CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
The main focus of actors of foreign policy formulation process is to articulate in vivid
terms the national interest of a country which serves as a guide in their relations with other
nations of the world. The efficient administration of foreign policy objectives is based on
credible and widely accepted principles that helps shape a country’s image among the comity
of nations.
After independence in 1960, Nigeria began her external relations as a sovereign state
with its emergence as the 99 th member of the United Nations, thus we shall analyze some of
the forces that influenced Nigeria’s foreign policy over the years, and how they have
manifested in the country’s contemporary foreign relations, and how they constitute variables
in understanding today’s challenges and planning for the future. To a large extent, these
numerous factors have helped shape and continue to shape Nigeria’s foreign policy in various
ways. While there is the technical tendency to view Nigeria’s foreign policy as starting from
1960 when the country gained its political independence from Britain, Nigeria, on the
contrary, did not start on a clean slate. Rather it brought with it a century-old colonial
relationship with her erstwhile colonial master: Britain and this largely influenced her foreign
policy ever since. The enduring impact of British influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy and
its ruling elite continued to have extensive effects on Nigeria’s pro-west stand, in spite of her
non-aligned claims until the late 1960s when the lessons of the Nigerian civil war of 1967-
1970 forced Nigeria’s foreign policy elites to reevaluate their stand towards external actors.
The radical impact of the civil war on Nigeria’s foreign policy was quite significant,
according to the International Peace Academy report of July 2003:
Nigeria’s leaders to drew some major lessons from the
experience: first, that the country’s survival as a
sovereign state could not be taken for granted; second,
that, based on France sending arms to secessionist
Biafra through Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire, there was a
compelling need to have friendly governments in
neighboring countries – a reality which partly explains
why Nigeria in the aftermath of the civil was
spearheaded the creation of ECOWAS; third, that the
existence of minority white owned regimes in
Southern Africa, which backed Biafran secessionists
during Nigeria’s civil war, was a threat to Nigeria’s
security.1.

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 Hence, the tragedy of the civil war helped to unveil the diplomatic naivety of
Nigeria’s foreign policy makers to the reality of the international system. Dr Asobie
described this era as the “Age of Innocence”. Thus, the military regime of General Gowon
made an attempt to reinvent our foreign policy to reflect the regional hegemonic inclinations
of Nigeria, in external policies which brought about the co-creation of regional organization:
ECOWAS. Yet, most of the principles that strengthened foreign relations at that time were
largely selfless and more or less reactionary towards events in the international environment.
In the same vein, they lacked genuine developmental momentum and were merely a
continuation of what was obtainable in the first republic.
However, the emergence of the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo’s regime in 1975-1979,
added some quantity of radicalism and dynamism and thus marked the Era of Awakening in
the history of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This was largely informed by the conviction of the
duo to use foreign policy as a tool for advocating the genuine cause of Nigeria and Africa at
large. In this effect, they did what previous Nigerian leaders couldn’t dare to do: oppose the
hegemonic powers of the west and nationalization of Barclays Bank and the British
Petroleum among others. The radical policies of Gen. Murtala marked a turning point in the
foreign relations of Nigeria and endeared him to many pro-Third World nations.
Unfortunately the regime of Gen M. Mohammed didn’t last long because he was killed in a
botched coup, while General Obasanjo kept to the agreement of his former boss and on 1st
October, 1979 he transited power to a civilian government. With the emergence of President
Shagari’s civilian regime in 1979, the foreign policy pattern of Nigeria dramatically shifted.
The regime began to reverse some of the radical foreign policies of its predecessor. Indeed,
because of the character of the regime, i.e. civil-democratic, there was multiple centre of
foreign policy decision making. Therefore, it could not have taken drastic and radical
decisions like the past military regimes.
Retrospectively, Nigeria experienced the most severe rule in the series of military
period that followed the Shagari’s administration which began with General Buhari’s regime
in 1983. However, with the emergence of General Abubakar after the sudden death of
General Abacha in 1998, a new democratic experiment was ushered in by his regime.
Consequently, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo emerged as the first civilian President of the fourth
republic on 29th of May, 1999. Because of the harrowing effects of the past regime of
General Abacha on Nigeria’s international image, Obasanjo embarked on a ‘Shuttle
Diplomacy’ that sought to re-build the county’s image in the international environment.

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 Therefore, it is quite instructive that all civilian democratic regimes are faced with the
challenge of rapidly formulating and implementing strategic foreign policies that can
deliberately change the developmental course of the country. As such, this challenge would
even be more difficult for the present administration in the face of the high level of
consciousness that characterize global citizens in this phase of globalization, in which
Nigerians are not exempted. Terrorism on the other hand is the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear to bring about political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or
equally important the threat of violence. These violent acts are committed by
nongovernmental groups or individuals, i.e. by those who are neither part of nor officially
serving in the military forces, law enforcement agencies, intelligence services or other
governmental agencies of an established nation-state.
Terrorists attempt is not only to sow panic but also to undermine confidence in the
government and political leadership of their country of target. Hence, Terrorism is targeted to
have psychological effects that reach far beyond its impacts on the immediate victims or
object of an attack. Terrorists mean to scare and thereby intimidate a wider audience, such as
a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country and its political leadership, or the
international environment as a whole. Generally, terrorist groups have few members, limited
firepower, and comparatively few organizational resources. For this reason they rely on
dramatic, often spectacular, bloody and destructive acts of hit-and-run violence to attract
attention to themselves and their cause. Through the publicity generated by their violence,
terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack.
The term “terrorism” was first used in France to describe a new system of government
adopted during the French Revolution (1789-1799). The “regime de la terreur” (Reign of
Terror) was aimed to promote democracy and popular rule by ridding the revolution of its
enemies and thereby purifying it2. However, the oppression and violent excesses of the
“terreur” transformed it into a feared instrument of the state. From then on, terrorism has had
a decidedly negative connotation. However, the word, did not gain wider popularity until the
late 19th century when it was adopted by a group of Russian revolutionaries to describe their
violent struggle against the rule of tsarist. Terrorism then assumed the more familiar
antigovernment associations it has today.
More than 2,000 years ago the first known acts of what we now refer to as terrorism
were perpetrated by a radical offshoot of the Zealots, a Jewish sect active in Judea during the
1st century AD. The Zealots resisted the Roman Empire's rule now known as Israel today
through a determined campaign primarily involving assassination. Zealot fighters used the

3
“sica”, a primitive dagger, to attack their enemies in broad daylight, often in crowded market
places or on feast days essentially wherever there were people to witness the violence. Thus,
like modern terrorists, the Zealots aimed their actions to communicate a message to a wider
target audience: in this scenario, the Roman occupation forces and any Jews who
sympathized or collaborated with the invaders. Between 1090 and 1272 an Islamic movement
known as “the Assassins” used similar tactics in their struggle against the Christian Crusaders
who had invaded what is today part of Syria. The Assassins welcomed the same notions of
self-sacrifice and suicidal killing evident in some Islamic terrorist groups today. They
regarded violence as a divine act that ensured its perpetrators would ascend to a glorious
heaven should they perish during the task.
During the 1920s and 1930s, terrorism became associated more with the repressive
practices employed by dictatorial states than with the violence of non-state groups like the
anarchists. The word terrorism was used to describe the reckless violence and intimidation
inflicted by the Nazi, fascist, and totalitarian regimes that came to power in Germany, Italy,
and the Soviet Union respectively. The repressive means these governments employed
against their citizens involved beatings, unlawful detentions, torture, so-called death squads
(often consisting of off-duty or plain-clothes security or police officers), and other forms of
intimidation. Such practices by governments against their own citizens still continue today.
Recent history records the use of such measures by the military dictatorships that took power
in Argentina, Chile, and Greece during the 1970s. But these state-sanctioned acts of violence
are more generally termed terror to distinguish them from violence committed by non-state
entities. As noted earlier, the word terrorism is generally reserved for acts committed by
groups outside government.
After Second World War in 1945, terrorism reverted to its previous revolutionary
associations. During the 1940s and 1950s, “terrorism” was used to describe the violence
perpetrated by indigenous nationalist, anti-colonialist organizations that arose throughout
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in opposition to continued European rule. Countries such as
Israel, Kenya, Cyprus, and Algeria, for example, owe their independence at least in part to
nationalist movements that used violent acts. The most spectacular terrorist incident of the
anti-colonial period was the 1946 bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel, by a Jewish
underground group known as the Irgun Zvai Le’umi (National Military Organization) 3. The
hotel was attacked because it served at that time as the military headquarters and offices of
the British administration in Palestine. Ninety-one people were killed and 45 others injured:
men, women, Arabs, Jews, and Britons alike. This particular bombing was ranked among the

4
most deadly terrorist acts of the 20 th century. The Irgun’s commander at the time was
Menachem Begin, a future prime minister of Israel and 1978 Nobel Peace Prize co-winner.
Begin is not alone among those once called terrorists who later ascended to the highest levels
of power in their newly independent countries. Others include Kenya’s president Jomo
Kenyatta, Cyprus’s Archbishop Makarios, and Algeria’s president Ahmed Ben Bella.
During the late 1960s and 1970s terrorism assumed more clearly ideological
motivations. Various disenfranchised or exiled nationalist minorities as exemplified by the
Palestine Liberation Organization also adopted terrorism as a means to draw attention to their
plight and generate international support for their cause. The PLO sought to create a state in
what was historically known as Palestine: the land that became Israel in 1948 and the West
Bank and Gaza Strip territories occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967. A
Palestinian group, in fact, was responsible for the incident that is considered to mark the
beginning of the current era of international terrorism. On July 22, 1968, three armed
Palestinians belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an
Israeli El Al commercial flight en route from Rome, Italy, to Tel Aviv, Israel. Although
commercial planes had often been hijacked before, this was the first clearly political
hijacking. The act was designed to create an international crisis and thereby generate
publicity.
Right-wing or neo-fascist and neo-Nazi, terrorism movements also began in many
Western European countries and the United States during the late 1970s in response to the
violence perpetrated by left-wing organizations. However, the right-wing groups lacked both
the numbers and popular support that their left-wing counterparts enjoyed. Thus the violence
of these right-wing groups while occasionally quite deadly was mostly sporadic and short-
lived. The three most serious incidents connected to right-wing terrorists occurred in
Bologna, Italy; Munich, Germany; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. In Bologna a 1980
bombing of a crowded rail station killed 84 people and wounded 180 others 4. The date of the
bombing coincided with the opening of a trial in Bologna of right-wingers accused of a 1976
train bombing. Also in 1980 a bomb planted by a member of a neo-fascist group exploded at
Munich’s Oktoberfest celebration, killing 14 and injuring 215 others 5. In 1995 white
supremacists carried out a truck-bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, which claimed the lives of 168 people6.
Two of the most important developments in international terrorism during the 1980s
were the rise in state-sponsored terrorism and the resurgence of religious terrorism. An
example of an attack believed to have been state sponsored was the attempted assassination

5
of Pope John Paul II in 1981 by a Turkish citizen who was allegedly working for the Soviet
and Bulgarian secret services. Other examples include the Iranian-backed car- and truck-
bombings of the American embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983
and Libya's role in the in-flight bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in
1988.
Religion was used to justify and legitimize, if not actually encourage, terrorist
violence in the assassinations of Egypt's president Anwar al-Sadat by Islamic extremists in
1981 and of Israel's prime minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish militant in 1994. In both
instances the assassins considered it a religious duty to halt the peace efforts of their victims.
Muslim terrorists carried out the bombing of New York City's World Trade Center in 2001
and a vague Japanese religious sect was responsible for the 1995 nerve gas attack on the
Tokyo subway. Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization carried out simultaneous suicide
bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; a suicide attack in
2000 on a U.S. navy warship in the harbor of Aden, Yemen; and the suicide attacks of
September 11, 20017.
The events of September 11, 2001, have no instance in the history of terrorism. On
that day 19 terrorists belonging to Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization hijacked four passenger
aircraft shortly after they departed from airports in Boston, Massachusetts; Newark, New
Jersey; and Washington, D.C. The first plane crashed into the north tower of the World Trade
Center in New York City shortly before 9:00 AM. Then about 15 minutes later, a second
aircraft struck the south tower. Shortly afterward, a third plane crashed into the Pentagon in
Arlington, Virginia. A fourth aircraft crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania after its
passengers, hearing by cell phone of the other hijackings, attempted to take control of the
plane from the hijackers before they could strike another target. Before September 11,
terrorists had killed more than about 1,000 Americans in the United States and abroad, during
the modern era of international terrorism, which began in 1968. About three times that
number perished on September 11. The attacks also showed a level of patience and detailed
planning hardly ever seen among terrorist movements today. The hijackers stunned the world
with their determination to kill themselves and take the lives of the hijacked passengers and
crews as well as the lives of thousands of people working in or visiting the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. The United States reacted by declaring a global war against
terrorism.

6
 The emergence of terrorism in Nigeria owing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in
Northern part of Nigeria has greatly undermined and weakened the country’s foreign policy
drive. Boko Haram, Niger Delta militants’, the movement of the Sovereign States of Biafra
(MASSOB) terrorists acts in Nigeria has brought about negative reactions from groups and
nations that have been affected by its activities in the country, hence worsened Nigeria’s
foreign relations with other countries of the world. Also, Bamgbose has explained that
domestic policies and actions of sovereign governments, routine exercise of powers on
matters which borders on day to day governance can accelerate into foreign policy
controversies or dilemmas that can attract global attention 8. The operation of terrorism in
Nigeria has moved from the situation or area of domestic or internal politics to the
international arena.
Terrorist acts in Nigeria by Boko Haram, Niger Delta militants, the movement of the
Sovereign States of Biafra (MASSOB) etc have generated so much interest from the
international environment raising questions as to the potency of government’s strategy to deal
with the menace. This is because the insolence boldness of these groups has continued
unabated amidst government claims of winning the war, everyday claims of winning the war,
everyday casualties increase at alarming rates after each attack making the general public to
lose confidence in the government. The attacks on the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja
in 2011 resulted to increased pressure from the international community on Nigeria to end the
insurgency which had started as a petty domestic issue that was over looked by previous
governments. The above became necessary due to the internationalization of the conflict
which got to its apex when Boko Haram was indoctrinated into a Takfiri and Jihadist groups
in 20099 and its subsequent links to international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic
Maghred (AQIM).10 The aftermath of this particular event brought about its sophistication in
operation as it migrated from a domestic or internal insurgency group to a global Jihadist
movement with far reaching consequence leaving the Nigerian state with damaging effects to
count from.
According to the global terrorism index (GTI), Nigeria moved from 16 th in 2008 to
11th in 2009 to 12th in 2010 and 7th in 2012. With GTI of 7.4 Nigeria is in worse situation than
Sudan which is ranked 11th and Mali 34th11. Some international scholars and analysts have
blamed the increase in terrorist activities in the country on ‘mirror politics’ which has
characterized the country’s political scene since independence 12. The scenario has led to
Nigeria losing its respect in the international arena as no country will be inclined to establish
a mutual relation with a country where bomb goes off at will on a regular basis.

7
 The focus of this research work is therefore to examine the rise of terrorism in Nigeria
and also look at the Foreign Policy of the Nigerian various governments amidst the security
challenges posed by the extremely unpleasant or offensive trend and also the measures taken
by government to pre-empt its expansion and continued threats to lives and properties with
recommendations drawn forthwith.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The high level of terrorist and violent attacks in Nigeria by the fundamentalist group
(Boko Haram) has heightened fears among the populace and the international community and
has eaten deep into its economy and as a matter of fact, the hostility has gone beyond
religious or political coloration.
Terrorism has been a major issue facing Nigeria in recent times in terms of how it affects
the nation’s relations with other countries in the international arena. It should be noted that
not much scholarly work has been done on how tourism affects Nigeria’s foreign policy, in
this regard; this project shall address some problems encountered. A major problem is how
countries in the international environment have warned its citizens against coming to Nigeria
because they believe that Nigeria is not safe enough for their respective citizens. For
example, on August 5, 2016, the United States of America warned against travelling to 20
states in Nigeria due to security reasons. This warning was given by the United State
Department of States. Such states include Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Delta,
Edo, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kastina, Kano, Kaduna, Kebbi, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, Rivers,
Sokoto and Zamfara13.
Furthermore, as a result of these terrorist acts in Nigeria by the various terror groups,
many foreign companies in Nigeria have brought an end to its operations in Nigeria. Also,
foreign companies who intend to come to Nigeria to invest have been discouraged as a result
of the security challenges they might encounter. Also, under the administration of ex
President, President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria had issues with its neighboring country;
Cameroon which made its foreign relations with Cameroon go soar. Cameroon president,
Biya blamed Jonathan for not doing enough to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency.
He accused Jonathan for not forming a strong bond with leaders of neighboring African
countries who were also battling the same insurgency, he was also accused of not responding
and returning phone calls meant to discuss ways of combining efforts to confront these
terrorist. These various actions by Jonathan led to Cameroon deporting more than 2000

8
Nigerians who were living in the country illegally as part of the security measures intended to
prevent suicide attacks by Boko Haram Jihadists.
Also, as a result of some violent attacks by the Nigeria Delta militants in the oil
producing regions in Nigeria against the oil pipelines, the oil production in Nigeria has
drastically fallen from about 2.2 million barrels per day to about 1.1 million barrel per day
bringing about a drop in the internally generated revenue which has made it difficult to
Nigeria to achieve some of its foreign policy.
In the light of these various problems, this study shall be guided by the following research
questions:
What are the factors that propelled the origin and spread of terrorism in Nigeria?
Does terrorism pose a threat to the development of Nigeria?
Does terrorism have any implications on Nigeria’s relations with other countries in
the international arena?

1.3 Objective of the Study

The specific objectives are to:
1. ascertain the origin and history of terrorism in Nigeria;
2. determine the causes of terrorism in Nigeria;
3. examine Nigeria’s foreign policies and relations from 1999-2015;
4. evaluate how terrorism has affected Nigeria’s foreign policies in the international
arena;
5. ascertain the measures taken by the government in tackling terrorist acts in Nigeria
and
6. give recommendations on how to tackle this menace.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is that it would act as a guide to the government in their
quest to quell the problem of terrorism as it affects the country’s relations with the outside
world. Also judging from the fact that terrorism is currently a prevailing destructive force and
it’s very spontaneous and topical, this study would help to proffer solutions. More so, this
work theoretically would be useful to writers, scholars, journalists etc. in order to add to their
existing knowledge of what they already know about terrorism in Nigeria and how this
menace influence Nigeria’s foreign policies in the international community.

9
1.5 Scope of the Study

First, the study covered the origin and history of terrorism in Nigeria in order to give us a
very clear understanding of how it affects Nigeria’s relations with other nations of the world
in the international arena. However, the central thrust of this research is the period between
1999 and 2015, the period which marks the return of democratic rule in Nigeria. The period
in view is quite significant because it ushered in a democratically elected leader in President
Olusegun Obasanjo and brought an end of military rule on May 29, 1999 which also brings
about a different form and approach to Nigeria’s Foreign Policy.

1.6 Methodology

The research is done using analytical method. The study derives its data from both
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include oral information gotten from
men in military, civil servants and politicians through interviews because they are experts and
policy makers. The politicians are involved in the policy formulation processes that pertain to
foreign environment and terrorism while men in force play active roles in combating
terrorism and the civil servants make recommendations to politicians on foreign policy
issues. Therefore, these informations from these sets of people will be crucial to the research
while secondary source which is also known as documentation. Due to the spontaneous
nature of the issue under research, informations shall be gathered from magazines, Journals,
Newspapers, textbooks, internet materials which are relevant to the study.

10
Endnotes

1
King M. C. Basic currents of Nigerian foreign policy (Washington: Howard
University Press. 1996), 23
2
King M. C. Basic currents of Nigerian foreign policy (Washington: Howard
University Press. 1996), 24
3
Idang G. J. Nigeria internal politics and foreign policy (1960-1966) (Ibadan: Ibadan
University Press 1977), 34
4
Cook D, The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Combating Terrorism Center,retrieve
fromhttps://intellektualtourist.wordpress.com/about-intellectualtourist/on

5
Bamgbose, J.A. the Boko Haram Crises and Nigeria’s External Relations” British
Journal of Arts and Social Sciences. Vol. II No II, retrieved from
http:www.bjournal.co.uk/BJAss.aspxon 5/5/19

6
Cook D, The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Combating Terrorism Center,retrieve
From https://intellektualtourist.wordpress.com/about-intellectualtourist/on
5/5/16
7
Kissinger H. Domestic Structures and Foreign Policy ,US: Daedal, 1969 504

8
Gambari I. Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria under the First Republic,
Zaria: Abu Press, 1980, 1
9
Bamgbose, J.A. the Boko Haram Crises and Nigeria’s External Relations” British
Journal of Arts and Social Sciences. Vol. II No II, retrieved from
http:www.bjournal.co.uk/BJAss.aspxon 5/5/19
10
Cook D, The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Combating Terrorism Center, retrieve
from https://intellektualtourist.wordpress.com/about-intellectualtourist/
on 5/5/16
11
Cook D, The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Combating Terrorism Center, retrieve
fromhttps://intellektualtourist.wordpress.com/about-intellectualtourist/on
5/5/16
12
Global Terrorism Index Report 2012

13
https://intellektualtourist.wordpress.com/about-intellectualtourist/

11
 CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This literature review is precisely interested with pre existing views, perceptions and
notions of various scholars and academicians in the world as regards their contributions to the
subject matter of this project. As a result of this, emphasis will be placing my focus on major
issues of this project work: terrorism and Nigeria’s foreign policies. When we talk about
terrorism, just like every other concept in political science that do not have a particular
definite definition, it has enormous and various definitions. Most scholars and analysts tend
to subscribe to the notion that terrorism is a political expression and not a criminal act.
According to the International Terrorism and Security Research (ITSR), it alludes to
the fact that terrorism is not a new thing, and that even though the word “terrorism” has been
used since the beginning of recorded history, it can be relatively difficult to define. According
to the ITSR, terrorism has been variously described as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and
a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination 1. Also, the
United States Department of Defence (USDD) gives its own definition of terrorism as “the
calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended
to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological2. The idea behind this USDD definition is that terrorist acts
are meant to instil fear in the public so as to intimidate the government to succumb and yield
to their various demands and if this happens, the country won’t be able to achieve its foreign
objectives. Also, Lodge postulates that “terrorism is an illegitimate and inappropriate means
of attempting to effect political change by the indiscriminate use of violence and force 3. Here,
what lodge is trying to make us understand is that terrorism is a means of attempting to effect
political change but it is illegitimate and illegal and it involves the use of unwarranted force
and violence. Also, to lodge, every terrorist acts are intended to effect a change in the
political system in a country or in the international arena. Furthermore, Cook argues that
terrorism is an attempt to achieve a political end by creating a climate of fear through
bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and seizure of air crafts 4. The idea behind Cook’s
definition of terrorism is that, those who are involved in terrorist activities use bombings,
assassinations, kidnappings and seizure of air crafts mechanisms or strategies in order to instil
fear because when there is fear in the populace, they tend to surrender to those who inflict
them with the fear and terror.

12
 More so, Lacqueur, an American historian, posits that terrorism is “the substrate
application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society to weaken or
even over throw the incumbent and to bring about political change 5”. In other words, judging
from Lacqueur’s definition of terrorism, one can say that terrorism and revolution are
synonymously the same because both are intended to bring about political change at the tail
end. Also, Edwin Madunagu maintains that “terrorism is the use of violence to achieve
political objectives.6”The motive behind this above definition is that terrorism is an aspect of
political violence but it is an extra normal kind of political violence. This is because in a bid
to immobilize the forces of the incumbent, the insurgents waste innocent lives, displace lives
and properties and feature of terrorism is that governments, states and their symbols including
innocent people are attacked in order to undermine confidence in a state’s ability to protect its
very own citizens.
Furthermore, Walter noted that terrorism is not only confined to anomalous
circumstances or exotic systems; it is also potential in ordinary institutions as well as in
unusual situations7. It has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and
a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Reigns of
terror are not adequately understood if they are conceived exclusively as ephemeral states of
crisis produced by adventurous events or as alien forms of control. Systems of terror usually
defined as ‘abnormal’ by the conventions western social and political thought may be
generated under certain conditions of stress by ‘normal’ political processes8. Ariel Merari, a
retired professor at the department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv, University, defines terrorism as
the use of violence by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents for obtaining political
(including social and religious) goals especially when the violence is intended to intimidate
or otherwise affect the emotions, attitudes and behaviour of a target audience considerably
larger than the actual victims9. Also, Paul Wilkinson, an Emeritus Professor of international
Relations and Director of the University of St Andrews Centre for the Study of Terrorism and
Political Violence, holds that as a type of unconventional warfare, terrorism is designed to
weaken or supplant existing political landscapes through capitulation, acquiescence or
radicalization as opposed to subversion or direct military action10.
Narrowing it down to Nigeria, not until recently, there is no history of terrorism in the
form of coordinated attacks to spread fears and undermine the government of the country.
Most studies have revealed many driving forces of terrorism, for the purpose of this project
work, the driving forces of terrorism has been narrowed to three; these are fundamentalism,
nationalism and secessionism11. According to the fundamentalist view, they contend that

13
terrorism is a product of religious fanaticism and an expression of faith and intolerance to the
spread of another religious faith or groups12. In other words, the exponent of this line of
argument regard terrorism as a tactics employed by some certain groups to contain the spread
of other religious faiths and impose their own religion and beliefs on others through violent
acts or intimidation. With regards to this argument, the only solution to the menace of
terrorism is the abolition of secular principle and the enthronement and acceptance of one
religion in the world. Tony Blair, a major believer of the fundamentalist view and a onetime
prime minister of Britain did not hesitate to attribute the September 11, 2001 attacks on New
York and Washington to Al-Qeda Islamic fundamentalist group led by late Osama Bin
Laden.13 In his reaction to the incident, Blair asserted unequivocally that:
Fanatics who are utterly indifferent to the
sanctity of human life perpetrated the acts” (the
Guardian, 2001:3)

It did not take long before the Alqeda group claimed responsibility for that terrorist
and violent act. In Nigeria, the current terrorist menace by the Boko Haram meaning
“Western education and values are evil”14 is what is signifies, the utterances of the sects
spokes man, Abu Qada also lends credence to the fundamentalist argument. Abu Qada
asserted that:
The reason for our insurgency (Boko Haram) is
because we the Muslim communities in the
North of Nigeria where Boko Haram operates,
see ourselves as increasingly threatened by the
strident Christianity that dominate the North.15

The Boko Haram terrorist group now wants Sharia established across the length and
breadth of Nigeria as the only condition for ceasing its bomb and gun attacks. However
according to the Nationalist view, terrorism is the exclusive preserve of the champions of
ethnic emancipation viewed from this prism; terrorism exists in a multi ethnic society where
there are prevalent cases of marginalization and oppression. According to this view, the
propelling force of terrorism is the existence of exploitation and oppression of a group which
invariably creates injustice and inequality. According to Mbah:

Terrorism inexorably becomes a weapon of the

underprivileged the victim of the prevailing
relations of power in the international system,
acting in self defence or struggling to shake off
the yoke of oppression.16

14
 The idea behind this argument is that terrorism is a revolutionary tactics and nothing
else. This explains why some terrorist groups assume a larger than life image of liberation
fighters, social revolutionaries and even martyrs of some worthy cause as they can
legitimately claim to speak for an identifiably oppressed group17
A review of Nigeria’s foreign policy positions over the years does point to a number
of philosophical-conceptual building blocks which are strongly related to the state of the
international environment. Within the context of decolonization, “self-determination and self-
government” were core philosophical principles that informed the country’s foreign policy.
As the country continued to mature as an independent and sovereign nation, other
philosophical principles that became part of Nigeria’s foreign policy fundamentals are
enlightened national interest, African solidarity, interdependence, internationalism,
asymmetric world order and supranational authority.
Akinterinwa argued that, with the emergence of President Obasanjo as the president
of Nigeria in 1999, there was a standard shift from an African-centered, to a global-focused
foreign policy. According to him, Nigeria’s foreign policy still remained essentially Africa-
focused at the political level while it was global-centered at the economic level 18. The poor
condition of the Nigerian economy inherited by Obasanjo, added with political vulnerability
at the time, demanded new tactics and strategies, and indeed, prompted the need to focus
greater attention on extra-African actors, without necessarily implying any form of neglect of
Africa19. Thus, Nigeria emphasized the economic factor to the impairment of political
considerations. This dramatic shift was explained by President Obasanjo, that Nigeria’s
foreign policy interests extend:
beyond our concern for the wellbeing of our
continent. The debt burden is not an exclusively
African predicament. Many countries in Asia,
the Caribbean and South America are facing
similar problems with it. It is imperative
therefore that the countries of these regions
harmonize their efforts in their search for a fairer
deal from the industrialized nations of the world
and this requires of us a more global approach to
world affairs than was previously the case19

According to Ayam, the reasonable explanation for the shift in Nigeria’s foreign
policy in 1999 can be seen within the forceful and seemingly irresistible influence of
globalization, which has continued to intrude on national borders and by implication
redefining the scope of sovereignty20. In essence, the doctrines of capitalism and

15
democratization had been elevated to the supreme standards of international relations by the
key players in the international system.
Basically, according to Akinterinwa, constructive and beneficial foreign policy
direction of the Obasanjo administration was aimed at addressing and redressing the
perceived inadequacy inherent in concentricism: which was the fact that “concentricism was
not at all an objective but a means; it was more or less a foreign policy tactic that had not
been fully taken advantage of; and as a means to an end, concentricism had to have focus”. 21
Consequently, Obasanjo’s foreign policy was largely shaped by the above philosophy, which
guided his diplomatic approaches to issues in regional and global politics. He nonetheless, set
out in achieving this lofty principle through a number of approaches. The most visible was
his deliberate decision to personally embark on shuttle political diplomacy, earning him the
title of the most travelled Nigerian Head of State.
President Obasanjo was succeeded by the Late Umaru Musa Yaradua who was
reputed to have introduced the concept of “citizen diplomacy” as the thrust of Nigeria’s
foreign policy. According to Agbu, citizen diplomacy is a political concept depicting the
involvement of average citizens engaging representatives of another country either
inadvertently or by design22. He stressed that the concept sometimes refers to “Track Two
Diplomacy”, which connotes unofficial contacts between people of different nations, as
differentiated from official contacts between governmental representatives. He argued that
the concept was construed by Nigeria under President Yar’Adua to mean that Nigeria’s
foreign policy would henceforth be focused on the Nigerian citizens at home and in the
Diaspora.
The foreign policy position of President Goodluck Jonathan which succeeded the late
Yar’Adua is generally perceived as a continuation of the foreign policy thrust of his
predecessor. Many commentators and scholars agree that there is no radical departure in
terms of Nigeria’s foreign policy transactions to warrant serious reflections. However, it will
suffice to mention that the current spate and direction of Nigeria’s domestic insecurity have
intensified the debates on the country’s national image.

2.1 Conceptual Model

2.1.1 Terrorism
Terrorism has become a fixture of international life. This phenomenon has been
variously described as tactic and strategy; a crime, a justified reaction to oppression and an
inexcusable abomination23. It has become increasingly rampant among those pursuing

16
extreme goals in the global world today, not only has modern science and technology
contributed to the expansion the rein and zones of terror, but also, the human condition and
individual aspirations, as well as the nature and levels of global interactions have also
contributed extensively. Thus, the concept is a criminal act that influences an audience
beyond the immediate victim. The strategy of most terrorist is to commit violent acts that
draw the attention of the local populace, the government and the world at large to their cause.
Their various attacks are aimed at obtaining the greatest publicity, choosing targets
that that symbolizes what they oppose. For example, in 1972, at the Munich Olympics, the
Black September Organization struck and killed II Israelis, they were the immediate victims
but the main target of the attack was the estimated 1 billion people watching the televised
event24. This being the case, everyone and any nation in the world is a potential target of any
terrorist attack whether it is a core or weak nation; it does not matter much to the terrorist
actors. As an observer puts it, “in the hands of the modern terrorists, evil is distilled into a
potent, living weapon.”25 The phrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is
a view terrorists themselves would agree to. The evil doers do not see their various violent
acts as evil but fighting for what they believe in by whatever means possible. The different
terrorist attacks in great nations like the United States of America and the United Kingdom in
2001 and 2005 respectively brings to the fore a future in which our societies are among the
battle fields and our people among the targets.
The September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States of America were not only
tragic, devastating and horrific but they were also followed by other major attacks such as,
the tourist facilities on Bali in 2002, the siege of a middle school in Breslain, Russia, Madrid
in 2004, the London transit systems in 2005 These attacks brought about massive loss of lives
and properties and have provided visible evidence that terrorism is a continuing problem and
ravaging fire for many societies around the world. The term terrorism has a connotation of
evil, indiscriminate violence or brutality. To label a group or action as terrorist is to seek to
suggest that the actors or the violence is immoral, wrong or contrary to obvious basic ethical
principles that any reasonable human being might hold. In some context, terrorism may be
conceived as, freedom fighters, revolutionaries, rebels, resistance fighters, members of
democratic opposition or national liberation soldiers26.
Furthermore, terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and
menacing of the innocent populace to instil fear for political ends. In the latter part of the 20 th
century, the phenomenon became popularized as one of the features of world politics and
conflict. Hitherto, terrorism is used by individuals, single minded small groups, state agents

17
and broad insurgent movements to seek some political and military results perhaps
considered difficult or impossible to achieve in the political forum or on the battlefield
against an army27. Also, as Walter argues, terrorism is not only confined to anomalous
circumstances or exotic systems; it is also potential in ordinary institutions as well as in
unusual situations28. It has been variously described as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and
a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Reigns of
terror are not properly understood if they are conceived exclusively as ephemeral states of
crisis produced by adventurous events or as alien forms of control. Systems of terror usually
defined as ‘abnormal’ by the conventions western social and political thought may be
generated under certain conditions of stress by ‘normal’ political processes.
Also, Merari for example, describes terrorism as the use of violence by sub-national
groups or clandestine state agents for achieving political (including social and religious) goals
especially when the violent act is aimed at intimidating or otherwise affect the emotions,
attitudes and behaviour of a target audience considerably larger than the actual victims 29.
Again, Wilkinson argues that as a type of unconventional warfare, terrorism is designed to
weaken or suppress existing political landscapes through capitulation, acquiescence or
radicalization as opposed to subversion or direct military action30.
Significantly, terrorism is a compulsive strategy of the relatively disadvantaged, the
weak who seeks reversal of authority, an efficacious use of violent force to achieve a desired
policy, a theatrical warfare whose drama involves the actors who actually carry out the
violent acts, the group against whom the violent act is targeted and the authority due to be
influenced, intimidated or compelled to act31. Often times, those who are accused of being
terrorists because of their violent acts rarely identify themselves as such, instead, they use
terms that represent their ideological or ethnic struggle such as: separatists, freedom fighters,
guerrillas, Jihadi, revolutionaries. Historically, the concept “terrorism” dates back to the first
organized human interactions. At minimum, it could be traced back to the period when
Jewish zealots used terrorism to resist the Romans by killing many roman soldiers and
destroying Roman property. Also, It could also be traced to when Muslims used terrorism to
fight each other (Shiites versus Sunni) and against the crusades. It was a period in the
religious circle when dying in the service of god, dying while killing the assumed enemies of
God (Allah) loomed large32.
The modern development of terrorism as a means of achieving political and religious
goals began during the French Revolution from 1793 to 1794 under the tenure of Louis XIV.
During this period, Maximilien Robespierre of France initiated and introduced government

18
sponsored terrorism in order to maintain power and suppress opposition to the government.33
In the same vein, during the Soviet Revolution in 1917, Lenin and Stalin, evolved
government sponsored terrorism as a useful tool to maintain government control. These
personalities systematically used the act of terrorism to intimidate and frighten the entire
society. To them, both terror and fear were veritable instruments for governmental
operations.
In 1966, Cuba hosted the Tri-continental conference which was sponsored by the
Soviet Union. The conference marked the beginning of the internationalization of terrorism.
Terrorist and liberation groups from Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America
began to work together and built alliances. The trend continued like that. In Germany, the
Red Army Faction (German group) allied itself with Black September (Palestinian group); in
France, Action Direct (French group) allied with the Red Army Faction and Red Army
Brigade (Italian group); in Japan, the Japanese Red Army allied with the popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine.34 Meanwhile, there is a wide spectrum of strategies of terrorist
groups, no one type of terrorist group has a monopoly on any particular technique or strategy.
Thus, different strategies can be adopted or employed by different, unrelated groups of
terrorist. Strategy in this context is the considered application of means to advance
individuals ends objectives. This depends largely on the circumstances and the terrorists
intentions. Harmon C. indentifies some of the terrorists strategies which include; strategy to
create or further a sense of societal dislocation, fear and even anarchy; strategy to discredit,
diminish, or destroy a particular government and replace it with another economic strategy
which is aimed at directly harm the property owners and perhaps to vitiate the economic
policies and programmes of government particularly in the areas of sabotage of oil pipelines,
bombings bank robberies and disrupting the export of manufactured goods and strategy for
international effect35. This finds explanation in some actions some governments embark upon
to deter unnecessary foreign incursion or intervention in the business of the country.
Essentially, the strategy of terrorists is to engage themselves in carrying out violent
acts that will draw the attention of the local populace, the government, and the entire universe
to the cause in which they are fighting for. They plan their various attacks to obtain the
greater publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. For example, in 1972 at
the Munich Olympics, the Black September organization killed 11 Israelis, the Israelis were
the immediate victims, but the actual target was the estimated 1 billion people watching the
televised event all over the world. The terrorist group used the high visibility of the Olympics
to publicize its views on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Similarly, in October 1983,

19
Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut
International Airport, although the immediate victims of the attack were the 24 military
personnel who were killed and over 100 others who were wounded, however, their true target
was the American people and its congress36.
A modern trend in terrorism is toward loosely organized, self-financed and
international networks of terrorists. Also, another trend toward terrorism is that it is
religiously or ideologically-motivated. Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups, or groups
using religion as a pretext, pose terrorist threats of varying kinds to many nations’ interests.
A third trend is the apparent and obvious growth of cross-national links among different
terrorist groups/organizations which may involve combinations of military training or
funding, technology transfer or political advice. In fact, looming over the entire issue of
international terrorism is a trend toward proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Indeed, Iran, seen as the most active state sponsoring terrorism, has been
aggressively seeking a nuclear arms capability. Also, indications have surfaced that the Al
Qaeda organization attempted to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
weapons. Given all these, stakes in the war against international terrorism are increasing and
attempts to prevent terrorist attacks are diminishing correspondingly.
Also, it is pertinent to examine some of the various dimensions of terrorism.
Prominent among these include, state-bound, non-state terrorism and terrorism across
national boundaries. State bound terrorism, here it means violent attacks being orchestrated,
supported and aided by states. This can be in various forms: intimidation, selective political
assassination, abduction and kidnapping. Some striking illustration includes the genocidal
activities the Nazi regime carried out against the Jewish population between 1939 and 1945
and the stallinest purge of the peasant class of Kulaks in Ukraine that brought about the death
of millions of civilians37.
The non-state terrorism on the other hand is often carried out by individuals or groups
who feel it is no longer worth it to accomplish political objectives within the law, a law which
to them represents the power of an immoral and/or illegitimate regime or government. These
individuals are contemptuous of the society’s political institutions and practices38. Some of
the factors responsible for the non-state terrorism are tied to relative deprivation:
asymmetrical or unequal allocation or distribution of public resources, poverty, and political
frustration. It could also be due to religious intolerance or fanaticism 39 while terrorism across
national boundaries is one that has external connection; the act is mostly drawn on external
factors. Whereas at the national (territorial) level the source of the violent act could be traced

20
and some solutions sought (such as in cases of kidnapping, abduction), extra-territorial
terrorism does not subject itself to such scrutiny and resolution 40. Hence, it is often difficult
to identify the actual source of some terror across national boundaries, and some times, if
identified, it becomes pretty difficult to cope with it without the collaboration of other actors
within the international system.

2.1.2 Foreign Policy

Foreign policy expresses self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its
national interests and to achieve its goals within international relations milieu or arena. Thus,
the approaches are strategically and carefully employed in order to interact with other
countries of the world. In international politics, nations are particularly interested in
achieving two basic things –national interest and foreign policy 41. The former begets the
latter. National interest is focused on taking action on issues that would improve the political
situation, the economic and social wellbeing, the health and culture of the people as well as
their political survival. In other words, national interest is people-oriented policies that have
the capacity to improve the lot of the people and make them stand among other nations in the
international arena. It must be policies that would promote the greatest happiness of the
greatest number of its citizens. For example, policies that lead to the creation of full
employment in the country and simultaneously advance the nations approach towards
economic and political emancipation vis-à-vis other members of the international system 42.
A country’s foreign policy, also known as the international relations policy’ is a set of
political and economic goals that seeks to outline how a country will interact with other
counties of the world. Thus, foreign policies generally are designed to help protect a
country’s national interests, national security, ideological goals and economic prosperity. It
is made up of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent, relations
between one state and others. It is a set of well articulated objectives with regard to world
beyond the borders of a given social unit and a set of strategies and tactics designed to
achieve those objectives43. This implies the perception of a need to influence the behaviour
of other states or international organization. The goal is to ensure that such states or
international organization maintain the existing pattern of behaviour especially if the
influencing state perceives such as contributing to the achievement of its own objectives, or
to change the present pattern by initiating a new set of policies, or by altering or halting the
implementation of existing ones44.

21
 Snyder views foreign policy as the processes of state interaction at the government
level, while P. Reynold conceives it as the external actions taken by decision-makers in a
state with the intention of achieving long-range goals and short-term objectives 45. To G. A
Modelski foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing or
altering the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international
environment. In essence, foreign policy suggests a stated set of attitudes towards the
international environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a country’s relationship with the
outside world, a conscious image of what is or ought to be the country’s place in the world, or
some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decisions on specific
issues.
This however, supports T. Adeniran’s assertion that foreign policy consist of three
elements: firstly, the overall orientation and policy intentions of a particular country toward
other nations of the world, secondly, the objective that a country seeks to achieve in her
relations or dealings with other countries and thirdly, is the means for achieving the set goal
or objectives46. These elements find expression in the interaction of nation-states within the
international arena. It satisfactory to say that the foreign policy of any state must be seen to
reflect some identifiable goals and such foreign policy can only be adjudged a success or
failure depending on the extent to which the set goals have been achieved or not achieved.
For example, one can say that Nigeria’s foreign policy in Chad between 1979 and 1982 was a
failure because it failed to achieve what it set out to do in Chad which was to restore peace
and order between the warring factions. 47 It is in Nigeria’s interest to restore peace and order
in the territory for the purposes of security, political stability and even economic wellbeing.
The basic element underlying the foreign policy of all countries in the international
arena is the quest for security, which, depending on the strength and leadership of a given
country, may range from the pursuit of status quo policies to visible imperialism. According
to Hartmann, because a foreign policy consists of selected national interests probably
formulated into a logically consistent whole that is then implemented, any foreign policy can
be analytically examined in three phases: conception, content and implementation 48.
Conception involves the strategic appraisal of what goals are desirable and achievable given
the presumed nature of the situations international arena, content on the other hand is the
result and reflection of that appraisal while Implementation looks at both the coordinating
mechanisms within a state and the means by which it conveys its views and wishes to other
states49. Though inefficiencies and failure can be very costly in any of these three phases, it is
obvious that the most critical and important phase is conception.

22
 Beyond this, the setting in which foreign policy is been made is very important.
Unlike domestic policies, the targets and goals of foreign policy decisions are not domestic
but entities external to the state. In other words, the process of foreign policy decision
making is influenced by factors that are not only internal to the state initiating this particular
foreign policies but also by pressures from external sources. Hence, two environments of
foreign policy can be identified: the domestic influences on foreign policy formulation
include a country’s geography, economy, demography, political structures, military, political
parties, lobbies and interest groups and public opinion. To be clear, a country’s location,
topography, its terrain, climate, size, population and distribution of natural resources will not
only affect the socio-economic development within the country but will also be a determinant
to the country’s needs in relation to other states in the international arena.
For example, in Japan, one of the main critical determinants of Japan’s foreign policy
is its natural resources poverty; the country depends highly on external sources for its supply
of energy and other strategic raw materials, its topography does not even allow Japan to grow
adequate food to feed its large population 50. On the other hand, the external environment
expresses the interests of other actors in the system which can come in varying dimensions
such as multinational corporations and political terrorists51. The motive behind the pressure
is either to impact positively on the country’s socio-economic and political project or to
negatively affect such a country. It is not uncommon to find participants in the process of
foreign policy decision-making having different perceptions of the objectives of policy as
well as if the realities of the environment. Differences in beliefs, values and wants of people
create in their minds certain expectations and desires about information concerning their
environment.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

There are many theoretical frameworks for the study, analysis and explanation of
different political phenomena. These frameworks however vary depending on the subject
matter under study, for the analysis of such phenomenon like terrorism Boko Haram,
MASSOB and the Niger Delta Militant. One of the theories that will be used in the analysis
of this work is the “Relative Deprivation” theory, which has to do with frustration and rising
expectation. The most outstanding scholars of this theory are W.G Runciman, (1996) S,
Stack, (1993) John Braithwaite and Ted Gurr (1970).

23
 The theory of relative deprivation is one of the most popular behavioural explanatory
frameworks in the study of violence. The central thesis of this framework is that aggression is
always a consequence of discontent of a kind. Relative deprivation is defined as a perceived
discrepancy between man’s (group) value expectation and value capabilities conditions of
life, which people believe they are rightfully entitled to while value capability are the goals
and conditions they think they are capable of obtaining and maintaining given the social
means available to them. Therefore, relative deprivation is the discrepancy between “ought”
and “is” of collective value satisfaction. It is in fact the degree to which the individual
(group) feel deprived as it relates to anger and frustration. This is related to frustration
aggression model of analysis. Consequently Gurr argued that relative deprivation is a
necessary condition for violence. The idea of relative deprivation has been used either to
measure fairness, inequality, or social hostility or aggression.
In applying this theory to the research work, it could be deduced that violence that is
occurring in the Northern part of the country is as a result of frustration due to the fact that
the Boko Haram sect feel deprived by the federal government by not implementing Sharia
law and power-rotation thereby making a Northerner as President of the country. It could be
seen that the aggressive nature of the Boko Haram sect is a consequence of discontent
thereby making a Southerner President of the country (Goodluck Jonathan). This has resulted
to religious and or political violence in the Northern part of Nigeria. And the Boko Haram
sect in the Northern part of Nigeria sees this in the cases of bomb blasts, killings and attacks.
The greater the extent of discrepancy that the Northerners see between what they seek (Sharia
law) which they know can be obtained from the Federal Government, the greater their anger
and consequent disposition to aggression which leads to political violence. The violence is
carried out by the Boko Haram sect made up of the Youths in the Northern part of Nigeria by
bombing Churches, Police Stations, and United nations Building etc.
Also, using the relative deprivation theory, it could be seen that the Boko Haram sect
have no other means of attaining their goal, the sect violence or conflict as a last resort in
achieving their aims and objectives. This they do by bombing government establishment and
churches. This theory has been used to explain further political and religious crisis in the
Northern part of Nigeria, which has resulted in series of political and religious violence in the
North due to the fact that the Boko Haram sect feel deprived.
Furthermore, Frustration Aggression theory will be utilized. This theory explains why
people become frustrated and aggressive when their goals and aspiration are not achieved. In
1939, researchers at Yale University Institute of Human Relation published a small

24
monograph that has had a tremendous impact directly or indirectly, almost on all behavioural
sciences. Led by John Dollard, Leonard Doob, Neal Miller, O.H. Mower, and Robert Sear,
the group attempted to account for virtually all human aggression with a few basic ideas.
Most of the studies investigating the causes and consequences of aggression in the
immediately following decades were oriented, to some extent, at least towards issues raised
by the Yale’s group analysis. Frustration can create aggressive inclination even when they are
not arbitrary or aimed at the subject personally.
According to Maslow, the usual definitions of frustration are in terms simply of not
getting what one desires, of interference with a wish, or with a gratification. Such a definition
fails to make the distinction between a deprivation which is unimportant to the organism
(easily substituted for, with few serious after-effects), and, on the other hand, a deprivation
which is at the same time, a threat to the personality, that is, to the life goals of the individual,
to his defensive system, to his self-esteem or to his feeling of security. It is our con-tension
that only a threatening deprivation has the multitude of effects (usually undesirable) which
are commonly attributed to frustration in general.
Militants activities in Nigeria’s Niger Delta therefore is mostly motivated by
frustration created by deprivation and a threat to the personality, that is, to the life goals of
individual or a group of people in the region. The region derives its name from being situated
at the mouth of the River Niger. Before the creation of the Nigerian state, economic activities
of the Niger Delta in pre-colonial days entailed mainly export of salt and fish to the
hinterland. In the 18th century, when the slave trade was at its peak, the region was West
Africa’s largest slave exporting area, and this was enhanced by its proximity to the sea. Slave
traders, however, diverted to palm oil trade in the 19th century when the slave trade declined.
The Niger Delta, the delta of the Niger River in Nigeria, is a densely populated region
sometimes called the Oil Rivers because it was once a major producer of palm oil. The area
was the British Oil Rivers Protectorate from 1885 until 1893, when it was expanded and
became the Niger Coast Protectorate.
The Niger Delta, as now defined officially by the Nigerian government, extends over
about 70,000 km² and makes up 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass. Historically and
cartographically, it consists of present day Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers States. In 2000,
however, Obansanjo's regime included Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River State, Edo, Imo and
Ondo States in the region. Some 31 million people of more than 40 ethnic groups including
the Bini, Efik, Ibibio, Annang, Oron, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Isoko, Urhobo, Ukwuani, and Kalabari,
are among the inhabitants in the Niger Delta, speaking about 250 different dialects.

25
 As Nigeria began to prepare for independence, the search for oil began in the Delta in
the 1950s and by 1956 it was discovered in commercial quantities. Less than two years later
it was being commercially produced and sold on the international markets. Today around two
million barrels of oil are extracted in the Niger Delta every day making it the world's eighth
largest oil producer in a country that remains one of the world's poorest as the oil revenues
largely bypass those living and working outside that industry. Foreign companies extract the
oil and it has been alleged that they do so without regard for local cultures or the local
environment which has been ravaged by oil spills, fires, pollution, deforestation and poor
waste management.
Furthermore, we have the poverty theory. The poverty theory can be used to explain
one of the major causes of Boko Haram insurgency, Mend activities and the MASSOB
movement in Nigeria. According to Liolio, the successful recruitment of the people into the
group depend on the nature of the economic and poverty level in the area mostly insurgent
gain members by claiming their struggle is for the people and that they would provide basic
necessity for the general population if supported. The insurgent may succeed if such society
embedded by poverty, illiteracy, ineptitude, corruption, discrimination to modernization and
globalization, which create artificial poverty to many underdeveloped countries, such
countries would become recruitment target of the terrorists. Liolio further stated that, it is
significant to know that the root causes of the insurgency often relate to a long cloudy set of
problems culminating into uncontrolled grievances and exploding violence. Such problems
are socio-economic and political, that is why insurgencies are more rampant in
underdeveloped countries or countries engulfed by corrupt regime, ethnicity, social
prejudices religion and disparities in the distribution of resources or even lack of it.
Also, Olojo contends that one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards
violent extremism; recruitment and support for Boko Haram are economic deprivation.
Several scholars believed that poverty and longstanding economic disparities in the northeast
part of the country made the youth join the sect. Similarly, Adesoji stresses that, In Nigeria
the marginalization and imbalance distribution or implementation of the resources made
some radicalized scholars to preach against the government and democratic setting, which
later gave birth to the present Boko Haram insurgency.
The poverty theory further explains that domestically the politicization of religious
traditions and the radicalization of religious communities are especially likely in times
economic decay, social integration or state collapse. Hopeless people below the poverty line;
people who are marginalized or physical threat turn to their religious in search for an

26
alternative political order that satisfies their need for welfares, recognition, and security. In
present time, there are many violence uprisings around the world, some transformed into full
terrorist organizations like the Boko Haram. The theory shows the significance of
socioeconomic factors in explaining religious insurgency like Boko Haram.

27
Endnotes
1
www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.phd/pot/article/view/123/html accessed 15th
june 2016
2
www.defense.gov/ accessed 15th june 2016
3
Lodge J. Introduction-Terrorism and Europe: Some General Considerations in Juliet
(Lodge. Sussex: Wheat Sheaf Book, 1988) 34
4
Cook C. Macmillan Dictionary of Historical Terms (New York: Macmillan Reference
1989) 19
5
Walter Laqueur. Terrorism (Boston, MA: Little Brown 1977) 28

6
Edwin Madunagu. The Making and Unmaking of Nigeria: Critical Essays on Nigerian
History and Politic (Calabar: Clear Lines Publications. 2001) 51
7
Walter Laqueur. Terrorism (Boston, MA: Little Brown 1977) 29

8
www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=120914 accessed 17th June 2016

9
Ariel Merari in The Terrorism Industry (Edward Herman. New York: Pantheon 1989) 44

10
Paul Wilkinson. Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan. 1974) 31

11
Daily Sun.. Boko Haram, How It All Started. Daily Sun, June 17 2011.

12
Daily Sun.. Boko Haram, How It All Started. Daily Sun, June 17 2011

13
Abonyi C. J. The Impact of the September 11 Attack on the World Politics. Journal of
International Current Affairs, 2006, vol.No.1. p12

14
Murtaza M. Y. Boko is a Bloody Haram. http://www.amazon .com/dp/B00NMGFVOY
accessed 27th June 2016

15
Murtaza M. Y. Boko is a Bloody Haram. http://www.amazon .com/dp/B00NMGFVOY
accessed 27th June 2016

16
Terrorism and National Security, A paper presented in the 1996 series of staff seminars of
the Department of Political Science University of Ibadan, April 5, 1996
17
www.pubs.caritauni.edu.ng/download.php? accessed 27th June 2016

18
Gambari, I. Nigerian Foreign Policy since Independence. Nigerian Journal of Policy
28
 and Strategy, (Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies 1986) 76
19
Gambari, I. Nigerian Foreign Policy since Independence. 79

20
Gambari, I. A. From Balewa to Obasanjo: The Theory and Practice of Nigeria’s Foreign
Policy. In A. Adebajo, & A. R. Mustapha (Eds.), Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy after the Cold War (KwaZulu-Natal: University of KwaZulu Natal
Press 2008) 61
21
Fayomi, O. O. The Diaspora and Nigeria-Ghana Relations (1979-2010). Unpublished
PhD Thesis, (Ota: Covenant University 2013)
22
Gambari, I. Nigerian Foreign Policy since Independence. 86
23
www.pubs.caritauni.edu.ng/download.php? accessed 27th June 2016

24
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25
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26
Enders W. and Sandler T. The Political Economy of Terrorism (United States: Cambridge
University Press. 2006) 61
27
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28
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29
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30
Wilkinson P. Political Terrorism (New York: Macmillan Press, 1974) 23

31
Wilkinson P. Political Terrorism (New York: Macmillan Press, 1974) 25

32
Wilkinson P. Political Terrorism (New York: Macmillan Press, 1974) 33

33
Rapport D. ‘Fear and Trembling Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions’. American
Political Science Review. 1984, Vol. 878. P 34
34
Hoffman B. Terrorism today (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 54

35
Harmon C. Terrorism Today (2nd edition) (London and New York: Routledge, 2000)

36
www.pubs.caritauni.edu.ng/download.php? accessed 24th June 2016
37
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29
38
Lutz J. M. and Lutz B. J. “Terrorism as Economic Warfare” Global Economy Journal 6,
2006 b 2: 13.
39
Adeniran T. Introduction to International Relations (Nigeria: Macmillan Publishers, 1983)
41
40
Adeniran T. Introduction to International Relations (Nigeria: Macmillan Publishers, 1983)
45
41
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42
Ojo O. and Sesay A. Concepts in International Relations (Lagos: JAD Publishers, 1988)
28
43
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44
Frankel J. The making of Foreign policy: An Analysis of Decision making (London:
Oxford University Press. 1967) 60
45
Reynold P. A. An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Longman. 1980) 46

46
Adeniran T. Introduction to International Relations (Nigeria: Macmillan Publishers, 1983)
6
47
Hartmann, F. H. The Relations of Nations (6th ed) (New York: Macmillan Press, 1983) 30

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49
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50
Curtis M. et al. Introduction to comparative government (New York: Pearson Education
Inc. 2006) 55
51
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52
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53
www.pubs.caritauni.edu.ng/download.php? accessed 12th July 2016

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 CHAPTER THREE

TERRORISM AND FOREIGN POLICY OF NIGERIA

3.1 Terrorism in Nigeria

Terrorism in Nigeria is fast becoming an emerging challenge to its national security.

According to Azazi, a former Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, “The Nigerian nation is
not prepared for the spate of violence we are experiencing” 1. However , this project argues
that there have been some signs and symptoms of terrorism in Nigeria before now; because
according to McNamara, “any society that seeks to achieve adequate security against the
background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of productivity and per
capita income, low technological development, inadequate and insufficient public utilities
and chronic problems of unemployment; (religious intolerance and criminal politicking) has a
false sense of security”2.
Between 1967 and 1970, Nigeria had remained a relatively peaceful and violent or
terror free nation, however, Obene is of the opinion that, the killing of Mr Dele Giwa, by a
‘Letter Bomb’ in October 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Nigeria3. Furthermore, the Movement for the Advancement of
Democracy hijacked a Nigeria Airways aircraft in October 1993 following the annulment of
Chief M.K.O. Abiola’s presidential election triumph. Afterwards, a vicious bomb blast ripped
Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium in August 1994. Several other terror acts have occurred since then.
For example, between 1996 and 1998 there was bomb attack on the car of a former Chief
Security Officer of Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria, Dr Omoshola. Also, the escort car
of the former Military Administrator of Lagos State, Brig Gen MB Marwa (Rtd) was attacked
by terrorists.
Other significant acts of terrorism in Nigeria can be summarized as follows: General
sectarian violence in Jos (2004, 2010, and 2011), series of bombings and killings in
Maiduguri (since 2004 to date), the 2010 New Year’s Eve bombing of Mogadishu Military
Cantonment Mammy Market Abuja, the May 29 2010 Presidential Inauguration bombing in
Abuja, the 1st October 2010 bombing in Abuja that disrupted the celebration of Nigeria’s
50th Independence Anniversary, the Mammy Market bombings in Bauchi, and Zuba near
Abuja in 20114. Furthermore, the Post-April 2011 Presidential Election violence in the
Northern parts of Nigeria, April 8, 2011 Suleja INEC office bombing, May 29, 2011 bombing
of social drinking sports in Maiduguri and Zuba an outskirts of Abuja. June 16, 2011 Nigeria

31
Police Force Headquarters bombing in Abuja, August 26, 2011 bombing of UN House in
Abuja, Nov 4, 2011 bombing of Army Task Force Operational, Police Headquarters and
other government buildings in Damaturu, Yobe State and Maiduguri in Borno State,
christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla near Abuja (25 December
2011), Mubi, Yola, Gombe and Maiduguri bombings (5-6 January 2012), Kano bombings (20
January and 1 February 2012). HQ 1 Division Nigerian Army and Kawo bridge bombings in
Kaduna (7 February 2012)5 etc
During the military rule of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sanni Abacha, Nigeria
witnessed series of bomb explosions targeted at some notable political figures. Some political
analysts referred to these various bombings as acts of terrorism. However, terrorism got to an
alarming rate in Nigeria and thus began to engage the attention of the general public, the
government and the international community in 2009. On 24th December, 2009, a young
Nigerian with the name Umar Abdul Mutallab attempted to blow up a US Jet in Detroit,
USA. This particular incident put Nigeria on the terror watch list. During investigation, it was
revealed that Mutallab had links with terrorist groups in both Yemen and Somalia. Yemen is
regarded as the, new Afghanistan‟ and has thus emerged as the key development centre for
the new generation of a worldwide known terrorist group alQaeda (the group responsible for
the bombing of the world Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 in the US)
bombs. In 2002 an anarchist Islamic group by the name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati
Wal-Jihad popularly known as “Boko Haram” was formed by Mohammed Yusuf 6. This Boko
Haram group has been said to have links with terror groups in Yemen and Somalia. The
group has been engaging in acts of terrorism since then. So this group has become the face of
terrorism in Nigeria. In the paragraphs below, brief history of Boko Haram will be examined,
its modus operandi and how it is been funded.

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad), better and popularly known by its
Hausa name Boko Haram, is a violent jihadist terrorist organization or group which has its
base in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. It is an Islamist movement which is strongly against
man-made laws. Founded in 2001 by Mohammed Yusuf, the group is a Jihadist group that
seeks to establish Sharia law in the country. The group is also known for attacking Christians
and bombing churches. The group whose name in the Hausa language, “Boko Haram”,
literally means "Western education is sinful", is divided into three factions. In 2011, Boko
Haram was responsible for the death of at least 450 people in Nigeria. 7 It was also reported

32
that they had been responsible for the death of over 620 in the first 6 months of 2012 8. In the
first few years of its operations, 10,000 people are reported to have died 9. The group later
became known internationally following sectarian terrorist acts in Nigeria in July 2009,
which claimed over 1,000 lives10. They do not have a clear structure or evident chain of
command. Moreover, it is still not clear whether Boko Haram has links to terror outfits
outside Nigeria and its fighters have frequently clashed with Nigeria's central government. A
US commander stated that Boko Haram is likely linked to AQIM (al-Qaeda in Islamic
Maghreb) 11.
The group adopted an official name known to be “Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati
wal-Jihad” which translates to “The Group of Al-Sunna for Preaching and Jihad” in
English12. In Maiduguri town, where the group was founded, the residents referred to it as
Boko Haram. The term "Boko Haram" was derived from the Hausa word “Boko” which
stands for "Western Education" and the Arabic word “Haram” figuratively meaning "sin"
(literally, "forbidden")13. The name, loosely translated from Hausa, means "western education
is forbidden". Boko Haran earned its name as a result of its very strong opposition to
anything Western, which it sees as corrupting Muslims. Boko Haram was founded as an
indigenous Salafist group, turning itself into a Salafist Jihadist group in 2009. It postulates
that interaction with the Western World is a sin and also gives support to the opposition to the
Muslim establishment and the Nigerian government. Publicly, the group belaud its ideology
despite the fact that its former leader and founder Muhammad Yusuf was himself a very
educated man who lived a lavish life and drove around in a Mercedes Benz14.
Boko Haram members do not interact with the local Muslim population and have also
carried out terrorist attacks in the previous years on anyone who criticizes it actions,
including Muslim clerics. In the wake of the 2009 crackdown on its members and its
subsequent re-emergence, the growing frequency and geographical range of attacks attributed
to Boko Haram have led some political and religious leaders in the north to the conclusion
that the group has now expanded beyond its original religious composition to include not
only Islamic militants, but criminal elements and dissatisfied politicians as well 15. According
to Borno state governor Kasshim Shetima “Boko Haram has become a franchise that anyone
can buy into. It's something like a Bermuda Triangle”16

A Historical Background of Boko Haram

Before the British came into Nigeria to colonize and subsequently annex Nigeria, the
Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently based. It was a sovereign

33
sultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with majority of its
population Kanuri Muslim. The Bornu Sultanate emerged after the overthrow of the Kanem-
Bornu Empire ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for over 2000 years. The Bornu Sultanate of the
Kanuri is different from the Sokoto Caliphate of the Hausa/Fulani established in 1802 by the
military conquest of Usman dan Fodio17. In 1903, Both the Bornu Sultanate and Sokoto
Caliphate came under control of the British. However, as a result of the activities of early
Christian missionaries who made use of the Western education as a tool for evangelism, it
was seen with suspicion by the local population. Growing dissatisfaction gave birth to many
fundamentalists among the Kanuri and other peoples of North-East Nigeria.
One of the most famous and prominent of such fundamentalists was Mohammed
Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, who was at the height of his notoriety during the 1970s
and 1980s18.The Nigerian authorities sent him into exile; he was not of the belief that
Mohammed was the Prophet and stimulated riots in the country which resulted in the deaths
of thousands of people. Some analysts view Boko Haram as an extension of the Maitatsine
riots. In 1995, Boko Haram was said to be operating under the name Shabaab, Muslim Youth
Organization with Mallam Lawal as the leader19.
Mohammed Yusuf took over leadership of the group after Lawal left to further his
education. Yusuf‟s leadership allegedly opened the group to political influence and
popularity. Yusuf officially established the group in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the
purpose of establishing a Sharia government in Borno State under senator Ali Modu Sheriff
before he later became a governor 20. He established a religious complex which included a
mosque and a school where many poor families from across Nigeria especially the Northern
part of Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children. The centre had
ulterior political motives and soon it was also working as a recruiting centre for future Jihadis
to fight the state. The group includes members who come from neighbouring countries like
Chad and Niger and speak only Arabic. In 2004 the building was relocated to Yusuf's home
state of Yobe in the village Kanamma near the Niger border.
Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss in its interview with IRIN News that
Yusuf successfully attracted followers from the unemployed youth "by speaking out against
police and political corruption21. Abdulkarim Mohammed, a researcher on Boko Haram,
added that violent uprisings in Nigeria are ultimately due to "the fallout of frustration with
corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment. 22" The group
carried out its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence
that changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government started an investigation into Boko

34
Haram's terrorist acts following reports that its members were arming themselves. However,
prior to that, the government had reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the
increasingly militant character of the organization, including that of a Nigerian military
officer. When the Nigerian government came into action, several members of the group were
arrested in Bauchi, resulting in deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which brought
about to the deaths of an estimated 700 people23.
During the fighting with the security forces, Boko Haram fighters reportedly "used
fuel-laden motorcycles" and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station. The group's
founder and former head Mohammed Yusuf was killed during this time while in police
custody. After Mohammed Yusuf's was killed, a new leader emerged whose identity was
unknown at the time. After the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the group launched its first
terrorist attack in Borno in January 2011. It resulted in the killing of four people. Afterwards,
the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity.
In January 2012, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Mohammed Yusuf, appeared
in a video posted on YouTube. According to Reuters, Shekau became the leader of the group
after Yusuf's death in 200924. Authorities had previously believed that Shekau was killed
during the violence in 2009. By early 2012, the group was responsible for claiming the lives
of over 900 people in Nigeria 25. In June 2012, the group claimed responsibility for the suicide
bombings of three churches in the Northern Nigerian state of Kaduna killing more than 50
people (Solomon, 2012). The medley of approaches adopted by the government towards
putting an end to the activities of the group appears not to have fully worked but there are
some encouraging signs.

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

Organization such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) is
known for hostage taking, kidnapping for ransom, pipeline vandalization, oil-theft, arson and
ambush. As of date, more than five hundred oil workers, politicians, actors, children, and
other important personalities have either been kidnapped or taken hostage 26. At first, the
group argued that kidnapping and hostage taking were introduced to force crude oil experts
involved in exploration in the Niger-Delta areas to pressure Nigerian government to take
positive steps towards ameliorating the environmental, social and political problems
deteriorating the Niger Delta area. Recently, the trends and patterns of hostage taking and
kidnapping differ markedly from using it as proxies to get government attentions, as the
groups now focus more on the ransom paid to ensure release of the oil industry workers.

35
Today, MEND targets are the foreign nationals irrespective of whether they work in the oil
industry or anywhere near the oil-producing areas or not. The primary intention is that when
such people are kidnapped; their relatives and embassies would pay whatever amount to
ensure that they are release.
Since late 2005, the resistance against the state and multinational oil corporations
operating in the Niger Delta region has taken a more violent and sophisticated turn with the
emergence of MEND. Attacks on oil facilities and the abduction of expatriate and local oil
workers (and family members in some cases) by insurgents has been on the increase. The
activities of this and other various groups operating in the Niger Delta region have led to the
shutting-in of about a quarter of the nation’s daily oil production. The crisis is however the
direct culmination of largely unaddressed hardship suffered in the regions such as land
dispossession and pollution, marginalization and political repression. For example, the UNDP
report on Human Development in the Niger Delta puts the poverty rate in the whole of the
South-South region of Nigeria (including the Niger Delta) at 74.8% 27 and further asserts that
the people of the region are been deprived the benefits of the oil industry such as
employment, because they lack skills or capital resources or both” required for participation
in the industry.
MEND is the most recent resistance group in the Niger Delta region. The group seeks
to win the right of local oil producing communities to participate in Nigeria’s oil industry.
This is with a view to securing benefits – royalties, employment, infrastructure, and
compensation for the degraded environment caused by oil activities – from the federal
government and oil companies28.
In November and December of 2005, two explosives were detonated in the creeks of
Rivers State, destroying two Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) pipelines
located in Okirika and Andoni axis with no person or group(s) claiming responsibility 29. Also,
on January 11, 2006 an SPDC oil-field located about 20km offshore was attacked, damaged
and four expatriates were kidnapped by militants after a violent gun duel with the military
guarding the oil-field30. The dust had barely settled when on Sunday January 15, 2006,
MEND militants “attacked and destroyed one flow station and two military house-boats
belonging to SPDC in Benisede, Bayelsa State”31.
Furthermore, in January 2007, four foreign oil workers were abducted at a Shell
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) location in Bayelsa State 32. In the early hours of
Saturday February 18 of 2007, Ijaw youth launched series of coordinated and devastating
commando-like attacks on specifically selected and strategically located oil facilities and

36
installations in western Niger Delta33. In March of the same year also, the same Ijaw youths
took hostage of about another nine expatriate oil workers, while by April; thirteen expatriates
were kidnapped in Port Harcourt alone34. In summary, more than five thousand foreigners,
most of whom are from America, Britain, Thailand, Egypt, and the Philippines have been
kidnapped and taken hostage by MEND group. These actions of the youths brought about a
new dimension in what is going on in the Niger-Delta region, as the youths were ready to
make the whole world know that the Nigerian Government has no control over what is
happening within its borders, most especially in the oil rich Niger Delta.
Before 2008, no group or organization ever dared the Nigerian Army. For example, in
December 1999 when 12 policemen were brutally murdered by suspected Ijaw youths at Odi
in Bayelsa State, the Nigerian Military sacked the entire town of Odi. Similar terror actions
have occurred in Jesse, Jos, and one other place in northern Nigeria. Now, the youths are
confronting the Federal Government and striking where it matters most: oil, the economic
strength center of Nigeria. As leader of MEND and most wanted militant in the Niger Delta,
Government Ekpemupolo, aka Tompolo said that these coordinated attacks against the oil
companies in the region are because they are ready to “take their future in their own hands”,
actions, which have since forced Nigerian government to set in motion processes of
negotiation that ultimately brought about the on-going Amnesty Programme35.
Since the beginning of 2008, kidnapping and hostage taking have gotten to new
heights. Many Nigerian politicians, university lectures, kings and their chiefs, musicians and
movie industry workers have been kidnapped from one point to the other. Anybody can be
kidnapped. More often than not, kidnappers and hostage-takers hardly kill victims, although a
number of deaths have been recorded. Whenever a person is kidnapped, the family, company
or embassy of the country of the victim is notified and a price is to be paid for his or her
release. Prices are placed on the kidnapped based on the worth of the victim. If an important
personality with influence in government or oil magnate or better still children of any of these
is kidnapped, the price is usually high. The former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria,
Prof. Charles C. Soludo’s father was kidnapped and released after a whopping 200 million
naira was paid to the kidnappers 36. Actors Peter Edochie and Nkem Owoh, two of Nigeria’s
famous movie stars, were only released after 20 million and 1.4 million naira were paid
respectively.
According to the spokesperson of MEND Jomo Gbomo, MEND’s aim and objective,
“is to totally destroy Nigeria’s capacity to export oil”. These various attacks and shut-in of
400,000 bpd led to increase in the price of oil on the international market 37. Commenting on

37
the strategy Boyloaf, then MEND Commander, explained that it was based on targeting oil
facilities rather than the military. In his words:
I believe the economy is the power. Like you
may have known, I don’t believe in fighting
human beings, I believe in crumbling the
economy. On my way crumbling (sic) the
economy, if any military man comes across me
and tries to stop me, I mean those people will
kiss their graves. My bullet, nozzle is always
targeted at the flow stations, pipelines etc, I
don’t believe in fighting human beings8.

Having known that the disruption of the flow of oil from the Niger Delta to the global
market would have a most potent, disastrous and devastating effect on the federal
government, oil companies and international community, the MEND militants withdrew from
the cities of the Niger Delta and went into the maze of creeks. The numerous attacks on the
oil industry infrastructures, particularly oil production and oil export had the effect of cutting
oil production and pushing up the price of oil in the tight and nervous global market.
MEND as a group/movement has no clear leadership structure. The anonymous or veiled
spokesperson Jomo Gbomo is the only known face of MEND. Jomo Gbomo who is known
only through press statements released to the media. The movement is a loose coalition of
shadowy groups (cells) and a variety of leaders scattered across the states of the Niger Delta,
who sometimes are unaware of events undertaken by other groups until such events are
publicized. The decision to have a multiple command structure, a diverse and amorphous
leadership is to make the movement difficult to contain, but effective in guerrilla warfare
extending over the whole region. This strategy is aimed at avoiding the fate in earlier
movements in the region with a visible leadership such as MOSOP, NDPVF, and EBA etc,
whose leadership/top hierarchy was easily targeted for elimination, or compromised by the
oil companies and the government39. This “invisible” nature of MEND constitute to an
important factor making the organization difficult for the government, oil companies and
even the military to target and effectively neutralize its activities in the crisis of the Niger
Delta.
This use of local force to block the global oil trade has been significant in two ways:
on the one hand, it has brought about more global attention being focused on the situation in
the oil producing communities in the region, particularly the plight and demands of the
people, while on the other, it has increased the energy security stakes of the world’s
established and emerging powers in the region40. MEND has tapped fully into acts likely to

38
draw global attention to the Niger Delta: the kidnapping of foreign nationals as hostages and
the shut-ins resulting from the destruction of oil facility that contribute to the higher price of
crude oil. These violent or terror acts have been connected to a sophisticated strategy for
engaging global media through the use of IT, and drawing the attention of intervention
agencies to the crisis and plight of the people in the region.
The Joint Task Force (JTF) has always maintained that MEND and other militia
groups in the region are criminals and miscreants who have been involved in illegal oil theft
and other criminal activities over the years and must be removed for the free flow of oil. This
view resonates in a leaked military report by the then commander of the Joint Task Force in
the Niger Delta (2006-2008), former Brig. Gen. L.P. Ngubane, “Brief for Chief of Defence
Staff on Strategies to Stem out Militant Activities within the Joint Task Force Operation
Restore Hope Area of Responsibility”.41 It was reported that the militants intercepted this
report and subsequently released it to the media. In the report organizations such as MEND,
MOSOP, INC, IYC, NDPVF and FNDIC are tagged as militant groups that must be
destroyed. The document highlights militant leaders in the region and estimates their
capabilities, weaponry and manpower. Marked for total destruction are Ijaw communities
such as Oporoza, Kurutie, Kunukunuma, Okerenkoko and other villages in Gbaramatu clan,
Delta State, which promotes militia activity. The report also identifies Ijaw communities in
Bayelsa and Rivers States that should also be targeted by the military campaign against Niger
Delta insurgents.
The emergence of MEND has redefined the socio-economic space and political
ecology of the Niger Delta and Nigeria as a whole. By resorting to armed struggle, the
organization has tapped into the local-global dimension of the quest for resource control in
the Niger Delta. International Crisis Group (ICG) postulated that the root causes of the Delta
insurgency are “well known” and include violence, under-development, environmental
damage, lack of credible state and local government institutions and endemic corruption 42.
ICG reports that MEND demands resource control, compensation for decades of
environmental damage and the release of two imprisoned ethnic Ijaw leaders.

3.2 Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (1999 – 2015)

Foreign policy expresses self-interest strategies chosen by the state to protect its
national interests and also to achieve its goals and objectives within the international relations
arena. Thus, the various approaches are strategically used in order to interact with other
countries of the world. In international politics, nations are solely interested in achieving two

39
basic things – national interest and foreign policy. The former begets the latter. National
interest accentuates taking action on issues that would develop or improve the political
situation, the economic and social wellbeing, the health and culture of the people as well as
their political survival. In other words, national interest is people-oriented policies that have
the capacity to improve the lot of the nation’s citizens and make them stand head above other
nations. It must be policies that would promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number
of the citizens. For example, a policy that brings about the creation of full employment in the
country and at the same time advance the nation’s march towards economic and political
emancipation vis-à-vis other members of the international system43.
A country’s foreign policy, also referred to as the ‘international relations policy’ is a
set of political and economic goals that seeks to shape how a country will interact with other
counties in the international arena. Thus, foreign policies are generally designed to help
safeguard a country’s national interests, national security, ideological goals and economic
prosperity. It’s made up of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable length,
relations between one state and others. It is a set of clear objectives with regard to world
beyond the borders of a given social unit and a set of strategies and tactics designed to
achieve those objectives44. This implies the perception of a need to influence the behaviour of
other states or international organization. The aim is to make sure that such states or
international organization maintain the existing pattern of behaviour especially if the
influencing state recognizes such as contributing to the achievement of its own objectives or
to change the present pattern by introducing a new set of policies or by altering or halting the
implementation of existing ones45.
Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence has been viewed from different
perspectives in recent times. One of the most dominant perspectives of Nigeria’s foreign
policy is that “it is chameleon in nature.” 46 A foreign policy constantly in a state of flux as a
result of internal and external dynamics inherent in any given administration or regime. Some
writers however maintained that regardless of the frequent changes, the substance of
Nigeria’s foreign policy has remained the same.
The formation and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy from independence has
been carried out in no fewer than fifteen different administrations through the ministry of
foreign affairs. From Tafawa Balewa’s administration in 1960 to the current President
Muhammadu Buhari’s administration, these various administrations - including the different
military regimes which took over administrative power in Nigeria for over a cumulative
period of 35 years, of the entire 56 years of the existence of Nigeria’s foreign policy-

40
maintained that it pursued the same national interest with regards to the nation’s foreign
policy47.
The consequence of the changing nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy, there has been a
glut of conceptual ideological transitions in Nigeria’s foreign policy machinery 48. Studies
indicate that past administrations made every effort towards an epistemological construction
and definition of the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy. These conceptualizations are often
regime specific and born out of a psychological and selfish hunger of various administrations
or regimes to shape an identity which will leave a lasting impression in the minds of
Nigerians49. To this notion, Pin laments: “...these ideologies are not necessarily products of
deep and profound philosophical reflections.”50 Concepts and ideologies that have been
recommended over the years since independence include: Africa as the centre piece of
Nigeria’s foreign policy, Dynamic foreign policy, and national consensus in foreign policy,
Economic diplomacy, Citizen Diplomacy and the transformation agenda of Nigeria’s foreign
policy are a few examples among many other ideologies which in many ways have not been
achieved.51

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Olusegun Obasanjo’s Civilian Administration (1999-

2007)
Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was elected as
the civilian president and at the beginning of this new administration, revitalization of the
derailing economy for the well-being of the Nigerian people was identified as a major
platform for sustainable democratic order. However, it was generally agreed that to reposition
the Nigerian economy for the desired growth, issues such as declining Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), the debt problem and repatriation of ill-gotten wealth must be
appropriately addressed52.

The need to balance the domestic and external contexts brought about an initial
foreign policy that required extensive outreach diplomacy during the early years of the
Obasanjo administration. Indeed, between May 1999 and mid-August 2002, it was reported
that Obasanjo had embarked on 113 foreign trips, spending 340 days out of the country 53. In
explaining his reasons for undertaking the trips, Obasanjo stated:
I have devoted much time and energy
journeying virtually all corners of the globe in
my personal effort to positively reintegrate our
country into the international community and
attract investment. We are happy to report that

41
 the results from these trips have been
encouraging enough to confirm my personal
belief and the advice of marketing experts
namely that personal contact is the best way to
market your product, and my product is
Nigeria54.

President Obasanjo and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Alhaji Sule Lamido,
travelled extensively in Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas to promote Nigeria’s bilateral
relations, even at the expense of very strong criticisms of the President’s “excessive”
overseas tours55. Ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo gave an insight into how he took stock of
his administration’s achievements on the external plane. These can be summarized in the sub
topics below:

Conflict Resolution
The administration made strong attempts to restore confidence and credibility to
Nigeria's contribution to the prevention, management and resolution of various conflicts in
Africa and elsewhere. At the Algiers Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in
1999, Obasanjo's proposal that the year 2000 be made the Year of Peace, Security and
Solidarity was adopted by the Summit 56. Also in September 1999, during the fourth extra-
ordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya, Obasanjo's proposal for the convening of a Ministerial
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) was
implemented, the conference was held in Abuja from 8th - 9th of May, 200057.
The administration worked towards achieving that the peace and stability process in
Sierra Leone, after Nigeria and ECOMOG‟s ending of the civil war, was being handled by
the United Nations, thereby reducing Nigeria's financial commitment. Nigeria also ensured
that its military personnel continued to feature regularly in the regional and international
peacekeeping missions. Such places included Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia/Eritrea,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Western Sahara and the Balkans. In the Mano River
area, Nigeria continued to broker peace between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in an
effort to put an end to the cycle of violence. In Sierra Leone for instance, Nigeria is playing a
leading role in the task of reconstruction after years of civil war. Nigeria has also contributed
the sum of $100,000 for the take-off of the Special Court to try war criminals58.
Also in Zimbabwe, Nigeria was greatly responsible for the "thawing of the ice" in the
potentially dangerous land crisis. The land crisis in the country was rightly identified as a
potential flash point for conflict, which could consume most of Southern Africa, with

42
consequences going far beyond the continent of Africa. Through the instrumentality of the
Commonwealth, the Abuja Agreement was brokered, to break the logjam. This Agreement
remains the most laudable mechanism for resolving the Zimbabwean crisis to date. The
Chief Obasanjo’s administration demonstrated that it was committed to making sure that
African continent is peaceful since peace and stability were the basic conditions for any
meaningful development.

Consular: Welfare of Nigerians

In this respect, a new consular policy was formulated in the Obasanjo administration,
which would be the guiding framework for Nigerian Missions in dealing with cases of
citizens of Nigerian outside the country, regardless of the circumstances of their departure
from the country or their current immigration status abroad 59. Nigeria’s diplomatic missions
abroad made it know repeatedly to their host countries that the dignity of Nigerian citizens
must be respected; migrant workers of Nigerian origin protected and those trafficked should
be recognized as victims who must be assisted rather than be desensitized.
Indeed the policy also sought a share of the international labour market for Nigerian
workers in almost all fields of endeavour. In that regard, Nigeria and a number of countries,
notable Italy, Ireland and Spain concluded frameworks for cooperation on mutual and
bilateral assistance on labour60. With this Nigeria will be able to provide manual labour
(manpower) to countries that have signed the agreement.

Regional Integration
It was of the belief in Nigeria that the integration of African economies could be
rapidly achieved through the proposed African Union, thus it instigated the active support of
the government in facilitating the eventual adoption of the treaty establishing the African
Union (AU). It was as a result of Chief Obasanjo's intervention that the Heads of States
adopted the Constitutive Act of the Union, during the Lome Summit in December 2000 61.
Nigeria's backing for the establishment of the AU was simply based on the belief that its
character, content and form were in consonance with the esteemed vision of the Organization
of African Union (OAU) founding fathers and the aspiration of Africans for the unity and
prosperity of it peoples. In 2002 the OAU was finally transformed into the African Union
(AU) as well as the successful conclusion of the Durban Summit. It was Nigeria’s belief that
if the African Union lived up to its expectation of becoming a catalyst for political, economic
and social transformation of the African continent, then the ideals and goals and objectives of

43
the founding fathers of the OAU of a united, strong and prosperous Africa would have been
given vent62.
The 'Fast Track' approach to integration in the West African region was led the Chief
Obasanjo’s administration. On December 9th, 1999 at the 22 nd Summit of Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of States and
Governments in Lome, Togo, Nigeria made a groundbreaking proposal for a fast track
approach to integration of the sub-region 63. This process, which originally involved close
economic relations with Ghana, has now brought about the establishment of a Free Trade
Area involving Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Niger and Ghana. It also has resulted in considerable
progress made in further integration of our currencies, transport and power systems.
The successful inauguration of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in Libreville,
Gabon in November, 1999 can be regarded to be the most outstanding achievement of
Nigeria during the tenure of Obasanjo in the area of sub-regional cooperation 64. The Gulf of
Guinea Commission comprising Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo,
DRC and Angola, has as its principal objective as follows; the strengthening of economic and
political cooperation among member states as well as the provision of a forum for
cooperation within sub-regional institutions such as ECOWAS and the Central African
Economic Community (SEMAC). Approximately eleven years after it was first proposed by
Nigeria, the final take-off of the GGC was a hallmark diplomatic achievement for the
country. The achievement recorded was largely as a result to the new democratic dispensation
in the country and Nigeria’s acknowledged leadership role in Africa.
Obasanjo's effort at achieving cooperation among nations was not restricted alone to
the African continent as it was also extended to the Third World through his chairmanship of
the G77. As a result of been the chairman of the G77, during the year 2000, Nigeria
successfully re-energized the group by convening a meeting at a Summit level meeting of the
G77 for the first time since its establishment 36 years ago in Havana, Cuba on 12th April
200065.
As the chairman of the G77 in 2000, Obasanjo, together with former leader of Libya
Mouamar Ghaddafi, put forward a South Healthcare Delivery Programme that was later
accepted at the Havana Summit of the group. The aim of the programme is to provide
assistance to the Healthcare sector of the needy members of the G77. The Secretariat of the
programme is based in Nigeria. In July 2002, the programme was formally launched with the
first batch of volunteers heading for Chad, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Niger. The budget

44
for the programme was estimated at $21 million and both Nigeria and Libya contributed
about 50% of the budget while Cuba supported with thousands of medical staff66.

Economic Achievements
Definitely, one of the most outstanding achievements of the Obasanjo administration
was Nigeria’s exit from the foreign debts loop. According to Obasanjo, “when we paid off
the debts, we drew a deep breath of satisfaction but we seemed to be on the road to the lender
again. The Debt Management Office, DMO, said we were under-borrowed. Now our debts
were 14 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, 16% below the internationally accepted
threshold. We don't need to reach that threshold or to hold a colloquium on the evils of
borrowing. Yes, we can use debts to bridge financial gaps when necessary but as the old
saying goes, he who goes a-borrowing goes a-sorrowing, and saddles the future generation
with debts it knew nothing about. Besides, debts must be tied to regenerative projects and
they must be well managed to avoid corruption. In this country, we are not friendly with
figures and I doubt if we ever knew exactly how much we owed anybody. I am told that at
one of the debt reconciliation meetings with the creditors, the Nigerian representative was
asked to present his figures. He reportedly said: "let's have your figures because I am sure
your figures are more accurate than ours." So, even though some critics thought at the time
that Obasanjo was wasting money by paying the debts, I believed, and still believe, it was the
right thing to do. Of course, I am not unaware of the fact that the present government is
working out new guidelines to limit borrowing by the Federal and State Governments. In
spite of that, we must keep the debt profile as low as possible”.67
Obasanjo stressed that while in power, the objective of what needed to be done is a
major determinant on steps to be taken on any issue. With this assertion, it can be noted that
there were no formal institutions or organizations consulted immediately in policymaking and
implementation as action to be taken are determined by the situation on ground. According to
Akande, the hallmark achievement of the Obasanjo administration was mostly in the foreign
affairs where the country’s image dented by the past military governments had been at least
taken care of68. Furthermore, according to Lamido, “Obasanjo has clearly paid enough personal
attention to foreign policy in the past as he has always done (if Joe Garba‟s testimony in this in
his book Diplomatic Soldiering) is anything to go by”69.

45
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under late Musa Yar’Adua Administration (2007-2010)
President Obasanjo was succeeded by the Late Umaru Musa Yar'Adua on the 29 th of
May 2010. It was reported by international observers that the election that brought late
President Yar'Adua into power was being flawed and also regarded as the most rigged in
Nigeria to date. The 2007 general election was majorly criticized by the European Union as
being seriously faulty and did not meet the required international standards. As a result of this
antecedent, the democratic credibility of Nigeria became questionable.
It was believed that the Late Umaru Musa Yar’Adua had introduced the concept of
“citizen diplomacy” as the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy. According to Agbu, citizen
diplomacy is a political concept describing the involvement of average citizens engaging
representatives of another country either inadvertently or by design 70. Furthermore, Agbu
asserted that the concept sometimes refers to “Track Two Diplomacy”, which indicates
unofficial contacts between people of different nations, as differentiated from official
contacts between governmental representatives71. He went further and argued that Nigeria
constructed the concept during the tenure of President Yar’Adua to mean that Nigeria’s
foreign policy would henceforth be focused on the Nigerian citizens at home and in the
Diaspora.
It is worthy of note that at the time President Yar'Adua came into office, he had health
problems. While he was managing his ill-health, Yar'Adua made no provisions for the Vice
President to act in his absence. Thus, the consequence was that the ship of the Nigerian state
was sailing rudderless on the international waters of foreign policy. Without both functioning
institutions and a leader, Nigeria's foreign relations and indeed the State of Nigeria also went
into coma when Yar'Adua went into coma in a hospital in Saudi Arabian. Nigeria failed to
attend important international meetings, lost many positions in multilateral associations,
forsook obligations, and found herself in a situation where many of her allies started
wondering what had gone wrong with Nigeria 72. This eventually led to the death of late
Yar'Adua on May 5th 2010, his Vice, former President Jonathan was appointed acting
president of Nigeria until the 2011 election where he won the seat of the president of Nigeria.

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015)

The Nigeria foreign policy position of the President Goodluck Jonathan’s
administration who succeeded the late Yar’Adua is generally perceived as a continuation of
the foreign policy thrust of his predecessor. In his capacity as the acting President, Jonathan
went on a number of diplomatic shuttles, as part of a deliberate attempt to reassure the whole

46
world that Nigeria was well and secure despite the internal political challenges especially
with the challenges of succession it was going through. Nigeria literally returned to the
international arena. Goodluck Jonathan embarked on a trip to the USA where he met with his
American counterpart, President Obama which allowed the delisting of Nigeria from the
discriminatory rule of the Department of Homeland Security on special screening of
passengers on international flights to the United States that specifically targeted Nigerians as
a result of the Christmas day attempted bombing a US airline by a Nigerian Abdu Mutallab 73.
Furthermore, Nigeria’s ambassador to Libya was recalled by Jonathan in protest of
suggestion by Muammar Gaddafi that Nigeria should separate into a Muslim North State and
a Christian South. The action was taken to checkmate the excesses of the then Libyan leader
and send a strong signal that Nigeria will not tolerate such unwarranted interference in the
nation’s internal affairs from any State.
The relationship between Nigeria and US continued to improve under Jonathan. The
signing of the first US– Nigeria Bi-national Commission was evidence to this. Alao noted,
aimed to establish a tool for sustained, bilateral, high-level dialogue to promote and increase
diplomatic, economic and security co-operation between the two countries 74. Nigeria’s
domestic priorities were the Commission’s main concern. These key domestic priorities
include good governance, electoral reform and preparations, transparency and anti-
corruption, energy (electricity supply) reform and investment, as well as food and agricultural
development, which were all key components of what Jonathan promised in his
transformation agenda75.
In fact, he brought about a purposeful mobilization and instrumentalisation of
Nigerians in Diaspora for national development. His administration did not only encourage
the formation of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) in all countries where
Nigerians are present, it went further to create a Diaspora Commission to take charge of the
affairs of Nigerians in Diasporas and ensure their effective instrumentalisation. His swift
response to the denigrating deportation of Nigerians by South Africa sent a very strong signal
that Nigeria “has come of age” and that any attempt to denigrate her has consequences.
President Jonathan was able to manage the said Nigeria-South Africa face-off in a diplomatic
way which was greatly appreciated by Nigerians. Also, he wasted little time to order the
evacuation of Nigerians trapped in the crisis torn countries like Libya and Egypt in 2011 and
January 2012 respectively. In fact, Nigeria was the first country to airlift her citizens from
Egypt. In January 2012 Nigeria hosted the fifth Nigeria/EU dialogue aimed at streamlining

47
migration in a globalizing world and in the interest of all parties. This affirmative action’s
projected vividly the citizen centered focus of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy.
Special attention to the improvement and strengthening of economic ties with the
country’s partners in the international arena as a foundation for stability and growth was
given by the Jonathan’s administration. For the first time in many years, there were conscious
efforts by Nigeria to ensure that her sacrifices of lives and resources towards restoring peace
to many countries in Africa no longer go without commensurate national benefit. It marked a
paradigm shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy. However, focusing on Nigeria’s domestic
priorities did not mean abandonment of African issues. It is on this note that the Jonathan
regime and through its leadership in ECOWAS effectively managed the dismissal of Laurent
Gbagbo of Cote D’Ivoire when he refused to hand over power, after the 2010 Presidential
elections in that country. Similar crisis of self perpetuation in office in Niger was also
condemned by the Jonathan’s administration.
After President Goodluck completed the tenure of former President Umaru Musa Yar-
Adua, he (Jonathan) then contested on the platform of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
and won the April 2011 presidential election with massive support and expectations among
many Nigerians. The president development emphasis was based on transformation
programme which according to him was to totally transform every decaying sector in Nigeria.
It was also the time Nigeria was experiencing high level of insecurity occasioned by the
activities of Boko – Haram in the North East, corruption and youth’s restiveness among other
problems. All these factors contributed negatively to the global perception of Nigeria and
Nigerians in the international arena. In order to solve these problems, President Goodluck
Jonathan’s foreign policy direction focused on investment and economic co-operation within
the global community.
This was made now during the May 29 inaugural and acceptance speech of the
President thus: Nigeria’s new foreign policy direction is now on investment and economic
co-operation which thus ties Foreign Policy to the country’s domestic agenda, a radical
departure from the old one which has Africa as the centre piece 76. The new foreign policy lay
more emphasis on investment rather than political drive as it is the only means of delivering
the dividends of democracy to the electorate. The new posture of government is that – while
we retain the leadership role in our sub-region, and while we play our leadership role on the
continent by taking the lead in all major issues on the continent, the Foreign Policy direction
will also be used to drive the economic and industrial development in Nigeria77.

48
 To support his words with actions, a new directive was given to Nigeria’s various
diplomatic missions by the president to consider themselves as the operators of the foreign
policy in practical terms. They were urged to look for opportunities, ventures, programmes
that they could bring to Nigeria to give the new focus a success. The significant of Jonathan’s
foreign policy based to his 2011 inaugural address was to priorities domestic concerns as he
clearly stated that, his administration’s foreign policy of externalizing domestic priorities.
The concern therefore is that even within the sub-region there should be a new initiative on
sub-regional integration based on inputs from the people unlike past efforts which were the
exclusive handwork as well as aspiration of the past leaders.
Indeed, to the best of his abilities, diplomatic and bilateral relationship with many
countries was renewed. He also addressed international gathering to help Nigeria fight the
terror activities of Boko Haram and corruption. He also encouraged Europe and Asian giants
to invest in Nigeria’s private sector particularly in the key areas of energy, downstream sector
and agriculture. Also, President Jonathan stresses that: “Therefore, there is urgent need for a
holistic effort by the government, corporate bodies and individuals to stamp out the evils of
insecurity, crime and corruption so that the country is relatively safe for both Nigerians and
foreigners” 78.
Globally, Nigeria’s image had damaged as a result of the widespread of corruption
and has resulted in foreign nationals exercising extreme caution in going into business
transactions with Nigerians, therefore weakening the nation’s economic sector. However,
President Goodluck did not actually succeeded in implementing foreign policy as seen in
USA government refusing to sell weapons to Nigeria to tackle the insurgency issues in
Nigeria, and the South Africa government also sizing money meant for Nigeria to purchase
weapons to fight Boko Haram among other diplomatic conflicts in the international field. In
the same vein, many Nigerians were executed in countries like Indonesia, Philippines,
Australia and unprovoked attacks on Nigerian citizens and massive deportation of Nigerians
across the globe.
In general, just like other previous administrations in Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan had
good policies. However, the problem face by Nigeria’s foreign policy that is affecting the
country’s global image is not based on formulation, but rather in implementating these
policies formulated79Nwankwo. In summary, Nigerian Foreign Policy under the government
of Goodluck Jonathans failed to have a significant impact on the global community.

49
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Muhammadu Buhari (2015)
Since Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the country has pursued a foreign policy
with an alignment to the West, with the exception in the periods of both late Generals
Murtala Mohammed and Sani Abacha which saw the country moving to the East 80. President
Muhammadu Buhari who assumed office on the 29th of May 2015 as a democratically elected
president of Nigeria has taken some new path in his administration’s foreign policy, mainly
in accordance with his party’s (APC) campaign manifesto which promised the electorate that
Nigeria’s national interest will guide his foreign policy, after which his administration will
focus on the sub-region of West Africa.
President Buhari kept to his promises, he immediately after taking oath of office, he
wasted no time in embarking on a high level diplomatic mission to the Lake Chad Countries
to drum up support for the fight against insurgency mainly Boko Haram in the North East that
nearly overwhelmed his predecessor’s administration. Worthy of note is that the president has
not deviated from his three cardinal agenda (fight against insecurity, corruption, economy/job
creation) even in his foreign policy implementation. This can easily be seen from the
president’s foreign travels, which have to do with the fight against corruption and
negotiations to repatriate Nigeria’s money stashed in foreign countries back to the country,
which have since been yielding results, to securing international commitment in the fight
against terrorism that has become a global phenomenon. Also, to finding ways of making
Nigeria an economically viable country through diversification from oil dependency and the
increase in its technological advancement.
Since May 29, 2015, President Buhari has undertaken a total of 31 foreign trips,
spending some 53 days outside Nigeria81. Buhari’s activist foreign policy role must be
considered against his personal convictions, and against the backdrop of his foreign policy
engagement as a military head of state. Of the 31 trips undertaken so far, the China visit
stands alone in yielding clear results. Though not initiated by Nigeria, Chinese authorities in
their enlightened self-interest, and to safeguard the lopsided Sino-Nigeria trade imbalance,
offered Nigeria a Yuan-Naira currency swap and a $6bn loan 82. The currency swap, which is
aimed more at undermining the US dollar as Nigeria’s main foreign exchange reserve, helps
Buhari’s foreign policy solvency only in a limited way. As if to confirm the vagaries of such
on-the-fly foreign policymaking, after the swap was announced, the Naira weakened further.
Three likely strands that may have influenced Buhari’s foreign policy inclinations are
as follows: the desire to engender a new and robust foreign policy thrust; the desire to
revitalize Nigeria’s stalled foreign policy impetus; and the desire to sustain the past and

50
renowned foreign policy glory by hands-on engagement83. Buhari conducting his foreign
policy evokes power, dedication and priority. However, enough can’t be said of Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy under the present administration of President Muhammadu Buhari because of
the scope of the study which is ends in 2015, just six months into the present administration.

51
Endnotes
1
Obene, W. R. ’Home-grown terrorism: An emerging challenge to Nigeria’s national
security. Presentation to Haske Biyu 2012 participants at the Armed Forces
Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna, 2012 23
2
McNamara, R. S. The essence of security: Reflections in office (New York: Harper and
Row. 1990) 17
3
Obene, W. R. ’Home-grown terrorism: An emerging challenge to Nigeria’s national
security. Presentation to Haske Biyu 2012 participants at the Armed Forces
Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna, 2012, 25
4
Obene, W. R. ’Home-grown terrorism, 26

5
Obene, W. R. ’Home-grown terrorism, 28

6
Obene, W. R. ’Home-grown terrorism, 31

7
Eme, O.I., et. al. Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria (AJBMR,
2012) 79
8
Eme, O.I., et. al. Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria, 88

9
Eme, O.I., et. al. Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria, 91

10
Mailafia, O. Conflict and Insurgency in Nigeria. 2013. Available at http://ureports.com
Retrieved 13-08-2016, 23
11
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, Combating Terrorism Centre. 2011.
www.theriseofbokoharaminNigeria.com Retrieved 13-08-2016, 45
12
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, 56

13
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, 59

14
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, 61

15
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, 63

16
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, 65

17
Bartolotta, C. Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram. The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations, 2011 49
18
Eme, O.I., et. al. Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria. AJBMR,

52
 2012, 89
19
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, Combating Terrorism Centre. 2011.
www.theriseofbokoharaminNigeria.com Retrieved 14-08-2016, 33
20
Cook, D. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, 45

21
Bartolotta, C. Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram. The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations, 2011, 55
22
Bartolotta, C. Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram, 57

23
Cook, D.. “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, Combating Terrorism Centre. 2011
www.theriseofbokoharaminNigeria.com Retrieved 14-08-2016, 43
24
Bartolotta, C. Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram. The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations, 2011, 56
25
Bartolotta, C. Terrorism in Nigeria, 58

26
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30
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31
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32
Hanson, Stephanie, ‘MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group’, Council on
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33
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34
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‘http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L04602484.htm – Accessed 15 August
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‘http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L04602484.htm – Accessed 15 August
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Fawole, W.A. Understanding Nigeria‘s Foreign Policy under Civilian Rule Since 1999, 31

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Obasanjo, O.. Political achievements.
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August, 2016
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Obasanjo, O.. Political achievements.
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August, 2016
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Obasanjo, O.. Political achievements.
http://chiefolusegunobasanjo.com/index.php/achievements/1education Retrived on 19
August, 2016
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Obasanjo, O.. Political achievements.
http://chiefolusegunobasanjo.com/index.php/achievements/1education Retrived on 19
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Obasanjo, O.. Political achievements.
http://chiefolusegunobasanjo.com/index.php/achievements/1education Retrived on 19
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Obasanjo, O.. Political achievements.
http://chiefolusegunobasanjo.com/index.php/achievements/1education Retrived on 19
August, 2016
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Akande D. Assessing two years of Obsanjo‘s Administration. The Guardian , 2001, June
10
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Lamido, S. Plying the foreign policy pitch. Published by the Office of the Honourable
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abuja-Nigeria. 2001, 45
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Fawole, W.A. Understanding Nigeria‘s Foreign Policy under Civilian Rule Since 1999:
Institution, Structure, Processes and Performance (Ibadan: College Press. 2004) 32
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Chidozie F, Ibietan J, Ujara E. Foreign Policy, International Image and National
Transformation: A Historical Perspective. International Journal of Innovative Social
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Alao, A. Nigeria and the global power: Continuity and change in policy and perceptions,
SAIIA occasional paper 96, October, 2013, 12
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Bello, M. Nigeria’s Foreign Policy to Attract Support for the Economy. This Day Live, 27
September, 2012. www.thisdaylive.com
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http://thenationonlineng.net/buharis-foreign-policy/ Retrived on 19 August, 2016

CHAPTER FOUR

57
 IMPACTS OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

4.1 Impacts of Terrorism in Nigeria in General

The impact and effects of the activities of the various terrorist groups such as called
Boko Haram and MEND in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. Their various activities have
paralyzed almost every sectors of the Nigerian economy. Terrorism has impeded peace ‘and
progressive development in Nigeria. It hinders political development, it affects rapid
economic growth and it distorts socio-cultural equilibrium and thus worsens the
environmental situation of the country. Many scholars across the universe have examined the
consequences of terrorism according to their respective observations and backgrounds but for
the purpose of this particular research work, it is pertinent to make a comprehensive
evaluation. Aspect of Nigeria such as political, economic, social, agriculture, educational and
environmental aspects shall be given examined elaborately.

Political Impacts

It is an unquestionable fact that a country that is going through crisis almost on an

annual basis could not be said to be politically stable. The Boko Haram crisis, which
dichotomized Nigeria’s Police Forces, was said to have been responsible for the bombing of
the Abuja Police Headquarter resulting to the death of about six (6) people including Police
Officers and civilians, in essence Boko Haram crisis brings about unstable government which
is very crucial to sustainable political development.1
The implication of the terrorist activities such as the activities of the group Boko
Haram on political development is that the Igbo’s was sidelined in the political scene, since
gaining independence in 1960, no Igbo man has become President of Nigeria and this created
a gargantuan vacuum between the Igbo’s and the northerners in the political system, the
northerners now wants to monopolize power because they belief that the west is a corrupting
influence in governance.2.
The Boko Haram insurgency also affected President Jonathan’s transformational
agenda. During the post election campaign of Ex President Goodluck Jonathan, he made a
promise to transform and give Nigeria a new and clear sense of focus if elected as the
President of Nigeria. He said he has a transformational agendum for the country. In order to
achieve this particular goal, on his inauguration as Nigeria’s President, he named his
administration as a transformational administration 3. While revealing his transformational

58
agenda, he highlighted specific areas that will receive transformational attention. These areas
include infrastructural development, quality healthcare system, agriculture, education, job
creation, electricity and transportation, etc. He assured Nigerians of his administration’s
readiness to transform the country. And after he was inaugurated, the transformation agenda
journey commenced; a violent or terrorist group in the Northeast that was not interested in the
transformation policies came up and decided to be a log in the wheel of the journey 4. With
the clear and visible intention of diverting attention from the transformational agenda of the
President, the terrorist group started truncating the advancement of the transformation agenda
by unleashing and causing instability in the country. This terrorist group continued their
terrorist acts under the present administration of President Muhammadu Buhari to truncate
the change agenda of the President.
This to an extreme length worked very well for this violent group. They successfully
diverted the attention of not just the President but also of other people on the transformational
journey. Instead of giving full attention of the transformational agenda, the Federal
Government under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan spent more time
seeking how to deal with the menace of Boko Haram. Also, this trend continued under the
present administration of President Buhari, because of the sensitive, dangerous, and very
deadly nature of Boko Haram activities, attention is now focused on them. Boko Haram has
seriously threatened the adequate, efficient and effective implementation of the
transformational agenda and the change agenda of the present administration.

Economic Impacts
Here, a question needed to be asked ‘Can incentives to attack businesses increase the
activities of Terrorist’5. It could be seen that terrorists are rational actors because achieving
their stated goals and objectives as efficiently as possible is their main priority. The specific
goals of a terrorist group may appear bizarre and difficult to appreciate by outside observers,
but nevertheless, terrorists will work hard or strive to reach these goals as efficiently as they
can. They strive to achieve a maximum effect through the chosen actions. Empirical research
has categorically established that terrorists indeed go for those kinds of high level actions
from which they expect the highest benefit–cost ratio. If, for instance, the police make some
kind of terrorist act more difficult to accomplish, terrorists quickly shift to a different attack
mode. Terrorists know to be rational actors, it is necessary to consider the benefit–cost
relationships of various strategies from the point of view of the terrorists6.

59
 In recent years, it could have been evidently seen that terrorism has taken various new
patterns, increasingly moving from military targets to civilian targets which includes
individuals and business activities. Recent terrorist attacks in Nigeria affected both the
national and the global economy. The economic consequences of such high level attacks can
be largely broken down into short term direct effects; medium-term confidence effects and
longer term productivity effects7.
The direct economic costs of terrorism, including the destruction of lives and
properties, responses to the emergency, restoration of the systems and the infrastructure
affected, and the provision of temporary living assistance, are most evident in the immediate
aftermath of the attacks and thus matter more in the short run 8. Direct economic costs are
likely to be equivalent to the intensity of the attacks and the size and the characteristics of the
economy affected9. Major violent attacks in Bornu, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi and Abuja by
Boko Haram group has caused major activity disruption especially the Abuja bomb that
happened in April, 2014 and the abducted over Two Hundred female secondary school in
Bornu State although, the direct economic damage was relatively small in relation to the size
of the economy. Furthermore, the cost of terror attack and insecurity in Nigeria has slow
down its infrastructure development.
Nigeria’s federal government plans to spend a considerable 20% of its 2012 budget on
security – equivalent to the share the US spent on security following the 11 September
terrorist attacks, in 200110. In 2013, it was increased to 27.11 but in 2014, N845 billion
(S5.29billion) was provided for recurrent and service vote for security in Nigeria 11. As the
economic impact of violent attacks includes long-term indirect costs (security) and direct
costs, the cost to Nigeria is at least the security cost of NGN1trn, or 2% of GDP, on
Renaissance estimates12. The impact of the terrorist attacks on financial markets was
relatively small in renaissance’s view; however, it increased when oil facilities began to be
attacked. Analysts pointed out that the government’s huge security spend has an opportunity
cost – it results in less spending on power infrastructure, education and healthcare, which
combined have been allocated a smaller budget than security in 2012 to 201613.
The indirect costs of terrorism have the potential to have an effect on the economy in
the medium term by demoralizing consumer and investor confidence 14. The activities of terror
attack can reduce the incentive to spend as opposed to save, this may bring about the
reduction in the investment in an economy and this will have an enormous effect on the
economy development of the entire world through normal business cycle and trade channels.

60
Falling investor confidence may spark a generalized drop in asset prices and a flight to
quality that increases the borrowing costs for riskier borrowers15 (IMF, 2001b).
As a result of the Niger Delta militant’s activities in the region, economically, as at
January 2006, Nigeria lost 211,000 barrels of crude oil daily which equals 8.4% of Nigeria
export of 2.6m16 (punch Jan18, 2006). Shell Nigeria shut in 455,000bpd by March 2006 due
to militant attack17 (New Age, March 28, 2006). By April, of the same year, it got to
650,000bpd (New Age April 28th)18. New Age calculated that facilities producing about 25%
of the nation’s crude oil remained under lock and key in Niger Delta region. The effect of this
on budget implementation is not farfetched. As to sales, earnings from crude oil export fell
by 702m US dollars in February 2006 from the previous month 19. As at June 2006, export has
been reduced by 20%. National power generation had reduced by more than 25% as a result
of shutting off of gas to 3 major power stations 20. As of September 2016, as a result of the
vandalization of the oil pipe line by the MEND group in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria
produces a mere 1.1 million barrels of crude oil daily as against the 2.2 million expected
which translate to Nigeria producing at only 50%21.

Social Impact
During colonialism, there was peace among Nigerians; this was a result of the
colonial masters merging under the hegemonies suzerainty of colonial masters. The social
background of Nigerians then can be surely said to be peaceful until when the colonial master
left Nigeria when things started falling apart at a rapid rate, the people of Nigeria faced one
another with serious enormity, hatred and they did not want to see one another again 22. The
social background of Nigeria turned from a peaceful one to being chaos which eventually
brought about a cankerworm that ate deep into the very fabric of Nigerians social system,
thus Boko Haram crisis and other groups like MEND, the implication here is that to attain
social development in Nigeria became impossible because the people living in the northern
and southern parts of the country are no longer in unity23.
The effects of terrorist actions on the social development is that it creates more hatred
between social groups in the country which would have united together to form a social
conscious society. Furthermore, it increases the lacuna in the interactions of various social
groups. A member of a social group might join the Boko Haram sect or MEND and this will
cause a very big problem, because the person that joined might reveal the secret of the social
group.

61
Every social gathering that attracts individuals especially the elites in the society is prone to
attack. The issue of bomb scare is worthy to note in this aspect. From past experience, it is no
longer a new phenomenon to witness an on-going activity been brought to an obstruct end
due to security reasons. In the last campaign towards the last general election in 2015, bomb
threat was constantly a factor to reckon with, though, this are not directly linked to Boko
Haram sect, the argument here is that most violent people may pretend under the pretext of
the sect to carry out their evil acts in the country. The fear of Boko Haram now becomes the
beginning of safety. The resultant factor is that the Boko Haram group as well as other terror
groups has directly or indirectly contributed towards the disruption of social activity in the
country.

Education Impacts
The education impacts or effects terrorist or violent acts have had on the educational
sector in Nigeria shall be examined as follows:

Poor Funding of Education

The ripple effects of terrorist groups insurgency in Nigeria has brought about a
situation in which expenditure on education has increasingly declined over the years 24. This
action is brought about by need to allocate more funds to security, to the detriment of other
sectors of the economy, including the education sector. Federal Government’s allocation of
funds to Education in recent years attests to this fact as shown in Table 1:

Table 1: Federal Allocation to Education between 1999 and 2010

S/N Years Allocation(billion) Percentage%
1 1999 23.0 11.2
2 2000 44.2 8.3
3 2001 39.9 7.0
4 2001 100.2 5.1
5 2003 64.8 11.8
6 2004 72.2 7.8
7 2005 92.6 8.3
8 2006 166.6 8.7
9 2007 137.5 6.1
10 2008 210.0 13.0
11 2009 183.4 7.2

62
 12 2010 249.1 6.4
13 2011 306.3 16.1
14 2012 400.15 12
15 2013 426.53 10.4
16 2014 493 9.5
17 2015 492 9.1
18 2016 369.6 15.1
Source: www.nigeriabudgetoffice.com

In 2011, less than 8 percent of the budget was allocated to education. This still falls
short of the United Nations prescription of 26 percent 25. Table 1 shows the appalling low
government spending on the education sector, which is considered as the most dynamic factor
that stimulates all round development of a nation. The high rate of illiteracy in the country is
worsened by government’s lack of commitment to adequately fund the education area.
Whereas a neighbouring country like Ghana committed 31 percent of its 2013 budget to
Education26, Nigeria’s spending on education in 2013 was a mere 8 percent of the total
budget27. In the current fiscal year, education enjoys 8.7 percent of the total budget. This is
still very low compared to the United Nation’s prescription28.

Loss of Trained Personnel

Another fall-out from the ceaseless violent attacks on the government institutions,
including education, is the loss of trained teachers who are either maimed, murdered or prefer
to give schools a wide berth as a result of the indiscriminate attacks on them by Boko Haram
operatives, who attack schools at random 29. Many Nigerians have had genuine reason to
move to Cameroon and Chad republic to escape the violent attacks of the terror group and
enjoy relative peace30.

Poor academic Performance

Academic activities have been disrupted from time to time as a result of the various
sporadic criminal attacks on the educational facilities in the country especially in the northern
part. Government has been forced to shut down schools in order to forestall sudden attacks on
them by Boko Haram insurgents. The Boko Haram attacks also bring about poor student’s
performance because learning is characterized by threat in the school environment of the
north, whereas it is an accomplished fact that learning thrives mostly in an environment

63
absent of threat. Etebu & James are of the view that “any society characterized by any form
of violence will not be conducive for any social interaction in form of teaching and
learning31”. Also in the same vein, it has been asserted that the threat of insecurity will
constitute negative reinforcement as a result of the obvious reason that teaching and learning
cannot take place efficiently and successfully in an environment characterized by threat 32.

Destruction of School Facilities

Bombing and shooting by Boko Haram and MEND insurgents destroy education
facilities which are largely inadequate at first because of the poor funding of the sector by
government. This indicates grave consequences for effective teaching and learning which
becomes hampered by inadequacy of educational facilities.

Agriculture and Food Supply Impacts

This particular sector is affected in many ways. Firstly, the land which is very
essential for agricultural production has become battlefield, occupied by these groups or the
land occupied by the Internally Displaced People (IDP). Almost all parts of Borno State and
other part of Northern Nigeria which formed the major food supply to the country had been
fled by the people. Also, in the Niger Delta region, as a result of the various vandalization
and bombing of the various oil pipelines, it has polluted the lands and water making it
difficult to do any agricultural activities and also killing aquatic animals like fish in the
process. Hunger and squalor therefore is imminent in Nigeria

Security Impacts
One of the basic needs of man in a given society is security-freedom from poverty,
want, disease, hunger and danger and terrorism brings all these, most serious of them being
security from danger33. The various violent attacks and bomb explosions causes not only
death of military personnel but also innocent civilians. Life is full of insecurity and
uncertainly under terror. Fear has become part of the people as everyone thinks of the next
targeted area of Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants.

Family Welfare Services

64
 These includes pre-marital counselling, single parent services, services for neglected
and abused children and elderly human psycho-physical stability and development of
individuals and family unit34.

Environmental Impacts
The emission of air occasioned by the numerous bomb blasts carrying toxic substance
pollutes the air and makes it so polluted for human and animals to breathe safely. The air
pollution also results in global warming which impedes plants development and causes
hotness of the weather. Instances abound where at the time of the bombing, the atmosphere is
covered with smoke and motorists and passably find so difficult to find their way. This has
led to multiple accidents when people struggle to run for their precious life35.
Added to the air pollution is noise pollution. There are indications that as a result of
bomb blast people become deafened. The noise generated from these blasts use to be so loud
that those who were at close range are greatly affected and it has been discovered that they
get deafened by it or get shattered or dumb as a result of the shock occasioned by the loud
sound. Since the inception of terror acts in Nigeria by the various terror groups like MEND
and the Boko Haram, there has been an unbelievable increase in the volume and range of
solid wastes generated as a result of rubbles created from bomb blasts. These solid wastes
generated from bomb blast and how to manger them have become a major issue in Nigerian
Urban Cities especially the Northern part of the country where these bomb blasts constantly
occur solid waste management is a major public health issue, a vital factor affecting the
quality of the environment and will be harmful to man’s comfort36.
As we all know, bombing is a chemical component which when it goes off causes a
big damage to crops growth. The bomb is made up of mixture of particles that is very harmful
to crops and so retards crops growth or even terminated the lives of these crops. The carbon
mono-oxide (Co) which emanates from the flame of exploded bomb results in the death of
crop and also such a crop or fruits cannot be consumed again by human beings or animals
because it has been mixed up with the various chemicals coming out from the flames of the
bomb and furthermore places like these cannot grow crops or fruits again therefore reducing
the agricultural productivity and can as well causing a big economic effects on the people 37.
Plants and animals are very important components of living things. Plants can be
useful to man in numerous ways like provision of shelter, prevention of rays of sun directly
towards man, and so on. When a bomb is detonated, the life span of these plants is terminated
leading to loss of all the economic and natural benefits man drive from these plants. Both

65
man and animals as well are directly affected by these bombing activities. It has been asserted
that more than three thousand human lives have been lost as a result of the terror acts of this
Boko Haram38. This even makes the places dangerous for man to live in, putting man’s life in
jeopardy and as well reducing the productive capacity of man. The casually of this Boko
Haram bombing menace and also the main target is man. So this affects man directly both
physical (loss of lives) or mentally economic benefits and which attacked by bomb, utters
their life or make them useable to man.
Ozone layer (O3) is a chemical substance that prevents the rays of sun from reaching
towards the earth39. Without the Ozone layer, man’s life would have been in serious danger.
This layer helps to prevent sun rays by absorbing it and preventing it from reaching directly
towards man and its immediate environment. It is a very non-living element or layer that man
cannot live without. When these bombs are detonated, the flames go directly into the sky
thereby dwindling this Ozone layer. The major damages caused to this Ozone layer are
carbon (IV) oxide (Co2) and carbon mono oxide (Co) and these exploded bombs are made up
of these chemical substances40. The major effects is that, this flames will diminish the
strength of the Ozone layer, making the Ozone layer weak thereby allowing the rays of sun to
penetrate through making the heat of the sun to be too hut on man and his environment. The
implication of the depleted Ozone layer is that the high attitude of sunray on man and its
immediate environment causes skin cancer, damages to some crops, and animals and can lead
to death41.
The outmost part of the earth is the soil. It is a layer that senses man in many ways.
As a result of the availability of these soils, man cultivates its agricultural produces; build its
houses, roads and even water supply. Numerous nutrients and minerals that supplement
agricultural crops and also make food production easier are present in these soils. When these
nutrients and minerals of the soil are affected by these numerous bombing activities, the
chemical substance of these detonated bomb damages these minerals and this makes
cultivation of agricultural produce difficult. The consequence is that man will have less food,
and unclean water supply, since the mixture of water and this chemical substance makes it
dangerous to drink water.

Effects on Human Resource

A newspaper in Nigeria, Punch reported the refusal of most emigrants to be posted to
riverside field location but on shore42. This same paper also reported low morale among
workers and the fear of mass resignation by the management. Nigerian oil workers were also

66
scared and were not ready to venture into offshore location. The various oil workers unions
like The Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and The Nigeria
Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) were forced to call on oil
companies to device numerous means of safeguarding the lives of their members since the
feelings of been kidnapped and insecurity saturated the air43.
Of great significance is that the oil companies in the region employed the use of
private security outfit apart from the ones in the companies’ establishment. Also, the number
of military personnel deployed to these areas and are also on the pay roll of these various
companies is believed to be more than the total police that exist in the Delta region 44. The
consequence of this on the total cost outlay of these companies is enormous and may bring
about cut down in some other headings. Also, the human resource is always the first to be so
affected.
In 2006, 2007 and 2008 Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) threatened
to sack some of its workers45. In reality, this action is likely to be in connection with both the
total withdrawal of its operation from Ogoni land and the Niger Delta youths and
communities disruption of its oil flow stations 46. In effect, the Nigerian state, the oil
companies, communities in the Niger Delta and the international community have all been
affected by the menace. On casualties, many policemen and soldiers have lost their lives as
well as youths carrying arms and innocent souls that were caught in cross fire. Punch also
reported that kidnapping of people specially oil workers caused panic and stir within the
government and the oil companies planned to suspend operations47.

4.2 The Impacts of Terrorism on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 1999-2015

Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has had vast diplomatic contacts and
relations with its neighbouring African countries and western nations and had worked
through these both to protect its national interest and to achieve other international political
interests. Based on both its economic and demographic strength, Nigeria has always seen
itself as one of the leading countries in Africa and its foreign policy has been set to reflect
this. Apart from being a member of many supranational organizations such as United Nations
(UN) and numerous of its special and related agencies such as, Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU), it also has taken the a
major role in articulating the views of developing nations on the need for modification of the
existing international economic order48. Upon gaining independence, non-alignment was
emphasized as one of the basic values of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Basically, the reasoning

67
behind this position was to preserve Nigeria’s choice and freedom of action as a sovereign
state. It also used the said opportunity to advance the goals of pan-Africanism, concern for
black people and decolonization49.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, globally, the acts of terrorism have
been on the increased with far reaching consequences. The inter connectivity among the
various Islamist groups have seen them come into sight with more Sophistication in terms of
tactics and weaponry. From the major terror group Al-Qaeda to AQIM, Al-Shabab to Boko
Haram in Nigeria, and the world is now has before it an intense security challenge that needs
collectivism among nations to overcome the menace50. The emergence of the terrorist or
violent acts in Nigeria that are until now on the rise and becoming a frequent faction has
made Nigeria to lose all these respect and its relevance in the international arena. Obviously,
no country in the international world will be willing to create a bilateral relation with a
country that is widely believed to be faced with terrorist actions. Instead of enjoying
multinational organizations venturing into Nigeria to boost the nation’s economy, the country
however is experiencing the exit of numerous foreign companies and industries from the
country to other countries even in Africa as a result of the unguaranteed security and
uncontrollable terrorist and criminal actions. The endless terrorist attacks against innocent
citizens in states such as Jos, Bauchi, Niger Delta and Maiduguri and other parts of the
country, carried out frequently with liberty is a substantive reason to worry he numerous
foreigners from coming into the country to invest.
Nigeria’s image abroad has been seriously affected as a result of the consistent acts of
terrorism. This has brought about the capital flight as many nations have withdrawn their
presence in the country making government to lose revenue at an alarming rate. Occurrences
of various kidnapping and bombings in Nigeria have made the country to forfeit its 6 th
position as a leading oil exporting country to Angola in 2011 51. Before this particular wobbly
situation, Nigeria used to produce a total output of about 2.4 million barrels per day 52.
Industry sources now put the average total oil production output in Nigeria at 1.1 million
barrels while Angola produces 1.9 million barrels daily as a result of the MEND terrorist acts
in the oil region53. The terrorist acts in the country have succeeded in the major back bone of
the economy as the most affected oil companies were, Shell production development
company, Chevron, the Nigerian Agip Oil and the state owned Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC). Furthermore, Shell’s oil production has dipped by 85 percent from
1.150 million barrels per day in 2005 to the current production figure of about 145,000
barrels due to a series of violent attacks in its platforms both in the eastern operations in

68
Rivers State and Western operations covering Bayelsa, Delta and Edo states 54. The same can
be said of Chevron whose production and loading facilities in the region especially in the
coastal Delta state have been blown up resulting in production shut down55.
Before this scenario, oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region have lost
about $200,760,000 in 1993 as a result of protests and blockages 56. Particularly, Shell had lost
N9.9 million in Ogoni land in 1993 when it was forced to halt its operations by angry
villagers. Also, given the currency at which these terror activities (kidnapping, abduction and
blowing up of pipelines) are going on within the country, Nigeria’s chances of meeting its
6000 megawatts target of electricity production on which about $2.6 billion had been
committed is unrealistic57. The essence of attempting to generate at least 6000 megawatts of
electricity by December 2016 was to woo more foreign investors to come and invest in
Nigeria which constitute part of its foreign policy 58. This set of foreign policy goals can only
be achieved if the kidnappers do threaten the lives of the foreigners who are working with the
power sector and if the pipelines that supplies gas for the use of electricity are not blown up
by the terrorists. It is safe to argue that the more the country lacks the capacity to guarantee
steady flow of crude oil in the international market, the more critical stakeholders will
become impatient with Nigeria and perhaps begins to look for an alternative oil nation like
Angola that is with an enabling environment59.
Enshrined in the foreign policy objective of Nigeria is Economic Diplomacy which is
one of the core components of the Transformation Agenda under the Jonathan
Administration60. Economic diplomacy is aimed at attracting investors from other countries in
the international community to come into Nigeria to invest. The recent rise in the security
problem in the country has frustrated these set objectives because instability and violence has
brought about balance of trade deficits especially in the Northern part of Nigeria. A very
visible effect of one of the effects of terrorism on Nigeria’s foreign policy is that most
countries do view Nigeria as an unserious minded nation to establish an economic agreement
with. Thus, most terrorist acts have often times been politicized and facts misleading by
government officials for personal gains.
Kidnapping and abduction which is one of the violent tactics of terrorist groups in
Nigeria especially in the Niger Delta region has made foreign country’s to issue travel advice
to their respective citizens against travelling to Nigeria. The tourism industry in the country is
the worst affected as it has lost some of its foreign exchange earnings as a result of the high
drop in the patronage of its activities by foreigners. International organizations such as
Department for International Development (DFID), The United States Agency for

69
International Development (USAID) and The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) etc
have all withdrawn their supports from troubled region in the country thereby making it
difficult for the locals to access important health and educational programmes which they
benefited from in large measures61.
Okereke argues that Terrorism issues in Nigeria have further been complicated by
credible reports indicating that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has established a
partnership with Boko Haram this can been seen in Boko Haram sophistication 62. Boko
Haram now uses paramilitary tactics which is almost the same to those being used by Al-
Qaeda as suicide bombing against government infrastructures, assassinations and violence
against Christians and Muslims who do not concur with their brand of Islam has become
rampant63.
Terrorist attacks in Nigeria have much more effects on the foreign policies of
countries that have been affected by the activities of terrorism in Nigeria and its people.
Bilateral and multilateral relations of the countries in the international arena with Nigeria
have continued to decline amidst issues of terrorism over the years. Terrorism in Nigeria has
been attributed to violent agitations, lack of patriotism and religious intolerance. Nigeria
needs to do more in order to restore its damaged image; combating terrorism needs to be done
with utmost sincerity and commitment on the part of government.

Endnotes

70
1
Adetoro R. A. “Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a symptom of poverty and political
alienation”. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3(5), 2014 23
2
Oral Interview with HON Soji Asuje, Politician, former Abeokuta North Local Government
Chairman, Abeokuta, Ogun State, 9h August 2016
3
Adetoro R. A. “Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a symptom of poverty and
political alienation”. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3(5), 2014 26
4
Oral Interview with HON Soji Asuje, Politician, former Abeokuta North Local Government
Chairman, Abeokuta, Ogun State, 9h August 2016
5
Oladimeji, Moruff Sanjo (Ph.D) and Oresanwo, Adeniyi Marcus, “Effects of Terrorism on
the International Business in Nigeria”, May 2014 Vol. 4, No. 7(1); 34
6
Oladimeji, Moruff Sanjo (Ph.D) and Oresanwo, Adeniyi Marcus, “Effects of Terrorism on
the International Business in Nigeria”, May 2014 Vol. 4, No. 7(1); 36
7
Oladimeji, Moruff Sanjo (Ph.D) and Oresanwo, Adeniyi Marcus, “Effects of Terrorism on
the International Business in Nigeria”, May 2014 Vol. 4, No. 7(1); 37
8
Oral interview with Sunnie Omeiz-Micheal, Senior Economist, The Lagos State Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Ikeja, Lagos, 28th August 2016
9
Oladimeji, Moruff Sanjo (Ph.D) and Oresanwo, Adeniyi Marcus, “Effects of Terrorism on
the International Business in Nigeria”, May 2014 Vol. 4, No. 7(1); May 2014 38
10
Oladimeji, Moruff Sanjo (Ph.D) and Oresanwo, Adeniyi Marcus, “Effects of Terrorism on
the International Business in Nigeria”, May 2014 Vol. 4, No. 7(1); 45
11
http://sjournals.com/index.php/SJR/article/view/2188 Accessed on August 18th 2016

12
Oral interview with Sunnie Omeiz-Micheal, Senior Economist, The Lagos State Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, Ikeja, Lagos, 28th August 2016
13
Oral interview with Sunnie Omeiz-Micheal, Senior Economist, The Lagos State Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, Ikeja, Lagos, 28th August 2016
14
Oral interview with Sunnie Omeiz-Micheal, Senior Economist, The Lagos State Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, Ikeja, Lagos, 28th August 2016
15
Oral interview with Ogundele Dele, Civil Servant, Nigeria Port Authority, Calabar,
Calabar, 11th September2016
16
Oral interview with Ogundele Dele, Civil Servant, Nigeria Port Authority, Calabar,
Calabar, 11th September2016
17
Adeyemo A. M. “The Oil Industry, Extra-Ministerial Institutions and Sustainable

Agricultural Development: A Case Study of Okrika LGA in Rivers State”. Nigerian

Journal of Oil and Politics 2 (1), 2002 67-77.

71
18
Oral interview with Sunnie Omeiz-Micheal, Senior Economist, The Lagos State Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, Ikeja, Lagos, 28th August 2016
19
Ibaba I. S. Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis (Port Harcourt: Amethyst and
Colleagues Publishers 2005) 46
20
Ibaba I. S. Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis (Port Harcourt: Amethyst and
Colleagues Publishers 2005) 48
21
Ibaba I. S. Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis (Port Harcourt: Amethyst and
Colleagues Publishers. 2005) 53
22
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria
accessed 26th August 2017
23
Oral interview with Captain Saburi Lawal, Naval officer, Defence Head Quarter Complex,
Garki, Abuja FCT Nigeria, Abeokuta, Ogun State, 15th August 2016
24
Oral interview with Iyamu Friday, Civil Servant, Federal ministry of Education, Abeokuta,
Ogun State, 21th August 2016
25
Olaniyan O. D. “Effect Of Boko Haram Insurgency On The Nigerian Education System”
Journal of Research Development, Volume 24 No.2, July, 2015 2
26
Olaniyan O. D. in Mohammed, A.S. & Toni. Boko Haram: Council on Foreign Relations.
2014 Retrieved on 27th December 2014 from www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-
haram/p25739 accessed 27th August 2016
27
Olaniyan O. D. in Olawale. “Challenges currently facing the educational sector in
Nigeria”. The Fronteira Post, April 8 2010 P 34
28
Olaniyan O. D in Omoh, G. “How government impoverished Nigerians: Poverty on
rampage.” Financial Vanguard: Vanguard Newspaper, 20th February, 2012, 16-20
29
Oral interview with Iyamu Friday, Civil Servant, Federal ministry of Education, Abeokuta,
Ogun State, 21th August 2016
30
Olaniyan O. D. in Ogbonnaya, U.M. & Ehigiamusoe, U.K. “Niger Delta military and
Boko Haram Insurgency: National security in Nigeria”. Global Security Studies.
4(3), 2013, 23.
31
Olaniyan O. D in Okoli, A.C. & Iortyer, P. “Terrorism and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria:
Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency”. Global Journal of Human- Social Science: F
(Political Science). 14 (1), 2014 39-50
32
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ebimieowei_Etebu/publications accessed 27 August
2016
33
Oral interview with Captain Saburi Lawal, Naval officer, Defence Head Quarter Complex,

72
 Garki, Abuja FCT Nigeria, Abeokuta, Ogun State, 15th August 2016
34
Olaniyan O. D “Effect Of Boko Haram Insurgency On The Nigerian Education System”
Journal of Research Development, Volume 24 No.2, July, 2015 5
35
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria-
in-view.html accessed 26th August 2016
36
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria-
in-view.html accessed 26th August 2016
37
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria-
in-view.html accessed 26th August 2016
38
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria-
in-view.html accessed 26th August 2016
39
Oral interview with Captain Saburi Lawal, Naval officer, Defence Head Quarter Complex,
Garki, Abuja FCT Nigeria, Abeokuta, Ogun State, 15th August 2016
40
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria-
in-view.html accessed 26th August 2016
41
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria-
in-view.html accessed 26th August 2016
42
Linus Ifeayi. The Impact of Terrorism In Nigeria: In view of the recent Attacks by Boko
Haram http://linusifeanyi.blogspot.com.ng/2011/09/impact-of-terrorism-in-nigeria-
in-view.html accessed 26th August 2016
43
Boko Haram: Thorns of Flesh of the Nation “Damaturu Attack”. News Watch Magazine
2011, November 11, 2
44
Ibaba I. S. Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis (Port Harcourt: Amethyst and Colleagues
Publishers. 2005) 14
45
Ibaba I. S. Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis (Port Harcourt: Amethyst and
Colleagues Publishers. 2005) 15
46
Oral interview with Omosanya Kabir, Police Officer, Nigeria Police Force, Ikenne,
Abeokuta, Ogun State, 21th October 2016
47
Ibeanu O. Oil Conflict and Security in Rural Nigeria: Issues in Ogoni Crisis. African
Association of Political Science, Occasional Paper Series 1, Harare, 1997 23

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48
Ibeanu O. Oil Conflict and Security in Rural Nigeria: Issues in Ogoni Crisis. African
Association of Political Science, Occasional Paper Series 1, Harare, 1997 25
49
Ogwu J. Nigeria’s foreign policy: Alternative futures (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs (NIIA) 1986) 34
50
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/156/html accessed 27
August 2016
51
Ogwu J. Nigeria’s foreign policy: Alternative futures (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs (NIIA) 1986) 36
52
Iyayi F. “Niger Delta Crisis: Development and Socio-Cultural Implications.” Being paper
presented at the Forum organised by PENGASSAN at Gateway Hotel, Ijebu Ode on
17th June, 2008, 23
53
Ikein A. A. The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria. (Ibadan:
Evans Brothers 1991) 45
54
Ikein A. A. The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria. (Ibadan:
Evans Brothers 1991) 47
55
Ikein A. A. The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria. (Ibadan:
Evans Brothers 1991) 48
56
Ibeanu, O. (1997). Oil Conflict and Security in Rural Nigeria: Issues in Ogoni Crisis.
African Association of Political Science, Occasional Paper Series 1, Harare, 1997
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Ikein A.A. The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria. (Ibadan:
Evans Brothers 1991) 57
58
Ikein A. A. The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria. (Ibadan:
Evans Brothers 1991) 59
59
Ibeanu O. Oil Conflict and Security in Rural Nigeria: Issues in Ogoni Crisis. African
Association of Political Science, Occasional Paper Series 1, Harare, 1997 31
60
Oral interview with Justice Jide Falola, Judge of the state High court Osun, Osogbo
15th September 2016
61
Justice Jide Falola, Interview with Justice, Justice of the state High court Osun, Osogbo,
Osun State, 15th September 2016
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accessed 17th september 2016

74
 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

75
 Terrorism is an international phenomenon that is a major issue in the international
environment. One of its definitions regards terrorism as the systematic use of force or
unpredictable violence against government or individual to attain political objectives. It has
been used by political organizations, nationalist, revolutionary and the ethnic groups. Today
terrorism has crossed international boundaries and has acquired international dimensions.
Terrorism has become one of the most important causes evoking serious and real
threat to security of countries, their inhabitants, poverty, democratic system and the national
development of human society and globalization. It can be said that the history of terrorism
can be traced to have began after the Napoleon’s defeat at waterloo and the removal of
royalist regime in France under new circumstances and arrangement of Europe, based on
agreement of the congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. The original and new forms of terrorism
were applied especially in revolutions in the 19 th and 20th century during the colonial and civil
war era during and after the First Word War in a scenario created by the Versailles Peace
Treaty and some other international agreements.
In addition, in Nigeria, terrorism is fast becoming an emerging challenge to every
sector and aspect of the political entity. Although, terrorism in Nigeria has been blamed on
the colonial history of the nation, the coercive imposition of colonial rule and structures,
manipulative techniques of the colonial transfer process and the air of resignation while the
post independence leadership embraced the operations of these institutions incubated the time
bomb blasted the first republic and whose offshore are still being in the country today. From
then till date, terrorism has become a disturbing menace in Nigeria.
Foreign policy on the other hand can be said to be the goals and objectives either
political or economic goals a nation set to achieve in its interactions with interactions with
other countries in the international environment. The various approaches are strategically
tinkered to safeguard and protect the country’s national interests. The history of Foreign
Policy in Nigeria can be viewed in two distinct periods. Throughout the period of 1914 to
1960, the colonial masters, Britain was the soul interest of the political entity known as
Nigeria after the 1914 amalgamation. However, the post independence era witnessed the
formulation of a sincere Nigerian Foreign Policy which can be regarded to as “Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy”. With the nation’s various military and civilian governments after gaining
independence in 1960, the Nigeria’s Foreign Policy had via various epistemological and
ideological construction evolve to what we have today in Nigeria.
This menace “terrorism” has had and still has adverse effects on the formulation
processes and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy as the case may be. Some of these impacts include;

76
many countries in the international environment have in one way or the other warned its
citizens against travelling to Nigeria because they believe some states in the country are safe
enough for its citizens. Such country include the United States of America who recently
warned its citizens against travelling to Nigeria by naming 20 states mostly in the Northern
part of the country they regarded as a no go area. Added to this is that as a result of these
various terror acts, some international organizations and companies have folded up or are
being discouraged to come into Nigeria to invest because they believe their safety in the
country cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, the relationship be Nigeria and some of its
neighbouring countries such as Cameroon has gone soar because of these numerous violent
acts. Also as a result of the terror acts in the Niger Delta region, the oil production has been
massively affected where the oil production in Nigeria has fallen to about 45% to 50% which
has reduced the revenue generated by the Nigerian government which has made it difficult
for the country to achieve some of its Foreign Policy in the international arena.

5.2 Conclusion
Terrorists’ activities are second nature to Nigeria. It is carried out by individuals,
groups in both private and public places and offices including the government one least
expect. It is government terrorism that has given birth to other forms of terrorism conducted
by individuals and groups. The increased terrorist violence caused by the various terrorist
groups in recent times is enormous and is a great challenge to security, peace, unity,
development of the country and Nigeria’s foreign policy. Besides terrorism instilling constant
fears, and destruction of lives and properties, it has threatened the fragile foundation of
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy formulation.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that terrorism in all its ramifications is a serious
threat to any country’s national interest and foreign policy. Thus, the question is what can be
done to address the problem? Having known the origin and the immediate cause of the
activities – issues of neglect, poverty, marginalization, underdevelopment, and youth
unemployment in the Niger Delta region, Northern part and Southern part of the country,
government should brace up to its responsibilities by addressing the problems. Granted that
both the past and present governments have done a lot to stimulate the developmental growth
of Niger Delta such as the establishment of Oil Mineral Producing Authority Development
Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 and Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC) in
1999, the government of Yar’Adua intensified actions on the post-Amnesty programme as it

77
went a long way to demonstrate the sincerity of the government to quicken the development
of Niger Delta region.
However, it is interesting to note that the National Assembly on 17 th February, 2011
passed a bill on Anti-Terrorism. This suggest, therefore that any form of terrorist act carried
out in Nigeria attracts a maximum of 20 years imprisonment. This is in line with what goes
on in most advanced nations. Many advance democracies spell out clearly their policy on
such crimes. The British government for instance, maintains an unambiguous policy on
ransoms. The country’s long-standing policy is not to make substantive concessions to
hostage takers or kidnappers. It believes that paying ransoms and releasing prisoners
increases the risk of further hostage-taking or kidnapping. The Nigerian government’s official
policy is that it does not pay ransom to kidnappers, yet it is common knowledge that most
foreign companies operating in Nigeria have paid ransom to free their personnel without any
government sanction or intervention.
In conclusion, this paper has made an in-depth analysis on terrorism and Nigeria’s
foreign policy. It submits that issues of terrorism in Nigeria have been caused by governance
failure which is indexed by the inability of government to provide the basic needs of its
citizens which include job creation, health care services, education, maintenance of the rule
of law and non the least security. Terrorism in Nigeria has also led to the deterioration of its
foreign relations, government needs to tackle insecurity with utmost sincerity to enable it
regain the confidence of the international community. The paper is of the opinion that
terrorism can be effectively tackled through collaborative effort by all and sundry involved in
the quest to defeat terror.

5.3 Recommendations
The consistent failure of the Nigerian government in dealing with terrorism issues in
Nigeria which has affected its relation with the other countries in the international
environment is a major factor that warrants this research. An in-depth analysis has shown that
terrorism is a menace that does not only affect the country’s domestic policy but also its
foreign policy. Thus, this paper recommends that for Nigeria to pursue her foreign policy
objectives and attain some level of global respect, it must be completely free from terrorism
and thus put in place the following measures:
The Nigerian government should ensure the provision of good life for its citizens.
Provision of basic social amenities like health care facilities, schools, electricity and very
important security will go a long way in ensuring social stability and development. Also,

78
ensuring good governance is also a solution for restoring peace and harmony in the country.
Government should make sure that the Rule of Law and also equity in the federal character
principle should be emphasized by government in order to avoid marginalization which often
times have led to frustration and violence. Furthermore, trans-Regional and global
cooperation among countries in the fight against terror is also necessary. There is an urgent
need for coordinated intelligence network analysis and policy making for all nations in the
campaign and fight against terror.
More so, the inter-connectivity of terrorist organizations must be defeated. For
example, Nigeria’s intervention in Mali is a good development. The fight against terrorism
will necessitate the harmonization of all local and global strategies in fighting the menace.
Freezing financial assets and destroying terrorist heavens will require dexterity in tactics. The
above recommendation can only be achieved through constant interaction and diplomacy
among nations to sustain the efforts and successfully prosecute the war on terrorism.
Furthermore, Counter Terrorism Units (CTU’s) should be established and monitored
by the United Nations. The CTU’s should be well trained and its activities effectively funded
with a contributory budget that should be set aside for that purpose. More so, their strategy
should be pre-emptive instead of been reactive. This will help put an end to the Fire Brigade
approach as it presently stands. Also, implementation of border security cooperation between
security agencies and border communities to enhance information sharing that can help
checkmate illegal migration and proliferation of small and light weapons (SAWLs) which
have been used by terrorist in some parts of the country.
In addition, the government should undergo a foreign policy drive designed at
rebuilding its image in the international environment. Going into bilateral and multilateral
engagements with advanced countries based on intelligence gathering and military
cooperation will help tackle the problems terrorism. Furthermore, government needs to be
sincere, representative and fair in the treatment of her citizens; all forms of discrimination
and marginalization in dealing with religious and development issues should be avoided.
Reducing poverty should also be a major concern of government, as terrorists get their
recruits from the unemployed and idle groups within the society.
Also, there has to be a distinct protocol for obtaining informations and sharing
informations with citizens. During such cases of domestic terrorism, a public system through
which information can be passed between citizens and the security forces must be available.
The availability of such protocol is essential to the protection of the lives of the Nigeria’s
citizens. It is unimaginable that despite many discussions in the last 4 years, Nigeria still does

79
not have a functional nation-wide emergency number. The 112 phone number that is being
shared is not active in most states as it only works in states that have set up their own
emergency services. Also, in light of what happened to Yusuf Omisani, who was picked by
SSS agents and kept incommunicado for 12 days, citizens need to be given the assurance that
when they share information; they will not be haphazardly assumed to be members of Boko
Haram and intimidated or victimized. In addition, one recommend a monthly meeting
between security operatives and community stakeholders in communities most affected by
these acts of terror. We need an alternative that encourages more collaboration and
information sharing to bridge the gap of communication. For the larger populace, the
National Assembly should host Quarterly Public Hearings to keep citizens reasonably
updated on the status of counter terrorism operations.
Also, for the promotion of peace education various government, religious institutions,
private sector and civil society groups should invest more resources in promoting peace
education. Peace education will help to redress the culture of violence and aggression and
indoctrinate the value of peaceful coexistence and non-violent orientation on every citizen.
Peace education should be integrated in the educational curriculum of Nigeria, from primary
education to tertiary education. Also, the problem of youth radicalization and extremism
could partly be limited through proper sensitization and enlightenment programmes using
special designated radio and television programmes, jingles and group discussions. A robust
countering violent extremism (CVE) programme should be an important part of peace
education. The Nigerian government, civil society groups and the private sector could partner
with Nollywood to produce home movies in the three major languages (Hausa, Igbo and
Yoruba) designed to precisely counter the narrative, rhetoric and doctrines of violent
radicalization or religious extremism. The private sector can play an important role in
providing financial support for these programmes.
Lastly, due to the increasing level of illiteracy in Nigeria, most Nigerian youth have
become easily vulnerable to manipulate and recruit into criminal, terror and extremist groups.
Although the right to education is one of the basic rights of every Nigerians, access and
entitlement to this right is hardly attained. To reduce the number of people who are likely to
fall prey to radical preaching and recruitment into violent groups, primary & secondary
education should be made free and compulsory for every child in Nigeria especially in the
northern region where education seems to be an issue. Thus, what is needed is for the local
and state government to gather enough political will to deliver quality and accessible

80
education to more children in Northern Nigeria through enhanced allocation and prudent
utilization of funds allocated to the education sector.

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