OCDE Triple Nexus Review 2022
OCDE Triple Nexus Review 2022
OCDE Triple Nexus Review 2022
Development‑Peace Nexus
Interim Progress Review
The Humanitarian‑
Development‑Peace Nexus
Interim Progress Review
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3
Preface
2022 marks the mid-point of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs were designed to be
an ambitious but achievable "blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all".
Multiple, overlapping crises – climate crisis, COVID-19 and conflict – are undermining progress across all
SDGs. In some cases, progress on development is in reverse, plunging millions of people back below the
poverty line. This is particularly true in places affected by fragility and conflict.
Before the pandemic, an estimated 80% of people living in extreme poverty would be living in fragile
countries and regions in 2030. The pandemic has made things worse, exacerbating underlying causes of
conflict and fragility. Climate change is a risk multiplier, making natural disasters more frequent and
heightening food and livelihood insecurity for hundreds of millions.
New conflicts in previously stable countries and regions are creating additional and acute humanitarian
needs. More food insecurity in developing countries will be one of the most severe legacies of the conflict
in Ukraine. Even before the Ukraine crisis, United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) estimated that humanitarian needs were at record levels, with 274 million people needing
humanitarian assistance in 2022.
As needs have grown, funding for humanitarian and development activities has struggled to keep pace.
Official Development Assistance from members of the Development Assistance Committee rose to record
levels in 2021 – USD 179 billion – but needs continue to outstrip available resources. The international
community needs to ensure that its actions in support of humanitarian and development goals are as
efficient and effective as possible.
There is room for improvement. Too often, we work in siloes (humanitarian – development – peace) and
fail to talk to each other and agree on joint plans and programmes. And yet, all this work is funded by the
same donors. Rigid thinking reduces the international community’s ability to support fragile countries and
people and we must do better.
The DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus was born out of a recognition
of the need to rethink traditional ways of working. It is the result of intensive consultations involving a broad
coalition of countries, UN entities, funds and programmes and civil society.
As this report shows, the DAC Nexus Recommendation provides a useful common framework for more
effective international engagement in fragile and conflict affected places. Three years after its adoption,
we are seeing some good progress. Stubborn challenges remain, but we are convinced that the principle
of improved coordination and collaboration between bilateral and multilateral actors is an essential part of
the recovery from the world’s current crises. We encourage all actors in fragile and conflict affected states
and regions to place the nexus approach at the core of their work, with the urgency that these multiple
crises demand.
Susanna Moorehead
Chair,
Development Assistance Committee
Foreword
In February 2019, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopted its Recommendation on
the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus and tasked the International Network on Conflict and
Fragility (INCAF) with overseeing its operationalisation. This interim report, presented in advance of the
monitoring report due in 2024, is a preliminary stocktaking exercise for the purpose of joint learning and
as input for future events, including the high-level follow-up Partnership for Peace roundtable in May 2022.
It analyses DAC and United Nations (UN) adherents’ efforts to align with the principles of the DAC
Recommendation.
The aim of this report is to take stock of achievements and lessons so far, and feed the ongoing collective
reflection on how to put the nexus approach into practice. It is not intended as a full assessment of
adherents’ progress against the objectives of the DAC Recommendation: this will be part of the formal
monitoring report in 2024.
This study contains both qualitative and quantitative data from a variety of primary and secondary sources.
A global survey of DAC members, UN adherents, and their national government and civil society
counterparts in host partner countries generated critical quantitative data and written comments. This
Nexus Interim Report Survey was distributed to target specific profiles at headquarters and country level.
A review of reports, policies and evaluations of the efforts by DAC and UN adherents and their partners
further informs the study. OECD statistics on official development assistance (ODA) flows to fragile and
conflict-affected settings were also used in this exercise. Several networks of actors involved in the nexus
approach were consulted, among them the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Results Group 4, the Peace
and Security Thematic Working Group of the DAC-Civil Society Organisations (CSO) Reference Group,
and the DAC-UN Dialogue.
While comprehensive, it should be acknowledged that this report was researched and written within the
limitations of available data, resources and time.
Acknowledgements
This interim stocktaking report was prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) under the auspices of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)
and in consultation with the group of United Nations (UN) adherents to the DAC Recommendation on the
Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. The OECD would like to thank the many contributors for their
engagement throughout the process.
This report would not have been possible without the contributions of the DAC and UN adherents to the
DAC Recommendation, who helped distribute the Nexus Interim Report Survey, and of participating
development, humanitarian and peace partners. In particular, the drafting team would like to thank the
many colleagues among adherent organisations and sister networks who supported the data collection
process as well as focal points from development agencies, civil society organisations and local
governments who took part in the survey at the country and global levels.
As this report was being prepared, an impressive number of new publications contributed to the collective
thinking on implementing the nexus approach. Although too numerous to mention here, these have helped
shape the drafting team thinking. Many of them can be found in the reference list.
The report was prepared by Dan Schreiber, Cushla Thompson, Júlia Codina Sariols and Kazuma Yabe.
The team was co-ordinated by Dan Schreiber, with significant input from Sophia Swithern, under the
strategic guidance of Cyprien Fabre and the general direction of Frederik Matthys. The team expresses
particular thanks to Susan Sachs, the editor of the report, for her thoroughness, patience and availability.
The drafting team would also like to recognise the following people for their significant contributions at
different stages of the review process: Kulani Abendroth-Dias, Peter Batchelor, Julie Belanger, Marie
France Bourgeois, Angelica Broman, Paul Carr, Filiep Decorte, Tom Delrue, Martin Eklund, Réachbha
FitzGerald, Mac Gordon Shaw, Orla Kelly, Sorie Lee, Mitch Levine, Betsy Lippman, Stephanie Loose,
Hugh Macleman, Sajjad Malik, Keiko Matsuo, Jonathan Papoulidis, Martina Schmidt, Rachel Scott,
Ryutaro Murotani, Christian Freres Kuer, Lydia Poole, Aaron Roesch, Carina Staibano and Marta Valdés.
The team further recognises the many colleagues from DAC and UN adherent organisations and their
partners based in DAC and partner countries for their support in implementing the global survey and other
parts of the research for this report. The team would also like to thank colleagues from the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and African
Development Bank for their contributions as well as colleagues from VOICE, the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee Results Group 4 and Reality of Aid for their interest and support.
Finally, the drafting team would like to thank Ola Kasneci, Sara Casadevall Bellés, Stephanie Coic and
Henri-Bernard Solignac-Lecomte for their advice and support in preparing the document for publication.
Table of contents
Preface 3
Foreword 5
Acknowledgements 6
Abbreviations and acronyms 9
Executive summary 11
1 Seizing the Nexus Recommendation’s full potential 14
1.1. A widely accepted common standard 15
1.2. The triple nexus as change management 22
1.3. Bridging the gap between support and implementation 24
1.4. The challenge of defining success 27
References 30
Notes 32
FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Country-level implementation of the HDP nexus is increasing 16
Figure 1.2. Perceptions of the nexus approach's risk-to-benefit ratio 25
Figure 1.3. Perceptions of contributions of the HDP nexus approach to a coherent and complementary
collective response 25
Figure 2.1. Who leads and co-ordinates efforts across the nexus? 35
Figure 2.2. What types of analysis are used most often as input for planning processes? 38
INFOGRAPHICS
Infographic 1.1. Nexus pilot countries: an overview 18
TABLES
Table 1. A snapshot of the implementation of the DAC Recommendation 12
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CCA Common country analysis
CSO Civil society organisation
DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DRR Disaster risk reduction
EU European Union
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
HDP Humanitarian, development and peace
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IFI International financial institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
INCAF International Network on Conflict and Fragility
INGO International non-governmental organisation
IOM International Organization for Migration
MDB Multilateral development bank
NGO Non-governmental organisation
ODA Official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PFM Public financial management
RC Resident Coordinator
RCO Resident Coordinator’s Office
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
Executive summary
The triple nexus approach rallies the broadest-ever coalition for change in
fragile and conflict-affected settings. As such, implementing the DAC
Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus can
help steer the “paradigm shift” or system-wide change called for at the
World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. For this to happen, however,
adherents must seize and sustain the strategic momentum that has been
building around the DAC Recommendation.
This chapter first presents evidence of the momentum behind the nexus
approach in general and the DAC Recommendation in particular. Next, it
presents how adherents are translating the DAC Recommendation into
their own institutions’ policies and strategic approaches. It goes on to show
that, while the DAC Recommendation is emerging as a widely accepted
common standard, there is a continued need to disseminate its principles to
a wider audience among DAC and UN Adherents and beyond, ensuring
jargon-free and practice-oriented messaging. Finally, since implementing
the DAC Recommendation is not an end in itself, the chapter explores the
work that lies ahead at strategic level to better define what success looks
like.
The DAC Recommendation builds on a change process that has been incrementally building up at country
level over decades.1 Global-level shifts beginning in the mid-2010s help explain the acceleration in recent
years of country-level processes. Joined-up country planning processes across the HDP nexus, which
began in 2015 in Haiti, are now taking place in 25 countries and contexts, according to mappings by the
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the European Union (EU). Figure 1.1 illustrates the steady
increase in the number of contexts where the nexus approach is being piloted, providing tangible evidence
of the momentum for the nexus approach at field level.
30
25
20
15
10
0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Total country planning processes initiated
New country planning processes in given year
Note: In general, the year that a country reports as the launch of its nexus pilot initiative is when a decisive step was taken in joined-up planning
and programming processes that often were initiated earlier. The number of new country planning processes in any given year, indicated by the
thin blue line, should be considered as indicative.
Source: For EU pilot projects, the EU Department for International Partnerships collected and provided information in the form of unpublished
documents. For pilot contexts and countries initiated by UN RCs to operationalise the UN’s new way of working: Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (2021[1]), Mapping Good Practice in the Implementation of Peace Nexus Approaches: Synthesis Report,
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2021-
11/IASC%20Mapping%20of%20Good%20Practice%20in%20the%20Implementation%20of%20Humanitarian-
Development%20Peace%20Nexus%20Approaches%2C%20Synthesis%20Report.pdf; UN (2018[2]), The New Way of Working – Country
Progress Updates (webpage), https://www.un.org/jsc/content/new-way-working
This accelerating pace of country-level implementation is linked to two main global-level processes in
particular. First, on the margins of the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, the UN Secretary-General and
executive heads of eight UN entities committed to implement a “new way of working” for humanitarian and
development actors to carry forward the vision and “deliver better outcomes for people by moving beyond
meeting their needs in the short term to reducing them over time” (UN, 2016[3]). This concept now guides
the efforts of UN entities across the three pillars of the HDP nexus and of the World Bank Group at country
level.2 Advancing the new way of working involves establishing predictable and joint situation and problem
analysis; better joined-up planning and programming; leadership and co-ordination by an empowered UN
Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) with adequate capacity and resources; and
financing modalities that can support collective outcomes (UN OCHA, 2017[4]). These different processes
are also occurring in the context of the broader reform of the UN development system, whose ambition is
to make it “fit for the purpose, opportunities and challenges presented by the 2030 Agenda”, notably
through a reinvigorated RC system and a new generation of country teams (UN, 2018[5]).
Second, a similar process has been taking place simultaneously within the EU. On 19 May 2017, as part
of the EU's new strategic approach to resilience, the EU Council strengthened its commitment in a set of
“conclusions” on operationalising the HDP nexus, encouraging the European Commission and EU member
states to take forward joint analyses and, where possible, joint planning and programming of humanitarian
and development partners (Council of the European Union, 2017[6]). A particular innovation in this regard
was the explicit inclusion of a conflict prevention and peacebuilding component that requires humanitarian,
development and peace actors to work together to address the root causes of fragility, vulnerability and
conflict and to build resilience. In the 2017 European Consensus on Development, EU development
partners also reinforced the principle of joint planning mentioned in the 2006 Consensus. This principle
“puts joined-up EU and EU Member State actions at the heart of the implementation of development
cooperation efforts” (Koenig and Brusset, 2019[7]).
Out of the 25 countries and contexts serving as pilot for the new way of working and/or the EU nexus pilots
initiative (Infographic 1.1), 19 (or 76%) are categorised by the OECD as fragile contexts. Most of the pilot
countries and contexts (13) are in sub-Saharan Africa; six are in the Middle East and North Africa region,
four are in Eastern Europe and Asia, and two are in South America and the Caribbean. Stakeholders
across the nexus are focusing joint planning and joined-up programming efforts on a range of thematic
areas to varying degrees. The most common of these is peace and human security (e.g. promoting social
cohesion, enhancing people’s safety and security, and addressing gender-based violence), with 16 pilot
contexts featuring efforts in this area. Joint efforts also focus on food security and economic resilience in
15 of the pilot contexts; on access to basic social services in 14; on forced displacement in 13; on efforts
to strengthen the coping capacity of local systems and the resilience of communities in the face of climate
change in nine; and/or on other factors of risk in seven of the pilot contexts.
Country-level processes have largely developed organically, building on existing mechanisms and
planning processes. This also means that the success of such processes so far remains highly dependent
on a combination of sustained and committed leadership from RC/HC and/or European leadership and co-
ordination; key partners’ willingness to commit; and in many cases, the roll-out of a robust humanitarian
co-ordination architecture. There remains much untapped opportunity cross-fertilisation across contexts.
Note: The thematic areas in the infographic represent a synthesis of key objectives defined through joined-up processes involving actors across
the nexus, mainly in the form of collective outcomes. The table indicates whether these are processes conducted in pilot countries of the New
Way of Working, the EU Nexus pilot initiative, or both.
Source: See Figure 1.1 for all the list of sources.
The adherence of seven UN entities (and counting) is a sign that the DAC Recommendation is having an
impact beyond its original signatories. It has emerged as a widely accepted, shared global standard to
foster change in how organisations act and interact, including by building a growing HDP community that
shares a commitment to and common principles for improving lives and outcomes. Box 1.1 describes the
nexus approach and aims of each of the seven UN adherents.
Beyond strategic commitment, the expanding collaboration between DAC and UN adherents is already
delivering early results. The DAC-UN Dialogue on the implementation of the DAC Recommendation,
launched by the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) in line with the outcome document
of the Partnership for Peace high-level Roundtable in October 2020, serves as a problem-solving platform.
Co-led by the United States and the World Food Programme (WFP), the DAC-UN Dialogue more broadly
aims to foster joined-up implementation of the DAC Recommendation in fragile and conflict-affected
contexts. Its work has been driven through two work streams:
The trilingualism work stream, co-led by the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), aims to “ensure that the right people are
deployed in the right place and at the right time and are doing the right things to support more
joined-up complementary nexus approaches to tackling the drivers of fragility”, according to the
(unpublished) January 2022 “offer document” of the DAC-UN Dialogue. This entails supporting a
step change in the capacity of staff at all levels to understand how to engage with stakeholders
from the humanitarian, development and peace pillars, as well as ensuring enhanced
understanding of opportunities to strengthen coherence and complementarity. The first objective
of this work stream was to produce an integrated nexus training package, knowledge platform and
ongoing support facility through the establishment of the Nexus Academy. The official launch of
the academy was in February 2022.
The co-ordination in countries work stream, co-led by Belgium and the International Organization
for Migration (IOM), aims to provide a shared space where stakeholders involved in the HDP nexus
can exchange on instruments for joint context analysis and joined-up programming in line with the
DAC Recommendation. It also provides country support upon request. To date, it has identified
Mozambique and Niger as pilot countries and has engaged UN RCOs. This workstream also has
launched a series of webinars focused on processes and tools to improve in-country planning and
co-ordination.
Box 1.1. The United Nations adherents to the DAC Recommendation and the HDP nexus
Between October 2019 and November 2021, seven UN entities submitted applications and were
accepted by the OECD as new adherents to the DAC Recommendation. In addition, in February 2021,
the UN Deputy Secretary-General announced that the UN Secretariat fully subscribes to the
Recommendation. These developments have further strengthened the strategic momentum around it
and enhanced its significance.
Much can be learned from the way adherents are already taking forward the nexus approach. While many
adherent organisations have started integrating the triple nexus approach into their strategic and policy
frameworks, they also need to ensure that their institutional systems and processes are adapted to
implementation of this approach. The DAC Recommendation can serve as a compass for such institutional
change. A review of internal processes finds three broad institutional approaches in use: grand strategies,
bottom-up approaches and targeted measures. For each adherent, timing, capacities, political will and an
assessment of its individual trajectory will dictate which change strategy is most appropriate. Some of the
necessary changes require a profound shift in institutional mind-set. In particular, there is an opportunity
to reframe integrity and risk and think about how the nexus can increase accountability to taxpayers.
It is a fundamental principle of international norms that every adherent must ensure that its own policies
and practices are consistent with the norms. In consequence, DAC and UN adherents have been
progressively revising their strategic plans and policies to ensure consistency with the DAC
Recommendation. For example, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the EU, Germany,
Ireland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States have all
explicitly outlined specific positions and ways of working to enhance the coherence of their efforts across
the HDP nexus. Most DAC adherents have reported new or ongoing ways in which they are incorporating
the HDP approach into their internal processes and policies. For example, Denmark has had a joint
strategy for co-ordinating humanitarian and development assistance since 2017, which was further revised
in 2021. Sweden’s 2016 policy framework and the United Kingdom’s 2015 aid strategy, both of which
predate the adoption of the DAC Recommendation, are additional examples of close alignment with the
principles of the DAC Recommendation.4
Across bilateral providers of official development assistance, humanitarian and development programming
is often managed by separate siloed entities or different ministries and agencies. Bilateral co-operation
agencies tend to have programmatic and budgetary control over humanitarian and/or development
activities but limited influence on diplomatic and security engagement in fragile and conflict-affected
settings. Relatedly, DAC members' efforts to improve whole-of-government co-ordination in fragile and
conflict-affected contexts do not necessarily translate into greater programme coherence across the HDP
nexus.5
Nevertheless, there is evidence that many adherents have started making the necessary operational
changes to implement the triple nexus approach. The different types of initiatives undertaken at
headquarters level to promote change reflect each organisation’s institutional opportunities and
constraints, which are especially dictated by support from the political leadership, the capacity of current
institutions to absorb the change or intervention, and the existence of a policy window (OECD, 2019[8]).
Adherents’ strategies to promote change and move forward towards the nexus can be grouped into three
broad types of activity:
Grand strategy approaches involve extensive legislative redesign efforts or other types of
strategic initiatives aimed at rethinking organisational processes and rewiring institutional
frameworks. While they requires a unique combination of circumstances, several major bilateral
and multilateral actors have nonetheless adopted this type of approach. Notable examples of such
strategic initiatives include the United States’ Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Hume et al., 2020[9];
Yayboke et al., 2021[10]); the World Bank Group’s Fragility, Conflict and Violence Strategy 2020-
2025 (World Bank Group, 2019[11]); the Global Compact for Refugees of 2018, with the UNHCR
acting as institutional sponsor; and Belgium’s 2018 general policy note on international
development (OECD, 2020[12]).
Example: The Global Fragility Act, enacted by the United States in 2019, requires joined-up humanitarian,
prevention and development programmes to promote conflict prevention and stability when relevant. It sets out
commitments to improve the global, regional and local co-ordination of relevant international and multilateral
development and donor organisations; to include specific objectives and multi-sectoral approaches to reduce
fragility; and to adopt approaches that ensure national leadership where appropriate as well as participatory
engagement by local and national actors.
Bottom-up approaches drive incremental reform by cultivating internal coalitions for change,
promote iterative joint learning and gradually integrate new approaches into the broader
organisation. This type of approach is a deliberative process entailing sustained effort and the
search for opportunities and internal champions. Unlike the grand strategy approach, a bottom-up
approach does not necessarily require early commitment from the strategic top of the organisation;
rather, middle management or policy functions may initially facilitate and foster their emergence.
Examples of this approach include Switzerland's nexus learning journey (Box 1.3); the Global
Affairs Canada internal nexus working group; UN-Habitat’s new collective results framework that
promoted a shift of mind-sets; and practical action at programme level by Sweden and the United
Kingdom (FAO, Development Initiatives and Norwegian Refugee Council, 2021 [13]).
Example: Switzerland’s nexus learning journey was designed as an iterative process to move from a double to
a triple nexus understanding through learning from good practices and analysing bottlenecks. Focus
discussions among headquarters staff and field interviews helped Switzerland generate the broad buy-in and
ownership that are crucial for nexus operationalisation. The thinking process has been mainstreamed, and
concrete proposals for change as well as the continued deployment of nexus advisors are being discussed.
Targeted measures give strategic impetus to the nexus approach in critical areas such as staffing
and training, funding mechanisms, co-ordination structures, operational tools, and new relevant
partnerships. This approach is more circumscribed but allows for effective action and can be intra-
organisational and/or inter-organisational.
Examples: There are multiple noteworthy examples of the target measures approach including Germany's new
transitional development assistance instrument; Sweden’s deployment of nexus advisors; the multi-
dimensional context analysis tools developed by various bilateral and multilateral donors; the Nexus Academy,
a common good developed within the DAC-UN Dialogue with support from the UNDP; the UNICEF Guidance
for Risk-Informed Programming; Korea’s design of a new HDP nexus strategy; the commissioning of external
evaluations of nexus-related effectiveness by several UN adherents, among them the IOM and UNICEF; and
the inclusion of nexus-related monitoring indicators as part of the new generation of strategic plans by various
UN adherents.
Some of these critical changes require profound adjustments in not only rules, but also institutional mind-
sets, as existing flexibilities are not always used. There may be an opportunity in terms of how integrity,
risk and effectiveness are framed as part of accountability to taxpayers. One revealing comment from
interviews was that “sometimes it seems that more energy is spent chasing the USD 2 not accounted for,
than ensuring the USD 2 million is spent on the right thing”.
There is broad acceptance of the value of the nexus approach. Despite this, disseminating the DAC
Recommendation’s principles widely remains an important priority to translate it into concrete actions that
inform organisational processes, partnerships and programming. It is important to keep the messages
jargon-free and practice-oriented.
The Nexus Interim Report Survey, undertaken for this report, found that a commanding majority of
respondents — 98% — agree or strongly agree that a coherent approach to humanitarian, development
and peace activities offers more potential benefits than risks or drawbacks.
Agree
29%
Strongly
agree
69%
Note: The figure shows the degree to which survey respondents agreed with the following statement: “Overall, I believe that a coherent approach
between humanitarian, development and peace activities carries more potential benefits than potential risks or downsides.”
Source: Nexus Interim Report Survey
Moreover, 44% of all respondents said they see a change in coherence and complementarity following the
adoption of the nexus approach – and this score reaches 70% among respondents most likely to be
involved in nexus planning and co-ordination activities (such as those in roles supporting RC/HCs).
Figure 1.3. Perceptions of contributions of the HDP nexus approach to a coherent and
complementary collective response
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Total Resident OECD DAC UN Agencies, International non- Others
Coordinators' Members Funds and governmental and
Offices Programmes civil society
organisations
Note: The figure shows survey responses, by type of organisation, to the question: “Have you seen any change in the coherence and
complementarity of the collective response as a result of adopting a nexus approach in your geographic area of responsibility?” Answers are
broken down by respondents according to where they work – in a UN RC office (RCO); a DAC member; a UN agency, fund or programme
(AFP); an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) or civil society organisation (CSO); and others
Source: Nexus Interim Report Survey
While there is broad acceptance of the nexus approach, a review of policy literature and consultations with
INCAF members show a continuing need to disseminate the DAC Recommendation’s principles to a wider
audience, both among adherents and beyond. One of the most frequently heard comment from those
consulted for this report is that the DAC Recommendation did not come with an instruction manual for
proper implementation – although some adherents have started to fill that gap (Box 1.4). A related
challenge, discussed in section 3.1, is to reassure humanitarian actors that in politically charged contexts,
co-ordination across the triple nexus takes into account the need to preserve humanitarian space. In other
situations, applying the HDP nexus approach can also seem daunting, as it demands a thorough
reassessment of current practice. How, then, can humanitarian, development and peace actors judge
whether they are effectively implementing the triple nexus approach? This concern appears to be very
much alive among DAC adherents to the Nexus Recommendation.
Moreover, adherents to the DAC Recommendation represent a diverse set of institutions ranging from
bilateral and multilateral organisations to ministries, executive agencies and bilateral development banks,
each with its own organisational culture and areas of expertise. As a result, the extent to which one
organisation’s practical guidance for implementing the DAC Recommendation aligns with the policies of
others is of understandable concern to adherents. The good news is that the survey and literature review
conducted for this report found little evidence that organisational differences among adherents are resulting
in conflicting interpretations of the HDP nexus approach. This common ground reflects the fact that many
of the concepts set forth in the DAC Recommendation have emerged over the course of many years, if not
decades.
Nevertheless, a fundamental question remains to be answered: How can actors know that their adopted
approach is, in fact, applying the triple nexus? In this regard, the development of jargon-free and practice-
oriented messages can help practitioners at country level focus, first on the core elements that matter most
for the collective implementation of the nexus approach. Interviews with nexus specialists from some DAC
members suggest that such distilled messaging on the core features of the triple nexus approach are
already common practice in some organisations and can provide effective support to country-level
activities. Box 1.2 compiles the core features cited by respondents in these interviews. A review of recent
guidance developed to help field practitioners apply the triple nexus approach confirms that these elements
are widely perceived as critical (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2020[14]; CARE
Canada, 2019[15]; Hövelmann, 2020[16]; Zamore, 2019[17]; FAO, Development Initiatives and Norwegian
Refugee Council, 2021[13]).
The triple nexus approach is a means, not an end. It needs to be founded on a clear vision of what collective
success looks like that can be evaluated and evolve based on joint learning. Indeed, how success is
defined can evolve over the course of the nexus learning journey. It is thus important to carve out space
for this discussion to happen among adherents at both policy and high-level decision-making level.
Box 1.3. Building a coalition for change: Switzerland’s learning journey approach
Switzerland provides a useful example of a deliberately bottom-up approach to nexus-minded
organisational change and demonstrates how the definition of success in implementing the nexus
approach evolves over time. The process started in 2018 when the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC) commissioned an independent evaluation of its implementation of the double
(humanitarian-development) nexus. The evaluation covered staff from all SDC departments at the
agency’s head office and the field and included field visits and data collection from various contexts.
The evaluation, published in 2019, concluded that the SDC is viewed as “a principled donor with a
strong focus on context” and advised the agency “to enhance a conducive institutional set-up at head
office in order to institutionalise the nexus approach and make it less person- and opportunity-driven”.
The SDC’s management endorsed the recommendations, prompting the agency to embark on what it
termed a learning journey. This process was designed to learn from good practices and analyse
bottlenecks with the aim of fostering organisational learning about how to implement the nexus
approach. Gradually, the process incorporated questions around how to better integrate the peace pillar
of the nexus into the SDC approach. A core group that consults regularly with a broader set of nexus
constituents carries the process forward. The main steps of the process include a review of state-of-
the-art examples from the field that Switzerland is contributing to as well as numerous interviews of field
and headquarters staff and non-governmental organisation partners. Various intermediary steps were
built into the process to disseminate learning and build buy-in across the organisation.
Concurrently with the initial phase of the learning journey, SDC management decided to reorganise the
agency and integrate the nexus approach into its change strategy. As a demonstration of strong political
support for the nexus approach, this served as an additional catalyst for change. The active participation
of headquarters and field staff has helped increase acceptance and ownership of the process within the
organisation. The SDC is also preparing in-depth sessions on specific thematic areas that need
attention such as climate change, forced displacement and education, peace and governance, and
equality. The conclusions of these sessions will be published in a report that will also present ideas on
how to move forward, building on the strong collective momentum.
Source: Nordic Consulting Group Denmark (2019[18]) Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development
Cooperation at the Swiss Development Cooperation, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/independent-evaluation-of-the-linkage-of-
humanitarian-aid-and-development-cooperation; 2021 interview with SDC staff.
The implementation of the DAC Recommendation as a framework for progress will require the
development of pragmatic, realistic and measurable objectives for reducing humanitarian needs, risk and
vulnerability in relevant contexts. From this standpoint, adherents define success in implementing the
nexus in two complementary ways, namely in terms of changes in the way of working and in the
achievement of sustainable outcomes improving lives in fragile contexts. This two-pronged approach is
also seen in the different ways adherents are starting to monitor progress against the nexus approach,
discussed in Chapter 2.
A focus on shifting the way of working and on achieving outcomes that benefit people offers a useful set
of benchmarks. However, defining what success looks like involves broader collective, strategic questions.
Indeed, DAC adherents have found that while some of their structures and policies need to be adjusted, it
is often culture and political economy rather than hard barriers that need to be addressed. These include
achieving enhanced inclusion of the peace dimension and peace actors; greater attention to building
coherence and complementarity between (rather than just within) institutions; and creating the right
institutional mind-sets and incentives.
Case studies show that field actors in various contexts tend to set unrealistic collective outcomes, establish
unfeasible indicators of success or turn a blind eye to unavoidable obstacles (Veron and Hauck, 2021[19];
Zürcher, 2020[20]). This suggests that stakeholders need to infuse joined-up planning and programming
with realism, focus and humility (Brown, 2020[21]). A more pragmatic approach is also needed when
developing guidance for the implementation of the nexus approach. There is a tendency to formulate
guidance on the nexus approach that is too abstract and not sufficiently connected to everyday working
realities in fragile contexts (Südhoff, Hövelmann and Steinke, 2020 [22]). In the absence of applicable
approaches, however, there is a risk that nexus implementation will simply involve changing the labels of
activities already in current practice.
Box 1.4. Organisational guidance on operationalising the nexus: The example of Sweden
Among available guidance documents to help field practitioners apply the triple nexus approach, that
of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), stands out as a particularly
useful available example for other adherents, by aligning closely with the logic and scope of the DAC
Recommendation.
Sida issued its guidance note after the DAC Recommendation was adopted and following the 2019
OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review of Sweden, which identified a need for a more
systematic approach to linking humanitarian with development work. The guidance note aims to provide
concrete guidance to Sida staff and guide the agency’s dialogue with partners and other donors. It
builds on Sida’s analysis of its own good practices in co-ordination, analysis and financing at country
level and reviews what Sida should do across the three dimensions of the nexus to operationalise the
DAC Recommendation’s principles. For example, the Sida guidance note points out opportunities for
engagement with multilateral partners on the HDP nexus such as the EU, UN and World Bank nexus
pilot approaches.
More recently, comparable efforts have started to develop among other DAC adherents, including
Canada, Italy and the United States.
Source: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2020[14]), Guidance Note for Sida: Humanitarian-Development-Peace
Nexus, https://cdn.sida.se/publications/files/sida62325en-humanitarian-development--peace-nexus.pdf.
The HDP nexus approach has largely developed organically, and the DAC Recommendation provides an
opportunity to set clear and measurable system-wide expectations. At both country and global level, the
most successful models have been largely driven by self-selecting coalitions of willing individuals and
institutions identifying specific, practical opportunities. This is the obvious and best way to start, as it
provides opportunities to test out approaches before moving to scale. It is now time for a wider set of actors
and resources to engage, particularly beyond the UN system. Ultimately, any definition of success must
be (co-)owned by the people affected by crises or fragility or their legitimate representatives.
References
Brown, S. (2020), “The Rise and Fall of the Aid Effectiveness Norm”, European Journal of [21]
CARE Canada (2019), Annual Impact and Learning Review: The Humanitarian-Development [15]
Nexus,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nexus_FINAL_EXTERNAL_200415.pdf
(accessed on 22 June 2021).
Council of the European Union (2017), Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian- [6]
Development Nexus, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24010/nexus-st09383en17.pdf.
FAO, Development Initiatives and Norwegian Refugee Council (2021), Development Actors at [13]
the Nexus: Lessons from Crises in Bangladesh, Cameroon and Somalia - Synthesis Report,
Food and Agricultural Organization, Rome, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb3835en.
Hövelmann, S. (2020), Triple Nexus to Go, Centre for Humanitarian Action, Berlin, [16]
https://www.chaberlin.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-triple-nexus-to-go-
hoevelmann-en-online.pdf (accessed on 22 June 2021).
Hume, E. et al. (2020), Getting From Here to There: Successful Implementation of the Global [9]
Fragility Act, Alliance for Peacebuilding, Washington, DC,
https://allianceforpeacebuilding.app.box.com/s/5t5gs6ihc9lubw29sr2btjciy3cdeudf.
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2021), Mapping Good Practice in the Implementation of [1]
Peace Nexus Approaches: Synthesis Report,
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2021-
11/IASC%20Mapping%20of%20Good%20Practice%20in%20the%20Implementation%20of%
20Humanitarian-
Development%20Peace%20Nexus%20Approaches%2C%20Synthesis%20Report.pdf.
Koenig, S. and E. Brusset (2019), Joint Programming in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States, [7]
European Commission, Brussels.
Nordic Consulting Group Denmark (2019), Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of [18]
Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation at the Swiss Development Cooperation,
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Bern, https://www.alnap.org/help-
library/independent-evaluation-of-the-linkage-of-humanitarian-aid-and-development-
cooperation.
Südhoff, R., S. Hövelmann and A. Steinke (2020), The Triple Nexus in Practice: Challenges and [22]
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2020), Guidance Note for Sida: [14]
UN (2018), The New Way of Working - Country Progress Updates (webpage), [2]
https://www.un.org/jsc/content/new-way-working.
UN OCHA (2017), New Way of Working, United Nations Office for the Coordination of [4]
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York,
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/NWOW%20Booklet%20low%20res.002_0.pdf
(accessed on 29 June 2020).
Veron, P. and V. Hauck (2021), “Connecting the pieces of the puzzle: The EU’s implementation [19]
World Bank Group (2019), Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020-2025, [11]
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/844591582815510521/pdf/World-Bank-Group-
Strategy-for-Fragility-Conflict-and-Violence-2020-2025.pdf.
Yayboke, E. et al. (2021), A Policymaker’s Guide to the Global Fragility Act, Center for Strategic [10]
and International Studies, Washington, DC, https://www.csis.org/analysis/policymakers-guide-
global-fragility-act.
Zamore, L. (2019), The Triple Nexus in Practice: Toward a New Way of Working in Protracted [17]
and Repeated Crises, Center on International Cooperation, New York,
https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/triple-nexus-in-practice-nwow-full-december-2019-
web.pdf (accessed on 29 June 2020).
Notes
1
For a comprehensive overview of the lineage of the triple nexus approach from different perspectives,
see, among other source materials, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/ngo-perspectives-on-the-eus-
humanitarian-development-peace-nexus; https://www.dropbox.com/s/smy3t02ovt5y6mm/SGDE-EDRMS-
%239939660-v1-Triple%20nexus%20in%20the%20DRC_final_EN.pdf?dl=0; and
https://csopartnership.org/resource/localizing-the-triple-nexus-policy-research-on-humanitarian-
developement-and-peace-nexus-in-9-contexts/?wpdmdl=17681&refresh=61c273ffbd36d1640133631.
2
The UN has also established the Joint Steering Committee to guide policy setting and foster synergies
in humanitarian and development action to achieve progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. See
https://www.un.org/jsc/sites/www.un.org.jsc/files/general/tors_of_the_jsc.pdf. Additionally, under the
banner of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative, the UN and World Bank Group have jointly
committed to “identify collective outcomes and deliver comprehensive and integrated responses to
countries at risk, in protracted crisis and post-crisis situations”, including by sharing data, joint analysis and
assessment of needs, and “aligned multi-year planning”. The UN-World Bank Fragility and Conflict
Partnership Trust Fund supports implementation of the initiative, which is described in more detail at
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/the-humanitarian-development-peace-
initiative.
3
For further information on the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Guidance, see https://unsdg.un.org/resources/united-nations-sustainable-development-cooperation-
framework-guidance.
4
For more detail, see the 2019 review of efforts by Sweden and the United Kingdom to implement the
nexus approach, published by Development Initiatives at https://www.alnap.org/help-library/key-questions-
and-considerations-for-donors-at-the-triple-nexus-lessons-from-uk-and. Another overview is the 2019
OECD Peer Review of Sweden at https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9f83244b-en.
5
This paragraph reflects findings from a survey of bilateral partners at both headquarters and field level,
which INCAF conducted in 2017 to identify programmatic progress in implementing nexus approaches.
These findings were presented and discussed at a meeting of the International Association of
Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection in 2018. A recording of the event is available at
https://phap.org/PHAP/Events/OEV2018/OEV180911.aspx?EventKey=OEV180911.
As noted in Chapter 1, the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 provided impetus to the triple nexus
approach, with the adoption of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Nexus Recommendation"
by "Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in 2019 marking another
milestone. This is why, in the spirit of collective learning, this chapter looks at progress and stumbling
blocks in complying with the principles of the DAC Recommendation not only in the three years since its
adoption, but also over the five years. In the same vein, the chapter focuses on the overall efforts of
adherents that align with these principles, whether such efforts are explicitly intended to implement the
DAC Recommendation, or they are aligned to other, related policy agendas and commitments such as
those under the Grand Bargain.
The chapter is organised in three sections that largely correspond to the 11 principles across three
dimensions elaborated in the DAC Recommendation: better co-ordination (principles III.1-III.3);
programming (principles IV.1-IV.6); and financing (principles V.1 and V.2). In section 2.4.2 on
programming, three principles (IV.2, IV.4 and IV.5) are grouped and discussed under the heading “Linking
the nexus with other relevant policy agendas”.
Significant progress has been made in recent years in developing new approaches to a shared
understanding of how to reduce risks and improve resilience. However, challenges remain, both to make
co-ordination work and to ensure that joint analysis and joined-up planning translate into programming.
There has been meaningful progress in fostering joined-up context analysis and planning, with widespread
piloting of new, promising approaches. These include the adoption of collective outcomes in 24 of the 25
nexus pilot countries (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2021[1]); experimentation with new tools and
platforms for joint country analysis; knowledge sharing and joint learning through the DAC-United Nations
(UN) Dialogue. Still, several outstanding bottlenecks require attention. For example, evidence that
international actors are ready and able to meaningfully commit to delivering under one strategy remains
patchy. In addition, and despite existing guidance, a common understanding of the concept of collective
outcomes is lacking. Finally, how stakeholders assess a particular context and design their planning is not
always conducive to joined-up approaches. An area for further policy research is how local actors can be
included more meaningfully in joined-up planning processes.
Leadership and co-ordination models vary greatly across contexts, with contrasting levels of perceived
success. Experience in several countries shows there is potential for better nexus co-ordination adapted
to the type of context, as discussed in section 3.7 in Chapter 3 on investing in national and local capacities
and systems. In general, however, there remains a deficit in leadership and co-ordination. The survey
conducted for this report found that, overall, UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) are perceived to be the main
providers of nexus leadership and co-ordination across different contexts, ahead of national governments
and major donors (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Who leads and co-ordinates efforts across the nexus?
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Nobody National government National government Group of international RC/HC
(overall leadership) (in specific sectors) partners
Note: The question in the survey reads: “In your geographic area of responsibility, who leads and co-ordinates the design and implementation
of a collective response integrating a nexus approach? (Several answers possible.)”
Source: Nexus Interim Report Survey
Three bottlenecks can be noted. First, improving the ability of national governments to play their role in the
nexus approach appears to depend on the degree to which sustainable development challenges are a
national priority; the level of trust between government and aid providers; and the resources (capacity,
technical expertise and funding) available to support nationally-led co-ordination (OECD, forthcoming[2];
Perret, 2019[3]). Second, while there is much room to support and empower appropriate leadership and
co-ordination by UN RCs, in particular those who also serve as Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) (MOPAN,
2021[4]), this requires clarifying expectations for their role beyond co-ordinating UN and Humanitarian
Country Teams and ensuring matching capacity to support the RC/HC functions. Third, in many contexts,
donor co-ordination remains a weak point of the nexus co-ordination architecture (OECD, forthcoming[2]).
Contexts where a country champion has emerged among bilateral partners to coalesce those partners’
efforts offer a useful model that could usefully be replicated more systematically. Two issues require further
policy research: first, best practices in the safeguarding of humanitarian principles in complex
environments and second, effective incentives for promoting partnerships with multilateral development
banks.
New operational practices reflecting the programming principles of the DAC Recommendation are
surfacing across operational contexts. Identifying and scaling up such good practices would require
sustained collective investment in joint learning and evidence. There is little visible progress in
strengthening transparency and the voice and participation of people affected by crises and fragility.
Preliminary evidence suggests that – while the volume of official development assistance (ODA) to peace
in fragile contexts has experienced peaks and troughs since 2009 – overall, there has been a gradual
increase in the proportion of all donors’ ODA to humanitarian needs and a gradual reduction in the
proportion going towards development and peace, especially in extremely fragile contexts. This trend
varies according to year and recipient country. In extremely fragile contexts, peace ODA is more focused
on basic safety and security, while in other fragile contexts, a greater proportion goes to core government
functions. Inclusive political processes are a priority across levels of fragility.
Research for this report finds only limited evidence of concrete progress in implementing the DAC
Recommendation principle of prioritising prevention and peacebuilding, while investing in development
remains most visible in the more stable among fragile contexts. Further attention to this area would be
necessary to help inform decision making. Some of the most tangible progress has been made through
recent initiatives, within both the DAC and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee frameworks, to identify
how to maximise the positive impact of development and humanitarian interventions on peace outcomes.
Despite some progress on enhancing the systematic use of conflict analysis among some actors, the
Nexus Interim Report Survey indicates that conflict and political economy analysis are the least-used input
to inform planning and programming (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2. What types of analysis are used most often as input for planning processes?
100
80
60
40
20
0
Political economy Conflict analysis Risks and resilience Poverty level Sectoral analysis Humanitarian needs
Note: Scores along the vertical axis represent a composite value based on respondents’ ranking of most-used to least-used type of input.
Source: Nexus Interim Report Survey.
The situation in Afghanistan has brought into sharper focus the need to understand and measure the
impact of ODA on peace outcomes, prompting International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and
the DAC Network on Development Evaluation to establish a dedicated joint task team. Some work is still
needed to design suitable gender analysis methodologies as, to date; gender-sensitive context analysis
fails to translate into effective programming. Learning lessons from contexts where collective outcomes
have focused on social cohesion and conflict prevention is one area for further policy research.
The survey conducted for this report suggests that widespread questions persist about how to assess
progress in implementing the nexus, with 48% of respondents indicating that they do not have a way to
measure success. Still, an increasing number of DAC members, UN entities and civil society organisations
have engaged in evaluating their performance in implementing a nexus approach, often by combining an
assessment of impact and internal fitness for purpose. OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews
and those of the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) are additional
useful sources of relevant information on individual institutions’ performance for the purpose of collective
monitoring. Adherents’ efforts also include the commission of longitudinal meta-analyses of the response
in various contexts, ranging from Afghanistan (Zürcher, 2020[7]) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Transition International, 2016[8]). Ultimately, any definition of success must be (co-)owned by the people
affected by crises or fragility or their legitimate representatives. Furthermore, existing DAC criteria can be
used and adapted to the specificities of implementing the nexus in fragile contexts.
Meaningful progress has occurred on three additional principles of the DAC Recommendation (IV.2, IV.4
and IV.5), though this is related to the implementation of other policy agendas and global commitments. It
is important for adherents to be aware of these linkages to ensure synergies in their efforts.
The humanitarian sector has adopted a people-centred approach as a core professional standard for more
than a decade. The development co-operation sector’s methodology of community-driven development
closely aligns with this operating principle. In both sectors, these approaches are the subject of extensive
policy research, guidance and training.
The rich body of policy literature around risk-informed programming in the humanitarian and development
sectors has translated into programmatic changes among some DAC and UN adherents. The COVID-19
pandemic — and, more recently, violent political transitions in Afghanistan and several West African
countries — have tested international actors’ ability to adjust to changes in the operational environment.
In addition to anecdotal evidence that actors are responding creatively and with greater agility under
extraordinary circumstances, these challenges have prompted many adherents to initiate internal
discussions about how to retain their newly won flexibility and further enhance their anticipatory capacity.
There is an opportunity to integrate the localisation agenda into nexus approaches. Currently using national
and subnational delivery systems is rarely the default option. Despite positive examples (e.g. in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip), efforts to empower domestic non-governmental organisations, the private sector
and local government actors in fragile and conflict-affected settings by ensuring they have meaningful roles
and responsibilities in project design, implementation and evaluation are still insufficient (Torres and Dela
Cruz, 2021[9]). Strengthening national and local capacities is especially important, given their importance
for long-term development outcomes (Poole and Culbert, 2019[10]). There is also great potential for
international actors to learn from local stakeholders, who often can bridge the nexus pillars in their work
and may only demarcate the pillars to fit the international system.
Several recent studies have assessed constraints to shifting a larger share of ODA from intermediaries to
local organisations and proposed ways to address the bottlenecks (OECD, forthcoming[11]). However,
inclusion and efforts to strengthen local capacities still require more attention. In 2021, the DAC buttressed
its normative framework with the adoption of the Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in
Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance.
Gender equality is fundamental to preventing conflict and fragility and attaining sustainable peace.
Women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in societies, the economy, disaster risk reduction and
peace processes — at all stages and levels of decision making – leads to more inclusive economies and
more sustainable peace; inequalities and exclusion, on the other hand, spur conflict and fragility. The DAC
Recommendation explicitly links to the international women, peace and security agenda, promoting
women’s equal opportunities in the economy and equal political representation. Enhancing gender equality
and women’s empowerment in fragile contexts by protecting the rights of women and girls, and striving for
inclusive resilience to natural hazards, are prerequisites for achieving not only the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development but also the women, peace and security agenda and the Compact on Women,
Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action of the Generation Equality Forum (OECD, 2021[12])
One of the motivating factors for the DAC Recommendation was the sense that crises — and humanitarian
funding requests — were ballooning, with limited financing and programming strategies in place to resolve
the issues driving these crises and humanitarian suffering. Across total ODA to fragile contexts, overall
there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of all donors’ ODA to humanitarian needs and a gradual
reduction in the proportion going towards development and peace, especially in extremely fragile contexts.
There is also a sense of untapped opportunities, with growing evidence that building resilience and peace
is cost-effective, and with a greater diversity and volume of financial resources in many fragile contexts.
Both the UN system and bilateral donors have made significant efforts to adjust their financing practices
to support nexus approaches, according to survey data, interviews and peer reviews. In particular,
progress has been made on financing instruments, approaches and individual projects, though these are
sometimes relatively siloed. Nexus approaches have not yet been fully mainstreamed and normalised, and
financing streams tend to not yet work together coherently. The financing strategies envisaged by the DAC
Recommendation are still largely missing and will be an important next step to support programming and
co-ordination towards prioritised, common goals (OECD, forthcoming[11]).
Reducing the risk of conflict and ending need are not a matter of just spending more, but of spending more
strategically. The call for financing strategies across the nexus recognises that prioritisation is both hard
and inevitable when needs exceed existing resources and that there is a need to improve how it is done
— for instance, by including the international financial institutions (IFIs) as nexus actors alongside bilateral
donors, the UN system and humanitarian actors. Steps have been taken, including by the OECD, to
develop financing strategy approaches that help bring together analysis and decisions on collective
priorities, sources and funds and on strategic programming, building on established methodologies and
planning processes.
Yet, the role that financing strategy processes could play in coalescing financing and prioritisation
decisions has not yet been realised, and collective outcomes remain driven by multilateral actors rather
than being truly inclusive. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they felt their team or
organisation had never been involved in developing or aligning to financing strategies that bring coherence
across the humanitarian, development and peace pillars. Where respondents said their team or
organisation had developed such strategies, the majority of these were developed at the level of the
respondent’s own organisation or across organisations with a similar mandate. It is rare that the
government or actors from other pillars of the nexus are involved. Peace financing constitutes a significant
gap: There remains a lack of clarity about the definition and role of peace financing, and none of the (few)
respondents who identified with the peace pillar reported having been involved in such a financing strategy.
To achieve the programming and co-ordination goals of the DAC Recommendation also requires having
the right type of financial resources to deploy. Progress has been made in developing instruments and
mechanisms that are nexus ready — that is, they are flexible and predictable, allow for a timely crisis
response, and facilitate greater involvement from a broader set of actors. The majority of respondents to
the Nexus Interim Report Survey reported that their organisation was able to align financing with activities
across the nexus where appropriate (64%); keep unallocated or contingent funding available in case of
changing needs (55%); commit an adequate proportion of its resources as multi-year financing (53%); and
adjust its financing in response to changes in the context (69%). However, the majority did not think (or
was not sure) their organisation had the ability to avoid fragmented, siloed or inappropriately short-term
funding (55%) (OECD, forthcoming[11]). Some DAC members deliberately do not have a dedicated
humanitarian budget for each country and context and are thus have more flexibility to match funding and
programming with needs and risk analysis.
Continued attention is needed to get development and peace financing into the most fragile contexts
alongside resources for emergency preparedness and humanitarian response and to ensure that
humanitarian assistance is sustained sufficiently to allow development activities to embed (Marley, 2022[13];
OECD, forthcoming[11]). Many crises require humanitarian support over a multi-year time frame, and
humanitarian assistance should be programmed and financed with that horizon in mind. As the COVID-19
crisis has demonstrated, not everything urgent is humanitarian and not everything long term is
development co-operation: Debt relief, macroeconomic stability or political engagement can be urgent in
certain contexts.
Against this backdrop, the expanded role that IFIs are playing across the humanitarian, development and
peace nexus should be welcomed. An increased number of IFIs have already started to tailor their work to
the needs of fragile contexts, with several development banks and the International Monetary Fund having
recently developed or put into effect fragility strategies.1
References
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Progress, Challenges and Opportunities, Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment
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Notes
1
On 9 March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted its Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-
Affected States, which identifies enhanced cooperation with development, humanitarian, peace, and
security actors a key principle of engagement for the Fund. In this regard, it explicitly refers to the DAC
Recommendation. The IMF Strategy can be found here: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-
Papers/Issues/2022/03/14/The-IMF-Strategy-for-Fragile-and-Conflict-Affected-States-515129
Co-ordination cannot mean the same thing everywhere. While co-ordination is a central and familiar term,
there is no shared definition that humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) stakeholders can refer to.
Diverging interpretations of co-ordination explain in large part the different expectations and anxieties
about the nexus. The appropriate model of co-ordination will need to be collectively determined in a
responsive and context-sensitive manner, taking into account the need to preserve humanitarian space in
relevant settings (OECD, forthcoming[1]).
Despite investments in various new tools for joint analysis, a common framework is still missing. The
general enthusiasm for developing a new generation of collective diagnostic tools has not resolved the
lack of clarity about the common choice of tools across contexts or the standardisation of the collective
decision-making process. To address this persistent bottleneck, it is necessary to streamline and
rationalise the use of various joint diagnostic tools, as the DAC-UN Dialogue has started to through the
activities of its “Co-ordination in Countries” work stream. In addition, more discipline in capitalising on what
already exists would limit the redundancy of tools and the duplication of analysis exercises.
Collective outcomes can provide useful intermediate targets and benchmarks for a given country or context
if more consistently interpreted. Developing collective outcomes that are truly collective, with joined-up
approaches to planning and programming agreed by all key stakeholders in a given context would
meaningfully advance coherence and complementarity. (OECD, forthcoming[1]).
Even when organisations rigorously establish priorities internally, clearly prioritised strategies have been
difficult to achieve collectively in the face of demand for funding that outstrips supply across all pillars of
the nexus. Without central, co-ordinated decision-making (OECD, forthcoming[2]; Hövelmann, 2020[3];
Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas, 2019[4]), significant gaps between funding asks and response have
become endemic. At the same time, existing financing is not necessarily aligned to collective outcomes
and donors express the desire to participate in the dialogue and priority setting process as partners, not
merely funders.
Financing across the nexus needs to move away from a traditional fundraising model and towards
strategic, coherent partnerships between financing providers and implementers across the three pillars of
the HDP nexus. This strategic process should include bilateral and multilateral agencies, as well as
international financial institutions (IFIs). While nearly 90% of the DAC’s humanitarian aid is channelled
through multilateral agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), over 70% of official
development assistance for development and peace is channelled through mechanisms other than
multilateral agencies and NGOs such as governments and IFIs. (OECD, 2022[5]) Depending on the context,
consideration should also be given to resources such as remittances and foreign direct investment flows
and to transitioning to government financing over time.
To be most effective, financing strategies should help bring together decisions on joint priorities, sourcing
of funds and strategic programming. This creates coherence and reduces friction and wasted personnel
resources by ensuring programming is fundable. This allows donors to invest more predictably through a
pipeline of well-designed, transformative programmes presenting reasonable chances for success. Yet
with few exceptions — for example, the area-based approaches in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) — collective outcome processes have either not included consideration of financing questions or
have left such questions to a second stage, divorced from the determination of programming priorities.
There are existing methodologies that can be tapped into, among them the OECD financing for stability
methodology as well as public financial management approaches, integrated national financing
frameworks and national strategy processes. The OECD is taking steps to further develop and pilot
financing strategies using fragility analysis and financing data to inform key financing and strategy
processes. The United Nations (UN) Resident Coordinator (RC) system, UN entities, Bilaterals and IFIs all
have a role to play in building broad coalitions around collective outcomes and financing strategies.
3.3. Promoting nexus literacy and widening the cadre of nexus-specific profiles
Enhancing both mutual understanding and information sharing among HDP actors remains a critical
challenge to better connecting short-term interventions to peace and development objectives. Improving
what can be termed “nexus literacy” across these actors is fundamental to address this challenge.
In addition, in the immediate term, building co-ordination and fostering collaboration will also demand
dedicated staff time and focus. At country level, clearly fostering a nexus approach requires more than a
side job of a few individuals. Dedicated capacity remains important, at least in the initial phases.
Investing in staff with a specific nexus-focused profile has proven important for catalysing and supporting
collective efforts, both within donors and institutions at global level and in co-ordination platforms at country
level. The growing number of deployed nexus advisors, as described in Box 3.1, is notable in this regard.
Nevertheless, there remains a need to better ensure a match between the ever-increasing need for
capacities and the limited pool of deployable candidates.
The newly established Nexus Academy1, a unique collaboration between bilateral and UN adherents to
the DAC Recommendation, has the potential to accelerate the availability of trained capacities. Similarly,
other initiatives related to institutional capacity building for the nexus approach are also at the starting block
or have been launched to address nexus training needs of various categories of personnel.
Box 3.1. The roles and experience of triple nexus advisors: a review of terms of reference
Different organisations deploy nexus advisors or nexus co-ordinators, as they are sometimes called, in
a variety of contexts. Nexus advisors can have an external and/or internal focus, as shown by a review
of a sampling of the terms of reference and the experience required for these positions.
Inter-agency role. Triple nexus advisors have been recruited by or seconded in support of UN Resident
Coordinators / Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) to facilitate the development of collective
outcomes and a nexus co-ordination architecture in, among other contexts, Cameroon, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Haiti, South Sudan and Sudan. The descriptions of these positions highlight
roles such as convening, facilitating and establishing fit-for-purpose co-ordination mechanisms for the
nexus approach; setting HDP priorities; supporting joined-up planning and programming with partners;
ensuring inclusion of government, donor, NGO and local actors in HDP priority setting and planning;
(Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2021[6]) and strategic advocacy.
The particular way in which roles and responsibilities are expressed depends of course on the context.
In Yemen, for instance, a World Bank-UN advisor to the UN special envoy played such an inter-agency
role and provided a triple nexus approach to finance in support of the peace negotiations and for
humanitarian challenges. (Bosire, 2018[7]) Elsewhere, different arrangements are used for inter-agency
nexus co-ordination. The position of co-ordinator of the Libya nexus working group was created by the
World Food Programme and seconded by Switzerland in response to operational nexus co-ordination
challenges in southern Libya. (Schreiber et al., 2021[8])
Intra-agency role. Several DAC and UN members as well as other actors have deployed nexus
advisors to facilitate and support activities of a more internal nature. These positions are focused
primarily on internal programme oversight and policy, on contributing to the integration of resilience at
all stages of programming, and on operational oversight of programmes with a strong triple nexus
component. For example, the majority of Sida’s nexus advisors fit this profile.
Extensive experience generally required. The different terms of reference reviewed featured similar
requirements for nexus advisor positions in terms of skills and seniority. These include 7-15 years of
experience on average; proven expertise across several pillars of the nexus; and, ideally, experience
working in fragile or conflict-affected environments and knowledge of the specific context.
Source: Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2021[6]), Mapping Good Practice in the Implementation of Peace Nexus Approaches: Synthesis
Report, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-mapping-good-practice-implementation-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-
approaches-synthesis; Bosire (2018[7]) , The UN-World Bank Partnership in Yemen: Lessons Learned from the Deployment of a UN-World
Bank Adviser in the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General;; Schreiber et al. (2021[8]), Co-ordination, Planning and Financing
for Development in Libya: Findings and Recommendations of the Joint OECD-UN Mission (unpublished).
varies, given that states also are not institutionally static and comprise multiple parts and complex
relationships. A good HDP nexus implementation starts with tailored approaches that take into account
national, subnational and institutional realities and bolster the active engagement of legitimate national
stakeholders across society.
Expectations regarding the co-ordination role of the UN RC/HC should be made clear and backed up with
adequate staffing and resources. The RC/HC function, supported by RCOs and OCHA, comes out of the
Nexus Interim Report Survey and other recent studies (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2021[6]) as an
important element of the HDP nexus co-ordination architecture. The DAC Recommendation explicitly calls
on adherents to financially and politically support and empower appropriate UN leadership to enable this
leadership to provide cost-effective co-ordination across the humanitarian, development and peace
architecture. There is an identified need to ensure that suitable, strong leaders are appointed to RC/HC
positions in fragile contexts and that expectations of these roles are commensurate with political capital
and resources available to them (MOPAN, 2021[9]; UN, 2021[10]; Ryan, 2021[11]).
The usefulness of an empowered leadership model referred to in the DAC Recommendation can also
apply to other actors who have convening power in a given context, such as diplomats, national co-
ordinators and political leaders.
Significant progress has been made to develop financing instruments, approaches and projects such as
pooled funds, resilience funds, flexible mid-year funding allocations and long-term framework agreements
for trusted implementing partners. However, financing also plays a strategic role, intentional or not, as a
tool to enable and incentivise behaviour. How donors allocate funds as well as where they spend these
will play a large part in the successful implementation of a nexus approach — for example, in how the
fundraising industry approaches crises, in any fragmentation of pitches and competition for funds, and in
how successfully implementers maintain focus on sustaining longer-term development approaches.
Some bilateral and multilateral agencies have reviewed or are reviewing their policies and processes to
enhance the agility, predictability and coherence of their financing arrangements and reduce the
sometimes-negative impacts of competition. INCAF members have found that while some structures and
policies need to be adjusted, it is often culture and political economy rather than hard barriers that need to
be addressed (OECD, forthcoming[2]).
Shifting these incentives requires a mix of staff expertise, proper institutional set-up and policy permission
space, with targeted seed money playing a supporting role to encourage flexibility and collaboration. It is
important that such incentives are seen as one part of a broader approach, rather than as specifically
fundraising for the nexus. It is also important to address the political economy and narrative. This may
include, for example, managing the tension between promoting flexible core funding and measuring so-
called nexus financing; exploring how leaders can incentivise staff to use flexibilities that may already exist;
and communicating around effectiveness, waste and accountability so that portfolio impact is seen as a
key metric rather than solely transactional controls or incentives to disburse.
Supporting change in partner countries is a political project. In this regard, the alignment of development
co-operation and peace is the real breakthrough of the DAC Recommendation. However, political
engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches remain underutilised resources in joined-up
efforts across the nexus to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace.
The response to humanitarian crises is not only development but also sustainable peace. Without peace,
humanitarian needs will not decrease, and development objectives cannot be reached. Addressing the
main drivers of crises is a generational endeavour that goes well beyond programming cycles. As a result,
development co-operation in and of itself is not enough to create the domestic conditions to reach the
Sustainable Development Goals. Development programmes cannot be expected to reduce humanitarian
needs durably until a conducive environment is created for development gains to hold and be preserved.
The DAC Recommendation recognises that political engagement and diplomacy play a role, alongside
development co-operation, in reaching sustainable peace, while humanitarian assistance focuses on
people’s most critical needs.
The peace element in the HDP nexus is a reminder that the international community engages in contexts
of conflict or rising tension to help reach a sustainable peace. Diplomatic and local mediation actors have
unique mobility across the HDP nexus and can draw on their networks and skills to support sustainable
peace, including by mobilising conflict-sensitive development co-operation in fragile contexts (OECD,
2020[12]). Yet, peace entails many different types of activities and mandates, and there are different
understandings of what actually contributes to peace, including security operations (Barakat and Milton,
2020[13]). Real effort to enhance shared understanding among different stakeholders remains necessary.
Investing in national and local capacities and systems cannot be an afterthought (OECD, forthcoming[1]).
Collective support and optimal use of public delivery systems for basic social services at national and local
level must remain a priority, even in times of crisis. Development co-operation is not the extension of
humanitarian assistance. Both urgent and longer-term actions are required in fragile or crisis contexts. Yet,
humanitarian actors often become involved in social or physical infrastructure in the absence of
alternatives. Those alternatives are traditionally linked to development co-operation. Not only do they
require domestic government buy-in and sustainable resources, which can be challenging in fragile
contexts; they also require considerable time for implementation.
As a result, international engagement in crisis contexts is over-reliant on extended humanitarian assistance
mechanisms even when development co-operation principles could apply. There are still very few existing
development mechanisms that are really fit for fragility. Some DAC members, among them Germany, have
demonstrated that transitional development assistance and targeted peace interventions can be fit for
fragility and provide structural support at local or national level. Those mechanisms can be powerful tools
towards peace and recovery when designed as early development instruments rather than extended
humanitarian assistance instruments.
Beyond the programming realm, there is also a need to include the stakeholders closest to the affected
communities in a more meaningful way in joint analysis and planning processes, in particular local actors
and national and international civil society organisations involved in implementing programmes.
3.8. Using the HDP nexus as an integrator for other policy priorities
The HDP nexus should integrate gender equality, climate change and other relevant considerations. It
should not become a new, siloed policy area. The nexus approach can help enhance understanding of the
interrelationships among various thematic perspectives and improve their coherence in addressing risks
and vulnerabilities. For example, recent research by International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)
and the DAC Network on Gender Equality on the articulation of gender across the triple nexus shows the
value of a gender lens for nexus approaches (OECD, 2021[14]). In a similar fashion, the nexus approach
can help address climate change (Daroca Oller, 2020[15]) — for instance, approaching climate change as
a risk multiplier in the fragility landscape and linking frameworks for prevention, disaster response and
fragility. Decentralisation of competencies and resources in partner countries to subnational governments
can also provide the institutional footing for area-based nexus approaches, as the local level is “a natural
place for working beyond silos” (Barakat and Milton, 2020[13]).
The HDP nexus approach has largely developed organically, and the DAC Recommendation provides an
opportunity to set clear and measurable system-wide expectations. At both country and global levels, the
most successful models have been largely driven by self-selecting coalitions of willing individuals and
institutions that identify specific, practical opportunities. This is the obvious and best place to start; as such,
opportunities allow approaches to be tested before moving to scale. It is now time for engagement by a
wider set of actors and resources, particularly beyond the UN system.
The success of the DAC Recommendation hinges on the important role of additional stakeholders beyond
its adherents. Global nexus co-ordination efforts have thus far gravitated towards the UN system, linking
in particular to initiatives around UN development reforms and the New Way of Working. However, with
75% of development assistance to extremely fragile contexts being channelled bilaterally, relying on an
UN-centric model might rapidly lead to partial implementation of a nexus approach. (OECD, 2022[5])
Multilateral development banks are playing a growing role across the nexus in fragile and conflict-affected
settings (Poole and Culbert, 2019[16]). Both loans and grants have been increasing, particularly with the
engagement of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and regional banks such as the African
Development Bank. However, their co-ordination and linkages with other development actors are not
always consistent and need to be strengthened.
References
Bosire, L. (2018), The UN-World Bank Partnership in Yemen: Lessons Learned from the [7]
Deployment of a UN-World Bank Adviser in the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, United Nations, New York.
Daroca Oller, S. (2020), Exploring the Pathways from Climate-related Risks to Conflict and the [15]
Hövelmann, S. (2020), Triple Nexus to Go, Centre for Humanitarian Action, Berlin, [3]
https://www.chaberlin.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-triple-nexus-to-go-
hoevelmann-en-online.pdf (accessed on 22 June 2021).
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2021), Mapping Good Practice in the Implementation of [6]
Peace Nexus Approaches: Synthesis Report,
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2021-
11/IASC%20Mapping%20of%20Good%20Practice%20in%20the%20Implementation%20of%
20Humanitarian-
Development%20Peace%20Nexus%20Approaches%2C%20Synthesis%20Report.pdf.
MOPAN (2021), Lessons in Multilateral Effectiveness -- Is This Time Different? UNDS Reform: [9]
Progress, Challenges and Opportunities, Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment
Network (MOPAN), Paris,
https://www.mopanonline.org/analysis/items/MOPAN_MLE_UNDSR_Progress_challenges_o
pportunities_June2021_web.pdf (accessed on 4 September 2021).
OECD (2022), Creditor Reporting System (CRS), OECD International Development Statistics [5]
(database), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1 (accessed on
28 April 2022).
OECD (2021), Gender Equality Across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, OECD [14]
Development Co-operation Directorate, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-equality-
across-the-hdp-nexus-july2021.pdf.
Publishing, Paris.
OECD (forthcoming), Financing Across the Nexus, OECD Publishing, Paris. [2]
Poole, L. and V. Culbert (2019), Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field [16]
Ryan, J. (2021), Review of UN Integration: Final Report, United Nations, New York. [11]
Schreiber, D. et al. (2021), Co-ordination, Planning and Financing for Development in Libya: [8]
UN (2021), Review of the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System: Rising to the [10]
Challenge and Keeping the Promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development -
Report of the Secretary-General, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3930790?ln=en (accessed
on 19 September 2021).
Notes
1
The Nexus Academy facilitates joint learning and knowledge exchange to accelerate nexus approaches
and promote complementary humanitarian, development and peace actions that tackle the root causes of
crises and end need. It is an initiative of the DAC-UN Dialogue, delivered as a common good by UNDP
SURGE Academy.
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