Global shipping continues to confront multiple challenges,

including heightened trade policy and geopolitical tensions and

is dealing with changes in globalization patterns. Additionally,
shipping must transition to a more sustainable future,
decarbonize and embrace digitalization. Being at the intersection
of these forces will influence how the sector adapts to the
evolving operational and regulatory landscape while continuing
to effectively service global trade.

Maritime trade volume contracted marginally by 0.4 per cent in

2022, but UNCTAD projects it will grow by 2.4 per cent in 2023.
Indeed, the industry remains resilient and UNCTAD expects
continued but moderated growth in maritime trade volume for
the medium term (2024–2028).

During 2022, containerized trade, measured in metric tons,

declined by 3.7 per cent. UNCTAD projects it will increase by
1.2 per cent in 2023 and expand by over 3 per cent during the
2024–2028 period, although this rate is below the long-term

1
growth of about 7 per cent over the previous three decades.

Starting in early 2022, seaborne trade, in particular dry bulk and

tanker shipments, has been impacted by the war in Ukraine.
The war led to changes in shipping patterns and increased the
distances travelled for commodities, especially oil and grain.
Growth in ton-miles exceeds growth in tons in 2022, 2023 and
for 2024 projections.

In 2022, oil and gas trade volumes witnessed robust annual

growth rates, of 6 per cent and 4.6 per cent, respectively.
The increase can be attributed to heightened demand for fuel
as the pandemic eased and related restrictions were lifted. As
spending on energy-intensive services like transport and travel
gradually recovered, a return to normalcy contributed to the
surge in oil demand. In contrast, containerized and dry bulk
shipments declined in 2022. Weakened containerized trade INTERNATIONAL
reflects the slowdown in global economic growth, high inflation
and normalizing of demand after the unusual surge during the
MARITIME TRADE
COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2023, oil cargo distances reached long-term highs, driven

by disruptions from the war in Ukraine. Crude oil and refined
products travelled longer distances, as the Russian Federation
sought new export markets for its cargo and Europe looked for
alternative energy suppliers.

Shipments of grains travelled longer distances in 2023 than

any other year on record. Although grain shipments from
Ukraine resumed in 2022 thanks to the Black Sea Initiative,
several grain-importing countries had to rely on alternative grain
exporters. They are instead buying from the United States of
America, or Brazil, which requires longer hauls.

Containerized trade distances have tumbled since 2020 but

increased marginally in 2023. Intra- Asian containerized trade,
which accounts for the majority of intraregional trade, saw its
share increase over the years. As intra-Asian trade is carried
over shorter distances, the average distances travelled per ton
of container cargo of global containerized trade are relatively
low. The predominance of intra- Asian containerized trade flows
reflects global manufacturing patterns with China continuing
to serve as the leader in global manufacturing, supported by
neighbouring East Asian countries. It also reflects the growing
participation of several East Asian countries in regional and
global value chains.
 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

A. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE FLOWS

1. Maritime trade volume contracted in 2022 and is expected to grow at a

slow pace
International seaborne trade volume contracted by 0.4 per cent in 2022, reaching 12,027 million tons,
down from 12,072 million tons in 2021. This drop in performance comes after a strong rebound in 2021
but is dwarfed by the sharp decline observed in 2020 at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2022
performance reflects the normalization that followed the extraordinary market surge in 2021.
Several factors influenced the weak growth in maritime trade flows in 2022 (see box 1.1). Weaker global
economic growth, high inflation impacting consumer spending, the disruption caused by the war in
Ukraine, and strict COVID-19 containment measures affecting the economic and trade performance
of China had a particular impact (Clarksons Research, 2023a and ICC, 2023). Maritime trade volume
contracted marginally by 0.4 per cent in 2022, but UNCTAD projects it will grow by 2.4 per cent in 2023.
Indeed, the industry remains resilient and UNCTAD expects continued but moderated growth in maritime
trade volume (table 1) for the medium term (2024–2028).
Global shipping is also facing concurrent forces that make balancing supply and demand a challenging
task for carriers. During 2022, containerized trade, measured in metric tons, declined by 3.7 per cent.
UNCTAD projects it will increase by 1.2 per cent in 2023 and expand by over 3 per cent during the
2024–2028 period, although this rate is below the long-term growth of about 7 per cent over the previous
three decades. On the supply side, container shipping may have entered an overcapacity phase, meaning
that carriers will aim at managing capacity using tools such as slippage, idling of vessels or demolition.

Box 1.1 Persistent challenges impeding global economic growth and trade
in 2022 and 2023
In 2022, global domestic product increased by 3.2 per cent, half the rate of the 6.1 per cent
recorded in 2021(a). The war in Ukraine and other interconnected shocks impacted global
economic performance, leading to a cost-of-living crisis. Growing poverty, hunger and debt
distress reversed progress on several Sustainable Development Goals, midway to their 2030
deadline.
Global inflation reached a multi-decade high of about 8 per cent in 2022 and early 2023. Inflation
rates vary by country groupings, with developing countries expected to reach 7.3 per cent and
advanced economies 3.3 per cent in 2023 (IMF). The Middle East and Africa recorded the highest
consumer price increases, particularly during the first quarter of 2023 (UNCTAD, 2023b).
Energy prices, particularly gas and coal prices, reached unprecedented highs in 2022, boosting
import bills in 2022 and impacting the most vulnerable households. Prices also affected food
security; between January 2020 and May 2023, the FAO food price index rose by 21 per cent,
although global food prices have displayed a downward trend since mid-2022. This was due
to several reasons, including trade-enabling conditions provided by the Black Sea Initiative (see
section B.3).
To combat inflation, central banks around the world raised interest rates from the end of 2021.
The tightening of monetary policy has increased existing debt costs and made new financing
more expensive for many developing countries. It has also constrained industrial production and
demand growth.
There is significant uncertainty about growth prospects, with downside factors such as geopolitical
risks associated with the war in Ukraine and trade tensions, inflation and financial vulnerability
negatively impacting the outlook. Global growth projections remain modest for 2023 (3.2 per cent)
and 2024 (2.9 per cent) (a), supported by the reopening of the Chinese economy. Asia, particularly
India, South Asia and Central Asia are projected to record the highest growth, whereas other
regions will mostly see very low growth.
Global inflation is projected to remain persistently elevated in 2023, with high food and energy
prices potentially deepening the cost-of-living crisis. It is expected to remain above central bank
targets in 2023 and above the 2000–2019 average and to gradually decline, reaching pre-
pandemic levels, towards the end of 2024 (a).

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 REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2023

Box 1.1 Persistent challenges impeding global economic growth and trade
in 2022 and 2023 (cont.)
Merchandise trade growth has also been slowing down. In 2022, volumes increased modestly
by 2.7 per cent, representing a sharp decline from the 9.4 per cent rebound witnessed in 2021
(c). During the first quarter of 2023, trade grew by 1.9 per cent, driven by the revival of economic
activity in China, and by an increase in the trade of road vehicles and pharmaceuticals (UNCTAD,
2023c). During the last two years, trade grew more in value terms than in volume terms, driven
mainly by rising commodity prices and inflation. The outlook for global trade for 2023 is pessimistic,
with an expected annual growth rate of 1.7 per cent (c) and -0.6 per cent for the second quarter
of 2023 (b). Trade growth is projected to improve to 3.2 per cent in 2024 (c).

Sources: IMF (2023) World Economic Outlook 2023 Update. Gloomy and More Uncertain, July 2023; OECD (2023) Economic
Outlook, Volume 2023 Issue 1, June 2023; UNCTAD (2023a) Nowcast; UNCTAD (2023b) Pulse of the Global Crisis;
UNCTAD (2023c) Global Trade Update, June 2023: Global trade growth returns but outlook is poor); United Nations
(2023) World Economic Situation and Prospects, Mid-year update, May 2023 and WTO (2023) Global Trade Outlook
and Statistics, 5 April 2023.
Notes: (a) reflects projections by IMF – July 2023; (b) by UNCTAD – Nowcast, last accessed on 28 July 2023 and (c) by
WTO - April 2023.

Bearing in mind the ongoing uncertainty and downside risks surrounding the economic prospects, UNCTAD
projects total seaborne trade to grow by 2.4 per cent in 2023, an improvement over the contraction of
2022. UNCTAD forecasts1 maritime trade to expand at an average annual growth rate of 2.1 per cent
during the period 2024–2028 (table 1.1). This is below the 3 per cent historical average growth rate of the
past three decades.

Table 1.1 International maritime trade development forecast, 2024–2028

(Annual percentage change)
Year Total seaborne trade Containerized trade
2024 2.1 3.2
2025 2.2 3.2
2026 2.2 3.2
2027 2.1 3.0
2028 2.1 2.9

Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations and forecasts published by Clarksons Research (July 2023).
Note: UNCTAD projections are based on the estimated elasticities of maritime trade concerning GDP, export volumes,
investment share in GDP as well as monthly seaborne trade data published by Clarksons Research. They also build
on the GDP forecast published in the International Monetary Fund, July 2023 World Economic Output.

2. Above-average growth in energy trade carried in tankers and moderate

growth for dry bulk trade projected for 2023
In 2022, seaborne trade volumes continued to be dominated mainly by dry bulk and oil shipments,
followed by containerized trade (figure 1.1).
Oil2 and gas3 trade volumes witnessed the highest annual growth rates among cargo types in 2022, at 6
per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively. In the case of oil, this growth rate, as well as the rates projected
for 2023 and 2024, significantly exceeds the 10-year average compound rates of the periods 1992–2002,
2002–2012 and 2012–2022 (Clarksons, 2023e).
This reflects greater demand for fuels with the easing of the pandemic and the return to normality leading
to spending on energy-intensive services such as transport and travel, marking a recovery from the lows
of 2020–2021. In addition, factors such as energy security and geopolitics have also contributed to this
growth. These factors are expected to persist in 2023, leading to further growth in the energy trade and
the gas trade in particular (Clarksons, 2023g). This is primarily driven by the need for enhanced energy
security and a growing environmental agenda.
In contrast, containerized and dry bulk shipments declined by -3.7 and -2.9 per cent respectively in 2022.
The performance of containerized trade in the second half of 2022 and the first half of 2023 largely reflects

4
 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

Figure 1.1 International maritime trade, 2003–2024

(Million tons loaded)
6 000
Dry bulk
5 000
Oil
4 000
Containers
3 000
Other dry
2 000
Gas
1 000
Chemicals
0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024
Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Intelligence Network time series (July 2023).
Notes: 2023 and 2024 are forecast. “Dry bulk” includes major bulks (iron ore, coal and grain) and minor bulks (metals,
minerals, agribulks and softs); “Oil” encompasses crude oil and refined oil products; “Other dry” is an estimation of
all other dry trade that is not included in major/minor bulks, for instance, cars and other vehicles, roro and project
cargoes, as well as reefer cargoes that don’t go in containers and breakbulk cargoes that are not in the minor bulk
category; “gas” includes LPG, LNG and ammonia.

the less favourable macroeconomic trends and a return to normal after the unusual post-COVID-19 surge
in container trade demand, which expanded at a solid 6.2 per cent over 2020.
For 2023, UNCTAD forecasts containerized trade volumes to increase by 1.2 per cent. The outlook for
containerized trade remains weak in 2023 given the overall macroeconomic and operating landscape. A
potential improvement in global economic conditions and the recovery of China from the disruption caused
by the COVID-19 pandemic and consequent economic slowdown could support sector performance
during the second semester of 2023 (Clarksons, 2023f). However, UNCTAD forecasts a growth rebound
starting in 2024 of around 3 per cent p.a. (table 1.1). These growth rates remain well below the average
rates witnessed during the periods 1992–2002 (8.7 per cent) and 2002–2012 (7.2 per cent) (Clarksons,
2023e).
In 2022, dry bulk shipments declined due to the disrupted Ukrainian exports, high energy prices (which
affected various energy-intensive industries that use dry bulk commodities as an input) and trends
in the Chinese economy, including the sharp decline in investment in the Chinese real estate sector
(Clarksons, 2023b and Danish Ship Finance, 2022). Demand for major dry bulks improved in 2023
driven by subsequent economic recovery in China. Grain and minor bulk shipments totalled 535 and
2,117 million tons respectively, representing a 3.8 and a 1.9 per cent growth rate compared to 2022
(Clarksons, 2023e). Bulk demand is projected to grow modestly within the 1.5–2.5 per cent range in 2023
(BIMCO, 2023). Improvements in bulk trade could materialize in 2024, depending on the easing of the
global macroeconomic situation, increased coal consumption and production in China and India, the pace
of the energy transition, and the war in Ukraine.

3. Distance travelled by sea of refined oil products, crude oil and grain
reaches record highs
Seaborne trade, both in tons and in ton-miles declined in 2022. In 2023 and 2024 ton-miles are projected
to grow more than tons, reflecting growth in distances travelled, with the gap between the two reducing in
2024 (figure 1.2). Closely monitoring trends in ton-miles, as discussed in sections B.1 and B.2, is essential
to understand if a long-term shift in the geography of shipping and trade is at play. This assessment
also involves examining key factors such as the impact of the war in Ukraine on trading and shipping
patterns, the pursuit of energy security, and the adoption of low-carbon energy sources. These elements
are significantly influencing trade flows and the demand for shipping services.
Over the past decade, the average distance travelled by seaborne trade increased for oil and dry bulk
commodities but fell in the case of containerized trade (UNCTAD, 2022a). The average distance travelled
by one ton of grain was 5,574 nautical miles in 2002 and increased to 7,251 in 2022. For oil commodities
(including crude oil and refined oil products) this measure was 3,993 nautical miles in 2002, increasing to
4,350 in 2022. The average distance travelled by one ton of dry bulk commodities (excluding grains) was

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 REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2023

Figure 1.2 Seaborne trade growth, tons and ton-miles, 2000–2024

(Annual percentage change)
10

4 Ton-miles
2 Tons
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024
-2

-4

-6

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Intelligence Network time series (July 2023).
Note: 2023 and 2024 are forecast.

4,978 nautical miles in 2002 and increased to 5,231 in 2022. These cargo types are expected to reach
long-time records in 2023, namely 7,338 nautical miles for grain, 5,253 nautical miles for other dry bulk
commodities, and 4,578 nautical miles for oil cargo (figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3 Distance travelled per ton of maritime cargo, 1999–2024

(Nautical miles)
7 500
7 000 Grain
6 500 Dry bulk
(excluding
6 000 grain)
5 500
Container
5 000
Oil
4 500
4 000
3 500
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Intelligence Network time-series (July 2023).
Notes: 2023 and 2024 are forecast. “Oil” includes crude oil and refined oil products.

Growth in distances travelled of oil cargo reflects structural shifts in the energy production and distribution
sectors and imbalances in supply and demand. The shale revolution in the United States, coupled with
the lifting of the crude oil export ban in 2015, led to an increase in oil cargo shipments from the United
States to Asia.
At the same time, the growing refining capacity in Asia has increased demand for crude oil shipments
from the Atlantic basin. Meanwhile, demand for refined oil products in Asia, especially China, and exports
of refined oil products from Asia have also changed the direction of flows and distances travelled. As for
dry bulk shipments, large consumption in China of iron ore, coal and grains and minor bulks used in steel
production have been a major driver in dry bulk trade shipments and distances travelled with many of
these commodities being sourced from the Argentina, Brazil and United States.
Since 2022, a gap is observed between ton and ton-mile growth in the case of oil and oil products, and
coal (figure 1.4 and figure 1.5). Growth in ton-miles seems to have been heightened by the war in Ukraine
in the case of these three products. In 2023, refined oil products, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and crude
oil trade are expected to witness the largest increases in ton-miles that exceed growth in trade volumes
(Clarksons, 2023e).

6
 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

Figure 1.4 Crude oil and refined oil products seaborne trade growth, tons and ton-miles,
2003–2024
(Annual percentage change)
10
8
6 Ton-miles
4 Tons
2
0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Intelligence Network time series (July 2023).
Notes: 2023 and 2024 are forecast.

Figure 1.5 Coal seaborne trade growth, tons and ton-miles, 2003–2024
(Annual percentage change)
20

15

10

5
Tons
0 Ton-miles
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

-5

-10

-15

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Intelligence Network time series (July 2023).
Note: 2023 and 2024 are forecast.

If sustained and inclusive, this development could lead to trade diversification opportunities and shifts in the
geography of trade that may enable new players to emerge as importers and exporters. However, for the
end user or the consumer, alternative cargo sourced from further away may entail greater shipping costs
and result in higher import prices. For shipping companies, increasing ton-miles implies a larger demand for
shipping capacity that may require investment in more ships and support better fleet utilization and earnings.
However, this gap is expected to reduce in 2023 and 2024. In the case of oil and oil products specifically,
starting in 2024, growth in tons is expected to increase while growth in ton-miles is expected to slow
down. This reflects lower growth in distances travelled (5.3 per cent in 2024) compared with 2023 (about
7.8 per cent) (Clarksons, 2023e). This suggests that growth in ton-miles exceeding volumes induced by
the war in Ukraine was a cyclical change in the usual patterns, as opposed to a structural shift.

4. Modest recovery in containerized trade in 2023

In 2022, global containerized trade volumes declined marginally by -0.7 per cent, reaching 163 million
20-foot equivalent units (TEUs), down from 164 million TEUs in 2021 and in sharp contrast to the surge in
volumes recorded in 2021 (8.1 per cent), as illustrated in figure 1.6. UNCTAD forecasts that containerized

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 REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2023

seaborne trade will grow by 1.2 per cent in 2023 and will grow modestly, as macroeconomic challenges
ease, with around 3 per cent per year for containerized trade starting in 2024 (see table 1.1 and annex).
Global containerized trade has been on a roller coaster ride since the COVID-19 pandemic. While the
market boomed in 2021 and during much of the first half of 2022, the situation changed dramatically
by the second half of the year and returned to normal pre-COVID-19 levels. Significant differences were
observed across regions in terms of annual changes in containerized trade (box 1.2).

Figure 1.6 Global containerized trade, 1996–2023

(Million 20-foot equivalent units and percentage annual change)
180 20
160
15
140

120 10
100
5
80

60 0
40
-5
20

0 -10
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Million TEU (left axis) Percentage annual growth

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data from MDS Transmodal (MDST), World Cargo Database, 1 June 2023.

Box 1.2 Seaborne containerized trade performs differently across sub-regions

Since 2020, containerized trade has faced an unprecedented rise in shipping rates, difficulties of
trade logistic systems to adapt effectively to supply and demand abrupt changes, less frequent
port calls, port congestion and labour-related issues. As a result, disruptions in maritime supply
chains have been widespread at a global level, prompting a substantial drop in seaborne
containerized cargo volumes.
However, impacts differed across regions, as shown in the table below. Effects were more
marked in Latin America than in other regions, with a reduction of almost six percentage points in
container volumes in 2020 compared to the previous year. By the end of 2022, although the gap
had narrowed, the total ended below the levels of 2019.
Annual changes in containerized international seaborne trade
(Sum of exports and imports) by sub-region, 2019 = 100
2019 2020 2021 2022
Sub-Saharan Africa 100 96.4 98.2 98.1
North America 100 100.5 109.4 101.6
Latin America 100 94.3 101.9 96.5
Australasia and Oceania 100 100.6 101.9 97.4
Europe 100 97.0 101.9 94.5
Asia 100 99.9 106.3 104.0
Indian Subcontinent and 100 96.9 98.0 101.6
Middle East
Global 100 98.7 104.5 100.9

Source: Barleta and Saade (2023), based on Container Trade Statistics (CTS), 2019–2022.

8
 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

Box 1.2 Seaborne containerized trade performs differently across sub-regions (cont.)
Performances diverged among and within regions and across the type of trades. Some of the main
ports in the region such as Panama, show that the Caribbean coast of Panama recovered more
quickly and showed better results in exports (+15 per cent exports vs. -15 per cent imports) in 2022
compared with 2019 whereas the Panamanian Pacific coast experienced a 14 per cent increase in
imports against a -11 per cent decline in exports.
As the world appears to be returning to previous levels and normalizing after the volatility of recent
years, many questions remain about the future of seaborne trade in the Latin American and
Caribbean region. A more resilient future will require mechanisms that consider global variations, route
changes, industry concentration and regional inequalities. It will also require addressing the historic
and substantial infrastructure gap related to connectivity between ports and the region’s economic
hinterland. This infrastructure gap poses a significant obstacle to development in countries from
this region, making it a crucial aspect to address in building resilience. The considerable investment
needed at a time when countries and Governments are under severe economic pressure and lack
resources constitutes a major hurdle.
Tighter and more efficient resource planning is needed, together with more creative financing
mechanisms. Extensive planning, financing and regulatory efforts are required to ensure an
integrated Latin American and Caribbean region that can navigate future disruptions and leverage
seaborne trade opportunities more effectively.

Source: UN-ECLAC, based on Eliana Barleta y Miryam Saade Hazin: “Challenges for the maritime sector: after the storm,
comes the calm?” Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, 2023; and Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: “International Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean
2022”, LC/PUB.2022/23-P, Santiago, 2023.

By the third quarter of 2022, normalization in market conditions started to show, reflecting the fading
away of the boost generated by various COVID-19-related drivers. Demand moderated and volumes
weakened, reflecting the end of the stimulus spending effect, especially in the United States; the impact
of inflation, including on global consumer demand; more destocking and inventory draws, as well as a
recovery of services trade.
By late 2022, containerized trade had tempered the bullish market conditions seen in 2021 and early
2022, when freight rates had soared, the orderbook surged, and port congestion reached record highs.
The average container capacity held up in ports increased from about 31 per cent in 2019 to 35 per cent
in 2021 and 2022 (Clarksons, 2023h). A softening in container shipping demand has helped to ease the
global logjam in the maritime supply chain, with the average number of vessels waiting in ports now back
to their pre-pandemic levels (see also chapter 4, and Danish Ship Finance, 2023).

5. Containerized trade flows on the main East-West routes contract, while

intraregional trade grows
Table 1.2 shows the bidirectional flows of containerized trade over the main East-West trade routes. The
transpacific route, involving trade between East Asia and more specifically China and the United States,
continued to dominate global containerized trade flows in 2022. However overall volumes transported on
this route contracted by -6.5 per cent, reducing volumes from 30 million TEUs in 2021 to 28 million TEUs
in 2022. Volumes on the Asia-Europe route also declined by -4.9 per cent in 2022, whereas flows from
Europe heading to the North American East Coast increased by nearly 2 per cent. These developments
reflect a weakening in the container shipping market in the second half of 2022.
In 2023, after a sluggish start to the year, ocean carriers shifted capacity from transatlantic routes (more
resilient in 2022, encompassing non-consumer goods, whose imports were less affected by the slowdown
in demand) back to transpacific routes where spot rates were projected to increase, albeit remaining lower
than pre-pandemic levels (Knowler, 2023; and Tirschwell, 2023).
Despite the drop in volumes observed in 2022, table 1.3 underscores the continued predominance of the
main East—West routes (37.5 per cent). However, the importance of intraregional routes, whose share
amounted to 27.6 per cent in 2022, remains significant. It reflects dynamic intra-Asian container shipping
activity and the manufacturing supply chain specific to East Asian countries. Other routes involving the
participation of developing countries include the non-mainline routes (e.g., Indian Sub-Continent to
Europe) with a 13.2 per cent share, followed by South—South trades (e.g. Africa—Latin America and the
Caribbean) which contributed 12.5 per cent to global containerized trade in 2022.

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Table 1.2 Containerized trade on major East—West trade routes, 2014–2022

(Million 20-foot equivalent units and percentage annual change)
Trans-Pacific Asia–Europe Transatlantic

Eastbound Westbound Eastbound Westbound Eastbound Westbound

Northern Northern
Europe and East Asia North America Europe and
East North Mediterra- to Northern to Northern Mediterranean
Asia-North America- Total Trans- nean to East Europe and Total Europe and to North Total
America East Asia Pacific Asia Mediterranean Asia-Europe Mediterranean America Transatlantic

2014 16.2 8.2 24.4 7.3 14.7 22.0 2.9 4.1 6.9
2015 17.4 8.1 25.5 7.4 14.3 21.7 2.8 4.3 7.1
2016 17.3 7.9 25.2 7.8 14.8 22.6 2.8 4.4 7.1
2017 18.5 7.8 26.3 8.1 15.7 23.9 3.0 4.7 7.7
2018 19.8 7.9 27.7 8.3 16.7 25.0 3.1 4.9 8.1
2019 19.1 7.4 26.4 8.6 16.9 25.5 3.0 5.1 8.1
2020 20.0 7.3 27.3 8.5 15.8 24.3 2.6 5.0 7.6
2021 23.8 6.4 30.2 8.2 17.3 25.5 2.7 5.6 8.3
2022 22.4 5.8 28.2 7.0 17.2 24.2 2.6 5.8 8.5
Percentage annual change
2014—2015 7.5 -2.2 4.2 0.5 -2.8 -1.7 -3.0 5.3 1.9
2015—2016 -0.8 -2.1 -1.2 6.0 3.2 4.2 0.4 1.4 1.0
2016—2017 7.0 -0.7 4.6 4.3 6.6 5.8 7.1 7.6 7.4
2017—2018 7.1 1.0 5.3 2.2 5.8 4.6 4.4 5.5 5.1
2018—2019 -3.7 -7.0 -4.7 2.9 1.4 1.9 -2.4 3.4 1.2
2019—2020 4.8 -0.7 3.3 -1.2 -6.5 -4.7 -12.8 -2.5 -6.3
2020—2021 19.2 -12.8 10.6 -3.4 9.6 5.0 1.5 12.6 8.8
2021—2022 -5.9 -8.5 -6.5 -14.4 -0.4 -4.9 -1.4 3.5 1.9

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on MDS Transmodal (MDST), World Cargo Database, 1 June 2023.

Table 1.3 Global containerized trade by route, 2020–2022

(Market shares in percentages)
2020 2021 2022
Main East West 39.1 39.1 37.5
Intraregional 26.9 26.5 27.6
Non-mainlane East West 12.7 12.8 13.2
South—South 12.2 12.3 12.5
North—South 9.1 9.3 9.1
100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data from MDS Transmodal (MDST), World Cargo Database, 1 June 2022.
Notes: Non-mainlane East—West: Trade involving Western Asia and the Indian Sub-continent, Europe, North America, and
East Asia. North—South: Trade involving Oceania, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Europe, and North America.
South—South: Trade involving Oceania, Western Asia, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

As noted above, weaker global demand, elevated inflation, large inventories and destocking, and the
continued COVID-19 logistical legacies, especially in China, all contributed to the negative performance on
the main East—West Asian trades. Accordingly, table 1.4 shows that trade flows on the main East—West
trade lanes involving East Asia, Europe and North America declined by nearly 5 per cent. In contrast, trade
on the non-mainlane routes (i.e. routes other than the main transpacific, Asia—Europe and transatlantic
lanes) recorded a volume increase of nearly 2 per cent in 2022, and intraregional trade, reflecting to a large
extent the intra-Asian shipments, increased by over 3 per cent in 2022 compared with 2021.

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 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

Table 1.4 Containerized trade on main East—West and other containerized trade routes,
2015–2022
(20-foot equivalent units and percentage annual change)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
TEU
Main East—West routes 54 196 409 54 867 319 57 869 249 60 743 741 60 011 073 59 172 534 63 966 110 60 925 992
Other routes 81 280 939 84 710 760 90 339 411 92 821 282 95 588 032 92 209 405 99 653 295 101 589 452
Of which
Non-mainlane East West 18 149 559 18 853 201 20 051 005 19 961 618 20 694 108 19 275 390 21 004 670 21 518 388
North—South 13 197 138 13 458 901 14 156 828 14 475 542 14 537 104 13 808 441 15 137 204 14 842 761
South—South 15 270 831 16 123 617 17 644 339 18 220 186 19 074 587 18 451 584 20 118 813 20 387 978
Intraregional 34 663 410 36 275 041 38 487 239 40 163 936 41 282 233 40 673 989 43 392 607 44 840 326
World total 135 477 348 139 578 080 148 208 660 153 565 023 155 599 105 151 381 939 163 619 405 162 515 444
Percentage change
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Main East—West routes 1.2 5.5 5.0 -1.2 -1.4 8.1 -4.8
Other routes 4.2 6.6 2.7 3.0 -3.5 8.1 1.9
(Non-main lanes)
Of which
Non-mainlane East West 3.9 6.4 -0.4 3.7 -6.9 9.0 2.4
North—South 2.0 5.2 2.3 0.4 -5.0 9.6 -1.9
South—South 5.6 9.4 3.3 4.7 -3.3 9.0 1.3
Intraregional 4.6 6.1 4.4 2.8 -1.5 6.7 3.3

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data from MDS Transmodal (MDST), World Cargo Database, 1 June 2023.
Notes: Non-mainlane East West: Trade involving Western Asia and the Indian Sub-continent, Europe, North America, and
East Asia.
North—South: Trade involving Oceania, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Europe, and North America.
South—South: Trade involving Oceania, Western Asia, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

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B. CONTINUED DISRUPTIONS TO SHIPPING AND PORTS THREATEN

ENERGY AND FOOD SECURITY

1. Changing energy trade patterns amid rising energy security

requirements
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, disruption to global logistics, in particular shipping and ports has been
reshaping trade flows and supply chains. The ongoing war in Ukraine continues to affect maritime transport
and trade. It has disrupted fossil fuel markets, as the Russian Federation is the leading exporter of natural
gas and the second-largest exporter of oil. This disruption exacerbated the challenges experienced during
the pandemic, when demand was reduced and supply contracted in the first phase, to be followed
by surging demand that outpaced supply, resulting in extremely high and volatile prices. After the war
erupted, natural gas prices reached record highs, causing electricity prices to surge in some markets, and
oil prices to soar to their highest levels since 2008 (IEA, 2023a). For example, immediately after the war
in Ukraine started, energy prices reached a 20 per cent increase for five months straight, with WTI crude
oil price jumping 15.3 per cent, from $92.77 per barrel (24 February 2022) and averaging $106.96 from
28 February to 3 August (Open Access Government, 2023).
Although energy prices have eased compared with the 2022 high peaks, prices could spike again in the
event of new disruptions, such as insufficient supplies of natural gas in case of a colder 2023 winter season
in Europe, potentially affecting companies and households. Total energy costs (direct and indirect) for
households are estimated to have increased by at least 63 per cent and possibly as much as 113 per cent
during the year following the beginning of the war in Ukraine (The Conversation, 2023). In this context,
energy security has become a key policy concern.
As global economic activity rebounded from the COVID-19 pandemic and global energy demand revived,
the flow of oil trade, including crude and refined petroleum also recovered (as mentioned in section A.2).
As a result, energy commodities, particularly crude oil and oil products increased their share in total
seaborne trade in 2022, notwithstanding a general persistent long-term trend of declining shares of oil
and refined products in total seaborne trade volumes and a long-term trend away from coal (figure 1.7).
This long-term trend is consistent with the peak in demand for coal and oil due to the energy transition,
which is projected to reduce the growth of the seaborne trade of these products by more than two-thirds
and one-third respectively by 2030 (DNV, 2022), suggesting that volumes and distances traded for those
commodities will decrease in the future.

Figure 1.7 Percentage share of different cargo types in total seaborne trade, 2002–2024
(Metric tons)
30
Minor bulk
25 Crude oil
Containers
20 Iron ore
Coal
15 Oil products
Other dry
10 Gas
Grain
5 Chemicals

0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Intelligence Network time series (as of 28 July 2023).
Notes: 2023 and 2024 are forecast.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union,
have applied restrictive economic measures to the trade of Russian crude oil, refined petroleum products
and gas, such as import bans, pipeline transport restrictions and a cap on the price of the oil barrel,

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 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

impacting underwriting for insurance-related processes. These measures have induced changes in the
trading patterns of these products.
For instance, the share of the Russian Federation in EU imports of petroleum products and coal declined
by 9.2 and 13 percentage points respectively between the average of the second and third quarters of
the period 2017–2021 and the second and third quarters of 2022. In contrast, oil imports from the Iraq,
Kazakhstan, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States increased
(Yanatma, 2023). On the other hand, exports of oil and oil products from the Russian Federation to
alternative destinations further away (including China, the Middle East, India, Türkiye, Africa and Latin
America) increased (Clarksons, 2023d).
The war in Ukraine also led European countries to import more gas from other suppliers, including the
Algeria, Norway, Qatar and the United States to compensate for the loss of shipments from the Russian
Federation. The latter represented 40 per cent of the European supply in 2021. Seaborne liquefied natural
gas (LNG) flows have replaced pipeline natural gas, as illustrated in table 1.5 through the significant
increase in import shares of European countries in 2022.

Table 1.5 Major seaborne exporters and importers of oil, oil products, coal and liquefied natural
gas, top ranking in terms of share of global trade volumes and of annual percentage
changes
Importing countries/regions Exporting countries/regions
Top importers 2022 Percentage Top percentage Top exporters 2022 Percentage Top percentage
share(1) changes 2021–2022 share(1) changes 2021–2022
Crude oil 1 Total Asia 58.1 Latin America and 22.2 Middle East/Gulf 47.4 North America 21.5
the Caribbean
2 Total Europe 25.9 India 10.4 Latin America and the 10.0 Black Sea 14.9
Caribbean
3 China 22.8 Baltic 10.2 North America 9.7 Middle East/Gulf 14.6
4 India 11.7 United Kingdom / 10.1 West Africa 8.2 Baltic 5.5
Continental Europe
5 United Kingdom / 11.5 Other Asia 10.0 Mediterranean 6.1 Latin America 3.7
Continental Europe and the
Caribbean
Oil products 1 Total Asia 31.4 Middle East/Gulf 21.7 Total Europe 34.1 Latin America 24.1
2 Total Americas 20.1 Latin America 14.0 Middle East/Gulf 18.4 Total Americas 12.8
3 South East Asia 16.9 Indian 11.9 Total Americas 16.0 United States 11.3
Subcontinent
4 United Kingdom/ 16.9 Africa (inc. 8.3 United Kingdom/ 14.4 East Asia 9.8
Continental Europe Mediterranean) Continental Europe (inc. Russian
Federation)
5 Latin America 11.6 United Kingdom / 2.3 East Asia (inc. 13.9 Middle East/Gulf 9.0
Continental Europe Russian Federation)
Coal 1 Total Asia 82.2 European Union + 34.4 Indonesia 38.2 Canada 12.9
United Kingdom
2 India 19.8 India 19.1 Australia 27.6 South Africa 9.2
3 China 19.0 Japan 1.1 Russian Federation 12.9 Indonesia 7.8
4 European Union + 9.8 Republic of Korea 0.8 Total North America 8.7 North America 2.9
United Kingdom
5 Republic of Korea 9.8 United States 5.9
LNG 1 Total Asia 64.1 United Kingdom 71.8 Total Atlantic 39.2 United States 11.7
2 Total Europe 31.0 France 71.6 Total Asia Pacific 36.9 Russian 9.7
Federation
(Arctic)
3 Japan 18.5 Total Europe 54.5 Total Middle East 24.0 Total Atlantic 9.0
4 China 16.2 Spain 48.0 Australia 20.1 Malaysia 7.1
5 Republic of Korea 11.7 Republic of Korea 14.5 Qatar 19.7 Total Asia Pacific 2.4

Sources: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on data from Clarksons Research, Seaborne Trade Monitor, July 2023.
Note: (1) Percentage shares of the total seaborne trade of specific commodities, totals can encompass countries mentioned
subsequently.

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 REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2023

Contrary to trading patterns of other energy products, gas grew more in volumes than in ton-miles in 2022
(figure 1.8). This was due to shifting trade patterns such as increased United States exports heading to
Europe rather than on longer voyages to Asia (Clarksons, 2022). Volumes increased in 2022 for both LNG
and LPG although the opposite trend is projected for 2023 (Clarksons, 2023e).
Coal trade volumes marginally increased in 2022, because of tight energy markets resulting from the war
in Ukraine. Coal trade benefitted from firm European imports, which drove ton-mile growth (figure 1.5 and
Clarksons, 2023c). In 2023, following policy reforms aimed at securing coal supply to cope with El Nino
impacts, coal imports to China increased significantly, particularly from the Russian Federation (Drewry,
2023a and Chen, 2023). Continued strong growth of coal imports in Asian economies is expected to lead
to record demand in 2023.

2. Energy security needs intersect with global environmental sustainability

goals
With energy security staying high on the agenda, maritime trade of energy commodities is expected
to grow more than non-energy commodities in 2023. Supply and demand factors suggest a positive
outlook for the next two years. Seaborne crude oil trade volumes are expected to grow (limited to some
extent by OPEC cuts) by 1.6 per cent in 2023 and by a strong 7 per cent in ton-miles (Clarksons, 2023e),
with exports growing from the United States, Brazil, Norway and the Russian Federation, and increased
Chinese and Indian demand. Figure 1.8 shows that global seaborne LNG demand is expected to remain
strong, with United States exports continuing to drive LNG export growth and China and India driving
import growth.
Increased maritime shipments of fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal and an increase in distances travelled
could lead to more carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This raises the question of the impact of shifts in
energy trade patterns vis a vis the need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Similarly, increases
in oil and gas prices could shift investment back into extractive industries and fossil fuel-based energy
generation, running the risk of reversing the trend towards renewable energy documented over the past
five years (IRENA, 2023). Latest disruptions have prompted interest in building energy supply capacity
to benefit from emerging trading opportunities. For instance, India increased its crude oil imports, due to
increased production of refined oil products, and its refined oil products exports to the European Union.
The United States has increased investment in new liquefaction infrastructure for significant additional
LNG capacity.
Despite this, clean-energy investment witnessed a rapid acceleration in 2022, with a record $2.8 trillion
invested globally into the energy sector, of which more than $1.7 trillion went to clean energy sources (IEA,
2022b). Current geopolitical tensions and challenging economic conditions have provided momentum to
build long-term energy security while simultaneously tackling the threat of climate change. In other words,
many countries have engaged in policies aimed at reducing dependence on volatile energy markets and
developing capacity in homegrown renewable energy to ensure domestic price stability.

Figure 1.8 Gas seaborne trade growth, tons and ton-miles

(Percentage annual change)
25

20

15

10
Ton-miles
5
Tons
0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

-5

Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Intelligence Network time series (July 2023).
Notes: “Gas” includes LNG and LPG.
2023 and 2024 are forecast.

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 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

Examples of policies aimed at boosting clean energy supply include the Clean Energy Plan and Inflation
Reduction Act (United States); the REPowerEU plan (European Union) and the GX Green Transformation
Programme (Japan). In developing countries, China, India, and Indonesia have launched initiatives
encompassing solar and biofuels. As a result of these initiatives, renewable power capacity is expected to
expand as much in the next five years as it did in the past 20 years (IEA, 2023a and IEA, 2022b).

3. Changing grain trade patterns and implications for food security

The Russian Federation and Ukraine are global players in the grain and agrifood markets and, before
the war, were important sources of wheat, corn, barley, rapeseed, sunflower oil and seeds for many
net food-importing developing countries, including many lower-income countries. For example, in
2018–2020, 32 per cent of the total of African wheat imports came from the Russian Federation and
12 per cent of total African wheat imports came from Ukraine. For least developed countries, imports of
wheat from the Russian Federation and Ukraine were 29 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. As many
as 25 African countries imported more than one-third of their wheat from the two countries, and 15 of
them imported more than half (UNCTAD, 2022b).
In this context, the disruption to Black Sea shipping and ports caused by the war in Ukraine has generated
a gap in volumes of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports, contributing to a 2.6 per cent contraction in global
grain trade volumes in 2022.
To help stabilize rising global food prices and deteriorating food security amid already high price levels due
to the pandemic, the United Nations brokered two initiatives. One of these, the Black Sea Initiative (BSI),
aimed at allowing the safe export of grain and other foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea
(box 1.3). It was signed on 22 July 2022 and discontinued on 17 July 2023.

Box 1.3 The Black Sea Initiative contribution to grain trade amid the war in Ukraine and
its discontinuation
The Black Sea Initiative involved the Russian Federation, Türkiye and Ukraine and concerned the
export of grain and fertilizer from three Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea. It consisted of Ukrainian
vessels guiding cargo ships to international waters on the Black Sea, avoiding mined areas and
vessels, then safely proceeding along an agreed corridor through the Black Sea. Ships were
inspected by a team including representatives from the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and
the United Nations. The Initiative was discontinued on 17 July 2023, with the withdrawal of the
Russian Federation from the deal.
Since its signature and up until 20 July 2023, the Black Sea Initiative facilitated exports of 32.9
million metric tons of various food commodities encompassing corn, wheat, sunflower products,
barley, soya and rapeseed and 725,000 metric tons of humanitarian food assistance exports to
regions facing acute food insecurity. Around 57 percent of shipments went to developing countries.
Considering World Bank income categories, 20 per cent of exports went to low-income and lower-
middle income groups.
The initiative enabled a gradual rise in ship departures and shipped volumes of grain from Ukrainian
ports, contributing to bringing down the cost of food, stabilizing global markets and keeping them
open. The food price index decreased from its peak in March 2022 by over 23 per cent in June 2023.
The discontinuation of grain trade flows through this passage is likely to reduce shipping demand
in the region and impact bulk shipping performance. Alternative routes could include transiting the
Black Sea via territorial waters in Romania and through the Constanta Port in Romania, shipments
by the river Danube and railway connections via the Republic of Moldova. These alternative options
could lead to rising logistics costs via the Black Sea and the Bosporus, making trade in the region
less competitive and supporting continued shifts in grain trading patterns.

Sources: United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint Coordination Centre Dashboard, accessed 20 July 2023; UNCTAD:
A double burden: the effects of food price increases and currency depreciations on food import bills, Geneva,
16 December 2022; UNCTAD: A trade hope: the role of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in bringing Ukrainian grain to
the world, Geneva, October 2022; UNCTAD: Maritime trade disrupted: the war in Ukraine and its effects on maritime
trade logistics, Geneva, 28 June 2022 and Sharma, T. (2023) End of the Black Sea Initiative: For Bad or Worse?
19 July 2023.

In response to potential food shortages caused by reduced grain exports resulting from the war in Ukraine,
several countries implemented trade policy measures such as export bans, export restrictions and export
taxes to limit the export of food to ensure sufficient domestic food supplies. Between June 2022 and April
2023, the share of traded food products restricted due to these measures has been estimated to range
between 7 and 10 per cent (IFPRI, 2023).

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 REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2023

While global food prices had decreased by March 2023, they remain high compared to pre-war and pre-
pandemic levels (UNCTAD, 2023e). The use of trade policy measures restricting food exports could send
prices soaring again (World Bank, 2023). This underscores the importance of restraining such measures
and of continued support for the Black Sea Initiative. Additionally, ongoing geopolitical and climate change
factors pose additional risks that could undermine the stability of global food prices.
A further impact of the war in Ukraine has been the substitution of import origins and, in some cases,
commodity substitution (WTO, 2023b). This underscores the importance of alternative sources of supply
and an open trading system that allows for shifting the source of imports. During 2022, reduced grain
exports from Ukraine were partly offset by increased shipments from other existing suppliers such as
Australia, Brazil and Canada, as reflected in table 1.6.

Table 1.6 Major grain seaborne exporters and importers 2022 and 2023, top ranking in terms of
share of global trade volumes and of annual percentage changes
Top importers Percentage Top percentage changes Top importers Percentage Top percentage
2022 share(1) 2021—2022 2023(2) share(1) changes 2022—2023
1 Total Asia 48.4 Morocco 25.0 Total Asia 48.3 Argentina 78.8
2 China 26.5 Iran (Islamic 10.4 China 26.6 Thailand 11.3
Republic of)
3 Total Africa 12.1 Philippines 7.0 Total Africa 11.9 Morocco 11.1
4 Total Europe 11.6 Colombia 6.8 Total Europe 11.4 Saudi Arabia 8.6
5 Total America 10.8 Mexico 6.2 Total America 10.5 Viet Nam 5.3
6 Total Middle 10.2 Taiwan Province 6.0 Total Middle East 9.9 China 2.8
East of China
7 European 7.7 Türkiye 5.6 European Union + 7.6 Total Asia 2.1
Union + United United Kingdom
Kingdom
8 Japan 5.0 Japan 2.0 Japan 4.9 Mexico 1.5
9 Egypt 5.0 Republic of Korea 0.6 Egypt 4.7 Japan 1.2
Top exporters Percentage Top percentage changes Top exporters Percentage Top percentage
2022 share(1) 2021—2022 2023(2) share(1) changes 2022—2023
1 Total South 38.4 Canada 114.4 Total South 38.6 Russian 26.9
America America Federation
2 Total North 28.1 Brazil 16.1 Total North 28.6 Canada 18.4
America America
3 Brazil 24.2 Total Asia/Pacific 11.4 Brazil 27.1 Brazil 14.6
4 United States 23.2 Total South 8.8 United States 22.6 Total Europe 6.3
America
5 Total Europe 21.7 Australia 7.0 Total Europe 22.5 European 5.4
Union + United
Kingdom
6 Argentina 11.7 Russian 1.4 Canada 10.4 Total North 4.1
Federation America

Sources: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on data from Clarksons Research, Dry Bulk Trade Outlook, July 2023.
Notes: (1) Percentage shares of total seaborne trade of specific commodities, totals can encompass countries mentioned
subsequently. (2) forecast figures (June 2023).

Shifting grain trade patterns are well illustrated in the case of Africa. Grain imports from Ukraine, crucial to
the food security of many African economies, declined by 14.9 per cent in 2022, forcing these economies
to adapt their trading patterns (WTO, 2023b). Egypt for instance, coped with an 81 per cent fall in wheat
imports from Ukraine during the first eight months of the war by replacing the source of imports with the
Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union (WTO, 2023b). Ethiopia replaced the loss
of wheat supply from the Russian Federation and Ukraine with shipments from the United States and
Argentina.

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 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

Overall grain trade volumes have remained relatively stable, despite higher prices due to commodities
being brought in from further away and from the ripple effects of the cost-of-living crisis (Clarksons,
2023c; UNCTAD, 2022f). This is because demand for food is often very inelastic to price changes, unlike
demand for many consumer products and some energy sources. Reducing food intake is more difficult
than reducing the consumption of non-essential consumer goods or services.

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 REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2023

C. SHIFTS IN THE GEOGRAPHY OF MARITIME TRADE

In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on de-risking supply chains and expanding goals
to diversify suppliers and markets. Heightened trade policy tensions, the COVID-19 disruption, the war in
Ukraine and the consequent drive for greater resilience building and self-sufficiency have moved supply
chain configuration to the forefront of the agenda for policymakers and industry.
Over the past decade, supply chain reconfiguration trends have been unfolding. These are most visible
in Asia and China, as the world’s largest market and key player in global value chains and containerized
trade flows. China as the global manufacturing powerhouse, is historically associated with the rise of
globalized production processes and supply chains structured around intra-industry trading patterns.
Since 2010, distances per ton of containerized trade travelled started to decline (table 1.4), largely
due to an increase in intraregional maritime trade which supports manufacturing activity in China and
its neighbouring countries. UNCTAD data reveals that intra-Asian routes serving intraregional supply
chains record the highest growth rates. This reflects global manufacturing patterns, where China serves
as the global manufacturing centre, supported by neighbouring East Asian countries supplying parts
and components. At the same time, China is increasingly reliant on domestic production of parts and
components, thereby reducing imports of many containerized goods from distant locations. China has
also been moving up the value chain with some lower-skilled manufacturing moving to its neighbouring
countries.
More recently, a growing geopolitical divide is causing shifts in supply chains. The introduction of tariffs in
the United States and China since 2018 has imposed additional costs on their bilateral trade and caused
a trade diversion, with some winners and losers emerging (Fajgelbaum et al., 2023). Tariffs imposed by
the United States affected around 18 per cent of its imports, equivalent to 2.6 per cent of its GDP, while
retaliation by China impacted 11 per cent of its imports, equivalent to 3.6 per cent of its GDP. These
tariffs impacted industries in both countries and increased costs for about two-thirds of dutiable products
in the United States (Fajgelbaum et al., 2023). Countries that have benefited from the trade diversion
include Canada, Mexico, India, Viet Nam and the European Union, among others (UNCTAD, 2019). While
some shifts in trade patterns were triggered by the United States and China tariffs, changes were also
accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021–2022 global logjam in logistics and the war in Ukraine.
In an increasingly complex operating environment, traders and supply chain managers are embracing
various strategies to increase their agility to respond to new challenges. These include pursuing new
efficiencies (such as reducing transport costs to increase profitability), finding new markets, and
reconfiguring supply chains to reduce the risk of disruptions in the event of shortages of key inputs in
their supply networks (Economist Impact, 2023). Supply chain reconfiguration involves various strategies
and approaches including offshoring production across a wider range of locations and a variety of trading
partners; bringing manufacturing back home (reshoring); relocating manufacturing to neighbouring
countries closer to the home market (nearshoring) or prioritizing trade with highly trusted countries that
share common values and strategies.
An important strategy adopted by companies for diversifying supply sources and reducing overdependence
on China without entirely decoupling from the country is the “China Plus One” strategy which encourages
companies to diversify their operations by expanding outside of China while still maintaining a presence
in the country. These strategies have implications for containerized shipping demand and supply patterns
as well as shipping costs and rates. Apart from the need to de-risk supply chains, a relative increase in
production costs in China has also encouraged moving some manufacturing to other countries. As an
example, several multinational companies, such as Apple, Samsung, Sony and Adidas, shifted some
manufacturing activities from China to South-East Asia, due to labour costs and risk management
considerations (Ho-him, 2023).
The share in United States imports from Taiwan Province of China, Mexico, Viet Nam and the European Union
in various sectors including vehicles, computers, electronic devices, transport equipment and machinery,
and electrical equipment and machinery (Bekkers et al, 2020 and Nicita, 2019) has been growing. In 2022
the share of United States container imports from Viet Nam increased to 8 per cent, up from 4 per cent in
2017. The share in India, about 3 per cent in 2017, amounted to about 5 per cent in 2022. In contrast and
while still dominating the global manufacturing space, the share in China of United States container imports
fell from 40 per cent in 2017 to about 31 per cent in 2022 (Danish Ship Finance, 2023).
China continues to be a key player and a leading world exporter of containerized cargo, and importer of
energy and commodities. Chinese companies are seeking to improve their resilience by diversifying their

18
 1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRADE

input and commodity sources. They are increasingly sourcing inputs from within China and investing in
manufacturing and commodities in third countries.
UNCTAD analysis of containerized maritime trade during 2022 and the first quarter of 2023 suggests
that the geographical proximity of manufactured trade remained relatively stable, suggesting a lack of
significant nearshoring trends, at least on average. However, there has been a notable increase in the
political proximity of trade since the latter part of 2022. This indicates a reorientation of bilateral trade
flows prioritizing partners with similar values (UNCTAD, 2023f). This phenomenon is likely to intensify in
the coming years, given efforts by Western economies to limit their dependency on China in strategic and
promising trading sectors related to technology and the energy transition.
Examples of such efforts include the United States Inflation Reduction Act, aimed at promoting investments
in domestic manufacturing capacity and encouraging procurement of key raw materials and components
for the green-energy transition domestically or from specific trade partners (Mc Kinsey and Company, 2022
and Sueur, 2023). Similarly, the CHIPS and Science Act aims to reshore production of high-tech equipment,
such as semiconductors (United States, White House, 2023). The European Union is considering similar
initiatives, with some countries already providing support to encourage local production of similar components
(O'Carroll, 2023 and Vidalon, 2023). These initiatives could potentially lead to shifts in future seaborne trade
flows. However, this may also result in additional costs for companies and consumers, shifting production
away from the most cost-effective producers, impacting welfare and trade, and potentially hindering the
diffusion of ideas, innovation and technology spill overs (Goes and Bekkers, 2022).
Given the uncertainties associated with global political frictions, energy transition and shipping
decarbonization, as well as higher transport cost volatility in the foreseeable future, intraregional trade
appears as an area where reinvigorated policy action could yield positive resilience-building outcomes
(Nicita and Saygili, 2021).
While Western economies are taking steps to reduce their dependence on China and prioritize sourcing
from countries with similar values, it is important to consider the implications for other regions. Strong
regional value chains have been pointed out as a possible strategy for economic resilience in Africa
(UNCTAD, 2022e). Their effectiveness can be strengthened through trade logistics policy reforms. Many
transport and trade facilitation measures involve close cooperation among neighbouring countries and
regional partners, including through corridors. Competitive regional markets for transport services can
also help reduce inefficiencies. Box 1.4 illustrates some of the trade logistics policy measures that will be
key to facilitating intra-African trade by leveraging the opportunities from the AfCFTA.

Box 1.4 The impact of the AfCFTA on the demand for transport infrastructure
and services
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement consolidates a growing $2.5 trillion
GDP market of 1.2 billion people, making Africa an attractive investment destination. The negotiation
of protocols on investment, competition policy, intellectual property rights, digital trade, and women
and youth in trade, as well as a dispute settlement mechanism, create predictability for African and
foreign investors and businesses interacting with African businesses, including accessing markets
more easily using digital trade solutions.
Transport infrastructure and services are critical to facilitating intra-African trade. Research by the
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) finds that intra-African trade in transport services – one
of the priority sectors for AfCFTA regarding liberalization of services – could increase by nearly
50 per cent by 2045 with the implementation of the AfCFTA. In absolute terms, over 25 per cent
of intra-African trade gains in services would go to transport alone, and nearly 40 per cent of the
increase in services production in Africa would be in transport.
A complementary study on the impact of the AfCFTA on the demand for transport infrastructure and
services indicates that the AfCFTA would lead to a general increase in intra-African freight demand
of around 28 per cent compared to a scenario without the presence of AfCFTA. The implementation
of the AfCFTA will lead to an increase in demand for road, rail, maritime and air freight increase by
22, 8, 62 and 28 per cent, respectively.
A significant increase in traffic flows is expected across all transport modes. Subsequently, transport
equipment needs for all modes of transport are expected to increase significantly. Africa would
require close to two million additional trucks, over 100,000 rail wagons, 250 aircraft and more than
100 vessels by 2030, if the AfCFTA is fully implemented. Aircraft demand to support trade flows
within West Africa will increase by 13.2 per cent by 2030. Trade between North and West Africa

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Box 1.4 The impact of the AfCFTA on the demand for transport infrastructure
and services (cont.)
would increase demand for aircraft by 12.9 per cent, while demand within Southern Africa will
increase by 12.2 per cent. In East Africa, critical rail links are identified across Kenya, Uganda and
the United Republic of Tanzania.
The analysis also considers the additional effects of implementing planned investments such as
those under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa. For instance, the modal share
of rail transport for intra-African trade is expected to increase from 0.3 to about 7 per cent when
considering the implementation of these planned investments.
Looking at cross-cutting issues, this increased demand points to a potential for investment in green
transport. Complementary research also suggests that the transport and logistics sectors could
greatly benefit from the increased participation of women. A complementary study undertaken by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in collaboration with other UN Regional
Commissions on transport and trade facilitation during COVID-19 identified that optimizing
automation and digitalization can reduce the need for human interaction, making cross-border
transport safer and more resilient to disruptions. It also highlighted the role of corridor management
institutions and the need for integrated corridor management when applying these solutions.
Overall, the results highlight the significant investment opportunities created by the AfCFTA in
transport infrastructure and services to benefit from the liberalisation of trade in transport services
and to support increased intra-African trade.
The report by the ECA on AfCFTA and demand for transport infrastructure and services provides
a treasure trove of investment opportunities in the sector. Harnessing these opportunities would
lead to job creation, particularly for youth, and to gender empowerment on the continent. The
investments also provide an avenue for a green economic recovery in Africa, with the view to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector.
Trade and transport are mutually reinforcing. Current infrastructure and services, across all modes of
transport in Africa require upgrading to cope with increased freight from AfCFTA. This underscores
the importance of prioritizing the implementation of the Programme for Infrastructure Development
in Africa (PIDA), the Trans-African Highway (TAH) network and the Single African Air Transport
Market (SAATM).

Source: Inputs provided by UN-ECA Secretariat.

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D. OUTLOOK AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Shipping continues to grapple with complexities generated by the global events that upended the world
economy over recent years. This includes the legacies of the COVID-19 pandemic, lower levels of global
economic growth, inflation, heightened energy and food security concerns, increased geopolitical risks
and trade policy tensions arising from more restrictive trade policy measures introduced to achieve
wide-ranging objectives including security, resilience, self-sufficiency and the competitiveness of domestic
firms. While the global economy remains vulnerable to disruptive shocks, certain trends are currently
supporting the shipping industry. In the short term, this includes redistribution of energy flows and
economic recovery in China after the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and its associated
response measures.
Against this background, UNCTAD forecasts moderate growth in seaborne trade volumes hovering at an
average of 2.1 per cent per year during the period 2024–2028. The divergence between growth patterns
between energy-related trade and non-energy is expected to continue.
Optimism around increasing Chinese economic activity, which drives dry bulk trade, the redistribution of
oil flows in response to the war in Ukraine and the re-opening of the world economy after nearly three
years of the COVID-19 pandemic and its fallout bodes well for tanker and dry bulk shipping and trade.
Prospects for gas trade are also positive, supported by a greater focus on energy transition, energy
security, and a low-carbon development path.
In sharp contrast to a year ago, container markets have corrected in 2022 and are expected to have little
growth in 2023. UNCTAD expects container trade to improve and increase at an annual rate of around
3 per cent over the 2024–2028 period.
While distances travelled by tanker trade increased following the war in Ukraine and its fallout on the
energy supply landscape, going forward, trends in distances travelled and trade ton-miles will depend
on a range of factors including trends in the energy transition, commodity prices, supply-side capacity
constraints, climatic factors, and regulatory requirements that may affect shipping fleet speed, routing and
operational decisions.
Projected growth in maritime trade volumes assumes that downside risks will dominate international trade
and economic growth in the coming years. These risks relate to the timing and path of global economic
recovery, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the evolving context of maritime transport and trade. Increased
policy-driven geo-economic fragmentation could potentially reshape trade patterns, supply chains and
shipping routes.
On the upside, however, drivers expected to provide momentum for an uptick in maritime trade flows
include an easing in logistical bottlenecks observed since 2020, easing of COVID-19 restrictions in China
and the decision taken by its central bank to cut interest rates, which may stimulate the economy. Other
factors include the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in several
Asian countries and expected increase in demand for transport and services arising from the AfCFTA.

Policy recommendations
Facilitate trade associated with easing impacts of the cost-of-living crisis
• Disruptions to food and energy distribution channels and shipping networks could exacerbate the
situation of people living in poverty and pose significant threats to food security.
• Trade tensions, protectionism and export restrictions entail economic and social costs. These should
be limited to the extent possible especially for grains and energy prices to avoid their culmination in
global overlapping crises.
• Grain fertilizer exports need to be ensured, including through the Black Sea Initiative and the
Memorandum of Understanding on trade facilitation of food and fertilizers from the Russian
Federation.
• Monitor trends in maritime trade patterns and shifts in distances travelled to ascertain implications
for the availability of ship carrying capacity (supply of shipping services), shipping costs and carbon
emissions.

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Support regional value chains and trade for resilience building

Recognizing the role of strong regional value chains and trade in building economic resilience and
complementing global value chains, it is imperative to support their development. This is particularly
important in the current context where uncertainty and volatility are arising from heightened geopolitics
risks, climate factors and commodity prices, as well as freight markets and transport costs.
• Monitor changes in seaborne trade and shipping patterns as well as assess related implications for
the geography of shipping and trade, fleet and costs as well as for port networks.
• Policymakers involved in designing and implementing trade logistics reforms at the national and
regional levels, should cooperate closely and promote public-private partnerships to support
effective transport and trade facilitation including through corridors.
• Continued reassessment of supply chain aspects such as sourcing, inventory and transport for
maritime transport to strengthen resilience and optimize robustness in the event of future disruptions.

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END NOTES

1
See methodologies and data sources in the Annex.
2
“Oil” encompasses crude oil and refined oil products.
3
“Gas” includes liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquified natural gas (LNG) and ammonia.

ANNEX

The UNCTAD seaborne trade forecasts build on IMF projections from July 2023 regarding GDP and
elasticities of maritime trade (concerning GDP, export volumes and investment share in GDP as well as
monthly seaborne trade data published by Clarksons Research).
The IMF July 2023 forecasts that world output will grow by 2.9 per cent in 2023. The IMF scenario assumes
higher-than-expected inflation worldwide leading to tighter financial conditions, a worse-than-anticipated
slowdown in China, further negative spill overs from the continued war in Ukraine, and continued supply-
demand imbalances weighing on growth prospects. It also assumes a higher-than-expected trade growth
in 2022 and 2023, reflecting declining global demand and supply chain problems.

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