POSITION PAPER

Committee Name: Phoenician Sentinel Council

After more than two decades of relentless conflict, Carthage and Rome sought to end the prolonged
struggle that ravaged their lands and resources. The war, primarily fought over control of Sicily left a
trail of devastation in its wake. Eventually, in 241 BCE, the two powers finally brokered a peace
settlement –Treaty of Lutatius– which resulted in Carthage ceding Sicily to Rome and paying a
substantial indemnity. The reason for the conflict? The existing Carthaginian empire and the
expanding Roman Republic came in contact with each other.

Acknowledging Carthage’s shortcomings, gleaning wisdom from past mistakes, and paving a path
forward as we navigate through the tumultuous waters of the Second Punic War are incumbent for any
leader of Carthage. Carthage’s only aim and goal is to preserve her trade and business empire. It has no
vision to create Carthaginian hegemony in the Mediterranean (Aneni and Al-Onyanabo). Its lack of
foresight, along with a complacent attitude and reluctance to confront potential adversaries
contributed to its downfall. Instead of proactively addressing emerging threats and expanding
influence, Carthage remained passive and content, maintaining the status quo as the financial centre.

In contrast with the Romans’ adeptness in compelling the conquered territories to participate in a
mutual defensive organisation under the leadership of Rome, Carthage exhibits a colossal error in her
foreign policy – it had no such policy. While Rome gradually integrates its allies into the Roman
hegemony, granting Roman citizenship and rights, Carthage prefers punitive taxation from its looser
confederates and subject allies, ultimately holding no real allies. This made it relatively easy to peel off
the allies loyal to Carthage by promising an alliance with Rome and the benefits it conferred (Aneni
and Al-Onyanabo). Carthage’s inability to reorganise their newly allied towns into new regional
hegemony prevented communities from realising shared benefits. To rectify this, Carthage should
engage with her allies not only in trade and self-defence but also in the predominant usage of a
common language, political habits, and architecture. The political strategy should be to build alliances
containing elements of mutual self-interest, through her complex series of treaties with various
communities.

The root cause of chaos in the First Punic War was Carthage’s heavy reliance on mercenary troops as it
had no standing citizen army. The Carthaginian army predominantly compose largely of mercenary
units – both paid local allies and mercenary armies from Greece, Iberia, Southern Italy, and Gaul
(Cartwright). Mercenary troops are useless to a Prince, as they are only paid for their services. They
have nothing to lose if the nation that hires them is defeated. All they care about is their pay, and there
their caring stops (Machiavelli). This reliance poses challenges like disloyalty and even causes in-fighting
between the rival clans. The mercenaries lack national sentiment and only care about their payment,
leading to a dearth of unity and purpose amongst the Carthaginian leadership and people. Such a
policy will have adverse effects on the number of men Carthage could summon to fight for the Second
Punic War (Aneni and Al-Onyanabo). In contrast with the Romans, the Carthaginians have no hint
of the Moral Law defined as “what causes the people to be in accord with their ruler…. So that they will
follow him regardless of their lives….undismayed by any danger…” (Tzu 1). There must be a strong
bond to the preservation and defence for Carthage, which must reflect evidently in the behaviour. This
feeling of national sentiment will play a huge role in keeping Carthage together. By providing its
recruits citizenship and establishing privileges for them, Carthage can generate loyalty and a feeling of
inclusiveness and belongingness to ensure a coordinated and effective response to Roman aggression
and to avoid internal divisions and conflicts that could undermine Carthaginian unity.
The glaring failure in Carthaginian philosophies is the failure to adopt the offensive realism in the
grand strategic goal. One important feature is that states that practice this tactic are uncertain about
the intentions of rival states. Therefore, they alleviate this feeling of uncertainty by increasing their
military and material prospects so that they become a great power in the region. These states realise the
advantage military prowess gives them over rival states and so they become assured of their security and
in turn, their survival. Alliances are made with friendly nations with the aim of isolating rival powers
and so reducing the military power of rival states. By increasing their military capabilities, states achieve
hegemony in the area, which serves as a bulwark against aggression from rival states (Aneni and
Al-Onyanabo).

The lack of offensive realism caused immense harm: The lack of hegemony in the Mediterranean
meant that Carthage has no real allies to its cause. Disregarding the lookout for potential rival states,
Carthage was happy to sit back and keep making money from trade. However, Carthage forgot that in
the long run, whoever had more power would have more gold (Aneni and Al-Onyanabo). “Great
powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony, thus eliminating any
possibility of a challenge by another great power… Only a misguided state would pass up the opportunity to
become the hegemon in a region because it feels it already has sufficient power”( Mearsheimer). If
Carthage had applied offensive tactics, it would have seen the need for a citizen army and the dangers a
mercenary army brings in its wake; it would have understood the art of establishing relationships with
allies; it would have realised the importance of looking out for potential rival states (Aneni and
Al-Onyanabo).

Before implementing any action, Carthage must realise that success needs a collective effort – a single
man can’t win wars. Carthage needs to sort out their differences and improve the primitive nature of
the vessels and poor communication and intelligence. Carthaginians should “make a more serious effort
to regain the command of the sea” (Hart 44). To be a sea power requires sustained commitment and
resources. The Carthaginians [must] redouble their construction to seize the initiative at sea. They
[must not] give the Romans breathing space rather, [they should] press their advantage (Bebber).

All this can be achieved by prioritising rapid rebuilding of the naval fleet; building defences and
establishing an early-warning system like high watchtowers and signal systems to warn approaching
attack (Mark); investing, expanding and modernising the fleet through the construction of new
quinqueremes and triremes, equipped with advanced naval technologies and weaponry; developing
torsion-powered catapults – ballistae and traction trebuchets to enhance its capabilities in besieging
enemy fortifications; improving communication systems and messaging protocols for coordinating
military operations, issuing orders, and disseminating intelligence across vast distances. Intelligence can
be prioritised by monitoring Roman naval movements and identifying vulnerable targets and exploit
enemy weaknesses. Additionally, utilising spies, scouts and reconnaissance patrols would provide
valuable insights into Roman naval deployments and facilitate effective decision-making. Lastly, an
advancement in battlefield medicine and healthcare by prompt medical assistance enhances the
survivability of wounded soldiers and mitigates the impact of disease and injury.

After applying changes and adopting strategies, I lay down the plan of action as Rome has declared war
on Carthage. The main idea we need to keep in mind is resilience: The Romans are practical people
who don’t believe in wasting time and effort if they see someone strong enough to withstand them
(Aneni and Al-Onyanabo). The army contingent will be divided into two parts: Hannibal and
Hasdrubal. I along with Mago, Bombilcar, and Tanithra will stay in Spain, to confront the Romans if
they come to Iberia. Simultaneously, Hannibal along with Himilco (who has knowledge of
Lilybaeum), Hasdrubal Gisco, and Adherbal will go and defend Carthage in case Romans decide to
attack there with 85,000 infantry + 25,000 already stationed in Carthage, 10,000 cavalry, 100 elephants
of Carthage, 250 warships, and 650 logistical ships. Calling the Romans to Spain is advantageous as
Rome doesn't even know what war they will fight. Rome views Carthaginian hegemony in Spain as a
main threat and is attempting to use diplomacy and military force to retaliate. The opening strategic
moves by the Romans would be disastrous with the Romans always reacting one step behind the
Carthaginians. In many respects, the Romans will find themselves at war in Spain without an actual
campaign plan or national strategy of any sort (Stepaniuk). After the Romans approach Saguntum,
their resources will be diverted, so Hannibal will attack the major military port, Lilybaeum, keeping
one of the commanders in Carthage for security. Lilybaeum poses to be an impactful target – it is a
major Roman port of Sicily. Firstly, warships are coast-bound and need to be able to beach or enter
harbours at short intervals, thus only control of beaches and harbours along the intended route could
move a fleet. Secondly, capturing the port and any part of the garrison or fleet will signal to the Romans
and their allies that Rome is incapable of protecting their holdings on Sicily and Carthage will fight for
what they have lost. Thirdly, a success in Sicily early in the war will allow Carthage to seize the island
and use it as a base to launch operations in southern Italy and as a base for resupply. Lastly, capturing a
major port will disrupt Roman daily life by affecting trade. A disruption in maritime trade would have
had an impact on all of Rome’s allies and not just the city of Rome itself (Stepaniuk).

Fighting in Lilybaeum will divert and deplete the Roman resources significantly. Once Hannibal has a
hold on Lilybaeum convincingly, cavalry will be transported from Carthage for further wars. Mago and
Bombilcar, meanwhile, will reach and attack Sardinia and then Corsica, forming a blockade for the
Roman fleet. Hannibal has entrusted me to command both land and naval forces surrounding the
Iberian peninsula, amid the mission, and guide the commander in Carthage once Hannibal leaves.

While this mission is into action, the Carthaginian constitution must be “adequate to all emergencies”,
creating a politically flexible environment which permits the state to rapidly and efficiently change laws
to immediate needs in times of war. This flexibility will enable Carthage to respond effectively to crises
and changes (Stepaniuk).

By pursuing its objectives and overcoming challenges with resolve and determination, Carthage will
emerge triumphant! Hail Carthage!
 Works Cited

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Hart, B.H. Liddell. “Strategy”. New York: Penguin Group, 2000. Print.

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Tzu, Sun. “Art of War”. London: Luzac and Co., 2010. Web.

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