SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA, petitioners, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS,
SHERIFF REYNALDO B. MADOLARIA, JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN LAYOSA BOTH OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON CITY AND DR. VICTORIA T. ONG, OH, respondents.
Facts
This case arises from a loan transaction entered into by private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong
Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein Ong granted a 1 million loan to the Ledesma.
Ledesma issued a check to ONG for the same amount as a security for the loan and promised
to execute a deed of REM over her house. REM execution did not materialize, but Ledesma
delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the title to ONG Oh.
Ledesma sold the said house and lot to VERSOLA for 2.5 M. VERSOLA paid Ledesma 1M as
down payment, with the remaining balance of P1.5M to be paid in monthly installments but
even before the monthly installments became due, Ledesma already asked petitioners to pay
the remaining balance of P1,500,000.00. Petitioners, however, were only able to pay the
amount of P50, 000.00 to Ledesma. To raise the full amount that Ledesma demanded,
VERSOLAs applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust) in the amount of P2, 000,
000.00. In the course of the application for said loan, VERSOLA, ONG, and Ledesma convened
with Asiatrust to arrive at a scheme to settle the obligation of Ledesma to ONG and the
obligation of VERSOLA to Ledesma.
Their agreement are as follows
ONG OH- will grant an additional amount to Ledesma of P450K amounting his loan to
1,450,000.
LEDESMA-would then execute a deed of sale transferring his house and lot to VERSOLA
ONG OH- would then deliver the duplicate copy of the title to ASIA TRUST BANK.
VERSOLA would then deliver the property to Asia Trust Bank after registering the same under
their name to secure the loan.
After such, ASIA Trust would then grant the loan and pay directly to ONG.
The agreement did not prosper when ASIA TRUST after securing the REM of the property
discovered that the said property was under encumbrances from certain Miladay Jewelry
prompting them to cancel the grant of the loan of 2Million. ONG OH left empty handed and filed
a complaint for Sum of Money against Ledesma, VERSOLA, and the ASIA TRUST Bank.
The RTC ruled in favor of ONG OH and appealed by VERSOLA to CA. The CA affirmed the
decision and modified the award for damages.
No appeal having been filed, the foregoing Decision attained finality.
ONG OH file a motion for writ of execution of judgment which the RTC granted and the sheriff
proceeded to set the auction sale and serving notice thereof to VERSOLA on September 19
2020. VERSOLA filed an opposition thereto but it was denied. They appealed to the SC on the
following ground:
 1. The property sold at the public auction is the family home of petitioners which is exempt
from execution pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code.
2. No application was made by private respondent for the determination of the value of
their family home to be subjected to execution, as required under Article 160 of the
Family Code;
ISSUE
1. Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from
execution?
RULING
No. Under article 153 of the Family code, the family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and
so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not
by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.
This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would stop
the party from later claiming the exception.

In the case under consideration, petitioners allegedly filed with the trial court an "Urgent Motion
to Suspend Auction Sale on the Property of Defendants under TCT No. 83104 located at
Sunville Subdivision, Quezon City" which was dated 12 September 2000. The said motion was
filed before 19 September 2000, the scheduled date for the sale of the subject property at public
auction. The records of the case, however, do not disclose that petitioners in the said motion set
up and proved that the property to be sold was their family home. In any event, said motion was
treated by the trial court as a mere scrap of paper presumably on the ground that such motion
did not contain a notice of hearing. As we have repeatedly held, a motion that does not contain a
notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper, it presents no question which merits the attention of
the court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no alternative but to disregard it. Such
being the case, it was as if no opposition to the auction sale was filed.

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would stop the party from later claiming
the exemption.

G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006

PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Respondents.

Facts
This case, stemmed from the death of Marcelino V. Dario, who died without will. He was
survived by her wife Perla and two sons namely; Marc and Marcelino III.
Marc and Marcelino III extra judicially settled the land and title thereof was cancelled and new
one was issued to the name of Marc and Marcelino III and their mother. Marc and Marcelino
advised Perla to partition their property and extinguish the co-ownership of the property which
was opposed by Perla. Subsequently, Marc and Marcelino institution and action for partition
before the RTC. The RTC ordered to partition the property in the following manner
Peral: 4/6
Marc: 1/6
Marcelino: 1/6
The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties
concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed
accordingly in the aforestated manner. The order was appealed by Perla to CA but only upon
motion for reconsideration the CA give the due course and partially reconsidered the October
19, 2005 Decision. CA held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or
both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the
property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also
held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario
and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. This leads to the present
issue.
Issue
Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to
such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home?
Ruling
Yes. But Minor beneficiary must complied requisites under Article 154 of the Family Code thus
enumerates:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of
the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur:
(1) They must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) They live in the family home; and
(3) They are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite
the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years
or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. In other words, if there are beneficiaries who survive
and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.
In this case, Lorenzo grandson of late Dario, son of Marcelino cannot be considered a
beneficiary of the family home for failing to concur with the third requisite for beneficiary.
Lorenzo is among those heirs mentioned in art. 154 of the Family code, he is also actually living
in the said home, However as to third requisite, Lorenzo cannot demand support from her
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The law first
imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father,
and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. There was no proof that
his father Marcelino has no means capable of support for Lorenzo neither is there any evidence
to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandson’s legal support. Hence, he cannot be considered beneficiary and partition is proper.
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence
including the land. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed
by law.
Characteristics of Legal support-(1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor
and the obligee; (2) It is in transmissible;(3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be
compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in
amount.

SANTOS vs SANTOS-Carandang
Facts
Jose was survived by her spouse Maria and 8 children from his first marriage to Josefa. He died
intestate leaving parcel of land given to him from the Gaspar family denominated as Deed of
donation intended for compensation to him as tenant of the land of Gaspar family for 18 years.
Some portion of the land was sold by Jose and donated a portion of it to Maria where she build
a Sari-sari store. The only left land after his death was the 694 square meters. His heirs asked
Maria to divide the remaining property left by Jose into nine equal parts including her. Maria
opposed stating that she was the sole owner of the said property by virtue of the donation
made. RTC ordered that the property exclusively belonged to Jose as it was acquired
gratuitously evidence by the deed of donation. And upon the grant of motion for reconsideration
the 694 square meter of land is CO-OWNED by the spouse Maria and his 8 children from first
marriage.
This was appealed by Maria with the following issues:
1st Issue: W/N Maria is the sole owner of a certain land by virtue of the donation?
1st Ruling: No. the Donation made is null and void.
Article 87 of the family code provides that every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts
which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition
shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
In this case, the donation of the subject property made by Jose in favor of Maria through
the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob Pala prior to his death is null and void. Accordingly, Maria
cannot claim to be the sole owner of the subject property based on the void donation.
2nd Issue: W/N the Disturbance compensation of tenant is a donation?
2nd Ruling: No. because it was acquired as compensation of Jose’s tenancy over the said land
owned by Gaspar family.
3rd Issue: W/N the property belonged to absolute community of property?
3rd Ruling: As a general rule, absolute community of property shall consist of all the property
owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
According to Article 93 of the Family Code, "property acquired during the marriage is presumed
to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. In the
present case, it was already established that the subject property was acquired by Jose by
onerous title during his marriage to Maria despite being denominated as donation. The subject
property was acquired by way of disturbance compensation. Thus, it shall form part of the
community property of Jose and Maria and one-half of the property belongs to Maria and the
other half should be divided by the heirs including Maria.

G.R. No. 445 March 31, 1902

PEDRO MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, defendant-appellee.

Facts
This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir,
against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.
It alleged that Don Francisco Martinez, owing to his advanced age, is dissipating and
squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia Ilustre, and to
her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the administration
of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation
and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the
property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.
The defendant Father answered that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of
attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that
the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the
estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of his father and is otherwise
mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to
revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against
the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of
attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his administration.
Issue: W/N the father is Prodigal?

Ruling: No. the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend,
waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of
support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. The declaration of
prodigality must be made in an ordinary action.

Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons
who can contract and dispose of property may make donations. Donations may comprise all the
actual property of the donor, except such as is required for the support of the donor in a
condition corresponding to his circumstances. And with further limitation that no person can give
by a donation more than what he can give by testament. A donation is considered inofficious in
all that exceeds such limits. Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to adjust claims
to generosity. Donations of real property must be made in a public deed

MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs.SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 143439 October
14, 2005

Topic: Marital Disqualification as witness of either Husband or wife exception. Harmony and
confidence of marital relation.

Facts

Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness against the accused his brother in law Maximo
Alvarez. Esperanza, wife of the accused and sister of Susan was called to be a witness against
her husband as the one who witness him from pouring gasoline up to ignition of it. While the
direct examination was conducted, Esperanza became emotional and the party of the accused
move to disqualify her pursuant to the rules on marital disqualification as witness. The trial court
granted the same which was opposed by the respondent through certiorari in the CA and motion
for temporary restraining the said order of the trial court which was granted by the CA. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari on the issue of

Issue: W/N Esperanza can testify against her husband in a criminal case?

Ruling: Yes. Sec. 22 rule 130 of the rules of court provides that during their marriage, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other , or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants. The
reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.

For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Obviously, the offense of
arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife
Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the
major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the
conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and

EDILBERTO CAMAISA, respondents

Topic: Disposal of conjugal property without the consent of the spouse.

Facts

Edilberto married to Norma, negotiated with spouses Manalo for the sale of their conjugal
property. The said contract as stated by Edilberto is with the consent of her wife and he will be
asking her wife to sign for the same during their meeting for renegotiation, and that spouses
Manalo agreed to pay for the property on installment basis after down payment. Norma had
meet with the other spouse and informed them that she will need to review the content thereof
before signing the said contract. Later on, Norma informed the petitioner that she will not allow
the said contract as they need the spot cash and their down payment in effect was returned to
them without objection on the petitioner’s part.

Spouses Manalo filed a complaint for specific performance of their contract with damages in the
RTC. It was dismissed hence this appeal. They maintained that the sale was already perfected
as evidenced by their payment to Edilberto.

Issue

W/N the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent?

Ruling

No. Under the 124 of the Family code stated that the administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

In this case, the properties subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to
sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Hence, no sale was
perfected in this case.

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-

appellees.

Facts

Arturo after a call made by spouses Lauron attended their daughter in law for the birth of her
child. After the labor rendered by Dr. Arturo he was not paid by the spouses Lauron. He
instituted a complaint against spouses Lauron for the payment of P500.

The spouse argued that they cannot be obliged to pay for the said labor cost because they are
not under obligation to pay for it and despite that their daughter in law lived with them
separately. The complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N spouses Lauron are obliged to pay for the bill incurred by their daughter in law?

Ruling

No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs. The same code provides that the rendering of medical assistance in case of
illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of
mutual support. This liability originates from the mutual obligation which the law has expressly
established between the married couple

In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of
the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and
mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the
plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said
obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was
at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the
obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such
critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance
therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his
fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical
assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO,

defendant-appellee.

Facts

G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO,

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents

Facts:

Erlinda loving wife of Potenciano, filed a petition with CA for habeas corpus to have custody of
her husband in consortium (An agreement of custodial arrangement wherein one holds an asset
or property on behalf of the actual owner (beneficial owner))

The CA dismissed the petition for lack of unlawful restraint on Potenciano. Erlinda appealed to
the SC on her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano countered
that he did not prohibited her wife to see him in fact she filed a petition to grant her visitation
rights which lead to the consolidation of the case.

The SC court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and granted visitation rights to Erlinda,
Hence, Erlinda filed Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that Poteciano is not mentally
capacitated and that their two children controlling him to obtain dominance of Potenciano’s
property and she added that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty
bound to live together and care for each other.

ISSUE: W/N Erlinda is correct?

Ruling: Yes. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.
(Although there is a legal obligation of husband and wife to share empathy, it cannot be
enforced by legal mandate, since the sanction is on mutual affection between husband and wife
which should be voluntary on their part without forcing the other to give the same)

Marital union is a two-way process. It is based on shared empathy- a shared feeling

between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion which is lacking in the situation
between Erlinda and Potenciano.