
As for the ‘transferred (manqul)’, the name gets trans-
ferred from its subject to a different meaning and is made
a fixed, permanent name for it. It is also applied to the first

38 the standard of knowledge

term which becomes common between them, like the name
‘prayer (salat)’ and Hajj, and the words ‘unbeliever (kafir)’
and ‘sinner (fasiq)’.59 [‘The transferred (manqul)’] differs
from the metaphorical because it always becomes fixed in
that which is transferred to it permanently and it departs
from that which is distinguished by a common name by that
which is common which was the first state made common
to both meanings, not that one of the two referents (mu-
sammayayn) is entitled to it. Then it transferred from it to
another, since none of the following: water-spring (yanbu‘
ma’), [golden] dinar,60 the sun disk (qurs al-shams), and the
seeing organ have precedence in entitlement to [the word]
‘‘ayn’.61 But rather each one has an equal description in op-
position to the ‘metaphorical’ and the ‘transferred.’
The metaphorical ought to be avoided in apodictic
proofs, not including oratories, speeches and poetry; rather
it is more eloquent in its use in them.
As for the ‘transferred (manqul),’ it is employed in all
the sciences62 for the utmost need for them (i.e. the scien-
ces). When the one who has set down the language did not

59
The original meaning of these four words are: ‘supplication’ for ‘Salat’; ‘to
aim at’ for ‘hajj’; ‘covering’ for ‘unbeliever’; and ‘exiting’ for ‘sinner’. For a dis-
cussion of the word fasiq, see C. Schöck, ‘Name (ism), Derived Name (ism mush-
taqq) and Description (wasf) in Arabic Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology
and Arabic Logic,’ pp.340–345.
60
The Arabic has been corrected dunya to dinar.
61
Yanbu‘ ma’ becomes ‘ayn ma’, ‘dinar’ becomes ‘ayn [dhahab], qurs al-shams
becomes ‘ayn al-shams, ‘al-‘udw al-basir becomes al-‘ayn al-basira.
62
Al-Farabi regards ‘jawhar (substance)’ as a transferred term. Fakhry summar-
ises jawhar as follows: ‘1) to denote the individual that is not present in a subject;
2) any predicate denoting what that individual is; and 3) whatever defines the es-
sence of a given species (i.e. secondary substance).’ Fakhry, Al-Farabi, Founder
of Islamic Neoplatonism: His Life, Works and Influence (Oxford: Oneworld Pub-
lications, 2002), p.55.

book one 39
realise all the meanings, he did not individuate them by
name; thus the other had to [resort to] transferring.
Whoever set down the language, set down the word
‘jawhar’ (jewel) for a [precious] stone (hajar), which the
money changer knows, and the dialectic theologian trans-
ferred it to a connotational attribute (alt. meaning) (ma‘na)
which he attained within himself—jawhar (substance) being
one of the divisions of existents (mawjudat).
This is what is used prolifically in the sciences (‘ulum)
and the crafts (sina‘at).
As for the equivocal (mushtaraka), they are not produ-
ced in apodictic proofs especially, and not in speeches (khi-
tabiyyat), except if a proof text (qarina) accompanies it.
[The equivocal] is also divided into [parts]: Among them
are those that fall under [the category] of the conditions of
the format like the unified name which is defined by the pat-
tern of the active participle (fa‘il) and the passive participle
(maf‘ul) like ‘mukhtar (chosen).’ You say: Zayd is the cho-
sen [one] (mukhtar) and knowledge is chosen. The former
has the meaning of an active participle and the latter the
meaning of the passive participle like ‘in urgent need (mud-
tarr) and similar [words].
Among them is that which occurs in a number of similar
entities outwardly but different in reality and one is hardly
able to examine the aspect of their contradictory aspects
for example: the living (al-hayy) which is applied to: God,
human beings, and plants. [p.58] [Also] light which is
applied to that apprehended by sight and the opposite of
darkness and the intellect which guides to [clarity] in ob-
scure matters.
If one should say: What is an example of the metaphori-
cal (musta‘ar)? We say: An example is metaphorically apply-

40 the standard of knowledge

ing the body parts of an animate being to inanimate beings,
like their saying: capital (ra’s al-mal)(lit. the head of money);
start of the day (wajh al-nahar)(lit. the face of day); water
spring (‘ayn al-ma’)(lit. eye of water); small part of the sun
showing during sunrise or sunset (hajib al-shams)(lit. brow
of the sun); spur of the mountain (anf al-jabal)(lit. nose of
the mountain); rain clouds (riq al-muzn) (lit. saliva of the
clouds); forever (yad al-dahr)(lit. the hand of time); the side
of the street (janah al-tariq) (lit. upper arm of the street); the
middle of the sky (kibd (alt. kabid) al-sama’).
[Other examples include:]
• He is between the ears of [the people] of the land
and their eyes (i.e. unknown to where he has gone)
(lit. between the hearing and sight of the land).
• He was immoderate in his laughter (and in his
anger). (lit. Evil’s teeth manifested themselves.)
• The thickest part of the fight (lit. the mills of war
turned).
• The intersecting mountain roads were covered in
snow. (lit. The intersecting roads in the mountains
had grey hair).
• Grey hair is death’s address.
• Bribery is the need extending its head.
• Family is the mite of wealth. (lit. Family are like
the mite that consumes wealth.)63
• Loneliness is the grave of the alive.
• False talk is the arm of discord (fitna).
• The sun is a velvet garment permitted for the poor.

Among the metaphorical expressions in the Qur’an are:

63
Al-Jurjani, al-Muntakhab, p.409.

book one 41
 • And it is indeed in the Mother Book (43:4)
• …that you may warn the Mother of Cirties and
those around it…(6:92)
• And lower to them the wing of humility out of
mercy (17:24)
• and [by] the [morning] as it breathes (81:18)
• so God made it taste the garb of hunger and fear
(16:112)
• Every time they light the fires of war, God extin-
guishes them (5:64)
• and they will be surrounded by its pavilion.
(18:29)
• So neither the heaven nor the earth wept for them
(44:29)
• and my head is alight with grey hair (19:4)
• So your Lord poured on them a scourge of chas-
tisement. (89:13)
• And when Moses’s anger abated (7:154)
The likes of [these examples] are many. These metaphors
(isti‘arat) are of the appropriate type in which the quality
borrowed (musta‘ar)64 and the lender (musta‘ar minhu) are
in a relationship.
If it is asked: What is majaz? (metaphor; figurative
speech). We say that what is intended is the metaphor. The
meaning is that it exceeded its original establishment (qad
tajawwaza ‘an wad‘ihi).
[p.59] What is intended by it is what implies reality [but]
in actuality is the opposite of it like God the Exalted’s say-
ing: And ask the city…, since those who are in charge are
the city dwellers, not the city itself.
64
The thing or notion from which the metaphorical meaning is borrowed.

42 the standard of knowledge

 These are verbal matters (umur lafziyya). Whoever ne-
glects them and does not take control of them at the onset
of his investigations, his errors will be many and will not
know from where they came.

[p.60] The second aspect (fann) concerning the specialised

concepts of the existent meanings and their relationship to
each other
The difference between this [aspect] and the preceding is
that the preceding is the investigation of an expression in
as much as it indicates meanings.
This is an investigation of ‘meaning’ which is fixed in
itself (i.e. its self-definition) even if an expression indicates
it (wa in kana yudallu ‘alayhi bi-lafz), since it is not possible
to define (ta‘rif) the meaning without expressions (alfaz).
The goal of this aspect (fann) is clarified through the [fol-
lowing] divisions:
First division: The relationship of the existents to our
perceptual means (madarik).
Let him be aware that the investigation in enumerating
existents and their realities can be divided into:
1) Perceptible (mahsusa).
2) Known through deduction—its essence is not tou-
ched by any of the senses.
The sensibilia (mahsusat) are the perceptibles (mudrakat)
through the five senses, like colours, followed by knowledge
of shapes and measurements; that is through the sense of
sight. Likewise the sounds with the sense of hearing and
flavours with the sense of taste; the smells with the sense of
smell, and [feeling] coarseness and smoothness, softness and
hardness, cold and hot, moist and dry with the sense of
touch.

book one 43
 All of these matters and their concomitants (lawahiq)
are attended to by the senses, that is the perceptive faculty
(quwwa mudrika) attaches to it through the senses in its
essence.
[Another type is] that whose existence is known and
deduced through its traces and is not known by the five
senses: hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch which do not
attain it.
An example of this are these very senses; for the meaning
of any one of them is the perceptive faculty, which is not
sensed through any one of the [five] senses, nor does the
imagination reach it.
[p.61] Likewise, power, knowledge, and will, but also
fear, shyness (khajal), excessive love (‘ishq) and anger, and
the rest of these attributes,65 we know them with certitude
from others through a form of deduction (istidlal), without
our senses having anything to do with them.
Whoever writes something before us, we absolutely
know his ability and knowledge with the kind of writing and
his volition (irada) based on deduction through his action.66
Our certitude which we attain through the existence of
these meanings (ma‘ani) is like our certitude which we at-
tain through the movements of his perceived hand (yadihi
al-mahsusa) and the organisation of the blackness of the

65
Concerning the triad of power, knowledge, and desire which has equivalents
in Christian theology, see Charles Tieszen, Christian Identity amid Islam in Medi-
eval Spain (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 204 and. n.158.
66
Concerning the distinction between irada and mashi’a and how Mu‘tazilites
and Ash‘arites interpret both terms when referring to God’s Divine will (irada),
see for instance Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism,
pp. 127–128. Al-Ghazali refers to irada as: ‘the impulse of the heart toward that
which it deems to be in accordance with an objective.’ For Al-Ghazali’s use in
this and other works, see Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, p.126.

44 the standard of knowledge

letters on white, even if this is visible and those meanings
are not.
Rather the majority of existents are known from their
traces (athar) through deducing them, not through the
senses (la tuhass). Therefore, you ought not amplify (ta‘zim)
the senses (ahsas) and think that realised knowledge (al-‘ilm
al-muhaqqaq) is perception (ihsas) and imagination and
that which is not imagined is not real.
If you should request of yourself (nafs) to investigate the
nature of power and knowledge, you would find that the
imagination comports itself with theoretical inquiry (nazar)
through formation, coloring and measurement (bi-tashkil
wa talwin wa taqdir), and you know that the imagination’s
comportment is in error and that the true nature of the de-
duced ability (al-mustadall ‘alayha) in reality is above form,
colour, spatial occupation (tahayyuz), and amount (qadr).67
Therefore, you ought not to deny the intellect’s indica-
tion (dalalat al-‘aql) of matters which the imagination re-
fuses. We now bring to your attention (nunabbihuka) about
the origin of this lapse.
Ponder that the primary perceptions (al-mudrikat al-
uwal) that belong to the human at the inception of his in-
nate nature (fitra) are his senses (hawass) which were in
control of him.
Then the preponderance from all of it is the vision (ibsar)
which perceives the colours with the primary intention
(prima intentio)(al-qasd al-awwal)68 and the forms (ashkal)

67
This is a rebuttal of the Mu‘tazilites.
68
For an explanation of this concept and its corollary al-qasd al-thani, which
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) originated, see for instance Kwame Gyekye, ‘The Terms
‘Prima Intentio’ and ‘Secunda Intentio’ in Arabic Logic,’ Speculum 46:1 (1971):
32-38; The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity mention that which emanates

book one 45
by way of succession (istitba‘). Then the imagination acts
without restriction in the sensibilia (mahsusat) and most of
its actions are in the seen things (mubsarat).
Then it assembles the visible things (mar’iyyat) into dif-
ferent forms such that the individual elements are visible,
and the assembling (combination) (tarkib) is from the [im-
agination]. Thus, you can imagine a horse with a human
head and a bird with a horse’s head. However, it is not at
all possible for you to conceive of individuals except that
which you have witnessed even if you should desire to im-
agine a fruit that you never saw, you would not be able to
do so. Rather your objective would be to take something
that you saw and then change its colour, e.g. a black apple.
You [actually] saw the apple’s form, and [the colour] black
and connected them, or a large fruit like a watermelon. You
continue to assemble the individual things [p.62] you have
seen for the reason that imagination follows sight. How-
ever, it is able to combine and separate.69 The imagination
is active in combining and separating, thus controlling you
in that.
Whatever knowledge you attained through inference (is-
tidlal), the imagination sends forth, fixing its glance toward
it, seeking its reality with the reality [that it possesses]. [The
fact is,] that the imagination does not possess reality except
of colour and form and requests the form and colour. This
is what the sight attains of the existents, even if you should

through God’s actions is considered a primary intention: Rasa’il Ikhwan al-Safa’

wa Khillan al-Wafa’, 3:476-478; See also Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias
on the Governance (tadbirat) of the Sphere, pp. 53.1–59.3; Genequand, Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos, pp. 45, 66.
69
Concerning ‘combination’ and ‘separation,’ see Aristotle, Metaphysics, 6:4,
1027b, 19, 29–30; Ibn Sina, Psychology V.I, 204–208.

46 the standard of knowledge

contemplate the essence of smell through an imaginary con-
templation, the imagination will call up for the smell a
form, colour, attribute, and measurement, lying about it,
and occurring [according to the requirements] of its natural
disposition.
How wonderous that if you should contemplate a col-
oured shape [of something] that the imagination doe not
request from it its taste and smell, as they are the portion
of the [senses] of smell and taste. Should you contemplate
the essence of taste and smell, the imagination requests the
portion of [the sense of] sight which is colour and shape,
despite the fact that the imagination (yatasarraf fi) has
power over the perceptibles (mudrakat) of all the five sen-
ses. However, since its familiarity with the perceptible of
[the sense of] sight became more intense and numerous, its
requesting the portion of sight became more dominating
and reaching.
Should you produce before yourself your knowledge of
the Creator of the world and that He is existent not in any
area, the imagination will recall for it a colour and decree
for close proximity, remoteness, connectedness, and separ-
ation from the world, in addition to other [attributes] that
he saw in coloured forms, but does not request for it a taste
or smell.
There is no difference between taste and smell and col-
our and form—all are from the perceptibles (mudrakat) of
the senses. Should you know the division of the existents
into sensibilia (mahsusat) and intelligibles (ma‘qulat). Do
not occupy yourself with the sense (hiss) and the imagin-
ation (khayal). Turn away from the imagination immedi-
ately and depend upon the requirements of the intellect
(muqtada al-‘aql) concerning it.

book one 47
 [Then] the division of the existent appears to you as
sense perception (mahsus) and other [than it].

[p.63] The second sub-division concerning existents:

Consideration of the relationship of each [existent] to the
other under generality and specificity
Know that a meaning among the existent meanings and a
reality from the established realities—if its relationship is
to another one from among the meanings and realities, and
its knowledge which is annexed to it is either general
(a‘amm) or specific (akhass) or ‘in equal measures [general
and specific]’ or ‘general in one aspect and specific in
another.’
Should you relate (adafta) the human to the animal, you
would find the former more specific than the latter.
Should you relate (adafta) the animal to the human, you
would find the former more general than the latter.
Should you relate the animal to the ‘sensitive,’ you
would find the former equal to the latter, neither general
nor specific.
Should you relate ‘whiteness’ to the animal, you would
find it more general in one aspect—since [this property] in-
cludes gypsum, camphor and a group of existents.70
It is also more specific in another aspect [since] it pre-
cluded from including the crow, [the people of East Africa
called] zunuj, and a grouping of animals.
Therefore, the collection of these realities are analogous
in this regard (tunasibuha bi-hadha al-i‘tibar) and do not
exceed the four [aforementioned] aspects.

70
See for instance, Ibn Sina, Danesh-nameh (Zabeeh trans.), p. 16, 17, 18, 19,
21, 26; Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 8, 10, 12–13, 16, 29, 121.

48 the standard of knowledge

 Hold that which we have not mentioned. analogus to
that we have mentioned.

[p.64] The third sub-division concerning the existents by

considering entification (ta‘ayyun) and non-entification
Know that the existents can be divided into ‘specific indi-
vidual existents (mawjudat shakhsiyya mu‘ayyana),’ which
are called ‘individual essences (a‘yan)’ and ‘particulars (ju-
z’iyyat)’ and into ‘non-individual things (umur ghayr
muta‘ayyina)’ which are called ‘universals (kulliyyat)’ and
‘generalities (al-umur al-‘amma).’
As for the ‘individual essences,’ they are things that are
realised through the senses like Zayd, Amr, this horse, this
tree, this sky, this planet, and the like.
Likewise, ‘this whiteness’ and ‘this ability’—entifica-
tion occurs with all the accidents (a‘rad) and substances
(jawahir).
Then these individuals like Zayd, this horse, this tree,
and this whiteness, do not participate in their individual es-
sences since the essence of this individual is not like the es-
sence of another except there are some similarities like each
of them resembling each other in corporeity (fi’l-jismiyya)
and like the resemblance of the horse and the person, not
including the tree, in animality.
Whatever things do not resemble each other are called
‘universals (kulliyyat)’ and ‘common things (al-umur al-
‘amma).’
It is also possible for Zayd and ‘Amr to resemble one
another after resembling one another in corporeality, ani-
mality, and humanity, in height and whiteness (i.e. skin col-
our). Height and skin colour in which there is resemblance
is a ‘common thing’ (amr ‘amm), encompassing both of

book one 49
them completely, not that the skin colour of this one is the
skin colour of that one and the height of this one is the
height of that one exactly, but in a sense (ma‘na) to which
we will alert when we investigate the universal meaning (al-
ma‘na al-kulli) and its certainty (thubut) in the intellect
(‘aql)—It is the most precise of the intelligibles that are
attained.

The fourth sub-division concerning the relationship of some

meanings to others
Know that you say:
This person is white.
This person is an animal.
This person, a female, gave birth to him.
Therefore, you have imposed upon him [the following]:
Whiteness, animality and birth and made him de-
scribed by these three attributes.

[p.65] The relationship of these to him is dissimilar. It is

possible to conceive of ‘whiteness’ as nullified from the per-
son and for him to remain a person. Its presence is not a
condition for his humanity. Let us call this a ‘separable ac-
cident (‘arad mufariq).’71
As for animality, it is necessary for the person. If you do
not understand the animal and abstained from understand-

71
Poryphyry, Isag. 5:1225-13.3; Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Top. 50.31-51.5;
Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, I4; Cornelia Schöck, ‘Jahm b. Safwan (d. 128/745-
6) and the ‘Jahmiyya’ and Dirar b. ‘Amr (d. 200/815),’ in The Oxford Handbook
of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016, pp. 70, 71, 72.

50 the standard of knowledge

ing it, you will not understand the person. Rather however
much you understand the person, you have understood a
special animal. The animality is a part of your understand-
ing by necessity.
[The person] is given another name (title) for distinguish-
ing [him]: ‘essentially constitutive’ (al-dhati al muqaw-
wim).72 As for his being born of a female and his being of a
certain colour for instance, his relationship to [them] is not
the same as the ‘animality’ relationship, since it is possible
for the meaning of the person to occur in the intellect with
its definition and reality, ignoring [the fact] that he was born
or with the erroneous belief that he is not born. Rather, it is
a condition to refrain [p.66] from believing that he is not an
animal [in order to understand the person].
As for distinguishing him from ‘whiteness,’ whiteness is
separable from [him], but his state of being born is insep-
arable [from him].
Likewise his state of being of a particular colour, is in-
separable in substance (bi’l-jumla) even if his being white
is separated from him especially.
The state of possessing a particular skin colour (muta-
lawwin) is not part of the quiddity of a person in the same
way as animality is.
Let us specify the label of ‘concomitant (als. neces-
sary)(lazim)’ for this division. The essentially constitutive
(al-dhati al-muqawwim) if it should also be concomitant.
Yet, it has constitutive ability. Therefore, the name (desig-
nation) of ‘concomitant’ should be specified in this section.
You benefited from this verification that each meaning
has a relationship to something. It is either essential to it
72
i.e. necessary for it to be what it is. See Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.),
p.9.

book one 51
(dhatiyyan lahu), constitutive of its essence (muqawwim li-
dhatihi), or non-constitutive of its essence but ‘concomitant
inseparable,’ or non-essential, non-concomitant but acci-
dental (‘aradiyyan).
Perhaps you say: The difference between the separable
accidental (‘aradi mufariq) and the essential is clear. How-
ever, the difference between the essentially constitutive (al-
dhati al-muqawwim) and the concomitant (lazim) that is
not constitutive, is perhaps ambiguous (yushkil).
Do you have a standard (mi‘yar) to return to?
We say: The speculative theologians (mutakallimun)
called the concomitants (lawazim) ‘the dependents (alt. de-
rivatives) of the essence (tawabi‘ al-dhat). Perhaps they
called them: ‘the dependents (alt. derivatives) of temporal
origination (huduth)’73
Perhaps they called them: ‘the followers of the actual
state’ such that from among them the Mu‘tazilites alleged
that the power of the Powerful has no relationship to it, but
rather it follows temporal origination (huduth). Perhaps
they compared that to the space-location (tahayyuz) of the
substance (jawhar). We will not go into this. [Rather] our
goal is to manifest a standard (mi‘yar) to perceived the dif-
ference between ‘the essential (dhati)’ and the ‘concomitant
(lazim).’ There are two standards:
First [standard]: Everything that is concomitant (yulzam)
and is not removed from existence, even if it be removed
through imagination (bi’l-wahm) and estimation (bi’l-
taqdir), and the thing remained understood with it, is con-
comitant (fa-huwa lazim).
We understood the state of the person as a ‘person’ and
the state of the ‘body’ as a ‘body’ even if we should remove
73
Janssens, p. 45.

52 the standard of knowledge

in our imagination their state of being created, for example,
and their being created is concomitant to them.
If we should remove in our imagination the person’s
being an animal, we would not be able to understand the
person. Necessary to understanding the person is not ne-
gating their animality. It is not necessary (laysa min daru-
ratihi) for understanding him for the state of createdness to
be negated. Therefore, whatever is not removed from exist-
ence and the imagination together, is essential (dhati).74
[p.67] Whatever is removed from existence and the im-
agination is accidental (‘aradi).
What accepts removing in the imagination without
[being removable from] existence is a non-essential con-
comitant (lazim ghayr dhati), except that this standard
which is greatly beneficial in the majority of places (ma-
wadi‘) is not regular (muttarad) in all [places]. Among the
concomitants is that which is manifest in concomitance
(zahir al-luzum) to something, such that it is unable to re-
move it in the imagination also.
The person’s [possessing a skin] colour is visibly con-
comitant. The person is not able to remove it in the imagin-
ation, since colour is a non-essential concomitant (lazim la
dhati).
Therefore, if we should define the person, colour (talaw-
wun) is not included in him, despite the fact that the defi-
nition is not devoid of all the constitutive essences (dhatiy-
yat muqawwima) as is forthcoming in the chapter on syl-
logistic terms (hudud). Likewise, the being of every number

74
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp.6–7: ‘It is insufficient in defining the
essential (dhati) to say that its meaning is inseparable (la yufariq) [from its sub-
stance]. Much of what is not essential, is inseparable (la yufariq)….’ Translation
is mine.

book one 53
is equivalent to another or disproportionate or it is con-
comitant non-essential.
Perhaps the person is unable to remove it in the imagin-
ation. Indeed, among the concomitants is what can be re-
moved like the [sum of the three] angles of a triangle [being
always] equivalent to two right angles the triangle [being]
of two right angles.75 It is concomitant and does not know
its concomitance to the triangle without a median, rather
with a median. This is not regular. We return it to the
second standard when there is an inability with the first; we
say:
If you should recall every entitative determinant (ma‘na)
in your mind, along with the thing you doubted was con-
comitant to it, or essential, except that you will have under-
stood that entitative determinant (ma‘na) first, like ‘animal
(hayawan)’ and ‘person (insan).’
If you should understand what a person is and what an
animal is, you will not understand the person except if you
first understood that he is an animal.
Know that he is essential (dhati). If you are able to
understand the thing’s essence without understanding the
entitative determinant (ma‘na) or if you are able to ignore
the entitative determinant through estimation (bi’l-taqdir);
[p.68] know that it is non-essential (ghayr dhati). Then
either his existence is removed either quickly like the per-
son’s standing and sitting or slowly, like his being a young
person.
Then know that it is separable accidental (‘aradi mufa-
riq). Then if it does not separate from it absolutely (aslan)
like the angles of the triangle being equal to the two right
angles, [then] it is concomitant.
75
See Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p.100.

54 the standard of knowledge

 How many a concomitant for the person! like the fol-
lowing: ‘blue-eyed’ or ‘black complexion’ in the Zinji. This
is inseparable in existence from the black person [of the
Zinj]. It is in addition to that person and is not remote that it
be called ‘concomitant,’ even if its concomitance is through
coincidence (bi’l-ittifaq), but not necessarily in genus, as it is
possible for there to exist a person who is not thus.
Were you able to do a trick in removing the blueness
from the eye or the blackness from the complexion, this
person would remain a person.
Were you able to do a trick to extract the triangles’
angles from being equivalent to the two right angles, the
triangle would not subsist and its existence would be ne-
gated. Then perceive this fine detail in the difference be-
tween the ‘necessary concomitant (al-lazim al-daruri)’ and
the ‘existential concomitant (al-lazim al-wujudi).’

The fifth sub-division concerning the essential in itself and

the accidental in itself
When the constituent was specified by the name ‘essential
(dhati)’ in the parlance (istilah) of the theoreticians (nuz-
zar), that which is opposite to it began to be called ‘acci-
dental (‘aradiyya)’ whether separable or concomitant.
Then it is said: ‘concomitant accidental (‘aradi lazim)’
and ‘accidental separable (‘aradi mufariq).’
[p.69] The accidental: With this entitative determinant,
that it is not constitutive, it is divided, in addition to what
is accidental to it, into the following:
1) Common to it and other things (ma ya’um muhu)
and other things.
2) What is specific to it and is not [applicable] to

book one 55
 something else. It is called proprium (khassa)’
whether or not it is concomitant and whether or
not what is related to it is a different species (naw‘
akhar), whether it encompassed all of that genus
or existed for part of it like ‘walking’ and eating.
If it is annexed to the animal it is a proprium
(khassa) since it does not exist for non-animals,
even if it should not always exist for the animal.
Should you annex it to the ‘person,’ it is a com-
mon accident (‘arad ‘amm). Likewise, neighing to
the horse and laughing to the person are among
the specific (khawass) [accidents].

Whatever is not specific to what it is related, but is cre-

ated for it and another is called a ‘common accident (‘arad
‘amm).’
Do not think that what we desire with the ‘accident’ is
what we want with the accident opposite the substance
(jawhar)(alladhi yuqabil al-jawhar).
This accident might be a substance (jawhar) like the
whiteness of the person. The meaning of substance here is
a substance possessing whiteness (jawhar dhu bayad).
What is denoted by the expression ‘substance (jawhar)’
is not like ‘whiteness (bayad).’ It is an accident. [Therefore,]
do not ignore this fine detail and be in error.
The accidental (‘aradi) is again subdivided into what are
known as ‘essential accidents (a‘rad dhatiyya) and into that
which cannot be called essential (ma la yusamma dhatiyya).

• That brought into existence is in motion (yataharrak).

• The body is in motion.
• The person is in motion.

56 the standard of knowledge

But we say the existent is not in motion due to it being in
existence, but for an entitative determinant (ma‘na) that is
more specific than it which is corporeity (jismiyya).
The person is not overwhelmed by motion because he is
a person, but rather because of an entitative determinant
more general than him (a‘amm minhu), namely his being a
corporeal body.
Therefore, motion is from among the accidents that are
essential to the body. That is, it is concomitant (talhaquhu)
with the body and overwhelms it (ta‘tarihi) in so far as it is
a body and not for an entitative determinant more general
or specific than it, but rather because of its essence.
[p.70] [Both the words] health (sihha) and illness
(saqam) describe the animal. It is among the essential acci-
dents (a‘rad dhatiyya) of the animal since it does not
cling to it because of an entitative determinant more general
than it.
Since it does not overwhelm it insofar as it is an existent
or corporeal body nor for something more specific than it
because it is not overwhelmed because it is a horse, ox, or
person, but rather because of what is more general than it;
that is his being an animal.
Likewise, double and single for numerals. Whatever
takes this course is called ‘essential accidents (a‘rad dha-
tiyya).’
You ought not to confuse the ‘essential’ in the first enti-
tative determinant which is the ‘constitutive (muqawwim)’
with the second entitative determinant which is non-con-
stitutive (ghayr muqawwim). These [then] are the divisions
of the accidental.
As for the constitutive essential (al-dhati al-muqawwim),
it is divided into:

book one 57
 1) That for which there is nothing more general than
it and is internal to the quiddity (al-dakhil fi’l-ma-
hiyya).76 It is possible to mention it in response to
the question ‘What is it?’77 and is called ‘genus
(jins).’
2) That for which there is more general (a‘amm) than
it without having a more specific [category[ than
it. It is possible to mention it in response to the
question: ‘What is it?’ It is called ‘species (naw‘).’
3) That which is mentioned in response to the ques-
tion ‘Which thing is it? (ayy shay’ huwa)’ It is
called ‘differentia (fasl).’78
Therefore, ‘the essential (dhati)’ is divided into: genus,
species, and differentia.
The accidental (‘aradi) is divided into:
The proprium (i.e. property) (al-khassa)79 and ‘the com-
mon accident (al-‘arad al-‘amm) in the aforementioned divi-
sions. Therefore, the total number is five.
Therefore, the universals in this regard (bi-hadha al-
i‘tibar) are five. The logicians call them ‘the five simple ex-
pressions (al-khamsa al-mufrada).’80
76
See Porphyry, Isagoge 12-19.90; Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:708.
77
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 8; Ibn Sina, Remarks and Admoni-
tions, trans. Shams Inati. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984,
pp.17-18, 58–66, 69, 70.
78
Concerning ‘Ayy shay’ huwa,’ see Shukri Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the
Arabic Language in Al-Farabi, pp. 65-66; Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:540,
596-601; Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp.9–10; Ibn Sina, Remarks and
Admonitions (trans. Inati), pp. 66, 200.
79
Concerning ‘al-khassa’, see Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:692:, e.g. ‘Any
[predicate] which is predicated of a species in a qualified way, without at all being
predicated of another species, is also called a “property” of that species.’
80
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p.10 calls them ‘al-alfaz al-khamsa’
equivalent to Porphyry’s quinque voces, See Shukri Abed, Aristotelian Logic, pp.
2, 10, 43.

58 the standard of knowledge

 The essential is divided into three parts which contain
situations of confusion (mawadi‘ ishtibah).We shall pro-
duce them at the exposition of the questions.
Should one say: Should the more general of the essentials
(dhatiyyat) be called ‘genus (jins)’ and the more specific (ak-
hass) be called ‘species (naw‘), what is the name of the one
between the more specific and the more general like ‘animal
hayawan)’ which is between the body (jism) (which is more
general than the ‘animal’) and between the person which is
more specific than the animal?
We say: This, in addition to what is higher [ranking], is
called ‘species (naw‘)’ and with respect to what is beneath
it, is called ‘genus (jins).’ If you should say: ‘species’ for the
intermediate (mutawassit), and the infima species which is
the person (insan), is this name univocal (bi’l-tawatu’) or
equivocal (bi-ishtirak al-ism)?
Know that it is equivocal; the person is called ‘species’
in the sense that it is not possible to [hierarchically] divide
him after that except by individual and number, like Zayd
and ‘Amr, or the accidental states (al-ahwal al-‘aradiyya)
like ‘tall,’ ‘short,’ etc.
As for the animal, it is called a ‘species (naw‘)’ in another
sense; that is there exists an essential more general than it.
The person is called ‘species (naw‘)’ in the sense no essential
exists that is more specific than he—all that I have produced
(awradtuhu) from that which is specific is accidental, not
essential (‘aradi dhati). Both dissimilar entitative deter-
minants (ma‘nayayn mutabayinayn).
Should one say: ‘The existent (mawjud)’ and the ‘thing
(shay’)’ are more general than ‘body (jism)’ an ‘animal
(hayawan),’ do [the logicians] call it a ‘genus (jins)’?
We say: There is no restriction (la hijr) in the names and

book one 59
concepts (istilahat) after understanding their entitative de-
terminants. The priority concerning the concepts is to
examine the custom of the speculative theologians (nuzzar)
who preceded. They specified (khassasu) the genus (jins)
with the meaning of [p.72] ‘internal to quiddity’ (dakhil fi’l-
mahiyya) [with which it] is permissible to answer the ques-
tioner’s question concerning quiddity and is mentioned in
response to the question: ‘What is it?’
If the thing (shay’) is indicated and it is asked: ‘What is
it?’ it is not fitting (lam yuhsin) to say that it is an existent
or a thing, but rather existence is like the accidental an-
nexed to the intelligible quiddity (al-mahiyya al-ma‘qula),
since it is permissible for the quiddity of a thing to occur in
the intellect, along with doubt about whether or not that
quiddity exists in the outer world (fi’l-a‘yan).
The quiddity of a triangle which is a form constituted of
three sides and it is possible for this quiddity to occur in
ourselves [while] the triangle is non-existent.
Should the existence be internal to quiddity, constitutive
of the reality of the essence, an understanding of the triangle
would not be conceived and [its] quiddity would not be ac-
quired in the intellect along with its non-existent (‘adam).
The constituents of the essence are internal to the essence
in the intellect.As also it is inconceivable for the form (sura)
of the person alone to [appear] in the intellect except if he
is a present animal. [Likewise,] the quiddity of the triangle
except if it is a present shape. Likewise, an image of some-
thing ought not be acquired by itself in the mind except its
being is existent, present in the mind, if the existence is con-
stitutive of the essence, like ‘animal-ness’ to the person, or
‘shape-ness (shakliyya)’ to the triangle; the matter is not
thus.

60 the standard of knowledge

 In general, the thing’s existence is either in the outer
world (fi’l-a‘yan) which calls forth all the constitutive es-
sentials or in the minds which is the similitude (mithal) of
the outer world in full concordance with it (mutabiq lahu)
and is the entitative determinant of knowledge, since there
is no entitative determinant for knowledge with the ‘thing’
except by fixing an image of the thing, its reality and its
similitude in the self as the image of a thing is fixed in the
mirror, for example, except in the mirror only the simili-
tudes of the sensibilia are fixed and the self is a mirror in
which the similitudes of the intelligibles (ma‘qulat) are
fixed. [The entitative determinant] (ma‘na) necessitates the
presence of all the constitutive essences again. Should one
say: I have come to know the difference between the genus
and that which is the general of the generality of the genus
(‘amm ‘umum al-jins) which is not the genus [itself]. So
with what [means] does one know the difference between
differentia (fasl) and species (naw‘)?
We say: The differentia are essential and are not men-
tioned in the reply to ‘What is it?’ but rather are mentioned
in the reply to: ‘Which one is it? (ayy shay’ huwa)’81
For example: ‘Wine (khamr)’ is indicated. It is said:
‘What is it?’ In reply it is mentioned: ‘a drink (sharab).’ It
is not proper [p.73] after that to say: ‘What is it?’ but
rather: ‘What kind of drink is it?’ Then it is said: ‘intoxi-
cating (muskir)’ which is a differentia (fasl) which separates
it from others and which the jurists call ‘caution (ihtiraz)’82
except that caution might be in the ‘essential’ or in the ‘non-

81
See above p. 37 n.72.
82
In different legal contexts it can mean protection from something or quaran-
tine. Ihtiraz also has the meaning of caution.

book one 61
essential.’ Thus, the name differentia (fasl) was specified
upon non-delimitation of ‘essential (dhati).’
Should it be said: ‘What thing is it?’ to which the reply
is: ‘Wine which has froth (lit. cast into the froth or scum).
Perhaps it is differentiated from other [things] and with it
caution occurred. However, that is a non-essential differ-
entia. As for ‘intoxicating (muskir),’ it is a differentia es-
sential to the drink as ‘speaking’ is to the animal.
Concerning [both], genus and differentia express the
reality itself in detail like your saying: ‘an intoxicating
drink’ and a ‘speaking animal.’
The species (naw‘) is an expression of it (i.e. the reality)
in general like saying: person, horse, camel, whether the
relative species (al-naw‘ al-idafi)83 or the actual species (al-
naw‘ al-haqiqi).
The differentia (fasl) is an expression of something
possessing reality (dhi haqiqa) like your saying speaking
(natiq), sensitive (hassas), intoxicating (muskir).
Anything that possesses speech, sensation or inebriation,
it is as if the thing for which the attribute appeared with
(dhu) (i.e., possessor) and what followed is not mentioned
in the differentiation: speaking, sensitive, inebriated. Fur-
ther explanation of this is forthcoming in the Book of Defi-
nitions84 which leads to conception of the realities of things
(tasawwur haqa’iq al-ashya’), since the definition is not
complete except by mentioning the genus and differentia.

83
Ibn Sina, Remarks and Admonitions (Inati trans.), p. 187 n. 5, 200 n. 22.
84
See below, p. 198.

62 the standard of knowledge

Fifth subdivision concerning the kinds of realities mentio-
ned in the reply of the questioner about quiddity
Know that the speech of whoever asks about the thing:
‘What is it?’ is a request about something’s quiddity. Who-
ever knows the quiddity and mentions it, he has replied.
Quiddity is realised with the collection of the constituent
essentials of the thing.
The answerer ought to mention all the constituent es-
sentials (dhatiyyat) of the thing so that he can answer [pro-
perly]; that is by mentioning the thing’s definition (hadd).
Should he leave out some of the essentials (dhatiyyat),
his answer would be incomplete.
[p.74] Should [the answerer] indicate ‘wine’ and say:
‘What is it?’ your [reply] ‘a drink’ is not in full concordance
(laysa bi-jawab mutabiq) since you have failed (akhlalta)[to
provide] some of the essentials and brought what is more
general (a‘amm), but rather you ought to mention the ‘in-
toxication (muskir).’ Should he indicate ‘a person’ and say:
‘What is it?’, we say: He is a person. Should he say: ‘What
is a person?’ Your answer would be a mortal, rational, liv-
ing being which is his complete definition.85
What is intended is that you must mention what en-
compasses it and other than it and what pertains specifically
to it since a thing is [such] with combining that, and with
it its essence is conceptualised (tatahassal dhatuhu).
Should this origin be fixed, that which is mentioned in
the answer to [the question] ‘What is it?’ is divided into
three parts:
First, what is with absolute haecceity (al-khususiyya al-
mutlaqa). That is by mentioning the definition (hadd) so

85
See above, p. 22 n. 50.

book one 63
that you know the mentioned thing’s quiddity (mahiyyat
al-shay’ al-madhkur), just as he said to you ‘What is wine?’
and you say: An intoxicating drink expressed from grapes.
This [description] is specific to wine and fully accords with
it (yutabiquhu) and is equivalent to it and is not more gen-
eral than it nor more specific, but rather both [elements] are
[harmoniously] reflected on each other (yan‘akisu kull
wahid minhuma ‘ala al-akhar). With this [state of] equilib-
rium it combines all the constituent essentials from the
genus and the differentia. Thus is the relationship of every
definition of a thing to its name.
Second, what is absolute equivocality? (al-sharika al-
mutlaqa) like if you are asked about a group which contains
a horse, a person, and an ox: ‘What is it?’ (i.e. absolute
equivocality). Upon [saying] that, the best that you can say
is: ‘an animal.’
As for what is more general that that, it is the body
(jism) which is not complete equivocal quiddity between
them, but rather it is a part of quiddity for the body is part
of the animal’s quiddity, since the animal is a body which
possesses a soul, sensitive and moving. This is its definition.
The person, the horse, and the like are a more specific
indication (dalala) which includes the group. He made the
group one thing (shay’ wahid) and specified an equivocal
quiddity for it; i.e. the animal.
Third, what is sound to mention concerning haecceity
(khususiyya)(i.e the particular characteristic) and equivo-
cality together. If you are asked about a group: Zayd, ‘Amr,
and Khalid: ‘What are they (ma hum)?’ what is sound for
you to reply is that they are people (unas).
Likewise, if Zayd alone was inquired about: ‘What is
he?’—it is not said ‘Who is he?—the sound reply would be

64 the standard of knowledge

that he is a person because that which differentiates Zayd
is his being a person from his being tall [p.75] and white,
son of so-and-so or his being a man or a woman or of
sound body or infirm or a scribe or a scholar or an ignorant
person—all of that is accidents (a‘rad) and necessary con-
comitants (lawazim) which adhered to him because of
matters connected with him at the start of his [being] cre-
ated or which befell him after growing up. It is not incon-
ceivable for us to estimate (nuqaddir) their opposites, but
rather remove them from him and he will be none other
than the person.
The relationship of ‘animality’ to ‘humanity’ and vice
versa is not thus, since it is impossible to say: A cause
(sabab) which attached itself to [Zayd] in his mother’s
womb made him a person; if it did not he would have been
a horse or another animal. He is precisely that animal (i.e.
man).
If he is not a person, then originally, he is not an animal,
neither precisely that nor something else.
Therefore, the person is the final essential (al-dhati al-
akhir).86 If one should say, why is it that it is not permissible
to say in the second division (al-qism al-thani) sensitive and
moving voluntarily (mutaharrik bi’l-irada) instead of ‘ani-
mal’ which is an essential equal to the animal?
We say: That does not fulfil the required condition since
the understanding from the sensitive (hassas) and the mov-
ing (mutaharrik) is by way of full concordance (‘ala sabil
al-mutabaqa). It is simply a thing which has the power of
sensation or motion, like the understanding of [the colour]
white is something that [possesses] whiteness.

86
Also species of species (naw‘ al-anwa‘).

book one 65
 Then what is that thing and what is the reality of its es-
sence? It is not a part of the understanding of these ex-
pressions except by way of concomitance (iltizam) so that
[it] is not known from the expression but by a rational way
which indicates that this is not conceived except for a body
which possesses a soul.
If it is asked about the body: ‘What is it?’ And you say:
White. You did not answer [correctly]; and if we were to
learn from another perspective, that whiteness does not
reside except for in a body. But rather we say: the indication
of whiteness to the body is by way of concomitance (ilti-
zam).
We have presented that which considered in the indica-
tion of expressions is the way of full concordance (muta-
baqa) and conception (tadammun). For that [reason] it is
not permissible to reply to the quiddity with remote par-
ticular properties (al-khawass al-ba‘ida) even if it were to
indicate by way of concomitance it is not proper (la yuhsin)
to say in response to whoever asks about the person’s quid-
dity, that he is the ‘one laughing’ and in reply to whoever
asks about the quiddity of the triangle that its angles equal
two right angles even if it should indicate by way of con-
comitance (iltizam).
[p.76] Should one say: You have alleged that all of the
parts of quiddity are present hƒowever it appeared in the
mind; but this is not the case. Should we know the temporal
creation (hadith), we inevitably know one thing along with
its parts being many, since its entitative determinant
(ma‘na) is ‘existence after non-existence (wujud ba‘da al-
‘adam)’ and since it contains knowledge of existence and
the negation of that existence, and of the being of non-
existence previously and the being of existence posteriorly,

66 the standard of knowledge

and it contains knowledge of anteriority and posteriority
(al-taqaddum wa-al-ta’akhkhur) and knowledge of time,
inevitably.
There is no doubt about all these intelligibles (ma‘lumat)
of their being present in the mind until the parts of the defi-
nition (hadd) of temporal creation (hadith) are complete.
These details do not occur to whoever reflects on the
temporal creation who is aware of it (i.e. the temporal
creation).
The answer is that there is no doubt that all the essential
parts (dhatiyyat) that constitute quiddity (al-muqawwima
lil-mahiyya) must enter with quiddity at conception (tasaw-
wur), but may not occur in the mind in detail. Many details
do not come to mind in detail, but if they should occur, they
become manifest and the knower knows that they occurred.
If the knower of the temporal creation, [even] if he does have
knowledge of these parts, and it is presumed that (quddira
annahu) he only knows of that which temporally comes to
be (hadith), then it is said to him: Did you know: the exis-
tent, the non-existent, anteriority and posteriority? Should
he say: ‘I did not know,’ he would be lying about it.
Whoever knows the person, and it is said to him: ‘Did
you know an animal, or a body, or a sensitive, or something
possessing height, width and depth—which is the definition
of the body (jism)?’ and he says: ‘I did not know it,’ he
would be lying.
We understand from this that these entitative deter-
minants (ma‘ani) are known and present in the mind except
that they are not detailed unless they should be invoked that
way. If they should be detailed, it is known that the enti-
tative determinants (ma‘ani) were known from before.
Understand this: this is detailed in itself. We have alerted

book one 67
to two influencers to doubt in this ample space in the form
of question and answer.
Addendum (takmilah) to this concise compilation with
descriptions (rusum) of the five concepts (al-mufradat al-
khams)87 and their order.
The descriptions that finction like definitions (al-jariya
majra al-hudud):
Genus (jins): It is described as a universal (kulli) which
predicates (lit. carries) to [multiple] things with different es-
sences and realities in answer [to the question]: ‘What is it?’
Differentia (fasl): It is described as a universal (kulli)
which predicates [essences and realities] to the thing in
answer [to the question]: ‘What is this thing in its substance
(jawhar)?’
Species (naw‘): has one of two meanings:
First, it is described as a universal which predicates [es-
sences and realities] on things that do not differ except in
number concerning the answer [to the question]: ‘What is
it?’
Second, it is described as a universal which predicates
the genus (jins) on itself and other things [by way of] a pri-
mary essential predication (hamlan dhatiyyan awwaliyyan).
The proprium (khassa): It is described as a universal
(kulliyya) which predicates on what is beneath a single real-
ity (haqiqa wahida) only, a non-essential predication (haml
ghayr dhati).
The common accident (‘arad ‘amm): It is described as a
universal which is applied to different realities (haqa’iq
mukhtalifa).
Then know that these essentials (dhatiyyat) which are
87
Janssens, p. 46 and n. 25; Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 10-12;
Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:685.

68 the standard of knowledge

genera and species (anwa‘) are organised from [lowest] to
[highest] until you reach the highest genus (jins al-ajnas).
It is the highest genus above which there is no higher genus
and [then] are organised from [highest] to [lowest] until you
reach the least genus which if you descend beneath it, it
stops at individuals and accidents.
[p.78]88 There is no doubt of the high genus descending
and stopping at the least species since it does not exceed
the end.
There is no doubt of the elevation of the least species
until it reaches a high genus which cannot be exceeded ex-
cept through mention of the accidents and necessary con-
comitants (lawazim).
As for the essentials, they are inevitably finite. The final
species are many.
The high genera which are the highest genera of which
the logicians allege are ten:89 One: substance (jawhar). Nine
accidents (a‘rad) which are: quantity (kam), quality (kayf),
relative/predicable (mudaf), place (ayn), time (mata), posi-
tion (wad‘), having (wa lahu), react/acting upon (wa an yaf
‘al) and being affected (yanfa‘il).
The substance (jawhar) is like we say: person (insan),
animal (hayawan), and body (jism).

88
The editor of the Arabic edition of the Mi‘yar has produced this chart based
on Porphyry’s division of the genera and species which we have reproduced in
translation:
Substance (jawhar) High substance, highest genera
Body (jism) Remote genus, high species
Live body (jism hayy) Intermediate genus, intermediate species
Animal (hayawan) Lower genus, near intermediate species
Person (insan) Lower species, infina species
Individual (fard) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc.
89
Janssens, p. 46 and n. 25.

book one 69
 Quantity: Like our saying: a cubit [.68m] or 3 cubits
[2.04m]
Quality: Like our saying: white and black.
Relative/predicable: Like our saying: double, half, son,
father.
Place: Like our saying: In the market place; at home.
Time: Like our saying: At such and such time (zaman)90
and such-and-such discrete moment (waqt).
Position: Like our saying: leaning, sitting.
React/acting upon: Like our saying: to burn and to cut.
Being affected: Like our saying: being burned and being
cut.
Having: Like our saying: wearing sandals (ni‘al), wear-
ing a shawl (mutatallis), and armed with a weapon (muta-
sallih).

These ten [essentials, categories] could be embodied in a

single individual, in a single context, as one says:
The jurisprudent so-and-so, the tall, the brown, son of
so-and-so, sitting in his house in the year such-and-such, is
teaching and is studying while wearing a shawl.
[p.80] These are then the genera of the existents. The
expressions which indicate them are by means of the ves-
tiges in the soul; I mean it is fixing their images in the
soul which is knowing them (wa hiya al-‘ilm biha). Nothing
is known except if it is part of these subdivisions nor is
there a single expression which is not internal to one of
these subdivisions.

90
For a brief overview of the concept of time, See Nader El-Bizri, ‘Time, Con-
cepts of,’ in Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia, ed. J.W. Meri, 2
vols., reissue with corrections and additions (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2017),
p.811.

70 the standard of knowledge

 As for the more general (a‘amm) from [among] all [these
existents], it is the existent (mawjud) and we mentioned
that it is not a genus and it is divided in the first division
into: Substance (jawhar) and accident (‘arad).
The accident is divided into these nine divisions and the
total is ten. There is much exposition (tafsir) and verifi-
cation (tahqiq) which will be brought to you in the Book
concerning the Divisions and Principles of Existence91
which is an investigation of the division of the existents
(mawjudat). God knows best.

[p.81] The Third Aspect (fann) concerning composing the

simple entitative determinants (ma‘ani)
Know that if the entitative determinants (ma‘ani) are
composed, there would occur from them [the following]
types:
First type: inquiring (istifham), appealing (iltimas), wish-
ing (tamanni), imploring (tarajji), amazement (ta‘ajjub),
and informing (khabar).
Our objective from all of that is the final type (al-sinf al-
akhir) which is the report (khabar) since we seek the de-
monstrative proofs (barahin) that guide to the sciences
(‘ulum). It is a kind of syllogism constituted from premises
(muqaddimat) in which each premise (muqaddima) from it
is a single report. It is called a proposition (qadiyya).
The report is what is said to its sayer: He is veracious or
untruthful regarding it in essence, not in accident. With it
avoiding all the other sub-divisions occurs, he who seeks
understanding for something that he knows could be told:
‘Do not lie (la takdhib).’ He leads him to confusion with
the subject matter.
91
See below, p. 247.

book one 71
 Likewise, whoever says: O Zayd, and intends somebody
else, since he believes Zayd is in the house if it said to him:
‘Do not lie,’ lying is not in the calling but rather in the re-
port which was implicitly subsumed to the ‘calling.’ There-
fore, our reflection on this aspect (fann) will be on the
proposition and its demonstrative proof by mentioning its
modalities (ahkam) and its sub-divisions.

The first sub-division: The proposition

The proposition by taking into consideration its essence can
be divided into two singular parts:
[p.82] The first is the report (khabar)92 and the other is
the subject of the report (mukhbar ‘anhu), like saying:
‘Zayd is standing.’ Zayd is the subject of the report and
standing is the report (predicate).
Also like saying: ‘The world is temporally created (ha-
dith).’ ‘The world’ is the subject and ‘temporally created’ is
the predicate.
The custom of the logicians to the call the predicate
(khabar) ‘carried, transmitted (mahmul)’ and the subject
‘that which is informed about (mukhbar ‘anhu).’
Let us use their terminology, for there are no restrictions
in the use of expressions [that render the same meaning].
Then if we say:
The form (shakl) is predicated on the triangle.
Every triangle is a form.
By saying this we do not mean by it that the reality
of the triangle is that of the form, but rather its meaning is:
The thing called ‘triangle’, is essentially called a ‘form.’
92
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 14, 161 n. clv.

72 the standard of knowledge

Regardless of whether the reality of that thing is a triangle
or a form or a third matter, and if we should indicate a per-
son, and say: This white person is tall, the reality of what
is indicated is his being a person, not this subject which is
‘white’ and not this predicate which is ‘tall.’
Should we say: This person is ‘white,’ the subject is the
reality. Thus, we do not mean the predicate except the ex-
tent which we mentioned unconditionally.
Let us understand its reality. This is the least by which
the categorical proposition (qadiyya hamliyya) is divided.
The propositions, by taking into consideration the per-
spectives of their composition, are of three kinds:
[p.83] The first is the categorical (hamliyya) in which it
is established (hukima) that one entitative determinant
(ma‘na) is predicated on another or is not predicated on it,
like our saying:
The world is temporally created.
The world is not temporally created.
The world is the subject and temporally created is the
predicate, negated one time and confirmed another.
Our [saying] the word ‘laysa’ is a negative particle. If it
is annexed to the absolute mention of the essence of the
subject and predicate, the predicate is negated from the sub-
ject.
The second type, which is called ‘conditional conjunctive
(shartiyyan muttasilan),’93 like our saying: If the world is
created temporally (hadith), it has a creator (muhdith). It
is called ‘conditional’ because one of the conditions for the
existence of the premise is because of the existence of the
93
See Janssens, p. 49; Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 66, 79.

book one 73
consequent (lit. what comes next) (al-tali) with a con-
ditional word such as ‘in’ (if) [or] ‘idha’ (if)94 but does not
take their places, like our saying: ‘If the world was tem-
porally created’—it is called a premise.
[p.84] Our saying: ‘It has a creator’ is called the con-
sequent (tali).
It is what the consequential particle (harf al-jaza’), which
corresponds to the condition, is connected with. The con-
sequent operates as a predicate (mahmul). However, it
differs from it from a number of perspectives; namely that
the predicate perhaps may refer actually to the same sub-
ject, and not differ from it, nor connect with it by necessity
and naturally (al-luzum wa-l-tab‘iyya)95 as our saying: ‘The
person is an animal.’ The animal is a predicate (mahmul),
not separate (laysa mufariq), concomitant (mulazim) or
consequent (tabi‘).
As for our saying it has a creator (fa-lahu muhdith), it is
another thing for which its conjunction (ittisal) and its com-
bination (iqran) with the description of temporal creation
is necessary (lazima) not because it returns to the same
world.
If you should analyse the conditional conjunction (al-
shartiyya al-muttasila) after omitting the hypothetical par-
ticle and the conditional particle from it, it returns (refers
back) to two categorical propositions (hamliyyatayn); then
each proposition returns to a separate predicate and a sep-
arate subject.
The conditional is inevitably (la mahala) the most com-
plex since at the beginning of the matter it is not disinte-

94
These are two different conditional particles in Arabic that have the same
grammatical function, and both could be translated into “if”.
95
See Ghazali, Incoherence (Marmura trans.), pp.131, 143.

74 the standard of knowledge

grated to simple things (basa’it), but rather they disintegrate
into the propositions (hamliyyat) at first, then into simple
things second.
The third type is what is called conditional disjunctive
(sharti munfasil), as we say: The world is either temporally
created (hadith) or eternal (qadim). They are both categori-
cal propositions, combined, one of whose disjunctions from
the other is necessary (lazimat al-infisal).
Before the conditional conjunctive (al-sharti al-mutassil)
was a necessary conjunctive (lazimat al-ittisal) and because
of it was called a ‘disjunction (munfasil).’ The speculative
theologians (mutakallimun) call this ‘investigation and dis-
junction (sabr wa taqsim).’96
[p.85] This disjunction (munfasil) might be confined to
two parts as we mentioned or it could be in three or more,
as we said: This number; it is either like this number; or
less, or more. It is, despite possessing three [parts], confined.
Perhaps the parts will increase to the extent that it will
not be possible to contain [the number] like our saying this
is either black or white and so-and-so is either in Mecca or
Baghdad.
Then this division is further divided into three parts:

First disjunction: Strict disjunction (lit. mutually exclusive

and totally exhaustive)(ma yamna‘u al-jam‘ wa-l-khuluww
jami‘an) like our saying: The world is either temporally cre-
ated or pre-eternal.
Joining pre-eternity with temporal creation is forbidden.
[So] one of them is exhausted.

96
Al-Jurjani, Al-Ta‘rifat, p. 121.

book one 75
 That is both are not permitted; inevitably one of them is
necessary.
The second disjunction: The mutually exclusive (ma yam-
na‘u al-jam‘ duna al-khuluww)
As if one says: ‘This is an animal and a tree.’ You say: ‘It is
either an animal or a tree. They do not both combine even
if it should be permitted to exhaust both of them for it to
be an inanimate being (jamad) for instance.
The third disjunction: is the inclusive (or totally exhaustive)
disjunction (ma yamna‘u al-khuluww)
What prevents exhaustion (khuluww) and does not prevent
conjoining (jam‘), as if you took its concomitant (lazim),
not itself by saying for example:
Zayd is either in the sea, or not drowning.
This precludes disjunction (abandonment), but does not
prevent conjoining (jam‘) since it is permissible for him to
be in the sea and not drown. It is not possible to abandon
one of the two parts.
Its reason is, if you should take the negation of drowning
which is concomitant to his being on land, and more gen-
eral than it, that which is in the body of water also may not
drown.
[p.86] The origin of the disjunction necessitates for it to
be said: He is either in the sea or on land.
Disjunction (lit. abandonment) and conjoining (jam‘)
would have together forbidden him; however the absence
of drowning is concomitant to his being on land but is not
equal to it. But rather it is more general (a‘amm). It is not
remote for it to deal with his being in the sea, and then lead
to a conjunction.

76 the standard of knowledge

 These are similar things for which the difference between
them must be established. The mind’s investigation is mean-
ingless except to perceive the division of things that are
similar in appearance, and to recognise the meeting of
things that are divergent in appearance. Things are diver-
gent in some aspects and equivocal in others, but the mind
can distinguish between what is equivocal with it and what
is divergent from it. That is with these divisions whose con-
text [we are addressing]. This is the face of the divisions of
the propositions, considering the parts of the proposi-tions
(qadaya) in dissolution (hall) and composition (tarkib) to
its types of predication, conjunction and divergence.
The second division of the proposition considering the
relationship of its predicate to its subject by negation or
affirmation.
Know that every proposition (qadiyya) from these three ty-
pes are divided into negative (saliba) and positive (mujiba),
meaning negating and affirming. The categorical affirm-
ation (al-ijab al-hamli) is like our saying: ‘Man is an ani-
mal,’ which means the thing that we assume in the mind,
regardless whether he was existing or not existing, without
adding time (waqt) and condition (hal), must be imposed
as an animal and judged as such, but rather according to
what encompasses the temporary (mu’aqqat) and its oppo-
site and the qualified (muqayyad) and its opposite. [p.87]
Our saying that ‘He is an animal under all circumstances
or under some circumstances,’ are two additions connected
to the absolute meaning of our saying that ‘He is an ani-
mal.’ This is in what the word is explicit, though it is
not far from being understood by the general public as a
rule, especially if the context (qarinat hal) of the subject has
adhered to it.
book one 77
 As for the categorical negation (salb hamli),97 it is like
our saying: ‘The person is not an animal.’ As for the con-
junctive affirmation (al-ijab al-muttasil), it is like our say-
ing: If the world was temporally originated, then it would
have a creator (muhdith).
Negation: What negates this necessity (luzum) and con-
junction (ittisal), like our saying: If the world was not tem-
porally created, it has an originator (muhdith), as our
saying: This number is either equal to that number or dis-
similar (mufawit) to it.
The intention of this division is to prohibit abandonment
(khuluww). Negating it is what negates the prohibition of
abandonment and indicates its possibility.
Should one ask: Our saying: ‘Zayd is not seeing (ghayr
basir),’ is it negative or affirmative?
If it were affirmative, then what is the difference between
it and our saying ‘Zayd is not seeing (laysa basiran)?’
And if it were negative, what is the difference between
it and our saying: ‘Zayd is blind (a‘ma)’ which is positive?
There is no meaning to our saying: ‘not seeing (ghayr
basir)’ except the meaning of its affirmation (ijab).
Concerning that in Persian, the difference is not evident
between our saying:
Zayd kurast.98
And our saying:
Zayd binast.
The same applies to our saying:
Zayd nadanst.
97
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 16, 22, 23.
98
Translation of three sentences in Persian: Zayd is blind Zayd is seeing / Zayd
is ignorant.

78 the standard of knowledge

 What is understood from the latter is that he is ignorant
and the formula (sigha) is the formula of negation.99
We answer: Here is the stumbling block and devoting
one’s attention to its elucidation is necessary (wajib).
Whoever does not distinguish between negative and affirm-
ative, will make many mistakes in the apodictic proofs.
We shall demonstrate that analogical reasoning is not
ordered from two negative premises, but rather it is necess-
ary for one of them to be positive to reach a conclusion.
Among the propositions are those in the negation format
and its definitions are the meaning of affirmation (ijab).
There is no doubt about critical exploration of the prop-
ositions.
[p.88] We say: Our saying: ‘Zayd does not possess sight
(ghayr basir)’ is an affirmative proposition (mujaba) as
similar to its translation in Persian, as if the [particle of ne-
gation] ghayr which was rendered into one thing, along
with (al-basir)(the seeing person), was employed to express
‘whoever is blind (a‘ma).’
The expression ‘Whoever does not possess sight (al-
ghayr basir)’ in its totality [has] the same meaning. It is af-
firmative (mujab) in one instance, as in the saying ‘Zayd
does not possess sight (Zayd ghayr basir)’ and in another
is negated as in the saying: ‘Zayd does not not possess sight
(Zayd laysa ghayr basir).’
[Then] let us specify this genus from among the affirm-
ative with another name: ‘ambiguous (ma‘dula)’ or ‘unde-
termined (ghayr muhassala)’ as if it was made anomalous
(‘udila biha) from its general rule (qanun) and was made
manifest in negative form (sighat salb) which is an affirm-

99
“nadanst” is negated through the use of a prefixed “na”.

book one 79
ation (ijab). Rendering the particle of negation with the ne-
gated as one word [happens] a lot in Persian like the words:
nadan, nabina, natuwan100 instead of blind (a‘ma), ignorant
(jahil), and impotent (‘ajiz).
Commanding of itself being an affirmation in Persian is
that it is synonymous with the form of confirmation (sighat
al-ithbat). It is said: ‘Fulan nabinast.’101 (So-and-so is blind.)
If it is negated ‘binanist.’ (Trans. seeing. Lit. not blind) Thus
the [grammatical] rule is in the form of negation.
The concordance between the word (expression) and the
meaning in language, requires three expressions with each
proposition: one for the subject (mawdu‘), one for the
predicate (mahmul), and one for connecting the predicate
with the subject as in Persian. However, in Arabic it is many
times limited to two expressions. It is said for instance:
‘Zayd is seeing (Zayd basir).’ Originally, it should be said:
‘Zayd, he is seeing (Zayd huwa basir) by adding the copula
(i.e. huwa)(harf al-rabita).
If the copula should precede the particle ‘ghayr,’ it is
said: ‘Zayd he is not seeing (Zayd huwa ghayr basir)’ it be-
comes: Zayd from one perspective is subject and ‘not seeing
(ghayr basir)’ from another perspective is predicate.
The word ‘he (huwa)’ is interspersed between them, con-
necting both [elements] with each other and becomes an af-
firmation.
If you should want negation, you say: ‘Zayd he is not
insightful (Zayd huwa laysa basiran),’ ‘the seeing (basir)’
becomes the predicate and the particle laysa (not) is the par-

100
The order of the Persian words “nadan, nabina, natuwan” does not cor-
respond to their Arabic equivalent. The order should be “nabina, nadan, natu-
wan”. It could be originally the result of a scribe’s mistake.
101
it is rendered affirmative through the suffixed “ast”.

80 the standard of knowledge

ticle of negation and the copula between the negation and
the predicate.
Likewise, you say: ‘Zayd he is not not seeing (Zayd laysa
huwa ghayr basir).’ The copula is before the components
of the predicate, connected to it.
[p.89] This is by way of notification about this detail. If
one should say: Is our saying: ‘not seeing (ghayr basir) and
our saying ‘blind (a‘ma)’ equivalent, or is one of them more
general than the other?
We say: This differs in [different] languages. Perhaps it
may be considered that our saying ‘not seeing (ghayr basir)’
is more general such that it is sound for the inanimate body
(jamad) to be described by it.
As for ‘the blind (a‘ma),’ it is not possible to be described
as such except one for whom it is possible to possess sight
(basar).
Clarifying this belongs to language; it should not be con-
flated with the topic we are concerned with [in this book].
Rather our objective is distinguishing the negative from
the affirmative, for the affirmative is not possible except for
that which is fixed, embodied in existence, or in an imagin-
ary (wahm).
As for negation (nafy), it is possible to use for that which
is not fixed, regardless of whether its being not-fixed is
necessary or not.
The third sub-division of the proposition considering its
generality or specificity
Know that the subject of propositions is either individual
(shakhsi) like our saying:
Zayd is a writer (katib).
Zayd is not a writer (laysa bi-katib).

book one 81
 [p.90] or universal (kulli) and it becomes a universal
[proposition]. The universal [proposition] is either indefi-
nite (muhmala) like our saying:
Man is in loss.102
Man is not in loss.

And we called it ‘indefinite’ because the existence of a

predicate for the universal subject (kulliyat al-mawdu‘) or
part of it did not manifest itself, or ‘quantified (mahsura)’—
It is what was demonstrated of it. The rule applied to all of
it like our saying:
‘Every person is an animal’ or mentioning that it
[applies] to some of it as we say: ‘Some of the animals are
human.’ Therefore, the propositions with this consideration
are four:
Individual (skakhsiyya)
Indefinite (muhmala)
Universal quantified (mahsura kulliyya)
Partly quantified (mahsura juz’iyya)
The proposition is divided as follows:
Negative (saliba) or affirmative (mujiba)
Conditional (shartiyya) or predicative (hamliyya)
Conditional conjunction (muttasila kanat al-shartiyya)
or disjunctive (munfasila)

102
See Qur’an 103:2: Verily man is in [a state of] loss.
103
Ibn Sina, Propositional Logic of Avicenna: A Translation from al-Shifa’: Al-
Qiyas, trans. Nabil Shehabi. Dordecht & Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973,
esp. pp.15, 242–44; Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p.18, 152 n. xlii.

82 the standard of knowledge

 The limiting expression (al-lafz al-hasir) is called a
‘quantifier (sur)’,103 as we said concerning the universal af-
firmative (al-mujaba al-kulliyya): All human beings are ani-
mals, and our saying concerning the partial affirmative:
‘Some of the animals are people,’ as also we said concerning
the universal negative: ‘Not a single person is a rock.’ And
like our saying concerning the partial negative: ‘Some of the
people are not writing (laysa ba‘d al-nas katiban)’ or ‘Not
every person is a writer (katib).’ The sense of both of them
is one.
Should you say: ‘The definite article (al-) if [both com-
ponents of it alif and lam] it is for exhaustiveness (istigh-
raq), and one’s saying: ‘The man is in loss’ is a universal
[proposition]’, how is it then did we call it indefinite
(muhmala)?
Know if that is verified in the language of the Arabs, the
indefiniteness must be sought from another language and
if it is not verified, then it is indefinite, since it has the ca-
pacity for [both] universal and particular.
The power of the indefinite is like that of the partial
since by necessity it includes it.
As for the generality (‘umum) it is doubted.
It is not necessarily [the case] that which is partially true
is not entirely true.
Then let him be careful of the indefinite propositions
(muhmalat) in syllogisms (aqyisa).
If the desired object from them is a universal conclusion
as the jurisprudent says for example:
The measured item (makil) is usurious (rabawi).
Gypsum (jiss) is a measured item
[Therefore, gypsum] is usurious.
It is said: Your saying the measured item is indefinite

book one 83
(muhmal), if you should mean all (kull), it is forbidden.
If you should mean a part of it, then the conclusion is
reached that some of the measured item is usurious.
[p.92] If you should say:
Some of the measured item is usurious.
Gypsum is a measured item.
Therefore, gypsum is usurious.
The outcome is not concomitant to the gypsum since it
is possible gypsum to be part of the indenite item that is not
usurious.
Should you say: ‘How is it that restriction (hasr) and in-
definiteness (ihmal) occur in conditional propositions (shar-
tiyyat)?’
Understand that whatever you say: ‘Whenever a thing is
temporally created, it has a creator’ or you say: ‘Always a
thing is either temporally created or pre-eternal (qadim),’
you have restricted the necessary universal restriction (al-
hasr al-kulli al-mujab).
Should you say: It is not definite if the thing should be
existent that it occupies a space (fi jiha).
Also, it is not definite if the selling [transaction] was
sound, it is binding (lazim) [to the parties]. Therefore, you
have negated the connection and restricted [it].
[Concerning] the rest of analogous [cases] of this, you
may apply syllogistic reasoning to them using [similar to
the above examples].

The fourth sub-division of the proposition considering the

mode (jiha) of the relationship of the predicate to the sub-
ject by necessity (wujub) or permissibility (jawaz), or im-
possibility (imtina‘)

84 the standard of knowledge

Know that the predicate in a proposition is not separable
(la yakhlu). Either its relationship to the subject is the rela-
tionship of the necessary in existence (al-daruri fi’l-wujud)
in the same matter, like your saying: ‘The person is an ani-
mal.’ (‘Animal’ is the predicate of the ‘person’ and his rela-
tionship to it is of necessary existence (daruri al-wujud)) or
his relationship is one of eternal non-existence (al-daruri al-
‘adam) like our saying: ‘The person is a rock.’ The ‘rock-
ness (state of being a rock)’ is a predicate and its relation-
ship with the person is one of eternal non-existence or it is
either not eternal, neither its existence nor its non-existence,
like our saying:
The person is a writer.
The person is not a writer.
[p.93] Then let us call this relationship ‘the matter of
predication (maddat al-haml).’104 The matter is of three
types:
1) necessity (wujub)
2) possibility (imkan)
3) impossibility (imtina‘) which is either absolute or
qualified (muqayyada).

The qualified (muqayyada): That which stipulates that

the predicate is necessary (daruri) for the subject, possible,
always existent, or not always existent by necessity (la bi’l-
darura).
The absolute (mutlaq):105 What is not involved with
something of that. These matters are superfluous to what
absolute predication (mujarrad al-haml) necessitates.
104
See Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p.3.
105
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp.32–35.

book one 85
 [p.94] The necessary proposition (qadiyya daruriyya) is
divided into:
1) That which is unconditional (ma la sharta fihi), as
we say: God is living (hayy), for He is the always
Existing, Everlasting.
2) That which the existent of the subject makes con-
ditional like our saying: Man is alive. As long as
he exists, he is alive. The existence of the subject
is condition on it.
That which is conditioned (mashrut) does not separate
from the first necessity (al-daruri al-awwal) in the mode of
necessity (fi jihat al-darura), but rather it separates in the
perpetuity of the subject in its essence (dawam al-mawdu‘
li-dhatihi) a parte ante and a parte post (azalan abadan)106
and the necessity of its existence for its own reality (nafs
haqiqatihi). Let us call this ‘absolute necessity’ (al-daruri
al-mutlaq).
As for the conditional necessity (al-daruri al-mashrut),
it is of three [kinds]:
[The first]: That which makes conditional in it the dur-
ation of the existence of the [essence] of the subject (dawam
wujud dhat al-mawdu‘) and the like of what was previously
presented.
[The second]: That which makes conditional in it the
duration of the being of the subject qualified (mawsuf bi-
‘unwanihi) by its [linguistic] expression, as we say:
Every object of motion (mutaharrik) is changeable (mu-
taghayyir). It continues to be changeable so long as it is in
motion, not only if the essence of the object of motion is in
existence only.
106
Eternally and everlastingly.

86 the standard of knowledge

 The difference between this and our saying: ‘The person
is living.’ is that the condition in the living is the essence
(dhat) of the person.
The condition in this place is not the essence of the ob-
ject of motion only, but rather the essence (dhat) of the ob-
ject of motion is with an attribute that adheres to the
essence; that is its being in motion.
The object in motion has [both] an essence (dhat) and a
substance (jawhar) from its being a horse, sky, or whatever
you wish to call it, and its being in motion adheres to it.
That essence is not in motion, but the person is not thus.
[p.95] [The third:] What makes conditional for it a spe-
cific time: determined (mu‘ayyan) or undetermined (ghayr
mu‘ayyan). Our saying: ‘The moon by necessity (bi’l-da-
rura) is eclipsed (munkhasaf),’ is qualified by a specific time;
that is the when the moon passes into the shadow of the
earth, when the earth is blocking the sunlight.
Our saying: ‘That man by necessity (bi’l-darura) is
breathing (muntanaffis).’ The meaning of that is that it is
sometimes and that ‘some’ is undetermined. If one should
say: Is it possible to conceptualize a perpetual object that is
unnecessary? We say: ‘Yes.’ As for in individuals (ashkas),
it is visible like: The Zanji: You might say that ‘His com-
plexion is black, as long as the complexion exists,’ and [the
opposite]: ‘He is not of black complexion as long as the
complexion exists.’ ‘The blackness’ of his complexion is not
necessary (daruri). However, his existence corresponded
with it in perpetuity.
Let us call this proposition existential (wujudiyya). As
for the universals, like our saying: Every planet has [a ce-
lestial position] either close to the eastern or western [hor-
izon]; it is like this all the time. This is not necessary for the

book one 87
existence of its essence (wujud dhatihi) since the [relation-
ship] is not like ‘the animal’ to ‘the person.’
Then understand:

The fifth sub-division of the proposition taking into consi-

deration that which contradicts it (naqid)
Know that understanding the contradiction (naqid) in the
proposition urgently requires examination.
[p.96] Perhaps the apodictic proof does not indicate any-
thing. However, it indicates invalidating (ibtal) its contra-
diction. Then it becomes as if it had indicated it.
Perhaps something will be placed in the syllogism prem-
ises (muqaddimat al-qiyas); its mode of indication (wajh
dalalatihi),107 so long as it does not appear in that which
contradicts it. If that which is contradictory is unknown,
these benefits are not attained.
Perhaps he will think that knowledge of that is patent;
but that is not so. Being careless of it produces error in most
of the theoretical sciences (nazariyyat).
The contradictory propositions are different by affirm-
ation and negation, in such a manner that requires in one
of them to be truthful and the other untruthful.
Should we say: ‘The world is temporally created,’ and
it was truthful, our saying: ‘The world is not temporally
created,’ is untruthful. Likewise, our saying: ‘pre-eternal
(qadim);’ that is if we mean by pre-eternal the negation of
the temporally created (hadith).
However, if we were to indicate one of them, then we
will have indicated the other. However, when we speak of
one of them, it is as if we speak of the other.
They are both in this mode concomitant (mutalaziman).
However, contradiction (tanaqud) has eight conditions; if

88 the standard of knowledge

the conditions are not adhered to, contradiction will not
occur:
First [contradiction], one of the two propositions has to be
negative and the other affirmative, as our saying:
The world is temporally created.
The world is not temporally created.
If we should say twice: The world is temporally created
(hadith), then there would be no contradiction.
Second [contradiction], that the subject (mawdu‘) of both
premises is the same. If it is more than two, then there
would be no contradiction in both premises, as our saying:
The world is temporally created.
The Creator is not temporally created.

[p.97] There is no contradiction between the two. This

is formed in a common expression. We say:
The eye is yellow.
The eye is not yellow.
With one of them we intend the dinar and the other the
seeing organ. In jurisprudence we say:
The young girl has a guardian over her initiation of
marriage.
The young girl does not have a guardian over her
initiation of marriage.108

107
See Al-Baji, Kitab al-Minhaj fi Tartib al-Hijaj, ed. Abdel Magid Turki. Paris:
G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1978, pp. 40-41.
108
See Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2010), pp.46, 57–61, 151, 157, 217.

book one 89
 We mean by [the latter] the non-virgin (thayyib) and by
the [former] the virgin by way of intending the specific with
the general and since the subject has multiple [meanings],
contradiction (tanaqud) does not occur.

Third [contradiction]: That the predicate is one: Our say-

ing: ‘The person is created’ and ‘The person is not a rock’
are not contradictory. That is formed in the common predi-
cate (mahmul mushtarak), as we say:

Whoever is forced to kill is one who is freely able to

abandon it (mukhtar).
Whoever is forced to kill is unable to abandon it
(laysa bi-mukhtar), but is compelled to [do so].

There is no contradiction. [The word] ‘mukhtar’ is ap-

plied to two different meanings. It is equivocal (mushtarak).
It might be intended by it whoever is able to abandon (qadir
‘ala al-tark) or it might be intended whoever hastens (muq-
addam ‘ala) to do something because of a [base] desire and
the emanation of a cause (da‘iya) from his essence.
However much the expression (lafz) was equivocal
(mushtarak), the subject (mawdu‘) or the predicate (mah-
mul) is in reality more than one, while externally it is per-
ceived as one.
The indication (‘ibra) is for the reality not the literal for-
mulation of the expression (zahir al-lafz).
Fourth [contradiction]: The predicate (mahmul) should not
be in two different parts of the subject (mawdu‘), like our
saying:
The Nubian is white.
The Nubian is not white.

90 the standard of knowledge

 or
He has white teeth.
He does not have a white complexion.
In jurisprudence we say:
[p.98] The thief has been amputated.
The thief was not amputated.
That is [having] an amputated hand but not foot or
nose.

The fifth contradiction: There is no difference in that to

which modifying terms are added, as in genitive cases, like
our saying:
Four is one half [of eight].
Four is not one half [of ten1]; namely it is one half of
eight, but not of ten.

There is no contradiction.
As we say:
Zayd is a father.
Zayd is not a father.
That is, he is a father to ‘Amr and not to Khalid.
In jurisprudence we say:

The woman has a guardian [for the initiation of mar-

riage] over her.
The woman does not have a guardian [for the initi-
ation of marriage] over her.
That is, she has a guardian over her [in the initiation of

book one 91
marriage], but not over her property (mal). Both are added
to the initiation of marriage. There is no contradiction from
the perspective of equivocity of the predicated expression.
Abu Hanifa says:
Her guardian (mawla), since he is legally responsible
(shar‘an) for her marriage out of commendation (is-
tihbaban) or obligation (ijaban).109
She does not have a guardian. She is independent and
ought not be forced into a marriage contract (la tujbar ‘ala
al-‘aqd).
It is necessary to take into account these meanings not
only for the contrary (naqid), but also for all kinds of anal-
ogical reasoning.
Concerning that, a Shafi‘i jurist says: The woman has a
guardian.
She does not take charge of herself is an unnecessary
concomitant (ghayr lazima).
Abu Hanifa says: Concerning your saying there is a
guardian over her, should you intend by it that she does not
take charge of herself, or the guardian forces her (yujbi-
ruha). Therefore, this essence of what is sought is in con-
tention. Making it a premise in analogical reasoning is a
pre-positing (musadara).
If it should be intended (urida), with it that the guardian
takes charge of her marriage by commendation (istihba-
ban) or obligation (ijaban), then it does not necessarily fol-
low from this that her marriage contract is nullified if she

109
For a discussion of ‘commendation and obligation,’ see for instance: Al-Ka-
sani, Kitab Bada’i‘ al-Sana’i‘ fi Tartib Al-Shara’i‘. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya,
2003, 3:374.

92 the standard of knowledge

embarked on it (ta‘atathu) in contradistinction to [the prin-
ciple that to have a guardian is a] commendation.
[p.99] The Sixth [contradiction]: The relationship of the
predicate to the subject does not differ in two aspects like
our saying:
The water in the jug is thirst-quenching and purifying
[as in ablution].
The water in the jug is neither thirst-quenching nor
purifying.

We intend that it is thirst-quenching in potentia not in

actu. Because of the disagreement of the means (jiha) of the
predication, both judgements (hukman) are not contradic-
tory.
Apropos is God the Exalted’s words:
You did not slay them, but God slew them, and you
threw not when you threw, but God threw (Qur’an
8:17)
It is a negation of throwing and an affirmation of it, but
for different reasons. There is no contradiction between
them. This is also what causes many to make errors in ap-
plied law (fiqhiyyat).

The seventh contradiction. It is not at two different times

like our saying:
The toddler has teeth. We mean by that after his
weaning.
The toddler does not have teeth; we mean by that in
the beginning of his affair.

book one 93
 We say in jurisprudence:

Wine was forbidden—we mean in the previous eras

and was permissible before the revelation of the
[Qur’anic] interdict.

In summary one of the propositions ought not to contra-

dict the other except only qualitatively (bi’l-kayf). The re-
sult would be one negates what the other affirms (awjaba)
of it.
One of the propositions is negated by what the other
proposition affirms (awjaba) according to:110

The manner (wajh) in which it affirms it.

The subject (mawdu‘) which it postulates in itself (bi-
‘aynihi)
In that manner
In that time
[p.100] In that mode111

Thus, they share truthfulness and falsehood. If a condition

should disagree, it is permissible for both [propositions] to
partake in truthfulness or falsehood.

The eighth contradiction: This is concerning the proposi-

tion whose subject is universal in particular (‘ala al-khusus).
It increases that whose subject is universal so that the two
propositions are dissimilar in partiality (juz’iyya) and in

110
These are the conditions (shurut).
111
Condition of combining in potentiality and actuality.

94 the standard of knowledge

universality (kulliyya) along with the dissimilarity in nega-
tion and affirmation until inevitably contradiction is necess-
ary, otherwise it would be possible for all parts to be
truthful like the two particularities (juz’iyyatayn) in the sub-
stance (madda) of possibility, like our saying:
Some people are writers.
Some people are not writers.
Perhaps both are false like universals in the matter
(madda) of possibility like saying:
Every person is a writer.
Not a single one of the people is a writer.
The contradiction is completed in the quantified prop-
ositions (mahsurat) after the conditions which we men-
tioned if one of the two propositions is universal and the
other particular (alt. categorical) so that its contradiction
is necessary (daruri).

Let us examine all the substances (mawadd) and place the

affirmative universal first and say:
Every person is an animal.
Some people are not animals.
Every person is a writer.
Some people are not writers.
Every person is a rock.
Some people are not rocks.
We inevitably find that one of the two propositions is
truthful and the other false.
book one 95
 Let us examine the universal negative (al-saliba al-kul-
liyya) and say:
Not one of the people is an animal.
Some people are animals.
Not one person is a rock.
Some people are rocks.
Not one person is a writer.
Some people are writers.

[Thus,] it is necessary for truth and falsehood to be di-

vided [between each pair of propositions] in all the sub-
stances.
[p.101] If one should say:
Both universal faculties in the substance of necessity
(wujub) and impossibility (imtina‘)112 are also divided into
truth and falsehood; we say: Yes, but that is not known ex-
cept after knowing the relationship of the predicate to the
subject, whether or not it is necessary (daruri).
If you should heed the conditions which we mentioned,
you would definitely know the contradictions. If you did
not know that relationship, however, the matter necessi-
tates contradiction.

The sixth sub-division of the proposition taking into ac-

count its opposite.
Know what we mean by ‘the opposite’ is that the predicate

112
Concerning this idea, see Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr, p. 124; Jon McGin-
nis, ‘Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274): Sharh al-Isharat,’ in Oxford Handbook of
Islamic Philosophy, p. 338.

96 the standard of knowledge

(mahmul) of the proposition is made a subject (mawdu‘)
and the subject is taken as a predicate, but with retaining
the same modality (kayfiyya) and the truth remaining as is.
If the truth does not remain, it is called alteration (inq-
ilab), not reversal (in‘ikas).
The propositions in their fundamental elements (‘unsur)
are four:
[p.102] The first is the universal negative (al-saliba al-
kulliyya) and it necessarily reflects like itself.
You would say: Not one person is a bird. [Therefore,] it
is necessary that: ‘Not one bird is a person.’
And you say:
Not one act of obedience is disobedience (ma‘siya).
Therefore, it is necessary: Not a single act of disobedience
is [an act] of obedience.
Necessitating this is manifest, but defining it exactly
(tahrir) [is as follows]:
If it was not imposed that: ‘Not one bird is a person,’
it is not imposed because it is possible that one bird is a
person.
If that was possible then our saying: ‘Not one person is
a bird’ is invalidated, since that bird is a person and that
person is a bird.
Then the veracity from our saying: [p.103] ‘Not one per-
son is a bird’ is eliminated (yartafi‘).
I have made it truthful.
The second is the universal affirmation (al-mujiba al-kul-
liyya). It is reversed as a partial affirmation like our saying:
Every person is an animal.
It is reversed to: some animals are people.
It does not convert entirely since it is possible the predi-
cate (i.e. the animal) to be more general (a‘amm) than the
book one 97
subject. Then a portion (taraf) of it is separated (yufsal)113
from the subject which is the person in our example. It is
not possible to say: ‘Every animal is a person’ since among
animals are non-persons like the horse and the like from
among the different species.
The third is partial negation (al-saliba al-juz’iyya). It is
originally not reversible.
We say:
Some animal is not a person.
It is truthful, and its opposite:
A person is not an animal. Not true.
[p.104] Nor our saying: Every person is not an animal.
It is sound for it to be opposite of this but it is not converted
(tan‘akis) neither to a universal (kulliyya) nor to a particu-
lar (juz’iyya).
The fourth: Partial affirmation (al-mujiba al-juz’iyya)
which reflects itself, that is a partial affirmation like our
saying: A certain person is a writer.
It is necessary from him that:
A certain writer is a person.
Should you say: That it is necessary that:
Every writer is a person.
Then know that that does not necessitate a partial af-
firmation insofar as it is a partial affirmation but rather in-
sofar (min haythu) as you learned externally that:

113
There is an eror in the Arabic original; fa-yufaddal should be fa-yufsal.

98 the standard of knowledge

 There is no writer apart from the person except that
from the partial affirmation (mujiba juz’iyya) is that whose
conversion (in‘ikas) is not entirely true (la yusaddqu in‘ika-
suhu), since you say:
Some people are white.
It is not possible for you to say:
Every white is a person.
But what is necessary (lazim):
[p.105] Some whites are human.
Since the examples are a cause for errors, the logicians
departed from known examples to unknown examples
(mubhamat) and they signified them with alphabetical
letters assigning the letter b (ba’) to the predicate and the
letter a (alif) to the subject, saying:
All A are B
That is they are things that are unknown and different
which we have called by these names.
So it is necessary from it:
Some B are A
We say:
No A is B
It is necessary from it that: Some B are A.114

114
This conclusion (Some B are A) is false which suggests that at least this part
of the work cannot be attributed to Al-Ghazali.

book one 99
A clarification of that is clear. We will not expand. But
rather we needed to (iftaqarna ila) know the opposite: In
certain syllogisms the aspect of its productive value (intaj)
appears as a contradiction (bi’l-‘aks). Perhaps analogical
reasoning will produce something and our goal is the op-
posite.
Therefore, it becomes evident with that regardless of
what analogical reasoning produces for us of a universal
negative, it also produces its opposite.
The same for the rest of the sub-divisions. God only
knows that which is correct.

100 the standard of knowledge

 [p.109] [BOOK TWO] 115

THE SYLLOGISM
(Kitab al-Qisas)

Know that if we should exhaust the premises of analogical

reasoning (qiyas) which are the exposition of the simple no-
tions (ma‘ani mufrada), the aspects of the words indicating
them (wujuh dalalat al-alfaz ‘alayha), the manner of com-
posing the conditional attributes through the predicative
formation (bi’l-tarkib al-khabari) which includes the subject
and the predicate—the latter of which is called ‘proposition
(qadiyya)’—as well as its principles (ahkam) and divisions,
it is worth us delving into the apodictic proof (bayan) of
analogical reasoning. It is the second composition (al-tarkib
al-thani) since it is reflection (nazar) on the composition of
the propositions so that the apodictic proof becomes a syl-
logism, just as the first is a reflection on the composition of
the notions (ma‘ani) so that it becomes a proposition. This
is the necessary composition (al-tarkib al-wajib) in the com-
pounded things (murakkabat).
The builder of the house first has to strive to gather the
individual components (mufradat), i.e. water, soil, hay, and
combine them in a specific form to become brick (labin).
Then he combines the bricks and assembles them a second
time.

115
Pages 106–108 of the Arabic edition do not contain text.

book two 101

 This ought to be the formation (sani‘) of whoever reflects
on every compound (murakkab). Brick does not become
such except in substance (madda) and form (sura).
Substance (madda): The soil and what it contains.
Form (sura): The squaring shape which occurs in con-
fining the brick in a mould.
Likewise the analogical reasoning (qiyas) composed
(murakkab) for it: Substance and form.
Substance (madda): The truthful certain premise (muq-
addimat). There is no doubt about requesting them and
knowing their perceptual means (madarik).
Form: Composing the premises according to the variety
(naw‘) of the order specifically. There is no doubt about
knowing it.
Reflection into analogical reasoning is divided into four
categories (funun):

[p.110] Substance and fallacies in syllogism

Form and various addenda chapters

[p.111] First reflection into the form (sura) of analogical
reasoning.
Analogical reasoning (qiyas): One of the types of proof
(hujaj).
The Proof (hujja): It is what is produced to confirm that
for which there is a need to confirm it from the truthful
sciences (‘ulum tasdiqiyya) which may be divided into three:
analogical reasoning (qiyas), induction (istiqra’) and simile
(tamthil).116

116
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 84-85. Griffel translates the latter
term ‘tamthil’ as ‘symboliation.’ Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, p.
114.

102 the standard of knowledge

 Analogical reasoning may be divided into four types:
Categorical (hamli), conjunctive conditional (sharti mutta-
sil), disjunctive conditional (sharti munfasil), and contra-
dictory syllogism (qiyas khulf).
Let us call all [of them] ‘categories of proof (asnaf al-
hujja).’ The definition of analogical reasoning (qiyas) is that
it is a composed statement which, if the propositions expres-
sed in the analogical reasoning are sound, implies by itself
another statement by necessity (lazima ‘anhu li-dhatihi).
[p.112] If the propositions are expressed in the proof,
with that they are called premises (muqaddimat) and
are called propositions before placing them therein (qabl
al-wad‘). Just as the necessary statement (qawl) from it is
called before inseparability (luzum) ‘the object of investi-
gation (matlub)’ and after inseparability it is called ‘con-
clusion (natija).’
It is not conditional for the propositions to be undisputed
(musallim al-qadaya) in that which is called analogical
reasoning, but rather its condition is that if its propositions
are undisputed, then it is necessary from them to have a
conclusion (natija). Perhaps these propositions are not
accepted. We call it ‘analogical reasoning’ because in as
much as it is undisputed, the conclusion would be necessary.
Then let us start with the categorical (hamli) among the
types of syllogism and proofs (hujaj).
First kind: Categorical syllogism which may also be
called a ‘connective syllogism (qiyas iqtirani) (alt. com-
binatorial) and also ‘decisive syllogism (jazmi).’117

117
Concerning the connective syllogism, see Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed
trans.), p. 43. Concerning the decisive syllogism see: Joep Lameer, Al-Farabi and
Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice. Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1994, pp.47–49.

book two 103

 It is compounded from two premises like our saying:
Every body is compound (mu’allaf).
Every compound is temporally created (muhdath).
[Therefore,] it is necessary from it: Every body is tem-
porally created.
This is a syllogism composed from two premises (muqad-
dimatayn) and every premise contains a subject and predi-
cate; all the individual units which constitute the premises
are four except that one of them is repeated in it, therefore
making the [actual] total three, which is the least of what a
syllogism disintegrates into since the least to be combined in
it is two premises. The least of which is ordered from the
two premises is two connotational attributes.
The first is ‘subject’ and the other is ‘predicate.’
It is inevitable that one will be repeated and common
between both premises. If it was not thus, then there would
be dissonance between both premises and they would
not be intertwined (lam yatadakhala) and a conclusion
from their pairing would not be necessary. Should you say:
‘Every body is compound (mu’allaf)’, [p.113] except that
you did not mention anything in the second premise about
the body (jism) nor about the composition (mu’allaf), but
rather you stated an example: Every person is an animal.
A conclusion from the two premises was not necessi-
tated.
Should you know to divide every syllogism into three
principles (umur), know that these singular elements (mu-
fradat) are called terms (hudud).
Each of the three terms a singular noun (ism mufrad)
which distinguishes it from others. As for the common term

104 the standard of knowledge

(al-hadd al-mushtarak), it is known as the ‘middle term
(hadd awsat).’
As for the other two, one is called the ‘major term (hadd
akbar)’ and the other the ‘minor term (asghar).’
The minor term is the subject (mawdu‘) in the con-
clusion (natija). The major term is the predicate (mahmulan
fiha) [in the conclusion].
It is called ‘major’ because it is possible for it to be more
general than the subject, even if it is possible for it to be
equal/coextensive (musawiyan).
As for the subject, it is not conceived (la yutasawwar)
that it will be more general than the predicate (mahmul). If
it is rendered as such, then the judgement (hukm) is false
like saying:
Every animal is a person.
It is false and its opposite is truthful.

[p.114] When there is an intense need to define the two

premises with two [different] names—it is not possible to
derive both their names from the middle term since it is
common between them. Their names are derived from the
other two terms.
The one containing the major term which has predi-
cative result (mahmul al-natija) is the major premise (muq-
addima kubra). The one which contains its subject which
is the minor term is the minor premise (muqaddima sug-
hra). The syllogism, which we have produced as an exam-
ple, contains three terms (hudud):
The body (jism)
The composed [state] (mu’allaf)

book two 105

 Temporally created (muhdath)
The composed (mu’allaf) is the common term.
The body is the minor term (al-asghar).
The composed is the major term (al-hadd al-akbar).
As we say:
Every body is composed (mu’allaf).
It is the minor premise (muqaddima sughra).
Our saying: ‘Every composed [thing] is temporally cre-
ated (muhdath)’ is a major premise. Combining the two
terms which occur on both sides is necessary from it: First,
the goal sought (matlub), [p.115] then the conclusion
(natija) last.
It is our saying: Every body is temporally created (muh-
dath). An example from jurisprudence is:
Every intoxicant is wine.
Every wine is forbidden.
Therefore, every intoxicant is forbidden.
‘The intoxicant,’ ‘wine,’ and ‘forbidden’ are the terms of
the syllogism. ‘Wine’ is the common term. The intoxicant
is the minor term. ‘Forbidden’ is the major term.
Our saying: ‘Every intoxicant is wine’ is the minor
premise.
Our saying: ‘Every wine is forbidden’ is the major
premise.
This is a division of the syllogism reflecting on its indi-
vidual [constituent] parts.
The second division for this syllogism reflecting on the
106 the standard of knowledge
quality (kayfiyya) of the position (wad‘) of the common
term with the other two terms (tarafayn).
This quality (kayfiyya) is called a figure (shakl).
The middle term (hadd awsat) is a predicate in one of
the two premises, and subject in the other as we revealed
with the example, and it is called the first figure (al-shakl
al-awwal);118 or the middle term is a predicate in both
premises together and thus is called the second figure (al-
shakl sl-thani); or it is a subject in both terms and is called
the third figure (al-shakl al-thalith).
[p.116] The first figure: its example (mithal) is what we
have shown above. Inference of a conclusion from it is
manifest (bayyin). Its outcome (hasil) refers back the [fact
that] the judgement (hukm) on the predicate is necessarily
on the subject. However much ‘the composition (mu’allaf)
is applied to the body, every judgement for the composition
is inevitably confirmed for the body [since] the body is in-
cluded in the ‘composition.’
If the judgement of temporal creation is determined/con-
firmed for the composition, it is by necessity confirmed for
the body. This is necessary insofar the judgement of the
temporal creation concerning the body is not self-evident
(bayyin).
However, its judgement over the composition is self-evi-
dent and the judgement with the composition which is evi-
dent to it. Therefore, the middle is the cause of the terms
coming together; that is the judgement being exceeded to
that which is judged.
Whenever you know that the judgement over the predi-
cate is a judgement over the subject, then there is no differ-

118
This corresponds to Aristotle’s ‘perfect syllogism.’

book two 107

ence between the subject being partial or universal, or that
the predicate be negative or affirmative.
[p.117] Should you exchange your saying: Every body
is composed with your saying: Some of the existent (maw-
jud) is composed, then it would be necessary from your syl-
logism that some of the existent is temporally created.
Should you exchange your saying: Every composition is
temporally created with your saying: Every temporally cre-
ated composition is not eternal, the negation of eternity
(azaliyya) is also exceeded to the subject of the composition,
just as the confirmation of temporal creation is exceeded
without difference.
Therefore, the product of this figure (shakl), according
to this consideration is in four syllogistic combinations (tar-
kibat):
[p.118] The first: Two universal affirmations (mujibitan
kulliyatan), as previously mentioned.
The second: Two affirmations, the minor one is partial
as if you exchanged your saying: ‘Everybody is composed.’
with ‘Some of the existents (mawjudat) are composed.’
The third: Minor universal affirmation (mujiba kulliyya
sughra) and the Major universal negative (saliba kulliyya
kubra) which is to substitute your saying: ‘temporally cre-
ated (muhdath)’ with your saying ‘not eternal (laysa bi-
azali).’
The fourth: Minor partial affirmation (mujiba juz’iyya
sughra) and the major universal negative (saliba kulliyya
kubra)—That is exchanging the minor one with the partial
and the major with the negative, saying for example: ‘A cer-
tain existent is composed (mawjud ma mu’allaf).’
[p.119] Not a single composition is eternal (azali).
With the exception of these syllogistic combinations (tar-

108 the standard of knowledge

kibat), [other combinations] do not yield [valid] results.
For if you hypothesise: Two negatives only, no syllogism is
ordered from them, since the middle term, if you should ne-
gate it from something, the judgement for it is negation or
affirmation (ithbat) does not exceed that which is negated
because of it (la yata‘adda ila al-maslub ‘anhu). Since ne-
gation necessitates distinction (mubayana) that which is
confirmed in the negative does not exceed to that which is
negated because of it (maslub ‘anhu). Should you say:
Not a single person is a rock.
Not a single rock is a bird.
[Therefore,] not a single person is a bird.
This conclusion will be seen as true, though its truth is
not necessary in this syllogism.
Should you say:
Not a single person is whiteness.
Not a single whiteness is an animal.
[Therefore,] not a single person is an animal.
The result is not true. The figure is that very figure.
However, should you negate the connection between the
whiteness and the person, not because they are dissimilar
(mubayana). Then, the judgement over the whiteness does
exceed to the person under any condition (bi-hal). There-
fore, there is no doubt that there has to be an affirmation
(mujiba) in every syllogism or its equivalent even if the for-
mulation (sigha) [p.120] is the negative formulation for
example.
However, in this figure in particular/specifically, it is a

book two 109

condition for the minor to be an affirmation in order for
the middle term to be confirmed to the minor one. Thus,
the judgement over the middle [term] is a judgement over
the minor.
It is necessary for the major [term] to be a universal so
that the minor term is incorporated under the major term
because of its [including] all of what is included in the
middle term.
Should you say:
Every person is an animal.
Some animals are horses.
Therefore, it does not follow that every person is a horse.
Indeed, if you judge the ‘animal’, as a universal [term],
qua being a body, and say: And every animal is a body.
This is exceeded to the minor [term], which is the human
being.
[p.121] Because the detailed examples could mislead the
viewer, the logicians turned to roducing vague different
connotational attributes (ma‘ani mukhtalifa mubhama) and
expressed them through the stand alone letter [symbols]
and created instead the body, the composed and the tem-
porally created in the example we have already shown:
a (alif), b (ba’), c (jim) which are the first letters of
the alphabet.119 They placed c (jim) which is the third
as a minor term upon which judgement is passed.
The letter b is the middle term through which jud-
gement is passed on c.

119
One of three arrangements for the Arabic alphabet.

110 the standard of knowledge

 A is the major term through which judgement is
passed over b so that it transmits to c.
The logicians said:
Every c = b
Every b = a
Every c = a
Therefore, likewise, the rest of the examples (durub).
Should you surround [yourself] with the connotation at-
tributes that we have attained, you will not be incapable of
striking similitudes (mithal) from jurisprudence (fiqhiyyat)
and the detailed rational sciences (‘aqliyyat) or in abstract
form (mubhama).
The second figure (shakl)
It is that in which the middle term was predicated in the
two terms (tarafayn) [of the syllogism]. However, a con-
clusion (natija) is reached if it is predicated on one of them
negatively and the other positively.
The differing of both premises in the quality (kayfiyya)
is a condition; that is in negation and affirmation. Then the
result will only be negative.
If that should be realised, the sense of its conclusion is
that if you should find two things, then another third predi-
cated on one of two things with affirmation (ijab) and the
other negation (salb). Therefore, the dissonance (tabayun)
between the two things is known out of necessity (bi’l-da-
rura). If they are not dissonant, then one would be predi-
cated on the other and the judgement over the predicate
would (also) be over the subject as [mentioned] in the first
figure.
book two 111
 There was nothing to negate by the universality (kul-
liyya) of one of them that would be required of the univer-
sality of the other.
[p.122] Therefore, every two things—this is their de-
scription (sifatuhuma)—are dissonant (mutabayinan); that
is one of them is negated by the other and vice versa.
Also, four [syllogistic] combinations are ordered within
this figure:
First, your saying:
Every body (jism) is compound (mu’allaf)—as in the first
figure. However, it reflects the second negative premise
from that figure. Thus, you say: ‘Not a single eternal (azali)
is compound’ instead of your saying: ‘Not a single composi-
tion (mu’allaf) is eternal (azali).’
What is concomitant (yalzamu) necessarily follow since
we premised (qaddamna) that:
The universal negative (saliba kulliyya) is a reflection of
itself (tan‘akisu ka-nafsiha). Then there is difference be-
tween your saying:
Not a single composition is eternal (which is mentioned
in the first figure) and between your saying:
There is not a single eternal (azali) which is composed
(mu’allaf).
Therefore, it can be concluded from this that: There is
not a single body which is eternal (azali).
Its determinate (muhassal) is the difference (mubayana)
between ‘the body (jism)’ and ‘the eternal (azali)’ since the
composition (mu’allaf) is a predicate for one of the two and
negated for the other. That indicates dissonance (tabayun)
in the way which we mentioned in a summary fashion
(mujmalan). Its detailed explanation is that the major pre-
mise (muqaddima kubra) is reversed, returning to the first

112 the standard of knowledge

figure. These were called the measures of the second figure
since it requires in its exposition to return to the first figure.

[p.123] The second mode (darb)

It is the very same. However, the minor premise (muqad-
dima sughra) is particular (juz’iyya) like your saying:
‘A certain existent (mawjud) is compound (mu’allaf)’
and ‘Not a single eternal (azali) is composed (mu’al-
laf).
Therefore, a certain existent (mawjud ma) is not eternal.
Its exposition is opposite the major premise as previously
[mentioned].

Third and fourth modes

The minor premise is negative either particular or universal
and the major premise affirmative.
It is not possible to render that comprehensible (tafhim)
with the example we have set forth of the first figure.
Since it does not contain except an affirmative minor
premise, since this is a condition in that figure.
We change the example and say:

The example of the third mood, like your saying:

Not a single body is devoid from the accidents (a‘rad).
Every eternal (azali) is devoid from the accidents.
Therefore, not a single body is eternal.

Therefore, the syllogism is composed of two universals

(kulliyyatayn), the minor of which is negative (saliba) and
the major of which is affirmative (mujiba).

book two 113

 The conclusion is universal negative (saliba kulliyya).
The middle term (al-hadd al-awsat) is: ‘devoid from the
accidents’ and is predicated on the body negatively (bi’l-
salb) [p.124] and predicated on the eternal (azali) affirm-
atively (bi’l-ijab). [Consequently,] dissonance (tabayun) is
necessitated.
The exposition of [the middle term] is the opposite of
the minor universal (kulliyya sughra); it is a negative uni-
versal which is reversed like of itself. Should it be reversed,
the predicate becomes a subject (mawdu‘) and returns to
the first in which the common term (hadd mushtarak) is a
subject to one of the two premises and predicated on the
other.

The fourth mode which is itself the third. However, the

minor is negative particular (saliba juz’iyya) like your say-
ing:
A certain existent is not a body.
Every moving thing is a body.
Therefore, some of the existents are not in motion.
When the negative was particular—and it cannot be re-
versed (wa hiya la tan‘akis)—this mode does not return to
the first figure through reversal (bi-tariq al-‘aks), but by
supposition (iftirad); that is your converting this partial to
a universal if it is a certain existent without a body. Then
the result would be:

[p.125] Some of the existents do not have a body.

Then let us suppose it ‘blackness,’ for example, and say:
Every blackness is not in a body.

114 the standard of knowledge

 Then the third mode becomes of this figure.
The third mode had returned to the first figure through
reversal. Thus it is.
The conclusion (muntij) then from this figure are the
four syllogistic combinations (tarkibat) to the exclusion of
everything else: Two negatives are not produced originally
nor are two affirmatives in this figure because every two
things where one things is found to be predicated upon
them both, it does not necessitate between them both con-
nection (ittisal) or dissonance (tabayun).
Since ‘the animal’ is predicated on the horse and person
it does not necessitate that the person be a horse, which is
a conjunction (itttisal).
‘Animal’ is predicate on the writer and the person but
does not obligate dissonance between them both, so that he
person is not a writer and the writer is not a person.
Therefore, this figure has two conditions (shartan).
The first is that they both differ, i.e. both premises in the
particular circumstances (kayfiyya). The other is that the
major premise is universal, as in the first figure.

Third figure
That is [when] the common term (hadd mushtarak) is a
subject in the two premises. This obligates a particular re-
sult (natija juz’iyya). Therefore, whenever you find, a par-
ticular conclusion, and you find two things that are both
predicated on that one thing, then between both predicates
is a connection and contact which is inevitable for that one
[thing]. It is possible that inevitably each one of them will
be predicated on part of the other under all circumstances
(bi-kull halif it could not be predicated on all of it.
[p.126] Therefore, the result was particular (juz’iyya).

book two 115

 Whenever you find some person which is one thing, [the
following] is predicated on him: a body and a writer, that
indicates between the ‘body’ and ‘writer’ is a connection
such that it is possible to say ‘writer’ about some bodies.
Some writers have a body even if all are that way.
However, the particularity is necessary under all circum-
stances.
This is a sufficient way in rendering [this matter] com-
prehensible. However, we follow the custom in detailed ex-
planation with an exposition of other modes (adrub) and
defining the aspect of requiring the conclusion to return to
the first figure in which six concludent modes are ordered:

First mode: from two universal affirmations (mujibatayn

kulliyyatayn) like your saying:
Everything in motion is a body.
Everything in motion is temporally created (muhdath).
Therefore, some body is by necessity temporally created.
Its exposition is contrary to the minor premise. There-
fore, it partially converts and our saying:
‘Everything in motion is a body’ becomes:
Some body is in motion.
Our following saying gets added to it: ‘Everything in mo-
tion is temporally created.’
Therefore, it is necessary that some body is temporally
created because of its returning to the first figure.
[p.127] Whenever you reverse [the order] of one prem-
ise, the subject becomes a predicate, where it is a subject
for the second premise. Then the middle term (al-hadd al-
116 the standard of knowledge
awsat) becomes predicated for one of the two and a subject
for the other.

Second mode
From two universals the major of which is negative, like
your saying:
Every ‘eternal’ is an agent (fa‘il).
Not a single eternal is a body.
Therefore, it is necessary from it [as follows]:.
Not every agent is a body, since it returns to the first
contrary to the minor.
This very conclusion is necessitated. Therefore, you say:
A certain agent (fa‘il) is eternal.
Not one eternal is a body.
Therefore, not every agent is a body.

Third mode
Two affirmations the minor of which is particular, like your
saying:
A certain body is an agent.
Every body is composite.
Therefore, it is necessary, [p.128] a certain agent is
composed.
Its exposition is, contrary to the minor and annexing the
compound to the major, it reverts to the first figure, and the
following conclusion is necessary; since you say:
A certain agent is a body.

book two 117

 Every body is compound.
Therefore, it is necessary: A certain agent is composed.

Fourth mode
Two affirmations, the major of which is particular, produce
a conclusion of particular affirmation like:
Every body is temporally created.
A certain body is in motion.
Therefore, it is necessary: A certain temporally created
thing is in motion.
That is in reversing the major [affirmation] making it a
minor [affirmation]. Then it returns to the first figure [of
the third mode] then reversing the conclusion in order to
produce for us our same conclusion. Therefore, we say:
A certain thing in motion is a body.
Every body is temporally created.
Therefore, it is necessary that a certain thing in motion
is temporally created, which is reversed to the same first
conclusion, namely: A certain temporally created thing is
in motion.

[p.129] This has demonstrated to you that it is realised with

two reversals (‘aksayn), the first of which is reversing the
premise and the other reversing the conclusion.
Fifth mode is composed from two disparate premises in the
quantity and the particular circumstances (kayfiyya) to-
gether. The minor is partially affirmed, the major is univer-
sal negative, and the conclusion negative partial, like your
saying:

118 the standard of knowledge

 A certain body is an agent.
Not a single body is eternal.
Therefore, it is necessary:
Not every agent is eternal since the minor is reversed
(tan‘akis ila) to your saying:
A certain agent is a body and it (i.e. the minor [affirm-
ation]) joins the major [affirmation] which states:
Not a single body is eternal.
Then this very conclusion is derived from the first figure
which is itself manifest.

Sixth mode: From two different premises also in quantity

(kammiyya) and particular circumstances (kayfiyya). The
minor of it is the affirmative universal and the major the
partial negative.
For example:
Every body is temporally created.
A certain body is not in motion.
Therefore, it is necessary that:
[p.130] A certain temporally created thing is not in
motion.

It is not possible to show the opposite since the negative

particular cannot be reversed and the affirmative universal
if it should be reversed, becomes particular. There is no
[valid] syllogism from two particulars (juz’iyyatayn).
Therefore, its exposition is to return to the first figure
[of the fourth mode] by converting particularity to a uni-
book two 119
versal hypothesis (kulliyya bi’l-iftirad).120 We hypothesise
that some which is not in motion—I mean some body as a
mountain (jabal) and say:
Not a single mountain is in motion. Annexed to it is:
Every mountain a body.
It is the truth of the indicative property (wasf ‘unwani)
of the subject’s essence.
[p.131] Then you take this minor [premise] and annex
it to the minor [premise] from this mode in the following
manner:
Every mountain is a body.
Every body is temporally created.
Therefore, it is necessary: Every mountain is temporally
created from the very first (awwal al-awwal). Then you
annex this conclusion to the first of the two hypothetical
premises. I mean your saying: ‘Not a single mountain is in
motion’ to produce from the second mode of this figure:
Some temporally created [thing] is not in motion.

We have mentioned that it returns to the first figure

contrary to the minor. Thus, this sixth mode returns to the
first figure in two steps.
These are the premises (maqayis) of this figure which has
two conditions:

120
‘Iftirad’ may be translated as ecthesis. See Robin Smith, ‘What is Aristotelian
Ecthesis,’ History of Philosophy and Logic 3:2 (1982), pp.113–127. See Osman
Bakar Classification of Knowledge in Islam. Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society,
1998, p.93 n.58.

120 the standard of knowledge

 First, the minor (one) has to be affirmative or its equiv-
alent. The other is that one of the two is universal, which-
ever one, since a syllogism is not organised from two par-
ticular propositions at all.
The concludent (muntij) from the compositions (ta’lifat)
is fourteen compositions—four from the first figure, four
from the second, six from the third.
That is after dropping (isqat) the indefinite propositions
(muhmalat). It is in the potentiality (quwwa) of the particu-
lar proposition (juz’iyya)—anything apart from that is not
a concludent. There is no benefit from detailing that which
does not produce [a result].
Whoever wants to exercise (irtiyad) getting its details
will be able to do so if he ponders it. Should it be said:
What is the number of possible combinations (iqtiranat)
in these figures?
[p.132] We said: 48 combinations121 in every figure 16.
That is because the two conjunctive premises (muqaddima-
tayn muqtarinatayn) are either both universal or both par-
ticular or one is universal and the other particular. In every
case, they are either both affirmative or both negative or
one is affirmative and the other negative.
Then these are 16 combinations, the product of multi-
plying 4 x 4 which are present in the three figures. The final
sum total is 48. The concludent is 14 combinations. The re-
maining [difference between the two] is 34.
If it should be asked: What are the specific properties
(khawass) of the figures?
We say: As for that which is general for every figure,
conjoining it (iqtiran) with an affirmation and a universal
121
The editor [of the Arabic version] counts a fourth figure and 64 combina-
tions.

book two 121

is inevitable. A syllogism is invalid with two negatives or
two particular propositions (juz’iyyatayn).
As for the particular characteristic (khassiyya) of the first
figure: It is either in the middle [term being] a predicate in
the first premise and a subject in the second premise or in
the premises with the minor one being affirmative and the
major one being universal, or in its conclusions by produc-
ing the four postulates:
1) Universal affirmation
2) Universal negation, [p.133]
3) Particular affirmation (al-ijab al-juz’i), and
4) Particular negation.
The true characteristics (khassiyya) that is not shared
with any other figure is that a negative particular (saliba
juz’iyya) is not in it, namely in its premises.
The second figure: Its particular characteristics are in its
middle (wasat)—it is predicated on both terms (tarafayn)
in its premises. It does not resemble it in the particular cir-
cumstances (kayfiyya) but rather is always [the case] one of
the two is negative and the other affirmative. As for the con-
cludent (intaj), it does not produce an affirmation orig-
inally, but rather only produces a negative.
As for the third figure, its particular characteristics are:
1) In its middle term it is a subject for the [other] two
terms.
2) In its premises for the minor premise to be affirm-
ative.
3) Its exclusive property (akhass khawassihi): It is
permissible for its major premise to be particular.
4) As for in the concludent: The particular is necess-
ary from it without the universal.

122 the standard of knowledge

 If it is said: Why was that called ‘first,’ that ‘second,’ and
this ‘third?’
We said: That was called ‘first’ because it manifests the
concludent (intaj) and produces the concludent in every-
thing else (fima ‘adahu) by replying to it either by reversal
(‘aks) or ecthesis (i.e. supposition (hypothetically) (iftirad).
That was called ‘second’ and this ‘third’ because the ‘sec-
ond’ produces the universal. The third produces the par-
ticular. The universal is more noble than the particular and
is commanding of that which is more noble absolutely (bi-
itlaq). Rather the universal is more noble than the particular
because the scientific questions of investigation (matalib ‘il-
miyya) which attain human perfection for the soul yielding
salvation and happiness—they (i.e. the scientific questions
of investigation) are the universals.
[p.134] Should the particular proposition provide benefi-
cial knowledge, then it would be by accident (bi’l-‘arad).
Should one say: Do you have legal examples of the sim-
ilitude of the fourteen syllogisms so that they are more
readily understood by jurists?
We say: Yes, we shall do that and write above every
premise, which requires returning it to the first figure by re-
versal (‘aks) or ecthesis (iftirad); that it is by conversion or
ecthesis (fard).
We write for each term (taraf) to which syllogism it re-
turns, God the Exalted willing. These are the examples:

Examples of the First Figure

1) Every intoxicant is wine (minor premise-affirm-
ative universal).
Every wine is forbidden. (major premise-affirm-
ative universal)
book two 123
 Therefore, every intoxicant is forbidden (con-
clusion-affirmative universal)
2) Every intoxicant is wine (minor premise-affirm-
ative universal)
Not a single wine is permissible (halal). (major
premise-negative universal)
Therefore, not a single intoxicant is permissible.
(conclusion-negative universal)
3) Some drinks are wine. (minor premise-affirmative
particular)
Every wine is forbidden. (major premise-affirm-
ative universal)
Therefore, some drinks are forbidden (conclusion-
affirmative particular)
4) Some drinks are wine. (minor premise-affirmative
universal)
Not a single wine is permissible. (major premise-
negative universal)
Therefore, not every drink is permissible. (con-
clusion-negative particular)

Examples of the second figure

1) (It returns to the second mode from the first fig-
ure.)
o Every garment is cubited (madhru‘).
(minor premise-affirmative universal)
o Not a single usurious item (rabawi) is cu-
bited. (major premise-negative universal)

124 the standard of knowledge

 o Therefore, not a single garment is usuri-
ous. (conclusion-negative universal)
2) (It also returns to the second mode of the first fig-
ure.)
o Not a single usurious item is cubited
(with reversing of this (bi-‘aks hadhihi).
He made it a minor premise then he re-
vesed the conclusion.) (minor premise-
negative universal)
o Every garment is cubited. (major prem-
ise-affirmative universal)
o Therefore, not a single usurious item is a
garment. (conclusion-negative universal).
3) (It returns to the fourth mood of the first figure.)
o A certain thing of economic value (mu-
tamawwil) is cubited (madhru‘).(minor
premise-particular affirmation)
o No a single usurious thing is cubited
(with reversing of this (bi-‘aks hadhihi).
major premise-negative universal)
o Therefore, a certain thing of economic
value is not usurious. (conclusion-par-
ticular negative)
4) (It returns to the fourth mode of the first figure
also.)
o A certain thing of economic value is not
usurious (with ecthesis (i.e. supposition)
(bi’l-iftirad). major premise-negative uni-
versal)
o Every food [that can be provided] is
usurious. (major premise-affirmative uni-
versal)

book two 125

 o Therefore, a certain thing of economic
value is not a food. (conclusion, negative
particular)

Examples of the third figure

1) (It returns to the third mode of the first figure.)
o Every food is usurious (minor premise-
affirmative universal)
o Every food is measured. (major premise-
affirmative universal)
o Therefore, some usurious item is
measured. (conclusion-particular affirm-
ation)
2) (It returns to the fourth [mode] of the first [figure].)
o Every garment is a thing of economic
value (mutamawwil). (through reversing
of this)(minor premise-affirmative uni-
versal (kulliyya mujiba))122
o Not a single garment is usurious. (major
premise-negative universal)
o Therefore, not everything of economic
value is usurious. (conclusion-particular
negative)
3) (It returns to the third [mode] of the first [figure].)
o A certain food is measured (with rever-
sing of this)(minor premise-affirmative
particular)
o Every food is usurious. (major premise-
affirmative universal)
o Therefore, a certain measurement is
122
The edition has ‘wajba’ instead of ‘mujiba.’ This error has been corrected.

126 the standard of knowledge

 usurious. (conclusion-affirmative par-
ticular)
4) (It returns to the third [mode] of the first [figure].)
o Every food is usurious. (minor premise-
affirmative universal)
[p.136]
o A certain food is measured (with rever-
sing of this)(He made it a minor premise
then reversing the result.)(major premise-
affirmative particular)
o Therefore, a certain usurious thing is
measured. (conclusion-affirmative par-
ticular)
5) (It returns to the fourth [mood] of the first [fig-
ure].)
o A certain cubited thing of economic
value (with reversing of this)(minor
premise-affirmative particular)
o Not a single cubited thing is usurious.
(major premise-negative universal)
o Therefore, not everything of economic
value is usurious. (conclusion, negative
particular)
6) (It returns to the fourth [mode] of the first [figure].)
o Every portable object (manqul) is a thing
of economic value. (minor premise-af-
firmative universal)
o A certain portable object is not usurious
with ecthesis (bi’l-i‘tirad).(major prem-
ise-negative particular)
o Therefore, not every thing of economic
value is usurious (conclusion-negative

book two 127

 particular)
This is what we intend to explain from the examples of
the categorical syllogisms (hamliyya) and their divisions.
Let us delve into the second type.

[p.137] [Second Type]

Conditional Conjunctive (sharti muttasil)

It is composed of two premises:

The first, composed of two propositions (qadiyyatayn)
conjoined (qarana) by a conditional conjunction.
The other is a single categorical [conditional conjunc-
tive] which is mentioned in the first premise itself or its op-
posite (naqid) and the exception particle (kalimat al-istit-
hna’)123 conjoins them.
An example is:
o If the world is temporally created, then
it has a Maker.
o However, it is temporally created.
o Therefore, it has a Maker.

[p.138] Therefore, we [say]: ‘If the world was tem-

porally created, then it has a Maker’ is compounded from
two propositions conjoined by a conditional particle like
our saying: ‘If (in),’ and ‘however (lakinna),’ the world is
temporally created. This is a single conditional proposition
with a subordinate conjunction attached to it.
[Also,] our saying: It has a Maker (fa-lahu sani‘) is the
conclusion.
This is that whose benefit increases in the discursive
123
Concerning the term istithna’, see Kwame Gyekye. ‘The Term Istithna’ in
Arabic Logic.’ Journal of the American Oriental Society 92:1 (1972), pp.88–92.

128 the standard of knowledge

sciences (‘aqliyyat) and the legal matters (fiqhiyyat).
We say:
o If this marriage is [contractually] sound,
then it indicates permissibility [of con-
summation].
o However, it is sound.
o Therefore, it indicates permissibility [of
consummation].
o If the witr prayer124 were to be per-
formed on the back of a camel, then it is
supererogatory.
o However, it is performed on the back of
a camel.
o Therefore, it is supererogatory.
The second premise of this syllogism is an exclusion of
one of the two propositions of the first premise, either the
antecedent (al-muqaddam) or the consequent (al-tali).
An exclusion (istithna’) is either the very consequent or
its contradiction or identical to the very antecedent or its
contradictory.
The concludent (muntij) from it is two: the very anteced-
ent (‘ayn al-muqaddam) and the contradiction to the con-
sequent (naqid al-tali)). As for the very consequent (‘ayn
al-tali) and the contradiction to the antecedent (naqid al-
muqaddam), they do not produce a conclusion.
[p.139] Demonstrative proof (bayan) of that is our say-
ing:
If the individual who appeared from afar is a person,

124
Witr is a highly recommended prayer prayed after the ‘isha’ prayer. One
prays an odd number of rak‘as.

book two 129

 he is an animal.
However, he is a person.
It is no secret that his being an animal is necessary.
This is an exclusion (istithna’) of the very antecedent.
We say:
‘However, he is not an animal.’
This is an exclusion of the contradiction to the con-
sequent. Thus, it is necessary that:
‘He is not a person.’
The absolute following (luzum) of this is more precise
in perception (adaqq mudrakan)—that is to know that if
he is not an animal, he is not a person.
Since, if he was a person, he would be an animal as we
made conditional in the beginning.
That is perceived by the slightest reflection (bi-adna
ta’ammul).125
As for the exclusion (istithna’) of the contradiction to
the antecedent, which is: He is not (laysa) a person.
Therefore, it neither concludes the contradiction, which
is: He is not (laysa) an animal.
Since, perhaps he might be a horse, nor the very con-
sequent, which is: He is an animal.
[p.140] for perhaps he is a rock.
Likewise, we say:
If this worshipper performed [one of the acts that nul-
lify his ablution] (muhdith) (i.e. being in a state of rit-
ual impurity), his prayers are invalid.
However, he is in a state of impurity.

130 the standard of knowledge

 Therefore, it is necessary for his prayer to be invalid.
[If we should say:] However, the prayer is not invalid.

This is contradictory to the consequent. Therefore, it is

necessitated:
He is in a state of impurity.
This is contradictory to the antecedent.
Therefore, it is not necessary that the prayer is valid or
invalid.
Should we say: However, the prayer is invalid. It is the
very consequent. Therefore, the following is not necessary:
His not being in a state of impurity (muhdithan).
His not being in a ritually pure state (mutatahhiran).
The conclusion is the exclusion to the very consequent
and a contradiction to the antecedent if it is established that
the consequent is equivalent to the antecedent, not more
general than it, nor more specific, like our saying:
If the sun has risen, then it is daytime. But the sun has
risen; Therefore, daytime is present.
But the sun has not risen.
Therefore, it is not daytime.
However, the daytime is present.126
[p.141] The sun has risen.

125
Concerning the expression, ‘bi-adna ta’ammul’ and the relationship of Avi-
cenna to the Greek philosophers, see Andreas Lammer, The Elements of Avi-
cenna’s Physics, pp. 85, 86, 92, 93, 95.

book two 131

 However, the daytime is not present.
The sun has not risen.
Know that negation and affirmation also extend to the
premises of this syllogism.
You say:127
If God is not One, the world is not ordered (munta-
zam).
However, the world is ordered. Therefore, God is
One.
The antecedent might be many sayings, and the con-
sequent entails all of them, such as your saying:
If one [genus of] knowledge (al-‘ilm al-wahid)128 is
not divided;
and everything that is not divided cannot be situated
in a divided place;
and every body is divided;
and knowledge is situated in the soul, then, the soul
is not a body.

126
See also Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers (Marmura trans.), p.
127.
127
See Marmura, Incoherence of the Philosophers (Marmura trans.), p. 127.
128
Knowledge which demonstrates in a single genus all the compounded things
from the first principles (mabadi’ uwal) which are parts of them or the necessary
for them in their essences. See also Al-Farabi’s definition of ‘first principles’: Al-
Farabi’s Philosophical Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:689: ‘those premises that are not
demonstrable in that discipline .... Of these, some are specific to that discipline in
question and some are common to it and to some other disciplines.’ (from Kitab
al-Burhan)

132 the standard of knowledge

 However, the premises are fixed and essential. The con-
sequent which is the soul is not a body is necessary (lazim).
Likewise, the antecedent may be one and the consequent
has many propositions like our saying:
If the [nondiscerning] boy’s Islam is sound, then it is
either:129
Obligatory (fard)
or
Permitted (mubah)
or
[p.142] Supererogatory (nafl).
Not a thing is possible from these divisions. Therefore,
it is not possible that [the boy’s Islam is] sound.
In the discursive sciences (‘aqliyyat) we say:
If the soul was existent prior to the body (badan), it
(the soul) is either:
Many (kathira)
or
One (wahida)
Neither this nor that is possible.
It is not possible for the soul to be present before the
body.
These are the modes of the conditional conjunctives.

129
These terms are applied in Islamic law to the range of human actions.

book two 133

God knows best.
The Third Type
The Conditional Disjunctive

This is what the jurists and the speculative theologians call

‘investigation and disjunction’ (al-sabr wa-al-taqsim) for
example our saying:
The world is either pre-eternal or temporally created.
However, it is temporally created.
Therefore, it is not pre-eternal.
[p.143] Our saying either ‘pre-eternal’ or ‘temporally
created’ is one premise.
Our saying: ‘However, it is temporally created’ is ano-
ther premise. It is the exception (istithna’)130 of one of the
two propositions (qadiyyatay) of the first premise in itself.
Thus, the contradiction of the other [proposition] is con-
cluded. In it four exclusions are produced.
[For instance], you say:
However, the world is temporally created.
Therefore, the following is necessary from it:
[The world] is not pre-eternal.
Or you say:
However, it is pre-eternal.
Therefore, it is necessary that it is not temporally created
Or you say:

130
Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers (Marmura trans.), p.237 n.5.

134 the standard of knowledge

 However, it is not pre-eternal.
[p.144] Therefore, it is necessary that it is temporally
created.
It is an exclusion of the contrary (istithna’ al-naqid).
Or you say:
However, it is not temporally created.
Therefore, [the following] is necessary from it:
It is pre-eternal.
The exclusion of exactly of the two, produces a contra-
diction of the other. The exclusion of the contradiction of
one of the two, produces the very other.
This is if the parts of incompatibility were restricted to
two. If they are three or more, but are completely incom-
patible (tammat al-‘inad), then excluding one individual
produces a contradiction of the other two, like your say-
ing:
• This number is either equal to that number, less,
or more.
• However, it is equal.
Therefore, it is necessary that it is neither less nor more.
Excluding one of the contradictions [of the propositions]
only results in restricting the truth to the other two parts,
like your saying: However, it is not equal.
[p.145] Therefore, it is necessary for it to be lesser or
greater.
Should you exclude the contradiction of the two el-
ements, the third becomes assigned (ta‘ayyan).
However, if the parts are not completely incompatible
(tammat al-‘inad), like your saying:

book two 135

 • This is either white or black.
or
• Zayd is either in the Hijaz or in Iraq.

Excluding a single element (‘ayn al-wahid) results in contra-

dicting the other, like your saying:
• However, he is in the Hijaz.
or
• However, he is black.

Thus, it results in the contradiction of all other divisions.

As for excluding the contradiction of one, it neither pro-
duces the very other, nor its negation. There is no restriction
in the divisions like your saying: He is not in the Hijaz
(laysa bi’l-Hijaz).
This does not require his being or not being in Iraq ex-
cept if the invalidity of the rest of the divisions is proven
with another proof (dalil). Upon that the rest will become
manifestly restricted (hasr) and completely incompatible.
This will not require an example from jurisprudence, for
most of the jurists’ reflection deals with investigation and
division [i.e., the examples from jurisprudence are widely
spread].
However, in the norms of the applied law, an absolute
restriction (hasr qat‘i) is not imposed. But rather hypotheti-
cal in it is like the absolute in another.

[p.146] The Fourth Type

Concerning the Impossible Syllogism

136 the standard of knowledge

 (qiyas al-khalf)(alt. al-khulf)

Its form is similar to the categorical syllogism.

If both premises are true, then it is called an ‘ostensive
syllogism (qiyas mustaqim).’
If one of the premises should apparently be true, and the
other false or disputed, and a patently false conclusion is
produced to deduce from it [the fact] that the premise is
false, it is called an impossible syllogism.131
An example of this is our saying in jurisprudence:
Every [formal prayer] that is obligatory (fard) is not
performed [while riding] a mount.
Witr prayer is obligatory (fard).
Therefore, it cannot be performed [while on a]
mount.
This conclusion is false and does not appear except from
a syllogism that has, among its premises, a false one.
However, our saying: Every obligation is not performed
on a mount.
This is a patently true premise. The falseness remained
in our saying: Witr prayer is obligatory (fard).
[p.147] Its contradiction that ‘It is not an obligation’ is
truthful. This is what is required from this question.
Its counterpart in the discursive sciences is our saying:
Everything that is eternal (azali) is not compound
(mu’allaf).
The world is pre-eternal.
131
Concerning true syllogisms from false premises, see Ibn Sina, Deliverance
(Ahmed trans.), pp.76–77.

book two 137

 Therefore, it is not compound.
However, the conclusion is patently false, for in its
premises one is false.
Our saying:
The eternal is not compound.
It is apparently truthful.
Falseness is restricted to our saying:
The world is pre-eternal.
Its contradiction is:
‘The world is not pre-eternal’ is truthful. This is what
is sought.
The method of this syllogism is for you to take the ad-
versarial position as a premise then annex another patently
true premise. The result of the syllogism will be patently
false. This became manifest due to the presence of one false
premise among them.
[p.148] It is permitted to call this the impossible syllo-
gism (apogogic syllogism)132 (qiyas al-khalf) since you turn
back from the conclusion. Then you take what you seek
from the premise that you left behind as if it is sound.
It is also permitted to call this the false syllogism (qiyas
al-khulf) since khulf’ means ‘falsehood’ which is contrary
to the truth A false [premise] is subsumed among the prem-
ises as if true.
Naming of it is incontestable after understanding the
meaning.

138 the standard of knowledge

 The Fifth Type
Induction

Induction is to examine many particulars (juz’iyyat) which

are subsumed under a universal sense (ma‘na kulli) until
you find a judgement concerning those particulars with
which judgement is applied to that universal (hukima ‘ala
dhalika al-kulli bihi).
An example of this in the discursive sciences (‘aqliyyat)
is for one to say:
An agent in the world is a body.
It is said to him: Why?
He says: Because every agent is a body.
It is said to him: Why?
He says: I have examined types of agents, including:
tailor, builder, shoemaker, carpenter, weaver, etc.
and found that each is a body (jism). Therefore, I
learned that corporeity (jismiyya) is a necessary jud-
gement (hukm lazim) for the state of agency (fa‘il-
iyya) with which I passed judgement over each agent.

This kind of inference (istidlal) is not beneficial in what

is sought. Therefore, we inquire:

132
Concerning this syllogism, see for instance Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed
trans.), p.79, khalf/khulf is translated as ‘absurd.’

book two 139

 Did you examine in all of that (fi jumlat dhalika) the
agent of the world (fa‘il al-‘alam)? If you examined it, and
you found it to be a body (jisman), then you get to know
what is sought before you examine the shoemaker, the
builder, and the like. Therefore, your being pre-occupied
with what is sought is being preoccupied with what does
not concern you.
If you did not examine the agent of the world, and did
not know its state, then why did you judge each agent to
be a body? You have examined some of the agents. There-
fore, it is not necessary from it (la yalzam minhu) except
that some of the agents are a body. But rather what is
necessary is [p.149] that every agent is a body, [only] if you
should carefully examine all [particulars] and none of them
is anomalous. Upon that what is sought will be one of the
parts of that which is examined (mutasaffah). Therefore, it
is not known with a premise built upon examination.133
Should one say: I did not examine all of them, but the
majority.
We say: Why then is it not possible for all to be a body
except for one? If that is possible, no certitude occurs with
it? However, probability (zann) occurs. Therefore, it is suf-
ficient in the applied law (fiqhiyyat) at first examination.
But rather analogy (tamthil) is sufficient as will [be dis-
cussed] later. It is the judgement of one particular over
another. The transmitted judgement is three:
1) Judgement [transmitted] from the general to the
particular. It is sound and necessary. It is the

133
Al-Farabi, Lexicon (Alon trans.), 2:623–624; Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed
trans.), pp. 83-84.

140 the standard of knowledge

 sound syllogism which we presented.
[p.150]
2) Judgement from one particular (juz’i wahid) to
another like considering the absent by the present.
This is analogy as will be [mentioned] later.
3) Judgement [transmitted] from many particulars to
a single particular. This is induction (istiqra’)
which is stronger than analogy.
An example of induction in jurisprudence is our saying:
If witr prayer should be an obligation (fard), then it would
not be performed on a mount.
It may be deduced from it as in the false analogy (qiyas
al-khulf). It is said: With what did you know that the obli-
gatory prayer (fard) is not performed on a mount?
We say: With the induction of the particulars of the
obligatory prayer from supererogatory prayers (rawatib)
and apart from it like the funeral prayer, votive prayers (lit.
that which is vowed) and making-up missed prayers, etc.
The Hanafi says:
The charitable endowment in perpetuity is valid
[while the endower] is alive. If it were necessary, it
would not follow the stipulations of the endower [be-
cause he is not the owner anymore].
Then it is said to [the Hanafi]: Why did you say that
of every necessary thing that it does not follow the
condition of the contracting party?
Then he says: I have induced (istaqraytu) the particu-
lars of the [resulting] necessary actions from selling,
marriage, manumitting a slave, and contractual di-

book two 141

 vorce settlement [initiated by the wife] (khul‘)…etc.
Whoever permits clinging to an absolute analogy (bi’l-
tamthil al-mujarrad) for which there is no analogy, it be-
comes required for him. If the principles (usul) should mul-
tiply, then the probability would increase.
However much the manifest principles, that is the par-
ticulars (juz’iyyat), increased in difference, the probability
in them would be greater such that if we say:
Wiping the head [in ablution] is fundamentally an obli-
gatory practice (wazifa asliyya) in ritual ablutions. Repeat-
ing this action is recommended (yustahabb).
It is said: Why?
We said: [p.151] We inducted (istaqrayna) that from
[the repeated] washing the face, hands, and feet. We did
not have save for this induction (istiqra’).
The Hanafi says: Wiping that is not repeated. It is said:
Why? He said: I induced [non-repetition from the singular-
ity of] wiping in dry ablution (mash al-tayammum) and the
wiping of footwear (mash al-khuff).
His presumption (zann) is stronger due to proof (dalala)
of two different parts for it.
As for three [bodily] organs in ablution, they form a
single testimony due to their homogeneity: It is like the
[single] testimony of the face, the right hand and the left in
dry ablution.
Then why is it not said to the jurisprudent: Your induc-
tion (istiqra’) is incomplete. Why have you not examined
the location of the disagreement?
Answer: Verily, induction falling short of reaching per-
fection necessitates inability of the conviction (i‘tiqad) to
attain certitude (yaqin). It did not necessitate the possibility
of remaining [equally] balanced as it was previously. But

142 the standard of knowledge

rather it determined selectively on the basis of probability
(bi’l-zann) of one of two possibilities. In jurisprudence pro-
bability is sufficient. Confirming one according to many
particular propositions is more probable (aghlab) than it
being exceptionally [acknowledged] based on rarity. (mus-
tathna ‘ala al-nudur).
If we do not have evidence (dalil) that the witr prayer is
obligatory [wajib], and that endowment [while still alive]
is necessary, and saw the permissibility of performing it
(i.e., witr) on a mount—there is no knowledge of it being
an obligation (fard), and the obligation to fulfil the con-
dition of the endower nor is there knowledge of it being a
necessary act (tasarruf lazim), then excluding the obligatory
[status of witr] and the necessity [of fulfilling the endower’s
conditions], have become more probable (aghlab ‘ala al-
zann) and more likely (arjah) than its contrary (naqid).
The possibility of disagreement does not conjecture, nor
is there a way to deny the possibility so long as the induc-
tion is incomplete.
It is insufficient for the completion of induction to exam-
ine (tatasaffah) what you found attesting to the judgement
(shahidan ‘ala al-hukm) if it is possible for onething could
be removed (i.e., does not fit into the induced generaliza-
tion) (yunqal) from it.
Just as if a person passes judgement that every animal
moves its lower jaw upon chewing since he induced the
many types of animals. However, he did not see all the
types of animals. He cannot ruleout that at sea there is an
animal, a crocodile, moves its upper jaw, according to what
is said.
Should he judge that any other animal except man, has
dorsoventral copulation with the female of the species with-

book two 143

out [meeting] face to face, he cannot ruleout that the
mounting of the hedgehog to be face to face. However, he
did not witness it.
[p.152] Therefore, the result of this is that complete in-
duction yields certitude and the incomplete (naqis) yields
probability (zann).
Therefore, induction is not beneficial if there are differ-
ences regarding any particulars, for the induction does not
yield universal knowledge by the fixing of the judgement to
the meaning which brings the particulars together until it
becomes a premise in another syllogism, not in fixing the
judgement for one of the particulars (juz’iyyat). As we say:
• Every movement takes place in time (fi zaman).
• Everythinsg in time is temporally created.
• Therefore, movement is temporally created.
We have proven our saying: “Every movement takes
place in time” by surveying the types of movement, includ-
ing swimming, flying, walking, etc.
If we wish to prove that swimming occurs temporally
with this induction, it will not be complete.
Exactitude (dabt): The proposition (qadiyya) that is
known through induction.
If a judgement is determined to its predicate which ex-
ceeds (yata‘adda) to its subject, then there is no problem (la
ba’s). Should its predicate be conveyed to one of the par-
ticulars of the subject, then this would not be possible since
the outcome is part of the same induction. Therefore, the
syllogism is no longer beneficial (fa-tasqut fa’idat al-qiyas).
Should our goal be for instance to demonstrate whether
or not the power of the intellect discerning of intelligibles
(al-quwwa al-‘aqliyya al-mudrika lil-ma‘qulat) is impressed

144 the standard of knowledge

(muntaba‘a) in the body, we say that it is not impressed in
the body since it realises itself (tudrik nafsaha) while the
faculties impressed in the body do not perceive themselves.
Then it is said: Why did you say that the faculties im-
pressed in the bodies do not perceive themselves?
[p.153] We say: We have examined the human percep-
tive faculties like sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, imagin-
ation, and estimation (wahm) and found that they do not
perceive themselves.
Then it is said: Have you examined, along with these,
the faculty of intellect?
If you examined it, you will know it before this proof
(dalil) which you do not need, even if you did not know it.
This is what is sought. Rather you did not examine every-
thing, but some [of the evidence]. Then why have you ap-
plied this judgement to everything? How is it that is
unlikely for all the impressed faculties to not know them-
selves except in one instance? Therefore, there is one judge-
ment in contradiction to the universal judgement (bi-khilaf
hukm al-jumla). This is possible as we mentioned in the
example of the crocodile and the hedgehog and in the
example of whoever alleges that the Creator of the world
is a body (jism).
Whoever possesses neither hearing nor sight will perhaps
pass judgement that the sense does not realise something
except by connecting with it with evidence (dalil) of taste,
touch, and smell. Were that made to [connect with] sound
and sight, it will be an error.
It is said: Why is it impossible for the senses to be di-
vided into that which needs connection with the perceived
(mahsus) and that which does not need?
If division is permitted, it is permitted for the two parts

book two 145

to be in a state of equilibrium.
It is permissible for the greater to be in one of the two
parts and in the other part there remains only one. There-
fore, this does not produce certitude. Perhaps it instigates
probability. Perhaps it persuades in such a way that belief
precedes it to its acceptance and continues with it.

[p.154] The Sixth Type

Analogy (Tamthil)

This is what jurists call ‘qiyas’ and scholastic theologians

(mutkallimun) call ‘returning that which is absent to that
which is witnessed.’ (radd al-gha’ib ila al-shahid).134
Its meaning: A judgement exists in two parts of a par-
ticular instance (mu‘ayyan wahid). Its judgement is then
transferred to another part which resembles it in a particu-
lar aspect (wajh ma).
An example of this is in the matters of reason (‘aqliyyat),
is for us to say:
The sky is temporally created since it is a body anal-
ogous (qiyas an ‘ala) to the plant and the animal and these
bodies whose temporal creation is witnessed.
This is not sound so long as it is not possible to show
that the plant is temporally created. It is because it is a body
and its corporeity (jismiyya) is the middle term for temporal
creation (al-hadd al-awsat lil-huduth).
If that is confirmed, then you know that the animal is
temporally created because the body is temporally created.
It is a universal judgement (hukm kulli).
From it an analogy is ordered in the form (hay’a) of
the first syllogistic figure (al-shakl al-awwal) which is as
134
Janssens, pp. 50-51.

146 the standard of knowledge

follows:
• The sky is a body.
• Every body is temporally created.
Therefore, the result is:
• The sky is temporally created.

Therefore, the judgement passes from universal to par-

ticular, subsuming itself to it. It is sound.
The impact of the specific present thing is abolished.
Mention of the animal is superfluous speech just as it is said
to a person:
Why did you set out to sea?
[p.155] He said: So that I can become wealthy.
It is said to him: Why did you say that if you set out to
sea you would become wealthy?
He said: Since that Jew set out to sea and became
wealthy.
It is said: But you are not Jewish. Then it is not necessary
to affirm the judgement concerning him and apply it to you.
Nothing will rectify [the matter] except for him to say:
He did not strike it rich because he is Jewish, but because
he set out to sea as a trader.
Then we say: Mention of the Jew is padding. But rather
the way for you to say is as follows:
Whoever sets out to sea becomes wealthy.
I also set out to sea to become wealthy.
The impact of the Jew in the syllogism is dropped.
Therefore, there is no good to be had in returning that

book two 147

which is absent to that which is witnessed except on a
condition, whenever it is fulfilled the impact of the specified
witness is dropped.
Then in this condition is a place for error also. Perhaps
the collective meaning is what displays its influence (athar)
and sufficiency (ghina) in the judgement. Then it is thought
to be sound (salih) when it is not, since the judgement is
not necessary by itself but rather for being in a concealed
state (hal khafiyy).
The individual essences (a‘yan) of the testimonies (sha-
wahid) contain hidden planes (safhat khafiyya). Therefore,
it is necessary to reject (ittirah) the specific testimony (al-
shahid al-mu‘ayyan). Therefore, you say:
The sky is temporally created since it is associated with
temporal creations (hawadith) like the animal.
Then you must reject mentioning the animal since it is
said to you: The animal is a temporal creation by virtue of
it merely being associated with temporal creations. Then
reject the animal and say:
Everything associated (muqaran) with temporal cre-
ations is a temporal creation. The sky is associated. There-
fore, it is a temporal creation. Perhaps with that the
opponent will forbid the major premise. Therefore, it is un-
sound that:
Everything associated with temporal creations is a tem-
poral creation except according to a certain aspect (wajh
makhsus).
If you allowed that the necessitor of temporal creation
its state is associated with a certain aspect, perhaps that as-
pect (you do not realise it), is present in the animal and not
in the sky.
If you know that, then make it manifest, annex it to the

148 the standard of knowledge

associated thing, make it a universal proposition and say:
Everything associated with temporal creations with
such and such an attribute is temporally created.
[p.156] The sky is associated with such and such at-
tribute.
Therefore, it is temporally created.
Concerning all states, there is no benefit in determining
in the discursive sciences a particular testimony (shahid) to
serve as a basis for a syllogism (li-yuqas ‘alayhi).
Similar to this is your saying:
God is knowledgeable of a certain knowledge (‘alim
bi-‘ilm) not in Himself. If He were a possessor of
knowledge he would possess a certain knowledge
analogus to that of a person (qiyas ‘ala al-insan).
It is said: Why did you say that what is attributed to the
person is attributed to God?
Then you say: That is because the cause (‘illa) is [mu-
tually] common (jami‘a).
Then it is said: [Is the] cause his being a learned person
(insanan ‘aliman) or his being learned only?
If he is a learned person (insanan ‘aliman), then the same
is not necessary in the case of God.
If he is learned (‘aliman) only, then leave out [the word]
‘person (insan)’ and say:
Every knower is a knower possessing knowledge (‘ali-
man bi-‘ilm).
The Creator is a Knower (‘alim)
Therefore, He possesses knowledge.

book two 149

 With that there is disagreement in your saying [the fol-
lowing]: Every knower possesses knowledge (‘alim bi-‘ilm).
If that is not a primary statement (awwaliyyan) then it
is inevitably necessary to demonstrate it with another syl-
logism.
If it is said: Is it possible to confirm the state of the con-
notational attribute (ma‘na) which generalises (jami‘) a
cause (‘illa) for judgement in such a way that we see the
judgement is abolished with its abolishment?
We say: No, the judgement is abolished with the abol-
ishment of some of the parts of the cause and its conditions.
It (i.e., the judgement) is not present with the presence of
some.
Whenever life is eliminated, man is eliminated.
Whenever life becomes existent (wujidat), it is not neces-
sary for man to be existent. Perhaps a horse or something
else would be existent.
However, the matter is contrary to that: Whenever a
judgement is brought into existence, it indicates the exist-
ence of the general connotational attribute (wujud al-ma‘na
al-jami‘).
The existence of the connotational attribute (ma‘na)
does not indicate the existence of the judgement merely
with the existence of the eliminated judgement with the
connotational attribute’s abolishment.
Whenever the person becomes existent, life exists.
[p.157] Whenever the soundness of prayer exists, a con-
dition exists which is ritual purity (tahara).
Whenever the soundness of ritual purity exists, it does
not necessitate the existence of prayer.
If it is said: What you have mentioned concerning invali-

150 the standard of knowledge

dating (ibtal) the benefit of that which is witnessed (shahid)
in returning to it that which is absent (gha’ib) is definitive
(maqtu‘ bihi).
So how is it presumed that given the numerous specu-
lative theologians (mutakallimin) and the soundness of their
intellects that there is inattention about that?
We said: Believing something to be true (mu‘taqad al-
sihha) in returning that which is absent to that which is wit-
nessed is in one of two ways:
1) Either realised (muhaqqaq) which returns to what
we mentioned upon request (mutalaba). The spe-
cific thing that is witnessed is mentioned to alert
the listener to the universal proposition concerning
it (al-qadiyya al-kulliyya bihi).
[For instance,] one says: A person possesses
kn0wledge but not about himself, alerting with it
that one possessing knowledge does not under-
stand anything of its connotational attribute
(ma‘na) except that he possesses knowledge.
Therefore, ‘the person’ is mentioned in order to
draw attention (tanbihan).
or
2) Someone falling short in reaching the pinnacle of
realisation (dharwat al-tahqiq). Perhaps [this per-
son] assumes (zanna) that there is proof (dalil) in
mentioning the specific thing that is witnessed
(shahid mu‘ayyan).
The origin of his assumption consists of two issues:
First, whoever sees the builder an actor (fa‘ilan) and a body
(jisman) perhaps generalises that one who undertakes an

book two 151

action (fa‘il) is a body (jism). [This word] “Al-fa‘il” (with
the definite article) (i.e., whoever undertakes an action) cre-
ates the illusion of exhaustiveness (istighraq) especially in
the language of the Arabs. It is among the indefinite prop-
ositions (muhmalat). It is possible to be forgiving with (yu-
tasamah) the indefinite propositions. Whoever undertakes
an action is taken as a proposition, the indefinite proposi-
tions are taken as universal, and whoever undertakes an ac-
tion is ordered as a syllogism (qiyasan).
He says:
Whoever undertakes an action is a body.
The Maker of the world undertakes an action.
Therefore, He is a body.
Perhaps one looks at wheat and sees it edible (mat‘um)
and usurious (rabawi).135 Then he says: That which is edible
is usurious. He adds to it the saying:
The quince is edible.
Therefore, it is usurious.
This is because he confuses his saying: ‘edible [foodstuff]
(mat‘um)’ with ‘everything that is edible (kull mat‘um).’
Therefore, should the keen verifier (muhaqqiq) hear him,
he would distinguish between [them] and say:

135
Abu Sa‘id Al-Khudriyy narrated a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad
singled out “staple foods” including wheat, barley, dates and salt as being usus-
rious if traded with the same kind, such as wheat for wheat, where there is surplus.
See for instance, Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Musaqat, Bab al-sarf wa bay‘ al-dhahab
bi’l-waraq naqdan, no. 2969:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=1&bo
okhad=2969

152 the standard of knowledge

 By your saying ‘the edible [foodstuff],’ did you mean
every [foodstuff] that is edible?
[p.158] Or some?
Should you say some of it, perhaps the quince is from
the ‘other some.’ However, should you say all of it, then
from where did you know that?
Should you say from the wheat, then wheat is not all
edibles. Should you see it as usurious, then it is not necess-
ary, except that all wheat is usurious and quince is not
wheat. Or ‘some of the edible [foodstuff]’ is usurious.
Another [part] is not required from it.
Likewise, his saying: Whoever undertakes an action is a
body.
He is asked: All who undertake an action or some of
them? as was affirmed. There is no need to repeat [this].
The second of the two [categories] is that perhaps he will
induce (yastaqri) from those who undertake an action
(fa‘ilin) until he has no other one who undertakes an action
remains unaccounted for. Then he sees that has induced (is-
taqra’a) all those who undertake an action and generalises
the saying: Everyone who undertakes an action is a body.
Truthfully, he should have said: Every thing that I wit-
nessed and examined is a body.
Then it is said to him: You did not witness the Maker
of the world over which judgement is not possible (la yum-
kin al-hukm ‘alayhi). His statement that ‘he witnessed’ is
annulled.
Thus, he contemplates wheat, barley and the rest of the
edible foodstuffs that are weighed and measured. He ex-
presses these foodstuffs with he word ‘all’ (al-kull) and
orders in his mind an analogy (qiyas) according to the first
figure (al-shakl al-awwal) which is:

book two 153

 Every edible foodstuff is either wheat, barley or some-
thing else.
Every wheat and barley or something else is usurious.
Therefore, every edible foodstuff is usurious.
Then he says: Quince is an edible foodstuff.
Therefore, it is usurious.
This is the starting point of his error. Otherwise, the
truth is what we have presented.
You ought not to lose the intelligible truth (haqq ma‘qul)
out of fear of opposing the well-known customs but rather
the famous customs are mainly interpolated (madkhula).
However, commonly accepted notions are their interpola-
tions to the extent that only very few pay attention to them.
[p.159] Generally you ought not to define the truth by
men but rather men by the truth. Therefore, you must be
cognizant of the truth first. Whoever goes down the [path
of] truth, know that he is right (muhiqq).
As for believing beforehand that a person is right; then
you define the truth by him; this is the error (dalal) of the
Jews and Christians and all the other imitators of [religious
authority] (muqallidin). May God the Exalted vouchsafe
you and us from it. Imitators
All the aforementioned [discussion] concerns annulling
the analogy in the rational propositions (‘aqliyyat).
As for the applied law (fiqhiyyat), it is permitted for a
specified particular (juz’i mu‘ayyan) to transmit its judge-
ment to another particular by virtue of their both sharing a
common description.

154 the standard of knowledge

 That common description (wasf mushtarak) necessitates
equivocity (ishtirak) in the judgement if a proof indicates it
(idha dalla ‘alayhi dalil). Its general proofs (adilla jumliyya)
before division are six:
The First Proof: It is the highest. It is when the possessor
of the judgement, who is the lawgiver, to it (wa huwa al-
musharri‘) like his saying concerning the cat:
‘It is among the animals that go round among you’136
when mentioning permissibility [of using] the leftover
it leaves behind.
[p.160] You draw an analogy for it with the mouse by
generalising with the category of ‘going round’ even if both
differ. This gets startled, and that is friendly, This is a
mouse, and that is a cat.
However, equivocity in a description to which the judge-
ment was added is more likely (ahra) in compulsoriness of
the equivocity in the judgement rather than divergence a
description that was not addressed as a justification for di-
vergence. Thus he says concerning selling fresh dates (rutab)
in exchange for dried dates (tamr). Does the [volume] of
fresh dates decrease if they are dried?
It is said: Yes.
Then he says: Do not sell.
Therefore, he added the invalidity (butlan) of selling the
136
The first part of this tradition is that cats are not ritually impure. See for in-
stance, Tirmidhi, Sunan, Kitab al-Tahara ‘an Rasul Allah Salla Allahu ‘alayhi wa
Sallam, Bab ma ja’a fi su’r al-hirra, no. 92:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=2&bo
okhad=92; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Tahara, Bab su’r al-hirra, no. 75:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=4&bo
okhad=75.

book two 155

fresh dates to the expected diminishment [in volume].
The same syllogism applies to grapes [that it cannot be
exchanged for raisins] because it shares [the quality] of ex-
pected reduction in volume.
Asking the question about fresh dates about grapes is
not prohibited even if one is grapes and the other is fresh
dates. This is because this is a difference in name and outer
form.
The Divine Law takes into account the connotational at-
tributes (ma‘ani) a lot, which is not the case with outer
forms (suwar) and names (asma’). This norm of divine law
gives preponderance in our presumption of equivocity
(tashrik) in the judgement upon participating in that to
which the judgement is annexed. Verifying the probability
(tahqiq al-zann) in this matter is precise. The place of exam-
ining it is jurisprudence.
The Second Proof is for the conjunction (ijtima‘) to be
commensurate (munasib) with the judgement like our
saying:
[Non-grape] wine (nabidh) is intoxicating. Therefore,
it is forbidden like grape wine (khamr).
Should it be said: Why did you say that: The intoxi-
cant is forbidden? (al-muskir yuharram)? impair
We say because it makes the intellect which guides to
the truth stop functioning. It is what is necessary to be
legally accountable (lit. completes legal accountability).
Therefore, this is appropriate to investigate the common in-
terests (masalih).
Then it is said: It is not logically impossible (la yumtana‘)
that the Divine Law took into account (ra‘a) the intoxicant
quality of that which is expressed from grapes in parti-

156 the standard of knowledge

cular [p.161] especially as [an act of] devout worship or
established prohibition (tahrim) not because of the cause of
intoxication but as an act of devout worship concerning the
wine of the grape without giving consideration (iltifat) to
intoxication. How many of the judgements concerning de-
vout worship are unintelligible?
Then he says: This is not impossible (ghayr mumtani‘).
Tet, the predominant in the Divine Law’s custom is fol-
lowing the common interests (ittiba‘ al-masalih). This being
[considered] predominant (min qabil al-akthar) is more
probable (aghlab ‘ala al-zann) than being by way of what
is rare (nadir).
The Third Proof is for the general description (al-wasf
al-jami‘) to show causal efficacy (ta’thir) in a location with-
out analogy (min ghayr munasaba). As the Hanafi [jurist]
says concerning the state of being an orphan girl (al-yati-
miyya): She is a minro child. Therefore, she ought to have
a guardian (yuwalla ‘alayha) like the non-orphaned [minor
children].
Then it is said: Why have you explained custodianship
[with the example] of youth?
Then he says: The [description] of youth has appeared
as acknowledged by all (bi’l-ittifaq) concerning other than
the orphan girl and concerning one’s [biological] son.
It is judged (quddira) that the description is not relevant
for the analogy to continue. Therefore, it is not necessary
to say:
This is an orphan girl and this here is not an orphan girl.
Therefore, it is said: An invalidating difference (iftiraq)
in this (i.e., orphanism) does not carry the equivocity (ish-
tirak) in the description of youth. Its influence appears else-
where. Orphanism did not appear elsewhere as acknowl-

book two 157

edged by all.
Yes, if it is established that the orphan does not need a
guardian over his property, both sides of the argument (i.e.,
orphanism and youth) will be even.
If it said: The impact of orphanhood has also appeared
in supporting [the argument for] guardianship (daf‘ al-wi-
laya) in a location as the influence of youth appeared in a
location. With that preponderance is required (tarjih).
Should you wish, you would compare (maththalta) this
division with the analogy of the grapes and the fresh dates
and their conjunction (ijtima‘) in the expectation of de-
crease [in volume]. It is supposed (yuqaddar) that that is
not a verbal relation (idafa lafziyya) from the Lawgiver.
Rather it is known by agreement of the two groups so that
it does not join with the analogy of the relation (mithal al-
idafa).
The Fourth Proof is for what contains equivocity not to
be enumerated (ma‘dud) or detailed (mufassal) since it is
the majority, and for what contains differenc to be a single
thing.
It is known that the genus of the connotational attribute
(jins al-ma‘na) which contains difference has no bearing on
this judgement however much commentary is turned to. It
is like the [Prophet’s] saying:
The Prophet œ said: ‘Whoever manumits his share
of a jointly possessed slave, it is essential for him to
manumit the slave completely if he has sufficient
money. [Otherwise his value should be estimated
justly and then he is to be given the opportunity to
work [for the amount that will secure his freedom]

137
The text of the hadith is incorrectly rendered by Ghazali. The translation has

158 the standard of knowledge

 without overburdening him with work.]137
Verily, [p.162] we apply the [same] analogy to the bond-
woman (ama), not that we came to know the conjunction
[of both the slave and the bondswoman] in an imagined
connotational attribute, or one that is influenced (mu’ath-
thar) or to which the judgement is added with its expression
(lafz).
This is because he has not yet proved to us its imagined
connotational attribute. This is not because we only saw
them both as in close proximity to each other.
Should the matter of marriage guardianship (wilayat al-
nikah) be examined and the state of being forbidden
required marriage, it is not explicit that “slave” shares the
same conotational meaning, and proximaty to both sides
all in the same way (‘ala watira wahida).
However, should we turn to the custom of the law (‘adat
al-shar‘), the judgement concerning slavery and manu-
mission does not change due to masculinity and femininity,
nor does it change due to blackness and whiteness, tallness
and shortness, time and place, and other such examples.
The Fifth Proof is the same as the fourth but what con-
tains invalidating difference (iftiraq) is not known with
certitude whether or not there is an inroad for it in the judg-
ment. But rather a manifest probability (zannan zahiran) is

been corrected and the tradition reproduced in its entirety from Al-Bukhari, Sahih,
Kitab al-Sharika, Bab taqwim al-ashya’ bayna al-shuraka’ bi-qimat ‘adl, no. 2323:
http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?hflag=1&bk_no=146&pi
d=100837
See also a variation on this hadith in Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-‘Itq, Bab dhikr
si‘ayat al-‘abd, no. 2768 where the passive verb ustus‘iya which means that the
slave is given the opportunity to work to secure the means to manumit himself:
http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=158&hid=2768&
pid=107155.

book two 159

assumed like our analogy of annexing manumission to a
specific part (juz’ mu‘ayyan) over annexing it to a non-dif-
ferentiated half (nisf sha’i‘) and the analogy of divorce an-
nexed to a specific part over annexing it to a non-differen-
tiated half.
Therefore, we say: The cause (sabab) is the cause; the
judgement is the judgement and the conjunction (ijtima‘) is
complete except in one thing, namely this one is specific and
is indicated and that one is non-differentiated.
If the modes of comportment (tasarruf) are not limited
to what is annexed to it, then it would be remote for there
to be for the possibility of indication and its opposite an
entryway into this judgement.
This is manifest probability. However, its opposite is
possible. The Sacred Law has made the common part a re-
ceptacle for some modes of comportment (ba‘d al-tasarru-
fat). However, it did not make the specific a receptacle
originally. So it is not remote that it would make that which
is a receptacle for some modes of comportment a receptacle
for annexing to it these modes of comportment. Therefore,
investigating this possibility become probable (zanniyyan).
The jurists who exercise independent reasoning (ijtihad) in
the interpretation of Islamic law (mujtahidun) differed in
accepting that, and in my view this genus (jins) contains
what may be judged, but it refers to the levels of prepon-
derance, which results in undefined and unlimited dis-
parities, and differs in occurrences (waqa’i‘) and principles
(ahkam). The matter is entrusted to the jurist who exercises
independent reasoning (ijtihad) in the interpretation of Is-
lamic law (mujtahid); if one of his two opinions is prepon-
138
The editor’s rendering of this paragraph is unsound. I have utilized the 1927
Kurdi edition to translate this passage, p. 111.

160 the standard of knowledge

derant, then it is permitted for him to judge by it.138

The Sixth Proof is for the collective meaning (ma‘na

jami‘) to be a specific matter (amr mu‘ayyan) or matters.
The collective does not have a relationship or influence
[p.163] except if the collective makes believe that the con-
cealed beneficial connotational attribute that is taken into
consideration from the perspective of the Sacred Law is de-
posited within.
It being deposited in that connotational attribute which
demands judgement (muqtadi lil-hukm) with God is more
probable (aghlab) than containing the connotational at-
tribute which contains opposition (mufaraqa).
The judgement of equivocity (ishtirak) concerning that
is more likely (awla) than the judgement of invalidating dif-
ference (iftiraq).
An example of that is our saying: Ablution (wudu’) is a
decreed act of ritual purification (tahara hukmiyya) because
of acts that nullify purification [such as relieving oneself or
having an intimate relation with one’s spouse].
This lacks intention (niyya) as in the example of dry ab-
lution (tayammum).
They are both equivocal in this.
However, they differ in that the former ritual purifica-
tion is with water [not so with] dry ablution. It resembles
it in eliminating impurities.
Our saying ‘a decreed act of ritual purification (tahara
hukmiyya)’ [from impurity] encompasses dry ablution
(tayammum). It caused the removal of impurities to go out.
We say that which necessitates intention (muqtada al-
niyya) in the knowledge of God the Exalted is a meaning
hidden from us. Comparing it to the decreed act of ritual

book two 161

purification is considered significant (yu‘tadd bihi), neces-
sary in its place of necessity, more probable (aghlab) from its
being associated with its being ritual purification with soil.
Ablution is then annexed to it and more overwhelmingly
probable than detaching it (i.e. dry ablution) from it.
There is a difference of opinion concerning this too.
We are of the view that that is conceptualised as bene-
fitting the preponderance (rajhan) of conjecture over con-
jecture. That is entrusted to the jurist who exercises inde-
pendent reasoning (mawkul ila al-mujtahid). In the biog-
raphies of the Companions that did not appear in append-
ing that which does not enjoy textual reference with that
which does except taking into account the majority of pro-
babilities. Moreover, there are no further regulators (dawa-
bit) after that in detailed qualification of the perceptual
means of the suppositions (madarik al-zunun). Everything
that is regulated with it is arbitrariness (tahakkum).
Perhaps he would make a mistake in supporting this
genus. Then it is said: Ablution (wudu’) is [an act of] near-
ness [to God] (qurba).
Then the aspect of the relationship of nearness [to God]
(qurba) to intention (niyya) is mentioned. This is abandon-
ing this path by inclining towards the relation. Perhaps [the
jurist] will err in making their side victorious. Then he says:

This is ritual purification with water.

Water is itself a purifier, as it is itelf a thirst quencher.

It is called a relationship (munasaba). Then he abandons

the similar difference (farq shibhi) as what we have men-

139
Sayf al-Din Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyya, 1985, pp. 257-259.

162 the standard of knowledge

tioned is abandonment of the collective similar (jam‘
shibhi).139
The noun ‘al-shibh’ in the language of most of the jurists
is specified by comparison (tashbih) with the like of these
[p.164] descriptions which it is not possible to affirm with
the aforementioned perceptibles (madarik) even if not at-
taching to the imagination is similar (tashbihan). However,
the expression was specified by it (i.e. al-shibh). It does not
contain except for a semblance (shibh). Likewise, they spec-
ified [the word] (understanding (mafhum)) for a fortiori sig-
nification of the narrative despite the fact that the word
‘manzum (ordered) also has an understanding (mafhum).
However, the a fortiori signification does not have order
(manzum) but only ‘mafhum (understanding).’ It was
named after it.
When we saw the reliance (ta’wil) on the likes of this
description whose attribute (munasaba) does not appear
permitted by supposition alone (mujarrad al-zann), and
suppositions differ according to the circumstances of the
jurists who exercise independent reasoning (ijtihad) in the
interpretation of Islamic law (mujtahids) to the extent that
something might instigate the supposition of one jurist but
itself does not instigate the supposition of another. [More-
over,] this thing does not possess a standard (mi‘yar) for
both disputants (mutanazi‘an) to turn to in the arguments
of discussion.
We have seen that what is necessary in the convention
(istilah) of the debaters (mutanazirin) is what the fore-
bearers from among the master jurists employed as a con-
vention excluding that which those who followed them
originated (ahdathahu). [The latter includes] whoever al-
leges that [he possesses] mastery in jurisprudence by seeking

book two 163

to fix the cause with an appropriate attribute [for analogy]
(ithbat al-‘illa bi-munasaba), legal effect (ta’thir), or lin-
guistic transformation (ihala). Rather our view is for the
opposer to restrict himself to the question of the proponent
(mu‘allil): Of what kind is this analogy of yours?
If it is of the kind ‘commensurate (munasib),’ ‘efficient
cause (mu’aththir),’ or the rest of the aspects, then do show
which mode.
If it is a pure semblance in a description that does not
contain a visible relationship (munasiba zahira) and you be-
lieve that it contains concealed meaning, I do not ask you
but rather I confront you with the descriptions that make
the fundamental principle (asl) and the corollary principle
(far‘) differ. Whatever is not analogous (ma la yunasib), if
it should be valid for combination, the same is valid for sep-
aration (farq).
[p.165] With this question, the proponent is exposed in
his analogy which he undertook. If its universal meaning
(ma‘na jami‘) was a pure co-extensiveness (tard mahd),140
it is not a valid analogy (la yunasib) and inclusion is not
imagined upon an obscure analogy (munasib mubham).
If what the questioner is faced with is a pure co-exten-
siveness which does not [prompt] conceptualising a matter
(amr), then the claimant (mu‘allil) must give preponderance
(yurajjih) in favour of [the questioner’s] position (lit. side)
(janib).
Likewise, if he should distinguish between dry ablution
(tayammum) and wet ablution (wudu’), dry ablution in-
cludes two [body] parts and the latter includes four. This

140
Tard: In Islamic law ‘whenever the cause is present, the legal qualification is
present.’

164 the standard of knowledge

[person] knows that it is not possible for the likes of him to
have an entryway (madkhal) into the judgement not by
himself nor by adhering to another meaning which has an
entryway which encompasses it, along with his imagining
the contrary to our saying: It is ritual purity (tahara).
This is the means of theoretical inquiry (tariq al-nazar)
into jurisprudential principles (fiqhiyyat).
Among the People of Opinion (ashab al-ra’y)141 is one
who ventured into jurisprudence and took to the extrem-
ities of the discursive sciences, without limiting them.142 He
begins to void most of the types of analogies and to limit
them to ‘the efficient cause (mu’aththir),’ and direct the ra-
tional posing of questions (mutalaba ‘aqliyya) to everything
to which he adheres in jurisprudence.
When he finishes by granting victory to his school of
thought in a detailed exposition, he becomes impotent in
taking a decision according to the condition which he es-
tablished when laying down the foundational principles
(ta’sil). Then he searches for strategies (yahtal) to grant vic-
tory to the base generalisations (tardiyyat radiyya) with var-
ieties of corrupt imaginings which he calls the efficient cause
(mu’aththir).
He pays no attention to the feebleness (rakaka) of those
corrupt imaginings (khayalat fasida). Nor does he re-con-
sider and pay heed to the corruption of the fundamental
principle which he created. Then the corruption summoned
him to be selective (iqtisar) in applying the judgement by
way of the efficient cause or the commensurate (analogy)
(munasib). He continues to fumble about.

141
Proponents of the use of opinion in legal decisions.
142
The translation of this sentence is based on the 1927 edition, p. 113 where
the text has: ‘sada atrafan min al-‘aqliyyat wa lam yukhmirha.’

book two 165

 A rebuttal to him concerning the detailed exposition of
what he mentions of legal questions is contained in our
works produced about the disagreements in matters of
jurisprudence (khilafiyyat al-fiqh) especially [the following]:
The Book of Fortifying the Reproach (Kitab Tahsin al-
Ma’khadh)143 and the Principles and Objectives (Al-Ma-
badi’ wa’l-Ghayat).
The object now from mentioning it is that the thorough
examination (istiqsa’) which we mentioned concerning the
discursive sciences (‘aqliyyat) ought to be abandoned im-
mediately in jurisprudential matters. Mixing the path that
leads to seeking certitude with the path that leads to seeking
probability (zann) is an action of one who treaded part of
both paths, without mastering either of them (lam yastaq-
illa bihima). Rather you ought to learn that certitude in the
theoretical sciences (nazariyyat) is among the rarest of
things in existence.
As for supposition it is the easiest to attain and acquire.
The probabilities that are considered in juridical matters
(fiqhiyyat) are the selectively determining factor (murajjih)
with which matters are facilitated upon hesitation between
[selecting] two things: approach or avoidance (iqdam aw
ihjam).
People take initiative in experiential positions (turuq al-
tajarib), holding onto the commodities (sila‘) waiting for
an opportunity or selling them out of fear they will depreci-
ate in value, choosing one of two ways in their travels but
in every action for which the person hesitates between two
positions, they are all based on a probability (‘ala zann).
[p.166] Should the intelligent person (‘aqil) hesitate be-
tween two matters and they are both equal with him in his
143
Also referred to in the plural as ‘Al-Ma’akhidh.’

166 the standard of knowledge

objective, selecting is not facilitated unless one of them
gains preponderance (yatarajjah ahaduhuma), seeing it
more correct in the imagination (mukhayyala) or through
a proof (dalala).
The measure (qadr) which gives preponderance to one
of the two sides is a probability of it (zannun lahu). All of
the juristic matters are theoretical inquiries from the mujta-
hids that aim at benefitting creation (islah al-khalq). These
probabilities (zunun) and the like take advantage (taqtan-
isu) of the nearest imagination or least circumstances (aqall
qarina). Upon this [probability] all the wise rely in their ap-
proach and avoidance of [in addressing] dangerous matters
in this world.
That measure (qadr) is sufficient in legal matters. Con-
striction and thorough examination (istiqsa’) in it distort
its intent, but rather void it. Likewise, thorough examin-
ation in commercial dealings is a similitude which trans-
gresses the intent of commercial dealing.
If it is said to a man: Travel so that you make a profit.
Then he said: How shall I know (lit. with what) that if I
should travel, I will make a profit?
Then it is said: Take [example from] so-and-so and so-
and-so.
Then he said: Opposite them are so-and-so and so-and-
so who might have died along the way or were killed or
[brigands] waylaid them.
Then it is said: However, those who have made a profit
are more numerous than those who have made a loss or
were killed.
Then he says: What is the hindrance to my being from
among those who make a loss, or are killed or die? How
do I benefit from the profit of others if I am from among

book two 167

them (i.e., those who do not make it)?
This is a thorough examinatsion (istiqsa’) seeking cer-
tainty. The one under consideration does not engage in
commercial transactions nor does he make a profit. The
likes of this man is considered overconcerned or a coward.
The judgement is applied the cowardly trader does not
make a profit.
This is the example of thorough examination (istiqsa’)
in jurisprudential matters, and it is sheer obsession, and
foolish.
Likewise abandoning thorough examination (istiqsa’) in
certain rational matters (al-‘aqliyyat al-yaqiniyya) is utter
ignorance.
Let every thing be taken from its premise (ma’akhadh).
Stupidity (khurq) in thorough examination is not in the
place of its abandonment less than foolishness (humq) in
abandoning it where it is required. God knows best.

[p.167] The Seventh Type

Concerning Compound144 and Defective Syllogisms

Know that the syllogistic expressions that are employed in

addresses and instructions and in books and collections are
not summarised mainly according to what we have de-
scribed but rather they might deviate from it:
1) Either through deficiency
or

144
For the compound syllogism, see for instance Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed
trans.), pp.72–73.

168 the standard of knowledge

 2) Increase
or
3) Compounding and mixing a genus with another
This matter ought not to cause you confusion with your
considering that which deviates from what we mentioned
is not a syllogism. But rather the eye of your intellect should
be restricted to the meaning (ma‘na) and turned toward it
and not to the verbal forms (ashkal lafziyya).
Every speech that has the potential to attain its desired
goal and to return to the syllogism which we mentioned,
its power is that of syllogism, it being a proof (hujja) even
if its composition is other than that which we presented.
Every speech that is composed according to the aspect
which we have presented except if it is pondered and exam-
ined, and no conclusion is attained from it, then this is not
a proof (hujja).
As for the type which deviates [by being] deficient, we
abandon one of the two premises (muqaddimatayn) or the
result (natija):
[p.168] Abandoning the major premise like for example
your saying:
These two are equal. [conclusion]
This is because both are equal to one thing. [minor
premise]
Then I have mentioned the minor premise and the result
and abandoned the major premise as your saying:
The things which are equal to a single thing are equal.
With it is a complete syllogism (tamam al-qiyas).

book two 169

 [The minor premise] might be abandoned due to its clar-
ity. Thus are most of the syllogisms in the books and
speeches. You might abandon the major premise if what is
intended is concealment so that falsehood remains hidden
within. If it should become manifest, then the one who is
addressed would be alert to the location of the falsehood.
An example of this is like your saying:
This person in this citadel is a traitor. He will sur-
render the citadel [conclusion] since I saw him speak-
ing with the enemy. [minor premise]
Completion of the syllogism [requires that] you add to it:
Whoever speaks with the enemy is a traitor. [major
premise]
This person speaks with him (i.e. the enemy). [minor
premise]
Therefore, he is a traitor. [conclusion].
However, should you declare the major premise, the lo-
cation of the falsehood appears and ‘Whoever speaks with
the enemy is a traitor’ is not sound.
This is used frequently in the legal syllogisms.
As for abandoning the minor premise, an example of
this is like your saying:
Be wary of this one’s duplicity. [conclusion]
Then it is said: Why?
Then we say: This is because the enviers engage in
duplicity. [major premise]
Then abandoning the minor premise is like your saying:

170 the standard of knowledge

 [p.169] This is an envier.
This becomes [an envier] when envy appears from
him.

It is like your saying:

This one’s [hand] should be cut off. [conclusion]
[This is] since the thief’s [hand] is cut off. [major
premise]
You abandon the minor premise.
That is agreeable if the addressee knows [that one] is re-
nowned for stealing.
Most of the jurists’ addresses (mukhatabat) are thus, es-
pecially in the books of the schools of jurisprudence (kutub
al-madhhab). [We have summarised this] out of the need
to be wary of prolongation. However, in the theoretical
sciences (al-nazariyyat) it (i.e. the syllogism) has to be de-
tailed so that the place of error becomes known.
As for that which deviates in composition (tarkib) and
mixing (khalt) it is when different premises are concealed
in the ordering of the words leading to a single conclusion.
They are: Attributive (hamliyya), conjunctive and disjunc-
tive conditional.
An example is like your saying: The world is either pre-
eternal or temporally created.
If it is pre-eternal, then it is not contemporaneous (muq-
arin) with acts of temporal creation.
However, it is contemporaneous with acts of temporal
creation since it is a body. If the body is not contempor-

book two 171

aneous with acts of temporal creation, it is void of them.
[p.170] That which is void of acts of temporal creation
is not compound and it is not possible for it to be in motion.
Therefore, the world is temporally created.
Therefore, this syllogism is composed of a disjunctive
conditional, a conjunctive conditional, categorical contra-
dictory (jazmi ‘ala tariq al-khulf),145 and categorical pro-
bative (jazmi mustaqim).146
Ponder examples of that. This occurs frequently in pub-
lic debates (munazarat) and formal instructional oratories
(mukhatabat ta‘limiyya).
Among the compounds clear conclusions and some of
the premises are not left in them. A single premise is men-
tioned for every analogy and some of the premises are ar-
ranged with others and are ordered into a single conclusion
like our saying:
Every body is composite. [minor premise]
Every composition is connected (muqarin) to and in-
separable from an accident (‘arad).
Every accident is temporally created (hadith).
Everything connected to a temporal creation (hadith)
does not precede it (fa-la yataqaddam ‘alayhi).
Everything that does not precede a temporal creation
coexists with it.
Everything that coexists with a temporal creation is
a temporal creation. [major premise]

145
See Lameer, Al-Farabi, pp. 47-50.
146
Lameer, Al-Farabi, p. 53.

172 the standard of knowledge

 Therefore, the world is temporally created. [con-
clusion]
Every one of these premises’ completion is with a com-
plete analogy whose conclusions are discarded and that
which is apparent from its premises. They are put forth for
one objective. Otherwise it ought to be said:
[p.171] Every body is composite. [minor premise]
Every composite is connected to an inseparable acci-
dent. [major premise]
Therefore, every body is connected with an insepar-
able accident. [conclusion]
Then it begins and another premise is added to it,
namely: Everything connected to an inseparable accident is
connected with a temporal creation.
Then it preoccupies itself with what immediately follows
it in order.
However, the clarity of these conclusions make up for
making them explicit (al-tasrih biha).
Perhaps the formal oratories (mukhatabat) encompass
words which contain conclusions. However, those conclu-
sions are abandoned due to: 1) their manifestation (zuhur)
or 2) They are not sought for proof (ihtijaj).
But rather you mention the premises in order to define
them in and of themselves by relying upon the acceptance
of the addressee (mukhatab). The Prophet œ said:

147
This hadith attributed to the Prophet can be found in slight variations in
Dhahabi’s Kitab al-Kaba’ir. Beirut: Dar al-Nadwa al-Jadida, n.d., p. 91; Muslim,
Sahih, Kitab al-Jannah wa Sifat Na‘imiha wa Ahliha, Bab al-amr bi-husn al-zann
bi’llah ta‘ala ‘inda al-mawt, no. 5130:
http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1
&pid=108485&bk_no=158&startno=2.

book two 173

 Man dies as he lived and is resurrected [in the same
state] he died.147
Both are premises whose conclusion is that man is res-
urrected in [the same state] he died.
The condition of life is the minor premise.
The condition of death is the middle term [of the syl-
logism].
However much, the condition of resurrection148 is
equal to the condition of death and
However much the condition of death is equal to the
condition of life,
The condition of resurrection is equal to the condi-
tion of life.
What is intended by the context of the words (siyaq al-
kalam), is alerting the creation to the worldly life being the
field of cultivation for the hereafter from which one gets
provisions.
Whoever does not acquire happiness in the worldly life,
there is no way for him to acquire it after his death. If one
was [metaphorically] blind in this life, then he is so upon
death. [By blind] I mean of impaired insight in the facility
to realise the truth (dark al-haqq), God save us from that!
[p.172] Whoever was sight impaired upon death, is also
upon resurrection sight impaired. Rather he is in worse
position for straying from the path since in the worldly life
the person has a hope of [attaining] his request and after
death realises despair.
What is intended is the words that occur in the debates
(muhawarat)
148 are all corrupted syllogisms whose composi-
The major premise.

174 the standard of knowledge

tions were altered to make them easier. One ought not to
be heedless of them by being preoccupied with the forms
(suwar). Rather one ought to realise only the perceptible
realities not the communicated utterances (alfaz manqula).

[p.173] The Second View (al-nazar al-thani)

from the Book of Syllogisms

Concerning the Matter (madda) of the Syllogism

We previously mentioned that every compound (murakkab)
is composed of two things:
First, its matter such as the relation of wood to bed.
Second, its outer from as the relation of the outer form
of the bed to the bed.
We have convincingly addressed the outer form of the
syllogism and the aspects of its composition. Let us now
address its matter (madda).
Its matter is the sciences (‘ulum), but not all of them,
rather assentual knowledge (‘ilm tasdiqi), not conceptual
knowledge (‘ilm tasawwuri).
Conceptual knowledge is the matter of the premise
(maddat al-hadd).
Assentual knowledge is the knowledge of the relation-
ship of the realities with each other in terms of affirmation
or negation—not every act of assent (tasdiq) but the essen-
tially true assentual knowledge and not even every truthful
[act], but only the certain truth (al-sadiq al-yaqini).
Perhaps that [a matter] or something is in itself truthful
with God but is not certain in the eye of the observer.
Therefore, it is not allowable that the matter be, for him,
the matter of the syllogism by which he seeks to deduct cer-

book two 175

titude (istintaj al-yaqin)—not every certitude (yaqini), but
only universal certitude (yaqini kulli). I mean that it is thus
in every situation.
Whenever we say that the matters of the syllogism are
the premises from one aspect, this is only so metaphorically
(majazan). For the premise is an expression of speech
through the tongue. It contains a subject (mawdu‘) and
predicate (mahmul).
The matter of the syllogism is the expression (lafz) which
the predicate and subject indicate, not the expressions
themselves. On the contrary, the subject and predicate are
the fixed sciences in the soul exclusive of the expressions
(alfaz). However, it is not possible to make something com-
prehensible except through expression (lafz), matter
(madda) and reality (haqiqa). They are the endpoint led to
in the fourth degree after three shells [of the physical el-
ements].
[p.174] The first shell (qishr) is the outer form (sura)
which is inscribed with writing.
The second [shell] is: speech (nutq) which consists of or-
dered sounds which are indicated by writing and indicative
of the inner dialogue that takes place in the ‘soul’.149
The third [shell] is: the inner dialogue which is knowl-
edge of the ordering of the letters and organisation of words
orally or in writing.
The fourth is: the pulp (lit. mind) (lubab) which is know-
ledge (‘ilm) present in the soul whose reality (haqiqa) goes
back to etching in the soul an identical resemblance to the
object of cognition (ma‘lum).
Thus these branches of knowledge are the matters of the
149
See S.H. Nasr, Islamic Spirituality: Foundations. New York: Crossroad Pub-
lishing Co., 1997, chapter 15.

176 the standard of knowledge

syllogism and the difficulty to intellectually abstract them
(tajrid) in the soul without ordering the expressions with
the inner dialogue in the ‘soul’, should not entice you to im-
agin a union between knowledge and inner dialogue. Verily,
the union of knowledge and inner dialogue must
not occur in the imagination since even the writer finds it
difficult to conceive of a meaning except if written inscrip-
tions are represented to him that indicate something so
much so that if he thinks of a wall, the expression ‘wall’ ap-
pears [at the same time] to him in written form.
However, since the knowledge of the wall is not depen-
dant on the knowledge of the origin of writing, it will not
be questionable for him that [this expression] is a necessary
concomitant (muqarin lazim) to knowledge and not the
knowledge itself.
Similarly, he can conceive that a person knows many
branches of knowledge but does not know the languages.
Therefore, the soul’s inner-dialogue will not occur in him
by which I mean the occupation with the arrangement of
the expressions.
Therefore, those cognitions that are verified and [that
one has granted] assent to (al-‘ulum al-haqiqiyya al-tas-
diqiyya) are the premises of the syllogism (mawadd al-
qiyas). If they are recalled in the mind according to a spe-
cific order, the soul prepares itself for knowledge to come
about in it and that the conclusion is from God the Exalted.
[p.175] Thus, whenever we say: ‘The matters of the syl-
logism are the certain premises (muqaddimat yaqiniyya),’
you do not understand from this except what we have men-
tioned.
Likewise the [attributes of] roundness and engraving for
the dinar are in addition to the matter of the dinar. The
matter of the dinar is pure gold. Likewise in the syllogism.
book two 177
 Just as the gold which is the matter of the dinar has four
states:
1) Pure unadulterated gold.
2) Mediocre gold. Not of the same high grades nor
of pure gold.
3) Adulterated gold due to bits of melted silver and
copper in it.
4) False gold. But it is a distinct genus resembling
gold.

[Likewise the syllogism] contains belief which is close to

certitude (yaqin) and acceptable to all in appearance. The
mind does not immediately perceive the possibility of nul-
lifying it, rather with precise thought.
The syllogism composed by it is called ‘dialectical (ja-
dali)’ since it is suitable for [engaging] adversaries [in] dis-
putations.
It may also contain belief in which categorical assent
(tasdiq jazm) does not occur, but rather probability (ghalib
zann), and self-contentment along with placing its nullifier
in mind or the soul accepting the nullifier if it should be on
one’s mind even if many times inattention about it occurs.
The syllogism from which it is composed is called ‘rhe-
torical (khitabi)’ since it is appropriate for manifesting in-
formation (ta‘limat) and formal oratories (mukhatabat).
Sometimes it might resemble certitude or what is known
as approximate to certitude (al-muqarib lil-yaqin) out-
wardly, but is not thus in reality. This is pure ignorance by
which the syllogism composed from it is called fallacious,
sophistic (mughalati, sufista’iyy) since what is intended by
that is only mixing (mukhalata) and sophistry. That is an-
nulling truths.

178 the standard of knowledge

 These are four stations which it is necessary to differ-
entiate from each other.
[p.176] As for the fifth which is called ‘poetic syllogism
(qiyas shi‘ri),’ it is not our objective. It is not mentioned to
produce a benefit from knowledge or probability, but the
addressee may know its reality. Rather it is mentioned for
[the following reasons]:
1) Encouragement (targhib) or deterrence (tarhib)
2) Disinclining (tanfir) or withholding (tabkhil)
3) Incetivise one to become generous (taskhiya) or
encouragement (tashji‘)
It produces an effect in the soul based on repetition of
these states and its affirmation of contraction and expan-
sion with knowledge of its invalidity.
That is like one’s nature disliking the snaller sweet (al-
hulw al-asghar) if it is compared to feces such that he im-
mediately finds it hard to consume it even if the sayer’s
mendacity is known.
Based on this depends the art of poetry. The majority of
the boastful preachers hold fast to it. They employ the art
of poetry in prose.
An example of this is if one should wish provoke some-
one to behave recklessly, and distracts him from being pru-
dent, he calls prudence ‘cowardice ‘and rebukes and
humiliates his companion and says:
The cowards regard cowardice as decisiveness.
Such is the trickery of the mean soul.
Then the soul of one who is refraining (mutawaqqif) ex-
pands to attacking with that, like his saying:

book two 179

 If I do not fall by the swords honourably
I will die enduring humiliation., not being
honoured.
[p.177] Likewise if he should desire to incentivise one to
become generous, he exaggerates in praising the generous
person. He likens him to that which he knows does not re-
semble him. However, it moves his soul, like his saying:
From whichever direction you approach him, he is
the sea
His depths are gift and his shores munificence.
So accustomed is he to be open-handed that if he
invited [thehand] to clinch
To close them, his fingertips would rebel.
You see him rejoicing, should you approach him
As if you give him what you are asking.
Should he only possess his soul in his hand
He would be munificent with it. Then let his
asker fear God.
All of these words are reports whose mendacity is
known. However, they move the soul in an extraordinary
and undeniable way.
Since this category does not accord with our objective,
let us then avoid further elaboration on it and return to the
four divisions.
Since we have made detestable the state of poetry one
ought not to believe that all poetry is false. Verily, some
poetry contains wisdom, and, verily, some narrative is en-
chanting.
Truth might be incorporated in poetic metre. This does
not deviate from it being true like the poet degrading
(tahjin) miserliness:

180 the standard of knowledge

 Whoever spends time amassing wealth
out of fear of poverty; He is the one who made
poverty (i.e., spiritually lacking).
These are truthful veracious words which influence the
soul. The pleasant metre (wazn latif) and the quiescent
poetic form promote it and increase its impact on the soul.
Therefore, do not look at the outer form of the poetry and
take note of the meaning in all of the matters so that you
are on the straight path (al-sirat al-mustaqim).
Let us now return to the objective [at hand] and say: The
premises can be divided into [the following two categories]:
Truthful certainties (yaqiniyyat sadiqa) which are necessary
to accept (wajibat al-qubul) and other categories.

[p.178] First Sub-Division

[The Certain Premises that are Suitable for Proofs]

The first division taking into account the perceptible is of

four types:
First Type (sinf): The purely primary-rational premises
(al-awwaliyyat al-‘aqliyya al-mahda) which are proposi-
tions (qadaya) that occur in man from the perspective of
his abstract rational faculty (quwwa ‘aqliyya mujarrada)
without adding meaning to them which necessitates its be-
lieving them.150
However, should the essences of the simples (basa’it)
occur for [one of three reasons]:
1) Aiding the senses
2) Aiding the imagination

150
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 95.

book two 181

 3) Another aspect.
The intellective faculty (al-quwwa al-mufakkira) made
it a proposition (qadiyya) when one of them is related to
the other, negative or positive which the intellect believes
out of necessity without feeling from where he got it.
Rather it is able to as if it possesses knowledge of it per-
petually as our saying:
Two is greater than one.
Three plus three equals six.
A single thing cannot be pre-eternal and temporally
created at the same time.
The negative and positive together are not valid in a
single thing only.

And other like examples. [As for] this genus (jins) of the
sciences, the intellect does not stop believing in them except
by conceiving of the simples (basa’it) by which I mean the
premises (hudud) and the individual essences (al-dhawat al-
mufrada).
However the essences are conceived and the compound
realised, [the genus (jins)]’s veracity is not suspended.
Perhaps it requires pausing until it is realised in the
meaning of temporally created and pre-eternal. However,
after knowing both [of these terms], true judgement is not
suspended.
Second type: the perceptibles (mahsusat) like our saying:
The moon is round. The sun is illuminated. The pla-
nets are many. Camphor is white. Coal is black. Fire
is hot. Ice is cold.

182 the standard of knowledge

 [p.179] If the abstract intellect (al-‘aql al-mujarrad) does
not attach itself to the senses, then it is unable to produce
these propositions (lam yaqdi bi-hadhihi al-qadaya). It at-
tains them by means of the senses. These are perceptible
propositions (awwaliyyat hissiyya).
An example of this is our knowledge that we possess [the
following]: Thought (fikr), fear (khawf), anger (ghadab),
appetite (shahwa), apprehension (idrak), and sensory per-
ception (ihsas).151
That is also revealed to the soul (inkashafa lil-nafs) with
the help of inner-faculties (qiwa batina). It is as if it occurs
later than the propositions which the intellect verified with-
out need of another faculty (quwwa ukhra) except for the
intellect.
Do not doubt the veracity of the perceptibles (mahsusat)
if you should exempt accidental matters (umur ‘arida) like:
the weakness of the sense, the remoteness of that perceived
and the density (kathafa) of the medium.
The Third Type: The empirically tested premises (mu-
jarrabat) which are matters whose veracity was tested by
the sense with the aid of a hidden syllogism (qiyas khafi)
like our judgement that: Hitting causes an animal pain. Cut-
ting is painful. Cutting the neck causes death. Scamony152
is a laxative.153 Bread satiates. Water quenches. Fire burns.
The sense associates (lit. perceives) death with cutting

151
See Ghazali, Alchemy of Happiness and Kitab Sharh ‘Aja’ib al-Qalb. These
ideas originate with Plato. Anger and appetite are the constituent elements of the
irrational soul. See Plato, Ethics in his discussion of the division of the soul.
152
Lat. Convolvulus Arvensis.
153
For a discussion of this syllogism, see Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical The-
ology, p. 206.

book two 183

the neck and pain is known upon [such] a cut with the dis-
positions of the object of hitting (hay’at al-madrub). That
is continued to be mentioned. Then a strong constitution is
ascertained from it. There is no doubt about it.
We need not mention the reason that causes certitude
after knowing that it is certain. [apodeictic]
[p.180] Perhaps, the experimental matter (tajriba)
necessitated a decisive judgement (qada’ jazmi).
Perhaps, it necessitated a majority proposition.
The [experiment] is not devoid of a hidden syllogistic
proposition which is present at visual perceptions the sense
perceptions (mushahadat). They are:
If this matter were by chance (ittifaqiyyan) or non-
necessary accidental (‘aradiyyan ghayr lazim), it
would not have continued in the main without diver-
gence (ikhtilaf), even if that concomitant (lazim) is not
present, then the soul regarded as unlikely its being
late in it and considered it rare and it would have
attributed [its absence] impeding accidental factor.
If this sensation (ihsas) is conjoined repeatedly and
the number of times is not fixed similar to the indefi-
nite number in a hadith that has multiple independent
chains of narrators (tawatur), every event occurs here
like a witness informer.
The analogy which we previously mentioned is added to
it.
The soul concedes to verification of veracity.

154
Reading ‘hazz (deep cut)’ for ‘jazz (beheading).’ For an explanation see Grif-
fel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, p. 201 and n. 145. For a further example
from Ghazali’s Iqtisad, see Griffel, pp. 202 and n. 150; 203 and n. 154.

184 the standard of knowledge

 Should one say: ‘How is it that you believe this with cer-
tainty?’ The speculative theologians (mutakallimun) doub-
ted it and said: ‘Cutting (hazz)154 is not a cause of death.
Food is not a cause for satiation, and fire is not a cause for
burning.’
[p.181] However, God the Exalted creates ‘burning,’
‘death,’ and ‘satiation’ upon these matters occurring not
with them.
We say: We have alerted to the depth of this chapter and
its reality in Precipitance of the Philosophers. What is
required now is that the speculative theologian who if he
were to be informed that his child’s neck was cut, would
not doubt his death. Not a single rational person would
doubt that. He acknowledges the occurrence of death and
seeks to make a connection (wajh al-iqtiran).
When it comes to the question of whether this is an in-
separable and necessary [connection] that cannot be
changed or whether this is through the course of God’s Way
(Sunna) through the carrying out God the Exalted’s pre-
eternal will (mashi’atihi al-azaliyya) which is not affected
by change (taghyir) or alteration (tabdil). This is a question
about the kind of connection, not the connection itself.
Then this should be understood and it should be known
that doubting the death of a person whose neck was cut is
pure delusion (waswas) and that the conviction (i‘tiqad)
that he is dead is a certitude (yaqin) which should not be
doubted.
[p.182] Among the types of empirically tested premises
(mujarrabat) are the intuitive premises (hadsiyyat) which
are premises in which the principle of judgement in them is
an intuition (hads) from the soul which occurs due to the
clarity and strength of mind, and that it is entrusted with

book two 185

witnessing over some matters. Then the soul yields to its
acceptance and its assent (tasdiq) of it such that it is unable
to doubt it.
However, should a disputer dispute it, believing in it or
opposing it, it is not possible for him to know with it as
long as his intuition is not strengthened and does not take
control of the belief which one who possesses great intu-
ition possesses. That is like our premise that: The moon’s
light is acquired from the sun.
The reflection of the moon’s rays to the world mirrors
the reflection of the mirror’s rays to the rest of the bodies
(ajsam) that face it. That is due to the difference in forma-
tion when its relationship to the sun (near, far, middle)
differs.
Whoever contemplates the evidences of that, will not
possess doubt concerning it.
Among the syllogisms that it contains is what is con-
tained in the empirically tested premises (mujarrabat). If
these differences came out of agreement or an external
matter except for the sun, it would not have continued [fol-
lowing] one pattern over time.
Whoever is a practitioner of the sciences, will acquire
from this genus (jins) by way of intuition (hads) and con-
templation (i‘tibar) many propositions against which he
cannot produce demonstrative proofs (la yumkinuhu iq-
amat al-burhan ‘alayha) or doubt it, or participate with it
to teach another except by guiding the seeker [of knowl-
edge] to the path he has travelled down and followed even
if he should take charge of the spiritual journey himself and
taking him from that spiritual journey to that belief if his
mind were strong and clear to a perfect degree.
Concerning the likes of this, it is not possible to silence

186 the standard of knowledge

every disputant (mujadil) with words meant to silence. You
ought not to desire the ability to dispute every truth.
Among the certain convictions (al-i‘tiqadat al-yaqiniyya) is
that which we are unable to make others know through de-
monstrative proof (bi-tariq al-burhan) except if he should
participate with us in practicing it so that he may partici-
pate with us in the beneficial sciences (‘ulum mustafada
mihu).
It is appropriate to state here: Whoever has not tasted,
will not know. Whoever does not reach, will not appre-
hend.
The Fourth Type: The propositions (qadaya) that are
not known by themselves but through a middle term
(wasat). However, its middle terms (awsat) do not escape
one’s mind. When either of the two parts of what is sought
is recalled, its affirmation (tasdiq) is recalled by it because
of the middle term is recalled with it like our saying: Two
is one third of six.
[p.183] This is known through a middle term (wasat).
It is:
Each one is divided into three equal parts. One of the
parts is a third.
The six is divided by twos: three equal parts.
Therefore, two is one third of six.
However, this middle term (wasat) is not isolated form
the intellect (dhihn) due to this small number. and due to
man being accustomed to contemplate it. Even if it is said
to you:
Twenty two. Is it one third of 66? Did you not hasten

book two 187

 to it like you did with the judgement that two is one
third of six? Perhaps you were deficient in the divi-
sion of 66 into three. If it is divided and it is con-
cluded that every division is 22, then you know that
is one third of it.
Likewise with the increase of the calculations.
Therefore, if this were known through a second opinion
not with the first opinion, it does not require pondering
(ta’ammul);155 it follows the same course as the propositions
(awwaliyyat). It is suitable for it to be among the substances
of the syllogism.
Rather the propositions (qadaya) which are the con-
clusions (nata’ij) of the syllogisms are compounded from
premises (muqaddimat) that are of the three aforemen-
tioned types and are suitable to be the substances of syllo-
gism (mawadd aqyisa) and their premises.

[p.184] Second Division

The Premises which are not certain
and are not suitable for proofs (barahin)
[The premises] are of two types:
A type which is suitable for jurisprudential probable
evidence (zanniyyat fiqhiyya).
A type which is unsuitable for that also.
The first type: It is suitable for legal matters but not epi-
stemic certainties (yaqiniyyat) and is of three types: Com-
monly accepted statements (mashhurat), premises given by
the accepted judgements (maqbulat), and conjectured state-
155
It is printed amal in the Arabic text, which means hope! There are missing
letters from couple of words on subsequent lines.

188 the standard of knowledge

ments (maznunat).
First sub-class: commonly accepted statements like our
judgement about the beauty of spreading greetings (husn
ifsha’ al-salam), feeding food (it‘am al-ta‘am), maintaining
good family ties (silat al-arham), adhering to truthfulness
in speech (mulazamat al-sidq fi’l-kalam), safeguarding
justice in judgements and legal rulings (mura‘at al-‘adl fi’l-
qadaya wa’l-ahkam).
Out judgement concerning the ugliness of harming the
person, killing an animal, creating deception (wad‘ al-
buhtan), husbands being content with wives’ infidelity
(fujur al-niswan), and requiting every grace with unbelief
and transgression (tughyan).156
These are propositions which if man is left to his pure
reason (‘aql mujarrad), his estimative faculty (wahm) and
his sense perception (hiss), the intellect would not be able
to come up with them with only the pure intellect and sense
perception. However, it was able to come up with them be-
cause of accidental causes (asbab ‘arida) which confirm and
fix these propositions in the soul which are five in number:
[p.185] First, a tender heart, as a result of natural dis-
position (ghariza).157 That is with respect to most people (fi
haqq akthar al-nas) so that it was antecedent to the esti-
mative faculty (wahm) of a people that slaughtering an ani-
mal is rationally evil. [That is] if the divine law had not
turned people away from that to considering slaughter and
sacrifice to be good. If this were so, then this belief would
have spread among the majority of people.
Concerning [slaughter], the Mu‘tazilis and the majority
of other groups have found problematic the aspect of justice
156
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 92-93.
157
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 92-93.

book two 189

in causing pain to animals through slaughter and inflicting
pain of [mental[ illness on the insane. They alleged with the
judgement of the mildness of their nature that that is evil.
Among them are those who were apologetic that they
will have recompense after the Gathering (hashr) in the
hereafter.
Those did not pay heed to the ugliness of a ruler’s slap-
ping a weak personon his to give him a loaf of bread despite
his being able to do so without slapping him.
A group of them made the excuse that these are punish-
ments for crimes they committed while they were legally re-
sponsible. They replied by way of transmigration of the
souls (tanasukh) after death to these forms so that they
would be tormented in them.
They did not know that the punishment of one who does
not know that he would be punished (mu‘aqab) so that he
might refrain because of it, is evil.
Should they allege that they know [the soul] will be pu-
nished for previous crimes, it would have had a thinking
faculty (quwwa mufakkira), which [in turn] would make it
imperative to recoginze the possibility of insects and worms
knowing the realities of matters, and all the geometric and
philosophical sciences. This is a rejection of that which is
perceived by the senses.
[p.186] So long as the punisher does not have an objec-
tive in seeking revenge, rejoice [at the suffering of the pu-
nished], or averting harm in the future, or the punisher does
not stand to benefit, then this is also evil (qabih). God is
able to beneficently bestow [His] bounties on creation with-
out [making them feel] pain, imposition (taklif) or force.
Harming them by imposition first and by punishment last
is more appropriate to be evil than what they have men-

190 the standard of knowledge

tioned. They made it evil to inflict pain on a person who is
innocent of committing crimes.
The second reason (al-sabab al-thani) is that the person
was created with a natural disposition for fanaticism
(himya) and pride (anfa). Because of it he judges as evil
being pleased by (rida) the licentiousness of his wife. He
thinks this is a necessary judgement for the intellect despite
the fact that a group of people are accustomed to prostitu-
ting their wives so that they could be familiar with that and
not find it repulsive. All adulteres deem committing adul-
tery with another’s wife as appropriate. They do not regard
it as evil since it agrees with their lusts. But rather they deem
as evil the one who alerts the husbands to it mkes known
to them what the adulterers do. They allege that that is
slander (ghamz, si‘aya) and defamation (namima). This is
truly evil.
Righteous people say: This is unfaithfulness and betrayal
of trust (amana). Their judgements are contradictory con-
cerning what is good and evil. They allege that they are
propositions of the intellect (qadaya al-‘aql).
Rather the source [of the propositions] is the morals that
were inculcated in them.
The third reason is love of making peace (tasalum), rec-
onciling (tasaluh), cooperation over livelihood. Therefore,
they find it good to show affection (tawaddud) for spread-
ing peace and feeding [the poor]. They regard as evil curs-
ing, repulsiveness (tanfir) and countenancing favour with
ingratitude, etc.
If it were not for their inclining toward matters to which
these reasons provoke ways or cause to depart from them,
the intellects would not have passed the judgement of good
or evil with their disposition (fitra) in these affairs. There-

book two 191

fore, we see a group who does not like [p.187] making
peace (tasalum) but who inclines toward conquest (tagha-
lub). The most pleasurable and best matters with them are
raiding, plundering, killing, and murder (fatk).
The fourth reason is the religious moral directives of up-
bringing (al-ta’dibat al-shar‘iyya) for the reform of people.
They have been repeated to their hearing since youth on the
tongues of parents and teachers, and [the children’s] up-
bringing was accordingly; it made firm those beliefs which
led to the belief that they are rational (‘aqliyya) like per-
fecting bowing and prostration and making devotional ani-
mal sacrifice and spilling [animal] blood.
Should the rational person, who was not raised with ac-
cepting these [directives] since his youth, be surprised with
them, his bare intellect would not attain them in a good or
evil manner. However, they are made good with the good
of the divine law. The estimative faculty (wahm) conceded
to accept it with the directive of upbringing from youth.
The fifth reason: Induction (istiqra’) of many particular
propositions (juz’iyyat) [is many]. When something is con-
nected with something else in most of its states, it is said
that it is absolutely connected with it. Likewise, judgement
is passed with spreading with good absolutely since it is
good in the majority of instance and it is distracted from
its evil at the time of relieving oneself (i.e. urinating or de-
facating).
Judgement is passed about truth with good since it is in
accord with objectives, desired in most instances. Whoever
asks about the place of a prophet or Friend of God (wali)
is ignorant of its evil only for the asker to find and kill him.
Perhaps he believed the evil of the lie then by hiding the
place, for the coincidence (musadafa) of untruth combined

192 the standard of knowledge

with evil most of the time.
These causes (asbab) and the like are the causes (‘ilal)
for the soul to pass judgement with these propositions (qa-
daya), not all of which are truthful or untruthful.
However, what is intended by what is truthful from
among them is that its truth is not manifest as a primary
formulation (bayan awwali) in the intellect. Rather it is in
need of realising its truthfulness for reflection (nazar) even
if it is praised by the primary intellect (al-‘aql al-awwal).
The truthful [proposition] is not [necessarily] praise-
worthy. The untruthful is different from the abhorrent
(shani‘). Perhaps there is that which is abhorrent which is
also truthful. Perhaps there is that which is praiseworthy
which is also untruthful.
There might be a praiseworthy [proposition] which is
truthful. However, with a precise condition most people
will not understand it and it is believed unreservedly despite
the fact that it is not truthful except with that condition,
like our saying: [p.188] Truth is good (al-sidq hasan).
This is not so in an absolute sense rather with con-
ditions. If some of the conditions are removed then the
truthfulness which is making known the place of the
prophet whose killing is intended is rendered repugnant
(qabiha). [This is in addition to] other such examples.
However you desire to know the difference between
these famous proposition (al-qadaya al-mashhurat) and the
primary-rational premises (al-awwaliyyat al-‘aqliyya), then
display our saying before your intellect: ‘Killing a person is
evil (qabih)’ and ‘Saving a person from being destroyed is
beautiful.’ [This is] after you estimate as if came to this
world at once, a mature and rational person (balighan ‘aq-
ilan). [Moreover,] you did not hear admonition (ta’diban)

book two 193

at all nor did you live with a people, nor had you experi-
enced organization or politics. However, you witnessed the
perceptibles (mahsusat) and took from them the imagin-
ations (khayalat).
Therefore, it is possible for you to doubt these premises
or examine them (al-tawaqquf biha). However, it is not
possible for you to [contradict] (al-tawaqquf fi) our saying:
Negation and affirmation are not true in the same in-
stance.
Two is more than one.
Therefore, when these premises are close to [being] true,
are possibly untrue, then they are not suitable for demon-
strations (barahin) which require certitude, they are suitable
for applied law (fiqhiyyat).

Second sub-class: Accepted judgements (maqbulat). They

are matters which we believe in them because we trusted
those who informed us about them from a group whose
number is less than the number [required] for multiple in-
dependent chains of narrators, or a single person who is
distinguished from others by his manifest righteous conduct
(‘adala zahira), or abundant learning (‘ilm wafir) which we
accepted from our forefathers, teachers and imams and con-
tinued to believe it.158
Like the unique reports (akhbar al-‘ahad) in the divine
law which are sound for legal syllogisms (maqayis fiqihiyya)
without the intellectual demonstrations (barahin ‘aqliyya).
In influencing informed opinion (itharat al-zann), the
unique reports have levels which are hardly hidden. The

158
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 89.

194 the standard of knowledge

widely-circulated traditions in the sound compendia of ha-
dith cannot be on [the same level] like a tradition trans-
mitted by one person. Nor is what one of the rightly guided
caliphs transmits like another transmits.
[p.189] The levels of probability concerning it are in-
numerable.
Third sub-class: Conjectured judgements (maznunat)159 are
matters which are believed (yaqa‘u al-tasdiq biha) not fixed.
Rather the possibility of its contradiction occurs in the
mind. However, the soul inclines toward it (amyal), like our
saying: Verily so-and-so goes out at night for suspicious be-
haviour.
The soul truly inclines toward [this sub-class] which
forms the basis for the management of actions (tadbir lil-
af‘al). With that the soul perceives the possibility of contra-
dicting [this sub-class].
When the well-known propositions (mashhurat) and the
accepted statements (maqbulat)160 are considered to the ex-
tent that their contradiction is felt sometimes, it is possible
to call them ‘a conjectured statement’ (maznuna).
How many a well-known proposition in an unexamined
opinion (badi’ al-ra’y) engenders a belief. Should one
ponder it and investigate it, that submission (idh‘an) is re-
turned to either conjecture (zann) or falsification (takdhib),

159
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 93.
160
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 89.
161
This is a hadith of the Prophet: ‘Support your brother whether he is oppressor
or oppressed.’ See for instance, Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Mazalim, Bab a‘in akhaka
zaliman aw mazluman, no. 2311:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=0&bo
okhad=2311. A similar hadith may be found in Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Birr wa-
al-Sila wa’l-Adab, Bab nasr al-akh zaliman aw mazluman, no. 4681:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=1&bo
okhad=4681.

book two 195

like one saying:
You ought to come to the aid of your brother [whether
or not he is] the oppressor or the oppressed.161
This is praiseworthy and famous. The intellect quickly
accepts it. Then it contemplates and its opposite is revealed,
namely:
The oppressor ought not be helped to become victorious.
Rather he ought to be prevented from [spreading] his evil
and the oppressed made victorious over him. This is what
is intended by the hadith addressing this. He (i.e. the
Prophet) was asked about that: How does one help the op-
pressor? He replied: Helping him is preventing him from
being unjust.162

The second type (al-naw‘ al-thani): What is unsound for

utterances (lafziyyat) and probable knowledge (zanniyyat).
Rather it is only sound for deception (talbis) and fallacious
reasoning (mughalata). It is [as follows]: Ambiguous prop-
ositions resembling other propositions (mushabbahat).
That is resembling (mushabbah) previously [mentioned]
divisions outwardly but are not from among them. They
can be divided into three parts:
First, the pure estimative premises (al-wahmiyyat al-
sirfa)163 which are the judgements (qadayat) with which
human estimation (al-wahm al-insani) judges decisively and
free from a doubtful and sceptical comparison (muqaranat
rayb wa shakk) like its judgement at the outset of its pri-
mordial nature (ibtida’ fitratihi) that it is impossible to have

162
See for instance Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Ikrah, no. 6552:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?bk_no=52&ID=3828
&idfrom=12708&idto=12731&bookid=52&startno=11.
163
Janssens, p. 52. Also translated as estimations.

196 the standard of knowledge

an existent exists without being able to point to its direction
(la ishara ila jihatihi), and that for a self-subsisting existent
to be neither connected with this world nor be separable
from it, and is neither inside the world nor outside it. [All
this is] impossible (muhal).
[p.190] This resembles the primary-rational premises (al-
awwaliyyat al-‘aqliyya) like the judgement that ‘A single
person cannot be in two places at once’ and ‘One is less
than two.’
[The primary-rational premises] are stronger than the
well-known propositions (mashhurat) which we have rep-
resented in the [following] examples: ‘Justice is good
(jamil)’ and ‘Injustice is evil (qabih).’ They are with this
strength false however it was in matters antecedent (mu-
taqaddima ‘ala) to the sensibilia (mahsusat) or more general
than them. This is because the imagination (wahm) is on
intimate terms with the sensibilia and it produces a judge-
ment to that which is not perceived with the like of that it
is on intimate terms with the sensibilia.
Its reality as false is known from propositions that the
magination (wahm) believes in some isolated [cases] (ahad).
However, [the imagination] does not yield to the conclusion
(natija) since it is not within the power of imagination to
percieve (idrak) the like of it. This is the strongest of the
false propositions (al-muqaddimat al-kadhiba). The esti-
mative natural disposition (al-fitra al-wahmiyya) passes
judgement over the false propositions according to its
judgement in the primary-rational premises (al-awwaliyyat
al-‘aqliyya). Therefore, if the estimative premises are in the
sensibilia, they are truthful and certain and reliance on them
is sound like relying on the pure rational proofs (al-‘aqliyyat
al-mahda) and the perceptibles (hissiyyat).

book two 197

 The second division: That which resembles the conjec-
tured judgements (maznunat). If it is investigated, conjec-
ture is expunged like one saying: You ought to aid your
brother whether he is an oppressor or oppressed.
This also resembles the well-known propositions (mash-
hurat). It could also resemble the well-known propositions
or the conjectured judgements (maznunat) from among the
admitted propositions (musallamat) upon which the oppo-
nents in public disputations (munazarat) agree either by
way of hypothesis (wad‘) or belief (i‘tiqad).
However if their acceptance among those present should
be repeated (lit. among the hearing of those present), they
will have an affinity for the [well-known propositions or
the conjectured statements] and their souls will incline to-
ward granting permission (idh‘an) to it more than inclining
toward categorical refutation (takdhib). Then he believes
that that inclining is assumption (zann) since the meaning
of assumption (zann) is inclining in conviction (mayl fi’l-
i‘tiqad). However, it is an inclining with a cause (sabab) like
your believing:
Whoever sets out at night does so for suspicious be-
haviour.
The soul inclining to this accusation is for a reason.
[p.191] Should it be repeated to the hearing of a group
that the blue-eyed blond-haired person for example, is only
a traitor, evil. Should they see him, their souls would incline
to belief [in his] treachery more than inclining toward belief
[in his] inviolability (siyana).
This is realised without a confirmed cause, but rather
[is] pure imagination by reason of hearing. For that reason
it is said whoever listens makes a prejudiced [judgement]

198 the standard of knowledge

(yakhill).
Therefore, there is a difference between this and the
realised probable (maznun muhaqqaq).
Close to this are the objects of imagination (mukhayya-
lat) which is likening one thing with another repugnant or
likeable thing since they share a common description which
is not the reason for being repugnant or likeable. Then the
soul inclines greatly because of it.164
That has nothing to do with conjecture (zann).
This despite the fact that it is the most lowly of ranks it
stirs people to most deeds and from it most of the human
behaviours emerge moving forward and refraining.
They are the poetic premises (muqaddimat shi‘riyya)
which we previously mentioned. You do not find an intel-
ligent person who is removed form being affected by it.
Even a woman to whom a man is asking her hand in en-
gagement should it be mentioned that her name is of an In-
dian or Sudanese person who is deemed ugly, the innate
[reaction] is to be eschewed from her because of the ugliness
of the name. Then beauty resists this imagining and pro-
duces a kind of loving. [This is so] even the branck of
knowledge of mathematics and logic which does not con-
tain any opposition to the schools of [theology] either
through refutation or confirmation, should one say:
It is among the branches of knowledge of the heretical
philosophers (al-falasifa al-mulhidin).
The nature of the religious eschews it.
[p.192] This inclination and eschewing which emerge
from this genus are neither conjecture (zann) nor knowl-
edge. What influences them is not suited to be made a prop-

164
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 94.

book two 199

osition (muqaddima) not in the indisputable proofs (qat‘iy-
yat), nor in presumptive matters (zanniyyat) nor legal mat-
ters (fiqhiyyat).
Third division: The errors occurring either from the in-
correct expression or from the meaning of the expression.
This happens from a truthful proposition in something
that shares a common name. Then the intellect transfers it
from that named thing to another with the very same name
such that it is precise (yaduqq wajh al-ishtirak) in the com-
monality like ‘light’ when it is applied at times to the mean-
ing for a seen light and at times to the intended meaning of
God the Exalted’s words:
‘God is the light of the heavens and the earth.’
(Qur’an 24:35)
Likewise it might be from confusion about a position of
pausing (mawdi‘ waqf) in words, like God the Exalted
saying:
‘…and none knows its interpretation, save God. And
those firmly rooted in knowledge say, ‘We believe in
it…’ (Qur’an 3:7)
If pause on God is ignored, then ‘those firmly rooted in
knowledge’ would be attached to God and a false proposi-
tion would occur.165
It might be through neglect of case endings like God the

165
The three types of pause in the Arabic language are: “pause in no vowel
(sukun),” “pause with reduced vowel (rum),” and “pause with slight vowel (ish-
mam).” For a detailed explanation, see for instance M. Sharkawi, History and
Development of the Arabic Language (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2017), p.
123.
166
Although a reading of rasulahu is attested to, the edition is in error as there
is there is no reference to the second recitation.

200 the standard of knowledge

Exalted’s saying:
‘…God is free from obligation to the idolaters, and
[so is] His Messenger…’ (Qur’an 9:3)
[p.193] The oversight is in the vocalisation of the ‘lam’
in His Messenger (i.e., rasuluhu).166 Then the reader reads
it with a ‘kasra (i)’ (i.e. rasulihi) and a false proposition oc-
curs.
Similar examples of these expressions are many.
As for the meaning, some occur from imagining the op-
posite. Should we say:
Every act of execution out of retaliation (qawad) its
reason is an intentional [murder] (‘amd).
Therefore, it is believed that every intentional [murder]
is a cause for retaliation.
Therefore, the intentional [murder] was seen as con-
comitant to every act of execution out of retailation. Then
every act of execution out of retaliation also was seen as
concomitant to the intentional [murder].
This genus precedes faster [before other possibilities] to
understanding (sabaq ila al-fahm). Man remains deceived
with his lack of awareness about its origin and precedes to
imagine from where he does not know until he is alerted
about it.
Among that is something whose cause is necessitating
considering something in place of something to the extent
that if judgement was passed over something it is believed
that it is sound for that which requires it (lazimhi).
Then if it said:
Prayer is an act of obedience (ta‘a).

book two 201

 Every prayer needs intention.
It is supposed that: Every act of obedience is in need of
intention such that obedience is required for prayer. This is
not so. The origin of belief and knowledge of God the Ex-
alted is an act of obedience. It is impossible to say that it is
in need of intention because the intention of getting near to
the one who is worshipped does not precede knowledge of
the one who is worshipped.
This also causes many errors in rational matters (‘aqliy-
yat) and legal matters (fiqhiyyat).
The reasons for the errors are too numerous to enumer-
ate. What we have mentioned contains an admonition for
that which we did not mention.
Therefore, the sum of what we mention from the sub-
types of propositions (muqaddimat that we have named
above are ten:
Four in the first division.
Three in the second division which are the substances
of the legal matters.
Three from the final division whose judgement we
mentioned.
[p.194] Should one say: In what do the rational matters
contradict the legal matters?
We say: there is no disagreement between them in the
syllogistic form. Rather they differ in matter (madda), but
not in every matter (madda).
Rather whatever is sound to be a proposition in rational
matters is sound for legal matters.
However, what might not be sound for rational matters

202 the standard of knowledge

might be sound for legal matters like the presumptive
matters (zanniyyat).
What might not be sound for both of them together
might be apprehended (yu’khadhu) as in the case of the am-
biguous propositions resembling other propositions (mus-
habbahat) and the logical fallacies (mughallatat).
Likewise they both disagree in the manner in which the
proposition becomes universal. The particular propositions
(muqaddimat juz’iyya) in jurisprudence are tolerated in
making them universal (yutasamah bi-ja‘liha kulliyya).
That is perceived (yudrak) from:
The statements of the possessor of the Divine Law
and his actions.
The statements of the People of Consensus (ahl al-
ijma‘).
The statements of individual Companions.
[This is the case] if that should be regarded as proof, ac-
cording to what is thoroughly examined in the principles
of jurisprudence.
What is customary (al-jari) from [these statements] in a
fashion analogous to (majra) the primary premises (awwa-
liyyat) from rational matters is that which is patently clear
in its expression, clear in its path like the patently clear ex-
pression that is heard from the legislator (i.e. God) or what
is transmitted in uninterrupted multiple independent chains
of transmission. That which is uninterrupted multiple in-
dependent chains of narratators are [in their certitude] like
that which is heard [directly from the Prophet œ].
His saying: ‘… three days in the Pilgrimage. And of
seven when you return …’ (Qur’an 2:196) is patently clear

book two 203

in its expression it being ten [days], clear in its way. I mean
the Qur’an is transmitted by the most authentic narrations
(mutawatir).
It might be clear in its way, apparent in its expression,
like what is intended from His saying: ‘when you return.’
It might be patently clear in its expression, not clear in
its way like the text which is transmitted by a number of
individuals [not exceeding three] (from the expression (lafz)
of the possessor of the Divine Law (i.e. God)).167
It might be devoid of the two faculties (quwwatayn)
[being neither clear in its path nor its expression] like the
outward manifestation which the individuals transmit.
The group of legal expressions in the universal and par-
ticular propositions [can be divided into] four divisions:
The first, A universal by which I intend with it a univer-
sal like his saying: Every intoxicant is forbidden.
[p.195] The second: A particular proposition which re-
mains a particular proposition like [the Prophet’s], May
peace be upon him, saying concerning gold and silk: ‘They
are both forbidden unto the males of my umma.’168
This applied specifically to males, but not to females.
The third: A universal proposition which is intended for
a particular proposition like [the Prophet’s], May peace be
upon him, saying: ‘Paying zakat on grazing sheep is requi-
red. It is intended for that [herd] which reaches its legal
167
Less than al-hadith al-mutawatir which is characterised by a continuous and
established series of transmitters all of whom are reliable.
168
On the prohibition of men wearing silk, see for instance Al-Tirmidhi, Jami‘,
Kitab al-Libas, Bab ma ja’a fi’l-harir wa-al-dhahab, no. 1639:
http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?hflag=1&bk_no=195&pi
d=122763; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Libas, Bab ma ja’a fi lubs al-harir, no.
3525:
http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1
&pid=116535&bk_no=184&startno=1.

204 the standard of knowledge

minimum amount (nisab).
God’s saying: ‘And the thieving male and the thieving
female cut off their hands…’ (Qur’an 5:38) What is in-
tended are some thieves.
If we should wish to make this a universal proposition,
then we would annex to it the descriptions upon which
examination [of this verse] appears. We say for instance:
Whoever steals an object which reaches the minimum
value in its entirety, from a secure location like it (min
hirz mithlihi) and to which he has no suspected
rights, [his hand] is amputated.
The grave robber (nabbash) or whoever steals wet
(ratba) things for example, with this description, [his hand]
is amputated. This is the custom.
What we deem sound in the decrees of the juristic dis-
putations (marasim jadal al-fiqh) is that he should not do
it as long as general wording is found. Rather, he should
adhere to the general significance of wording. A request of
the opponent for that which is specific is made.
That which is alleged is that which is specific could reach
the general. There is no objection to cling to the general in
the language of the jurists.
If they should employ this convention (idha istalahu ‘ala
hadha), adhering to it is more suitable than producing it in
a form since they do not accept particularization of the oc-
casioning factor (takhsis al-‘illa).
Whatever you should say, whoever steals an object
which reaches the minimum value in its entirety from a se-
cure location like it, [his hand] is amputated.
He prevented the opponent, saying: You have dis-
regarded a description (wasf), namely that the object that
is stolen is not wet. What made you know that this is not

book two 205

considered?
[p.196] There is no other option for you but to return
to the general and say: It is the original. Whoever adds a
description, he must produce the proof (dalil).
Therefore, adhering to the general is more suitable if it
is present.
The fourth: It is the particular by which is intended the
universal. As we express the particular with the general, we
say: There is no good from friends. We intend some of
them.
Likewise the particular might be employed. By it we in-
tend the universal like God the Exalted’s saying:
And among them is he who, if you entrust him with
a [single] dinar, he will not return it… (Qur’an, 3:75)
It is intended to cover all kinds of money that are his.
‘So whoever does an atom’s weight of good shall see
it.’ (Qur’an 99:7)
He expresses the many with the few.
Like God the Exalted’s saying:
‘…then do not say to them ‘Fie’…’ (Qur’an 17:23)
He expresses everything that contains grumbling in it.
Like God the Exalted’s saying:
‘Consume not your goods between you in deception’
(Qur’an 2:188)
‘Those who consume the property of orphans un-
justly…’ (Qur’an 4:10)

169
Nusaybin is a city located in present-day south-east Turkey near Mardin.

206 the standard of knowledge

 What is intended is ‘destruction (itlaf)’ which is more
general than ‘eating (akl).’ However, he used the word ‘eat
(akl)’ instead.
Like al-Shafi‘i’s saying: If a snake or scorpion should bite
[or sting] him [intentionally as part of a scheme] and if it is
an Egyptian snake or a scorpion from Nusaybin,169 [and he
dies] then qasas retribution (i.e., execution, unless he is for-
given by the family of the victim) is necessary.170
His goal is not specifying, but everything that is lethal
mainly. However, he mentioned what is famous to express
everything.
If a special expression (lafz khass) appears from this
genus, the specificity is annulled, and we derive the univer-
sal meaning intended by it and say:
Every [act] of contempt for both parents is forbidden.
Every [act] of consuming orphans’ property is for-
bidden.
Therefore, we attain a universal premise.
If it said: What is known about a specific occurrence: Is
it a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyya) whose specifi-
170
See Al-Shafi‘i, Kitab al-Umm, 8 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Ma‘rifa, 1990 (Kitab
Jirah al-‘Amad), 6:145:
http://islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?bk_no=31&ID=1282&id-
from=3037&idto=3385&bookid=31&startno=144.
171
See for instance, Al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Adab, Bab ma ja’a fi qawl al-
rajul waylaka, no. 5812:
http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=0&ID=
5912; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Siyam, Bab taghliz tahrim al-jima‘ fi nahar Rama-
dan ‘ala al-sa’im wa wujub al-kaffara al-kubra fihi, no. 1870:
http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=1&boo
khad=1870.
172
See for instance, Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Hudud, Bab man i‘tarafa ‘ala nafsi

book two 207

city requires [p.197] a proof? Or is it particular and by
making it general a proof is required? That is like [the
Prophet’s], May peace be upon him, saying to the Bedouin:
‘Manumit a slave’171 when he said: ‘I had sexual intercourse
during the day in Ramadan.’ [This is also] like his stoning
of Ma‘iz [ibn Malik al-Aslami] when he committed adul-
tery.172
Does that descend to the level of his saying: Everyone
who commits adultery, stone him? Whoever has an inti-
mate relation with his spouse during the day in Ramadan,
then must free a slave.
Then the description of the secual intercourse is what
the questioner described.
That established by reflection on the descriptions of the
Bedouin and what the Messenger of God, May peace be
upon him, knew, until the abandonment of seeking further
details with the possibility of ambiguity (ishkal) occupied
the place of the general words (‘umum al-maqal), even if it
were not known whether [Ma‘iz] was a freeman or a slave.
This was like the general applicability with respect to the
freeman and the slave.
If he knew him to be a freeman, the slave ought to be
charged with pursuing him to show that he does not affect
the slave by paying what is stipulated by the religious prac-
tices (mujibat al-‘ibadat).

bi’l-zina, nos. 1694, 3206:

http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?bk_no=1&ID=783&id-
from=3274&idto=3282&bookid=1&startno=4.
173
See for instance, Al-Suyuti, Al-Durar al-Muntathara fi’l-Ahadith al-Mushta-
hira, ed. Muhammad bin Lutfi al-Sabbagh, Riyadh: Malik Sa‘ud University, n/d,
p. 110, no. 199. The hadith is of unknown provenance. Al-Sakhawi, Al-Maqasid
al-Hasana fi Bayan Kathir min al-Ahadith al-Mushtahira ‘ala al-Alsina, ed. Mu-
hammad ‘Uthman al-Khusht, Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1985, p.312, no.416.

208 the standard of knowledge

 Rather we have made this to take the place of the general
since [the Prophet] said: ‘My judgement concerning the one
is my judgement concerning the group.’173
If we had known that from among his custom is spec-
ifying every person with a judgement which is contrary to
the other, we would not have put this in place of the gen-
eral. It is as if one from among the Zahirites knows that
what is intended by the aforementioned particular proposi-
tions (juz’iyyat) concerning the kinds of usury (rabawiyyat)
is they are the same particular propositions.
There is much detail concerning this which this book
cannot contain.
We have demonstrated upon closer examination con-
cerning the form of the syllogism that the particular special
judgement (al-hukm al-khass al-juz’i) is that it is made uni-
versal in six ways:174
[p.198] It is demonstrating that what diverges does not
influence (ma bihi al-iftiraq laysa bi-mu’aththir).
That which is in conjunction (ijtima‘) is commensurate
(munasib) or the influencer (mu’aththir) in order to be a
ruling (manat). It is more effective in revealing the objec-
tive.
That is because among the particular propositions are
those from which it is known that what is intended from
them is ‘universal (kulli).’ Also among them are those who
do not know that like those from among the Zahirites who
do not know that what is intended with the aforementioned
six particular propositions concerning the kinds of usury
(rabawiyyat) is a matter that is more general than [the par-
ticular propositions].

174
This refers to the earlier discussion on pages 105–109.

book two 209

 All of the theoreticians (nuzzar) knew that what is in-
tended by ‘wheat (burr)’ is not ‘wheat (burr) but a meaning
more general than it since usury on the wheat remained
after grinding it and since it became flour and the name
wheat stopped being applicable.
Then it is known that what is intended by it is general
universal description which flour and wheat share.
However, the general universal (al-kulli al-‘amm) may
be known through innate intelligence (badiha) without pon-
dering like our knowing that what is forbidden (muharram)
is the general complaining (al-tabarurum al-‘amm) without
the specific grumbling (ta’affuf).
It may be in doubt like wheat. Flour and wheat are
equivocal in universals (yashtarikan fi kulliyyat) like taste
(ta‘m), sustenance (uqtiyyat), measure (kayl), and property
(maliyya).
If doubt should set in concerning it, it is not possible to
affirm it (ithbatuhu) except by one of the six ways which
we have mentioned. God knows best.

[p.199] Third View

Concerning the Logical Fallacies (mughallatat)
in the Syllogism
It contains sections
Section One
Concerning enumerating the
inducers of error (matharat al-ghalat)

Know that the syllogistic premises (al-muqaddimat al-qiya-

siyya) if they should be organized according to their form
are of the kind that produce the three forms (al-ashkal al-

210 the standard of knowledge

thalatha) and first the three terms (hudud) were produced
from them. They are the first parts. If the two premises are
distinguished (they are the second parts) and the premises
are truthful and not a conclusion (ghayr al-natija) and are
better known, then that from among them which is con-
comitant by necessity (lazim bi’l-darura) is true, no doubt
about it.
That from which truth does not result, truth does not
result due to imperfections (khalal) in these aspects which
we mentioned.

1) Either it deviates from the forms or 2) from the

moods produced from them (al-durub al-muntaja
minha), or 3) the lack of distinction in the terms
(hudud), or 4) in the premises (muqaddimat), or 5)
inserting the conclusion in the premises and there is
no other [conclusion], or 6) the conclusion precedes
one of the premises in knowledge. 7) Therefore, the
premise is not better known than the conclusion.

These are seven inducers.

We shall explain each one with an example so that being
cautious with them is facilitated. We say:

The first inducer: It is not one of the three forms and not
a common term from among the terms. It is either the sub-
ject of the two or the predicate or a subject of one of the
two, a predicate of the other.
[p.200] If equivocity (ishtirak) is negated in reality and
expression, the intellect does not make a mistake concerning
it (i.e. the equivocity). Therefore, that appears. It makes a
mistake in an equivocal expression (ma huwa mushtarak

book two 211

lafzan) if it is present with a difference in meaning. There-
fore, close scrutiny of the words in equivocal expressions
(al-alfaz al-mushtaraka) is necessary, especially those whose
synonymity (mutawata’a) is doubtful (ma yushtabah min-
ha). It becomes difficult to perceive the difference. This is a
great inducer to errors.
We have mentioned in summary the details of that in
The Book of Syllogistic Premises except there we did not
mention save for the expressions whose meanings are not
combined (la yattahid ma‘naha).
The reason for equivocity (ishtirak) might be the proper
arrangement and order of the expressions, not the ex-
pressions themselves.
We mentioned four examples of them:
The first, what is composed from the positions of stop-
ping and starting as we mentioned of God the Exalted’s
words: ‘… save God. And those firmly rooted in knowl-
edge…’ (Qur’an 3:7)
[It] has two different meanings. Then it casts its simili-
tudes (amthal) in one of the two premises with a meaning
and in the second of the premises with another meaning.
Therefore, the common term (hadd mushtarak) is annulled
and it is believed that there is a common term.
The second, the shuttling of the pronouns between mul-
tiple things to which attributing them is possible, like your
saying:
All that the intelligent person learned is as he learned.
The intelligent person knows the rock.
Therefore, he (fa-huwa) is like the rock.
Your saying: ‘Therefore, he (fa-huwa)’ is between refer-

212 the standard of knowledge

ring back to the intelligent person (‘aqil) or that which is
perceived with the intellect (ma‘qul).
It is sound in the premise on the basis that it returns to
that which the intellect perceives and is unsound (yulbas)
in the conclusion. Its returning to the intelligent person is
imagined (yukhayyal).
The third, the arranged letters between the two mean-
ings in one of which they are truthful and in the other false,
like his saying:
The five is double and single.
It is true.
Therefore, it is believed that our saying [the following]
is believed: [p.201] It is double and (waw) single at the same
time.
The reason for it is doubting the signification (dalala) of
the conjunction (waw).
Therefore, it indicates all the parts when you say: The
person is bone and flesh, i.e. he contains bone and flesh.
It indicates all of the attributes like our saying: The per-
son is alive and a body.
Therefore, what we have mentioned is true in the five by
way of combining the parts not by way of combining the
attributes and the expression like the expression.
The fourth: The attribute going back and forth between
being an attribute of the subject and being an attribute of
the predicate mentioned before it. We say: Zayd is sighted
(basir).175 That is not blind. We say: Zayd is a physician.
When we order this we say: Zayd is a sighted physician.
It is believed that he is possessing of insight (basir) in
175
A similar example can be found in Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.),
p.144.

book two 213

medicine.
These expressions are true individually. They are true as
a group according to one of the two allegorical interpre-
tations.
There are many examples of that and the syllogistic form
is raised up to an unknown extent. In what we mentioned
there is sufficiency (ghaniyya).
The second inducer: for it not to be a type of conclusive
among the total of the types of the three forms [of reason-
ing]. For example your saying:
Few people are writers.
Every writer is intelligent.
Therefore, few people are intelligent.
This conclusion is true even if it did not produce with
affirming the few negation of the many. If the many was in-
telligent, it contains the few.
If what is intended by it is that only the few are writers
and intelligent, the order of the syllogism is mixed since he
said: Few people are writers.
[p.202] It includes two premises in potentia (bi’l-
quwwa). One of them is:
Some of the people are writers.
The other is: That ‘some’ is few.
Both are predicated on each other. In the second prem-
ise, judgement was passed over one of the predicates
namely ‘the writer (katib)’ to the exclusion of the other.
Thus the order became mixed.
Likewise if you should say:

214 the standard of knowledge

 It is impossible for a man to be a rock.
It is impossible for a rock to be an animal.
Therefore, it is impossible for a person to be an ani-
mal.
Since this type is composed of two negatives apart from
they both contain the negative expression (lafz salbi) when
you say: It is impossible (mumtani‘ an…) for a person to
be a rock.
It means: Not a single person is a rock.
Rather this amount is sufficient to negate the conclusion
(nafy al-natija).
The minor premise of the first form (sughra al-shakl al-
awwal) as long as it is not positive, it does not produce any
conclusion at all (lam yuntij aslan).
These errors increase if the mind becomes attached to
the expressions without acquiring the meanings with their
realities.

The third inducer: For the three terms [of the syllogism],
which are the first parts, not to be distinct and complete
(mutakamila) such as your saying:
Every person is human.
Every human is an animal.
Therefore, every person is an animal.
And your saying:
Every wine (khamr) is wine (‘uqar).
Every wine (‘uqar) intoxicates (muskir).

book two 215

 Therefore, every wine (khamr) intoxicates (muskir).
The middle term (hadd awsat) [of the syllogism] is ident-
ical with the minor term (hadd asghar). Indeed only the ex-
pression multiplied (ta‘addada al-lafz).
[p.203] This is from the use of synonymous expressions
whose spelling differ and whose terms are equal in their
understood meanings.
We have already mentioned them. Let one be aware of
them also.

The fourth influencer: For the second parts which are the
premises not to be superior (mutafadila). That does not
agree in the simple individual expressions (al-alfaz al-mu-
frada al-basita) since a place of error occurs in them. How-
ever, it is homonymous in the compound expressions (al-
alfaz al-murakkaba).
How many a compound expression that conveys a
meaning, the strength of which is as strong as the power of
one or can be indicated with a single expression, as you say:
The person walks.
Then it is possible for you to substitute the subject ex-
pression with ‘the speaking animal (al-hayawan al-natiq).’176
The expression ‘to walk (yamshi)’ means that he ‘moves
by moving both feet from one location to another’ so that
the expression is extended.
It is possible for you to specify the deception (talbis) in
it. Along these lines is our saying:
The more a Muslim teaches him, he is like the one he
taught.

176
Natiq is also means rational in particular contexts.

216 the standard of knowledge

 The Muslim teaches the unbeliever.
Therefore, he is like the unbeliever.
These premises are different in their terms (hudud) in the
positing (wad‘). However, there is a defect in harmoniza-
tion (ittisaq). It is abandoning making explicit its details (al-
tasrih bi-tafsilihi, otherwise your saying:
‘The one whom the Muslim taught’ is subject.
Your saying: ‘He is like the one whom he taught’ is
predicate.
However, the meaning of your saying: ‘He (huwa)’ is
repeated.
It might be such that it is not distinguished in the posit-
ing (wad‘), but rather it contains a part (juz’) which is poss-
ible that it is: 1) part of the subject, 2) part of the object.
You say: Zayd the tall is white.
Therefore, the predicate is ‘white’ only.
‘The tall’ is part of the subject.
It is possible for ‘the tall’ to be mentioned in the form of
‘who is’. Then it goes back to Zayd, such that you say:
Zayd, who is tall, is white.
[p.204] If you should say: ‘Zayd is tall, white,’ ‘tall’ be-
comes part of the predicate.
If ‘who’ is not mentioned it is possible that ‘who’ is
wanted otherwise it is not wanted.
As you say: ‘Humanity (insaniyya)’ in so far as it is ‘hu-
manity’ is specific or general.
It is possible for the subject ‘abstract humanity’ (al-in-

book two 217

saniyya al-mujarrada) and the predicate is ‘the specific.’
It is possible for the subject to be ‘humanity’ alone and
the predicate ‘specific’ in so far as it is humanity since if you
should say: Humanity is specific or general, you would be
informing about one thing.
Should you say: Humanity in so far as it is humanity
is specific or general, you would be informing about two
things.
Every khabar (predicate)177 is a predicate (mahmul).
Thus, if you should say: ‘Humanity is not in so far as it
is humanity, specific or general,’ it is true.
[However,] should you say: ‘Humanity is not specific or
general,’ it is false.
The difference between both of them [becomes under-
stood] when we mention the meaning of the universal
(ma‘na al-kulli) in the principles pertaining to existence
(ahkam al-wujud).
Errors whose solution is difficult for intelligent thinkers
(hudhdhaq al-nuzzar) let alone the literalists (zahiriyyin)
stem from these different syllogistic combinations (tarki-
bat). You will not be able to be rid of the places of conceal-
ment for error except through God the Exalted’s granting
success. Then let the investigator into these impediments
seek success from God the Exalted until he is delivered from
its darknesses.

The fifth inducer: For the premise to be false. It is not free

of either ambiguity in expression (iltibas al-lafz) or in mean-
ing (ma‘na).
If there is not anything from these reasons, the intellect

177
The khabar is a predicate in a nominative sentence.
178
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 79-80.

218 the standard of knowledge

will not submit to it and believe it. There are no words ex-
cept for in that which rational persons err. Whoever be-
lieves everything he hears, is of morbid temperament (fasid
al-mizaj), difficult to treat.178
As for ambiguity in expression (iltibas al-lafz), it is when
there is a relationship between it and what is true, as if two
expressions are equivocal in meaning and there is a differ-
ence (iftiraq) in precise meaning. Therefore, it is believed
that the judgement that is truthfully applied to one of the
two is true in the case of the other.
Confusion occurs about the difference in an addition to
or deficiency in meaning along with the unity of that which
is named.
[p.205] That has increased greatly. For example the ex-
pression ‘covering (sitr)’ and ‘covering (khidr)’. ‘Khidr’ is
not said except if it is inclusive of a young woman otherwise
it is ‘sitr.’
Like crying (buka’) and ‘wailing (‘awil). [The word]
‘‘Awil’ is not said except if [crying] is accompanied by rai-
sing the voice. Otherwise it is crying (buka’). Both are con-
sidered equal.
Likewise, soil (al-thara) and dirt (al-turab). ‘Thara’ is
‘turab’ that as a condition contains moisture.
Likewise ‘strait (ma‘ziq)’ and ‘strait (madiq).’ ‘Ma’ziq’
is ‘madiq’ however it is not called that except in places of
war.
Also ‘fugitive (abiq)’ and ‘fugitive (harib)’. ‘Abiq’ is
‘harib’ however with an additional meaning that [the
fleeing] is from exhaustion and fear. If it not for a reason
of strong dislike (sabab munaffir), [the fleeing] is called
‘harib’ not ‘abiq.’
[Another example] is the water in the mouth (rudab) is
such as long as it remains in the mouth. Otherwise if it
book two 219
leaves the mouth it is ‘buzaq.’
The brave person (shuja‘) is not called ‘brave (kamiy)’
except if he were heavily armed, otherwise he is a ‘batal.’
The sun is not called ‘ghazala’ (disc of the sun) except
during sunrise.
These expressions are similar in origin and contain a
kind of dissimilarity (tafawut).

It might be thought that the judgement for one of them

applies to the other. Then it is believed for this reason.
As for the semantical cause (sabab ma‘nawi) to erring,
the premise is partially truthful not entirely. Then it is ap-
prehended as if it is universal and is believed. Distraction
(dhuhul) occurs from the condition of its veracity. Most of
the premise occurs with the estimative faculty (wahm)
preceding to the opposite. Should we say:
Every [dragged] person for [potential] execution is
the result of intentional [first degree] murder.
Every act of stoning is for adultery.
Therefore, it is believed:
Every intentional murder is is an act of execution out of
retaliation and every act of adultery carries the punishment
of stoning.
This contains many errors for whoever is not mindful of
[this].
That which is true for some but not the whole, might be
such that it is true for part of the subject like our saying:
The animal is legally competent. This is true about the

179
Duha is the time between just after sunrise and before noon.

220 the standard of knowledge

human to the exclusion of others.
[p.206] It might be true concerning the whole subject
however in some circumstances like our saying: Man is
legally competent. However, this is not true for the states
of childhood and insanity.
It might be true sometimes like our saying: One who is
legally competent is required to pray. It is not true about
the time of duha179 since no prayer is required then.
It might be true with a discrete condition like our saying:
One who is legally competent is forbidden from consuming
wine. It is with the condition that he is not compelled (muk-
rah) in which case the condition is abandoned.
Likewise, your saying: If he is wrongly killed, he is like
one who is killed. It is sound with a condition, namely that
the killer is not a father and the murdered is not a son.180
All of these matters which are believed to be truthful
mainly and do not arise as generally true (kulliyya sadiqa)
except if they are restricted by a condition, perhaps the in-
tellect will give in and believe [them to be] true and accept
that they are generally true (kulliyya sadiqa). Therefore,
false conclusions are necessary.181

The sixth influencer: For the premises not to be other than

the conclusion. Then they would sequester the objective of
the premises without realising it.
[It is] like your saying: The woman has a guardian. She
does not have power over the marriage contract.
If you are required to account for the meaning of her
state (that she has a guardian), perhaps you would not

180
As an exception to the rule, a father, grandfather, or greatgrandfather do not
face the same punishment for killing a son, grandson or greatgrandson.
181
Ibn Sina, Deliverance, pp.80–81.

book two 221

be able to demonstrate a meaning except that which is
disputed.
[p.207] Likewise if one says: the voluntary fast with de-
claring your intention during the day (bi-niyya tansha’u na-
haran) is sound since it is a fast obligation on oneself (sawm
‘ayn). If it is requested that the definition of it being a fast
obligation on oneself, he did not dispense with making the
conclusion a part of [the definition], since it is said:
What is the meaning of it being a fast obligation on
oneself (sawm ‘ayn)?

He says: It is suitable on a voluntary basis (tatawwu‘).

Then it is said: With that specificity is not determined
(la yuthbat al-ta‘ayyun) since it is suitable every day before
the dawn for makeup (qada’). It is not said ‘sawm ‘ayn.’
Should he say: Its meaning is that it is not suitable save
for on a volunteering basis, it is said: Specificity is not de-
termined with this. Night is not suitable for other than the
voluntary fast. It is not said of it ‘‘ayn’. Then he is forced
to combine between the two meanings and say: Its meaning
is that it is beneficial on a voluntary basis, but not for any-
thing else.
Then it is said: His saying that it is suitable on a volun-
tary basis is the judgement whose knowledge is required.
How is it he made it a part of the justification (‘illa)? The
justification’s (‘illa) essence is not valuated without judge-
ment. Then judgement over it becomes necessary. There-
fore, the judgement is other than the justification.
Similar examples of this in rational matters (‘aqliyyat)
are many. It is for that [reason] we did not mention them.

222 the standard of knowledge

The seventh influencer: That the premises do not possess
more knowledge than the conclusion. Rather the premises
are either equal to it in knowledge like the complementary
terms (mutadayafat).
That is like whoever disputed Zayd being a son to ‘Amr.
He says: The proof of Zayd being a son to ‘Amr is that
‘Amr is a father to Zayd.
This is impossible since both of them are known simul-
taneously, and none of them is known through the other.
Likewise whoever confirms that an attribute is knowl-
edge through his saying: Indication of that is the place in
which it exists is knowledgeable (‘alim).
It is madness since he does not know the place as being
knowledgeable except with the knowledge of the ‘state of
emplacement (al-hall)’ in the place is knowledge.
The premise might be delayed in knowing about the con-
clusion. Then it becomes a circular analogy (qiyas dawri).
[p.208] Examples of it in the discursive sciences (‘aqliy-
yat) are many.
As for applied law (fiqhiyyat) as if the Hanafi says:
The prayer of one who does dry ablution (tayammun)
is invalid if he should find water during it since he is
able to use it.
Whoever is able to use water, he is required to [use]
it.
Whoever is required to use water, it is not permitted
for him to pray using dry ablution.
Therefore, the ability to use [it] is the middle term (hadd
awsat) [of the syllogism].
The invalidation of the prayer is a conclusion.

book two 223

 It is said: If you should want the ability through sensory
means, then it is invalid with what if he should find it is
possessed by another.
If you should want with it the ability based on divine
law: then it is said: As long as prayer [with dry ablution]
being performed (qa’ima), the many actions are forbidden
to him. Then the use [of water] is forbidden.
The ability [to use water for ablution] based on divine
law is dependent on invalidating the prayer.
[p. 209] Invalidation produces ability (qudra).
Ability precedes [the invalidation[ the way a cause (‘illa)
precedes effect (ma‘lul); that is in essence not temporally.
How does he make that which is posterior (mu-
ta’akhkhir) in rank a cause to that which is anterior in rank,
which is invalid?
These are the inherent qualities which induce error. We
have restricted them to seven divisions. Each division
branches out to innumerable aspects.
If it is said: These are many errors; who will eliminate
them?
We said: These errors do not all combine in every syllo-
gism. Rather the inducer of the error in every syllogism is
restricted and caution concerning it is possible.
Whoever takes into account the three terms (hudud) [of
the syllogism], and acquired in his intellect meanings, not
expressions, then predicated one of them on the other and
made them two premises, and took into account the con-
comitants of predication (tawabi‘ al-haml) as we mentioned
concerning the conditions of contradiction (shurut al-tana-
qud) and took into account the form of the syllogism, un-
equivocally knows that the required conclusion is a
concomitant truth (haqq lazim).

224 the standard of knowledge

 If he should not trust it, he turns again to the premises,
the aspect of assent (wajh al-tasdiq), the form (shakl) and
definitions (hudud) of the syllogism once or twice like the
accountant does in his accounting which he organises, since
he goes back to it once or twice.
Should he do that, and he does not attain confidence
(thiqa) and profound peace of mind (tuma’nina), let him
abandon investigation and be content with conformity with
established custom (taqlid). Every job has men for which it
is suited. ‘Everyone is made to proceed with ease towards
that for which he has been created.’182

[p.210] Section Two

Concerning demonstrating the imagination
of the Sophists183

Should one say: If the premises are necessary and truthful,

and the intellects encompassing them, and this ordering
which you mentioned concerning the syllogistic form (surat
al-qiyas) also is clear, from where did the Sophists derive
their denial of the sciences and their belief in the equipol-
lence of proofs (takafu’ al-adilla)?184

182
Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Tawhid, Bab qawl Allah ta‘ala wa laqad yassarna
al-Qur’an li’l-dhikr fa-hal min muddakir, no.7112:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=0&bo
okhad=7112;
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad, Musnad al-‘Ashara al-Mubashsharin bi’l-Janna,
Musnad al-khulafa’ al-rashidin, no.1352:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=6&bo
okhad=1352.
183
Like al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina rebuts the sophists but gives a fuller exposition of
their fallacies, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 140-148.
184
For an explanation of the equipollence of poofs, see P. Crone, ‘Excursus II,’
in S. Schmidtke, ed., Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, p.110 and n.11.

book two 225

 Or from where did differences among people concerning
the intelligibles (ma‘qulat) get stirred up?
We said: As for the occurrence of difference, it is because
of most intellects’ falling short with respect to the con-
ditions which we mentioned. Whoever contemplates these
conditions will not be surprised from the opposing of the
opposer concerning them, especially the poofs of the intel-
lects are driven to conclusions which the estimative faculty
(wahm) does not acquiesce to (yudh‘inu laha). Rather it
denies it (yukadhdhibu biha), unlike the arithmetical scien-
ces, the estimative faculty and the intellect cooperate con-
cerning them.
Whoever does not know arithmetical matters knows
that he does not know them. If he should make an error in
them, his error does not continue, rather it is possible to re-
move it in a short time.
As for the rational sciences, they are not this way.
Among the Sophists are those who deny the primary
sciences (‘ulum awwaliyya) and empirical knowledge (his-
siyya) like our knowledge that two is greater than one and
our belief in our existence, or that one thing is either eternal
or temporally created.
Those people, imperfections entered them from a faulty
temperament and corruption of the intellect as a result of
great confoundment in the theoretical sciences (nazariyyat).
As for those who regarded as sound the indispensable
assertions (daruriyyat), they allege that the equipollent
proofs (adilla mutakafi’a) are in the theoretical sciences.
What prompted them to address the problem (hamalahum
‘alayhi) is what they saw from the contradiction of the
proofs of the groups of speculative theologians and what
overwhelmed them in one of the questions from the doubts

226 the standard of knowledge

and problems whose solution is difficult. They believed that
they do not have a solution originally. They did not address
that due to their own short-sightedness, error (dalal), their
lack of insight into the method of reasoning (tariq al-nazar),
and they did not realise the conditions for reasoning as we
presented.
We mention a group of their imaginings to which we
provide a solution so that it is known that short-sightedness
is from one who does not know how to resolve the doubts.
[p. 211] If not, then either every matter’s existence is
known and it is ascertained and its or its non-existence is
known and it is ascertained or it is known that is of the type
of [knowledge] that man could not know and he ascertains
that also.
The inducers of [the Sophists’] imaginations are three
parts:
First, What returns to the syllogistic form which includes
the saying:
Your saying amongst the most obvious of what you
mentioned: The negative universal (al-saliba al-kul-
liyya) reflects a likeness of itself.
Should we say: Not a single person is a stone.
Then it necessarily follows from it our saying: Not a
single stone is a person.
You consider this to be necessary (daruri). It is not con-
ceived that it differs. This is an error. If the sense issues a
judgment concerning it in a place, then it is considered true
in every place.
We say: There is not a single wall in a peg (watad).

book two 227

 We do not say: There is not a single peg in a wall.
We say: There is not a single jug in the drink.
We do not say: There is not a single drink in the jug.
Therefore, we say: We alleged that the essence of the
predicate however it opposes the essence of the sub-
ject itself, necessitates what we mentioned.
As we say: Not a single jug is drink.
Certainly it necessary follows that: ‘Not a single drink
is a jug’ because if difference (mubayana) should occur,
then certainly it necessarily follows: There is not a single
drink which is a jug.
This is because if difference occurs between two things
universally, it is from both sides since if the connection were
imposed in some, the state of the difference would be false
universally.
This example did not reflect itself and the two meanings
in which difference exists between them did not produce a
result (lam yahsul). If they both produced a result, then the
opposite necessarily follows.
[p.212] Should we say: Not a single wall is in the peg.
Therefore, the predicate is our saying: ‘in the peg’, not
‘the peg’ absolutely.
Should difference occur between ‘the wall’ and the thing
which we have estimated in the peg, then its opposite
necessarily follows:
Everything in a peg is not a wall.
Therefore, certainly we say:
Not a single thing among that which is in the peg is
a wall.
228 the standard of knowledge
 Not a single thing among that which is in the drink
is a jug.
The solution to this is difficult for one who receives these
matters from the expression (lafz) not from the meaning
(ma‘na).
Most intellects will experience difficulty perceiving the
abstract meanings (mujarradat al-ma‘ani) without turning
to the expressions (alfaz).
Also among them is someone’s saying: You have alleged
that the universal affirmative proposition (al-mujiba al-
kulliyya) reflects the affirmative particular proposition
(juz’iyya).
Until when our saying is sound: ‘Every person is an ani-
mal’ our saying that ‘Some of the animals are people.’
It is not thus. Thus we say: Every old man used to be a
youth. We do not say: Some of the youth used to be old
men.
Every loaf of bread used to be wheat. We do not say
that: Some of the wheat was bread.
Therefore, we say: The impetus for error (mathar al-gha-
lat) is abandoning the condition in the opposite.
If it is inserted between the subject and predicate: our
saying: It might have been (qad kana) is either taken into
account in the opposite or it is annulled in both proposi-
tions.
If this is annulled, both premises are false together. It is
our saying:
Every old man is a youth.
And every youth is an old man.

book two 229

 It is subject and predicate purely (mujarrad).
Should you say: Every old man used to be a youth.
Then its opposite is: One of those who were youth is
an old man.
That does not necessarily follow certainly if the first
is true.

[p.213] Whoever does not quickly understand the like

of these matters is in error. Then he judges by making the
error in himself necessary and believes that there is no way
to knowledge of the truth.
Among them are their doubting the first [syllogistic]
form and their saying:
You have alleged that it does yield a conclusion (muntij).
One says:
Man alone laughs (dahhak).
Everyone who laughs is alive.
Therefore, man alone is alive.
The conclusion is erroneous. The form is the first form.
They are both universal affirmative propositions (mujibatan
kulliyyatan). If you should make our saying: ‘Man alone
laughs’ a particular proposition (juz’iyya), it is permitted
for it to be the minor premise (al-sughra). It is not con-
ditioned in the first form except for the major premise to
be universal.
Then we say: The source of the error is his saying ‘alone’
is not taken into account in the second premise, and it is
repeated in the conclusion, where it should not be repeated

230 the standard of knowledge

in the conclusion, so that it becomes necessary that: Man is
alive. Or, it is repeated in the second premise, so it become
false. It is said: The one who laughs, alone is alive.
The meaning of our saying: ‘Man alone laughs’ is that
man to the exclusion of others laughs.
Upon verification they are both premises (muqaddima-
tan).
The first is that man laughs.
The other is: Anyone apart from man does not laugh.
Should you say: ‘The one who laughs is alive’ you have
passed judgement over the predicate of one of the two
premises, namely your saying: Man laughs.
You have abandoned the judgement over the predicate
of the second premise which is: Anyone apart from man
does not laugh.
Should you restrict yourself in one of the two premises
to one thing, then limit yourself in the conclusion to [this
thing] and say: Man is alive.
But do not say ‘alone’ since the judgement exceeds the
middle term (al-hadd al-awsat) to the minor term (al-
asghar) whatever judgement you pass on the middle term.
The middle term here is ‘one who laughs (al-dahhak),’
confirmed for man, and negated for other than him.
Therefore, the judgement over one who laughs ought to
be predicated over both its parts together. It is not [p.214]
opposed in the second premise in which the middle term is
mentioned in the predicate to the second part from the
middle term (al-juz’ al-thani min al-awsat).
An example of this is: Weak intellects err. If something
should be difficult for man, his soul does not permit him to
refer to the incapacity of his soul, thinking that this is not
possible to be in him, and he would conclude that theoreti-

book two 231

cal reasoning is not a path that leads to certitude. This is
an error.
Among this is their saying:
Two is one quarter of eight.
Eight is one quarter of thirty-two.
Therefore, two is one quarter of thirty-two.
This is due to ignoring the condition of predication
(shart al-haml) in the correlatives (idafiyyat). Its reason is
apparent since the conclusion to this is that two is one
fourth of one fourth of thirty-two.
Then if the other premise is sound and it is: one fourth
of one fourth is one fourth, then what they said is sound.
If we should say: Zayd is like ‘Amr.
‘Amr is like Khalid.
Then it does not follow (lam yalzam) that Zayd is like
Khalid. Rather it follows that Zayd is an example like the
example of Khalid’s example (mithl mathal Khalid).
If we should have another sound premise, namely:
The similitude of a similitude is a similitude.
Therefore, with that the conclusion is sound.
They have ignored a necessary premise which is false.
Let him be wary of the like of it.
Also among them are their saying:
It is impossible for man to be a stone.
It is impossible for the stone to be alive.
Therefore, it is impossible for man to be alive.

232 the standard of knowledge

 We have mentioned the way of error it contains and that
both premises are negatives (salibatan) which do not pro-
duce logical subjects that are positive.
Likewise the positive (mujiba) might be considered nega-
tive in our saying: Zayd does not possess sight (ghayr basir).
[p.215] Likewise, the negative proposition (saliba) is
considered positive (mujiba) as in our saying: It is imposs-
ible for man to be a stone.
All of that is because of observing the expressions with-
out verifying the meanings.
Further examples of this include their saying: Bones are
not in the liver at all. The liver is in every man. Therefore,
the bone is not at all in man.
The conclusion is erroneous.
Should you ponder this, you will know the impetus for
error (mathar al-ghalat) in it by way of the means which
we mentioned.
Likewise there are objections to the second and third
forms with the likes of that.
After defining the way, there is no need for proliferating
the examples.
Then these are the doubts about the form of the syllo-
gism.

Second division: Concerning the doubts whose cause is an

error in the premises.
For example they say: We see contradictory syllogisms.
If the syllogism were sound then its affirmative proposition
(mujib) would not be contradictory.
An example of this is: Whoever alleges that the govern-
ing power (al-quwwa al-mudabbira) in the person is the
heart, infers (istadalla) that:

book two 233

 I found the king who governs takes up residence in
the middle of his kingdom.
The heart is in the middle of the body.
Whoever alleges that it is in the brain infers that:
I found the highest [parts] of a thing clearer and
better than its lower parts,
The brain is higher than the heart.
Other examples of this include:
The Merciful does not cause pain to one who is innocent
of [committing a] crime.
[p.216] God is the Most Merciful of the merciful.
Therefore, he does not cause pain to whoever is innocent
of [committing a] crime.
This conclusion is false. You can see that God does cause
pain to animals, cattle, and the insane, pain without
crime. Therefore, we doubt our saying that: He is the Most
Merciful.
[Also] in our saying: The Merciful does not cause pain
without benefit along with [possessing] the ability to aban-
don causing pain.
Likewise is one saying: Breathing is voluntary like walk-
ing, not like the heart beat, since we can abstain from it.
Another says: It is not voluntary. If it were so, then we
would not breathe during sleep. However, we are able to
abstain from it at any time we desire like walking. We are
not able to arrest [our] breathing at all times. Both con-
clusions are contradictory.

234 the standard of knowledge

 An example of this is our saying: Every existent is either
conjunctive (muttasil) or disjunctive (munfasil) with the
world. Whatever is not conjunctive or disjunctive is non-
existent. Therefore, this is more likely.
A group among which are you (pl.) have alleged with
[employing] widespread syllogisms that the Creator of the
world is not inside the world or outside. Then how can the
syllogism be deemed reliable?
Likewise, some people alleged that the substance (jaw-
har) is infinite in divisibility (tajazzu’).
We know that whatever has two limits (tarafan) and is
confined between them, is finite (mutanahin).
Every body has two limits and is confined between them.
Therefore, it is finite.
A group alleged that it is finite in a part which is indivis-
ible.
We know that every substance between two substances
that it encounters one of the two without encountering the
other in the same way.
Therefore, it has two things that are distinct (mutaghayi-
ran).
This syllogism is also definitive (qat‘i) like the first one
without difference (farq).
Another example of this is: We do necessarily know that
a heavy object cannot stay put in air.
A group said: The earth is standing in air, the air sur-
rounds it and people [p.217] stand straight on it (mu‘ta-
midun) from all sides so that those standing on two oppos-
ite points of the earth with the soles of their feet are oppo-
site each other.
We know that by necessity.
Therefore, this and its examples indicate that the syllo-

book two 235

gisms do not cause trust (thiqa) and certitude (yaqin).
Therefore, we say: As the first is doubt which emerged
out of ignorance in the form (sura) of the syllogism, then
this emerged out of ignorance about the substance (madda)
of the syllogism:
[The substance] is certain truthful premises (muqaddi-
mat sadiqa yaqiniyya) and the difference between it and
apart from it.
However certain what must not be certain is, it follows
from it inevitably that its conclusions are contradictory.
As for the first, examples include: It is a syllogism com-
posed of rhetorical exhortative premises (muqaddimat
wa‘ziyya khitabiyya) since one thing was taken from it and
found in a [certain] way. Then with it, judgement was ap-
plied to everything.
We have already demonstrated that judgement (hukm)
over everything with many particular propositions (ju-
z’iyyat) is impossible (mumtani‘). Then how is judgement
with one particular proposition?
Rather if the particular propositions proliferated, they
would not benefit except for probability (zann). Then pro-
bability continues to increase in strength with the prolifer-
ation of examples. However, it does not lead to knowledge.
As for the second, it is composed of well-known dialec-
tical premises (muqaddimat mashhura jadaliyya) some of
which are sound while its contradictory being found repug-
nant for [one of two reasons]: either for what it contains
that goes against the people (jamahir) or what goes against
the outward expression of the Qur’an.
How many a person renders something sound because
he finds prohibiting it repugnant or his imagination ran
away from accepting its contradictory.

236 the standard of knowledge

 We alerted to this in [the discussion of] the premises.
The location of the prohibition contains a description of
God [being described by] mercy according to the general
perspective which the common people understood. God the
Exalted is glorified above this. Rather the expression of
mercy and anger are interpreted allegorically in His own
right (fi haqqihi) like the expressions ‘descending,’ ‘coming,’
and others like the expression revelation (nuzul) and
coming (maji’) and others.
Should one considered the outward and accepted it as
sound without verification, then the false conclusion fol-
lows.
[p.218] God’s being merciful according to the notion by
which the common people understand it is not a primary
premise (muqaddima awwaliyya), nor does a syllogism with
the aforementioned condition indicate it.
The location of the error is abandoning allegorical in-
terpretation where it is necessary.
In accordance with this, you see the contradictory (ta-
naqud) of most of the syllogisms of the aforementioned
[group]. They compose them from sound premises seeking
fame or the zealots agreeing to aid the schools of jurispru-
dence with them without proof and without their being pri-
mary for which it is necessary to be sound.
As for the third, the certain and sound is that it (i.e.
breathing) is a voluntary act. Whoever says:
If it were voluntary, then it would not happen in
one’s sleep.
However, it does.
Therefore, it is not voluntary.

book two 237

 Therefore, it is conjunctive conditional in which is ne-
gated the hypothetical syllogism in modus tollens (istuth-
niya fihi naqid al-tali) and the contradictory to the ante-
cedent (naqid al-muqaddim) is concluded (istuntija).
The form of the syllogism is sound. However, making
the consequent necessary for the antecedent (luzum al-tali
lil-muqaddam) is not sound (ghayr musallam). The volun-
tary action occurred in sleep. How many a person who is
asleep walks ordered steps and speaks comprehensible (lit.
ordered) words!
His saying: ‘If it were voluntary, then he would be able
to abstain from it at any time’ is unsound.
Rather man eats and passes urine voluntarily. He is not
able to abstain all the time. However, he is generally able
to abstain not restricted to every time.
If it is restricted with every time, it would be false and
the consequent necessary for the antecedent would be un-
sound.
As for the fourth, it is that every existent is either con-
junctive (muttasil) with the world or disjunctive (munfasil).
It is an imaginative premise whose way of error we men-
tioned and distinguished the estimative premises (wahmiy-
yat) and demonstrated that they are not sound to become
premises in the demonstrative proofs (barahin).
It is the origin of error also concerning the question of
the part that cannot be further divided. However, mention
of the location in which the imagination errs is long and is
thoroughly examined in another book.
As for the fifth, it is the earth being suspended in air
which is not impossible.
[p.219] One saying: Everything heavy leans downward.
The earth is heavy. Therefore, it leans downward. There-

238 the standard of knowledge

fore, it follows from that that it is necessary for it to pen-
etrate the air and not stop.
The error of its origin is disregarding the expression
‘downward (al-asfal)’ and ‘What is its meaning?’
Opposite downward is upward. Therefore, two op-
posite directions are necessary.
Opposite both directions is: either [the earth] is in ad-
dition to the person’s head and feet, even if he is not
a person; he is neither downward nor upward. If man
were inverted, the downward direction would be up-
ward which is impossible;
or
The downward would be the most remote location
from the surrounding celestial sphere which is the
centre. The upward is the closest location to the sur-
rounding [celestial sphere].
If this is sound, the earth if it is at the centre, then it is
the lowest of the low (asfal safilin).185 [This is] because the
lowest of the low is extremely remote from the surrounding
[celestial sphere] which is the centre. However much it
should exceed the centre in any direction, it leaves the lo-
west direction for the upward.
If the meaning were in the lowest [area], then what they
mentioned is not impossible.
If the meaning were upward (i.e. in the highest) and the
lowest is parallel to the direction of our head and feet, then
what they mentioned is impossible.
Then carefully ponder the definition of ‘low’ (asfal) until

185
Qur’an 95:5.

book two 239

one of two matters appear to you. You will know that
through investigating the reality of the direction and they
are both in what you define its [i.e., direction’s] opposite
extremities. It is not possible to explain this in this book.
Therefore, these errors emerged from rendering sound
premises which are not necessary to render sound and no-
tice was given about their influencers (matharat). Then let
him draw an analogy between what we mentioned and
what we did not mention.

The third division: Doubts which are attached to the con-

clusion in one mode (min wajh) and to the premises in
another.
Among them is their saying: If these conclusions occur
from the premises, then from what do these premises occur?
If they should occur from other premises, then an endless
chain to other than the conclusion is necessary. This is im-
possible (muhal).
If they should occur from the premises that do not
require premises, then are they sciences which occurred in
our mind since we were born or were they acquired after
they were not?
If they were acquired since we were born, then how is it
that they were acquired and we do not sense them since the
long years of his life go by and it does not occur to him that
[p.220] things equal to one thing are equal?
How is it that knowledge of them being equal occurs in
his mind while he is oblivious of it?
If these [premises] do not occur in us from the outset
(awwal al-amr), then they occurred, then how is it that
knowledge which did not exist occur without acquisition
(iktisab) and the antecedence of a premise which is caused

240 the standard of knowledge

by it (yahsul biha) and every acquired knowledge is not
possible except with knowledge that precedes it and leads
to succession (tasalsul)?
We say: Every knowledge is acquired (muktasab).
Then with knowledge that preceded it is acquired since
knowledge is either conceptualisation (tasawwur) or assent
(tasdiq).
Conceptualisation is with a term and the parts of the
term ought to be learned before the definition.
What is the benefit of our saying in the definition of wine
that it is: ‘an intoxicating beverage expressed from grapes’
to whoever does not know ‘beverage’, ‘intoxicant,’ ‘grapes,’
and ‘expressed’?
Knowledge of these parts is antecedent (sabiq). Then
[these parts] are also if you knew exactly, then knowledge
of the parts of the term (‘ilm bi-ajza’ al-hadd) must precede
them and regress infinitely. However, [this knowledge]
comes to conceptualisations (tasawwurat) which are prin-
ciples (awa’il) which are known through the witnessing
(mushahada)186 with an internal sense (hiss batin) or an un-
defined external sense (zahir min ghayr tahdid). Upon [these
conceptualisations] [regress] stops.
Likewise the assent (tasdiq) to the conclusion which de-
mands the antecedent of knowledge of the premises un-
doubtedly.
Likewise the premises (muqaddimat) until [knowledge]
proceeds upwards to principles (awa’il) to which assent oc-
curred not with the demonstration (burhan).
Their saying remained: How is it that those principles
186
For a discussion of Ghazali and Ibn Sina’s use of the term ‘mushahada,’ see
for instance, Alexander Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Gha-
zali’s Theory of Mystical Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation. Abingdon,
Oxon. and New York: Routledge, 2012, pp.62–63.

book two 241

were present in us without us sensing? or
How did they occur when they do not come into being
without acquisition? When did they occur?
Then we say: These sciences did not occur in actuality
in us in every state. However, if the inherent disposition
(ghariza) of the intellect is complete, then those sciences will
be potential (bi’l-quwwa) not in actuality (bi’l-fi‘l).
Its meaning is: We possess…: A faculty (quwwa) which
perceives (tudrik) individual universals (al-kulliyyat al-mu-
fradat) with the aid of the outward and inner senses.
[p.221] An imaginative temporal faculty for the soul
whose nature is composition (tarkib) and decomposition
(tahlil) and is able to relate the individual definitions (mu-
fradat) to each other.
We possess a faculty (quwwa) which perceives what the
intellectual faculty arranges the relationship between both
of them from the individual definitions (mufradat) and the
relationship between them both is negative and positive.
[The faculty] perceives the pre-eternal and the tem-
porally created and relates them to each other.
Then it precedes the intellectual power (al-quwwa al-
‘aqila) to passing the judgement of negativity (al-hukm bi’l-
salb), namely:
The pre-eternal (qadim) is not temporally created (ha-
dith).
[The faculty] which relates the animal to the human then
judges the relationship between both of them is positive,
namely: Man is an animal.
This faculty perceives some of these relationships with-
out an intermediary and does not perceive some of them.
Therefore, it comes to be dependent upon (tatawaqqaf ila)
the intermediary like it perceives ‘the world,’ ‘the tem-

242 the standard of knowledge

porally created,’ and ‘the relationship between both of
them. Therefore, it does not issue the judgement of ‘nega-
tive’ as it did in the case of the pre-eternal and the tem-
porally created and not of ‘positive’ as in the case of the
animal and the person. Rather it is dependent upon seeking
an intermediary which is for you to know that it is insepar-
able from the temporal originating events (hawadith) and
does not precede them. Whatever does not precede the tem-
poral is temporal.
If it is said: These assents (tasdiqat) you have divided
into: ‘What is known through an intermediary’ and ‘what
is known as primary knowledge (ma‘rifa awwaliyya)’ with-
out an intermediary.
However, these assents are inevitably preceded by con-
ceptions (tasawwurat) since whoever does not know that
the temporally created (hadith) and the world are [both] in-
dividual ideas (mufrad), does not know that the world is
temporally created.
Only one who knows existence anticipated by nonexist-
ence (wujud masbuq bi-‘adam) knows what is temporally
created (hadith).
Only one who knows ‘nonexistence’, ‘existence,’ ‘prior-
ity (taqaddum)’ and ‘posterity (ta’akhkhur)’ knows ‘exist-
ence anticipated by nonexistence’ and that ‘priority’ here
refers to nonexistence and posterity for existence.187
It is necessary to know these concepts.
Concerning the one who perceives (mudrik) them, if it
is this sense perception (hiss), then sense perception does
not know except for one person. Therefore, assent ought

187
Concerning ‘priority and posterity’ see throughout this work. Also see for
example, Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers (trans. Marmura), pp, 27, 30.

book two 243

to be only in one person.
[p.222] Should [the one who perceives] see a person and
his whole is greater than his part, then why does he pass
judgement that in every person the whole of him is greater
than his part given the fact that he only witnessed with his
sense perception only a specific person? Then let him pass
judgement on that specific person and abstain from the rest
of the persons until [when he] can observe [them].
If he should pass judgement over the generality that
every whole (kull kull) is greater than the part, from where
does he derive this judgement seeing that his sense percep-
tion did not perceive except a particular person (shakhs
juz’i)?
We say: The universals are intelligible, not sensed and
the particular propositions are sensed not intelligible.
The universal judgements of the intellect (al-ahkam al-
kulliyya lil-‘aql) are over the intelligible universals (al-kul-
liyyat al-ma‘qula).
This is revealed in the difference between the intelligible
and the physical.
Therefore, man is intelligible.
He is perceived by the senses (mahsus) and witnessed in
the person of Zayd for instance.
We mean by his state of being perceived in two aspects:
The man who is perceived only does not conceive that
he will sense except attached to a specific colour, a specific
size, a specific condition, and a close proximity and remote-
ness [that are] specific.
These matters are accidental (‘aradiyya) compared to
human-ness (insaniyya), and not essential in it (i.e. the
human-ness). If they were substituted, that person would
[remain] that person.

244 the standard of knowledge

 As for the rational person, he is a human only with
whom [the following attributes] participate in a single in-
stance of homonymity (ishtirak wahid): tall, short, near,
far, black, white, small, large.
Therefore, you have a faculty which man recalls con-
nected with unusual matters. That faculty is called ‘sense
and imagery (hiss wa khayal).’ You possess another faculty
which man calls forth free from the unusual matters.
Sh0uld you impose its opposites, you would not affect the
person. That is called the ‘rational faculty (quwwa ‘aqila).’
[p.223] Therefore, what appeared to you is: Extreme
separation lies between the sense perceiving the particular
person whom the unusual accidents enclose and do not pen-
etrate his quiddity (mahiyya) and between the intellect per-
ceiving the pure essence of the thing not connected with
that which is unusual to it.
[Likewise] the universal judgements (al-ahkam al-kul-
liyya) over the universal substance that is free from unusual
substances and accidents.
If it is said: How did he attain with witnessing a particu-
lar person universal knowledge? How did he aid the senses
in attaining that which is not sensed?
We said: The sense leads to the imaginative faculty (al-
quwwa al-khayaliyya) examples of the sensibilia (mahsusat)
and their images so that the person can see something with
his eyes closed. Then he chances upon an image of the thing
present with him identical with the seen (‘ala tibq al-mus-
hahada) [p.224] as if he sees it with the imaginative faculty
(al-quwwa al-khayaliyya) not the perceptive faculty (quw-
wat al-hiss).
Not all animals possess this faculty. Rather among the
animals are those in whom the perceived image disappears

book two 245

with the disappearance of that which is perceived.
This image remains in memory because of the imprint
in the imagination. It does not preserve the thing if it is not
accepted with the potential which accepts it. [For example],
water accepts the impression but does not preserve it. Wax
accepts and preserves. Acceptance is with moisture and
preservation is with dryness.
If these likenesses and images occurred in the imagin-
ative faculty, the imaginative faculty reviews it but does not
review the external sensibilia. If it should review it, you
would find with it for example an image of a tree, an animal
and a rock [as follows]:
Equivocal in corporeity (muttafiqa fi’l-jismiyya).
Different in animal-ness.
Then you distinguish what is equivocal, which is corpor-
eality, and make it a single universal. Then you will com-
prehend the absolute body (al-jism al-mutlaq).
You take what contains difference which is animal-ness
and make it other universals which are free from other con-
nections (qara’in).
Then you understand what is essential (dhati) and what
is foreign (gharib). Then you will know that corporeality is
essential for animals. Should it cease, then its essence would
cease. The ‘whiteness’ to an animal is not thus.
Therefore, with it what is essential is distinguished from
what is unessential and the more general from the more spe-
cific. Those are the principles of categorical conceptualisa-
tions (tasawwurat naw‘iyya).
These universal terms (al-mufradat al-kulliyya) occur be-
cause of sense perception and are not objects of sense. It is
not a wonder for there to occur with sense perception that

246 the standard of knowledge

which is not perceived. This is present with beasts of the
field since the mouse distinguishes the cat, perceives it with
sense, and knows its malice toward it. The baby goat kid
perceived its mother’s accordance (muwafaqa) with it and
thus followed her.
[p. 225] Enmity (‘adawa) or accordance (muwafaqa) are
not objects of sense (mahsus). Rather they [constitute] the
faculty of perception (mudrak quwwa) of animals which is
called the ‘estimative faculty (wahm)’ or ‘discerning (mu-
mayyiz)’ which in the animal are like the intellect (‘aql) in
man. Man also possesses that discrimination (mumayyiz)
along with intellect (‘aql).
Therefore, there occurs in the intellect from the imagin-
ative particular propositions (juz’iyyat khayaliyya) univer-
sal terms (al-mufradat al-kulliyya) which are commensurate
with the imagination in one aspect and differ in another.
We shall demonstrate the aspects of it being commen-
surate and differing with it in the Book of the Divisions and
Principles of Existence (Kitab Aqsam al-Wujud wa Ahka-
muhu).188
The sum total of the words is that the primary cogni-
tions (al-‘ulum al-uwal) with the concepts conceptually
(bi’l-mufradat tasawwuran) and with the relationships it
contains in terms of assent (wa bima laha min al-nasab tas-
diqan), occur in the soul from God the Exalted or from an
angel of His when the faculty of intellect occurs in the soul
and the occurrence of the perceptibles (mahsusat) in the im-
agination and it (i.e. the intellect) examining them.
The faculty of reason is as if it is the faculty of sight in
the eye.

188
See below, p. 248.

book two 247

 Perceiving the imaginative particular propositions (al-ju-
z’iyyat al-khayaliyya) is like sight looking at colourful
bodies (al-ajsam al-mutalawwina).
The illumination of the King’s (i.e. God’s) light upon
human souls resembles the illumination of the lantern’s or
sun’s light being shed upon the colourful bodies (al-ajsam
al-mutalawwina).
[p. 226] The acquisition of knowledge in a relationship
with those terms resembles the vision of the harmony of the
bodies’ colours.
For this reason, God the Exalted made a similitude of
this light through the medium of a perceivable symbol (‘ala
tariq darb mithal mahsus) with ‘a niche wherein is a lamp’
(Qur’an 24:35).
If it should become evident to you that the soul is a sub-
stance that is independent within itself, not in a corporeal
body and not impressed in a corporeal body, then God the
Exalted’s saying: ‘an olive [tree] neither of the east nor of
the west’ (Qur’an 24:35) is in accord with its reality of
being free of all spatial locations (jihat).
If that does not appear to you by way of examination,
then the allegorical interpretation of that parable is in
another way (‘ala wajh akhar).
What is intended by all of this is for the way of acquiring
primary knowledge (‘ulum awwaliyya) as an individual pre-
cognition (tasawwuran) or an assertion (tasdiqan). Know-
ing that is among the most important matters.
It alone we have intended even if we have mentioned it
when discussing the futility of the Sophists.
This is an entryway of the entryways of the equivocators
(mutashakkikin) and indeciders (ahl al-hayra) which we
have revealed.
Included is their saying: The way which you have men-
248 the standard of knowledge
tioned in reaching a conclusion (intaj) is not beneficial since
from knowledge of the premises according to your con-
dition, the conclusion is known with those premises. Rather
in the premises is the very conclusion. Therefore, whoever
knows:
1) Man is an animal.
2) The animal is a body.
3) Therefore, he will know on the whole that man
is a body.
Therefore, the knowledge of [man’s] being a body is not
additional knowledge acquired from these premises.
We say: Knowledge in the conclusion is a third knowl-
edge additional to that in both premises.
As for the example of man and animal, we do not men-
tion it except as a pure example. It is beneficial in what is
possible for it to be the formed object of investigation. This
is not of this genus. Rather it is possible that the conclusion
would not appear to man even if each of the two premises
are patently clear to him.
Therefore, man may know:
Every body is composed.
[p.227] Every composed thing (mu’allaf) is tempor-
ally created (hadith).
With that he is ignorant of the relationship of the tem-
poral creation (huduth) to that which is composed (mu’al-
laf) and other than the relationship of the composed to
the body.
Rather it is knowledge which occurs upon the occur-
rence of both premises and calling them forth together
in the mind with the soul advancing toward seeking the

book two 249

conclusion.
Should one say: Should you know that every two things
are a pair, then is this in my hand a pair? Should you say:
I do not know. Then your claim that every two things
are a pair is invalid. It is two and you did not know that it
is a pair.
Should you say: I know it. What is it? We say: This is
answered [in the following manner]: Whoever says: Every
two things are a pair. Therefore, he means with it that every
two things that we know, are two. Therefore, it is a pair.
What is in your hand we do not know to be two.
[p.228] This reply is invalid (fasid). Rather every two
things are in his soul a pair regardless of whether or not we
know [the thing].
However, the reply is for us to say: If what is in your
hand is two things, then it is a pair. Should you say: Is it
two? Then I say: I do not know. This ignorance does not
contract my saying that every two things are a pair. Rather
opposite it I may say:
Every two things are not a pair.
or
Some of the two is not a pair.
Therefore, we should realise that: Is it two?
Therefore, should we know it is two, we know it is a
pair and we recalled that in our mind.
It is conceivable that you would be heedless of the con-
clusion with the appearance of the two premises. How
many a person looks at a [female] mule with a swollen

189
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 82-83.

250 the standard of knowledge

stomach and assumes that it is pregnant.
If it were said to him: Do you not know this is a [female]
mule? Then he says: Yes.
If it were said to him: Do you not know that a [female]
mule cannot be pregnant, he would say: Yes.
[p.229] If it were said: Why were you heedless of the
conclusion and thought the opposite of it? Then he says:
Because I was heedless of the composition of the two prem-
ises and bringing them together in the mind, directed to-
ward seeking the conclusion.189
With that it was discovered that the conclusion even if
it were subsumed in potentia (bi’l-quwwa) beneath the
propositions as [is the case] with the particular propositions
(juz’iyyat) beneath the universals, then it is knowledge
added to the propositions in actu (bi’l-fi‘l).
Among them is the saying of one of the equivocators
(mutashakkikin): Should you seek to contemplate knowl-
edge, do you know that knowledge or not?
If you should know it, then why should you seek it?
If you should not know it, then acquired it, from where
do you know that it is your object of acquisition? Are you
not like one who seeks a runaway slave and does not know
him; Should he find him, he would not know that he is [the
one] or not?
Therefore, we say: Knowledge which we seek, we know
from one aspect but are ignorant of it from another aspect
since we know it through actual conceptualisation (al-ta-
sawwur bi’l-fi‘l) and we know it through assent in potential
(al-tasdiq bi’l-quwwa). We want to know it through assent
in actu (bi’l-fi‘l).
Should we seek the knowledge that the world is tem-
porally created, we know of ‘temporal creation (huduth)’

book two 251

and ‘the world’ through conceptualisation. We are able to
assent to it (al-tasdiq bihi). Should a middle term (hadd
awsat) appear between the world and temporal creation like
the conjunction (muqarana) of temporally created things
(hawadith) or other thing, then we know that which is in
conjunction with temporally created things is a temporally
created thing (hadith).
Should we know that the world is in conjunction with
temporally created things, we know in actu that it is a tem-
porally created thing.
Should we know it, we would know that it is what we
seek.
If we did not know it before conceptually, we would not
have known it is what is sought.
If we had assented to it in actu, we would not have
sought it.
Like the runaway slave whom we know through con-
ceptualisation (tasawwur) and imagination (takhayyul)
from one aspect and we are ignorant of his location. If he
should be perceived by the sense in his place at once (duf‘a),
we would know that he is the one sought.
If we did not know him, we would not know him upon
catching him.
Should we know him from every aspect, that is know
his location, we would not have sought him.
Therefore, this is what we desire to demonstrate from
the doubts [and ambiguities] that confuse the Sophists.
The objective in displaying it is not engaging in disputa-
tion (munazara) with them, but revealing these fine details.
If he should seek (talaba) [p.230] certitude with the
methods of demonstrative proofs (masalik al-barahin), he
would greatly derive benefit otherwise how does the Sophist

252 the standard of knowledge

engage in disputation while his disputation in himself is an
admission of the means of reasoning (tariq al-nazar)!
One ought not to be amazed by the belief in Sophism
and the indecision with the clarity of the intelligibles
(ma‘qulat). That does not agree except rarely with one who
is afflicted with a disease in his mind. We witness a group
of leaders of [theological] sects who are [practically] Soph-
ists, and the people are ignorant of them.
Everyone who engages in disputation [arguing] for the
logical necessity (ijab) of blindly following authority (taqlid)
and annulling critical inquiry (nazar) is a Sophist in admo-
nishing concerning critical inquiry. They do not have sup-
port except that intellects are not trustworthy (la thiqa
biha), and the differences in them are many. Therefore,
walking the way of safety that is blindly following authority
(taqlid) is more suitable.
If it is said to them: Did you imitate the veracity of your
prophet and distinguish between him and the liar? Or is
your blind imitation like that of the Jews and Christians?
If it is like their blind imitation, you have permitted your
being deniers (mubtilin). This is unbelief with you. If you
should not permit it, do you know it with necessity or with
intellectual examination?
Should you know it through intellectual examination,
then you have confirmed intellectual examination.
People have disagreed concerning this intellectual exam-
ination, that is acknowledging the truth (tasdiq) of the
prophets, as they have disagreed in all of the theoretical
sciences (nazariyyat).
In confirming the truth of the prophets with miracles
there are depths and obscurities which can hardly be hidden
from the examiners. With this belief they at a rank lowlier

book two 253

than that of the Sophist.
They are the most tenacious in denying critical inquiry
and negators (should they confirm critical inquiry) of
knowledge of the truth of the prophet.
As for the Sophist, he cast away his analogy in denying
universal knowledge (al-ma‘rifa al-kulliyya).
Of this genus are the Batinites of this age (i.e. the
Isma‘ilis). They were deceived by the many differences
between the critical examiners [p.231] and called for belief
in the invalidity of the intellect’s investigation (nazar al-
‘aql). Then they called for blindly following their infallible
imam.190
Should it be said to them: With what did you come to
know the infallibility of your imam; It is not possible to
argue for the necessity of him (da‘wa al-darura fihi)?
They alleged that in him is different kinds of critical in-
quiry whose use is equivocal in the presumptive matters
(zanniyyat) and which are not introduced two except that
they differ about them. They do not deduce by [a thing]
being theoretical (nazari) occurring in a locus of difference
(mahall al-khilaf) over its invalidity (butlan). They pass a
judgement of invalidity over all the rest of the theoretical
sciences (nazariyyat) so difference reaches them.
This and the likes of it are caused by diseases which af-
flict the mind. It spreads like madness but is not called mad-
ness. Madness takes [quasi] artistic forms.
Those who are deceived by examples of these illusions
are lowlier than for us to engage in disputation with them.
190
For a refutation of the Isma‘ilis, see in this volume The Correct Balance and
Ghazali’s Fada’ih al-Batiniyya wa Fada’il al-Mustazhiriyya (The Infamies (Enor-
mities) of the Batinites and the Virtues (Merits) of the Mustazhirites), trans.
McCarthy: http://ghazali.org/works/bati.htm.
191
Burhan is apodeixis.

254 the standard of knowledge

Let us confine ourselves to what we have already mentioned
concerning demonstrating the reasons for indecision
(hayra). God knows best.

Fourth view concerning

The concomitants (lawahiq) of the syllogism
It contains different sections with knowledge
of which knowledge of demonstrative proofs (barahin)191
will be complete
Section concerning the difference between causal
analogy (qiyas al-‘illa)192
and the analogy of indication (qiyas al-dalala).

Know that if the middle term (al-hadd al-awsat) is a cause

(‘illa) for the major term (hadd akbar) the jurists called it
‘causal analogy (qiyas al-‘illa) and the logicians called it ‘the
demonstration of why (burhan al-lima)’ [for in it is men-
tioned] the reply to ‘Why (lima)?’
If it is not a cause (‘illa) the jurists called it the ‘analogy
of indication (qiyas al-dalala)’ and the logicians called it
‘demonstration through the ‘that’ (burhan al-inna)’ which
is an indication of the major term present for the minor
term without proof of its cause and an example of the anal-
ogy based on cause (qiyas al-‘illa) from the perceptibles
(mahsusat) is your saying:
This piece of wood is burnt because fire burned it.
This person is satiated since he just ate.
The analogy of indication (qiyas al-dalala) is opposite it.

192
Also referred to as the ‘defective analogy.’

book two 255

That is deducing the conclusion (yustadall bi’l-natija) from
the conclusive (muntij). Then we say:
This is satiated. Therefore, he recently ate.
This woman is milk-bearing. Therefore, she gave
birth recently.
Examples from jurisprudence include: This thing is in-
herently unclean (‘ayn najisa). Therefore, praying with it is
invalid (la tasihh).
The analogy of indication is opposite it. That is for you
to say: Prayer is invalid with this thing (‘ayn). Therefore, it
is unclean.
[p.233] Generally, deducing the conclusion from the
conclusive (muntij) merely indicates its existence not its
cause (‘illa). Therefore, we deduce [the following:]
From the creation of the world the existence of the Cre-
ator (muhdith).
From the existence of systematically arranged writing
(kitaba manzuma) the knowledge of the writer.
We make ‘writing’ the ‘middle term’ and ‘knowledge’
‘the major term’ and say:
Everyone who writes in a systematically arranged
manner is learned in writing.
This [person] wrote in a systematically arranged man-
ner. Therefore, he is learned in writing.
Writing is not a cause of learning. Rather learning is
most deserving of our estimating its causality (‘illiyya).
Likewise if two conclusions were concomitant (talaza-
mat) with a single cause, it is permissible to deduce with
one of the two conclusions the other. Therefore, it is an
analogy of indication (qiyas dalala).

256 the standard of knowledge

 An example of it from jurisprudence is our saying:
Fornication (zina) does not necessitate (la yujib) the
state of being forbidden (muharramiyya). Therefore,
it does not necessitate forbidding marriage.
Forbidding marriage and making licit casual looking
[such as seeing without lust, his stepmother or
mother-in-law wearing house clothing that reveal the
head or the arms as an example] are concomitant.
They are both conclusions (natijatan) of consum-
mated marriage which necessitates forbidding affinity
by marriage (musahara) [such as the absolute prohib-
ition to marry a step-daughter, mother-in-law…etc].

If both their concomitance with a single cause is deter-

mined, the existence of one of them indicates the existence
of the other. If both their condition should differ, deduction
is not possible (lam yumkin al-istidlal) because of the possi-
bility of their differing in the condition.
Just as the analogy of indication is divided into two
types, the analogy of cause is also divided into two divi-
sions:
First, the middle term contains a cause (‘illa) for the con-
clusion (natija) but it is not in itself a cause for the existence
of the major term like our saying:
Every person is an animal.
Every animal is a body.
Therefore, every person is a body.

193
Al-Farabi, Lexicon, 2:579. (burhan lima al-shay’)

book two 257

 Therefore, the person was a body before he was an
animal.
Corporeity (jismiyya) is first to the animal. Then [the
animal] causes it for the human.
Therefore, the animal is a cause for predicating the
body on the person, not for the presence of corpor-
eality. Corporeality is essentially anterior (tataqad-
dam bi’l-dhat) in the ordering of the types and genii
over the animal.193
[p. 234] Know that what is affirmed for the specie (naw‘)
from predicating the genus on it, likewise the highest genus
(jins al-jins), the differentia (fusul), the terms (hudud), and
the necessary accompaniments (lawazim) are because of the
genus and the genus is a cause in its predicating it on the
specie, not in the presence the predicate itself. I mean the
predicate of the conclusion (mahmul al-natija).
The second division: What is a cause for the existence of
the major term absolutely, not like this example.
It might not be absolutely as in something that has
multiple causes. It is not possible for single causes (ahad al-
‘ilal) to be made a cause for the major term absolutely.
Rather they are a cause at a specific time and place.
An example of this in jurisprudence is:
Assault is a cause for sin absolutely.
Adultery is a cause for stoning absolutely.
Apostasy is not a cause for killing absolutely.
It is necessary for killing to be by way of retaliation
(qasas), etc. However, it is a cause for killing with respect
to a specific person. That does not cause it to be excluded
258 the standard of knowledge
from its being causal analogy (qiyas al-‘illa).

[p.225] Chapter concerning

demonstrating certitude (burhan al-yaqin)

The actual demonstrative proof (al-burhan al-haqiqi) does

benefit something whose change is not conceived. That is
according to the premises of the demonstrative proof. They
are certain and eternal, are not altered and do not change
at all. By that I mean that the thing does not change, even
if a person should be heedless of it like our saying: ‘The
whole is greater than the part’ and ‘Things that are equal
to a single thing are equal,’ and the like.
Therefore, the conclusion that emerges from it are also
certain (yaqiniyya).
Certain knowledge (al-‘ilm al-yaqini) is for you to know
[in the case of] a thing with such-and-such a description af-
firmed through assent (muqtarinan bi’l-tasdiq) that it is not
possible for it not to be thus. Should you place in your mind
the possibility of error in it and being oblivious to it, that
would not occur in your soul originally. If that is affirmed,
then you permit the error and its possibility. Therefore, it
is not certain.
Thus, you ought to know the conclusions to the demon-
strative proof. Should you truly know it according to our
saying and the opposite was said to you, a report from the
greatest of God’s creation in rank and the loftiest in degree
in theoretical inquiry (nazar) and discursive sciences (‘aqliy-
yat), that caused with you a probability (ihtimal). There-
fore, certitude (yaqin) is not complete (tamm). Rather, if its
opposite was transmitted from a truthful prophet, then the
transmitter must be considered a lier, or one should resort

book two 259

to allegorical interpretation of the expression heard from
him. The possibility of truth does not occur to you.
Thus, if [the expression heard] is not open for allegorical
interpretation, the prophethood of the one from whom was
recounted the saying which opposes what you rationalised
if what you rationalised must be doubted. If you should
doubt its veracity, then your certitude is incomplete.
Should you say: Perhaps the demonstrative proof of his
veracity appeared to me. Then I heard from him what
contradicts a demonstrative proof I have.
[p.236] I say: The existence of this is impossible like one
saying: If the widely-attested accounts are contradictory,
what is the way forward concerning them, as if Mecca’s
existence and lack of was widely attested to? This is im-
possible.
Therefore, the contradiction in the demonstrative proofs
which combine the conditions which we mentioned, is im-
possible. Should you see them as contradictory, know that
in one of the two or both the aforementioned conditions
were not realised. Therefore, review the location (mazann)
of error and the seven influencers (matharat) which we pre-
viously enumerated.
Most of the errors are in the initiative to render as sound
the premises of the demonstrative proof on the basis that
they are primary premises (awwaliyya). They cannot be pri-
mary premises. Rather perhaps they are praiseworthy and
well-known or imaginary.
You ought not to take the premises as sound so long
as certitude is not part of them to the extent which we
described.
Just as it is believed that what are not primary premises
are primary premises, it might be believed that primary

260 the standard of knowledge

premises are not primary premises. Therefore, they are [er-
roneously] doubted. There is no doubting the primary pre-
mises except if the sound innate human disposition (fitra
salima) is removed from the intellect because of some of the
fanatic speculative theologians who associated themselves
with the corrupt schools of thought through rejecting the
certain accounts (jalliyyat) to the extent the soul is accus-
tomed to hearing them. Therefore, that which is certain is
doubted.
Just as that which is not certain from among the praise-
worthy beliefs (mamduhat) recurs to [your hearing], you
hasten to believe it and regard it a certitude because of the
repetition in hearing it. This is the greatest of the influencers
of error (matharat al-ghalat). Rare are those from among
the rational persons (‘uqala’) who are vigilant against being
deceived by it.
Should you say: The likes of this certitude is precious
and rare. Therefore, few are the premises that have it (taq-
illu bihi).
We say: Those [areas] in which the imagination and the
intellect cooperate are many, including: arithmetic, ge-
ometry, and sense perceptions (hissiyyat). Therefore, many
certitudes of this kind proliferate in them. Likewise with
the intelligibles (ma‘qulat) which the estimative premises
(wahmiyyat) do not adjoin (la tuhadhiha).194
As for the pure judgements of reason (al-‘aqliyyat al-
sirfa) that are attached to theoretical inquiry into meta-
physics (al-ilahiyyat), they contain some of the like of these
certitudes. Certitude in them does not reach the extent
(hadd) which we mentioned except by practicing the judge-

194
Translating ‘tuhadhi’ rather than ‘tuhazi.’

book two 261

ments of reason and weaning the intellect off estimative
premises and sense perceptions and making them intimate
with the pure judgements of reason.
[p. 237] The more that theoretical inquiry increases in
them and the perseverance in seeking them is more com-
plete, insights into them are closer to the certain complete
boundary.
Whoever’s practice is prolonged and he attains mastery
into those insights (ma‘arif) is unable to silence his adver-
sary or causing the one seeking guidance (mustarshid) to
descend to his station by merely mentioning what he pos-
sesses, except if he were to guide him to travel his path in
practicing the sciences and lengthy reflection until he
reaches what he has reached. [That is] if he is of sound in-
tuition (sahih al-hads), of sharp intellect and clear mind.
If he should depart from him [falling short] in intelli-
gence or in intuition or guardianship over contemplation
(tawalli al-i‘tibar) which he undertook, he will not reach
what he has reached. With that [the seeker of guidance] op-
poses what he says about himself with repudiation (bi’l-
inkar).
He preoccupies himself with disapproving (tahjin) and
exclusion (istib‘ad).
The way of the insightful knower (al-‘arif al-basir) is to
abandon him out of disregard rather to not disseminate
to him the secrets he possesses. That is more sound for his
side and more conclusive for the noisy confusion of the
ignorant.
Not all that is seen is said. Rather the chests of the free
are the graves of secrets.

Chapter concerning the primary

262 the standard of knowledge

 questions of investigation (ummahat al-matalib)

Know that the objects of investigation (matlubat) of the

sciences [about which] questions are asked, can be divided
into four divisions because of the relationship of each one
to the format with which it is asked about.

The first, the question whether something is the case (mat-

lab hal). This question, I mean the form ‘hal’ is directed to-
ward seeking the existence of something in itself like our
saying: Does God exist? Does void exist? Or, regarding the
presence of an adjective or adverb to something, like our
saying: Does God will (murid)? Is the world temporally cre-
ated (hadith)?
The former is called the question of the absolute hal (i.e.
whether something is the case) and the latter the question
of the qualified hal (i.e. whether something is the case).

[p. 238] The second is the question what (matlab ma). Con-
ceptualisation (tasawwur) is known by it without assent
(tasdiq).
That is either by name like your saying: What is the void
(khala’)? What is the Griffin of the West (als. Fabulous
Griffin)(‘anqa’ mughrib)?195 That is: What is it that you
want by its name?
This precedes every question. Whoever does not under-
stand the meaning of ‘world (‘alam)’ and ‘temporal creation

195
For a brief discussion of the griffon, See Thérèse-Ann Druart, ‘Avicennan
Troubles: The Mysteries of the Heptagonal House and of the Phoenix,’ Tópicos
(México) [online]. 2012, n.42 [accessed 2018-07-16], pp. 51-73. URL:
http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-
66492012000100004&lng=es&nrm=iso. ISSN 0188-6649.

book two 263

(huduth)’ it is not possible for him to ask: ‘Does the world
exist?’
Whoever does not conceive of the signifying meaning
(ma‘na al-dall), it is not possible for him to ask about its
existence, or the request (al-talab) is according to the es-
sences’ reality (haqiqat al-dhat) like your saying: What is
the person (insan)? What is wine (‘uqar)? With it you seek
its definition (hadd), if you should know that what is in-
tended by the name ‘‘uqar’ is wine.
This is delayed from seeking whether something is the
case (hal). The one who does not believe in the existence of
wine (khamr) does not ask about its definition.

The third, the question ‘Why?’ which is seeking the cause

(‘illa) to answer the question whether something is the case
(hal) like your saying: Why was the world temporally cre-
ated (hadithan)?
It is either seeking the cause (‘illa) of assent (tasdiq) is
like your saying: Why (lima) did you say that God is exist-
ent (mawjud)?
The cause of His existence is not sought. Rather the
cause is in the occurrence of the assent to His existence (al-
tasdiq bi-wujudihi). It is the demonstration that something
exists (burhan al-inna)196 in the language of the logicians
and the analogy of indication (qiyas al-dalala) in the lan-
guage of the speculative theologians (mutakallimin).
As for seeking the cause of existence (talab ‘illat al-
wujud) like your saying: ‘Why is the world created?’ we say:
because of a temporally created will.

196
Marmura, ‘Ghazali and Demonstrative Science,’ pp. 188-193; Tariq Jaffer,
Al-Razi: Master of Qur’anic Reasoning and Theological Interpretation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.201–202.

264 the standard of knowledge

The fourth is: the question ‘Which? (ayy)’ through which
something is sought apart from another.
These are the primary questions of investigation and cer-
tain problems (as’ila).
As for the question: ‘Where? (ayna),’ ‘When? (mata),’
and ‘How? (kayfa)’ they are not primary questions of in-
vestigation. They are potentially subsumed under the pri-
mary question: ‘the restricted hal (if something is the case).’
If the process of awareness and understanding (tafattun)
occur to him with the question in the form of ‘hal’ and if
they do not, they are primary questions of investigation not
included in what we have enumerated.

[p.239] Chapter concerning

Demonstrating the essential meaning (dhati)
and the primary meaning (awwali)

As for the essential [meaning], it is applied to two aspects

(wajhayn):

The first of which is: The predicate has to be taken into the
definition of the subject, constituting it, internal to its real-
ity, like our saying: Man is an animal.
Therefore, it is said: The animal is essential to man. That
is it is constituting him as previously demonstrated.
The subject is either taken as part of the definition of the
predicate like our saying: Some animals are men.
The predicate here is ‘man’. Rather ‘animal’ is part of
the definition of man.
If one of two things is not taken as part of the definition
of the other, then one is not essential to the other.

book two 265

 This can be exemplified [in the following example]: ‘The
flattened [quality] is part of the nose.’ Therefore, it is essen-
tial to the nose with the aforementioned meaning since it is
not possible to define the ‘flattened [quality]’ except as part
of mentioning the nose in its definition.
As for the primary, it is also mentioned in two aspects:
The first is what is primary in the intellect. That is it does
not need an intermediary to know it like our saying: Two
is more than one.
The second is for it to be such that it is not possible to
affirm or negate the predicate upon another meaning more
general than the subject. Therefore, should we say: Man
falls ill and does not recover.
It is not primary for him with this meaning since it is
said about what is more general than him which is the
animal.
Indeed, it is primary for the animal since it is not applied
to what is more general than it which is the body.
Likewise accepting its transference to the animal is not
primary since it is said of what is more general than it,
namely the body. If the animal is annulled, the acceptance
of the transference remains. If the body is annulled then it
does not remain.

Chapter concerning that in which the matter

of the demonstrations (barahin) is combined

They are three [categories]:

Principles (mabadi’)
Subject matters (mawdu‘at)
Questions (masa’il)

266 the standard of knowledge

 [p.240] By ‘subject matters (mawdu‘at) we mean that
which is used in demonstrating (ma yubarhan fiha).
Questions (masa’il): That upon which [the demonstra-
tion] is based (ma yubarhan ‘alayha).
Principles (mabadi’): That with which [the demonstra-
tion] is produced (ma yubarhanu biha).
What is meant by principles (mabadi’) is the proposi-
tions (muqaddimat) which we previously mentioned.
As for the ‘subject matters (mawdu‘at), they are the
matters which are placed in the sciences and whose essential
accidents are sought. By ‘essentiality (dhatiyya) I mean the
second meaning of the two aforementioned meanings.
Every branch of knowledge has a subject.
The subject of geometry (handasa) is: measurable dimen-
sion (miqdar).
The subject of arithmetic (hisab) is: number (‘adad).
The subject of knowledge which is known as physics (al-
‘ilm al-mulaqqab bi’l-tabi‘i) is the body (jism) of the world.
From a certain aspect the world’s body is in motion and is
constant.
The subject of grammar (nahw) is the language of the
Arabs from the perspective of its inflection differing.
The subject of jurisprudence (fiqh) is the actions of those
who are legally responsible (af‘al al-mukallafin) from the
perspective that [the actions] are not prohibited and they
are commanded (yu’mar), or are permitted (mubah), or are
commendable (yundab), or are disliked (yukrah).
The subject of the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-
fiqh) is the judgements of the divine law (ahkam al-shar‘),
namely: obligation (wujub), prohibition (hazr), permissibil-
ity (ibaha) from the aspect of your perceiving it from its
proofs (adilla).

book two 267

 The subject of logic (mantiq) is distinguishing the intel-
ligibles (ma‘qulat) and giving a precise exposition of the
meanings (ma‘ani).
[p.241] As for the questions (masa’il), they are proposi-
tions (qadaya) specific to every branch of knowledge
through which knowledge in the sciences is sought by one
of two terms: Negation (nafy) or confirmation (ithbat).
[This is] like our saying concerning arithmetic: This number
is either even or odd. In geometry: This measurable dimen-
sion (miqdar) is equal (musawin) or different (mubayin).
In jurisprudence (fiqh): This action is permitted (halal)
or prohibited (haram) or obligatory (wajib).
In the divine science (al-‘ilm al-ilahi): This existent is
pre-eternal (qadim) or temporally created (hadith). This
existent either has a cause (sabab) or not.
What is intended is if the predicate of questions (mahmul
al-masa’il) is sought through theoretical inquiry (matluban
bi’l-nazar). Therefore, it is not permitted for it to be essen-
tial to the subject with the first meaning since if it were thus,
it would know the subject before the [branch of] knowl-
edge. It is not permissible for the animal, which is essential
to man, meaning that he is extant in his definition, to be
the object of scientific investigation (matlub). Whoever
knows man, will undoubtedly know his being an animal
before him. Knowledge of specific parts of the definition
precedes knowledge of the delimited (mahdud).
However, the essential with the second sense (ma‘na) is
the object of scientific investigation (matlub).
As for every predicate, which is not in the second sense
(ma‘na) or in the first sense is called ‘strange (gharib)’ like
our saying in geometry upon examining the lines: This is a
197
See Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 102.

268 the standard of knowledge

fine (hasan) line or crooked (qabih).
[This is] because the ‘fine (hasan)’ and the ‘wrong
(qabih)’ are not apprehended (la yu’khadh fi) the definition
of line nor the line in its definition. Rather the essential is
in itself straight or curved and the like.
Likewise, we say in medicine: This is a round or square
wound.197
It is a strange predicate for the wound since one of the
two cannot be apprehended in the definition of the other.
Rather it is essential to the shapes.
The predicate may be essential to the subject with the
second sense (ma‘na). However, it is strange when annexed
to the knowledge in which it is employed like our saying in
jurisprudence This movement is fast or slow.
Therefore, speed and slowness are essential to move-
ment. However, they are sought in natural science (physics).
What is sought in jurisprudence is another essential
(dhati akhar), namely its state of being obligatory (kaw-
nuhu wajiban), or prohibited (mahzur) or permitted
(mubah).
If we should say in physics: This action is permitted or
forbidden. It would be incompatible to this science (gharib
min al-‘ilm).
[p.242] If it is said: Is it permissible for the predicate in
both premises (muqaddimatayn) to be essential (dhatiyyan)
in the first sense (bi’l-ma’na al-awwal)?
We say: No, if it were that way, the conclusion would
be known. If we say:
Man is an animal.
The animal is a body

book two 269

 Therefore, man is a body.
Knowledge of the conclusion is not sought (ghayr mat-
lub). Therefore, whoever knows man, know all the parts
(ajza’) of his definition (hadd) which are ‘the body’ and ‘the
animal.’
Indeed, it is not unlikely that every definition is essential
in the second sense (bi’l-ma‘na al-thani). Rather if one of
them is essential in the second sense, this is sufficient re-
gardless of whether it is the minor or the major premise.
If it is said: Why have you said that the essential in the
first sense (al-ma‘na al-awwal) is not sought while we seek
knowledge about [whether] or not the soul is a substance
(jawhar)? Substantiality (jawhariyya) for the soul is essen-
tial (dhatiyya) since whoever knows the soul knows its state
of being a substance (jawhar) if it is a substance (in kana
jawharan).
We say: Whoever knows the soul does not conceive from
him seeking its state of being a substance since knowledge
of its substantiality is antecedent (sabiqa) to knowledge of
[the substance]. However, should we seek whether or not
the soul is a substance, we would not know from the soul
except for a matter (amr) accidental to [the substance] (‘arid
lahu) which is the mover (muharrik) and the perceiver (mu-
drik). That is like [the attribute] ‘white’ to snow.
What is sought is the genus of what is accidental to it
(al-ma‘rud lahu) which is not constitutive (muqawwim) of
the quiddity of the accidental quality (‘arid). I mean the sub-
stantiality (jawhariyya) of the perceiver and mover is the
constitution of the essentials (taqwim al-dhatiyyat).
Likewise every time its image or name occurred to us,

198
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 77-78.

270 the standard of knowledge

not its reality, it is possible for us to seek the genus (jins) of
that whose name and image which occurred to us.
Other than in this aspect is not possible.

Chapter in resolving doubt (shubha)

in the circular analogy (al-qiyas al-dawri)

Should one say: Why did you conclude (qadaytum) with

annulling the circular proof (burhan dawri)?198
It is known that if man is asked about the causes (asbab)
and effects (musabbabat) of what God decreed His way
(Sunna) that connects some of them with each other (i.e.
the causes and effects). They contain what relates in a cycle
to the first, since it is said:
Why was there a cloud?
Therefore, it is said: Since it was vapour which be-
came concentrated and amassed.
[p.243] Then it is said: Why was there vapour?
Then it is said: Since the land was damp and the heat
caused a reaction with it. Therefore, some moisture
turned into vapour and ascended.
Then it is said: Why was the land damp?
Then it is said: Because there was rain.
Then it is said: Why was there rain?
Then it is said: Because there were clouds.
Therefore, it returned according to the cycle (bi’l-
dawr) to the cloud. It is as if it said: Why were there
clouds? I said: because there were clouds.

book two 271

 The occurrence in cycles (dawri) is invalid (batil) whe-
ther or not the repeated term (al-hadd al-mutakarrir) in-
stervenes with an intermediary or intermediaries.
We say: This is not what occurs cyclically and is invalid.
Rather the invalid is for something to be apprehended by
revealing itself by saying:
Why was this cloud?
Therefore, the cause is what in the end returns to cau-
sation (ta‘lil) with this cloud itself.
As for it returning to the explanation with another
cloud, the cause is unlike the effect (ghayr al-ma‘lul) in
number (‘adad). Except it is equal to it in type (naw‘). It is
not remote for the same cloud to be a cause for another
through the dampness of the land, then the rising of vapor,
then the formation of another cloud.

Chapter concerning that in which

the true demonstration occurs
Know that the true demonstration is what benefits the
necessary, perpetual and eternal certitude (yaqin) which is
impossible to change like your knowing that the world is
temporally created and that it has a Creator and the like
which is impossible to oppose it forever, since it is imposs-
ible for a time to come in which we judge the the world to
be pre-eternity, and [we] negate [the existence of] [p.244]
the Creator.
As for the changing things which do not possess per-
petual certitude, they are all of the particular propositions
(juz’iyyat) which are terrestrial, the closest of which to
being unchanging are the mountains.

272 the standard of knowledge

 If you should say that this mountain’s elevation is such-
and-such.
Every mountain’s elevation is such-and-such. Therefore,
it is such-and-such.
Therefore, it is concluded: The elevation of this one is
such-and-such.
The conclusion (hasil) is not eternal knowledge (‘ilman
abadiyyan) since in the minor premise certitude is not per-
petual, since it is conceived that the mountain’s elevation
will change.
Likewise is the depth of the seas and the locations of is-
lands. These matters do not remain [unchanging]. How is
then your knowledge that Zayd is at home and the like of
that which are related to accidental human circumstances?
Not like our saying:
Man is an animal.
The animal is a body.
Man is not in two places at once.
and the likes of this.
These are eternal perpetual certainties which are not
subjected to change. Even one of the speculative theologians
said: Knowledge is a kind of ignorance (al-‘ilm min jins al-
jahl).199
He intended with it this kind of knowledge. Should you
know as reliably reported on authority of multiple indepen-
dent narrators (bi’l-tawatur) for example: Zayd is in the

199
Elsewhere Ghazali mentions that ‘Reality is a kind of ignorance (al-haqiqa
jins min al-jahl).’

book two 273

house.
Should this conviction (i‘tiqad) be perpetually assumed,
and Zayd leaves [the house], then this conviction itself
would become ignorance.
This genus (jins) is not perpetually conceived in the per-
petual certitudes (al-yaqiniyyat al-da’ima).
If it should be said: Is it conceivable to produce a dem-
onstration (iqamat al-burhan) on that whose occurrence is
valid for the most part (akthariyyan) or by chance (ittifaqiy-
yan)?
We say: As for what is valid for the most part (akthari)
from the major premises, they undoubtedly have causes for
the most part (‘ilal akthariyya).
If those causes (‘ilal) are made middle terms (hudud
wusta), they produce beneficial knowledge and overwhel-
ming probability (zannan ghaliban).
As for knowledge, by virtue of it being ‘majority (ak-
thari)’ and ‘most likely (ghalib),’ and if we should know the
enactment of the Sunna of God the Exalted that the beard
either grows because of the strength of the skin or the for-
titude of the form (matanat al-najjar). If we should know
by the old age [of the person as an indicator for] the
strength [p.245] of the skin and the fortitude of the form,
we pass the judgement of the beard emerging. That is we
passed judgement that [its] emerging is most likely and that
the direction of emerging is more dominating than the other
direction. This is certain (yaqini). What occurs most likely
(ghaliban), the set preponderant (murajjah) is inevitable (la
mahala), however with a hidden condition (shart khafi)
which is not known (la yuttala‘u ‘alayhi). The lack of that

200
‘Walad’, the word for child, is masculine.

274 the standard of knowledge

condition is rare. Therefore, we pass certain judgement that
whoever marries a young woman copulated with her, will
most likely (ghaliban) have a child. However, the presence
of the child himself200 is probable (maznun) and the state
of the existence (wujud) which is generally overwhelming
is definitive (maqtu‘ bihi).
Thus we pass judgement in the probable judgement of
jurisprudence (al-fiqhiyyat al-zanniyya) that knowledge
upon the appearance of probability is obligatory definitively
and categorically (qat‘an). Therefore, the production
(‘amal) is probable (maznun) and the presence of the judge-
ment is [also] probable. However the presence of the pro-
duction (‘amal) is categorical (qat‘i) since it is known with
a categorical proof that the divine law established that with
probability bordering on certainty (ghalib al-zann) in place
of certitude (yaqin) with respect to [declaring] acts obliga-
tory (wujub al-‘amal). The judgement’s being probable does
not prevent us from regarding as definitive that we have re-
garded as such.
As for the matters which occur by chance (ittifaqiyya)
like a person finding treasure while walking for which it is
not possible for probability or knowledge to occur with it,
even if attaining the probability of its existence, it would
become mainly probable (ghaliban akthariyyan) and would
no longer be only by chance.
Indeed, it is possible to produce a demonstration (bur-
han) by its being only by chance (ittifaqiyyan).
The logicians adopted the convention (istalaha ‘ala) of
designating ‘deomonstrating (burhan)’ to that which pro-
duces necessary, perpetual, universal certitude (al-yaqin al-
kulli al-da’im al-daruri).
If you do not support them in adopting this convention,

book two 275

it is possible for you to call all of the true sciences (al-‘ulum
al-haqiqiyya) ‘demonstrative (buhaniyya)’ if the premises
assemble the conditions that were [mentioned].
Should you support them in this, then the demonstrative
sciences (al-burhani min al-‘ulum) are: knowledge of God
and His attributes and all the eternal unchanging matters,
like our saying: Two is greater than one. This is true eter-
nally and everlastingly (fi’l-azal wa’l-abad).
Knowledge of the configuration of the heavens (hay’at
al-samawat), the planets, their distances, measurements and
the manner in which they journey (kayfiyyat masiriha) are
demonstrative (burhaniyyan) with those who saw that they
are eternal and unchanging.
They are not demonstrative (burhaniyya) with the
people of truth who view the heavens as they do the terres-
trial realm (ardiyyat) in permitting change in them.
[p.246] As for that which differs in the territories (biqa‘)
and regions (aqtar), like the linguistic sciences and the
political sciences, it differs according to time period and re-
ligious community like the jurisprudential (fiqhiyya) and
legal (shar‘iyya) statutes from the particulars of the per-
mitted and forbidden.
It is not hidden that they are not from the demonstrative
syllogisms (burhaniyyat) according to this convention (‘ala
hadha al-istilah).
The philosophers allege that the highest felicity in the
afterlife does not have any meaning except for the soul
reaching its perfection which is possible for it to attain and
that its perfection is in the sciences, not in the base desires
of the self (shahawat).
When the soul remains eternally, its salvation (najat) and

276 the standard of knowledge

happiness (sa‘ada) in the truthful sciences for eternity like
knowledge of God and His attributes, His angels, and the
ordering of the existents (mawjudat) and the progression
of the causes (asbab) and effects (musabbabat).
As for the sciences which are not perpetually certain, if
they are sought, they get, rather to get through them to
other than them.
This is a locus (mahall) which is not revealed except after
lengthy theoretical inquiry. This book does not permit for
a thorough investigation of it. Rather the locus where it is
revealed is the specific sciences (al-‘ulum al-mufassala).
[p.247] Chapter concerning the Divisions
of the Cause (‘illa)

[The word] ‘cause (‘illa)’ is applied to four connotational

attributes (ma‘anin).
The first: Something that possesses movement in its es-
sence (ma minhu bi-dhatihi al-haraka). It is the cause for a
thing’s existence, like the carpenter to the chair and the
father to the boy.
The second: The substance (madda) and what is necess-
ary to exist for something’s existence like wood for a chair
and menstrual blood and sperm for the boy.201
The third: The form (sura) which is the completion for
everything. It may also be called a ‘formal cause (‘illa su-
riyya)’ like the form of the bed to the bed and the form of
the house to the house.

201
Compare Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 127.
202
This has been corrected from the ‘al-suluh lil-julus min al-sarir.’
203
See for instance Al-Kindi, Risala fi hudud al-ashya’ wa rusumiha in Rasa’il
al-Kindi al-falsafiyya, ed. Mu ammad ‘Abd al-Hadi Abu Rida. 2 vols. Cairo: Dar
al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1950–1953, 1:109–130. Also Andreas Lammer, The Elements
of Avicenna’s Physics: Greek Sources and Arabic Innovations, p. 247, 505.

book two 277

 The fourth: The teleological end (ghaya ba‘itha) first, its
existence is required ot be at the end like dwelling (sakan),
for the house and utility to sitting from [crafting] the bed
(al-suluh lil-julus min al-sarir).202
Know that every one of these occurs as middle terms in
the demonstrative proofs (yaqa‘u hududan wusta fi’l-bara-
hin) since it is possible for each one to be mentioned in reply
to the question ‘Why? (jawab lima).’
As for the principle of motion,203 an example of it from
the intelligibles (ma‘qulat) for it to be said: Why (lima) did
the prince fight so-and-so?
Then it is said: because he plundered his province. The
act of plundering is the principle of motion.
[p.248] It is said: ‘Why did so-and-so kill so-and-so?’
Then it is said: ‘because the sultan forced him to do it.’
An example of this from jurisprudence is to say: ‘Why
was this person killed?’ Then it is said: ‘because he com-
mitted adultery or apostatised.’
Therefore, ‘adultery’ is the originator of this matter
(mabda’ hadha al-amr) which is what the jurisprudents call
for the most part ‘cause (sabab).’
As for ‘substance (madda),’ an example of it from the
intelligibles is to say: Why (lima) does man die?
Then we say: since he is a composite of dissonant things
(umur mutanafira) from hotness, moisture, coldness, dry-
ness—contested and dissonant. hotness
Examples of it from jurisprudence is to say: Why were
the commercial partnership (qirad) and agency (wikala) an-
nulled with death and unconsciousness (ighma’)?
We say: because it is a weak permitted contract which
is not necessary (la luzum lahu).
This is a material cause (madda) since the voiding be-

278 the standard of knowledge

fell’s the contract the way death visits the human being,
upon the concomitance of the cause (jarayan al-sabab)
which is the principle of the matter (mabda’ al-amr) in
death and voiding together.
As for the form (sura), it contains the constitution
(qiwam) of the thing, e.g. the bed is a bed with its form
(sura), not its wood. Man is man because of his form (sura)
not his body (jism).
The visual appearances (hay’at) of things differ in the
outer forms (suwar) not in the substances (mawadd). There-
fore, their being supported with them (i.e. the outer forms)
is not hidden. If it said: ‘Why did this sperm become a per-
son and this wood a bed?’
Then it is said: Through the acquisition of the human-
ness form (surat al-insaniyya) and the bedness form (surat
al-saririyya).
As for the purpose (ghaya) for whose sake is the thing,
an example of it from the intelligibles (ma‘qul) is to say:
Why are the molars wide?
It is said: because what is intended with them is crushing
(tahn).
Why did they fight the [particular] class? It is said: to en-
slave them.
In jurisprudence it is said: Why were the adulterer, the
apostate and the murderer killed? It is said: to prevent
[committing] grave sins (fawahish).
These four causes join together in everything that has a
cause (‘illa).204
204
Contrast Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 129, who argues that more
than one, though not necessarily all four of the causes combine in a single in-
stance.
205
Synonymous with sabab.
206
Bud‘ can also refer to sexual intercourse (jima‘).

book two 279

 Thus it is in the legal judgements.
[p.249] Perhaps the jurisprudents called the matter ‘locus
(mahall)’ ‘the agent (fa‘il),’ which is like the carpenter (naj-
jar), and the father, ‘cause (ahl),’205 the objective (ghaya),
and ‘judgement (hukm).’
In the example of marriage (furida al-nikah), the hus-
band is the cause (ahl), the vagina (bud‘)206 is locus (ma-
hall), making it lawful (hill)] is an ‘objective (ghaya),’ and
the form of the contract is as if it is the outer form (sura).
So long as these matters (umur) are not in conjunction,
marriage does not exist. Thus it is said: Marriage which
does not benefit lawfulness (la yufid al-hill) does not exist.
Likewise selling which does not benefit ownership.
The existence of the objective (wujud al-ghaya) is inevi-
table (la budda minhu). Its (i.e. the objective) nature as in-
telligible (ma‘qulan), inducive (ba‘ith) is a condition prior
to existence. Its nature as present in actu is necessary after
existence.
As long as the agent (fa‘il) and the substance (madda)
are able to be present, the existence of the thing like the car-
penter, the wood, the father, the sperm drop (nutfa), the
seller (ba’i‘) and the sale object (mabi‘) are not necessary
under all circumstances (fi kull hal).
So long as the form exists, it is necessary for the thing to
exist, like the form of the bed, and humanity (insaniyya).
So long as the objective exists in actu, it is necessary for
the thing to exist, like the ‘state of being lawful (hill)’ in
marriage and ‘usefulness (suluh)’ for sheltering oneself and
sitting in the house.
The thing in these four aspects differs in this meaning.
Then every one of these causes [is as follows]:

280 the standard of knowledge

 Distant (ba‘ida) like the wife surrendering [herself] to
the husband upon the husband possessing half of the
dowry (sadaq). It is the cause (‘illa) of the dowry.
The dowry is the near cause of surrendering.
or in potential: like drunkenness to wine before
drinking.
or in actu: as in the state of drinking.
or specific: like adultery is to stoning.
or generally: like the to stoning or the punishment.
or essentially: It is called ‘cause’ by the jurisprudents
like adultery is to stoning.
[p.250] or accidentally: like someone being liable for
having been married [which should shield against
adultery] (al-ihsan lahu) which is called a condition
(shart). Stoning is not imperative except by finding
one liable [for the act of adultery] while being mar-
ried. It is [from] the characteristics (khisal) which
however, function in place of the cause with it. Just
as if you should release the support from beneath the
roof, then it falls. Therefore, it is said: its falling is by
the cause of weight (‘illat al-thuql). However, with
the removal of the support, ‘the quality of [collaps-
ing] downward (huwiyy)’ has a condition which is
the space underneath being devoid of a solid body,
not to penetrate it.
Examples of this in the perceptibles are may. Thus we
have restricted ourselves to the legal examples (al-amthila
al-fiqhiyya).

book two 281

 [p.251] [BOOK THREE]
DEFINITIONS 207

Theoretical inquiry in this book is restricted

to two aspects (fannan)

First: What occurs of the terms that constitute

the universal laws

Second: The specific terms

[p. 252] The First Discipline

Concerning the laws of the definitions

It contains chapters

The first [chapter] concerning

demonstrating the need for the definition

We previously presented that knowledge is of two parts:

The first: Knowledge of the essences of things (‘ilm bi-
dhawat al-ashya’) which is called ‘conceptualisation (tasaw-
wur).’
The second: Knowledge of the relationship of the es-
sences to each other whether through negation (negation)
or confirmation (ijab). It is called ‘assent (tasdiq).’

207
Also Syllogistic Terms.

282 the standard of knowledge

 Attaining ‘assent’ is through proof (hujja) and attaining
complete conceptualisation (tasawwur) through the term
(hadd).
The existent things are divided into:
Individual concrete things (a‘yan shakhsiyya) like Zayd,
Mecca, and ‘this tree.’
Universal things (umur kulliyya) like the person, the
country, the tree, wheat, and wine.
You already know the difference between the universal
(kulli) and the particular (juz’i).
Our objective is the universals (kulliyyat) since they are
used in demonstrative proofs (barahin).
The universal is sometimes understood in a universal
sense (fahman jumliyyan) like an understanding from just
the common name and the rest of the names and nicknames
of the species (anwa‘) and genera (ajnas).
[The universal] may also be understood in a detailed
summary which encompasses all of the essentials which
contain the supports (qiwam) of the thing and greatly and
completely distinguish it from another in the mind reflecting
the name and the name reflecting upon it as is understood
from our saying:
An intoxicating beverage expressed from the grape
(sharab muskir mu‘tasar min al-‘inab).
and
A speaking mortal animal (hayawan natiq ma’it).
and
A body possessing a soul, sensitive, moves at will, and
gets nourished (jism dhu nafsin hassasin mutaharri-
kin bi’l-irada mutaghadhdhin).
book three 283
 [p. 254] With these above mentioned terms, it is possible
to understand:
Wine Man Animal
an understanding that is greatly summarised, detailed,
verified and discerned fashion than is understood from their
mere names.
That which makes the thing understood this kind of
understanding is called ‘a term (hadd) just as that what
makes the first ‘kind (darb)’ of understanding understood
is called a ‘name’ and a ‘nickname.’
The understanding which occurs from defining is called
a summarised (mulakhkhas), detailed (mufassal) knowl-
edge. Knowledge which occurs with only the name is called
knowledge in general (‘ilm jumli).
A thing might be understood by that which distinguished
it from apart such that it is reflected in its name and the
name reflects on it. It is distinguished by essential constitut-
ive / (al-sifat al-dhatiyya al-muqawwima) which are the
genera (ajnas), species (anwa‘), and differentia (fusul).
Rather by the accidents (‘awarid) and the specific attributes
(khawass). That is called a description (rasm). It is like our
saying in distinguishing man from others: He is the animal
who walks on two legs, who has wide nails, and laughs.
This distinguishes him from others like the term (hadd).
Like your saying concerning wine: It is the liquid that
ferments in the earthen jar upon whose surface froth
forms…and other such accidents which if combined do not
occur except with wine.
And this if it is more general than the thing defined with
abandoning some of the precautions (ba‘d al-ihtirazat), is
called a ‘deficient description (rasm naqis).’

284 the standard of knowledge

 There is something which is difficult to comprehend all
of its essences or for which an expression cannot be found
and then modulates to accidental precautions (ihtirazat
‘aradiyya) instead of the essential differentia (fusul dha-
tiyya). Therefore, it becomes a distinguished description
(rasm mumayyaz) existing in place of the term (hadd) only
in discernment (tamyiz) not in understanding all of the es-
sentials (tafahhum jami‘ al-dhatiyyat).
Those who are sincere request from the term (hadd) con-
ceptualising the true nature (kunh) of the thing and repre-
senting its reality (tamaththul haqiqatihi) in [p.255] them-
selves not for the sake of discernment (tamyiz). Rather it
attains the conceptualisation completely and discernment
follows it. Whoever seeks absolute discernment (al-tamyiz
al-mujarrad) will be convinced by the description (rasm).
Then you would know to what the [following] reach out
of causal efficacy (ta’thiran):
The noun (ism)
The term (hadd)
The description (rasm)
You know the division of the conceptualisation of the
thing (inqisam tasawwr al-shay’) into a conceptualisation
which has detailed understanding of its essentialities (dha-
tiyyat) and a conceptualisation which has an understanding
of its accidents (a‘rad).
Each one of them might be complete and equivalent to
the name in the extremities of predication (tarafay al-haml)
or it might be incomplete (naqis). Therefore, it is more gen-
eral than the name.
Know that the most beneficial of the descriptions (anfa‘u
al-rusum) in defining the things is for the proximate genus

book three 285

(al-jins al-qarib)208 to be placed in it originally. Then you
mention the well-known particular accidents (al-a‘rad al-
khassa al-mashhura) in terms of differentia (fusulan). The
hidden proprium (al-khassa al-khafiyya) if mentioned, do
not generally benefit the definition. When you say concern-
ing the description of the triangle:
It is a form whose angles are equal to two right angles.
You have defined it (rasamtahu) to an architect (mu-
handis) alone.
Therefore, the definition is a saying which indicates the
quiddity (mahiyya) of the thing.
The description (rasm) is the saying composed of the ac-
cidents of the thing and its particular characteristics whose
sum specifies them (i.e. the accidents) by being in conjunc-
tion and are equivalent to it.

Second Discipline concerning

the substance of the definition and its form

We have presented that every composed thing (mu’allaf)

has substance and form as in the syllogism (qiyas).
The substance of the definition (maddat al-hadd) are the
genera, the species and the differentia. We have mentioned
them in the Book of the Syllogistic Premises [above].
[p.256] As for [the definition’s] form and configuration
(hay’a), they are for taking into account in it the production
(irad) of the proximate genus (al-jins al-aqrab). It comple-
ments (yurdif) all the essential differentia (al-fusul al-dha-
tiyya) with none left behind. We mean by producing the
proximate genus to not say concerning the definition of

208
Janssens, p. 58.

286 the standard of knowledge

man (hadd al-insan): ‘A mortal speaking body (jism natiq
ma’it)’ even if that is equivalent to what is being sought (al-
matlub). Rather we say (animal). The animal is an inter-
mediary (mutawassit) between the body and man. It is
closer to what is sought from ‘the body.’
We do not say in the definition of wine: that it is an in-
toxicating liquid (ma’i‘ muskir), rather we say: an intoxi-
cating beverage. Therefore, it is more specific than ‘liquid’
and closer to ‘wine.’
Likewise, all of the essential differentia (fusul dhatiyya)
ought to be produced in order even if discernment should
occur in some of the differentia.
Should he be asked about the definition of the animal,
he says: A body possessing a soul (jism dhu nafs), sensitive
(hassas), possessing dimension (bu‘d), moving at will (mu-
taharrik bi’l-irada).
He brought all of the differentia. Should he have aban-
doned what comes after the sensitive (hassas), discernment
would occur with [the definition]. However, he would not
have conceived of the animal with its complete essential
parts.
The definition is the exterior expression (‘unwan) of
what is defined. Therefore, it ought to be equivalent in
meaning. If some of these differentia are deficient, then it is
called an ‘incomplete definition (hadd naqis)’ even if it is
discerned and was a constant (mutarrid) reflected on the
way to a solution (fi tariq al-hall).
However much he mentions the proximate genus (al-jins
al-qarib) and brings all of the essential differentia, he ought
not to increase it.
However much you mention these conditions in the
form and substance of the definition, you would know that

book three 287

the single thing does not have except for one definition and
that it does not have the capacity for conciseness and pro-
lixity [p.257] since its conciseness is from omitting some of
the differentia. This is deficiency (nuqsan).
Prolonging it by mentioning the definition of the prox-
imate genus instead of the genus is like your saying in the
definition of man: He is a body possessing a soul, sensitive,
in motion by will, speaking, and mortal.
[p. 258] Then he mentioned the definition of the ‘animal’
in place of the ‘animal’ which is superfluousness which is not
needed. What is intended is that the definition includes all of
the essentialities of the thing either in potentia or in actu.
However much the animal is mentioned, it includes [the
following attributes]: sensitive, in motion, and body in po-
tential that is by way of inclusion (tadammun).
Likewise a definition is present for the thing which is
composed of a form (sura) and a substance (madda) by
mentioning one of the two. As it is said in the definition of
anger: It is the blood of the heart boiling. This is mentioned
of the substance.
It is said: It is seeking revenge. This is mention of the
form.
Rather the complete definition is to say: It is the boiling
of the heart’s blood for seeking revenge.
If it said: If the heedless person should be heedless or if
somebody had acted deliberately, and prolonged the defi-
nition by mention of the proximate genus, instead of the
proximate genus [itself] -whether he added to some of the
essential differentia something of the accidents (a‘rad) an
effective concomitants (lawazim) or reduced some of the
differentia, would the aim of the definition be missed like
that of the syllogism by formulating it wrong?

288 the standard of knowledge

 We say: Those who look to the outward forms of things
(zawahir al-umur), perhaps regard as great the matter con-
cerning this error and the matter is easier than they believe,
however much man takes note of the definition’s intention
(maqsud al-hadd). What is intended is the conceptualisation
of something with all its constituents (muqawwimat) while
taking into account the order in knowledge of the most gen-
eral and important through displaying the general first and
backing it with the particular (akhass) which functions the
same as the differentia (al-majri majra al-fusul). If that is
preserved, required detailed conceptual knowledge occurs.
As for the deficiency (nuqsan) in abandoning some of
the differentia (fusul), it is a deficiency in conceptualisation
(tasawwur).
As for an increase in some of the accidents, what has oc-
curred of complete conceptualisation is not refuted. [On the
contrary,] benefit might be derived from it in some of the
situations in increasing disclosure and illumination.
As for the substitution of the essentials with the con-
comitants (lawazim) and accidents (‘ardiyyat), that is ob-
jectionable (qadih) in perfect conceptualisation.
Then let him know the level of the influence of each of
these in what is intended. Man ought not to remain fixated
on the habitual description that is familiar in every matter
and forget his objective.
[p.259] Therefore, as long as all the essentials are known
in order, the objective is fulfilled even if something of the
accidents (a‘rad) is added or if the definition of the prox-
imate genus was posited (ukhidha) instead of the genus
[itself].

book three 289

 Third discipline concerning
ordering of seeking the definition with a question
The inquirer about something by his saying: ‘What is it?’
does not reply except after finishing from the ‘question of
what (matlab hal).’ Likewise, the questioner with ‘Why?’
does not ask except after finishing from the ‘question of
what (matlab hal).’
If he should ask about the thing before conviction in its
existence, and say: What is it? (ma huwa) he returns to
seeking an exposition of the name like one saying: ‘What is
the void (khala’)?’ ‘What is alchemy (kimiya)?’–and he does
not believe either to be in existence.
If he should believe in the existence, the request is di-
rected at conceptualising the thing in it essence (fi dhatihi).
Its proper order is for him to say: What is it? pointing,
for example, to a date palm.
Then if the one who is asked answers with the proximate
genus and says: ‘a tree,’ he does not convince the questioner
with it, rather it is related to what the form (Which? (ayy))
mentions. He said: Which tree is it?
Should he say: ‘It is a tree which bears dates’ he attained
the objective and the question ends except if the meaning
of dates (rutab) or tree is not understood [in which case] he
returns to the form ‘What (ma)’ and says: What are dates?
What are trees? Then he mentions the genus and species
and says: The tree is a plant which has a trunk.
If it is asked: What is a trunk? Then he mentions its
genus and species and says: It is a body which receives nour-
ishment and is growing.
If it is asked: What is a body? Then he says: It extends
in the three dimensions (al-aqtar al-thalatha)—It has length,
width and height.
290 the standard of knowledge
 It is thus until the questioning ceases.
If it is said: When does it cease? The progression to an
undefined end is impossible. If you should specify its stop-
ping, then it is arbitrariness (tahakkum).
[p.260] Then we ssay: [The question] does not progress
indefinitely, but rather terminates at genera and species
which are known to the questioner undoubtedly.
If [the questioner] should maintain [total] ignorance (lit.
eternally), he does not have a an expose of the definition
(hadd), since every definition (ta‘rif) and knowing requires
previous knowledge. Therefore, one does not know the
form of the thing with the definition except one who knows
the parts of the definition from the genus and differentia
before it, either by himself in order to clarify it or by
another abstraction (tajrid) until he proceeds upward to be-
ginnings (awa’il) which are known by themselves.
Likewise every assentual knowledge (ta‘allum tasdiqi) is
with the proof (bi’l-hujja) and with knowledge that pre-
cedes the premises which are primary and are not known
through analogy or are known through analogy but return
in the end to the primary intelligibles (awwaliyyat).
The end of the definition is in a fashion analogous to the
syllogistic premises without difference.
What is intended by this is that the definition (hadd) is
undoubtedly composed of the thing’s genus (jins) and es-
sential differentia (fasl dhati) and does not have any other
meaning (la ma‘na lahu siwahu).
Whatever does not have differentia (fasl) or a genus
(jins), does not have a definition (hadd). Thus if we are
asked about the definition of ‘existent (mawjud)’ we would
not be able to [define] it except if commentary on the
name is desired. Then it gets translated with another foreign

book three 291

[language] expression or is substituted with something in
Arabic. That is not a definition but rather mention of a
name in place of another which is synonymous.
If you should ask about the definition of wine (khamr),
we say: wine (‘uqar). About the definition of knowledge
(‘ilm) we say: knowledge (ma‘rifa) and about the definition
of movement (haraka), we say: movement (naqla).
It is not a definition but rather repetition of things that
are synonymous.
[p.261] Whoever should wish to call it a definition, then
there is no objection in [such] designations (itlaqat). We
mean by definition (hadd) what obtains in the soul a paral-
lel image to that which is defined (mahdud), coinciding with
all of its essential species (fusulihi al-dhatiyya).
We have taken into account the essential species (fusul
dhatiyya) since the thing:
It may differentiated from other than it in the objec-
tive which does not support its essence like the dif-
ferentiation of the red garment from the black.
It may be differentiated by an inseparable concomi-
tant (lazim la yufariq) like the differentiation of tar
with blackness from snow [white], and the differenti-
ation of the crow from the parrot.
It may also be differentiated in essence the differenti-
ation of the garment from the sword and the robe of
silk from the dirham of cotton.
Whoever asks about the quiddity of the garment seeking
its definition, he seeks those matters with which there is
support for its state of being a garment (thawbiyya). We do
not support the state of being a garment from colour,

292 the standard of knowledge

length, and width. Then his reply is: What is not essential
to the garment’s essence is locus in the question (mahall
bi’l-su’al).
You know that the definition is composed of genus and
differentia and that which is not subsumed to the genus
until it is differentiated from it with an undefined differen-
tia, like what is mentioned in displaying a description
(ma‘rad rasm) or elucidating a name. Then its naming of
‘definition’ is opposed to the naming which we adopted
by convention (istalahna ‘alayha). Therefore, the defini-
tion is equivocal with it (mushtarakan lahu) and to what
we mentioned.

Fourth discipline concerning

Classifications to which the name definition is applied

‘Definition’ is applied equivocally (bi’l-tashkik) to five

things:

First: the definition which explains the meaning of a name

(al-sharih li-ma‘na al-ism) and does not turn with it to the
existence of the thing or non-esistence. Rather, [p. 262] it
may be doubtful (mashkuk) and we mention the meaning.
Then if its existence appeared, it is known that the defini-
tion was not through the pure name (al-ism al-mujarrad)
and its explanation (sharh) but rather is an [exterior] ex-
pression (‘unwan) of the essence and its explanation.209

Second: According to the essence which is the conclusion

of demonstration (natijat burhan).

209
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 126.

book three 293

 Third: What is, according to the essence. It is the prin-
ciple of demonstration (mabda’ burhan).
Fourth: What is, according to the essence and the com-
plete definition which combines the principle of demonstra-
tion and the conclusion of demonstration.
Likewise, if you are asked about the definition of eclipse
(kusuf) and you said: obscuring the light of the moon be-
cause of the middle [positioning] of the earth between it
and the sun,210 ‘obscuring the light of the moon’ is the con-
clusion of the demonstration.
‘The middle [positioning] of the earth’ is the principle
(mabda’).
Therefore, in the emplacement (ma‘rad) of the demon-
stration you say:
When the earth [took a middle position] the light was
obscured.
Therefore, ‘taking a middle position’ is the middle
term (hadd awsat). It is the principle of demonstra-
tion (mabda’ burhan).211
‘The obscuring’ is the greater term (hadd akbar). It is
the conclusion of demonstration (natijat burhan).
Thus the demonstration and the definition are inter-
twined (yatadakhalu). The essential causes of this genus (al-
‘ilal al-dhatiyya min hadha al-jins) enter into the definitions
of things (hudud al-ashya’) as they enter into their demon-
strations (barahin).

210
See Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers (Marmura trans.), p. 6.
211
Concerning the ‘principle of demonstration,’ see Lammer, The Elements of
Avicenna’s Physics, p. 85.

294 the standard of knowledge

 Everything that has a cause (‘illa) its essential cause (‘illa
dhatiyya) in its definition must be mentioned so that the
form (sura) of its essence is complete.
The four causes (‘ilal) enter into the definition of the
thing which has the four causes (al-‘ilal al-arba‘a) like his
saying concerning the definition of: Adze (qadum)
It is an artisan tool (ala sina‘iyya) made of iron, its form
thus, with which wood is carved.
Therefore, your saying: ‘tool (ala)’ is a genus (jins).
‘Artisan (sina‘iyya)’ indicates the efficient principle (al-
mabda’ al-fa‘il). ‘The form (shakl)’ indicates the formal
cause (sura) (lit. form). ‘Iron indicates the substance
(madda).’
[p. 263] ‘Carving (naht)’ indicates the final cause
(ghaya). It is with [carving] that [the definition] avoids the
awl and the saw as one cannot carve with them.
One might restrict oneself in the definition to the con-
clusion of the demonstration (natijat al-burhan) if discern-
ment (tamyiz) occurs with them. Concerning the definition
of eclipse, it is said:
The occlusion of the moon’s light.
Therefore, this is called a definition (hadd). It is the
conclusion of demonstration (natijat burhan).
If he should limit himself to the cause (‘illa) and say:
‘The eclipse is the middle positioning of the earth
between the moon and sun’, discernment occurs with
it.
It is said: Premise of the principle of demonstration
(hadd mabda’ burhan).

book three 295

 The complete definition (al-hadd al-tamm) is composed
of them both.

The fifth section: What is a definition for matters which do

not contain internal causes (‘ilal) and external (sabab)
causes. If it had internal causes, they would not be internal
to their substance, like defining: ‘the point (nuqta),’ ‘unity
(wahda),’ and ‘definition (hadd).’
For ‘unity’ a definition (ta‘rif) is mentioned but it does
not have an [external] cause (sabab).
The ‘definition (hadd)’ is defined. It is a saying which in-
dicates the thing’s quiddity (mahiyyat al-shay’).
The saying has a cause. Therefore, it is undoubtedly tem-
porally created (hadith) sssssfor an internal cause (li-‘illa),
However, its [external] cause (sabab) is not essential to it
like the obscuring of the moon’s light in an eclipse.
This fifth one is not purely a commentary on the name
nor is it a principle of demonstration (mabda’ burhan) or
the conclusion of the demonstration (natijat burhan) nor is
it a composite from them both.
The noun ‘definition (hadd)’ is applied to these divisions.
The description (rasm) might be called a definition (hadd)
because it is distinguished.
Therefore, that is a sixth aspect.

Fifth discipline concerning

the definition not being restricted with
the demonstration
It is not possible to confirm it using it upon dispute.
This is because if it is confirmed with the demonstration,
[the form of the syllogism] lacks a middle term, like one

296 the standard of knowledge

saying: The definition of knowledge (‘ilm) is experiential
knowing (ma‘rifa). Then it is said to him: Why?
[p.284] Then we say: because every science (‘ilm) is con-
viction (i‘tiqad) and every conviction (i‘tiqad) is experien-
tial knowing (ma‘rifa). Experiential knowing (ma‘rifa) is
greatest.
The middle term ought to be equal to [the lesser and
greater terms (tarafayn)] since this is how the definition is.
This is impossible since the middle term in that has two
states (halatan) as follows:
1) For it to be a definition of the lesser.
or
2) A description (rasm) or a proprium (khassa).

The first state: for it to be a definition. This is invalid in two

respects:
First, the thing does not have two complete definitions
(haddan tamman) since the definition does not combine
from the genus and the species. That does not accept sub-
stitution (tabdil).
The subject is a middle term which is precisely the grea-
ter [term], not apart from it. If it should be different in ex-
pression (lafz) or in reality (haqiqa) it is not a term for the
lesser.
Second, [as for] the middle term by what is its being a
definition for the minor (haddan lil-asghar) known? If it is
known by another term, then the question exists in that
other. That either progresses without end, which is imposs-
ible, or it is defined without a middle term. Therefore, the
first is without a middle if it is possible to identify (mu‘arrif)
the term without a middle term (wasat).

book three 297

The second state: That the middle term is not a definition
for the minor. Rather it is a description (rasm) or proprium
(khassa).
This is invalid in two respects:
First, how is it possible for that which is not a definition
nor essentially constitutive (dhati muqawwim) to become
more knowledgeable than the essentially constitutive? How
does it conceive that you know from man that he is a
laugher or a walker and he does not know that he is a body
and an animal?
Second, that it is the greater in this middle term, if it
should be an absolute predicate, and not a definition; only
necessary is its state of being a predicate for the minor term
and not it being a definition (hadd).
[p. 265] If it was a definition, it would be impossible
since the definition of true characteristics (khassiyya) and
the accident (‘arad) is not the definition of the subject of
the proprium (khassa) and the accident (‘arad). The defini-
tion of a laugher (al-dahik) is not the very definition of a
person.
If it is said: It is predicated on the middle term (awsat)
according to the meaning it is the definition of its subject.
This is a postulate (musadara) of what is sought.
Therefore, it has been proven (tabayyana) that the defi-
nition is not acquired (la yuktasabu) with the demonstra-
tion (burhan).212
Then if it is said: With what is it acquired (i.e. cogi-
tated)(bi-madha yuktasabu)? What is its method (tariq)?
We say: Its method is composition (tarkib) which is to
take a particular element (shakhs) from the elements whose

212
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 114-115.

298 the standard of knowledge

definition is sought such that it is not divisible and examine
from which genus from among the ten categories (al-maqu-
lat al-‘ashar).213 Then we take all of the predicates that con-
stitute them which are in that genus [or in the thing which
constitutes them like the genus]214 and [p. 266] it does not
turn to the accident s(‘arad) and the concomitant (lazim).
But rather it is limited to the constituent elements (muqaw-
wimat). Then what is repeated is excised and from its to-
tality restricts to the latest and near (al-akhir al-qarib)
[concomitant] to which you add the species (fasl).
If we should find it coextensive (musawiyan) to that
which is defined (al-mahdud) from two aspects, it is the
definition (hadd), by which we mean one of the two aspects:
[First,] coextensiveness (tard) and coexclusiveness
(‘aks)215 and equality (tasawi) with the name in the predi-
cate. Whenever the definition is affirmed (thubita), the
name (ism) is unrestrained (intalaqa). Whenever the name
is unrestrained, the definition occurs.
By the second aspect we mean: coextensiveness (musa-
wat) in meaning which is for it to indicate the completeness
of the reality (kamal haqiqat al-dhat), nothing is excepted
from it. How many a distinguished essential (dhati muta-
mayyiz) abandoned one of its species. Consequently, its
memory (dhikruhu) does not in the soul produce a form
that is intelligible (ma‘qula) to that which is defined (mah-
dud), coextensive with the perfection of its essence (kamal

213
Here Ghazali refers to Aristotle’s ten categories. See also Ibn Sina, Deliver-
ance (Ahmed trans.), pp. 120-123; Studtmann, Paul, ‘Aristotle’s Categories’, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/aristotle-categories.
214
Text added by editor from Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 116.
215
Janssens, p. 59 and n. 64.

book three 299

dhatihi). This is sought by the definitions (matlub al-
hudud). We have already mentioned an aspect of that.
An example of seeking the definition (talab al-hadd) is
if we were asked about the definition of wine (khamr). Then
we indicate a specific wine (khamr mu‘ayyana) and collect
its attributes upon which it is predicated. Then we see it as
red and with froth on top. This is accidental. Then we cast
it off (natrahuhu). We see it as having a strong smell, wet
and for drinking. This is a necessary. Then we cast it off.
We see it as a body or a liquid and flowing, an intoxi-
cating drink, and expressed from grapes. These are the es-
sentials (dhatiyyat).
Therefore, we do not say: a body, liquid, flowing, drink,
since the liquid (ma’i‘) suffices for the body since it is a spe-
cific body. The liquid is more particular than it.
We do not say: ‘liquid’ since the drink suffices for it and
includes it. It is more particular and nearer. Then you take
the nearer genus which includes all of the general essentials.
It is: Drink (sharab). We deem it coextensive with other
drinks. Then you differentiate it with an essential differentia
(fasl dhati) not accidental (la ‘aradi) like our saying: ‘An in-
toxicant kept in an earthen vessel or the like.’
Then the following conjoin for us: [p.267] An intoxicat-
ing drink (sharab muskir).
Then you perceive: Is the name coextensive in both terms
of the predicate? If it is coextensive with it, did we abandon
another essential differentia whose essence is not completed
except with it? If it is found with us, then we annex it to it
just as if we found in the definition of the animal that it is:
a body, has a soul, sensitive.
It is coextensive with the name in predication. However,
there is another essential differentia which is moving at

300 the standard of knowledge

will (al-mutaharrik bi’l-irada). Therefore, you should add
it to it.
Thus, this is the way to determine the validity of the defi-
nitions, the only way.

Sixth discipline concerning

the inducers of error in the definitions

They are three [in number]:

The first is in the genus (jins).
The second is in the differentia (fasl).
The third is equivocal (mushtarak).

The first inducer: The genus which has a number of aspects

(wujuh):
Among them is: For the differentia to be denoted instead
of the genus. It is said about rapturous love (‘ishq) that it is
exaggerated love (ifrat fi’l-mahabba, al-mahabba al-mu-
frata). Love is a genus and exaggeration (ifrat) is a differ-
entia (fasl).
Among them is: For the substance (madda) to be de-
noted in place of the genus, like your saying about the
sword that it is iron that cuts and about the chair that it is
wood upon which [one] sits.
Among them is: For the primordial matter (hayula) to
be adopted in place of the genus like our saying that about
ashes that they are burnt wood.
Therefore, its state is not wood but rather it was wood
in opposition to wood from the bed which exists in it as a
substance (madda). However, not in the ashes. However,
it was [before] becoming something else through conver-

book three 301

sion of its essential form. This is what we intended by ‘pri-
mordial state.’ You may express it with another expres-
sion if you should find its use disagreeable (lit. find it ugly)
[because its Greek in origin].216
Among them is: For the particulars (ajza’) to be adopted
in place of the genus. Therefore, it is said in the definition
of [the number] ten that it is five plus five, or six plus four
or three plus seven, and the like.
[p. 268] Our saying that the animal is a body and soul
is not thus because the body being a type of soul (nafsan
ma) derives from (yarji‘u) an essential differentia of it. The
soul is a form (sura) and perfection (kamal) for the body.
[It is] not like the five for the remaining five.
Among them is: For the habitus (malaka) to be denoted
in place of potentiality (quwwa). and [potentiality in place
of the habitus. That is among the genera (ajnas) that are
put forth (al-muqaddama) in the genera of the definitions
(ajnas al-hudud)],217 like our saying: The righteous person
is one who is able in avoiding the appetitive pleasures
(ladhdhat shahwaniyya).
This is not so since the sinner (fajir) is also able, but also
acts.218 However, the righteous person abandons the pleas-
ures with a firm disposition and the sinner in potentia (bi’l-
quwwa).
Habitus (malaka) might resemble potentiality (quwwa)
as in our saying:
One capable of oppression is one in whose prerogative
(min sha’n) and nature (tiba‘) is the predilection (nuzu‘)

216
Satiated” is a correct translation of istashba‘t in the Arabic text. It is a typo.
It should be istabsha‘t.
217
From Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 137.
218
That is, he acts on his appetitive pleasures.

302 the standard of knowledge

to forcibly seize from the hand of another that which is
not his.
Habitus (malaka) is denoted in place of potentiality
(quwwa) since one who is able to oppress might be just and
his nature does not incline toward oppression.
Among that is for you to take a metaphor (ism musta‘ar)
or a dubious name (mushtabah) like one saying: Under-
standing is harmony (muwafaqa) and the soul is a number
(‘adad).
Among that is for you to place something from the
necessary concomitants (lawazim) in place of the genera
(ajnas) [like the one and the existent].219
Among [these aspects] is to place the species in place of
the genus. Then it is said: Evil is oppressing the people.
Oppression is one of the species of evil. Evil is a general
genus which encompasses other than evil.

The Second Inducer: With respect to the differentia (fasl),

placing that which is genus in place of the differentia or that
which is a proprium (khassa) or a concomitant (lazim) or
an accidental (‘aradi) in place of the differentia.220
That occurs most of the time. Being circumspect with re-
gard to it is very difficult.

[p. 269] The Third Inducer: What is equivocal (mushtarak).

It contains different aspects:
Among them is to define something with that which is
more hidden than it (akhfa minhu) like one who defines fire
as: ‘a body which resembles the soul. The soul is more

219
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 138.
220
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 138.

book three 303

hidden than fire.’ Or he defines it with that which is like it
in knowledge like a contrary (didd) with a contrary like our
saying:
A pair is anything that is not single. Then you say: Any-
thing single is not a pair.
or
You say: The pair is anything that exceeds anything
single by one.
Then you say: The single is that which is less than the
pair by one.
Likewise, if the other component of the relation (mudaf)
is posited in the definition of the modifying expression
(mudaf ilayhi),221 then you say: Knowledge is from what
the essence constitutes the scholar. Then you say: The
scholar is one in whom knowledge subsists.
Both relatum (mutadayifayn) know together (ya‘laman
ma‘an). One is not known through the other. Rather, [they
are known] together.
Whoever is ignorant of knowledge is ignorant of the
scholar. Whoever is ignorant of the father is ignorant of the
son.
It is wrong to say to the questioner who says: ‘What is a
father?’ whoever has a son. He is [effectively] saying:
Should you know the son, truly you would know the father.
Rather it ought to be said: The father is an animal , there
is another [person] of his species who [came into existence]
from his drop of semen such that he is thus.
There is no definition of the thing itself nor its assign-
ment to one who is like him in ignorance.
221
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 139.

304 the standard of knowledge

 Among them is for the thing to be defined by itself or by
that which is posterior to it in knowledge like your saying
abut the sun: a star which comes out in the day.
It is not possible to define the daytime (nahar) except
with the sun. [The daytime’s] meaning is: the time of the
sun’s rising. It is concomitant (tabi‘) to the sun. Therefore,
how is it defined?
Like your saying concerning the primary quality (kay-
fiyya) is that with which similarity (mushabaha) and its an-
tithesis occur.
It is not possible to define the similarity except that it is
an affinity (ittifaq) in the primary quality. Perhaps it op-
poses sameness (musawa). Therefore, it is an affinity in the
quantity (kammiyya) and opposes similarity (mushakala).
Thus it is an affinity in the species.
Therefore, it is necessary to be mindful of its definitions
(muraqabatuhu fi’l-hudud) of this and the like so that error
through being heedless of them does not address them.
Examples of this are many. In what we have mentioned is
an admonition concerning the genus.

[p.270] Seventh discipline concerning

the difficulty for the human capacity (quwwa bashariyya)
to define except at the end of rolling up sleeves
and [exerting] effort

Whoever knows what we have mentioned among the in-

ducers to doubt (matharat al-ishtibah) in the definition, will
know that the human capacity does not overcome wariness
about all of that except that it overcomes those things that
are rare (nudur) which are a lot. The most difficult of them
for the intellect are four matters (umur):

book three 305

 The first of them is: We have made conditional to take
the nearest genus (al-jins al-aqrab). How is it that the seeker
of knowledge is not heedless of it and takes a genus which
he considers to be in closer proximity? Perhaps there exists
what is closer in proximity than it. Therefore, he defines
wine as: an intoxicating liquid, while being oblivious to
‘beverage (sharab)’ beneath which it is. ‘Beverage (sharab)’
is closer than it.
Man is defined as follows: A mortal speaking body.
Therefore, the animal and its like are overlooked.
Second: If we should make conditional for all the differ-
entia to be essential and for the concomitant (lazim), which
does not separate from existence and imagination, to be
highly suspect in the essential, and perceiving that is among
the most obscure matters. Then from where does he get [the
idea] that he is not heedless, takes a concomitant (lazim)
instead of a differentia and considers it essential?
Third: Should we make conditional putting forward all
of the essential differentia so that we are not defaulting
(nukhill) one [of them], from where do we vouchsafe a de-
viance (shudhudh) from it especially if it existed as a differ-
entia in which differentiation and coextensiveness in the
name in predication occurred (as in the body, possessing a
soul, sensitive) in its rendering as coextensive the expression
‘animal’ with being heedless of ‘movement by will’? This is
among the most obscure (aghmad) of what is perceived.
Fourth: The differentia constitute (muqawwim) the
species and divide (muqassim) the genus.222 If the condition

222
See for instance Silvia di Vincenzo, ‘Avicenna against Porphyry’s Definition
of Differentia Specifica,’ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medieval
26 (2015), p. 171 and n. 102.

306 the standard of knowledge

for division is not taken into account, it adopts in the divi-
sion differentia which are not primary to the genus (laysa
awwaliyya lil-jins). [The differentia] is difficult and unsat-
isfactory in the definition (hadd). Just as the body is divided
into: ‘growing (al-nami)’ and ‘non-growing (ghayr al-nami)
a division in an essential differentia (inqisaman fi fasl
dhati),’ likewise it is divided into the sensible (al-hassas),
non-sensible (ghayr al-hassas) and into speaking (natiq) and
non-speaking (ghayr al-natiq).
Whatever is said, the body is divided into:
[p.271] Speaking and not speaking.
It was divided into that in which the primary differentia
are not primary (awwaliyyan). But rather it ought to be di-
vided first into:
Growing and non-growing.
Then the growing is divided into:
Animal and non-animal.
Then ‘animal’ is divided into:
Speaking and non-speaking.
Likewise, ‘animal’ is divided into:
Possessing two legs and possessing [more than two]
legs.
However, this division is not in primary differentia
(fusul awwaliyya), but rather ‘animal’ ought to be di-
vided into:
Walking and not walking.
Then ‘walking’ is divided into:

book three 307

 Possessing two legs and possessing [more than two]
legs.
The animal was not prepared for two or more legs be-
cause of his being an animal, rather taking into account his
state walking. He was prepared due to his walking by tak-
ing into account his being an animal.
Paying attention to the order in these matters (umur) is
a condition for realisation of the discipline of definitions
(sina‘at al-hudud). It is extremely difficult. Therefore, when
that became difficult the speculative theologians regarded
as sufficient that which is discerned (mumayyaz), saying:
The definition (hadd) is: It is the speech which combines
and restricts.
[p.272] [The speculative theologians] did not make con-
ditional concerning [the definition] except for discernment
(tamyiz). Therefore, it is necessary for it to suffice with men-
tion of the propria (khawass). About the definition of the
horse, it is said: It is the neighing. About man it is said: He
is the laugher. About the dog it is said: It is the barker.
That is extremely remote from the definition of defining
the essence of that which is defined.
Due to the difficulty of the defining, we saw it appropri-
ate to relate a group of the known definitions that are for-
mulated precisely in the Second Category (fann) of the
Book of Definitions.
Here concludes the First Category with the praise of
God, the Glorified and Exalted.

308 the standard of knowledge

 [p. 273] The Second Category
Concerning the differentiated definitions
(al-hudud al-mufassala)

Know that the things which it is possible to define are end-

less since the truthful sciences (i.e. assentual knowledge)
(‘ulum tasdiqiyya) are endless since they follow conceptual
knowledge (tasawwuriyya). The least that affirmation (tas-
diq) encompasses is two concepts (tasawwuran).
In general, everything that has a name it is possible:
To precisely formulate (tahrir) its definition (hadd) or in
its description (rasm), or give an exposition of its name
(ism).
If there is no desired object (matma‘) in the thorough in-
vestigation (istiqsa’), then it is more appropriate to be re-
stricted to the laws that define its path.
This occurred with the First Category. However, we pro-
duced detailed definitions for two benefits:
The first is: You acquire experience (durba) by means of
being exact in the definition and its composition (ta’lif).
Examination and practice in the thing undoubtedly indi-
cates (tufid) gaining power over it.
The second is: Being cognizant of the meanings of the
names which the philosophers employed. We have pres-
ented them in Precipitance of the Philosophers since engag-
ing in disputation (munazara) with them is not possible
except in their language and according to the judgement of
their convention (istilah).
If [one] does not understand what they want, then it is
not possible to engage in disputation with them. They have
presented the definitions of expressions which they applied
in metaphysics (ilahiyyat) and physics (tabi‘iyyat) and a

book three 309

little something of maths. Then let these definitions be taken
as an explanation of the name.
[p.274] If the proof (burhan) has been established—that
what they have exposited is as they exposited it, it is con-
sidered a definition (u‘tuqida haddan). Otherwise it is con-
sidered an explanation of the name as we say:
Definition of the jinn: An airborne animal that speaks,
[has a] transparent body, and possesses the ability to trans-
form itself into different forms.
Therefore, this is an explanation of the name in people’s
understanding.
As for the existence of this thing according to this aspect,
it is known through the proof (burhan). If the proof indi-
cates its presence, then it is a definition (hadd) according to
the essence (bi-hasb al-dhat). If it does not indicate it, but
rather that the jinn intended in the divine law which is de-
scribed by its description is another matter (amr akhar), this
is taken as an explanation of the name in people’s under-
standing.
As we say in the definition of the void (khala’): It is a di-
mension (bu‘d) for which it is possible to impose on it three
dimensions (ab‘ad thalatha), existent not in a substance
(madda), to be such as a body fills it and evacuates it.
Perhaps the indication indicates that its existence is im-
possible. Therefore, it is taken as an explanation of the
name in the absolute sense of the theoreticians (nuzzar).
We have presented this overview so that you know that
what we present from the definitions is an explanation to
what the philosophers intended in an absolute sense. There
is no judgement that what they mentioned is as they men-
tioned it. Perhaps that depends on examination of the
proof’s necessitating it (mujib al-burhan ‘alayhi).

310 the standard of knowledge

 [The First Section which is employed
in Metaphysics (ilahiyyat)]
Employed in metaphysics are fifteen expressions: The Cre-
ator the Exalted who is called in their language (The First
Principle).
The Intellect (‘aql), the soul (nafs), the universal intellect
(al-‘aql al-kulli), intellect of the whole (‘aql al-kull), the uni-
versal soul (al-nafs al-kulliyya), the soul of the whole (nafs
al-kull), possession (mulk), cause (‘illa), effect (ma‘lul), cre-
ation (ibda‘), creation (khalq), temporal creation (ihdath),
and pre-eternal (qadim).
[p.275] As for ‘the Creator (al-bari) the Mighty and Sub-
lime’ they alleged that He has no definition (hadd) or de-
scription (rasm) since He does not have a genus or differen-
tia or accidents concomitant with Him (talhaquhu).223
The definition (hadd) is in harmony with (yalta’imu)
with the genus and the differentia.
The description (rasm) is [in harmony] with the genus
and the differential accidents (al-‘awarid al-fasila).
All of that is composite (tarkib). However, there is
speech which explains His Name, namely:
The Existent (mawjud), necessarily existing in Himself,
whose existence is not possible to be from another. Any
other cannot exist except emanating from His existence
(fa’idan ‘an wujudihi) and occurring through Him (hasilan
bihi) either through an intermediary or without.
It follows from this explanation that He is the Existent
Who does not multiply in number or measure nor in the
parts of subsistence (ajza’ al-qiwam) like the multiplicity of
the body in form (sura) and prime matter (hayula), nor in
223
Al-Ghazali, Incoherence (Marmura trans.), pp. 88-89.

book three 311

the parts of the definition like the multiplicity of the person
with animalness (hayawaniyya) and speech (nutq), nor in
additional parts.
[The Creator] does not change neither in essence (dhat)
nor in the concomitants of the essence (lawahiq al-dhat).
What they mentioned contains a negation of the at-
tributes (nafy al-sifat) and negation of the multiplicity in
them. That is in what they are opposed.224
Therefore, this is an explanation of the name ‘Creator’
whom they regard as the ‘First Principle.’
As for the intellect (‘aql), it is an equivocal term (ism
mushtarak) which the public (jamahir), the philosophers,
and the speculative theologians apply to different aspects
and to different meanings. The equivocal does not have a
universal definition (hadd jami‘).
[p. 276] As for the public, they apply it to three aspects:
First, what is wanted with it is the soundness of the in-
itial original disposition (al-fitra al-ula) in people. Then it
is said of one whose initial original disposition is sound that
he is rational (‘aqil). Therefore, his definition is: A power
(quwwa) with which he excels at distinguishing between
evil (qabiha) and good (hasana) matters.
Second: What is intended by it is what man acquires
through empirical matters (tajarib) of the universal judge-
ments (al-ahkam al-kulliyya). Thus its definition is: Mean-
ings (ma‘anin) that join together in the mind which are
premises (muqaddimat) in which the matters (masalih) and
aims (aghrad) are deduced (tustanbatu).

224
According to al-Ghazali, God has seven attributes (sifat): Ability (qudra),
knowledge (‘ilm), life (hayat), will (irada), hearing (sam‘), sight (basar), and speech
(kalam). For a discussion of these terms, see for instance Al-Ghazali’s Moderation
in Belief, trans. Aladdin Yaqub (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

312 the standard of knowledge

 Third: Another meaning (ma‘na) which returns to the
man’s self-compusure (waqar) and appearance (hay’a). Its
definition is: A praiseworthy disposition in man (hay’a
mahmuda lil-insan) in his movements (harakat), states of
rest (sakanat), looks (hay’at), words (kalam) and choice
(ikhtiyar).
In this equivocity people dispute calling a single person
‘rational (‘aqil).’ Then one says: This one is rational by
which he means the soundness of the inborn capacity
(ghariza).
Another says: He is not rational. What he means by it is
the lack of practical experiences (tajarib) which is the sec-
ond meaning.
As for the philosophers, the name ‘intellect (‘aql)’ in
their estimation is equivocal, indicating eight different con-
notational attributes (ma‘anin):
The intellect (‘aql) which the scholastic theologians
want.225
Theoretical intellect (‘aql nazari)
Practical intellect (‘aql ‘amali)
Hylic (alt. material) intellect (‘aql hayulani)
Habitual intellect (‘aql bi’l-malaka)
Actual intellect (‘aql bi’l-fi‘l)
Acquired intellect (‘aql mustafad)
Active intellect (‘aql fa‘‘al)

225
Al-Ghazali’s source for the definition of intellect is Ibn Sina’s Book of Defi-
nitions. See for instance Dimitri Gutas, ‘Ibn Sina [Avicenna]’, The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/ibn-sina/.

book three 313

 As for the first: It is what Aristotle mentioned in the
Book of Demonstrations226 and he distinguished between
‘intellect (‘aql)’ and ‘knowledge (‘ilm).’
The meaning of this ‘intellect’ is the conceptualisations
(tasawwurat) and assents (tasdiqat) which occur to the soul
in the original disposition (fitra). Knowledge (‘ilm) is what
occurs to the soul by way of acquisition (iktisab). Then they
differentiated the acquired (muktasab) and the innate (fitri).
Then one of them is called ‘intellect (‘aql)’ and the other
‘knowledge (‘ilm).’
It is pure convention (istilah mahd).
[p. 277] This meaning is the one with which the specu-
lative theologians defined the intellect. Abu Bakr al-Baqil-
lani227 says concerning the definition of intellect: ‘It is a
necessary knowledge (‘ilm daruri) which makes possible
possible things (ja’izat) and makes impossible impossible
things (mustahilat) like the knowledge which makes im-
possible a single thing being pre-eternal and temporally cre-
ated and making impossible a single person being in two
places [at once].
As for the rest of the [categories of] the intellect, the phil-
osophers mentioned them in The Treatise on the Soul.228
As for the theoretical intellect (‘aql nazari), it is a faculty
(quwwa) of the soul which accepts quiddities of the univer-
salia (mahiyyat al-umur al-kulliyya) with respect to their
being universal.
[This faculty] is a reservation against (ihtiraz ‘an) the

226
i.e. Posterior Analytics
227
Baghdadi theologian, judge and logician, d. 403/1013.
228
This appears to be a reference to Ibn Sina’s Treatise on the Soul (Kitab al-
Nafs) as found in the Book of Deliverance (Kitab al-Najat) and The Book of Heal-
ing (Al-Shifa’).

314 the standard of knowledge

sense (hiss) that only accepts the particularities (al-umur al-
juz’iyya).
Thus is the imagination (khayal).
This is what is intended by the soundness of original
human disposition (al-fitra al-asliyya) with the public as
previously mentioned.
As for the practical intellect (al-‘aql al-‘amali): It is a fac-
ulty of the soul (quwwa lil-nafs) which is the principle of
stirring (mabda’ al-tahrik) the faculty of desire (al-quwwa
al-shawqiyya) to what it chooses of the particulars for the
purpose of a supposed or known objective.
This is a motive (als. agent) faculty (quwwa muharrika)
and is not a genus of the sciences. Rather it was called ‘ra-
tional (‘aqliyya)’ because it is commanded by the intellect
(mu’tamar li’l-‘aql), by nature obedient to its directives
(isharat). How many an intelligent person knows that he is
afflicted in following his desires but is [p. 278] unable to
oppose the desire, not because of the impotency of his the-
oretical intellect but rather because of the lassitude of this
faculty which was called the ‘practical intellect (al-‘aql al-
‘amali).’
This faculty (i.e. the practical intellect) is strengthened
through spiritual self-discipline (riyada), struggle (muja-
hada) and perseverance in opposing the desires.
The theoretical faculty (al-quwwa al-nazariyya) has four
states:
The first: That it has not acquired any referring objects
(ma‘lumat). That is with the young boy. However he only
possess a readiness. This is called the ‘hylic intellect (al-‘aql
al-hayulani).’
The second: The boy reaches the age of discernment
(tamyiz). What used to be with the remote faculty (al-

book three 315

quwwa al-ba‘ida) becomes with the near faculty (al-qariba).
However much the necessary assertions are displayed for
him he finds himself believing them, not like the infant. This
is called the ‘habitual intellect (al-‘aql bi’l-malaka).’
The third: For the theoretical intelligibles (al-ma‘qulat
al-nazariyya) to occur in his mind. However, he is heedless
of them. Whoever wishes can invoke them in actuality. It
is called the ‘actual intellect (‘aql bi’l-fi‘l).’
The fourth: The acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafad)
is when those referring objects (ma‘lumat) are present in his
mind. He reviews (yutali‘u) them and becomes intimately
aware in contemplating them (yulabis al-ta’ammul fiha). It
is the knowledge that is in existence in actuality, present.
The definition of the ‘hylic intellect (al-‘aql al-hayulani):’
It is a faculty of the soul that is ready to accept the quiddity
of things (mahiyyat al-ashya’) separated [p.279] from mat-
ters (mawadd). And with them the boy is differentiated
from the horse and the rest of the animals, not with limited
knowledge or a faculty near to the knowledge (quwwa
qariba min al-‘ilm).
The definition of the ‘habitual intellect (al-hadd bi’l-ma-
laka):’ It is the perfection (istikmal) of the hylic intellect
(‘aql hayulani) until it becomes with proximate potentiality
to actuality (bi’l-quwwa al-qariba min al-fi‘l).
The definition of the ‘actual intellect (‘aql bi’l-fi‘l):’ It is
perfecting the soul with a certain form. That is an intelli-
gible form (sura ma‘qula) until when its intellect desires or
it recalls it in actuality.
The definition of the acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mus-
tafad): It is quiddity separated from matter (mujarrada ‘an
al-madda), impressed upon the soul by way of acquisition
externally.

316 the standard of knowledge

 As for the Agent Intellects (al-‘uqul al-fa‘‘ala),229 they are
another type (namat akhar).
What is intended by Agent Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al):
Every quiddity separated from substance originally.
Therefore, the definition of Agent Intellect (al-‘aql al-
fa‘‘al) is in so far as it is an intellect:
A formal substance (jawhar suwari). Its essence is a
quiddity separated in its essence (dhatuhu mahiyya mujar-
rada fi dhatiha) (not by separating something other than it
for it) from matter (madda) and its attachments (‘ala’iq).
Rather it is an existent universal quiddity (mahiyya kulliyya
mawjuda).
In so far as it is an Agent, it is: A substance (jawhar) with
the aforementioned description to be such as that the hylic
intellect (al-‘aql al-hayulani) emerges from potentiality to
actuality with its supervising it.
What is intended by substance is not ‘a space occupying
object (mutahayyiz)’ as the speculative theologians intend,
but rather what exists by itself (qa’im bi-nafsihi), not in a
subject.
The formal (suri) is an exclusion from the body (jism)
and what is in the matters (mawadd).
Their saying ‘not with the abstraction of something else
(la bi-tajrid ghayrihi)’ is excluding the intelligibles
(ma‘qulat) that are inscribed on the soul from the individual
matters (ashkhas al-maddiyyat). [The intelligibles] are ab-
stracted with the intellect’s abstracting them not their ab-
stracting themselves in their essences (la bi-tajridiha fi
dhatiha).

229
Also known as the Active Intellect.

book three 317

 The Agent Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al): That which causes
human souls in the cognitions (‘ulum) to emerge from po-
tentiality to actuality. It is related to the intelligibles and
the intellectual power like the relationship of the sun to
the visible objects (mubsarat) and the faculty of sight (al-
quwwa al-basira) with which the vision emerges from po-
tentiality to actuality.
[p.280] These intellects may be called ‘angelic intellects
(al-‘uqul al-mala’ika).’
Concerning the existence of a substance (jawhar) (i.e.
angelic substances (al-jawahir al-mala’ika)) in this manner,
the speculative theologians oppose them since in their view
there is no existence to something that exists in itself that
does not occupy space except God alone.
Angels are subtle space-occupying bodies according to
the majority [of the speculative theologians].
Affirming the soundness of that is through demonstra-
tion (al-burhan). What we mentioned is an explanation of
the name.
As for the soul, it is in their view an equivocal term (ism
mushtarak) which occurs in a meaning: Man, animal, and
plant are equivocal in it.
In another meaning: Man and heavenly angels (al-ma-
la’ika al-samawiyya) are equivocal in it in the view.
The definition of the soul in the first meaning in their
view is:
First Perfection (kamal awwal) of the natural organic
body (jism tabi‘i ali) which possesses life in potentia.
The definition of the soul according to the second mean-
ing is:
A non-corporeal substance (jawhar ghayr jism) which is

318 the standard of knowledge

First Perfection of the body, moving it by choice according
to the principle of rationality (‘an mabda’ nutqi), that is in-
tellectually (‘aqli) in actu or in potentia.
That which in potentia is the differentia (fasl) of the
human soul. The one in actu is a differentia (fasl) or a pro-
prium (khassa) of the angelic soul (al-nafs al-malakiyya).
An explanation of the first definition is: If the seed is cast
to the ground, it has the capacity for growth (numuww)
and nourishment (ightidha’). Therefore, it changed from
what it was before it was cast to the ground. That is with
occurrence of a description in it (huduth sifa fihi) [p.281].
If it did not exist it would not have the capacity to receive
from the Bestower of Forms, who is God the Exalted, and
from His angels. That description is perfection for it. Thus,
it is said concerning the definition that it is First Perfection
(kamal awwal) of a body.
That was posited (wudi‘a) in place of the genus. The
seed and the semen of animals and man are equivocal in it.
The soul is a form (sura) through a syllogism to that
mixed matter (madda mumtazija) since it is imprinted in
the matter (muntabi‘a fi’l-madda) and is a potentiality by
analogy (quwwa bi’l-qiyas) to its actuality (fi‘l). It is a per-
fection through a syllogism (kamal bi’l-qiyas) to the plant
and animal species.
The signification (dalala) of perfection is more complete
than the signification of potentiality and form. Thus [the
definition of the soul] is signified in the locus of the genus
(mahall al-jins).
The natural (tabi‘i) is a caution against (ihtiraz ‘an) the
artificial (sina‘i). The images of the technical arts also con-
tain perfection.
The instrumental (ali) is a caution against (ihtiraz ‘an)

book three 319

the faculties which are in the four elements. They act with
their essences (dhawat) not with instruments (alat). The fac-
ulties of the soul (al-qiwa al-nafsaniyya) act with instru-
ments in them.
[The speculative theologians’] saying: Possessing poten-
tial life (dhu hayat bi’l-quwwa) is another differentia. That is
in his nature to live by growth and to subsist through
nourishment. Perhaps he lives through sensory awareness
(ihsas) and movement (haraka) which are both in his power.
Their saying ‘First Perfection’ is as a caution against the
faculty of motion (quwwat al-tahrik) and perception. It is
also perfection of the body. However, it is not ‘First Per-
ception.’ It occurs second due to the existence of the per-
fection which is a soul.
As for the soul of man and celestial bodies, they are not
imprinted in the body but rather are the perfection of the
body meaning that the body moves with it through rational
choice (ikhiyar ‘aqli).
As for the celestial spheres (aflak), they are perpetually
active (‘ala al-dawam bi’l-fi‘l).
As for man, his movement is through potentiality (bi’l-
quwwa).
As for the universal intellect (al-‘aql al-kulli) and the in-
tellect of the whole (‘aql al-kull), the universal soul (al-nafs
al-kulli) and the soul of the whole (nafs al-kull), its proof is
that the existents are three parts in their view: Bodies which
are the most base (akhass) of the [categories].
Agent Intellects (al-‘uqul al-fa‘‘ala) are the most noble
of them since they are free of matter and its attachment
(‘alaqa) such that it does not move the matters also except
with desire (bi’l-shawq).
[p. 282] At their centre are the souls which are activated

320 the standard of knowledge

by the intellect and are active in the bodies. They are an in-
termediary. [The speculative theologians] mean by ‘celestial
angels (al-mala’ika al-samawiyya) the souls of the celestial
spheres (nufus al-aflak). They believe they are alive.
They mean by ‘the nearest angels (al-mala’ika al-muq-
arrabin), the Active Intellects (al-‘uqul al-fa‘‘ala).
By the ‘universal intellect (al-‘aql al-kulli)’ they mean the
intelligible meaning (al-ma‘na al-ma‘qul) which is said
about the numerous minds of individual human persons. It
does not exist in a normal state (qiwam) but in conceptual-
isation (tasawwur). Should you say ‘the universal man (al-
insan al-kulli),’ you have indicated with it a rationalised
meaning of the person existent among the rest of the indi-
viduals (ashkhas), which in the intellect is a single form
(sura wahida) which is in congruence with (tutabiq) the rest
of the individuals from among humankind. There is not just
a single humanity (insaniyya wahida). It is Zayd’s humanity
which is the very same as ‘Amr’s humanity. However, in
the intellect there occurs an image of a person from the per-
son of Zayd for instance. [Zayd’s person] is in congruence
with the rest of the individual persons, all of them. There-
fore, that is called ‘the universal humanity (al-insaniyya al-
kulliyya).’
This is what [the speculative theologians] mean by the
‘universal intellect (al-‘aql al-kulli).’230
As for [the expression] ‘the intellect of the whole (‘aql
al-kull),’ it is used in two senses:
The first, which is more suitable to the expression is:
What is intended by ‘the whole (al-kull)’ is ‘all of the world

230
Other names for the ‘universal intellect’ include: God (Allah), the First Exist-
ent, the Prime Mover, the Director, the Necessary Being.

book three 321

(jumlat al-‘alam).’ Therefore, ‘the intellect of the whole’ has
this meaning with the meaning of explaining its name: It is
all of existence that is free from matter from all aspects and
that does not move by itself (dhat) and not by accident
(‘arad).231 It is not moved except through urging (bi’l-
shawq).
The last rank of this ‘all (jumla)’ is the ‘Active Intellect
(al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al)’ that causes the human soul in the rational
sciences (al-‘ulum al-‘aqliyya) to emerge form potentiality
to actuality. This ‘all’ is ‘The Principles of the Universe (ma-
badi’ al-kull)’ after the First Principle (al-mabda’ al-awwal).
The First Principle is the Originator of everything
(mubdi‘ al-kull).
As to ‘the universal (al-kull)’ according to the second
sense, it is: ‘the farthest body (al-jirm al-aqsa).’ I mean the
ninth celestial sphere (al-falak al-tasi‘) that revolves in the
day and night. All of that is inside it from all of the heavens
is in motion. Therefore, its celestial sphere is called the ‘Uni-
versal Celestial Sphere (jirm al-kull)232 and to its movement
the ‘Movement of the Universe (harakat al-kull).’ It is the
greatest of created things. In their view what is intended is
the ‘Throne (‘arsh).’
The Universal Intellect: In this sense it is the substance
free of matter in all aspects. It is the mover of the ‘Move-
ment of the Universe’ at the urging of itself (‘ala sabil al-

231
For an explanation of Ibn Sina’s take on this concept, see Andreas Lammer,
‘Defining nature: from Aristotle to Philoponus to Avicenna,’ in Aristotle and the
Arabic Tradition, ed. Ahmed Alwishah and Josh Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), p. 137.
232
For an explanation of ‘celestial sphere (jirm),’ see Al-Kindi, Al-Kindi’s Meta-
physics: A Translation of Ya‘qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi’s Treatise ‘On First Philos-
ophy (fi al-Falsefah al-Ula),’ trans. Alfred L. Ivry (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1974), p. 157.

322 the standard of knowledge

tashwiq li-nafsihi). [p.283] Its existence is the first existent
acquired (mustafad) from the First.
[The speculative theologians] allege that what is in-
tended by [the Prophet’s], May peace be upon him, saying:
‘The first thing that God created was the intellect. He said
to it: ‘Come forth,’ and it did….’233
As for the universal soul (al-nafs al-kulli), what is in-
tended by it is the intelligible meaning (al-ma‘na al-ma‘qul)
which is said about many things that are different in
number in reply to the question ‘What is it?’ from which
every one of [the souls] is a soul particular to an indivi-
dual (shakhs) as we mentioned in respect to the Universal
Intellect.
The soul of the whole (nafs al-kull) by analogy with the
intellect of the whole (‘aql al-kull) is the totality of incor-
poreal substances (jumlat al-jawahir al-ghayr al-jismaniyya)
which are perfections (kamalat) that order the heavenly
bodies and move them by way of rational choice (al-
ikhtiyar al-‘aqli).
The relationship of the soul of the whole to the intellect
of the whole is like the relationship of ourselves to the Ac-
tive Intellect.
The soul of the whole is a principle that is near to the
existence of the natural bodies (al-ajsam al-tabi‘iyya). Its
rank is in attaining existence after the rank of the intellect
of the whole. Its existence emanates from [the latter’s] exist-
ence.
The definition of angel (malak) is: A simple substance
(jawhar basit) possessing life and speech (nutq), rational

233
This hadith is weak. It appears for instance in Tabarani’s Mu‘jam al-Kabir:
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=84&b
ookhad=7986.

book three 323

and immortal and is an intermediary (wasita) between the
Creator, the Mighty and Sublime and the earthly bodies (al-
ajsam al-ardiyya). From it is rational and [also] essential
(nafsi). This is [the angel’s] definition in their view.
The definition of ‘cause (‘illa)’ in [the speculative theo-
logians’] view: It is every essence (dhat) which is the existent
of another essential (dhat akhar). It is in actuality from the
existence of this action. The existence of this is actually not
from the existence of that actually.
As for the effect (ma‘lul), [it is] every essential whose
existence is actually from the existence of another. The
existence of that other is not from its existence.
The meaning of our saying: ‘from its existence (min wu-
judihi)’ is apart from our saying ‘with its existence (ma‘a
wujudihi).’ The meaning of our saying ‘from its existence’
is for the essence to be through its own consideration pos-
sibly existent (mumkinat al-wujud). Its existence is necess-
ary in actu not from its essence, but rather another essence
is existent in actu from which necessitating this essence is
necessary (yalzamu ‘anha wujub hadhihi al-dhat).
And it possesses this pure possibility (imkan mahd)
within itself.
And it [also] possesses necessity (wujub) within itself on
condition of the cause (bi-shart al-‘illa).
And it [also] possesses impossibility (imtina‘) within
itself on condition of the non-existence of the cause (bi-
shart ‘adam al-‘illa).
[p.284] As to our saying ‘with our existence (ma‘a wu-
judihi),’ it is for each of the two essences if imposed into
existence (furida mawjudan), it is necessary for it to know
that the other is existent. If it is imposed that it is eliminated
(marfu‘), then it is necessary that the other be eliminated.

324 the standard of knowledge

 The cause (‘illa) and effect (ma‘lul) are together with the
meaning of both these consequences (luzumayn) even if
there should be difference between the two manners of the
two consequences (wajhay al-luzumayn) since one of them
which is the effect (ma‘lul) if imposed into existence, it is
necessary for the other to have been in existence until this
one is brought into existence.
As for the other which is the cause (‘illa), if it is imposed
into existence, it is necessary for the effect (ma‘lul) to exist-
ence to follow.
If the effect (ma‘lul) is eliminated it is necessary to pass
judgement that the cause was eliminated first so that this
could be eliminated. It is the case that the elimination of
the effect necessitated elimination of the cause.
As to the cause, if we should eliminate it, it is necessary
to eliminate the effect with the affirmation (ijab) of elimin-
ating the cause.
Definition of origination (ibda‘): It is an equivocal term
(ism mushtarak) for two concepts (mafhumayn):
First [concept], establishing (ta’sis) something not from
matter and not with an intermediary.
Second concept, that something has an absolute exist-
ence (wujud mutlaq) from a cause (sabab) without an in-
termediary (mutawassit). In its essence it is for it not to be
existent. That which is in its essence is completely lost.
With this concept, the first intellect (al-‘aql al-awwal)
originates (mubdi‘) in every state since its existence is not
from its essence. It possesses knowledge from its essence.
That had been completely lost.
Definition of creation (khalq): It is an equivocal term
(ism mushtarak). It is called ‘creation (khalq)’ in order to
acquire (ifada) the existence of ‘whatever its form (kayfa

book three 325

kana).’ It is said ‘creation (khalq)’ in order to acquire exist-
ence (wujud) occurring from matter (madda) and form
(sura) of ‘whatever its form (kayfa kana).’
It might be called ‘creation (khalq)’ for this second
meaning but by way of origination (ikhtira‘) without prior
matter (sabq madda) and containing the potentiality of its
existence (wujud) and possibility (imkan).
Definition of temporal creation (ihdath): It is an equivo-
cal term that is applied to two aspects:
The first: temporal (zamani). The meaning of creation
in time is bringing into existence something after it did not
have existence in a previous time.
The meaning of atemporal creation (al-ihdath al-ghayr
zamani): It is something acquiring existence. That thing
does not contain that existence in its essence not at a spe-
cific time, excluding other times, but at every time.
Definition of pre-eternity (qidam): Pre-eternity has dif-
ferent aspects: It is called pre-eternity (qidam) by analogy
(bi’l-qiyas) and absolute pre-eternity (qidam mutlaq).
[p. 285] Pre-eternity by analogy: It is something whose
time is in the past more than the time of any other thing. It
is pre-eternal by analogy to it.
As for absolute pre-eternity, it also has two aspects: It is
said according to time (bi-hasb al-zaman) and according to
essence (bi-hasb al-dhat).
As for that which is according to time, it is the thing
which is existent in a past time that is infinite (ghayr muta-
nahin).
As for the pre-eternal according to essence, it is that the
existence of whose essence does not have a beginning with
which it is necessitated.
Therefore, the pre-eternal according to time is that

326 the standard of knowledge

which does not have a temporal existence and is existent
[with respect to] the angels, the heavens, and all of the fun-
damental principles (usul) of the world in the view [of the
speculative theologians].
The pre-eternal according to essence, does not have a
higher beginning; that is it does not have a cause (‘illa). This
is only exclusive to the Creator the Mighty and Sublime.

[p. 286] The [Second] Division

That employed in Physics (al-tabi‘iyyat)
We mention from among them 55 expressions which are
[as follows]:
Form (sura) Hyle (hayula) Subject (mawdu‘)
Predicate (mahmul) Matter (madda) Element (alt. matter of
all matter) (‘unsur)
[Definition of the] Base element (rukn) Nature (madda)
element (ustuqas)234
Natural disposition (tab‘) Body (jism) Substance (jawhar)
Accident (‘arad) Fire (nar) Air (hawa’)
Water (ma’) Earth (ard) World (‘alam)
Celestial sphere (falak) Planet (kawkab) Sun (shams)
Moon (qamar) Movement (haraka) Eternity (dahr)
Time (zaman) Time: Now (an) Place (makan)
Void (khala’) Plenum (mala‘) Non-existence (‘adam)
Rest (sukun) Speed (sur‘a) Slowness (but’)
Inclination (i‘timad) Impetus/Driving (mayl) Lightness (khiffa)
Weight (thuql) Temperature (harara) Moisture (rutuba)
Coldness (buruda) Dryness (yubusa) Coarse (khashin)
Smooth (malis) Hard (sulb) Soft (lin)
Loose (rakhw) Transparent (mushaff) Rarefication (takhalkhul)
Conjunction (ijtima‘) Homogeneity (tajanus) Interpenetrating
(mudakhil)
Conjunctive (muttasil) Union (ittihad) Succession (tatalin)
Continuous succession
(tawalin)

234
Often translated as ‘element.’ Ustuqas can also be pronounced astaqis or
ustuqus.

book three 327

[1] Definition of form (sura): … An equivocal term en-
compassing six meanings:
[p.287] First, it is the species (naw‘) which is applied and
intended by it that which is beneath the genus. Its definition
with this meaning is the definition of the species (hadd al-
naw‘). This was previously [discussed] in the premises of
the Book of Analogy.
Second, the perfection (kamal) with which the species
completes its second completion (istikmalahu al-thani).
Therefore, it is called form (sura). Its definition with this
meaning is every existent in the thing, not like a part of it.
Its constitution (qiwam) is not sound without it. Because of
it the thing came into existence like the sciences and the vir-
tues (fada’il) in man.
Third, a thing’s quiddity (mahiyya) is how it came to be
called a form (sura).
Its definition with this meaning is that every existent in
the thing is not like a part of it. Its constitution is not sound
without it whatever its form (kayfa kana).
Fourth, the reality (haqiqa) which constitutes the locus
(mahall) in [the form].
Its definition with this meaning is: It is what exists in
another thing not like a part of it. Its existence is not sound
if it is separated from it. However, its existence occurs to it
in actu like the form of water in the hyle of the water. It
occurs in actu in the form of water or in another form
whose judgement is that of the form of water.
Fifth, the form (sura) which constitutes the species is
called a form (sura).
Its definition with this meaning is: It is what exists in
something not as a part of it. Its constitution would not be
sound if it is separated from it. Nor would the constitution

328 the standard of knowledge

of less than it be sound either except if the natural species
(al-naw‘ al-tabi‘i) occurs in it like the ofrm of humanness
or animalness in the natural body created for it.
Sixth, the separate perfection (al-kamal al-mufariq). It
may be called a form (sura) like the soul for the person.
Its definition with this meaning is: It is a non-corporeal
part (juz’ ghayr jismani), separate, which along with a cor-
poreal part (juz’ jismani) complete the natural species (naw‘
tabi‘i).

[2] Definition of hyle: As for the absolute matter (hyle) (al-

hayula al-mutlaqa) it is a substance (jawhar) whose exist-
ence in actu occurs by his saying ‘the corporeal form
(al-sura al-jismaniyya)’(as a faculty which accepts forms)
and that in its essence there is no form except for in the
sense of potentiality. It is now with them [a non-quanti-
tative] part (of the body) which is divided in an abstract
way; rather I do not say with a measured division, into
‘form’ and ‘hyle.’ The words affirming that are long and
precise.
It may be said ‘hyle’ for everything in whose prerogative
it is to accept perfection and something that it does not con-
tain. Therefore, it is in analogy with what does not contain
hyle and in analogy with what contains a subject (mawdu‘).
[p. 288] The bed’s matter (madda) is a subject (mawdu‘)
of the bed’s form (surat al-sarir) and hyle for the form of
ashness (ramadiyya) which occurs with burning [the wood
of the bed].

[3] The subject (mawdu‘): It is said about everything that

it is its prerogative to have a kind of perfection (kamal ma).
That perfection was present and is its subject.

book three 329

 It is said ‘subject’ for every locus (mahall) which is rec-
ognised by its essence (mutaqawwim bi-dhatihi) and
composing that which is placed in it (ma yahilluhu).
As it is said: ‘hyle’ for the locus which is not recognised
by its essence but rather with what occurs in it.
It is said subject (mawdu‘) for every meaning over which
the judgement of negation or affirmation is passed. [4] It
opposes the predicate (mahmul).

[5] Matter (madda): It might be said that it is a synonym

(ism muradif) for hyle.’
Matter (madda) is said for every subject which accepts
perfections through its combining with another and its ap-
pearance to it is little like semen (mani) and blood (dam)
to the animal form (surat al-hayawan). Perhaps that which
was mating with it is from its species, perhaps not.

[6] Element (alt. matter of all matter)(‘unsur): a term for

the fundamental principle (asl) in subject matters. There-
fore, it is said ‘element (‘unsur)’ for the primary locus (al-
mahall al-awwal) with whose alteration (istihala) it accepts
forms (suwar) in which the creations (al-ka’inat) which
occur from it are diversified (tatanawwa‘u)—if absolutely
it is the first intellect (al-‘aql al-awwal). If with a corporeal
condition, it is the first locus of bodies which the rest of the
existent bodies form to accept their forms.

[7] [Definition of the] element (ustuqas): It is the primary

body (al-jism al-awwal) in whose conjunction (ijtima‘) with
primary bodies (ajsam uwal) opposing it in [p. 289] species
(naw‘). It is called the ‘[definition of the] element (ustuqas).’
Therefore, it is said: It is the last [stage] to which the dis-

330 the standard of knowledge

integration of the bodies reaches. Upon division to it there
is not a division except whose parts are homoeomerous
(ajza’ mutashabiha).235

[8] Base element (rukn): It is a simple substance (jawhar

basit) and an essential part (juz’ dhati) of the world like the
celestial bodies and elements. Therefore, the thing by anal-
ogy with the world is a base element (rukn).
In analogy with what is assembled from it (ma yatarak-
kabu minhu), it is a definition of the element (ustuqas).
In analogy with the element (‘unsur) which is from it
whether it came into being from it at the time of composi-
tion (tarkib) and conversion (istihala) together or with pure
conversion (istihala mujarrada) from it. The air (hawa’) is
an element (‘unsur) of a cloud with its density but is not a
definition of the element (ustuqas). It is a definition of the
element (ustuqas) and an element (‘unsur) for plants.
The celestial sphere (falak) is a base element (rukn) but
not a definition of the element (ustuqas) or an element
(‘unsur) of the form. Its form has a subject. It does not have
an element (‘unsur) whatever is meant by the subject. It is
a locus (mahall) for a matter in which it is in actu. A prior
locus (mahall mutaqaddim) is not meant by it.
These names which are the hyle, subject, element,
matter, [definition of the] element, and base element may
be used by way of synonymy (taraduf). Therefore, some of

235
Kindi’s definition as quoted in Kennedy-Day, Books of Definition in Islamic
Philosophy, p. 78, is: ‘the element (or matter) of the body; it is the smallest of
things of the assemblage of the body.’ Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Hudud (trans. by Ken-
nedy-Day), p. 106: ‘About the element1 (ustuqas). The element1 is the primary
body by whose coming together with other bodies different kinds of primary
bodies are formed. Element1 is said of the final result after the bodies break down,
where there is no further division except into similar parts.’

book three 331

them may be substituted in place of others by way of con-
cession (musamaha) so that what is intended by the con-
nection (qarina) is known.
If a rock should tumble down, it does not tumble down
due to it being a body, but rather for another meaning in
which it differs from the rest of the bodies in it. Then it is
a meaning in which it differs from fire which inclines up-
ward. That meaning is a principle (mabda’) for this species
of movement. It is called [9] ‘nature (tabi‘a).’
The same movement may be called ‘nature.’ Therefore,
it is said: the rock’s nature (tabi‘a) is: tumbling down (al-
huwiyy). The element (‘unsur) and the essential form (sura
dhatiyya) might be called ‘nature.’
Physicians apply the expression ‘nature’ to the hot
temperament (mizaj), the ‘instinctive heat (al-harara al-
ghariziyya),’ the forms of the organs (hay’at al-a‘da’), the
movements (harakat), and the vegetative soul (al-nafs al-
nabatiyya).
Every one has another definition with which our goal
has no relation. Therefore, we have restricted ourselves to
the first [definition].

[p. 290] [10] Natural disposition (tab‘): It is every form

with which one of the different species (naw‘ min al-anwa‘),
whether active (fi‘liyya) or passive (infi‘aliyya), are com-
pleted. It is as if it is more general than ‘nature (tabi‘a).’
A thing might be from nature (‘an al-tabi‘a) and not in
natural disposition (laysa bi’l-tab‘) like an additional finger.
It might resemble it being in the natural disposition ac-
cording to the individual nature (tabi‘a shakhsiyya) and not
in the natural disposition according to the universal nature
(al-tabi‘a al-kulliyya).

332 the standard of knowledge

 The generality of the disposition is more inclusive of ‘ac-
tion (fi‘l)’ and ‘passivity (infi‘al)’ than nature (tabi‘a) which
is an actual principle (mabda‘ fi‘li).

[11] The body (jism) is an equivocal term (ism mushtarak)

that may be applied to that which is called by it such that
it is conjunctive (muttassil), defined (mahdud), potentially
measured by three dimensions. I mean it is measured in po-
tentia (bi’l-quwwa) if not in actu (bi’l-fi‘l).
‘Body’ may be applied to ‘outer form (sura)’ in which it
is possible to display dimensions of how they are related in
height, width and depth and possessing particular bound-
aries.
This differs from the first in that if it did not make con-
ditional defining the being of the totality (jumla) and
measuring it in potentia or in actu or believing the bodies
of the world are infinite, every part (juz’) of it would be
called a ‘body (jism)’ with this reflection (i‘tibar).
‘Body (jism)’ is applied to a substance (jawhar) com-
posed of hyle and outer form which is in the attribute which
we mentioned. Therefore, it is called a body with this re-
flection (i‘tibar).
The difference between quantity (kamm) and this outer
form is that a portion of water and wax however much they
exchange their forms, the measurable defined dimensions
are exchanged and not one of them remains exactly the
same (bi-‘aynihi), one in number, and the outer form which
receives these states (qabil li-hadhihi al-ahwal) remained
one in number without exchange.
The outer form (sura) receives these states, which are
corporeal (jismiyya).
Likewise if the body condenses (takathaf) for example,

book three 333

like air turning into a cloud through condensation (taka-
thuf), or water [p. 291] or rarefication (takhalkhul) for
example freezing (jamd) which results in the transformation
(yastahilu) its physical form (sura jismiyya) and its dimen-
sions and measurements are altered. Thus the difference
appears between the physical form (al-sura al-jismiyya)
which belongs to quantity (kamm) and the form which be-
longs to substance (jawhar).

[12] Substance (jawhar) is an equivocal name. It is said sub-

stance (jawhar) for the essence of the whole (dhat kull) like
‘person’ or ‘whiteness.’ Therefore, it is said: ‘the substance
of whiteness and its essence (dhat).’
It is said substance (jawhar) for every existent (mawjud).
Its essence does not need another essence to join to it so
that it can be actualised. That is the meaning of their saying:
Substance is self-existent (qa’im bi-nafsihi).
‘Substance’ is also said to what is with this description.
It is in its prerogative to accept the contraries (addad) with
their succession to it.
It is said ‘substance’ to every essence whose existence is
not in a subject (mawdu‘). This is the convention of the
ancient philosophers.
The difference between the subject and the locus (ma-
hall) was previously discussed. Therefore, the meaning of
their saying: ‘The existent is not in a subject,’ is that the
existent is not in conjunction in existence with a locus exist-
ent in itself and constituting it.
There is no objection that [the substance] is in a locus
which is not constituted without it in actu. If it was in a
locus, it is not in a subject.
Therefore, every existent if it is like whiteness, tempera-

334 the standard of knowledge

ture, movement, work, it is a substance in the first mean-
ing.
The first principle (al-mabda’ al-awwal) is a substance
in all its meanings except in the third aspect (wajh) which
is the succession of the contraries (ta‘aqub al-addad). In-
deed, [one] may abstain from applying the expression ‘sub-
stance’ to it out of propriety for the divine law.
The hyle (hayula) is a substance in the third meaning,
not in the second meaning.
The outer form (sura) is a substance in the fourth mean-
ing, not in in the second or third.
The speculative theologians apply the name ‘substance
(jawhar)’ to ‘the indivisible space-occupying individual sub-
stance (al-jawhar al-fard al-mutahayyiz alladhi la yanq-
asimu)’ and call the divisible (munqasim) ‘a body (jism),’
not ‘a substance (jawhar).’ With that judgement they refrain
from applying the name ‘substance (jawhar)’ to the First
Principle (al-mabda’ al-awwal), the Mighty and Sublime.
Contesting the names after clarifying their meanings is a
habit of those possessing imperfections.

[p. 292] [13] Accident (‘arad) is an equivocal name which

is said of every existent in a locus (mahall).
It is said accident (‘arad) [of the following]:
1) Every existent in a subject (mawdu‘).
2) The individual universal meaning (al-ma‘na al-
kulli al-mufrad) which is predicated upon many
(kathirin) in a non-constitutive predication (ham-
lan ghayr muqawwim). It is the accident which we
placed in opposition to the essential (alladhi qa-
balnahu bi’l-dhati) in the Book of Syllogistic
Premises.

book three 335

 3) Every meaning existent in the thing outside of its
nature (kharij ‘an tab‘ihi).
4) Every meaning predicated on the thing for its exist-
ence in another [thing] which is separate from it
(yufariquhu).
5) Every meaning whose existence was not primarily
and principally (fi awwal al-amr).

The outer form (sura) is an accident (‘arad) in the first

meaning only. It is what the speculative theologian means
if he does not compare it (qabalahu) with the substance
(jawhar).
‘White’ is anything possessing whiteness which is predi-
cated on snow, gypsum and camphor. It is not an accident
in the first and second aspects, [but rather] in the third as-
pect. That is because this ‘white’ which is a non-constitutive
predicated species (naw‘ mahmul ghayr muqawwim) is a
substance not in a subject or a locus.
Therefore, ‘whiteness’ is subsisting (hall) in a locus and
a subject. Whiteness is not predicated on snow. Therefore,
there is no snow which is whiteness, but rather it is said
‘white (abyad)’ which means something possessing white-
ness. Therefore, this is not a constitutive predicate (haml
muqawwim).
A rock tumbling down is an accident in the first, second,
and third aspects, but not in the fourth, fifth or sixth.
Rather its movement upward is an accident in all of these
aspects.
The movement of the person sitting in a ship is an acci-
dent in the sixth and fourth aspects.

[p. 293] [14] The celestial sphere (falak) in their view is a

336 the standard of knowledge

simple spherical body which is not susceptible to accident
of location (kawn) and corruption, moves by nature on its
axis (‘ala al-wasat), including it (mushtamil ‘alayhi).

[15] The planet (kawkab) is a simple spherical body whose

natural place is the same as of the celestial sphere in whose
nature it is to not be susceptible to accident of location
(kawn) and corruption, moves by nature on its axis, not in-
cluding it (ghayr mushtamil ‘alayhi).

[16] The sun (shams) is a planet (kawkab) and the largest

of all the planets (kawakib) in body (jirm) and the most in-
tense in light. Its natural place is in the fourth orb (kura).236

[17] The moon (qamar) is a planet (kawkab) whose natural

place is downward, in whose nature it is to receive the light
from the sun in different forms. Its essential colour is to-
ward black.

[18] Fire (nar) is a simple body whose nature is hot and dry,
moving by nature from the centre. It settles beneath the orb
of the moon.

[19] Air (hawa’) is a simple body (jirm basit) whose nature

is hot and moist, clear and subtle, moving to the place be-
neath the orb of fire (kurat al-nar) and above the orb of the
land.

236
For a discussion of the orb (kura), see for instance Damien Janos, ‘Moving
the Orbs: Astronomy, Physics, and Metaphysics, and the Problem of Celestial
Motion according to Ibn Sina,’ Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 21 (2011), pp.
165–214.

book three 337

[20] Water (ma’) is a simple body whose nature is cold,
moist and transparent which moves to the place beneath
the wind orb (kura) and above the land.

[21] The land (ard) is a simple body whose nature is cold,

dry, moving to the middle and descending to it.

[22] The dominion (‘alam) is the totality of all simple natu-

ral bodies. ‘Dominion’ is said about every group of homo-
genous existents (mawjudat mutajanisa) like their saying:
The dominion of nature (‘alam al-tabi‘a), the dominion of
the soul (‘alam al-nafs) and the dominion of the intellect
(‘alam al-‘aql).

[23] Movement (haraka) is the first perfection in potentia

(kamal awwal bi’l-quwwa) because of what is in potentia.
If you wish, you could say: It is the emergence from poten-
tiality to actuality, not at a single moment.

[p. 294] Every change in their view is called ‘movement (ha-

raka).’
As to the movement of the whole (harakat al-kull), it is
the movement of the farthest body (al-jirm al-aqsa) toward
the center, encompassing all of the movements which are
in the middle, and faster than them.

[24] Eternity (dahr) is the reality of the intelligible (al-ma‘na

al-ma‘qul) from adding permanence (idafat al-thabat) to
the soul in all of time (fi’l-zaman kullihi).

[25] Time (zaman) is a measurement (miqdar) of move-

ment marked by the aspect of priority (taqaddum) and pos-
terity (ta’akhkhur).

338 the standard of knowledge

[26] The now (al-ana) is a moment (zarf) in which past and
future time participate.
It may be said that time is small measure in estimation,
conjoined with the true now (al-ana al-haqiqi) from its
genus.

[27] Place (makan) is the internal surface (al-sath al-batin)

from the containing substance (al-jawhar al-hawi), contigu-
ous (mumass) to the surface visible from the containing
body (al-jism al-mahwi).
‘Place’ might be said of the lower surface upon which a
thing rests and carries it.
It is said ‘place’ with a third sense except that it is not
existent. It is [of] finite dimensions like the dimensions of
the situated (mutamakkin) in which the dimensions of the
situated enter into it.
If it is permitted for it to be applied without the situated,
it is a void (khala’).
[p. 295] If it is not permissible except for an existent
body in it to occupy them (i.e. the dimensions), it is not
void.

[28] Void (khala’) is a dimension in which it is possible to

impose in it the dimensions of three constituent elements
(qawa’im), not in matter (madda), such as a body occupies
it and abandons it.
As long as this is not existent, this definition is an expla-
nation of the name [void].

[29] The plenum (mala’) is a body from some aspect. Its

dimensions oppose another body entering into it.

book three 339

[30] Non-existence (‘adam) is one of the principles (ma-
badi’’) of temporally created events (hawadith). It is for
there not to be in something the essence of something in
whose nature it is to accept it and exist in it.

[31] Rest (sukun) is the absence of movement in what by

nature moves with it being in one state of the quantity,
quality, place and position in time. It exists in it in two
times (anayn).

[32] Speed (sur‘a) is movement traversing a long distance

in a short time.

[33] (but’) is movement traversing a short distance in a long

time.

[34, 35] Inclination (i‘timad) and impetus (mayl) is a

quality (kayfiyya) with which the body resists what prevents
it from movement toward its direction.

[36] Lightness (khiffa) is a natural power with which the

body moves away from the centre naturally.

[37] Weight (thuql) is a natural power with which the body

moves toward the centre naturally.

[p. 296] Temperature (harara) is an efficient quality (kay-

fiyya fi‘liyya) which moves that which is in it upward in
order for it to produce lightness. Therefore, there is opposi-
tion to it to combine the homogeneous things (mutajanisat)
and to separate the disparate things (mukhtalitat) and to
produce rarefication (takhalkhul) similar to the quality in

340 the standard of knowledge

the quality (al-kayf fi’l-kayf), and condensation (takathuf)
in the position (wad‘) with its decomposition and its subtle
ascending (tas‘idihi al-latif).

[39] Coldness (buruda) is an efficient quality (kayfiyya

fi‘liyya) which combines the homogeneous things (mutajan-
isat) and the non-homogeneous things (ghayr al-mutajan-
isat) by its restricting (hasr) the bodies through reducing
and tightening them which are both from the [category] of
the quality (kayfa).

[40] Moisture (rutuba) is a passive quality (kayfiyya

infi‘aliyya) with which the body accepts restriction and
strange formation (tashkil gharib) easily, but does not pre-
serve that. Rather [the body] returns to the form of itself
and its position which is according to the movement of its
body (jirm) in nature (fi’l-tab‘).

[41] Dryness (yubusa) is a passive quality (kayfiyya

infi‘aliyya) for the body whose restriction and strange
formation are difficult. Abandoning it and returning to its
natural form are difficult.

[42] Coarse (khashin) is a body whose surface is divided

into parts which are in a different position (mukhtalifat al-
wad‘).

[43] Smooth (amlas) is a body whose surface is divided into

homogeneous parts (mutasawiyat al-wad‘).

[44] Hard (sulb) is a body which does not accept pushing

its surface inward except with difficulty.

book three 341

[45] Softness (lin) is a body which accepts [pushing its sur-
face inward].

[46] Loose (rakhw) is a body which is not quickly separ-

ated.

[47] Clear (mushaff) is a body in whose essence there is no

colour and to be such as what is behind it is seen with an
intermediary (bi-tawassut).

[48] Rarefication (takhalkhul) is an equivocal term (ism

mushtarak).
‘Rarefication’ is said about the body’s movement from
a measure (miqdar) to a greater measure which necessitates
for its constitution to be thinner. ‘Rarefication’ is applied
to the quality of this constitution (kayfiyyat hadha al-
qiwam). [p. 297] ‘Rarefication’ is applied to the movement
of the parts of the body from close proximity to apart from
each other. Therefore, a body which is more delicate then
them penetrates them.
This is a movement in position (wad‘). The first is in the
quantity (kamm). ‘Rarefication’ is said about the same posi-
tion of the parts of this.
The definition of condensation is understood from the
definition of rarefication. It is known that it is equivocal
and occurs in four senses opposite to those meanings.
One of them is movement in the quantity.
The other is quality.
The third is a movement in position (haraka fi’l-wad‘).
The fourth is position (wad‘).237

237
See Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), pp.131-132.

342 the standard of knowledge

 Conjunction (ijtima‘) is the existence of many things
which are encompassed by a single meaning. Opposite it is
difference (iftiraq).

[50] Two homogenous things (mutajanisan) both resemble

each other in position (wad‘). It is not permissible for any-
thing possessing a position (dhu wad‘) to occur between
them.

[51] Interpenetrating (mudakhil) is a thing which meets

another in its totality until a single place adapts to them.

[52] Conjunctive (muttasil) is an equivocal term (ism mush-

tarak) said about three meanings:

First, is about which it is said ‘conjunctive in itself (muttasil

fi nafsihi)’ which is a species of quantity (kamm).
Its definition (hadd) is something in whose nature it is
for an equivocal name (hadd mushtarak) to exist between
its parts.
Its description (rasm) is that it is subject to division in-
definitely.
The second and third have the meaning of conjunctive
(muttasil).
The former is from the accidents (‘awarid) of conjunc-
tive quantity (kamm al-muttasil) with the first meaning with
respect to what is a conjunctive quantity. [That is] both the
conjunctive things’ two extremities are one.

[p. 298] The third is equivocality (shirka) in position but

with a position.
That is everything whose extremity and that of another

book three 343

thing are one in actu, it is said that they are conjunctive like
the two lines of an angle.
The third meaning is that it is among the accidents
(‘awarid) of the conjunctive quantity from the aspect of it
being in a matter (madda), namely the conjunctives in this
meaning, the extremity of each one of them is concomitant
(mulazim) with the extremity of the other in movement
even if it should change it (ghayyarahu) in actu. [An
example of this is] the conjunction of the body parts with
each other and the ligatures (ribatat) with the bones.
In general every contiguous concomitant thing (mumass
mulazim) is difficult for it to accept disjunction (infisal)
which is opposite contiguity (mumassa).

[53] Union (ittihad) is an equivocal term.

‘Union’ is said of the equivocation of things in a single
essential or accidental predicate (mahmul wahid dhati aw
‘aradi) like the union of camphor and snow in whiteness,
and the person and the ox in ‘animalness.’
‘Union’ is [also] said of the equivocation of the predi-
cates (mahmulat) in a single subject (mawdu‘) like the
union of taste and smell in the apple.
‘Union’ is [also] applied to the conjunction of the subject
and predicate in a single essence like both parts of a person:
the body and soul.
‘Union’ is applied to many bodies either through succes-
sion (tatali) like the table or through genus like the chair
and the bed, or the conjunction of an animal’s [body] parts.
Most worthy of [being mentioned in] this chapter by the
name ‘union’ is a single body occurring in number (bi’l-
‘adad) from the conjunction of many bodies (ajsam) due to
their specific attributes being annulled, the removal of their

344 the standard of knowledge

individual definitions (irtifa‘ hududiha al-munfarida), and
the annulment of their independence (istiqlalat) in the con-
junction.

[54] Succession (tatali) is the being of things that have a

position (wad‘) with not another of their genus between
them.

[55] Continuous Succession (tawali) is the existence of a

thing in an analogous relationship to a definite principle
(mabda’ mahdud). There is nothing between them similar
to them both.

[p. 299] Third Section

What is employed in Mathematics

When we did not talk about mathematics in Precipitance

of the Philosophers, we restricted ourselves to these ex-
pressions in small measure (‘ala qadr yasir).
Some of them are subsumed under metaphysics (ila-
hiyyat) and physics (tabi‘iyyat) in the examples and illus-
trations which are six expressions:

Extremity (nihaya) Infinite (ma la nihaya) Point (nuqta)

Line (khatt) Surface (sath) Distance (bu‘d)

The extremity (nihaya) is the end to which the thing

possessing quantity goes so that there is nothing of it
behind it.

The infinite (ma la nihaya) is the quantity (kamm) posse-

ssing of many parts to the extent that nothing remains

book three 345

external to it, it being of its same species, and in so far as it
is not terminated.

The point (nuqta) is an indivisible essential (dhat ghayr

munqasima) which has a position (wad‘) which is the ex-
tremity of the line.

The line (khatt) is a measurement which does not accept

division except from one side which is the extremity of the
surface (nihayat al-sath).

The surface (sath) is a measurement (miqdar) in which it is

possible for there to occur two divisions which intersect at
the angles (mutaqati‘atayn ‘ala qawa’im) and is the extrem-
ity of the body.

[p. 300] The distance (bu‘d) is everything between two ex-

tremities which do not intersect. It is possible to indicate
its direction (jiha) and it is in its nature for extremities
to be imagined in it from the type of potential of the two
extremities.
The difference between the distance and the three
measurements (i.e. point, line and surface) is that the [dis-
tance] may be a linear distance without a line, and a flat
distance (bu‘d sathi) without a surface.
An example of it is: If it was imposed in a body, which
is not internally disjunctive, two points, between them both
was a flat distance (bu‘d sathi) but no line.
Likewise if two opposite lines are imagined in it, a dis-
tance exists between them, but not a surface because either
a surface is between them if it is separated in actu with
one of the aspects of disjunction or a line exists in it if it is
in a surface.
346 the standard of knowledge
 Therefore, we differentiate between height and line and
between width and surface since the distance between the
two aforementioned points is length and not a line. The dis-
tance between the two aforementioned lines is width, not
surface even if each line has a length and each surface has
a width.
Our objective was reached of the Book of Definitions in
general rule and exposition.

book three 347

 [p.303] [BOOK FOUR]
DIVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES
OF EXISTENCE

The objective of this book is to research (bahth) the divi-

sions of existence (aqsam al-wujud). I mean the universal
divisions and researching the essential accidents (‘awarid
dhatiyya) which are attached to it as in existence (min hay-
thu al-wujud). This is what is intended by the principles
(ahkam) [of existence].
The difference between the essential accidents and non-
essential accidents have been discussed.
The concomitants of a thing, meaning its predicates, are
divided into that for which something more specific than it
is present and that for which there is nothing more specific
than it.
That for which something more specific than it is present
is divided into: Differentia (fusul) and essential accidents
(a‘rad dhatiyya). The difference between them was pre-
viously discussed.
In the differentia, the thing is divided into its species.
In the accidentals, it is divided into differing states (ikhti-
laf ahwalihi).
The difference between the differentia and the universal
accidents (a‘rad ‘amma) have been discussed.
The division of existence into ten divisions one of which
is substance (jawhar) and nine accidents who totality was
previously [discussed] resembles the division of the differ-
entia even if is not so in reality.

348 the standard of knowledge

 Likewise if we should mention in the verification of the
differentia (tahqiq al-fasl) and its penetration into quiddity,
these matters (umur) are not external to the differentia as
existence (wujud) is and the thing (shay’) is external to the
genera. That is with the judgement of what previously oc-
curred from the convention (istilah).
The division [of existence] into potential and actual, one
and many, anterior and posterior, general and specific, uni-
versal and particular, pre-eternal and temporally created,
complete and defective, cause and effect, necessary and
possible and the like, resembles the division of the essential
accidents. These matters are not concomitant to the existent
for a matter more general than it nor a matter more specific
than it like movement (haraka). It is concomitant to the
existent insofar as its being a body not insofar as its being
an existent.
Our objective from proper reflection (nazar) on this is
divided into two aspects (fannayn):

[p. 304] First Aspect (fann)

Concerning the Divisions of Existence

They are ten species in themselves.

Then its affair (amr) in the soul—I mean knowledge of
it (al-‘ilm biha)—is also ten heterogeneous [things] (muta-
bayina). The meaning of knowledge is an example which is
in full concordance (mutabiq) with that which is known
(ma‘lum) like the form (sura) and picture (naqsh), which is
a similitude (mithal) of the thing.
[Existence] has ten outward expressions (‘ibarat) since
the expressions (alfaz) are in the consequence (tabi‘a) of the
traces that are permanent in the soul and are in full con-

book four 349

gruence (mutabaqa) with the external things (al-ashya’ al-
kharija):
Substance (jawhar) Hyle (hayula) Subject (mawdu‘)
Correlative (mudaf) Place (ayna) When (mata)
Position (wad‘) Possession (lahu) To do (an yaf‘ala)

The logicians produced these ten outward expressions

each of which whose meaning we reveal. After compre-
hending the meaning, the expressions are incontestable (la
mushaha).

Saying concerning Substance (jawhar)

Know that the existent is divided with a type of division
into:
Substance (jawhar) and Accident (‘arad)
The primitive name of the substance and accident are
equivocal as previously mentioned. However, we now
mean with all of them a single thing. Thus, we want with
‘substance’ that which is existent and not in a subject (la fi
mawdu‘).
[p.305] What we want by ‘subject (mawdu‘)’ is the prox-
imate locus (mahall qarib) which is self-sufficient (yaqum
bi-nafsihi), not with the subsistence (taqwim) of the thing
which inheres (hall) in it like colour in a person, rather in
the body. The quiddity of the body is not subsistent with
the colour, rather colour is an accident (‘arid) which ad-
heres after the quiddity of the body constitutes its essence
(qiwam mahiyyat al-jism bi-dhatihi). [This is] not like the
form of the ‘waterness (ma’iyya)’ in the water. If [its form]
should separate upon the water being converted into air,
the quiddity is not replaced because of that which is separ-

350 the standard of knowledge

ated, not like heat and cold upon separating from the water.
Therefore, the quiddity is not altered.
If we are asked about hot and cold, ‘What is it?’ we
would say: It is water.If we are asked about the air, we do
not say it is water.
Should we present there and say: Hot water or cold and
did not present here, then we should say: Water which has
become rarefied (takhalkhala) and spread. Therefore, the
form of ‘waterness’ has dissipated.
The speculative theologians also call this an accident
(‘arad). They mean by accident that which is a locus (ma-
hall). This form is in a locus. There ought to be no conflict
over the terminology (istilah). Each group has a right to
specify the accident (takhsis al-‘arad) as it wants. However,
it is not possible to deny the difference between heat in re-
lationship to the water [the heat] dissipates after it cools
and between the water form which disappears when it is
converted to air. What is lost (za’il) here takes the place of
the aforementioned in the question ‘What is it?’ What is
lost there does not take its place.
Substance in the terminology of the speculative theolo-
gians is an expression concerning what [cannot inhere]
in a locus (mahall). The ‘water form’ is not a substance
(jawhar).
According to the terminology of the Philosophers, the
expression ‘of what (‘amma) [cannot inhere] in a locus
(laysa fi mahall). They take form (sura) as substance (jaw-
har).
The equivocal meaning (ma‘na mushtarak) between
water and air if water is converted to air, they also call it
substance (jawhar) which is hyle.
If the meaning of the subject (mawdu‘) is understood,

book four 351

then the difference between it and the predicate (mahmul)
is that substance (jawhar) is divided into: That which is not
in the subject (mawdu‘) (which cannot be a predicate) and
into that which is not in the subject but is possible to predi-
cate it on a subject.
First: It is the individual substance (jawhar shakhs) like
Zayd or ‘Amr.
Second: It is the collective substances (jawahir kulliyya)
like the person, the body, and the animal.
Therefore, we indicate the subject like Zayd and predi-
cate these substances on it (wa nahmilu hadhihi al-jawahir
‘alayhi). We say: Zayd is a person, an animal, and a body.
Therefore, the predicate is a non-accidental substance
(jawhar la ‘aradan) except that it is predicated and knows
the essence of the subject (‘arifa dhat al-mawdu‘) and not
[p.306] external to its essence (kharijan ‘an dhatihi) not like
the accident (‘arad) since it is predicated on the substance.
A thing that is external to the subject’s essence (kharij ‘an
dhat al-mawdu‘) is known by it. [For instance,] whiteness
is predicated on the substance and is external to the sub-
stance’s essence. Therefore, this subject is not defined with
the definition of the predicate since we say in defining
‘whiteness’:
It is a colour which sight distinguished (yufarriq al-
basar) but by which the subject is not defined (la yuhadd
bihi al-mawdu‘). As to the person, the animal, the body and
the like, we predicate them on the person of Zayd. These
substances (jawahir) are defined by a definition which is
exactly the definition of the subject (hadd al-mawdu‘), since
we say about Zayd: He is a mortal, speaking animal, or,
He is an animate sensitive body possessing freewill (jism
dhu nafs hassas mutaharrik bi’l-irada).

352 the standard of knowledge

 Thus the difference between the universal and particular
substances has a disposition (yatahayya’u).
As for the accidents they are generally in a subject. How-
ever, they are divided into that which is said about a subject
by way of predicating it (bi-tariq al-haml ‘alayhi) and that
which is not predicated on a subject.
That predicated on a subject is the universal accidents
like colour for example. It is predicated on white, black,
and other colours. Therefore, it is said: White is a colour
and black is a colour.
As for the individual accidents (a‘rad shakhsiyya), it is
not possible to predicate them like Zayd’s writing, a per-
son’s whiteness since it is not possible to predicate it on
something until it is said: ‘It is Zayd’s writing,’ or ‘It is a
person’s whiteness.’
Should you say that Zayd is a writer or white, that is not
posited for whiteness. Rather it means that he possesses
writing (dhu kitaba).
Whenever we say: ‘He is a person (dhu insan),’ the per-
son is not predicated. Likewise if we should say: ‘possessing
of whiteness (dhu bayad).’ Therefore, it is possible the thing
is either predicated (mahmul) in consideration of it being
universal, whether accident or substance.As long as it is an
individual it is not predicated, whether in terms of accident
or substance.
The reality of the definition of universal (kulli) is [men-
tioned] in the principles pertaining to existence (ahkam al-
wujud).
Therefore, if it is said: ‘Is the universal substance (jawhar
kulli) more appropriate to knowing substantiality (jawha-
riyya) or the individual (shakhsi)?
We say: The universal substance (jawhar kulli), accord-

book four 353

ing to what follows, its constitution (qiwam) is from the
singular propositions (shakhsiyyat) since without them the
universals (kulliyyat) would not be extant. The individual
in rank is more advanced than it (i.e. the universal). How-
ever, the individual in its being rationalised (fi sayruratihi
ma‘qulan) is in need of the universal (yaftaqiru ila al-kulli)
but is not in need of [the universal] for its existence.
This is verified upon demonstration (bayan) of the mean-
ing of the universal (ma‘na al-kulli).
If it is said: What are the divisions of substance?
We say: If it is intended by this substance: what exists
not only [inhering] in a locus (la fi mahall) or existing not
in a subject, it is divided into:
[p.307] A body (jism), I mean ‘occupying space (muta-
hayyiz)’ and ‘not subject to space (ghayr mutahayyiz).’
The body is divided into ‘nutritive (mutaghadhdhin)’
and ‘non-nutritive (ghayr mutaghadhdhin).’
The nutritive is divided into ‘animal’ and ‘other.’
The animal is divided into speaking (natiq) and not
speaking (ghayr natiq).
All of the animals are included in their different classes
(asnaf) and each species (naw‘) is divided into a class which
is specific to it even if we cannot sense it.
As to the non-nutritive, included herein is [the follow-
ing]: the sky, the planets, the four elements (al-‘anasir al-
arba‘a) and all of the metals (ma‘adin).
Then these are the divisions of the substances.
The majority of the speculative theologians are of the
view that all the determined substances (al-jawahir al-mu-
tamayyiza) are a single genus. However, they differ in their
accidents (a‘rad) since the body has a single quiddity (ma-
hiyya wahida) which is by nature space-occupying (muta-

354 the standard of knowledge

hayyiz) and composite (mu’talif). [The body’s] being alive
means: The subsistence of knowledge (qiyam al-‘ilm) and
life in it.
The philosophers say: These substances (jawahir) are dif-
ferent in themselves with the differing of their definitions.
The attributes (sifat) that constitute the [substances] are
configurations (hay’at) of the things (ashya’) which with the
change of its quiddity the answer to ‘What is it?’ is changed.
This necessitates divergence (ikhtilaf) in the verification
(tahqiq) of the essence.
Verifying the truth in both schools of thought (i.e. of the
scholastic theologians and philosophers) is not our objec-
tive. Rather our objective is demonstrating the meaning of
the substance and it divisions.
It is time now to speak about ‘quantity (kammiyya)’ and
‘measurable dimension (miqdar).’

Quantity (al-kam)
Know that quantity (kamm) is an accident (‘arad) and is an
outward expression (‘ibara) of the meaning which accepts
divisibility (tajazzu’), coextensiveness (musawat) and dis-
similarity (tafawut) to its essence (dhat).
Coextensiveness (musawat), dissimilarity (tafawut), and
divisibility (tajazzu’) are of the concomitants of quantity. If
something else is concomitant then it is through its medi-
ation not insofar the essence of that other thing.
[p.308] [Quantity] is divided into: Conjunctive quantity
(al-kamm al-muttasil) and disjunctive quantity (al-kamm
al-munfasil).
As for the conjunctive (muttasil), it is every measurable
dimension (miqdar) for which exists for its parts (ajza’)
a common definition (hadd mushtarak) whose two terms

book four 355

(tarafahu) meet at it (yatalaqa ‘indahu) like the dot for the
line and the line for the surface (sath). The now (alana) is a
demarcator (fasil) of past and future time.
The conjunctive is divided into [two parts] ‘that which
possesses denotation (wad‘)’ and ‘that which does not (ma
laysa bi-dhi wad‘).’
That possessing denotation is whose parts are in con-
junction, [possess] stability (thabat) and concomitance (ta-
sawuq) in existence together such that each of the two can
be indicated by: ‘Where is it from the other? (ayna huwa
min al-akhar)’
From that is what accepts division in only a single aspect
like the line.
From it is what receives constitutions (qawa’im) in two
distinct aspects (jihatayn mutaqati‘atayn). It is the surface
(sath).
From it is what receives constitutions (qawa’im) in all
of them. It is the body.
The place (makan) is also possessing of denotation
(wad‘) because it is the interior surface of a containing [sur-
face] (al-sath al-batin min al-hawi). It surrounds the con-
tained (mahwi). Therefore, it is its place (makan).
A group say: the place of water from the vessels (aniya)
is the space (fada’) which is measured as an absolutely void
space (khala’ sirf) should the water depart from it and
another does not take its place.
This also, according to the speaker, is the totality of the
conjunctive quantity (al-kamm al-muttassil). It is a measur-
able dimension (miqdar) which accepts division (inqisam),
coextensiveness (musawat), and dissimilarity (tafawut).
As for time (zaman), it is the measurable dimension of
movement (haraka) except that it does not possess denota-

356 the standard of knowledge

tion (laysa lahu wad‘) since there is no existence to its con-
stituent elements together even if it should have conjunc-
tivity (ittisal) since its past an its future are defined by the
term ‘the now (alana).’
[p.309] As for the disjunctive (munfasil), it is that whose
parts do not have an equivocal thing (shay’ mushtarak) at
which its both terms meet like ‘number (‘adad)’ and ‘speech
(qawl).’ For example, the parts of the [number] ‘ten’ are not
in conjunction with each other. Should you place five on
one side and five on the other, there is no equivocal term
(hadd mushtarak) which functions like the dot of a line and
‘the now (alana)’ of time.
The statements (aqawil) also are among the totality of
what is related to quantity (kammiyya). Everything that is
possible to measure with one of its parts possesses measure-
ments (aqdar) since ten is measured: with one ten times,
and two five times. There is not a number which is not es-
timated with one of its parts. Likewise with time, the hour
measures night and day. With night and day the month is
measured and with the month, the year.
These matters function like the cubits (adhru‘) of lengths
(atwal). Likewise, the statements (aqawil) are measured by
one of their parts. Likewise, the accident (‘arad) is measured
since with it correspondence (muwazana), coextensiveness
(musawat), unity (wahda), and dissimilarity (tafawut) are
measured.
These are the divisions of quantity.

Saying concerning Quality (kayfiyya)

What is meant by it is the dispositions (hay’at) with which

questioner’s question about singular individuals (ahad al-
ashkhas): ‘How is he?’ is answered.

book four 357

 We have been cautious with the individuals against the
differentia (fusul). That reminds [one] of the question con-
cerning the discrimination (mumayyiz) of the thing: ‘With
what thing is it? (bi-ayyi shay’ huwa)’
On the whole, it is an expression of every disposition
fixed (hay’a qarra) in the body in which the consideration
of their existence in [the body] does not necessitate a rela-
tionship (nisba) with [what is] external to the body nor a
relationship which occurs in its parts (ajza’).
These two differentia (faslan) are for a precaution
against the relation (idafa) and the denotation (wad‘) as will
be forthcoming.
Then this ‘quality (kayfiyya)’ can be divided into what
is specific to the ‘quality’ from the aspect of what is ‘quality’
(min jihat ma huwa kam)238 like quadrature (tarbi‘) for the
surface (sath).
And straightness for a line, singularity for a number, and
so for even [numbers].
As for that which is not specific to ‘quality,’ it is divided
into sensible (mahsus) and non-sensible (ghayr mahsus).
As for the sensible it is that by which the sensible is af-
fected (yanfa‘ilu ‘anhu). That is it produces (yuhdith) in it
traces of the [particular circumstances] [p.310] like colour,
taste, hotness, coldness, etc. which affect the five senses.
That which is firmly rooted from the whole of that is
called ‘passive qualities (kayfiyyat infi‘aliyya) like the yel-
lowness of gold and the sweetness of honey. That which is
quick to dissipate like the blushing from [experiencing] em-

238
Concerning the conceptual qualifier (min jihat…), see Sari Nusseibeh,
Avicenna’s Shifa’. Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2018, p. 258.

358 the standard of knowledge

barrassment and yellowness239 due to fear is called passivity
(infi‘al).
As for the non-sensible, it is divided into predisposition
(isti‘dad) for another matter and into perfection which is
not predisposed to other than it.
As to predisposition, it is for constitution (muqawama).
Passivity is called a natural faculty (quwwa tabi‘iyya)
like salubriousness,240 firmness, the faculty of memory
(quwwat al-dhakira), and wrestling (musara‘a).
If there was a predisposition (isti‘dad) to difficulty of ac-
tion (‘usr al-fi‘l) and ease of passivity (suhulat al-infi‘al), it
is called ‘weakness (da‘f)’; that is the negation of power like
chronic illness (mimradiyya) and softness (lin).
A difference exists between health and salubriousness.
A salubrious person may not be healthy and a chroni-
cally ill person may be healthy.
As for the perfections (kamalat) which is not possible
for them to be pre-disposed (isti‘dad) to another perfection
(kamal) and are imperceptible in themselves like knowledge
and health, what is quickly dissipating from among them
is called: ‘states’ like the anger of one possessing forebear-
ance and the illness of the salubrious person. That which is
enduring (thabit) is called ‘habitus (malaka)’ like knowl-
edge and health. I mean enduring knowledge with long
practice save for the sciences of the self-acquired sciences
(al-‘ulum al-shada)241 which are threatened with disappear-
ing. Knowledge is a non-sensible quality of the soul.
239
The text has safwa instead of safra which is clearly an error.
240
Concerning the natural faculty see for instance Ibn Sina, Deliverance (trans.
Ahmed), p. 122.
241
Corrected to ‘al-shada’ from ‘al-shadi’ which has the meaning of polite lit-
erature and guiding oneself through the acquisition of knowledge. Lane, Lexicon,
4:1521.

book four 359

 Saying concerning the possessive construction (idafa)

It is the meaning whose existence in the syllogism is to

another thing which does not exist at all like ‘fatherhood
(al-ubuwwa) in syllogistic relationship (bi’l-qiyas) to son-
ship (bunuwwa) not like the father who has an existence
(wujud) which is specific to him (yakhussuhu) like ‘hu-
manity (insaniyya)’ for instance.
[p.311] This meaning is distinguished from the quality
(kayf) and quantity (kam); there is no concealing it.
Therefore, this is its origin (asl).
As for its divisions, they are divided according to the rest
of the intelligibles (maqulat) in which the relationship
(idafa) is displayed.
It is displayed to the substances and the accidents.
If it is displayed to the substances (jawahir), [the follow-
ing] occur from it: father and son, master and slave, and
the like.
If it is displayed in the quantity (kam), [the following]
occur from it: small, large, few, many, half, double and the
likes of it.
If it is displayed in the quality (kayfiyya), [the following]
come from it: habitus (malaka), the state (hal), the sense
(hiss), the sensible (mahsus), knowledge (‘ilm) and that
which is known (ma‘lum).
If it is displayed in the ‘where (ayna),’ [the following]
appear from it: above (fawqa), below (asfal), front (qud-
dam), beneath (that), right (yamin), and left (shimal).
If it is displayed in the ‘when (mata)’ [the following]
occur from it: quick (sari‘), slow (bati’), prior (mutaqad-
dim) and posterior (muta’akhkhir).
Likewise the rest of the intelligibles (maqulat). They are

360 the standard of knowledge

divided in another aspect into:

That in which the name of the relatum (mutadayi-

fayn) differs like: father (ab), son (ibn), master
(mawla), and slave (‘abd).
That in which the name is concordance in both of
them like: the brother (akh) with the brother (akh)
and the friend (sadiq) with the neighbour (jar).
[p.312] That in which the structure of the name
differs along with unifying with that from which is
derived from it like: the owner (malik) and the owned
(mamluk), the scholar (‘alim) and that which is
learned (ma‘lum) and the sensing (hassas) and the
sensed object (mahsus).
As long as the annexed (mudaf) is not present by virtue
of it being annexed, the possessive construction (idafa) is
invalid. Therefore, the father is a human. It is an expression
of his being a person, not annexed but rather indicates its
adding the expression ‘father.’
The signifier of the expression indicating annexation is
the equipollence of both sides, for the ‘father’ is a father of
a ‘son’, and the ‘son’ is a son of ‘father’.
If it is said: The ‘father’ is a father to a human being, it
is not possible to say: The human being is a human being
for the father.
If it is said: ‘The place is a place for the possessor of the
place (dhi al-makan),’ it is possible for you to say: ‘The pos-
sessor of the place possesses a place in the place’ so long as
the possessor of the place (which is one of the two relatum)
is a proper name (ism khass) just as you say by ‘the hand’
to the hand and ‘possesses the hand’ to one who possesses

book one 361

the hand and ‘with the hand (bi’l-yad).’ If we should say:
The place is a place for the sailing vessel (zawraq), [the
order of both expressions] is not reversible (lam yanqalib)
since not every sailing vessel has a place. Therefore, the ori-
gin of the relation (mudaf ilayhi (lit. the thing added), is not
mentioned and contains the expression which indicates the
possessive construction.
Should you say: ‘The hand is the person’s hand,’ it is not
possible for you to say: ‘The person is a person for the
hand.’ Rather it should be said: The hand is for the posses-
sor of the hand until it is transformed by way of equipol-
lence (takafu’).
Among the conditions for equipollence (takafu’) is for
the union of the direction of the possessive construct (wijhat
al-idafa) until they are all apprehended (yu’khadh) in actu
or all in potentia, otherwise it would be thought that one
of them would possess priority over the other.
Among the specific qualities of the possessive construct
is if one of the annexed [elements] is known actualised with
it (muhassalan bihi), the other is also known thus. The
existence of one of them is with the existence of the other,
neither before nor after.
Perhaps it is probable (yuzann) that knowledge (‘ilm)
and ‘that which is known (ma‘lum)’ are not equal. Rather
that which is known is prior to knowledge, not so. Rather
knowledge is a similitude of that which is known by its
being known with the existence of knowledge in itself and
the essence being knowledge without order, except for
what is known and what is perceived to exist in potentia
not in actu. Therefore, [that which is known] precedes
knowledge in actu but not in potentia.

362 the standard of knowledge

 Saying concerning ‘where (al-ayna)’

What is intended by it is the relationship of the substance

to its place in which it is like your saying concerning the
question: ‘Where is Zayd?’ that he is in the suq or at home.
[p.313] We do not mean by it that ‘where (ayna)’ is the
house. Rather what is understood from our saying: ‘in the
house’ is the accident (‘arad) to it.
Every body (jism) has a ‘where (ayna).’ However, some
of them are manifest (bayyin) like the person, [who] is one
for the world. Some of them are known through allegorical
interpretation (ta’wil) like for all the world. Therefore, it
has ‘where’ based on allegorical interpretation (ta’wil).
Every body has a specific obscure ‘where’ (ayn khass
gharib) and equivocal ‘wheres’ (aynat mushtaraka) which
include it. Some are smaller than each other and closer to
the first like ‘Zayd, he is in the house.’ His near ‘where’ is
the air [pocket] which surrounds him and meets the surface
of his body, then the city, then the populated areas
(ma‘mur) of the earth (ard). This is why it is said: He is in
the house, in the city, in the populated areas, on earth, and
in the world (‘alam).
As for the types of ‘where (ayna),’ among them is
‘where’ in its essence and ‘where’ that is annexed (mudaf).
As for ‘where’ in its essence, like our saying: ‘in the house’
and ‘in the suq.’
As for ‘where’ that is annexed, it is like: ‘above,’ ‘below,’
‘right,’ ‘left,’ ‘around,’ ‘intermediate,’ ‘what is between,’
‘what follows,’ ‘next to,’ ‘with,’ ‘over,’ and the like of that.
However, the body does not have ‘where’ that is an-
nexed if it does not have ‘where’ in its essence. What is
‘above’ is inevitable and for it to have ‘where’ in its essence.

book four 363

If the meaning of its being is ‘above’, it is a ‘temporal above-
ness (fawqiyya zamaniyya).’

Saying concerning ‘when (mata)’

It is the relationship of the thing to the restricted time which

accompanies its existence and whose extremities (nihayat)
correspond with the extremity of its existence (nihayat wu-
judihi) or a definite time of which this time is a part. Gen-
erally: It is what is said in the answer to [the question]
‘when.’
The definite time is defined according to: (1) its distance
from the now (alana) either in the past or future. That is
through a common name (ism mashhur) like your saying:
yesterday, the day before yesterday, tomorrow, next year,
and a century, or to (2) a well-known historical event after
‘the now (alana),’ like your saying: during the period (‘ahd)
of the Companions [of the Prophet] and the time (waqt) of
the [Prophet’s] Emigration [to Yathrib].
The definite time is either primary to it or secondary to
it. Its primary time is what envelopes its existence. The [des-
ignation of] non-disjunctive (ghayr munfasil ‘anhu) is con-
sistent with it.
Its secondary time is the supreme definite time (al-zaman
al-mahdud al-a‘zam) of which the extremity of the first is
a part of it, like [p.314] for the war to be in six hours on
the day of…the month of … in the year. Those six hours
are the primary time that is consistent.242
The day, the month, and the year are secondary times
(azmina thawanin) which are relative (tudafu ilayha) by vir-

242
This is real time (al-mata al-haqiqi).

364 the standard of knowledge

tue of the its time being a part of it. Therefore, it is said: A
war broke out in such-and-such year.243
The concurrence (musawaqa) of time to a thing’s exist-
ence is not time being antecedent to it. By ‘musawiq’ we
mean coextensive. That could be with the extremities of a
divisible time.
The measure (miqdar) is an answer to the questioner
about ‘How many? (bi-kam)’ as is said: How many [years]
(i.e. how long) did so-and-so live? Then it is said: one
hundred years. Therefore, time is the measure (miqdar).
If it is said: For how long (kam) did the war last? Then
it is said: For one year. Therefore, this is in full concordance
(mutabiq), not an antecedent (muqaddim). That in full con-
cordance (mutabiq) may be extended (mumtadd). How-
ever, it is not a condition of it to be extended. A condition
of antecedent time (al-zaman al-muqaddam) is extension
(imtidad) and division (inqisam).

Saying concerning position (wad‘)

It is an expression of the being of the body such that a re-

lationship [with the following qualities exists] for its parts,
some of them with some: inclination (inhiraf), correspon-
dence (muwazana), and modes (jihat). The parts (ajza’) of
the place if in a place which carries it, like standing (qiyam),
sitting (qu‘ud), lying down (idttija‘), and lie flat (inbitah),
this difference is due to a change in the relationship of the
[body] parts. The leg is distanced from the thigh in stand-
ing, and in sitting they both come together. If [the body]
should extend both its legs to lie down, the position of its

243
This is figurative time (al-mata al-majazi).

book four 365

parts is like the [body’s] position if it should stand up.
However, relative to the mode and place, [the position]
differs if the head is upright above the leg which is not the
case with lying down.
However, whenever a person should walk, the position
does not change for him, but the place does. ‘Position’ is
not [equal to] changing the place (tabaddul al-makan).
The position might be for the body relative to its essence
(dhat) like the parts of a person. If [the body] is not the
body of another, the position (wad‘) of its parts would be
intelligible (ma‘qul). [The position] might be relative to
another body. That is in its ‘where’ which affirms it in re-
lationship to ‘above,’ ‘beneath,’ ‘right,’ ‘intermediate,’ etc.
When the places are of two types: [p.315] A type in the
essence and a type in the relationship, the position also be-
comes two types.
However, the thing does not a have a relative postion
(wad‘ bi’l-idafa) if it does not have a position in its essence.
When the place in his essence which is not relative is of
two types: A type which is primary and proper (awwal
khass) to the body, then its position is sometimes analogous
(bi’l-qiyas) to its primary and proper place and sometimes
to its secondary place which is common to it and another
and [that place’s] horizons. Every person has a position vis-
à-vis the two poles for instance and the horizons. Every part
of the sky has a [corresponding] position to the parts of the
eath in every situation. With [the earth’s] movement the
position only changes, not the place.

366 the standard of knowledge

 Saying concerning the accident which is expressed
through ‘for it (lahu)’
It might be called ‘possession (jida).’244 When there is like
this with ‘moving,’ ‘bearing a weapon,’ and ‘wearing a Per-
sian mantle,’ ‘for it (lahu)’ does not acquire a meaning ex-
cept that it is the relationship of the body to the body which
corresponds to all of its simple [forms] or some of what co-
incides (muntabaq) is transferred with what is surrounded
by it to that which coincides with it.
Then from [for it (lahu)] is what is natural like skin to
an animal or foor to a turtle. There is also what is voluntary
like a shirt to a person. As for water in the vessel, it is not
like this since the vessel is not transferred with the water
being transferred, but rather it is vice versa. That relation-
ship is not included among these categories (maqulat) but
rather under the category of ‘the now (al-ayna).’ God
knows best.

[p.316] Saying concerning ‘to do (an yaf‘ala)’

It means the relationship of the substance (jawhar) to a
matter existing of it in something else, not subsisting in the
essences. But rather it continues to be renewed like: heating,
defining, and cutting.
Coldness, hotness and cutting which occur with ice and
fire and the hot things in other than it, have a relationship
to its causes (asbab) with whoever is convinced of the
causes in existence (asbaban fi al-wujud).
That relationship on the part of the cause (min janib al-
sabab) is expressed by ‘to do (an yaf‘ala)’ if it is said: to

244
Text has been corrected from ‘jidda’ to ‘jida.’

book four 367

heat up, to cool down. The meaning of ‘heat up’ is to make
heat and the meaning of ‘cool down’ is to make cold.
Therefore, it is this relationship that is expressed with these
expressions.
One may believe that calling that a verb is a metaphor,
if he sees the action a metaphor for all that has no will to
choose. However, with that he does not deny that relation-
ship for which his [following] saying is believed: The fire
heated it. Therefore, that relationship is a genus of the ac-
cidents (jins min al-a‘rad) which is expressed with a verb
or something else. Thus, there is no impediment in the ex-
pressions.

Saying concerning passivity (infi‘al)

It is the relationship of the changed substance to the chang-
ing cause (al-sabab al-mughayyir). Every passive thing
(munfa‘il) is from an agent (fa‘il). Every thing heated or
cooled is from something that heats or cools with the judge-
ment of the general custom (‘ada muttarida) with the ad-
herents of the truth (ahl al-haqq), and with the judgement
of the necessity of the natural disposition (jibilla) in the
understanding of the Mu‘tazilites and philosophers.
In general passivity is change (taghayyur) which may be
from particular circumstances (kayfiyya) to particular cir-
cumstances like the hair changing from black to white , for
it has been changed gradually by getting older, and changed
it from black to white, little by little, gradually.
Also [it is] like water turning hot from cold. When water
heats up the coldness is removed little by little and heat is
created in it little by little, in conjunction (‘ala al-ittisal) ex-
cept if its paths are cut off; [p.317] then it stops. At every
pause it is in one state which departs from what is before it

368 the standard of knowledge

and what is after it. Its condition is not stable at the time
of procession (suluk).
Generally, there is no difference between your saying: to
be affected (yanfa‘ilu) and your saying: to be changed (ya-
taghayyaru).
The types of change are many. They are exactly the types
of being affected (infi‘al).
Therefore, these are the high genera (al-ajnas al-‘aliya)
of all the existents.
The custom is to limit them to these ten [categories].
If it said: Was this limiting acquired through imitation
of the early scholars (mutaqaddimin) or is there a demon-
strative proof (burhan) for it?
We say: Imitation (taqlid)245 is the affair of the blind.
The purpose of this book is for the ways of demonstrative
proof to be cultivated with it. Therefore, how is it possible
to convince of it with [blind] acceptance? Rather it is fixed
through demonstrative proof.
Its manner (wajh) is that this limiting contains claims
(da‘awa):
The first of which is that this ten is present [categories].
This is known through experience (mushahada) of the in-
tellect and the senses as we detailed.
The other is that there is none apart from it in existence.
That is known through everything which the intellect per-
ceives that is not void of the following: substance (jawhar)
or accident (‘arad).
Every substance (jawhar) has an expression (‘ibara) ap-
plied to it or encompasses a thought. Therefore, it is poss-
ible to insert it under this totality (jumla).

245
Taqlid is blind acceptance of authority.

book four 369

 As to it not being possible to restrict it to nine [cat-
egories], the way of knowing it is for you to know the dis-
sonance (tabayun) of these divisions with what we men-
tioned concerning their differing. Then knowledge of these
claims is complete with this totality (jumla).
Yes, it is not remote for the theoretician (nazir) to doubt
the aspect of the difference (mubayana) of a division to a
division until the aspect of difference between the pure
relative (idafa mahda) and the relationship to the place
(nisba ila al-makan) or passivity (infi‘al) is unclear in his
mind. [This is because] these matters also contain a rela-
tionship (nisba). However, there is something behind the
relationship. If he should look closely, then dissonance (ta-
bayun) would appear to him.
Likewise, it is not remote to puzzle over an accident
(‘arad) that it is from this division or that as a theoretician
puzzles over the difference between the relationship of the
substance (jawhar) to its place (makan) and between the re-
lationship of the substance by way of juxtaposition (mu-
hadhat).
That is presented in such a way as to be an attribute and
its being in the place (makan) such that [p.318] it is relative
and it does not have a name which indicates it in so far as
that attribute is concerned without a relationship until it is
assigned (yutakallafa) the name ‘the where (al-ayna)’ and
the name ‘when (mata)’ is created for an occurrence in time.
However much its name indicates it in so far as it is
relative (mudaf), and is the one which made its name indi-
cate it in so far as it is a description, it opposed this doubt.
This is negligence (taqsir) from the one who created the
names.
Likewise it might be displayed in this that the name of a

370 the standard of knowledge

genus (ism jins) indicates it in the sense it is relative and the
names of its species (anwa‘) indicate in so far as they are
attributes (sifat), not in so far as they are relative. There-
fore, it is thought that the genus is a relation (idafa). It is
wondrous that the genus might be from the category
(maqula) of the correlative (mudaf), and the species (naw‘)
from another category (maqula). Its cause is what we men-
tioned.
If there is equivocation in the condensation (takathuf)
and the rarefication (takhalkhul), that it is from the cat-
egory of particular circumstances (kayfiyya) or from the
category of denotation (wad‘), and doubt spread widely
from the equivocity of the name here. ‘Rarefication (tak-
halkhul)’ means to separate the parts of the body from each
other so that foreign bodies from this or another can in-
tervene in them.
‘Condensation (takathuf)’ means the close proximity of
the parts by becoming compact until the air they contain is
pressed out. Then it flows from its openings and its parts
come together and touch.

[p. 319] Second Aspect (fann)

Concerning the division of existence
with its essential accidents into its types and states

Like [existence] being a principle (mabda’), a cause (‘illa),

and an effect (ma‘lul).
[Also] it is [divided] into what is in potentia (bi’l-
quwwa) and what is in actu (bi’l-fi‘l).
Pre-eternal (qadim) and temporally created (hadith).
Before (qabl) and after (ba‘d).
Prior (mutaqaddim) and posterior (muta’akhkhir).

book four 371

 Universal (kulli) and particular (juz’i).
The complete (tamm) and the deficient (naqis).
The singular (wahid) and the many (kathir).
The necessary (wajib) and the possible (mumkin).
These accidents (‘awarid) are confirmed for the existence
(wujud) in so far it is existent (mawjud) not in so far as it
is another thing more specific than it like it being a body,
an accident or other than them both.

Saying concerning division into cause and effect

and describing the existent with it being a principle
(mabda’) and a cause (‘illa)
The principle is a name for that whose existence in itself is
complete (istatamma wujuduhu fi nafsihi) either from its
essence or from something else.
Then the existence of another thing occurs from it which
constitutes it. This is called a cause (‘illa) in relationship to
what is a principle (mabda’) of it. Then it must be either
like the part from the effect, e.g. wood and the image of a
bed to a bed or it is not like the part.
[Concerning] that which is like the part, the effect in actu
may not be necessary from its existence. It is called an ‘el-
ement (‘unsur)’ like wood for the bed. It might be necessary
from its existence undoubtedly the existence of the effect
(ma‘lul) [p. 320] in actu. It is the image of the bed. The el-
ement (‘unsur) is called a material cause (‘illa qabiliyya) and
the image is called a formal cause (‘illa suwariyya).
That which is not like the part (juz’) is divided into that
which is distinct to the effect (mubayin lil-ma‘lul) and in-
trinsic (mulaq).
The intrinsic (mulaq) is divided into: ‘that which acquires
a description (sifa) from the effect and is described by it,’

372 the standard of knowledge

which is like the subject to the accident since it is said: sub-
ject, hot, cold, black, and white, and into ‘that which is
opposite of it;’ that is the effect acquires the description from
the cause. Therefore, the effect is described by the cause. It is
like the form of ‘waterness’ to the equivocal matter (madda
mushtaraka) between water and air upon conversion. That
which is equivocal is called ‘hyle (hayula).’ It is incontestable
to apply this name and replace it.
As for that which is distinct (mubayin), it is divided into
[the following]:
That from which existence comes about. Existence is not
for the sake of it (laysa li-ajlihi). It is the efficient cause (‘illa
fa‘iliyya) like the carpenter to the bed.246
That to which the effect owes its existence is the end
cause (al-‘illa al-gha’iyya),247 like the utility (suluh) for sit-
ting to chair and bed.
The first cause (al-‘illa al-ula) is the end (ghaya) without
which the carpenter would not have become a carpenter.
It being a cause is antecedent (sabiqa) to the rest of the
causes since with it the causes became causes. Its existence
is posterior to the existence of the whole (wujud al-kull).
The prior (mutaqaddim) is its causality (‘illiyya).

246
For an explanation of the different types of cause, see Andreas Lammer, The
Elements of Avicenna’s Physics: Greek Sources an Arabic Innovations. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2018, pp. 162-164. Also see Jon McGinnis,
‘Ibn Sina’s Natural Philosophy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL:
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/ibn-sina-natural/;
Kara Richardson, ‘Causation in Arabic and Islamic Thought’, The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/arabic-islamic-causation/.
(Section 2.3)
247
Ibn Sina, Deliverance (Ahmed trans.), p. 127.

book four 373

 [p.321] The cause is eternally (abadan) more nobler than
the recipient (qabil) since the agent (fa‘il) is beneficial and
the recipient is the benefitting (mustafid).
Then the cause might be in the essence (dhat), in the ac-
cident (‘arad), in potentia (bi’l-quwwa), in actu (bi’l-fi‘l), in
close proximity (qariba), [or] far (ba‘ida). Examples of it
were previously [mentioned].

Saying concerning division into that which is

in potentia and in actu

The name ‘potentiality (quwwa)’ may be applied to another

meaning. Therefore, there is ambiguity about ‘potentiality’
which is opposite ‘actuality (fi‘l).’ Then let its proof be pres-
ented:
It is said: Potentiality (quwwa) is the principle of change
(mabda’ al-taghyir) either in the passive thing (munfa‘il),
which is the passive power (al-quwwa al-infi‘aliyya), or in
the active thing (alt. agent) (fa‘il), which is the efficient
power (al-quwwa al-fi‘liyya).
It is said of what it contains that action or passivity is
permitted from the thing.
And with what it contains the thing constitutes the
other.
With what it contains the thing either becomes changing
or fixed. Changing is not without weakness (da‘f).
[p.322] The power of the passive thing may be limited
and oriented toward a single specific thing like the potential
of water to accept the form (shakl) without preserving it
which is opposite the wax which contains the power of ac-
ceptance and preservation together.
The thing might contain the passive power in relation-

374 the standard of knowledge

ship to the two contraries like the wax’s acceptance of heat-
ing and cooling.
Likewise, the power of the agent is oriented toward a
single specific thing like the power of fire to burning only.
It might be oriented toward many things like the power
of those who choose different matters.
A thing may contain a disposition (isti‘dad) for things,
however some through the intermediary of others like the
potentiality of cotton to accept the form of spinning and
the state of being a garment (thawbiyya).
The theoretician (nazir) may make an error in the ex-
pression ‘potentiality’ and become confused by this mean-
ing with the potentiality which is mentioned opposite the
actuality.
The difference between them both is apparent from [a
number] of aspects:
First, the potentiality which is opposite the actuality
reaches its limit when the thing becomes actual. The other
power remains present if it is in an active state.
Second, [concerning] the active power (quwwa fa‘ila),
only the mover principle (al-mabda’ al-muharrik) is de-
scribed with it. With the second power, the passive thing
(amr munfa‘il) is mainly described.
Third, the action which is opposite the active power
means: Relationship of change, or being (kawn) or [certain]
movement to a principle which is passive in [this relation-
ship].
The action which is opposite the other power is used to
describe everything from the likes of the acquired existents
(al-mawjudat al-hasila) if it is:
Passivity (infi‘alan) or a state (halan).
Non-action (la fi‘lan) and non-passivity (la infi‘alan)

book four 375

 If it is said your saying: ‘The thing in potentia, not in
actu is summed up a disposition for the thing and accept-
ance of its locus (mahall),’ this is understood.
As for the other power, which is the active (fa‘ila), like
the power of fire to burn, how does one who has not seen
fire burn acknowledge it? Truly God the Exalted created
burning when cotton and fire come together, for example,
with the judgement of God the Exalted’s habitual course?
[p.323] We said: Our objective concerning what we have
mentioned is to explain the meaning of the name, not to
verify the existence of the named. We have warned about
the aspect of realising the truth of it in Precipitance of the
Philosophers.
The objective is for one of them not to be confused by
the other if one who believes that employs both of them.

Saying about the divisions of the existent into

pre-eternal, temporally created, before and after

As for the pre-eternal it is an equivocal name between the

pre-eternal according to essence and between pre-eternal
according to time.
That which is according to time has no beginning to the
time of its existence. As for the one according to essence, it
is the one whose essence does not have a principle, and
cause with which it is existent.
The true well-known [one] is the first one. The second
is as if it is borrowed from the first and is as if it is figurative
(majaz). This is from the traits designated by the philos-
ophers.
In this equivocity a temporal event is equivocal also.
There the temporal event is according to time. It is that

376 the standard of knowledge

whose time of existence has a beginning (ibtida’). According
to essence, its essence has a principle (mabda’) through
which it exists.
The world according to the philosophers is a temporal
creation according to the second sense and pre-eternal ac-
cording to the first.
The creator (sani‘) of the world is pre-eternal according
to both interpretations together.
[p.324] The [philosophers’] calling the world temporally
created (hadith) with its casuistry (ta’awwal) is purely figu-
rative (majaz mahd) since it is the understanding existing
after it did not exist. The world in their view was not
brought into being after it was not.
Among their interpretations (ta’wilat) is their saying:
The world has a relationship to the nature of existence and
a relationship to non-existence (‘adam). Existence occurs
to it (i.e. the world) not from its essence but rather from
something apart from it. Should we estimate the absence of
that other, from its essence there would be non-existence
(‘adam).
A thing does not possess from its essence beforeness in
essence (qabliyya bi’l-dhat) before it does not possess [any-
thing] from something else. Therefore, non-existence for it
is before existence. Therefore, this is allegorical interpre-
tation (ta’wil).
It is a constraint (takalluf) from the words in applying
the expression [temporally created]. One cannot deny to
them abandoning the expression ‘temporally created (ha-
dith)’ until they charge for themselves a manner (wajh)
to apply the expression. Rather they are to be rebuked
for abandoning belief in the locus of temporal creation (ma-
hall al-huduth) and that the existence of the world is not

book four 377

preceded by nothingness. If that is not believed, then the
names are insufficient and incontestable (la mushaha fiha).
It is astonishing that they say: With the belief in the tem-
poral creation of the world we are more appropriate (awla),
we say: The effect (ma‘lul) is a temporal creation in every
time. The description of its temporal creation in it is fixed
(thabit) in their view for all eternity and with you in one
state.
If what is understood from temporal creation is what
[the philosophers] mentioned, then it is more deserving of
it except that the understanding of temporal creation is
what we mentioned and what they had denied and applied
the expression to something else which continues in all
times.
The way of annulling it is what we mentioned in Pre-
cipitance of the Philosophers.
As for ‘before,’ it is an equivocal name for the disputa-
tions (muhawarat) of the speculative theologians and the
masses since what is applied and desired is ‘beforeness by
nature (al-qabliyya bi’l-tab‘),’ as it is said: One is before
two. That is in everything. It is not possible for the other to
exist except if it is existent and it to be existent and the
other non-existent.
Therefore, its existence is not possible without the other
since it is before the other. That ‘other’ may be called ‘after
(ba‘d)’ as if it is metaphorical (musta‘ar) and figurative
(majaz). Rather the famous apparent ‘beforeness’ is the
temporal ‘beforeness’ (al-qabliyya al-zamaniyya) and its af-
fair is visible.
It is said ‘before’ for priority in rank (al-taqddum bi’l-
martaba) like the priority of genus over species in relation-
ship to the highest genus (al-jins al-a‘la).

378 the standard of knowledge

 [p.325] It might be in relationship to something particu-
lar, as it is said: The first row is before the second row, if
the mihrab became that which is related (mansub). If it is
related to the masjid’s door, perhaps the last row would be
described by ‘beforeness.’
‘Before’ might be said of precedence (sharaf) as it is said:
Muhammad, May peace be upon him, is before Moses and
before Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.
‘Before’ might be said of the cause (‘illa) in relationship
to the effect (ma‘lul) bearing that they are both together in
time and that in their being in potentia or in actu they are
equal (yatasawiyan). However, in as much as that one of
them is in existence and not acquired from the other and
the other’s existence is acquired from it, it is prior to it (mu-
taqaddim ‘alayhi).
Should you ponder the state of the prior in all of its
meanings, [the prior] depends on the priority (taqaddum)
having the description (wasf) which is for the posterior (mu-
ta’akhkhir) in every state. The posterior does not have that
except if it is an existent to the prior.

Saying concerning division of the existents

into universal and particular
Know that the universal is an equivocal name which is ap-
plied in two senses:
First, existent in the outer world (al-a‘yan).
Second, existent in the inner-mental realities (adhhan),
not in the outer world (al-a‘yan).
As for the first, it is for the thing that is taken absolutely
(‘ala al-itlaq) without reflection it joined another to itself
and [without] reflection of its abstraction from another,
rather without taking into consideration that it is one. Man,

book four 379

for example, is comprehended (ma‘qul) that he is a certain
reality (haqiqat ma) and that something is made compul-
sory (ulzima) for humanity (insaniyya) and the most cling-
ing (ashadduhu iltisaqan bihi) to [existence]; his state, being
one or many; since he is not conceptualised except thus.
However, the intellect is able to consider absolute humanity
without taking into consideration that it is one or more.
Man in so far as he is man is something and in so far as he
is one or more is something. That being for him is in po-
tentia or in actu is another thing. Man is man only without
another condition at all.
The general or the particular is an additional condition
for whoever is a person. Unity and multiplicity are thus.
Whoever knows the person, knows a single matter.
Whoever knows that the person, who is known, possesses
unity, knows two things:
First of the two: man.
The other: unity
Likewise if he knows multiplicity.
Similarly, if he knows the particular and the general.

[p. 326] All that is additional to the object of knowledge

(ma‘lum).
That is not only so if you imposed these states in actu,
but is thus if you imposed them in potentia.
You impose ‘the absolute man (insan mutlaq)’ in poten-
tia without consideration of unity and multiplicity and im-
pose unity and multiplicity after him. Therefore, in your
understanding ‘humanity (insaniyya)’ and the relationship
of ‘humanity’ to unity or multiplicity occurs.

380 the standard of knowledge

 Imposing unity and multiplicity is additional to the ori-
gin of humanity.
Indeed multiplicity and unity necessitate humanity in
existence inevitably. Not everything that makes something
necessary is in its essence. We know that humanity qua hu-
manity is one or many. There is a difference between our
saying that ‘Humanity does not exist except if it possesses
two states’ and our saying: ‘One of its two states is ‘hu-
manity qua humanity (bi-ma huwa insaniyya).’ It does not
contradict our saying that: ‘Humanity qua humanity is
one.’ Humanity qua humanity is many. Its contradiction is:
Humanity qua humanity is not one.
If it is thus, it is permitted for one or many to exist, but
not in so far as it is humanity.
By universal, it is intended with it absolute humanity (al-
insaniyya al-mutlaqa) which is devoid upon the condition
of unity or multiplicity (ishtirat al-wahda aw al-kathra) or
other than that from the concomitants (lawahiq) that stand
aloof from every consideration except humanity with ne-
gation and confirmation together.
The difference between our saying: ‘Humanity without
another condition’ and our saying: ‘Humanity on the con-
dition that there is not another with it,’ since the latter con-
tains the added condition of negation (ishtirat nafy) and by
the former we mean absoluteness (itlaq) which is definitely
demarcated from what is behind humanity, whether
negative or affirmative.
Therefore, the universal with this meaning is existent in
the outer world (mawjud fi’l-a‘yan). The existence of unity
or multiplicity or other than that from among the concomi-
tants with the person, even if it is not with humanity qua
humanity, since humanity is not external to it in existence,

book four 381

every existent along with something else not in its essence
has a particular existence (wujud yakhussuhu). Another ad-
hering to it does not necessitate negating existence from the
perspective of its essence (min haythu dhatihi).
Humanity upon consideration is existent in actu in par-
ticular individuals (‘ahad al-nas), is predicated on every one
not that it is one in the essence or many. Therefore, that is
not humanity qua humanity.
The second meaning of the universal is humanity for
example on the condition that it is a category (maqula) in
every respect (bi-wajh min al-wujuh) which is dictum de
omni.248 This is not present in the concrete things since it is
impossible for there to exist a single thing which in itself
[p.327] is predicated on every one of the individuals (ahad)
at a single specific moment in time. That is because the ac-
cidents particular to the person of Zayd surround him but
not the accidents of ‘Amr until that very humanity is
brought into existence in ‘Amr and [the person] becomes
that in number exactly.
Perhaps antipathetic accidents (a‘rad muta‘anida) sur-
round him. However, this denotation of him exists in the
intellects in the meaning that if the person of Zayd is prior
in the senses, a trace (athar) occurs in the soul. [The trace]
is an imprint of the form of humanity in it, but it does not
know.
This form which is taken from absolute humanity with-
out consideration of the particular accidents (‘awarid muk-
hassasa) if brought into a relationship with ‘Amr’s

248
The principle that whatever is affirmed or denied of an entire class or kind
may be affirmed or denied in another. See for instance, Richard Patterson, ‘Aris-
totle’s Perfect Syllogism, Predication, and the ‘Dictum de Omni,’’ Synthese 96
(1993), pp. 359-378.

382 the standard of knowledge

humanity, it would truly correspond to it (tabaqathu) in the
sense that if a horse appeared to the senses after him, an-
other trace would temporally occur in the senses. If ‘Amr
had appeared a trace (athar) would not be renewed in the
soul. Rather all the rest of the individual persons whether
in existence or potentiality or whose relationship is equal
to the whole, are equal in that. Therefore, it is called uni-
versal in this sense since its relationship to every one is one.
Therefore, this form has a relationship to one of the in-
dividuals and another to the rest of the forms that are in-
scribed in the soul. When its relationship with one of the
individuals and apart from was one, the example of its co-
inciding (mutabiq) was likewise. Thus it is said: It is uni-
versal and its relationship to the soul and the rest of the
forms in the soul is an individual relationship (nisba shakh-
siyya). Therefore, it is one of the individual forms of knowl-
edge (ahad al-‘ulum) that are inscribed in the soul.
This is what posed a problem for the speculative theo-
logians and about which they expressed themselves in the
present condition (bi’l-hal). They differed in affirming it and
denying it.
A group said: It is neither existent nor non-existent.
A group denied it and found problematic the difference
(iftiraq) and the equivocity between the names since black
and white are equivocal in being a colour (lawniyya) and
are different in a thing. Then how is it that what contains
difference and what contains equivocity are one?
The origin (mansha’) of that is some of them misunder-
standing a belief of his which has an existence in the soul,
non-existent outside, if it established a universal form in the
soul.
Its being universal in this aspect is not in existence. But

book four 383

rather it is established in the outer world (fi’l-a‘yan) in the
first aspect (al-i‘tibar al-awwal).
The meaning of its universality is: homogeneity (tama-
thul) without unity in the existent humanity of Zayd and
the existent humanity of ‘Amr in its being humanity in
number (al-insaniyya bi’l-‘adad).
[p.328] As to examples of it in the soul is the intelligent
[one] to humanity. Therefore, it corresponds a single cor-
respondence with it and to the humanity of Zayd and ‘Amr.
The form in its soul is one and with its unity corresponds
to multiplicity as if in relationship to it is also one; I mean
that multiplicity.
Therefore, this is verification of the meaning of the uni-
versal which is the most obscure of what is perceived (agh-
mad ma yudrak) and the most important of what is sought
since all the perceptibles are a branch for verifying these
meanings. Therefore, it is inevitable that they would be
made clear.
As for the complete and the deficient, what is intended
by them is not the particular and universal.
Rather what is intended by the complete (tamm) is that
for which exists everything that is in its nature to exist for
it and [that which is not a thing] from which it is possible
to exist for it except it is existent for it. [That] is either in
the perfection of existence (kamal al-wujud) or in the active
capacity (quwwa fi‘liyya) or in the passive power (quwwa
infi‘aliyya) or in the quantity (kammiyya).
The deficient is the opposite of (ma yuqabil) the perfect
complete (al-tamm al-kamil).

384 the standard of knowledge

 Saying concerning the division into
One and Many and their concomitants

Know that ‘one’ is a name for something that does not ac-
cept division from the aspect that it is said that it is one.
However, the aspects for which division is prohibited
because of them, affirming unity in relationship to them (i.e.
the aspects), are many.
Among them is what is not divided in the genus. There-
fore, it is one in genus, like our saying: The horse and man
are one in ‘animalness’ since there is no difference between
them except in number, species and accidents. As to ‘ani-
malness,’ there is no difference or division between the both
of them in it.
Among them is what is not divided in species; [therefore
it is one in species], like your saying: The ignorant and the
learned are one in species; that is in humanity.
Among them is what is not divided in ‘common accident
(‘arad ‘amm).’ [Therefore, it is unified in accident, like our
saying: The crow and the mouse are one in blackness.
[p.329] Among them is what is not divided by relation
(bi’l-munasaba). [Therefore, it is one by analogy], like our
saying: The relationship of the king to the city, and the re-
lationship of the intellect to the soul, is one. Among them
is what is not divided in the subject. [Therefore, it is one in
the subject even if it is many in the definition], like our say-
ing: The growing and the withered are one in subject. Like-
wise the smell, taste and colour of the apple converge in a
single subject. Therefore, it is said: These things are one;
that is in subject, not in every aspect.
Among them is that whose meaning is not divided in
number or is divided into common numbers in a thing like

book four 385

the head—it is one from a person. That is it is divided into
parts which mean the head.
Among them is what is not divided by definition (hadd).
That is its reality does not exist for another nor does it have
anything comparable in the perfection of its essence (kamal
dhatihi) like it is said: The sun is one.
The most true of things with the name one is one in
number. Then it is divided into:
1) What contains multiplicity in actu and is one in
composition (tarkib) and conjunction (ijtima‘) like
one house for example.
2) What does not contain multiplicity in actu but in
potentia…like the body qua body. That is it pos-
sesses a continuous corporeal form (sura jismiyya
ittisaliyya).
3) What does not contain multiplicity neither in actu
nor in potentia. It is, every substance in the view
of the philosophers is one and incorporeal (kull
jawhar wahid laysa bi-jism).
The essence of the first and real one (al-awwal al-haqq)
is thus through affinity (bi’l-ittifaq). That is confirmed by
the scholastic theologians for the one singular distinguished
substance. It is not divided nether in potentia nor in actu.
It is one in number.
That which does not accept division neither in potentia
nor in actu is more deserving of the name the unique
(wahid).
Therefore, the meaning understood from multiplicity is
in opposition to singular at every rank.
The absolute multiplicity (al-kathir ‘ala al-itlaq) is plac-
ing the one in opposition to the absolute. It is not one re-

386 the standard of knowledge

garding that in which it is contained. That is it contains one
[thing] which is not alone in it. This is answered through
arithmetic.
The many might be many in relation to [something else]
(bi’l-idafa).
Unity (ittihad) in quality (kayfiyya) is called ‘similarity
(mushabaha).
[p. 330] In quantity (kammiyya) it is called ‘coextensive-
ness (musawat).’
In genus (jins) it is called ‘homogeneity (mujanasa).’
In species (naw‘) it is called ‘similarity (mushakala).’
Unity in the terms [of a syllogism] (atraf) is called ‘con-
gruence (mutabaqa).’
Therefore, from this appears evidence (bayan) of the
meaning of the one in genus (al-wahid bi’l-jins),249 one in
species, one in number, one in accident, and one in coex-
tensiveness.
The totality of the relationships to the one are: similitude
(tashabuh), coextensiveness (musawat), congruence (muta-
baqa), homogeneity (mujanasa), and similarity (musha-
kala).
The types of multiplicity are opposite that.

Saying concerning division of existence

into contingent (mumkin) and necessary (wajib)

Know that the contingent (mumkin) is an equivocal name

that is applied to [different] meanings:

249
For a discussion of oneness, see for instance Damien Janos, ‘Al-Farabi’s (d.
950) On the One and Oneness: Some Preliminary Remarks on Its Structure, Con-
tents, and Theological Implications,’ in Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy,
pp.101–128.

book four 387

 First, it is the general term, expressing what is not pro-
hibited from existing. In accordance with this the necessary
existent (al-wajib al-wujud) is subsumed under it.
The First Truth (al-haqq al-awwal) is contingent (mum-
kin al-wujud); that is existence is not impossible. Things in
this aspect are divided into two parts: impossible (mum-
tani‘), that which is impossible, and contingent (mumkin),
[i.e.] that which is not impossible.
Subsumed under it is: contingent (ja’iz) and necessary
(wajib).
[p.331] Second, the specific position (wad‘ khassi) by
which is intended negation of necessity (salb al-darura) in
existence and non-existence together. It is that whose exist-
ence and non-existence are not impossible. The necessary
does not belong to it (kharaja ‘anhu). That mentioned with
this aspect is [of] three [types]:
That whose existence is impossible (mumtani‘ wujudihi).
That is its non-existence is necessary.
That whose existence is necessary (wajib). That is its
existence is necessary (daruri).
A thing whose existence and non-existence are not
necessary (la daruri fi wujudihi). But rather its relationship
to them both is one. That is what is intended by contingent
(mumkin).
Third, to express a contingent (mumkin) which its exist-
ence is unnecessary in a state of its states. It is more specific
than what preceded. That is like writing to the person, not
like change to the moving. It is necessary (daruri) in the
state of it moving, not like the lunar eclipse which is necess-
ary (daruri) when the earth is between it and the sun. The
numbers in this position are four: necessary (wajib), con-
tingent (mumkin), existent possessing necessity (mawjud

388 the standard of knowledge

lahu darura), and existent not possessing necessity at all
(mawjud la darura lahu al-batta).
Fourth, the non-existent thing is specified (yukhassas) in
a state where its existence in the future is not impossible.
Therefore, ‘contingent (mumkin)’ is said of it. That is it has
existence in potentia and in actu. In accordance with this it
is not said: The world in its state of existence is contingent
(mumkin). But rather it is said: Before its existence it was
contingent.
As to the necessary existent (wajib al-wujud), it is when
that which is imposed out of non-existence is non-extant.
It being impossible follows (lazima).
The necessary existent (wajib al-wujud) is divided into
[two]:
1) What is necessary for its essence.
2) What is necessary for another, not for its essence.
As to what is necessary for its essence, it is that whose
non-existence (‘adam) is impossible for its essence, not by
the imposition of another thing [does] imposing its non-
existence (‘adam) becomes impossible with it.
The world is a necessary existent (wajib al-wujud) how-
ever much we imposed eternal volition (al-mashi’a al-aza-
liyya) which is attached to its existence. However, it became
necessary (sara al-wujub lahu) from volition, not from its
essence (la min dhatihi).
[p.332] Necessity for God is from His essence (min dha-
tihi) not from another.250
Generally, all that its necessity took place through its
existence, it is necessary due to the existence of its cause

250
This notion is known as ‘Aseity.’

book four 389

(sabab) undoubtedly. It remained contingent. Its existence
does not become more probable than its non-existence.
When existence and non-existence are coextensive, it re-
mained non-existent in non-existence. Its existence is sound
due to making necessary its existence and due to its cause
encountering by chance the perfection of what became a
cause for its existence.
From this, many matters are clarified [as follows]:

First, it is impossible to posit something which is a necess-

ary existent through itself and something else together. If
the other thing is removed or its existence is not taken into
consideration, it has to be the case that: 1) Either the necess-
ity of its existence does not remain. Therefore, it is not
necessary for itself (fa-la yakun wajiban li-dhatihi), or 2)
Or it is a necessary existent through itself and its necessity
remains. Therefore, the necessity of its existence is not for
another. That other is superfluous (fadla).

Second, everything that is necessary in existence by virtue

of something else is possible of existence (mumkin al-
wujud) in itself (bi-dhatihi), since by considering its essence,
it is possible of existence, or a necessary existent or non-
existent (mumtani‘ al-wujud).
The last two divisions are invalid (batilan), since if it
were non-existent (mumtani‘ al-wujud) in its essence, an
existence for it would not have been conceptualised in
another.
If it were a necessary existent through itself, it would not
be a necessary existent for another as previously mentioned.
Therefore, it is affirmed that it is possible of existence in
itself.

390 the standard of knowledge

 The outcome is that every thing that is possible in es-
sence is necessary through another (wajib bi-ghayrihi).
Therefore, the possible, if its cause (‘illa) is considered,
and [the cause’s] existence is decreed (quddira), it is necess-
ary of existence.
If the absence of its cause (‘adam ‘illatihi) is decreed,
then it is non-existent.
If its cause is not taken into consideration, not through
considering the void (i.e. the absence)(‘adam) nor the exist-
ence (wujud), it [acquires] in itself the third meaning (al-
ma‘na al-thalith) which is possibility (imkan).
[p.333] Therefore, every contingent (mumkin) is imposs-
ible (mumtani‘) and necessary (wajib); that is impossible
upon decreeing the absence of the cause (‘adam al-‘illa).
Therefore, it is impossible with another not in its essence,
or possible inasmuch as its essence, if its cause is not con-
sidered with it out of negation (nafyan) and affirmation
(ithbatan).
Combining these matters [together] is not contradictory
(mutanaqidan). Rather we add: The impossible is also di-
vided into: Impossible in itself (mumtani‘ li-dhatihi), and
impossible for something else (ghayr). Combining of black-
ness and whiteness is impossible for itself.
The being of negation and affirmation is one thing, true,
and impossible in itself. Imposition of the Resurrection
today and God the Exalted knows that He will not bring it
about today is impossible. However, not because of itself
like the impossibility of combining between whiteness and
blackness. However, because of the previous knowledge of
God that it does not exist and the impossibility of knowl-
edge being ignorance. Its impossibility is due to something
else not to itself.

book four 391

Third: It is not permissible for two things, each of which is
necessary of existence to the other because it is not necess-
ary for the other. It has a cause prior to it in essence not in
time. It is impossible for that which is prior in essence (mu-
taqaddim bi’l-dhat) to be posterior in essence (mu-
ta’akhkhiran bi’l-dhat).
Inasmuch as it is a cause, it is necessary for it to be prior
in essence.
Inasmuch as it is an effect, it is necessary for it to be an-
terior.
That is absurd (muhal) since it is necessary for the thing
to be before that which is before it in essence.

Fourth: The necessary existent in its essence (wajib al-

wujud bi-dhatihi)251 is necessary existent in all its aspects
so that it is not a locus (mahall) of temporal creations
(ahdath), nor change, nor have a delaying will, nor a delay-
ing knowledge, nor an attribute delayed from its existence.
Rather everything that it can possibly have has to be present
in itself,252 [the attributes have to be] posterior to itself. It
is possible for a concomitant (laziman) to be for it and not
be for it. It is due to the fact that it is (yakunu haythu ya-
kunu) for a cause (‘illa) and is negated due to the fact that
is negated because of the absence of that cause (‘illa). There-
fore, its existence in the two states of the absence of that

251
Concerning the ‘Necessary Existent through Himself,’ see Maria De Cillis,
Free Will and Predestination in Islamic Thought: Theoretical compromises in the
Works of Avicenna, al-Ghazali and Ibn ‘Arabi. Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge,
2014, pp. 26-27. Also useful for a discussion of necessity of existence is Robert
Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2003, esp. chaps. 12-14.
252
The first part may be applied to the Aseity of God. Griffel is of the view that
this passage is not Ghazali’s view. He states: ‘In fact, the passage reads much like

392 the standard of knowledge

attribute and its presence is connected to a matter external
to it, either negation or affirmation until its abandoning it
is impossible. Therefore, it is not existent through itself.
Rather its essence is impossible except with that attribute
or its existence.
In the state of existence, the presence of the cause is con-
ditioned and in the state of non-existence, either the absence
of that cause or the presence of a non-existent cause (‘illa
ma‘duma).
[p.334] Its essence is not devoid of making conditional
a thing except its essence so that you can conceptualise that
with the rest of what we explained with it the necessity of
existence (wajib al-wujud).
This is what we wanted to mention from the judgements
of existence and its divisions and to take hold of the reins
of the demonstrative proof in this case since [it would mean
further] elaboration. The position of this book is not to
show the details of these matters, but rather to show the
way to knowledge of the realities of things, introducing the
law of proper reflection, and cultivating the standard of
knowledge (tathqif mi‘yar al-‘ilm) in order to distinguish
between [knowledge] and fancy (khayal) and supposition
(zann) which are near to it.
If happiness in this world and the hereafter cannot be
achieved except by knowledge and good deeds, and real
knowledge is confused with that which is not real; thus be-
cause of it a standard is required. Similarly, the righteous

an analytical and slightly polemical restatement of Avicenna’s position, notwith-

standing that the latter believed that God indeed has a will and would not have
chosen these specific words on knowledge and will. We might assume this passage
is a report rather than al-Ghazali’s own opinion.’ Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical The-
ology, p. 272.

book four 393

deed,253 which is beneficial for the hereafter is confused with
the uncharitable deed, so it requires a balance with which
its reality is perceived. Therefore, we shall compile a book
on The Balance of Action as we have compiled The Stan-
dard of Knowledge. Therefore, we dissociated that book as
a separate book so that people who are not interested in
this book could dedicate themselves to that book (i.e., The
Balance of Action). May God give guidance to those who
examine both books with the eye of intellect, not with the
eye of imitation. He is the Giver of support and direction.
Amen.

End of
The Standard of Knowledge

253
The editor has ‘knowledge (‘ilm)’ which is clearly an error.

394 the standard of knowledge

 isbn 978-9957-635-75-6

the royal islamic strategic studies centre

English Islam Series • Book Number 37