METRO MANILA’S

TRANSPORT CHAOS
METRO MANILA'S
TRANSPORT CHAOS
Copyright © 2023
IBON Foundation, Inc.

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CONTENT
Foreword 1
Preface 5
Introduction 7
Shape of chaos 8
Tangle of issues 17
Saga of nearsighted policymaking 25
So, where are we? 34
 LIST OF ACRONYMS
AADT annual average daily traffic
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BBB Build Build Build
BOT build-operate-transfer
BRT bus rapid system
C circumferential
Cavitex Manila-Cavite Expressway
DBM Department of Budget and Management
DOTC Department of Transportation and Communications
DPWH Department of Public Works and Highways
EDSA Epifanio delos Santos Avenue
EV electric vehicle
GAA General Appropriations Act
GCR Greater Capital Region
GOCC government-owned and controlled corporation
HOV high-occupancy vehicles
HPAAC Healthcare Professionals Alliance Against COVID-19
HPG Highway Patrol Group
HRT heavy rapid transit
IRR implementing rules and regulations
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
JUMSUT JICA Update on Manila Study on Urban Transport
km kilometer
kph kilometer per hour
LEV light electric vehicle
LRT Light Rail Transit
LRTA Light Rail Transit Authority
LRV light rail vehicle
LTFRB Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board
LTO Land Transportation Office
MATES Manila Toll Expressway Systems, Inc.
MCX Manila Calabarzon Express
MRT Metro Rail Transit
MMDA Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
MMETROPLAN Metro Manila Transport, Land Use and Development Planning Project
MMPTPSS Mega Manila Public Transport Planning Support System
MMPTS Mega Manila Public Transport Study
MMTC Metro Manila Transit Corporation
MMUTIP Metro Manila Urban Transport Improvement Project
MMUTIS Metro Manila Urban Transportation Integration Study
MMUTSTRAP Metro Manila Urban Transportation Strategy Planning Project
MOTC Ministry of Transportation and Communications
MPIC Metro Pacific Investment Corporation
MPTC Metro Pacific Tollways Corporation
MUCEP MMUTIS Update and Enhancement Project
NCR National Capital Region
NEDA National Economic and Development Authority
NLEX North Luzon Expressway
OBR organized bus route
ODA official development assistance
OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
OTCA Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency
P2P point-to-point
PCU passenger car unit
PDP Philippine Development Plan
PEATC Public Estates Authority Tollway Corporation
PISTON Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahang Tsuper at Opereytor Nationwide
PNCC Philippine National Construction Corporation
PNP Philippine National Police
PNR Philippine National Railways
PUV public utility vehicle
PWD person with disability
R radial
RBT rail-based transit
RMC route measured capacity
ROW right of way
SCP Service Contracting Program
SLEX South Luzon Expressway
SMC San Miguel Corporation
SOMOCO Skyway Operations and Maintenance Corporation
SUV sports utility vehicle
SWS Social Weather Station
TNVS transport network vehicle service
TOD transit-oriented development
UP University of the Philippines
USAID US Agency for International Development
UTDP (Metro Manila) Urban Transport Development Plan
UTSMMA Urban Transport Study in Manila Metropolitan Area
UV utility vehicle
 LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS
TABLES
TABLE 1 Comparative regional annual length of national roads, 2016-2022 (in kilometer)
TABLE 2 Annual motor vehicle registration in the Philippines and Greater Capital Region
by vehicle type, 2015-2019
TABLE 3 Summary of railway systems in Mega Manila, 2014
TABLE 4 Number of passengers, load factor and revenues of light rail transits, 2011-2021
TABLE 5 Number of passengers and revenues by railways, 2012-2021
TABLE 6 Ridership by railway system, 2019-2022
TABLE 7 Ownership, operation, maintenance, and fare collection of public transportation
modes in Metro Manila, July 2017
TABLE 8 Trip composition by mode, December 2015
TABLE 9 Travel demand in the study area - Inter-zonal trips, 2012 and 2017
TABLE 10 Changes in daily traffic crossing Metro Manila boundary
TABLE 11 Metro Manila annual average daily traffic, 2019 and 2021
TABLE 12 Motor vehicle loans, 2015-2022 (in Php billion)

MAPS
MAP 1 C and R roads
MAP 2 Railway Lines in Metro Manila
MAP 3 Road traffic volume and V/C ratio in Metro Manila, 2012
MAP 4 Proposed Lines in UTSMMA, 1973
MAP 5 Alignment of Proposed and Existing Lines in Metro Manila
MAP 6 Proposed Lines by JICA, 1976
MAP 7 MMUTIS committed and proposed public transport projects for 1999-
2004
Foreword
Investing in transport infrastructure has been imbued with magical properties.
The government’s infrastructure offensive is overwhelmingly spent on roads, rail,
seaports and airports. We are made to believe, if we do not already do so, in the
alchemic powers of these transport projects to transform the sector’s anarchy into
a catalyst for development.

IBON’s Transport Series contributes to explaining the misdirection happening.

Ordinary Filipinos do suffer the most from the anarchy of the country’s transport
system. In the cities, commuters deal with interminably long lines for jeepneys, buses
and the few trains there are – with those on the road further facing haphazard routes
and stygian traffic. The transport system, like the congested cities themselves, have
evolved without foresight or regulation.

In the countryside, rural communities deal with exorbitantly priced travel which is
few and far between. Unreliable and inconsistent transport options exacerbate the
geographical divide where vast sections of the population already have such scant
livelihood opportunities and social services. The government should address these
travails, immediately and urgently, but how they are addressed matters immensely.

Unfortunately, there are very many reasons to question if the profit-driven

privatized way is really the way to go for the people who desperately need better
mobility the most. Markets provide only to those who have the purchasing power
to make their presence felt, but in the Philippines the vast majority are just getting
by. Tens of millions of Filipinos will just be made to pay more for transport out of
what little income they have. Privatized transport prioritizes lucrative routes while
underserving socially crucial but unprofitable connections.

Even more dubious is the unquestioning belief that transport projects somehow
unleash economic miracles by making people and goods move around much
faster. Developing agriculture and building Filipino industry, however, involves
so much more than mobility and overstating the impact of transport projects is
disingenuous. If there is no substantial state support, trade protection and foreign
investment regulation for domestic producers, better transport will just reinforce
the low value-added, foreign investor-biased, and service-oriented economy behind
so much joblessness, informality and backwardness today.

As with most everything about politics, economics and political economy the most
important questions to ask to gain clarity are always “for what” and “for whom.”

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 1

Trillions of pesos have to be spent to develop the transport system but it is critical
to ask if the trillions of pesos are not just spent well but also going to their best uses.

The topic is not easy. Transport has to move 110 million Filipinos and support all
their economic and other activities. These are spread across over 7,600 islands
worth of land and forests, mountains and valleys, and rivers and seas. Moreover,
policies are not made tabula rasa or in a political vacuum – decisions are made amid
accumulating urbanization, corporate investments, and even democratic decline.
The transport knot to untangle is only becoming more immense by the day.

This series will take up different aspects of the problem. The National Capital Region
(NCR) is the country’s undisputed center of economic activity. It is also incontestably
the country’s prime example of anarchic transport born out of years of neglect
and profit-minded pseudo-urban planning. The NCR has tens of thousands of the
iconic jeepneys which have become symbols of a sector left to the whims of informal
governance and ad-hoc development. Yet after providing decades of affordable
service, small drivers and operators nationwide are being displaced in the name of
so-called modernization and the environment.

The Philippines’ transport infrastructure spanning road and rail, small vehicle and
buses, and ports and airports is undeniably growing. Yet systemic disparities still
abound and mobility is still unreliable and inaccessible, expensive and burdensome,
and unsafe and inconvenient for most of the population. Poor and low-income
Filipinos compelled to economize are on the frontlines of active mobility, especially
as the government keeps failing to provide reasonable transport options for them –
even just the low-hanging fruit of bus rapid transport.

The anarchic and inequitable state of transportation infrastructure demands a

comprehensive reevaluation and strategic overhaul. The prevailing market-oriented
policy environment is a binding constraint that legitimizes the state’s abdication of
its responsibility for public transport. This favors profit-centric motives over the
general public welfare.

In contrast, responsible public ownership provides a framework to mobilize

resources for universal mobility as well as strengthens regulation and oversight in
matters of safety, reliability, and efficiency.

Accessibility is intricately linked to public ownership. By strategically planning

routes and deploying resources, a publicly-driven transport system ensures
connectivity to even the remotest corners of the archipelago as necessary.
Affordability, a cornerstone of public welfare, is best guaranteed by public ownership.
Fare structures can properly balance operational costs of transport providers with
the commuting public’s capacity to pay.

2 IBON Transport Series No. 1

A publicly-owned and -operated transport system run responsibly and democratically
will constantly develop its technical prowess and financial capabilities to provide
more efficient transportation. This immediately improves the welfare of Filipino
commuters.

But beyond this, public ownership also enables the sector to be strategically linked
to overall economic development. The short-term employment from construction
projects is just the beginning, and even quickly fades. Much more important is for
the transport infrastructure to support and be part of comprehensive programs for
agricultural modernization and national industrialization.

Farms and industrial firms have to be made productive first for improved mobility
to mean anything, and for transport infrastructure to contribute to the structural
transformation of the economy. Connectivity helps facilitate this but stops being
meaningful after a point when input subsidies, protection against imports, and
regulating foreign investment for development quickly become more necessary.
Industrialization is also be boosted by government-led initiatives that encourage
domestic production of the materials, machinery and technology for transport.

IBON’s Transport Series seeks to give transport policy stakeholders a better

understanding of the sector from the perspective of the people and with a view to the
structural economic transformation the country needs. We aim to foster informed
discourse on the importance of public ownership as a cornerstone of transport
development, and of the steps needed towards this.

For too many Filipinos, morning’s breaking light is the prelude to tiring hours of
travel that’s even repeated at the end of the day. A better transport system that eases
this daily burden won’t fix all the other troubles people face which will need constant
struggle. But it’s at least a start.

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 3

Preface
This is a part of IBON’s Transport Series which aims to describe the problems in the
sector and come up with viable and sustainable solutions. Each part is focused on
one aspect of the transport crisis, especially in Metro Manila and its environs where
it manifests. Each part does not aim to be exhaustive but to raise questions for
further research and discussion, and hopefully, proposals for meaningful changes.

The Transport Series recognizes that the transport mess is complex and only
reflects an economy and economic planning that do not serve the majority of the
population. It is framed within IBON’s very critique of neoliberalism that has taken
over the Philippine government’s visioning of so-called Philippine development but
has only caused our long-term economic decline.

If the transport crisis has to be resolved in the realm of policymaking, it should

be radically and comprehensively placed within the principle of people-centered
economics – the kind of policymaking that genuinely promotes sustainable
development. The transport crisis, after all, is also just a symptom of a far more
deep-seated crisis of Philippine underdevelopment.

This part of the IBON’s Transport Series describes the mess, including government’s
official transport policies.

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 5

Introduction
The transport system in Metro Manila, the Philippines’ National Capital Region
(NCR), is one of the most unsustainable in the world. If it is any indication of the
transport mess, the navigation app Waze has identified Metro Manila traffic as the
worst on earth.

It is so difficult to get to where one needs to be in Metro Manila. Commuters

have to take several modes of transport to get to their intended destination, with an
average of two to three transfers.1 Routes and modes of public transport are not fully
interconnected; and commuters have to walk long distances to get to the next stop
or terminal, which is also aggravated by the lack of proper walkways and sidewalks.2
Public transport has been bad for decades and has reached the point of crisis in
recent years.

Yet, authorities have only come up with a hodgepodge of uncoordinated solutions,

which only add to the notoriety of Metro Manila’s transport crisis. The government,
private sector, and even multilateral institutions have proposed transport policy
reforms to push for infrastructure projects. They have framed these proposals within
the design of ‘livable cities’, the latest buzzword in the pursuit of rapid economic
growth. They have also been quick to repackage these as the ‘new normal’ in the
time of the COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, however, these proposals remain
stuck in the neoliberal economic policy framework, which has proven to be quite an
unsustainable pattern of production and consumption.

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 7

Shape of chaos
Urban and transport planners have focused on Metro Manila and the nearby
provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna and Rizal, dubbed the Greater Capital Region
(GCR), as the country’s main economic hub. Public transport accounts for 70% of
passenger trips in GCR.3 Public transport may be taken by road, rail and river. Despite
the feasibility of these modes, the GCR, specifically Metro Manila, is notorious for its
chaotic transport system. This is stemming from the rule of commercial and private
profit interests instead of a strong and reliable government.

Road shambles

Public commuters rely extensively on the road system composed of buses,

jeepneys, regular metered taxis, and garage to terminal or utility vehicles (UV). There
are also a handful of point-to-point (P2P) buses, which depart on a fixed schedule and
travel directly from the terminal to the drop-off point. At the height of pandemic
lockdowns in 2020, the government also started supervising the operation of the
EDSA Carousel, a bus rapid transit (BRT) system running on a dedicated right-of-
way called the EDSA Busway. Additionally, Metro Manila has seen in recent years
the proliferation of mobile applications-based transport network vehicle services
(TNVS) and motorcycle hailing services, such as Grab, Angkas, and JoyRide, among
others. On secondary roads within barangays, tricycles and ‘pedicabs’ (cycle
rickshaw) operate for the ‘last mile’ in transporting people.4 5

All of these, however, are commercially or privately operated thus intent on

making revenues and profits rather than coordinating with one another for more
efficient transport service. The state does not centralize all efforts nor operate
its own road transportation. Even the EDSA Carousel is run by the Mega Manila
Consortium Corporation and ES Transport and Partners Consortium.6

Metro Manila has an arterial road network that is composed of six

circumferential (C) roads and 10 radial (R) roads that connect the region’s 17 cities
and one municipality. The C roads serve as beltways and go around the old city
center of Intramuros, City of Manila. The R roads start from Kilometer 0, or Rizal
Park in Intramuros. The R roads do not intersect one another and do not intersect
the C roads twice. Altogether, they form a semi-weblike arterial road system, much
like the Interstate Highway in Washington, D.C. in the United States.7 8 (See Map 1)

Notice, however, that C-3 is missing a section to connect Sgt. Rivera/G. Araneta
Avenue in Quezon City to South Avenue in Makati City. C-5 is broken and continues
across the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) as C-5 Road Extension from West Service
Road near Merville Exit in Pasay City. Only the first segment of C-6 (not featured in
map) is completed, which runs from the Skyway near the FTI (Food Terminal Inc – now

8 IBON Transport Series No. 1

MAP 1. C and R roads
R9 R8 R7 Ayala Land Premiere-owned Arca
South) in Taguig City to Ortigas
Avenue Extension in Pasig City. The
R8 second segment is planned to end at
the Batasan Complex in Quezon City.9
C5
C and R roads were constructed
intentionally to lead traffic in and out of
C4 the City of Manila, but the subsequent
C3 lack of centralized urban planning has
C2
R6
only caused chaos. Business districts
R10
C1 are unconnected and constructed
C1 R5 liberally; they crowd along the entire
C2 length of C-4 (EDSA) and C-5 and make
C3
R4
these two C roads super-congested.
C4 Zoning rules are also restrictive, with
big and gated private subdivisions
and sometimes even city boundaries
C5 being closed to the commuting public.
Lastly, there is no integrated public
mass transport system that can take
R1 advantage of the benefits of an arterial
road network.10

Worst of all, building primary

roads has become increasingly
R2 R3 a private construction venture,
SOURCE: IBON Foundation, Inc. "Mass transport system in Metro Manila and the quest for since the government has allowed
sustainability" IBON Policy Study, 2018
private corporations to take over
government’s role. The country’s economic oligarchs who dominate the construction
of infrastructure, ports, roads and public utilities are also the ones who design, build,
operate and/or manage projects. These benefit more their real estate, shopping malls,
trading, shipping and logistics and other businesses than public transportation. The
government may take a guarantor or regulatory role but has in the process given up
its leverage over urban planning.

Meanwhile, there are limited-access toll expressways that connect Metro Manila
to Central Luzon (the North Luzon Expressway or NLEX) and to Southern Tagalog
(SLEX). NLEX is operated and maintained by NLEX Corporation, a subsidiary of the
Metro Pacific Tollways Corporation (MPTC) which is owned by the Metro Pacific
Investments Corporation (MPIC).11 On the other hand, the segment of SLEX from
Magallanes Interchange (Makati City) to Alabang Exit (Muntinlupa City) is operated

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 9

jointly by the Skyway Operations and Maintenance Corporation (SOMOCO) and San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) Skyway Corporation. The South Luzon Tollway segment
of SLEX from Alabang to Santo Tomas, Batangas is held by SMC SLEX Inc., which is a
concessionaire operated by the Manila Toll Expressway Systems Inc. (MATES) and a
joint venture of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and SMC-
backed PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada Tbk group of Indonesia.12

The Manila-Cavite Expressway (Cavitex) on the southwest part of the region

runs along the coastline of Manila Bay and connects Roxas Boulevard to Cavite, with
two toll plazas, namely Parañaque Toll Plaza and Kawit Toll Plaza.13 It is operated and
maintained by the Public Estates Authority Tollway Corporation (PEATC), a non-
chartered government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), in joint venture
with the Cavite Infrastructure Corporation, a unit of MPIC.14

New roads, expressways and links are still being built purportedly to decongest
Metro Manila and speed up travel around GCR. But even after the government’s
grandiose infrastructure program, Build Build Build or BBB (a discussion for later),
Metro Manila’s traffic has remained horrendous.

GCR (counting NCR, Region III and Region IV-A) has a total of 6,117.11 kilometers
(km) of roads as of October 2022; this is 17.8% of the national total. This however is
an increase of only 95.5 km from the length in 2016, which is only 2.9% of the national
total of additional roads built.15 (See Table 1) NCR has the highest road density in
the country, i.e. ratio of road length to land area, at 188.2 km per square kilometer
(km2) of land area. Region IV-A is second with 15.4 km/km2. Region III, owing to its
remaining agricultural lands, has a road density of 11 km/km2.16

Yet, based on Land Transportation Office (LTO) data, the number of motor vehicles
has continued to increase. In a five-year span, 2015-2019 (note that registration was
suspended in 2020), the number of registered motor vehicles in GCR grew from 4.5
million to 6.2 million units, a whopping 38% increase. GCR accounts for half of the
registered vehicles nationwide – 71% of all cars and 67% of all sports utility vehicles
(SUV’s) registered nationwide. (See Table 2) Every year, new registrations increase
faster (by 14%) than renewals (by 7.2%).17

Meanwhile, the data on registered public road transport vehicles is outdated. In

GCR, there are around 5,000 intracity buses; about 55,000 jeepneys; 6,483 UVs; 16,701
taxis; 18,813 TNVS; and 45,000 motorcycles for ride-hailing services.18 19 But these
are only estimates based on earlier studies, as the Land Transportation Franchising
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) is weak in reporting and consolidating its statistics.

In October 2020, at the peak of COVID-19 lockdowns, the LTFRB launched a

Service Contracting Program (SCP), which aimed to pay public utility vehicle (PUV)
operators and drivers based on the maximum number of trips made per week, with or

10 IBON Transport Series No. 1

TABLE 1. Comparative regional annual length of national roads, 2016-2022 (in kilometer)
REGION 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Philippines* 31,112.97 32,868.06 32,932.71 33,018.19 33,119.57 34,250.97 34,352.40

NCR 1,159.01 1,162.08 1,167.18 1,166.24 1,166.24 1,166.24 1,166.20
CAR 2,247.04 2,257.98 2,257.98 2,257.92 2,269.49 2,265.23 2,309.33
NIR 1,657.30 - - - - - -
Region I 1,667.45 1,667.50 1,667.04 1,679.15 1,699.27 1,711.33 1,728.36
Region II 1,919.02 1,951.44 1,984.95 2,009.14 2,018.51 2,018.51 2,021.20
Region III 2,344.91 2,344.77 2,344.77 2,344.48 2,344.48 2,388.53 2,407.08

Region IV-A 2,517.66 2,542.32 2,542.32 2,542.45 2,542.45 2,542.45 2,543.83

Region IV-B 2,297.70 2,297.70 2,297.80 2,297.92 2,297.98 2,297.71 2,297.40

Region V 2,385.66 2,385.69 2,389.23 2,389.23 1,651.66 2,449.14 2,446.78
Region VI 1,928.82 3,028.76 3,028.76 3,053.77 2,417.71 3,064.42 3,064.31
Region VII 1,743.02 2,304.50 2,315.47 2,328.63 3,061.57 2,358.62 2,376.17
Region VIII 2,537.21 2,560.16 2,560.07 2,563.10 2,330.91 2,560.37 2,560.23
Region IX 1,651.12 1,651.66 1,651.66 1,651.66 2,560.37 1,651.66 1,651.66
Region X 1,961.02 1,959.57 1,959.57 1,971.02 1,977.53 1,977.53 1,977.53
Region XI 1,684.98 1,684.98 1,688.69 1,688.69 1,704.27 1,704.27 1,704.27
Region XII 1,547.32 1,547.92 1,556.08 1,556.02 1,556.02 1,530.07 1,503.20
Region XIII 1,521.03 1,521.03 1,521.16 1,518.77 1,521.11 1,526.53 1,530.34
BARMM - - - - - 1,038.35 1,064.53
* Includes BARMM but excludes NIR.
BARMM - Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao CAR - Cordillera Administrative Region NCR - National Capital Region NIR - Negros Island Region

SOURCE: Department of Public Works and Highways

without passengers, and also based on agreed-upon performance indicators. There

were two types of trips, namely a gross service contract or Libreng Sakay (free ride)
with additional revenue to the operators and drivers as they provide free rides, and
the net service contract which includes an amount for operation and maintenance
costs.20

Funding for SCP was originally under the Duterte administration’s second-year
COVID response, Republic Act 11494 or the Bayanihan to Recover as One Act, with a
Php5.58 billion allocation. This was continued under the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of 2021 but with only Php3 billion.21 The budget was increased to Php7 billion
in GAA 2022, and the LTFRB had to wait for its exemption from disbursements to be
approved before it could implement the program during the May 2022 elections.22
But then again, funding was substantially reduced to Php1.28 billion under GAA
2023, with the new president Ferdinand Marcos Jr himself getting confused in his
press conference as to whether or not Libreng Sakay was being continued.23 The
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) had to field its own buses to
make up for the huge reduction.

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 11

TABLE 2. Annual motor vehicle registration in the Philippines
and Greater Capital Region by vehicle type, 2015-2019
Area and vehicle type 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Philippines 8,706,607 9,251,565 10,410,814 11,595,434 12,725,305

Bus 31,943 29,794 34,801 28,613 37,440
Cars 962,365 971,750 1,040,108 1,104,054 1,168,104
Motors 4,877,063 5,329,770 6,174,345 7,162,253 8,014,202
SUV 428,221 493,228 568,997 605,206 674,949
Trailers 44,946 50,315 53,018 55,889 64,935
Trucks 384,570 407,357 430,576 448,684 475,285
UV 1,977,499 1,969,351 2,108,969 2,190,735 2,290,390

Greater Capital Region* 4,478,631 4,680,001 5,223,415 5,653,243 6,177,400

Bus 19,879 19,551 22,815 18,511 20,776
Cars 719,684 719,312 756,481 788,972 829,332
Motors 2,102,405 2,270,857 2,650,253 3,025,192 3,413,372
SUV 302,274 348,007 394,534 411,199 451,112
Trailers 30,447 32,636 34,283 35,156 41,784
Trucks 170,901 180,589 190,436 187,363 190,240
UV 1,133,041 1,109,049 1,174,613 1,186,850 1,230,784
* Covers the National Capital Region, Region III and Region IV-A.
SUV - sports utility vehicle UV - utility vehicle

SOURCE: Land Transportation Office

TABLE 3. Summary of railway systems in Mega Manila, 2014

Item PNR LRT Line 1 LRT Line 2 MRT Line 3

Guideway & At-grade Elevated Elevated with UG Elevated, with UG

Railway Type (HRT, narrow-gauge) (LRT, std gauge) (LRT, std gauge) (LRT, std gauge)
Tutuban (Manila) - Roosevelt (QC) - Santolan (Pasig) - North Ave. (QC) -
Route
Mamatid (Cabuyao) Baclaran (Pasay) Recto (Manila) Taft (Pasay)

Route Length 54.0 km 18.1 km 13.5 km 16.9 km

Number of
25 20 11 13
Stations

Capacity - 1,358 pax/train 1,628 pax/train 1,182 pax/train

Max Speed - 60 kph 80 kph 65 kph

Scheduled Speed - 38 kph 32.8 kph 30 kph

Travel Time 2 hours 26 minutes 27.5 minutes 30 minutes 30 minutes

Headway 30 minutes 2 minutes 4.5 minutes 3 minutes

km - kilometer kph - kilometers per hour UG - underground std - standard HRT - heavy rail transit
LRT - Light Rail Transit MRT - Metro Rail Transit PNR - Metro Rail Transit QC - Quezon City

SOURCE: Japan International Cooperation Agency, Follow-up survey on roadmap for transport
infrastructure development for Greater Capital Region (GCR), Final Report, Almec Corporation, August 2019

12 IBON Transport Series No. 1

MAP 2. Railway Lines in Metro Manila
The Department of Transportation
(DOTr) claimed to have serviced
about 53 million passengers at the
height of funding allocation. Still, the
agency was found out in 2021 to have
disbursed only Php2.3 billion or 41%
of the Bayanihan budget and Php540
million or 18% of the GAA 2021, even
as it was quoted as saying that it had
incurred Php4.7 billion in payables.
Underspending caused delayed
payments and benefits to PUV
operators and drivers.24 The SCP has
only disincentivized the transport
workers while giving those without
service contracts undue competition.
From the commuters’ point of view,
LRT Line 1
LRT Line 2
the short-lived Libreng Sakay has only
MRT Line 3
PNR Southrail
remained a band-aid solution to the
systemic shortage and dominantly
privatized and commercialized road
SOURCE: Japan International Cooperation Agency, Follow-up survey on roadmap for
transport infrastructure development for Greater Capital Region (GCR), Final Report, Almec
Corporation, August 2019
transport system.

Rail nightmare

Metro Manila has rail transport served by the Light Rail Transit (LRT) Lines 1
and 2, the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) Line 3, and the 59-year-old Philippine National
Railways (PNR). LRT-1 runs 20.5 km from Baclaran, Pasay City to Roosevelt, Quezon
City. LRT-2 travels 13.5 km from Recto, City of Manila to Santolan, Quezon City.
MRT-3 has a 17-km route from Taft Avenue, City of Manila to North Avenue, Quezon
City.25 (See Table 3 and Map 2)

Only the PNR south commuter line is operational at the moment, albeit erratic,
which makes a 29-km trip from Tutuban, City of Manila to Cabuyao City in Laguna.
The development of the north commuter line (Tutuban up to Malolos City, Bulacan)
has been stalled for years due to the controversial failure of the Northrail project.26

As of 2014, LRT-1 had 139 light rail vehicles (LRVs); LRT-2 had 18 trainsets with 4
LRVs each, a total of 72 LRVs; and MRT-3 had 73 LRVs. The average load factor (line
volume divided by seating capacity) increased from 62% in 2006 to 96% in 2014 for
LRT-1; 31% to 60% for LRT-2; and 77% to 92% for MRT-3.27

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 13

 The number of passengers grew to an average of 1.68 million passengers
per average weekday for the three light rails and PNR. (See Tables 4 and 5) But
the number of passengers started to go down since then. In 2015, there were 341
million passengers, or 1.31 million per day, 14% lower than the volume in 2011. The
main issue is the rolling stock – the steep decline since 2014 was caused by a 45%
reduction in train availability on MRT-3; 20% on LRT-1; and 16% on PNR. MRT-3 alone
recorded more than 10 service interruptions in 2017 due to frequent breakdowns,
few operational trains, inappropriate trains, and accidents, among others.28

In 2019 before the pandemic, PNR carried 11.2 million passengers, which was
already an 18.2% decrease from the previous year and decreased further to 4.8
million in 2020, then 3.6 million in 2021. The same trends is observed with LRT-1
and 2. Ridership of MRT-3 also declined in 2019 and 2020, but increased in 2021.
(See Table 6) In total, the rail lines carried an average of 993,000 passengers on an
average weekday in 2019, a decline from the 1.32 million in 2014.29 Ridership per
month was already increasing in 2022 from previous numbers in 2021, but it does
not change the fact that rail ridership has been generally on the decline.

Like road transport, rail is also generally privatized and commercially operated.
LRT-1 and LRT-2 are government assets, but their operation and maintenance,
including fare collection, are by the private sector. PNR is government through and
through, while MRT-3 is completely private. (See Table 7)

TABLE 4. Number of passengers, load factor and revenues of light rail transits, 2011-2021
Light Rail Manila Corporation Light Rail Transit Authority DOTr - MRT3
(LRT Line 1) (LRT Line 2) (MRT Line 3)
Year Total no. of Average Farebox Total no. of Average Farebox Total no. of Average Farebox
passengers daily load revenues passengers daily load revenues passengers daily load revenues
(in million) factor (in %) (in Php million) (in million) factor (in %) (in Php million) (in million) factor (in %) (in Php million)

2011 156.9 77.0 2,274.3 63.8 39.0 856.8 158.8 77.3 1,956.8

2012 170.7 90.2 2,503.9 70.3 48.0 938.3 174.5 90.2 2,136.6

2013 171.8 94.6 2,515.2 71.4 60.0 944.9 176.1 94.7 2,159.9

2014 170.7 98.0 2,512.0 72.8 60.0 968.0 167.8 96.0 2,021.0

2015 141.4 94.3 2,316.2 62.4 59.1 1,246.7 118.2 nda 2,316.6

2016 147.9 89.2 3,015.2 67.0 57.1 1,307.8 133.9 nda 2,681.5

2017 157.0 83.8 3,158.7 66.0 61.2 1,271.5 140.1 90.7 2,779.4

2018 165.2 85.4 3,310.2 64.7 56.0 1,244.5 104.2 98.0 2,068.7

2019 161.3 85.9 3,217.9 57.0 52.6 1,068.6 96.3 98.7 1,907.9

2020* 50.6 34.7 996.3 12.5 25.2 216.0 31.5 40.8 604.5

2021 42.9 28.3 867.5 11.7 30.6 230.1 43.9 26.0 806.9
Details may not add up to totals due to rounding.
* Load factors in 2020 are an average of January to March and June to December monthly values only.
nda - no data available DOTr - Department of Transportation LRT - Light Rail Transit MRT - Metro Rail Transit

SOURCES: Department of Transportation and Light Rail Transit Authority

14 IBON Transport Series No. 1

TABLE 5. Number of passengers and revenues by railways, 2012-2021
Passenger carried by transport service
Total Total revenue
Year Metro South Metro North Bicol Bicol passengers (in Php thousand)
Commuter Commuter Express Commuter

2012 15,143,542 - 79,629 472,946 15,696,117 397,641

2013 19,483,121 - - 485,663 19,968,784 401,023

2014 24,200,482 - - 471,474 24,671,956 515,501

2015 18,736,900 - - 449,775 19,186,675 427,087

2016 21,412,727 - - 430,236 21,842,963 452,662

2017 15,947,602 - - 500,435 16,448,037 399,778

2018 13,691,451 329,556 - 686,015 14,707,022 430,684

2019 11,297,747 1,232,522 - 654,828 13,185,097 470,693

2020 3,879,923 902,139 - 284,066 5,066,128 331,193

2021 3,091,425 491,803 - 229,023 3,812,251 68,441

1. Indicative Passenger Report from Operations Department and Revenue Report from Controllership Division.
2. On May 2020 Bicol transitioned to GCQ from ECQ; BCT Line resumed operation on May 6, 2020.
3. April 2020 MMSC Revenue Data (Php170.00) is an additional short Remittance from the month of January 2020.
4. April 2020 BCT Revenue Data (Php10.00) is an additional short Revenue from the month of February 2020.
5. Operation Cancellation on April 5-11, 2021 due to Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) imposed at NCR.
6.PNR increased its capacity from 30% to 70% last November 4, 2021.

SOURCE: Philippine National Railways

TABLE 6. Ridership by railway system, 2019-2022

Line 2019 2020 2021 2022

LRT 1 161,346,440 50,969,666 44,353,617 19,396,328

LRT 2 57,540,983 12,684,559 11,849,037 8,580,703

MRT 3 97,561,947 31,800,597 44,008,368 33,830,915

PNR 11,226,171 4,782,062 3,580,105 -

LRT - Light Rail Transit MRT - Metro Rail Transit PNR - Metro Rail Transit

SOURCE: Department of Transportation

Forgotten river

Despite the practicality of water transport along the 27-km Pasig River,
which meanders through the municipality of Taytay, Rizal and cities of Taguig,
Pasig, Makati, Mandaluyong and Manila, it is undeveloped and intermittent. The
Pasig River Ferry Service, rather a water bus system, is the only water transport
system in Metro Manila. It has 12 stations, from Intramuros in the City of Manila to
Pinagbuhatan in Pasig City. It used to be owned and operated by a private company,
SCC Nautical Transport Services Incorporated, but was suspended in 2011 as it was
operating at a loss. It was reopened in 2014 with four privately owned ferries and is
currently operated by the MMDA in cooperation with the DOTr and the Pasig River
Rehabilitation Commission.30

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 15

 There was a program pitched by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) in 2018 to develop an additional 17 stations in the next four years and to bid
out the operation to a private firm. The MMDA also committed to build three more
stations: one at Circuit Makati, a riverfront development project by Ayala Land Inc.
on the site of what used to be Santa Ana Race Track in Makati City; one at Quinta
Market, a public market along Carlos Palanca Street in Quiapo, City of Manila; and
one on Kalawaan in Pasig City.31

Mayors of both Pasig City and City of Manila committed to donate at least two
boats to the ferry service. On 24 March 2020, Pasig City Mayor Vico Sotto led the
turnover of two 56-seater vessels to the ferry service. The real estate firm, New San
Jose Builders, on the other hand donated to the MMDA a 50-seater ferry in 2021. City
of Manila Mayor Isko Moreno’s promise did not materialize.32

TABLE 7. Ownership, operation, maintenance, and fare collection

of public transportation modes in Metro Manila, July 2017

Public Ownership
Operation Maintenance Fare collection
transportation of assets

Public utility jeep Various private franchise holders

Public utility bus Various private franchise holders

Point-to-point Froehlich Tours Inc., HM Transport Inc, Robinsons Malls, RRCG Transport, Lingkod Pinoy
bus (P2P bus) Bus Liner Inc, UBE Express

Light Rail Manila Light Rail Manila

LRT 1 GPH AF Consortium
Corporation Corporation

Comm Builders and

Technology Phils.
Light Rail Transit
LRT 2 GPH Corp. (CB&T), AF Consortium
Authority
PMP Inc.,
Gras Sabrocai

Metro Rail Transit

MRT 3 MRT 3 Office (DOTr) Busan Rail Inc. AF Consortium
Corp., MRT Holdings

Philippine
GPH Philippine National Railways
National Railways

Pasig River Ferry SCC Nautical Transport Services Incorporated

1. AF Consortium - a consortium composed of Metro Pacific Investments Corp. (Pangilinan), AC Infrastructure Holdings Corp. (Ayala), Globe Telecom Inc. (Ayala), Meralco Financial
Services Corp., Smart Communications Inc., BPI Card Finance Corporation (Ayala)
2. Light Rail Manila - a consortium composed of AC Infrastructure Holdings Corporation (Ayala), Metro Pacific Light Rail Corporation (Pangilinan), and Philippine Investment Alliance
for Infrastructure fund (Macquarie Group of Australia)
3. Metro Rail Transit Corporation - a consortium composed of Astoria Investment of the Ayala Corp., Anglo Philippine Holdings of the National Bookstore Group, Railco Investments
of the RAMCAR Group, Metro Global Holdings Corp., and Sheridan LRT Holdings of the Unilab Group

GPH - Government of the Republic of the Philippines DOTr - Department of Transportation LRT - Light Rail Transit MRT - Metro Rail Transit

SOURCES: Department of Transportation P2P website Sakay.ph; Light Rail Transit Authority;
Metro Manila Development Authority; Metro Rail Transit 3 Office; Philippine National Railways

16 IBON Transport Series No. 1

Tangle of issues
The irony of such anarchy is that it is the general public that suffers the
consequences. The transport crisis is a tangle of many issues that have only gotten
worse over the decades. No solution has been put in place, precisely because it has
been government policy to allow private business to dictate how the urban centers
are arranged.1

Chronic shortage of trips

GCR’s mobility demand is not only for its population but also for a labor force
that makes a daily commute from other surrounding provinces. As of 2014, the total
daily passenger trips taken in the GCR, not including walking, was 24.6 million.
As already mentioned, public transport accounted for 17.3 million or 70% of these
passenger trips. (See Table 8)

There is no data on mobility supply, and we can only assume that the 17.3 million
mobility demand is equivalent to the mobility supply. But daily sights of long queues
in transport terminals, overcrowding, and stranded masses of passengers are telling
of the chronic shortage in Philippine public transportation.

About 39% of the daily passenger trips by public mode (6.8 million) were taken
by jeepney, 2.4 million by bus and 5.7 million by tricycle. But the annual average
daily traffic (AADT) data of the MMDA in 2019 shows that the trips taken by bus,
jeepney and tricycle have fallen by 21% from the figures in 2014. This is equal to a
reduction in public transport supply of 10.5% and in turn equivalent to a reduction
of 1.6 million trips.33 34

Meanwhile, 1.5 million of the daily passenger trips were taken by rail, served
by the LRT Lines 1 and 2, MRT-3, and PNR. As already mentioned, daily passenger
trips taken by rail have fallen due to the reduced number of rolling stock, resulting
in constant breakdowns and poor maintenance of the existing rail lines. The rail
system has failed to keep pace with passenger growth.

Thus, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, there had already been a massive
shortage of almost 2 million daily passenger trips in Metro Manila alone, which was
only worsened by the pandemic. In a survey by the Social Weather Station (SWS)
in 2021 when the government started easing pandemic lockdown restrictions, 69%
of adults in Metro Manila with non-home-based work said that going to work had
become much harder.35
1 The latest transport statistics available are the studies made by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for the Philippine
transportation department – the Metro Manila Urban Transportation Integration Study (MMUTIS) released in 1999; the MMUTIS Update
and Enhancement Project (MUCEP) released in 2015, and the JICA Roadmap for Transport Infrastructure Development for Metro Manila and
Its Surrounding Areas released in 2014 with a follow-up survey in 2019. There is also a data collection survey on improving road-based public
transportation system in Metro Manila conducted by JICA in 2022.

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 17

TABLE 8. Trip composition by mode, December 2015

Mode Number of trips (in '000) % of Public or Private % of Total

Public mode 17,337 100.0 48.8

Train 1,485 8.6 4.2
Bus 2,352 13.6 6.6
Jeepney 6,763 39.0 19.0
Tricycle 5,687 32.8 16.0
Utility vehicle/High-occupancy vehicle 261 1.5 0.7
Pedicab 631 3.6 1.8
Others 156 0.9 0.4

Private mode 7,263 100.0 20.4

Motorcycle 2,948 40.6 8.3
Car 2,894 39.9 8.2
Taxi 315 4.3 0.9
Truck 270 3.7 0.8
Others 826 11.4 2.3

Walking 10,913 - 30.7

Total 35,503 - 100.0

SOURCE: Japan International Cooperation Agency and Department of Transportation and Communications, The Project for Capacity Development and Transportation Planning and
Database Management for the Republic of the Philippines, MMUTIS Update and Enhancement Project (MUCEP), Technical Report, Almec Corporation, Oriental Consultants Global
Co., Ltd., December 2015

The traditional jeepney has been particularly affected by the pandemic

lockdowns and government’s own decision to phase it out and replace it with
modern ones (a discussion for later). It may be recalled that in 2020 the Duterte
administration suspended public land, sea and air transport and placed the entire
island of Luzon under strict quarantine protocols. However, when restrictions eased
and limited public transport was resumed, the traditional jeepney was not a priority
for resumption.

There were about 900 traditional jeepney routes in the GCR pre-pandemic,
but only 651 routes have been reopened as of end-2022. There were about 74,000
traditional jeepneys in the GCR pre-pandemic, but only 49,959 have continued plying
their routes.36 Yet, modern jeepneys have been allowed in 59 new routes as early as
mid-2020, which confirmed suspicions by drivers’ associations that the suspension
of the traditional jeepney’s routes and trips was actually about the government’s
contrived modernization program.37

The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) has since the
pandemic pushed for active transport, i.e., physical activity that is done as a means to
transport (a discussion for later). Examples are walking, biking and skating. While it is
inarguable that these are beneficial to the individuals and communities in terms of
economic costs, health and healthy environment, the government has yet to present

18 IBON Transport Series No. 1

a comprehensive plan to improve public mass transportation. Instead, it continues
its car-centricity and orientation towards private transport.

Longer waiting and travel times

The collapse of public transport supply has resulted in longer waiting and travel
times, causing unimaginable economic and social losses. This wasted time has only
gotten worse over the decades. The average travel time for buses lasted more than
90 minutes in 2014 compared to 79 minutes in 1996 and over 50 minutes in 1980. For
private cars, travel time exceeded 60 minutes in 2014 from more than 50 minutes in
1996 and more than 30 minutes in 1980.38

Commuting to work also became longer from 37 minutes in 1980 to 51 minutes

in 1996.39 No comparable data after 1996 is available to show how much time
commuting to work has become longer. But to argue, in an online survey in 2019,
for an average distance of 12 km in traveling to work or school in Metro Manila,
commuting time by bus averaged at 78 minutes.40 A study by the mobility advocacy
group, Move As One Coalition, shows that in Metro Manila, vehicle travel time per
kilometer has gone from a baseline of 1.83 minutes in 2015 to 2.57 minutes in 2019, a
40% increase in time taken to travel the same distance.41

The average trip length for Metro Manila residents also became longer from 5.3
km in 1980 to 6.4 km in 1996. The MUCEP study is no longer comparable as it already
includes residents of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal, and is disaggregated per
mode of transport. At any rate, the average trip lengths in 2014 were 25.55 km by
bus, 15.47 km by rail, and 14.82 km by UV or high-occupancy vehicles (HOV).42

‘Carmageddon’

Metro Manila traffic has been called ‘carmageddon’, a portmanteau of car and
Armageddon, the biblical place where good and evil are destined to have their final
battle. Indeed, long hours of traffic jams, heat, rains, floods, and suffocating pollution
have reduced citizens to being ‘warriors’ acting on their basic survival instincts.43
And the war is being won by cars – 70% of GCR road-users take public transportation
but are crammed into only 22% of road space.44 Government’s underlying bias for
private car sales and ownership is the culprit for such road inequality.

From 1996 to 2012, passenger trips by car to and from Metro Manila increased by
15%, while those by jeepney and bus declined by about 7 percent. In terms of vehicle
trips, car trips shot up by 69% (on average 3.3% per annum), while public vehicle trips
increased by 41% (yearly average growth of 2.2%).45

From 2012 to 2017, travel demand showed a decline in passenger trips of 2% with
car and 28% with public transport (jeepney and bus). Yet, in terms of vehicle trips, car

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 19

 trips increased further by 4.3% (or on average 0.9% per annum), while public vehicle
trips decreased by 8% (or on average –1.6% per annum). Jeepney and bus traffic
decreased by 1% and 34%, respectively. In 2012, cars accounted for 32% of the inter-
zonal passenger trips but comprised 71% of passenger car unit (PCU)-km. In 2017,
these figures increased further to 39% of the passenger trips and 74% of PCU-km.
(See Table 9)
TABLE 9. Travel demand in the study area - Inter-zonal trips, 2012 and 2017
2012 2017 2017/2012

Mode Person Trips PCU Person Trips PCU

Person
PCU
Number
% Number
% Number
% Number
% Trips
('000/day) ('000/day) ('000/day) ('000/day)

Car 6,170 31.7 3,629 71.3 6,054 38.8 3,784 73.8 0.98 1.04
Public
13,300 68.3 1,463 28.7 9,540 61.2 1,345 26.2 0.72 0.92
Transport
Jeepney 7,620 39.1 1,141 22.4 6,652 42.7 1,134 22.1 0.87 0.99
Bus 5,680 29.2 322 6.3 2,888 18.5 211 4.1 0.51 0.66

Total 19,470 100.0 5,092 100.0 15,594 100.0 5,129 100.0 0.80 1.01
PCU - passenger car unit

SOURCE: Japan International Cooperation Agency, Follow-up survey on roadmap for transport
infrastructure development for Greater Capital Region (GCR), Final Report, Almec Corporation, August 2019

From 1996 to 2017, the number of passengers increased 1.8 times, while the
number of PCU increased 2.7 times, which means that more and more people used
private vehicles instead of taking the bus and jeepney. The traffic to and from Rizal,
Laguna and Cavite increased about three times.46 (See Table 10)

From 2012 to 2019, the AADT of public buses and jeepneys in Metro Manila
decreased by 14%, while that of private cars and motorcycles surged by 46%.47 From
2019 to 2021, public transport supply continued to collapse by 22% for buses and
by a whopping 46% for jeepneys. UV also decreased 64%, from 72,000 to 26,000.
Meanwhile, motorcycle traffic increased from 1 million to 1.4 million. Car traffic
slightly decreased by 8.3%, but cars singly continued to account for 44% of traffic
volume. (See Table 11)

Higher car ownership as well as decline in car occupancy from 2.5 to 1.7 persons
per car increased car traffic. Similar declines in vehicle occupancy could be observed
on jeepneys (from 15.1 to 10 passengers) and buses (from 46.5 to 35.3 passengers).48
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) - MMUTIS Update and
Enhancement Project (MUCEP) 2015 study showed that only 11.5% of households
owned a car in Metro Manila, with about 10% of the car-owning households having
more than one car.49 In a more recent (2020) survey conducted by researchers at the
De La Salle University, car-owning households comprised 43.6% of the respondents,
with about 11.3% of them having more than one car.50

20 IBON Transport Series No. 1

TABLE 10. Changes in daily traffic crossing Metro Manila boundary
MMUTIS (1996) MUCEP (2012) Roadmap 2 (2017)
2017/
Direction
1996
Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total

North

Pax No. 126,495 37,581 164,076 74,854 30,628 105,482 76,880 83,691 160,571 1.0

PCU 3,874 19,499 23,374 10,475 11,704 22,179 12,161 32,003 44,164 1.9

North East

Pax No. 143,560 60,009 203,569 140,157 43,403 183,560 184,668 85,570 270,238 1.3

PCU 3,970 30,152 34,122 16,067 17,723 33,790 16,570 34,526 51,096 1.5

East

Pax No. 412,199 163,216 575,415 590,220 415,018 1,005,238 562,522 750,962 1,313,484 2.3

PCU 11,442 110,802 122,244 57,604 177,298 234,901 55,256 314,083 369,339 3.0

South (Laguna)

Pax No. 130,591 36,837 167,428 120,611 82,102 202,713 122,306 148,692 270,998 1.6

PCU 3,355 25,440 28,795 14,457 33,456 47,912 12,850 62,256 75,106 2.6

South (Cavite)

Pax No. 126,057 27,527 153,584 134,435 52,569 187,004 172,530 118,121 290,651 1.9

PCU 3,240 18,539 21,779 23,363 20,636 43,999 18,438 53,563 72,001 3.3

Total

Pax No. 938,902 325,170 1,264,072 1,060,277 623,720 1,683,997 1,118,906 1,187,036 2,305,942 1.8

PCU 25,881 204,432 230,314 121,966 260,817 382,783 115,275 496,431 611,706 2.7
MMUTIS - Metro Manila Urban Transportation Integration Study MUCEP - MMUTIS Update and Enhancement Project PCU - passenger car unit

SOURCE: Japan International Cooperation Agency, Follow-up survey on roadmap for transport infrastructure development for Greater Capital Region (GCR), Final Report, Almec Corporation, August 2019

TABLE 11. Metro Manila annual The volume of automotive sales has also
average daily traffic, 2019 and 2021 been continuously increasing due to easier
terms and other promotional offers given
Vehicle 2019 2021
by banks on their car loans. From 2021 to
Car 1,526,667 1,399,242
2022 alone, another 31% increase in the
Public utility jeep 135,417 73,766 sales volume was recorded, not as fast as the
Utility vehicle 72,168 25,805 increase in the length of road construction.51
Taxi 129,720 130,855 Auto loans, reaching a total of Php322 billion
Public utility bus 31,620 24,693 in 2022, increased by an average annual of
Truck 86,976 84,738 9.5% from 2016 to 2022, peaking at 31% in
Trailer 21,553 18,477 2019. This is despite negative growths of
Motorcycle 1,065,807 1,421,642
5.8% and 18.3% in the pandemic years of
2020 and 2021, respectively. (See Table 12)
Tricycle 18,052 18,455

Total 3,087,980 3,197,673

Yet, as already cited in the LTO data,
SOURCE: Metro Manila Development Authority the number of newly registered vehicles

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 21

 TABLE 12. Motor vehicle loans, 2015-2022 (in Php billion)
Type of loan 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Motor vehicle loans 151.3 203.8 256.6 288.3 377.9 356.0 291.8 326.3
Auto loans 150.2 202.2 254.6 285.8 374.2 352.5 287.9 322.4
Motorcycle loans 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.7 3.5 3.9 3.9
Data may not add up due to rounding off
Data is as of December of respective years and in the universal and commercial banking system in the Philippines

SOURCE: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

in GCR increases yearly by 14%, faster than registration renewals. It is easy to say
that since traffic demand has exceeded infrastructure capacity, new roads have to
be constructed. But this assumes that the acquisition of private vehicles, especially
those occupying too much road space such as cars and SUVs, simply continues to
be unrestrained by policy while allowing public transport to continue collapsing.
The government has blindsided commuters into thinking that what we need is
infrastructure while its car-centricity and bias for private transport goes unscathed.
The only policy that has probably been proclaimed although not implemented
truthfully is the requisite that car buyers should show a photo of their garage to the
car dealers before they are allowed to buy.

Congestion

Cars inarguably are the main cause of the awful traffic congestion in the
country’s capital region. Congestion refers to the excess of vehicles on a portion or
length of the roads at a particular time, which results in speeds that are much slower
than normal or ‘free flow’ speeds. A congestion level of 43% means that travel time
is 43% longer than the baseline non-congested conditions, say, a 30-minute trip in
free-flow condition will take 13 minutes longer.

Most of Metro Manila primary roads – C roads and R roads – are operating at
or close to capacity. Almost half (44%) of the roads averaged 10 km per hour (kph) or
less, which happens when roads exceed 50% of volume capacity, while an average of
71% of the road sections are at less than 20 kph speed.52

Among the circumferential roads, C-5 carries the highest traffic volume with
3.4 million PCU-km per day (7.7 million person-km), followed by EDSA (C-4) with
2 million PCU-km per day (9.4 million person-km) as of 2017.53 Both C-5 and EDSA
reach full capacity in a day, respectively with 89% and 84% of their lengths operating
at speeds below 20 kph. Among the radial roads, Quirino Highway (R-7) is the busiest,
with traffic at 3.2 PCU-km ratio and 7.9 million person-km a day.54 (See Map 3)

The traffic/volume ratios on expressways, such as Cavitex (0.33), NLEX (0.07)

and SLEX (0.31) are better than on the primary roads. Skyway is a lot higher (0.83) but
still lower than most of Metro Manila’s primary roads (0.93).55

22 IBON Transport Series No. 1

MAP 3. Road traffic volume
and V/C ratio in Metro Manila, 2012
For more updated data on traffic
congestion, we may refer to the live
updates of the TomTom Traffic Index.
Congestion levels in Metro Manila
decreased from an average of 71%
in 2019 pre-pandemic, 53% in 2020
lockdowns, and 43% in 2021 extended
but easing lockdowns.56

During rush hours, congestion

levels are quite different. In 2019
when the average congestion level
was 71% as cited, it was actually 97% in
the morning and 125% in the evening.
Every 30-minute vehicle trip then
was lengthened by 29 minutes in the
morning (+97%) and by 38 minutes in
the evening (+126%).57 The TomTom
Index measures vehicle driving
speeds, but it does not account for
commuter waiting times, which are
SOURCE: Japan International Cooperation Agency and National Economic and
Development Authority, Roadmap for Transport Infrastructure Development for Metro a crucial measure of sufficiency and
Manila and its Surrounding areas Region III & Region IV-A, Final Report, Main Text, Almec
Corporation, March 2014 efficiency.58
The cost of chaos

The impact of such road congestion is severe on public transport. This is composed
mainly of single proprietors (the owners) of public utility vehicles, and the bus, jeepney
and UV drivers as well as motorcycle riders for hire who have yet to pay the ‘boundary’
or daily rent to the owners. Underpaid and forced to work long hours, they compete for
the curbside for passengers in order to meet the ‘boundary’ and earn beyond that. With
the traffic congestion, they have had less number of trips or have been forced to reduce
their daily round trips. Their costs have increased and their productivity has declined.

Jeepney drivers have lost substantial incomes and have been forced to look for
other sources of income. This is not to mention that drivers’ incomes have also been
battered by persistent oil price hikes. The price of diesel more than tripled from
Php20.45 per liter in January 2016 to Php68.67 per liter in end-2022. The price of
gasoline increased from Php37.59 to Php63.88 per liter in the same period. Jeepney
fares increased only twice during those years, cumulatively by only Php2.59 60 Ironically,
the government even blames jeepneys for the road congestion and targeted them for
phaseout by end of 2023 (a discussion for later).61

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 23

 Passenger road transport inflation in Metro Manila has reached an average
annual of 5% in 2020-2022, coming from only 4.7% the previous three years. The
average annual inflation of other passenger transport by road (which includes
jeepney and tricycle) reached 6.7% in the pandemic years, which has been more
burdensome at 8.1% for the bottom 30% of households.62 Transportation eats up
about 6% of household expenses and it ranks third in a family’s priorities, next to
food and housing and utilities.63 Many poor family breadwinners have resorted to
walking to work or to their livelihood sources to cope with rising transport costs,
but then again the lack of walkways and pedestrian spaces is hazardous to them.

If not walking, commuters have had no choice but to rely on the terrible public
transportation system. For the students, the traffic has added stress to an already
stressful and unsafe school environment. For the elderly and persons with disabilities
(PWDs), mobility has been limited. For the working class, longer waiting and travel
times have affected their work, employment status, livelihoods, health, and well-
being. The traffic has also given them more reason to aim for private transport such
as motorcycles or cars, which motorcycle traders and automotive sellers have taken
advantage of through loans and installment plans. The banks are also making a killing
from government’s bias for private transport. Thus every year, the number of cars and
motorcycles continues to rise and lead to a gridlock that is worst on earth.

Road congestion costs the economy some Php2.4 billion a day for Metro Manila
and Php1 billion for the adjoining provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Cavite,
according to JICA in its 2019 updated study.64 This translates to about Php180 per
trip of transport cost for GCR, which includes the time spent by people on the road
due to long travel times and also the increase in cost for operating vehicles under
the present traffic conditions.65

Part of the economic losses are the high level of pollution and unhealthy
environment (vehicle emissions account for 88% of air pollution in Metro Manila), not
to mention the mental and health stresses the transport crisis brings. At one time, a
patient carried by an ambulance did not make it to the hospital.66 67 The “inadequate
and unsafe transport options” have been called by the Healthcare Professionals
Alliance Against COVID-19 (HPAAC) a critical public health issue.68

In Metro Manila alone, based on calculations by Move As One Coalition in 2020,

the economy could lose Php520 million a year if the government does not massively
expand active transport and public transport capacity. The amount represents losses
from longer commutes, job losses, shutdowns of public transport operators, road
crashes, and carbon emissions.69 In early 2020, pre-pandemic, traffic congestion
landed Metro Manila the second-worst ranking in a global survey of traffic conditions
in 416 cities across 57 countries. The survey estimated the cost of lost productivity at
Php3.5 billion per day.70

24 IBON Transport Series No. 1

Saga of nearsighted policymaking
If we should come up with a comprehensive policy for a sustainable public
transport system, the best place to start is to have updated and reliable travel
statistics. Unfortunately, even well-meaning studies such as ours are stuck with
the government’s lack of appreciation and priority for transportation science.
History further reveals that the Philippine government has only been following
the recommendations of foreign-led studies to serve foreign business, including in
infrastructure construction and transportation. Public transport in the NCR would
suffer so much from such self-serving policymaking.

Several studies have been made to move people to their destinations in an orderly
manner. Two significant ones, both offering master plans on public transport and
infrastructure, came in the 1970s – both were only partly implemented. Succeeding
studies only made references to the first two studies, utilizing parts but making
incongruous assumptions, which only created more confusion. In the late 1990s, a
new master plan was crafted but would remain un-implemented.71

Unrelated studies

The first of the two major studies was the Urban Transport Study in Manila
Metropolitan Area (UTSMMA) conducted by the Japanese government’s Overseas
Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA), the precursor of today’s JICA. The study
was done between March 1971 and September 1973, at which time the “metropolitan
area” was yet to be formally consolidated and called Metro Manila.72

The UTSMMA was a comprehensive plan that prioritized railways, in particular

a rapid transit railway network of subways in the inner area bound by EDSA, the
main corridor, and elevated in the suburban areas. The study also proposed the
modernization of the PNR.

The subway plan envisioned five lines. It was a total of 135.1 km of rail that would
fully integrate all the areas that have become the 17 cities of today’s Metro Manila
and decongest the city center (Manila) by developing then sparsely populated areas
near Manila.73 (See Map 4)

On the other hand, portions of the PNR system would be elevated rail to avoid
clogging the main roads. As a linked portion of the rapid transit railway, PNR would
service additional towns outside Manila not serviced by the five subway lines.

The UTSMMA also included road and highway development, such as the
planning of a system of circumferential roads. Some of these, such as C-5, were
implemented.74 The study also envisioned the secondary and important role of buses

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 25

MAP 4. Proposed Lines in UTSMMA, 1973 and jeepneys to be used for feeder
services once the rail systems were
operational.75

The UTSMMA would have taken

15 years to complete. University of
the Philippines (UP) scholars are of
the opinion today that the UTSMMA,
had it been fully implemented, may
well have solved Metro Manila’s
traffic problems for several years to
come. It would have even increased
the development potentials of nearby
towns.76 But only portions of the road
plan and a significantly shortened
Line 1 would be carried out and under
Line 1
a new plan and based on a quite
Line 2
Line 2
different set of assumptions.
(approx. alignment)
Line 3
Line 4
Line 5
Instead of fully heeding the
UTSMMA, the Marcos dictatorship
SOURCE: Jose, Ricardo T., et al, The Mass Transit System in Metro Manila: From Tranvia to commissioned the drawing up of
MRT, 1879-2017, University of the Philippines System Emerging Interdisciplinary Research
06-008, n.d. another plan. The second study
was the Metro Manila Transport, Land Use and Development Planning Project
(MMETROPLAN) conducted from January 1976 to February 1977. The Philippine
government commissioned what was to become the Halcrow Fox and Associates,
one of the world’s leading urban planning and transportation consultancy firms, to
do the study. Government officials dealing with transport and planning formed a
steering group. The World Bank funded MMETROPLAN.77 78

But MMETROPLAN was not built on the advices of UTSMMA. In fact, it killed
the proposal for the rapid transit railway network for Metro Manila. In the opinion
of today’s urban planners and engineers from UP, MMETROPLAN doomed heavy
rail transport by arguing that it would be unviable economically in the long run.79
To quote:

“Heavy Rapid Transit (HRT) would provide public transport

passengers with much faster journey, but by 1990 would attract
only 2.5% of motorists and would have negligible impact on
traffic congestion. Partly because of this and partly because of
its very high capital cost, it would be hopelessly uneconomic:
the annualized capital costs would be higher than the estimated
benefits in 1990...passenger flows are not high enough to exploit

26 IBON Transport Series No. 1

 its full capacity...and the large savings in time for public transport
passengers are not given a high value in Manila, and are not high
enough to persuade motorists to change mode.

These results are conclusive, and are unlikely to be changed by

any circumstances or reasonable assumptions...it is clear that
any other fully segregated public transport system, whether
light rail or busway, would also be uneconomic. As such systems
would require the appropriation of most, if not all, of the available
funds for all transport (including highways) in Metro Manila for
the foreseeable future, and as there is no other rationale for
their implementation, they have been rejected from further
consideration.” (MMETROPLAN, 1977)

The World Bank-funded study also did not favor the PNR, arguing that the
routes did not correspond to the demand and that it would be expensive eventually.
MMETROPLAN obviously preferred road transport modes over an upgraded PNR.

It also did not agree to opening up the Cainta and Marikina areas in the eastern
portion of Metro Manila as these would be prone to flooding. Instead, the study
recommended developing Tandang Sora/Commonwealth Avenue in the northern
portion and Sucat/Parañaque in the southern portion of Metro Manila.80

To address traffic congestion, MMETROPLAN made short-term recommendations

focused on bus and jeepney operations, such as the use of non-airconditioned buses
designed for more standing passengers and charging affordable fare and the use of
premium buses designed for seated passengers and charging higher fares. The study
also proposed to limit the bus operations of the government-run Metro Manila Transit
Corporation (MMTC), which was eventually discontinued. It saw jeepneys as a way to
address low demand but high frequency service.81

The most important recommendations of the MMETROPLAN on road public

transport, which would later define a deregulated sector, focused on the issuance
of franchises for buses and jeepneys. The franchise period was shortened, and
restrictions were loosened to suggest “properly regulated competition”. The study
further encouraged small operators for both jeepneys and buses.

The MMETROPLAN focused on the main strategies of cordon pricing (or

charging toll fees) and bus lanes. It finally recommended light rail transit (LRT) of
rapid streetcars that would run on road level, not segregated from motor transport
and would follow street lights just like cars and buses. Four short lines were proposed,
radiating from Manila to Monumento, Quezon City, San Juan and Mandaluyong, and
Makati and Pasay.82 (See Map 5)

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 27

MAP 5. Alignment of Proposed
and Existing Lines in Metro Manila MAP 6. Proposed Lines by JICA, 1976

Line 1
Line 2
Existing LRT-MRT lines
MMETROPLAN Line 3

JICA Line 4
UTSMMA Line 5

SOURCE: Jose, Ricardo T., et al, The Mass Transit System in Metro Manila: From SOURCE: Jose, Ricardo T., et al, The Mass Transit System in Metro Manila: From
Tranvia to MRT, 1879-2017, University of the Philippines System Emerging Tranvia to MRT, 1879-2017, University of the Philippines System Emerging
Interdisciplinary Research 06-008, n.d. Interdisciplinary Research 06-008, n.d.

Cost could only be the most probable consideration for recommending light
rail (with lower capacity) over heavy rail (with more capacity). But MMETROPLAN
proved to be more costly as it was shortsighted in projecting overcrowding, which
increased by more than 50% from a forecast of 190,000 to 216,000 daily for 1980 to
301,000 to 330,000 for 1990. Construction of the planned lines was targeted between
1980 and 1985. In 2010, the actual passenger volume was already 430,000.83

Meanwhile, JICA’s Feasibility Study for Manila Rapid Transit Railway Line 1, an
offshoot of the UTSMMA, was completed in June 1976 while MMETROPLAN was
being drafted. Despite the ongoing World Bank study, JICA promoted its own study
as urgent in light of the anticipated heavy traffic demand along EDSA.84 85

JICA proposed that Line 1 would run from Quezon City through Commonwealth
Avenue and Quezon Boulevard; through the Manila university belt, port areas, and
Taft Avenue; possibly extending to Baclaran and the airport in Pasay City. The study
included five mass transit lines – actually a scaled-down version of the UTSMMA -
but some would be elevated instead of underground. (See Map 6)

Again, JICA recommended heavy rail based on updated population projections.

This is also to integrate the rail system with PNR train services that would be
modernized and upgraded to rapid transit as well as bus and jeepney routes to bring
people to the train stations. Construction was projected to take 15 years.86

28 IBON Transport Series No. 1

Wrong decisions, wrong direction

The Marcos dictatorship adopted MMETROPLAN just the same, including the
construction of routes and stations, but with several changes along the way. Instead
of a street level light rail system, the government decided that LRT-1 (paralleling
part of UTSMMA’s Line 1 and MMETROPLAN’s Rizal Avenue corridor line) would
be segregated from road traffic and would be elevated. This added to the original
costing and necessitated the drafting of a supplemental plan.

The Marcos dictatorship took the construction of LRT-1 as a government project

and created the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) with the First Lady Imelda
Marcos, then governor of Metro Manila, as the first chairperson. From the start,
LRTA would oversee operations but a private corporation would handle the day-to-
day activities for 10 years.87

The PNCC started construction in September 1981 with an official development

assistance (ODA) loan from the government of Belgium. The private corporation was
Electrowatt Engineering of Zurich. LRT-1 became the first mass transit in Southeast
Asia and was also among the world’s best financially for some years. The benefit to
the commuting public was immediately felt.88

But since passenger demand was higher than the capacity of the cars, the trains
quickly deteriorated due to overcrowding. This slowed the trains, which years later
were rehabilitated with help from the government of Japan. But since LRT-1 is light
rail, the modern cars remained limited.

Metro Manila’s traffic continued to worsen in the 1980s, with increasing

passenger traffic and slowing road vehicle movement to an average of 18 kph. As
early as this time and even upholding the MMETROPLAN, The Marcos government’s
Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) and Electrowatt were
already considering heavy rail or a monorail system (but not LRT). Their study
recommended a 20-year time frame to develop around 150 km of mass transit rail,
reverting to UTSMMA and JICA but combining with MMETROPLAN.89 This seemed
to be the beginning of the ‘hodgepodge planning’ that would prove costly to the
commuting public.

The aforementioned UP scholars strongly believe that the UTSMMA could

have been a game changer and that the MMETROPLAN was a crucial point in the
underdevelopment of Metro Manila’s public transport system and its crisis today.90
What could have transpired then that made government planners and the World
Bank opt for road transport and light rail, while our Asian neighbors were already
investing in heavy rail systems at that critical time? The country was under Martial
Law, and the systemic plunder and corruption under the Marcos dictatorship

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 29

may have been a factor that shunned planners from investing hugely in public
transportation. Whatever the reasons, the MMETROPLAN unfortunately set the
stage for a deregulated, private-sector-led and road-focused public transportation
system.

More studies, no lessons learned

The next study was the Metro Manila Urban Transport Improvement Project
(MMUTIP) that was implemented from July 1980 to August 1981 and funded by
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan. It recommended a
new franchising system, additional bus routes and additional units. Additionally, it
recommended the control of entry and operations of jeepneys along major bus routes.
At the same time, it deregulated the entry and operations of jeepneys outside major
thoroughfares that were otherwise served by, or were more suitable for, buses. It also
proposed the stoppage of MMTC operations because it was unprofitable to serve
missionary routes. Finally, the study encouraged tricycles for feeder services.91

The MOTC commissioned yet another study, the Metro Manila Urban
Transportation Strategy Planning Project (MMUTSTRAP), funded by the Australian
Development Assistance Bureau, or what is today’s AusAID. The study ran from
November 1982 to April 1983 while LRT-1 was already being constructed. The
MMUTSTRAP was against deregulation and stressed service over profitability. It
also prognosticated that a mass transit rail would have to rely on huge government
subsidy to keep it in operation and continued to prefer light rail. Yet, it did not propose
new routes or rolling stock. Furthermore, the study produced a prioritization plan
for transport projects such as terminals and road development as well as transport
policies for Metro Manila.

JICA conducted another two-phase study between November 1982 and March
1985 also while LRT-1 was being constructed: the JICA Update on Manila Study on
Urban Transport (JUMSUT I and II). It focused on supporting the implementation
of LRT-1 and how to reroute public transport vehicles (buses and jeepneys) along the
LRT-1 corridor – Rizal and Taft Avenues – for balanced mode share.92

The government for its part also conducted a study in the decade of 1990-2000.
The Metro Manila Urban Transport Development Plan (UTDP) is an inter-agency
collaboration among the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), MMDA, NEDA,
Highway Patrol Group (HPG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), and MTPC. They
aimed to determine what projects could be implemented to improve transportation
in Metro Manila.

Among other things, the study compared proposals for a mass transit system
along EDSA. One was the Philtrak, a proposed bus system with its own right of way

30 IBON Transport Series No. 1

(ROW), versus a street-level LRT along EDSA. The concept of Philtrak was to use locally
made big capacity articulated buses powered by either diesel engines or a tram-like
overhead catenary electric system. It had a system capacity of 1,056,000 passengers a
day, average speed of 48 kph, 96 units of rolling stock, and 19 stations.93

The study preferred Philtrak over LRT, but an LRT (now MRT-3) was built
instead, which is now carrying more than twice the number of passengers it was
estimated to carry.94 The government set aside Philtrak, as it was saddled with
financial difficulties. Meanwhile, municipal transport authorities in Curitiba, Brazil
and Bogota, Colombia, followed by Washington, United States and Mexico later on,
were copying the Philtrak concept, now called the BRT.95

At any rate, it is still clear today that neither Philtrak nor the MRT is the most
suitable mass transit along EDSA, as transport engineers insist; and heavy rail
system is still the most appropriate.96

Neoliberalism steps up a gear

Markedly since the start of the 1990s, public mass transport planning and
management has increasingly geared the sector towards the general trend of
marketization and profitability. The decade started the refinement and intensification
of market-oriented reform policies in the economy that would veer the transport
sector away from public service and shape it into another area for profiteering. Even
feasibility studies proved to be part of the profitable business.

The MMUTIS would be the last comprehensive study conducted, again by JICA,
from 1996 to 1999. It recommended a 15-year master plan for:
1. MRT integration
2. MRT modal interchange facilities
3. MRT Line 2 Extension (Recto Avenue, City of Manila to Masinag, Antipolo
City)
4. MRT Line 4 to serve the corridor between Recto, City of Manila and Batasan,
Quezon City and eventually Novaliches, running from España Avenue,
Quezon Avenue and Commonwealth Avenue – now known as MRT-7 along
Commonwealth Avenue and MRT-9 along España Avenue and Quezon Avenue
5. MRT Line 6 to provide a mass transit system between Baclaran in Pasay City
and Imus and eventually Dasmariñas in Cavite – now known as LRT Line 1
Cavite Extension
6. PNR Commuter Improvement/Manila Calabarzon Express (MCX) to serve
the north-south transport demand along PNR’s ROW in the south and
connecting the proposed Northrail project.97 (See Map 7)

MMUTIS promoted the rail transit system as the center of the public transport
system of Metro Manila through private sector participation, effective use of ODA,

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 31

and integrated urban development. It made comprehensive recommendations on
land use zoning and development, traffic management, establishment of a transport
and development planning process, transport terminal development, improvement
of the regulatory process, and measures to accelerate infrastructure development.98
MMUTIS recommended strengthening the role of the MMDA.

Take note that JICA made a turn-around from its recommendation of heavy rail
to planning for a light rail system. MMUTIS, it may be gathered, shifted up neoliberal
economic planning in the transport sector by promoting private sector involvement,
the attraction of private investments and foreign loans such as ODA, and the use of
pricing and road and vehicle taxes. This is while enjoining government to do its part
in facilitating the privatization of public transport and infrastructure development.

The Philippine government just passed the build-operate-transfer (BOT) law

(Republic Act 6957) at the start of the decade, effectively privatizing infrastructure
development, including for public utilities such as public transport. It was the time
that the implementation of neoliberal policies would speed up at a ferocious pace,
and JICA and its studies such as MMUTIS would make an observed reversal from
emphasizing on heavy state investment in the 1970s to promoting private funding
in the 1990s.

MAP 7. MMUTIS committed and proposed public transport projects for 1999-2004
Committed projects Proposed projects

SOURCE: Napalang, Ma. Sheilah and Jose Regin Regidor, Challenges of Urban Transport Development in Metro Manila: A look back at the last 40 years, n.d.

32 IBON Transport Series No. 1

 MMUTIS is explicit on its recommendation for government to improve the
investment criteria in the transport sector especially in mega projects and to clear
rules and guidelines on private sector participation particularly on BOT projects.
When it comes to MRT projects, MMUTIS has also laid down the framework that
government would shoulder the construction component while the private sector
would take care of the operation component.

Planning for an efficient public mass transport system thus has been
transformed from a state responsibility to a private business initiative. Effectively
too, public funds for such a much-needed system have been reduced and utilized
instead to support private profiteering. Focusing on the attraction of private
foreign investments also explains now why feasibility studies could remain without
government implementation, for after all, the objective of such studies has been
to give the private investors an idea of what is profitable. Not to mention that
conducting feasibility studies is also a profitable venture.

More studies for profit

In January 2006, JICA would complete a study on the assessment of bus

operations along EDSA, an EDSA bus revalidation survey. It found out that there was
an oversupply of bus units along the section where routes overlapped. This time,
JICA was looking into the possibility of introducing BRT along EDSA (a discussion
for later).99

JICA funded another study from November 2006 to April 2007, the Mega Manila
Public Transport Study (MMPTS), as a follow-up to the EDSA bus revalidation
survey. It reviewed franchising issues, such as the proliferation of operating buses,
jeepneys and UV express without franchises, known as “colorum” in Filipino slang.
It recommended the computerization and synchronization of the databases of the
LTFRB and the LTO. The study also called for more studies with the end-view of
rationalizing supply-demand, since it also pointed out the ineffectiveness of the
route measured capacity (RMC) formulas.100

In July 2007, with the support from the US Agency for International Development
(USAID), a pre-feasibility study for the suitability of BRT was completed. However, it
was limited by several premises, as the then DOTC already reserved Commonwealth
Avenue for MRT-7 while the MMDA reserved EDSA for its organized bus route (OBR)
scheme. Thus, the study recommended BRT lines only along Ortigas Avenue and
C-5. This study eventually inspired the feasibility studies for Cebu BRT as well as
Davao BRT.101

From 2010 to May 2012, the DOTC and UP developed a Mega Manila Public
Transport Planning Support System (MMPTPSS), the first government-to-
government project. It emphasized the need to change the basis for determining the

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 33

number of bus or jeepney units serving particular routes and to replace the RMC. It
recommended for a network-based approach using transport models to assess the
impacts of additional units or the introduction of new routes.

For instance, routes with very high passenger demand (more than 160,000
passengers per day) shall be served by rail-based transit or BRT; high passenger
demand (100,000 to 160,000 passengers per day) shall be served by BRT; medium
passenger demand (10,000 to 100,000) by PUVs with 60 or less passengers/seats but
not less than 22 passengers such as buses; and low passenger demand (not exceeding
10,000 passengers per day) shall be served by PUVs with less than 22 passengers/
seats such as jeepneys and other paratransit modes.

Results of each feasibility study would feed into government’s current planning
for investment in the transport sector.

So, where are we?

After more than 40 years, the Philippine government still does not have an
institutionalized dataset on the transport sector, which we could be using as basis
for intelligent planning. Still, the latest studies are from JICA – MUCEP done in
2015 and the JICA Roadmap for Transport Infrastructure Development for Metro
Manila and Its Surrounding Areas released in 2014, with a follow-up survey in 2019.
The government relies on these dated studies to plan for the future of the transport
sector.

MUCEP indeed aimed to enable the then DOTC to make a public transportation
plan for Metro Manila by strengthening the agency’s capacity in transportation
database management, travel demand forecasting, and urban transportation
planning, among others. An updated database of trip information is a requisite in
transportation planning, yet the government is still at the stage of capacity building
in travel demand forecasting.

The NEDA adopted a National Transport Policy in 2017 under the Duterte
administration when the traffic crisis was at its height and undeniable, and also
as the Duterte administration was unveiling its ambitious BBB program. But the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) were only released in 2020 at the height of
the pandemic. Still, by end-2022 as the NEDA released the Philippine Development
Plan (PDP) 2023-2028 under the Marcos Jr administration, the agency admits that
the implementation of the National Transport Policy is difficult without a National
Master Plan and sufficient data.102 Most of the existing demand data do not reflect
travel patterns and needs.

At any rate, the NEDA is now implementing the recommendations of the JICA

34 IBON Transport Series No. 1

roadmap, which aims to decongest Metro Manila by building corridors of mass transport
systems in Southern Tagalog, Central Luzon, and Metro Manila. It aims to create a
seamless transportation system from the port of Batangas to the port of Manila and to
Clark Green City in Mabalacat, Pampanga and Subic port in Zambales.103

The recommendations on the follow-up survey of the JICA roadmap are based on
five “building blocks”, namely spatial reconfiguration, investment in infrastructure,
new townships and transit-oriented development (TOD), digital infrastructure,
and rethinking of institutional arrangements. In order to see a mobile, accessible,
inclusive, resilient, vibrant and sustainable Mega Manila, the follow-up survey
affirms that the following should be rolled out:
• Inter-connected urban expressways (80 km) and intercity expressways
(approximately 400 km);
• A railway network of 6 main lines (approximately 369 km), complemented by
5 secondary lines (75 km);
• Reshaping of a megapolitan footprint in the north-south direction, and away
from disaster-prone areas (including relocation of informal settlers);
• Modernization of road-based public transport system into a virtually-
integrated fleet of light electric vehicles (LEVs) and electric vehicles (EVs)
serving diverse trips (including phaseout of traditional jeepneys);
• Creation of new townships and transit-oriented development (TODs) and
development of old zones of existing urban hubs that will be homes to an
additional 10 to 15 million people in 20 years;
• Update of several archaic laws on transit and traffic, creation of new entities,
and re-modelling of infrastructure-coordinating institutions into a Mega
Manila Transport Authority;
• Conduct of researches and in-depth feasibility studies in support of the
above measures, as well as efficient program implementation.104

JICA insists that the establishment of a regional transport authority for

GCR should be seriously considered. It projects that if the old pace of expressway
development in the last 15 years is doubled, less than 50% of the target expressway
will get built by 2035. Likewise in railways, a pace twice faster would only build
1/5 of the desired network.105 This only emphasizes the need for fast and massive
infrastructure development in the next 15 years, which can only be achieved through
massive investment.

The main focus of PDP 2023-2028 resonates with this, i.e. a chapter on
infrastructure to cover the transport sector instead of a chapter on the transport
sector and how it contributes to, as well as reflects, a more sustainable economic
plan. “Infrastructure is critical to the economic transformation of the country”,
the PDP explicitly says, and the PDP overall has remained in the old framework
of attracting foreign investments in private-sector-driven infrastructure
development.

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 35

 For land travel, the PDP recognizes the problems of supply shortage, both of
railways and road-based public transportation; the inaccessibility of and lack of
safe transport facilities, especially for vulnerable groups; non-viability of active
transport; and road traffic fatalities. These are on top of the concerns of lack of
development on the following: maritime and airport infrastructure; civil works and
utilities installation along roads (e.g. electricity poles, waterworks, among others);
port and ancillary facilities; automated logistics processes; movement through
digital infrastructure; and addressing the impact of climate change.106

These are sectors that have been commercialized and privatized over the
decades, and being such is actually the root of them being inappropriate to the needs
of the commuting public. Still, NEDA is not focused on these sectors being reverted
to public hands, rather on continuing to entice private infrastructure corporations
to provide the financing and build the transport facilities. The PDP thus is simply
a menu of profitable avenues where private investment can go. Public transport is
only one sector where private and foreign investors may profit from.

Thus, the plan is focused on PUV modernization, infrastructure and support

facilities for active transport, continuation of the service contracting program
under private financing, more investments in universally accessible and gender-
responsive transport designs, transport corridors to sea and air ports, and digital
infrastructure. The plan is the overall gentrification of a poly-centric Mega Manila,
and as a postscript, where the traditional jeepneys, the slums and urban poor, and
the working class commuting public including farmers in the suburbs are yet to find
their place.

Metro Manila’s transport crisis stems from government’s own policy of

commercializing and privatizing public transportation and relying on the private
sector to provide the facilities, units, ticketing and fare collection system, garage
and terminals, ports, roads, and everything. Neoliberalism has resulted in weak
regulatory policies as well as weak state intervention in public mass transport.

Government cannot deny its car-centricity. In NEDA’s survey on the aspirations

of the Filipino people, the agency reports that among the aspirations of Filipinos is
to have at least one car or vehicle. When translated to the vision paper AmBisyon
Natin 2040, it has been worded as “convenient and affordable” transport. Although
it has not specified the bias for having a private vehicle, there is still no mention of
transport being mass and public.107

In reality, government’s car-centricity only betrays its bias for private business,
such as real estate corporations, infrastructure construction companies, shopping
malls, privatized public utilities, transport corporations and service companies
to design the national capital according to their business needs and profitability.

36 IBON Transport Series No. 1

Building corridors, on the other hand, eases the mobility of the flow of goods and
services to and from the country’s special economic zones and serves the import-
export economy. In the end, the problem is rooted in government’s own vision of a
service economy instead of a producing one, which is catered to big local and foreign
capitalists.

There are viable solutions to Metro Manila’s transport problems (a discussion

for much later) but in order to be able propose these, identifying the causes of urban
blight and economic underdevelopment is a start (also a discussion for later). With
this proper perspective, we can move forward to visioning an economy for the many
and rearranging a transport sector to serve this vision – a discourse that deserves
deeper and long-term articulation.

Metro Manila's Transport Chaos 37

 ENDNOTES

1 Mijares, Andra Charis, et al. “Enhancing the sustainability and inclusiveness of the Metro
Manila’s urban transportation systems: Proposed fare and policy reforms.” Transport and
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files/Bulletin%2084_Article3.pdf.
2 Chang, Katreena, et al. The Systemic Shortage in Philippine Public Transportation: The Impact
of the Infrastructure Flagship Project Pipeline on the Mobility Needs of the Greater Capital
Region and Recommendations to Bridge the Gap. Move As One Coalition, 26 May 2021.
3 Japan International Cooperation Agency and National Economic and Development
Authority. Roadmap for Transport Infrastructure Development for Metro Manila and its
Surrounding areas Region III & Region IV-A, Final Report, Main Text. Almec Corporation,
March 2014.
4 IBON Foundation, Inc. “Mass transport system in Metro Manila and the quest for
sustainability”. IBON Policy Study, 2018.
5 Subingsubing, Krixia. “EDSA ‘transformation’ now comes with loops, ‘carousel’”. Inquirer.
Net, 2 July 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1300500/edsa-transformation-now-
comes-with-loops-carousel.
6 Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board. Resolution No. 81 Series of 2020.
30 May 2020, https://ltfrb.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/87.-RESOLUTION-
NO.081-S.2020.pdf.
7 IBON, op. cit.
8 Madarang, Catalina Ricci S. “Mapmaker shows Metro Manila‘s original road system before
Skyway construction”. Interaksyon, 21 June 2021, https://interaksyon.philstar.com/
trends-spotlights/2021/06/21/194155/mapmaker-shows-metro-manilas-original-road-
system-before-skyway-construction.
9 Department of Public Works and Highways. Southeast Metro Manila Expressway (SEMME)
(C6 Expressway Phase 1). https://www.dpwh.gov.ph/dpwh/PPP/projs/mme.
10 Madarang, op. cit.
11 “NLEX Corporation”. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NLEX_Corporation.
12 “South Luzon Expressway”. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Luzon_
Expressway.
13 CAVITEX. “About CAVITEX”. https://www.cavitex.ph/about-us.
14 “Manila-Cavite Expressway”. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manila–Cavite_
Expressway.
15 Department of Public Works and Highways. ATLAS 2022, Table 7. https://www.dpwh.gov.
ph/dpwh/DPWH_ATLAS/13%20Table%207.pdf.
16 Department of Public Works and Highways. ATLAS 2022, Table 11. https://www.dpwh.gov.
ph/dpwh/DPWH_ATLAS/Tables%20&%20Graphs%20(Roads)/Road%20Data%202016/
ATLAS%202016/Table%201.5.htm.
17 Department of Transportation. Road Sector Interactive Dashboard. https://dotr.gov.ph/data-
sets/road-sector.html.
18 JICA and NEDA, Roadmap, op. cit.
19 Japan International Cooperation Agency. Data Collection Survey on Improving Road-Based
Public Transport System in Metro Manila, Republic of the Philippines, Final Report. Almec
Corporation, Oriental Consultants Global Co., Ltd., April 2022.
20 Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board. “PUV Service Contracting Program”.
https://ltfrb.gov.ph/puv-service-contracting-program.
21 Luna, Franco. “Less than half of service contracting program funds disbursed
by DOTr so far”. PhilStar Global, 26 October 2022, https://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2021/10/26/2136862/less-half-service-contracting-program-funds-
disbursed-dotr-so-far.
22 De Leon, Susan. “DOTr prepares for third-phase of Service Contracting Program”.
Philippine Information Agency, 28 March 2022, https://pia.gov.ph/news/2022/03/28/dotr-
prepares-for-3rd-phase-of-service-contracting-program.
23 Colcol, Erwin. “EDSA Carousel rides will be free again as Libreng Sakay program gets
P1.28-B funding”. SPOT.ph, 12 January 2023, https://www.spot.ph/newsfeatures/
mobility/103398/edsa-carousel-libreng-sakay-to-resume-2023-dbm-a4833-20230112.
24 Luna, op. cit.
25 Japan International Cooperation Agency. Follow-up survey on roadmap for transport
infrastructure development for Greater Capital Region (GCR), Final Report. Almec
Corporation, August 2019.
26 Ibid.
27 IBON, op. cit.
28 Japan International Cooperation Agency. Follow-up survey on roadmap for transport
infrastructure development for Greater Capital Region (GCR), Final Report, Summary.
Almec Corporation, August 2019.
29 Department of Transportation. Rail Sector Interactive Dashboard. https://dotr.gov.ph/data-
sets/railways-sector-d1.html.
30 “Pasig River Ferry Service”. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pasig_River_Ferry_
Service.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. Metropolitan Manila Annual Average Daily
Traffic (AADT) 2019. https://mmda.gov.ph/images/Home/FOI/Annual-Average-Daily-
Traffic-AADT/AADT_2019.pdf.
34 Chang, et al., op. cit.
35 Ibid.
36 Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board. Memorandum Circulars issued, 2020-
2022. https://ltfrb.gov.ph/issuances/memorandum-circulars.
37 Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahang Tsuper at Opereytor Nationwide (PISTON). Monitoring as
of 26 December 2022.
38 Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Department of Transportation and
Communications. The Project for Capacity Development and Transportation Planning and
Database Management for the Republic of the Philippines, MMUTIS Update and Enhancement
Project (MUCEP), Technical Report. Almec Corporation, Oriental Consultants Global Co.,
Ltd., December 2015.
39 Japan International Cooperation Agency. Metro Manila Urban Transportation Integration
Study (MMUTIS) Final Report Summary. Almec Corporation, Pacific Consultants
International, Yachiyo Engineering Co., Ltd., March 1999.
40 Traffic in Manila, Philippines. September 2022, https://www.numbeo.com/traffic/in/Manila.
41 Suzara, Zy-za Nadine, et al. Move People, Not Just Cars: Correcting the systemic underfunding
in national road-based public transport in the Philippines (2010-2021). Move as One
Coalition, 26 May 2021.
42 Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Department of Transportation and
Communications. The Project for Capacity Development and Transportation Planning
and Database Management for the Republic of the Philippines, MMUTIS Update and
Enhancement Project (MUCEP), Project Completion Report. Almec Corporation, Oriental
Consultants Global Co., Ltd., December 2015.
43 Santos, Ana P. “Carmageddon: The indignity of commuting in Metro Manila”. Reporter’s
Notebook, Aljazeera, 24 October 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/10/24/
carmageddon-the-indignity-of-commuting-in-metro-manila.
44 JICA and DOTC, MUCEP, op. cit.
45 JICA and NEDA, Roadmap, op. cit.
46 JICA, Follow-up survey, op. cit.
47 Suzara, et al., op. cit.
48 JICA and NEDA, Roadmap, op. cit.
49 JICA and DOTC, MUCEP, op. cit.
50 Rith, Monorom, et al. “Towards more sustainable transport in Metro Manila: A case study
of household vehicle ownership and energy consumption”. Transportation Research
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Vol. 6, 10 July 2020.
51 “Philippines – Automotive Sales Volume”. Marklines, 2023, https://www.marklines.com.
52 JICA, Follow-up survey, op. cit.
53 Ibid.
54 JICA and NEDA, Roadmap, op. cit.
55 Ibid.
56 “Manila traffic”. TomTom Traffic Index, https://www.tomtom.com/traffic-index/manila-
traffic.
57 Chang, et al., op. cit.
58 Ibid.
59 Department of Energy. Oil Monitor. https://www.doe.gov.ph/oil-monitor?q=oil-monitor.
60 Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board. Memorandum Circulars issued, 2018-
2022. https://ltfrb.gov.ph/issuances/memorandum-circulars.
61 Department of Transportation. Department Order No. 2020-021, Omnibus Franchising
Guidelines. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qxhL8iP3McdC0rM37CGEW5Cr92LMSvCH/
view.
62 Philippine Statistics Authority. OpenSTAT Database Portal. https://openstat.psa.gov.ph.
63 Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department. “Consumption patterns
among Filipino households, 2021”. Fact in Figures, No. 71, December 2022. House of
Representatives. https://cpbrd.congress.gov.ph/images/PDF%20Attachments/Facts%20
in%20Figures/FF2022-71_Consumption_Patterns_Among_Fil_Households_2021.pdf.
64 JICA, Follow-up survey, op. cit.
65 JICA and NEDA, Roadmap, op. cit.
66 Santos, op. cit.
67 Dela Peña, Kurt. “Suffering commuters, higher fare, fewer trips: PH transport woes pile up”.
Inquirer.Net, 15 June 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1611391/suffering-commuters-
higher-fare-fewer-trips-ph-transport-woes-pile-up.
68 Chang, et al., op. cit.
69 Suzara, et al., op. cit.
70 Sidel, John T. “What are the challenges faced by urban transport in the Global South?”. LSE
COVID-19 Blog, 21 May 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/05/21/what-are-the-
challenges-faced-by-urban-transport-in-the-global-south.
71 Jose, Ricardo T., et al. The Mass Transit System in Metro Manila: From Tranvia to MRT, 1879-
2017. University of the Philippines System Emerging Interdisciplinary Research 06-
008, n.d.
72 Napalang, Ma. Sheilah and Jose Regin Regidor. Challenges of Urban Transport Development
in Metro Manila: A look back at the last 40 years. N.d.
73 Jose, et al., op. cit.
74 Ibid.
75 Napalang and Regidor, op. cit.
76 Jose, et al., op. cit.
77 Napalang and Regidor, op.cit.
78 “MMETROPLAN, 1977”. Caught (up) in traffic, https://d0ctrine.com/?s=mmetroplan&submit=.
79 Napalang and Regidor, op. cit.
80 Jose, et al., op. cit.
81 Napalang and Regidor, op. cit.
82 Jose, et al., op. cit.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Napalang and Regidor, op. cit.
86 Jose, et al., op. cit.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Caught (up) in traffic, op. cit.
91 Ibid.
92 Napalang and Regidor, op. cit.
93 Hermoso, Tito F. “Fresh transport ideas: From UBER to PHILTRAK”. Autoindustriya.com, 28
August 2015, https://www.autoindustriya.com/inside-man/fresh-transport-ideas-from-
uber-to-philtrak.html.
94 Caught (up) in traffic, op. cit.
95 Hermoso, op. cit.
96 Caught (up) in traffic, op. cit.
97 Napalang and Regidor, op. cit.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 National Economic and Development Authority. Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2023-
2028. https://pdp.neda.gov.ph.
103 JICA, Follow-up survey, op. cit.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 PDP 2023-2028, op. cit.
107 National Economic and Development Authority. AmBisyon Natin 2040. https://2040.neda.
gov.ph.
ISBN 978-621-460-036-6