The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia

Author(s): Amare Tekle

Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies , Sep., 1989, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1989),
pp. 479-502
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/161103

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to The Journal of Modern African Studies

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, 3 (I989), pp. 479-502

The Determinants of the Foreign

Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia
by AMARE TEKLE*

THE FOREIGN policy of Ethiopia, like that of other countries, is based

on certain goals and values, and determined by the dynamic interplay
of domestic and external factors. Although its formulation has been
clearly influenced by Marxist concepts about the nature of society and
the alignment of forces in the world, there are elements of continuity as
well as change, not least because Ethiopia has maintained its core
values while playing an important role from time to time in the
international arena long before the 1974 revolution. In other words,
despite a shift in orientation, the central purpose of Ethiopia's foreign
policy has remained the same, and a change in style has not brought
forth a change in essence. Indeed, in some respects, the exigencies of a
fast-changing international environment have been more significant
than the replacement of the Emperor by the Dergue. It must be stressed
that Ethiopian policy has been largely rigid, with adjustments being
made only in response to certain fait accomplis that were outside the
control of the decision-makers.

THE GOALS OF FOREIGN POLICY

The present Ethiopian Government has s

intimately-linked foreign-policy goals; nat
guarantee territorial integrity and nation
legitimacy of the regime, so that it can c
accepted at home and abroad; and a restru
Since concepts like 'national security' and
and subject to different interpretations, how
elite have been important in determining
mean,1 as well as in setting priorities and
external and internal resources in order t
tation.

* Associate Professor of Political Science, Morris Brown College, Atlanta, Georgia.

1 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: a theory of international relations (New York, 1966), pp. 571-2.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
480 AMARE TEKLE

Upon achieving power, the immediate objectives of the Government

were to win the conflict in Eritrea and the war with Somalia, and to
achieve internal political stability by firmly establishing its authority
and creating a framework for 'socialist' development. This required
immediate commitment to bolstering its military strength, which
involved seeking alliances which would ensure the immediate and
massive inflow of armaments.
The policy-frame was based on the principles of proletarian
internationalism and non-alignment, reflected in all the basic docu-
ments of the Government and the ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia
(W.P.E.), including the new constitution. These proclaimed support
for, and solidarity with, socialist countries as well as movements and
forces committed to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism,
neo-colonialism, and racism, plus Chinese reaction and Zionism, added
in 1979 and I98I, respectively.1 From the beginning, the Government
had consistently condemned both the so-called 'imperialists', essen-
tially the United States and the N.A.T.O. alliance, and the alleged
'reactionary' Arab states, including Iraq and Syria, and conversely
had closely identified itself with the causes of the Soviet Union and its
socialist allies, and the struggle of revolutionary movements in the
Third World.

Although the previous Government had proclaimed Ethiopia to b

non-aligned, this stance included not only maintaining cordial relations
with the Soviet bloc, but also providing the United States with military
bases and facilities. By way of contrast, the present Government
considers the Soviet Union to be a 'natural ally' of the Non-Aligned
Movement.2 Whereas the organisation's founding fathers had, on th
basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, emphasised mutua
accommodation, understanding, tolerance, and co-operation, Ethio
pia's Marxist leaders advocate class struggle and world revolution.

THE EXTERNAL SETTING

Although the external environment include

systems, as well as bilateral relationships, it

1 Yemen was only willing to sign a treaty of friendship with Ethi

not just to anti-imperialism and anti-racism, as in the propos
Zionism', as finally agreed in I98I. A section denouncing 'Chin
added to Chairman Mengistu's speech during the celebration of
revolution, because Fidel Castro threatened to cancel his state
Government did not take an official position on the question.
2 Socialist Ethiopia was one of the few vocal advocates of such
was raised at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana in I979.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 48I
precise distinctions between the three, since
paramount role in each.
Ethiopia is a small, impoverished country suff
of war and famine, and dependent for its secur
it has always been, on the assistance of other
institutions. Its location in a strategically impo
has always affected its foreign policy, notab
major powers of the day. Although unabl
marginal role in the international system, t
Ethiopia, the structure and distribution of pow
forces in the international environment, hav
leeway in its diplomatic manoeuvres.
History demonstrates that Ethiopia has succes
taken advantage of, the interplay of forces
perennially seeking solutions to its national
dicaments. This explains the role played in t
successive great powers - notably Portugal, It
United States, and now the Soviet Union
attachment to, and the advantage it has tak
organisations, including the League of Nation
and the Organisation of African Unity.1
The skill and opportunism with which Emp
able to exploit the League of Nations, and en
coming to his rescue against Britain, which in t
role in Italy's defeat and his victorious return f
use of his newly-acquired friendship with Wash
power at home and to ensure his country's posi
entry into, and active participation in, the Non
well as his cultivation of the personal friendship
including Nasser; his masterly manipulati
movement and his pre-eminent role in the
which enhanced the country's stature and hi
world affairs - all can be cited as brilliant ex
ability to manoeuvre skillfully in, and manip
The present Government has also been success
extent, in its assessment of the international climate, and in its
attraction of support from the Soviet Union. Yet, it has damaged
Ethiopia's stature and minimised its influence in the Non-Aligned

1 Stephen V. Chukumba, The Big Powers Against Ethiopia: Anglo-Franco-American diplomatic

maneuvers during the Italian-Ethiopian dispute (Washington, D.C., I979), p. 6.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
482 AMARE TEKLE

Movement and the O.A.U. This has nothing to do with the country's
close relationship with Moscow since the present leaders are only a little
more servile to their main ally than was the imperial regime to
Washington. The problem lies less in the substance than the conduct of
the policy adopted, and this has been detrimental to the Government's
relationship with non-aligned, and particularly African states.

i. The Regional System

The foreign policy of Ethiopia has always been profoundly affected

by the prevailing conditions in the Horn of Africa, and by its
traditional perception of, and psychological disposition towards,
neighbouring countries on both sides of the Red Sea. The present
Marxist leaders, like their predecessors, believe that Ethiopia is
uncomfortably surrounded by several unfriendly states, whose in-
habitants share more differences than similarities, and whose relation-
ships have largely been characterised by mutual suspicion and fierce
hostility.
Unlike its neighbours, Ethiopia not only managed to escape being
colonised, but was able to assume its present dimensions, except in the
north, during the 'scramble for Africa', expanding from 345,000 to
800,000 square kilometres during this time.' The leaders succeeded not
because of their military strength but because of their capacity to
exploit the cupidity of the European colonialists.2 Even so, Ethiopia
itself was often treated as if it were not a sovereign state in full control
of its destiny. The I906 treaty between France, Italy, and Britain,
signed without the knowledge of Menelik II, let alone with his consent,
was actually designed to carve Ethiopia into spheres of influence while
seeming to guarantee its independence and territorial integrity.
Nevertheless, the Emperor was able to keep and control the lands and
hitherto free peoples acquired as spoils of his own colonialism. This is
the root cause of the continuing tension and hostility that obstructs the
promotion of any positive, meaningful, and enduring relationships
among the peoples and countries of the region.
A glance at the map of Ethiopia reveals the problem. First, although
the Ogaden and surrounding areas are inhabited by Somalis, they were
incorporated into the Empire during the aforementioned 'scramble for
Africa', on the basis of treaties and agreements between Ethiopia and

Andre Davy, Ethiopie d'hier et d'aujourd'hui (Paris, I970), p. IOI.

2 Chukumba, op. cit. p. 29.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY
483
its European 'neighbours'. But this historica
has been rejected by an independent Somal
sacred duty to struggle for the 'decolonisati
Somalia and Ethiopia have already fought th
territories, the last being in 1977, and host
varied levels of intensity. At present, the Et
National Movement (S.N.M.) operates fro
determination to overthrow the regime in Mo
Western Somali Liberation Front (W.S.L.F.)
Second, Eritrea, which became an Italian colony in 1889, was
federated after World War II with Ethiopia as the result of an
unfortunate decision by the newly-created United Nations. However,
even the federation, the bitter fruit of compromise, was forcibly and
illegally annulled by Haile Selassie in I962, thereby provoking the
already-dissatisfied Eritreans to embark on a war of liberation which
has not yet ended.
The Government continues to exercise less and less control over both
disputed areas, helped by the intervention of foreign troops and a
massive influx of armaments. The Eritrean and Somali conflicts are
central determinants of the present Government's foreign policy, bein
not only regarded as harmful catalysts in its relationships wit
neighbours, but also wrongly perceived as the instigators of the myria
national liberation movements and political/ethnic groupings insid
and outside Ethiopia.
Ethiopia shares the Nile and its longest border with the Sudan, an
in spite of periodic spells of friendship, the Government has continued
to help successive dissident groups in the Southern Sudan, including its
present commitment to, and virtual control of, the Sudan People
Liberation Front (S.P.L.F.), based in part on mistrust of the 'Arab
Northerners, not least because of their support for Eritrea and it
people. Ethiopia's relations with the third state in the Nile Valley have
been shaped as much by Egypt's attitudes and actions as regard
Somalia, Eritrea, and the Sudan, and by its close association with other
Arab and Muslim states, as by the most basic questions regarding th
Nile waters. Ethiopia's relations with Djibouti are cordial, albeit
susceptible to subversion as a result of mutual mistrust:2 the smal
state's fears of its bigger neighbour's long-range ambitions are justifie
by bitter memories of the latter's pre-independence scheming wit
1 Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: a new political history (New York, 1965), p. 96.
2 'Djibouti -War on the Opposition', in Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), 249, 27 Septembe
I986, p. 3.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
484 AMARE TEKLE

France, and the regime in Addis Ababa persistently worries that a

Muslim Djibouti will succumb to the pressures of, and be controlled by,
Ethiopia's Arab 'enemies', thus depriving it of a major outlet to the
seas.

Ethiopia's unsatisfactory relationships with its neig

especially the vulnerability of its two ports in Eritrea, h
why Haile Selassie had signed a mutual defence treat
Although benefiting militarily, logistically, and diplo
this agreement during its last war with Somalia, Ethio
was ready access to the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa
direct intervention by Kenya. However, the enemy of
not necessarily always your friend, and the I979 treaty o
and co-operation between Ethiopia and Kenya has
implemented with much enthusiasm because of major
ideology and the nature of their respective political
alliances.'
Ethiopia is the only non-Arab and officially non-Muslim state in the
Red Sea region, and because of its proximity to the Middle East, the
oil-rich Persian Gulf, and the militarily important Indian Ocean, it
continues to attract the attention not only of the two superpowers, but
also Israel and various Arab governments, as well as Western Europe
and, to a limited extent, Japan and China.
Haile Selassie had good relations with both Israel and Iran, not least
because both were also staunch allies of the United States. Israel, which
trained anti-guerrilla commandos in Eritrea, had military bases in the
Dahalak archipelago in the Red Sea. Since I978, the Government has
regularly denounced 'Zionist' Israel, despite having previously
received fruitful clandestine help, including the supply of arms and
ammunition, and also the training of the crack division known as
Nebelbal, later to be used in Eritrea, at the new base in Arba, on the
Addis Ababa-Assab road.2 Ethiopia's friendship with Iran faded when
the Shah gave open military and diplomatic support to Somalia,3 but
has now improved significantly. Conversely, Ethiopia was the object of
Arab wrath and condemnation, especially after its participation in the
Suez Commission of 1956, being regarded as the southern front for the
alleged imperialist-zionist, anti-Arab alliance. Although the Emperor's

1 Colin Legum, 'Ethiopia on the Eve of Becoming Africa's First Full-Blooded Communist
State', in Third World Reports (London), 24 August i984.
2 Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over Eritrea: war and revolution in the Horn of Africa (Stanford, 1983),
p. 104.
3 The Shah bluntly told an Ethiopian delegation which visited Tehran in I977, of which th
author was a member, that he had given Somalia 'a few rifles', in addition to medical supplie

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY
485
personal diplomacy gradually improved re
South Yemen were openly hostile, the positi
political confusion that engulfed Ethiopia
Indeed, the more conservative Arab gove
threatened by the prospect that the Dergu
destabilising Marxist state in the region tha
possibility of turning the Red Sea into a
South Yemen appears to be friendlily disp
Finally, in spite of its ruling classes, Eth
culturally as much a part of Africa as
Menelik's colonial ambitions aside, its hist
Red Sea and the Nile. After I960, howeve
westwards beyond the Sudan and south
Following the independence of most Afr
recognised that Ethiopia's interests and prob
from theirs, and that it must, for its own g
African affairs. Hence the adoption of a s
Ethiopia by harnessing and channelling t
African nationalism, which had already m
debut in regional and international affair
unknown concern for, and active partici
African developments, most notably th
harmonising role played by Haile Selass
Organisation of African Unity in I963.
It can be argued that this policy was
Ethiopia could get from Africa, and not o
For example, on a number of crucial issue
Haile Selassie opportunistically sided with
including the French over their continued r
Djibouti,2 and the British after Rhodesia
independence.3 The present Government h
benefited from the bilateral and multilatera
but with a marked difference in both commitment and rhetoric.

Erlich, op. cit. ch. 7, especially pp. 79-8I.

2 Only after the fall of the Emperor in 1976 did Ethiopia unequivocally support Djibouti's
independence, albeit much to its regret in I983.
3 Although a co-sponsor of the decision of the extraordinary session of the Organisation of
African Unity's Council of Ministers that member-states should sever diplomatic ties with Britain,
Ethiopia reversed its position shortly thereafter and helped effectively to scuttle any possibility of
unanimity on effective sanctions against Rhodesia. This was to deal a serious blow to the image
of the O.A.U., whose resolutions were seldom to be taken seriously thereafter.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
486 AMARE TEKLE

2. The Bilateral Relations

The corner-stone of Ethiopia's current foreign policy is its continuing

friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Apart
from the Dergue's near total dependence on the leaders in Moscow and
their Warsaw Pact allies for military and logistical support during the
war with Somalia and in the Eritrean conflict, several other factors
have facilitated the consolidation of this new special relationship. This
included gratitude for the immediate and unhesitant recognition of
Mengistu's Government by the U.S.S.R. and the other members of the
Soviet bloc. In addition, they responded quickly and generously when
the military regime needed 'revolutionary' assistance and guidance in
order to respond to the multitude of problems that it had inherited, as
well as those caused by the creation of a new socio-economic and
political order, albeit mistrustful of the old bureaucracy and yet
themselves possessing little political experience and administrative skill.
The Dergue ended up by signing numerous economic, social, political,
trade, cultural, educational, consular, and administrative agreements
and protocols with almost all socialist countries, including the People's
Democratic Republic of Mongolia. The growing intimacy between the
Marxist leaders of Ethiopia and those elsewhere in the communist
world was further heightened, but not caused, by the West's hostile
reactions to the Dergue.
The Soviet Union and its allies were thus able to exert immense
influence in both the domestic and foreign affairs of Ethiopia. Exper
from the German Democratic Republic assisted the military regime i
its struggle against various opponents, including the Ethiopian People
Revolutionary Party (E.P.R.P.), and in training cadres for th
completely reorganised security services, later consolidated into a fu
fledged ministry with the second biggest budget in the country. The
Dergue has sent hundreds of Ethiopians for training to the Soviet Uni
Eastern Europe, and Cuba, and meanwhile continues to employ ma
of their administrators and technicians.
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has sometimes adopted
rather rough and intimidating tactics in order to get the Government
to follow Moscow's line, even where no apparent interests are involved,
as in Micronesia, or when Ethiopia's cause might be injured, as with
Cuba's position on Puerto Rico. While the Treaty of Friendship and
Co-operation between the two countries stresses the role of 'con-
sultation' on matters of mutual concern,1 it is widely accepted tha

1 Keesings Contemporary Archives (Harlow, Essex), 2 February I979.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 487
secret documents contain provisions that o
pro-U.S.S.R. foreign policy in exchange for eff
the present leadership. Under the circum
customary for officials from the Foreign Min
Addis Ababa routinely to apprise their count
be adopted by Ethiopia as regards specific
forthcoming international and regional confer
which the U.S.S.R. has no representation. In fa
managed during 1976-7 to rebuff Soviet attem
advisory group in its Ministry of Foreign Aff
Since the most important spheres affected by
are mutual security and defence, the Treaty of
eration provides the legal framework, and
for effective measures to be taken when they m
Soviet leaders and the news media have rep
strategic importance of Ethiopia, and the U
exclusive use of the Dahalak archipelago in
part of its Indian Ocean aircraft in bases in
Eritrea.2

Ethiopia illustrates the dilemma faced by an

dependent on foreign military and technical as
Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation has b
concerned nationals and foreigners, includi
mind that Ethiopia has in the past consisten
policy goal, rather than avoiding entanglin
argued that the Marxist leaders are continu
and have not lost sight of national interests, in
commitment to the special relationship wit
attitude towards, the Soviet Union. Yet, the im
are difficult to reconcile with the real interest
principles of the international and regional
ments to which it belongs. In fact, the presen
object lesson in how a bilateral agreement can
those geo-strategic factors, historical consider
principles that are ordinarily so essential in
and conduct of any state.

1 The Ethiopian Defence Minister was reportedly denied ent

1981.
2 The Ethiopian Government claimed that most of the aircraft destroyed by an E.P.L.F.
commando raid on Asmara airport in I984 belonged to the Soviet Indian Ocean naval group.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
488 AMARE TEKLE

Can Marxist Ethiopia be written off as a Soviet satellite? Although

its diplomatic relationship with the socialist bloc has broadened and
deepened - four new embassies have been opened in Eastern Europe
since the revolution - it conducts active diplomatic intercourse with
western as well as other non-socialist countries, either through its own
embassies abroad or through the numerous diplomatic missions resident
in, or accredited to, Ethiopia. It has also opened an important new
embassy in Brussels accredited to both the E.E.C. and the Benelux
countries. However, content analysis of policy reveals a different
picture. First, it must be mentioned that Ethiopia continually consults
the Soviet Union on all major policy decisions, and those that do not
meet Moscow's approval have either been cancelled or shelved - for
example, the posting of an ambassador to the United States in I983.1
Secondly, Ethiopia obsequiously follows the line taken by the Soviets in
international conferences, and has strongly spoken for their interests
where they were not represented. Thirdly, the Workers Party of
Ethiopia (W.P.E.) and the state bureaucracy sometimes show more
than necessary eagerness to praise the policies and actions of Moscow,
even before the latter has solicited for support officially - for example,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
It has been suggested that Ethiopia's continued trade relations with
the capitalist countries illustrates the pragmatism of its policies, and the
specific nature of its socialist development. This, however, is more an
indication of the Soviet Union's willingness to allow Ethiopia to earn
the foreign currency with which it prefers to be paid for its arms and
other goods, rather than of the Government's independence of action.
The value of this arrangement is further enhanced by Moscow's ability
to determine the rouble's rate of exchange with western currencies.
Is Marxist Ethiopia a proxy of the Soviet Union? Obviously Moscow
uses all its African allies, as far as it can, to promote the interests of the
Soviet Union, not least in the O.A.U.2 Until the fairly recent
implementation of glasnost and perestroika, many African leaders feared
that the Soviet Union was all too ready to intervene militarily in the
continent by stressing the alleged imperative of proletarian inter-
nationalism, as well as by specific provisions in agreements with its

1 General Taye Tilahun, who became ambassador to Sweden, was originally slated for
Washington, D.C., until the Dergue abruptly changed its mind because of Soviet pressure. Since
1975, Ethiopia has been represented only by a charge d'affaires, and its latest attempt to appoint
an ambassador was rebuffed by the Bush Administration in I989.
2 The Soviet Union has used Ethiopia's 'good offices' to promote its African policy on several
occasions - for example, in its relations with Robert Mugabe (who had not previously been
backed by Moscow) just before and after Zimbabwe's independence.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 489
Marxist allies. During the Brezhnev era, there w
Ethiopia would be used as a staging point in muc
Yemen or Angola served in the case of the Soma
the Eritrean conflict in 1977-8. These fears s
conviction that the unstable conditions in a number of African states
would, sooner or later, provoke conflict with their neighbours and
involve Soviet-backed Ethiopian troops.
In this respect, even more attention must be paid to the central role
played by Ethiopia in the informal network of Africa's Marxist regimes
created during the late I97os and early I98oS. This has enabled the
Government to forge an undertaking with Angola and Mozambique to
harmonise their positions in almost all international and regional
conferences. Even more ominously, though impracticably, they have
made agreements to extend all-round assistance to each other,1 and to
Marxist groups and progressive movements struggling to achieve
power in independent African states. Co-operation in this respect has
taken place on a government-to-government and party-to-party basis,
as well as with both legal and illegal opposition parties. This has not
augured well for Ethiopia's relations with a number of other African
states, especially its neighbours. There was a nagging suspicion in the
minds of several Kenyan politicians and officials that the abortive coup
in 1983 against President Daniel arap Moi may have been inspired,
and even supported, by Ethiopia.
On the other hand, it must be noted that this network has also
become a medium of consultation in order to harmonise negotiating
positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the other members of
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) regarding
economic and technical help for their African allies.

THE INTERNAL SETTING

The internal setting of a nation's foreign

analysed by looking at (i) economic condit
bilities, and (iii) political development and/
psychological components, consisting of (iv
the ideology, and (vi) the personality and im
I. Economic Conditions

Ethiopia has been, and remains today, one of the world's poorest and
economically most backward countries. Several factors account for this,

1 Colin Legum, 'Moscow's Closest Ally in Africa', in Third World Reports, 25 November I983,
p. 2.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 AMARE TEKLE
490

notably an imbalanced economy and an inadeq

environment. Although the agricultural sector
per cent of the population, by the time of the re
contributing only about two-thirds of the gross n
country.
The Dergue moved quickly to nationalise the means of production
and distribution, to promulgate far-reaching land-reforms, and to
formulate a series of short- and long-term economic plans. It was hoped
that an initial concentration on industrialisation would, inter alia,
stimulate farming and employment. But the announced programmes
could not be realised because the country was besieged by a host of
political, economic, administrative, and natural problems, including
foreign and civil wars and drought. Agricultural production fell, and
many rural areas were ravaged by one of the worst famines in modern
history, while industrial output not only slowed down, but in some
cases even declined. Although plagued by the leadership of incompetent
cadres unable to give proper guidance, by faulty and ill-maintained
machinery and equipment, and by inadequate materials and wastages,
the Dergue preferred to blame bureaucratic apathy and lethargy for the
bad performance of state enterprises and industries.
It must be recognised that Ethiopia does not possess enough internal
resources to overcome all its economic difficulties, and to finance the
construction of the infrastructure needed to assure industrialisation.
But although the ten-year perspective plan relies heavily on foreign
aid,1 the assistance received from the country's major allies has proved
to be woefully inadequate and disappointing. In all fairness, it must be
mentioned that this has more to do with their incapacity than their lack
of goodwill, since Ethiopia is the fifth largest recipient of Soviet and
East European economic and technical assistance. Aid from the West
has been reduced to trickles, mainly because of the Government's
strong political alignments, bad human-rights records, and unac-
ceptable economic programmes, although the E.E.C. continues to
provide aid.
The investment picture looks bleaker by the day, in spite of measures
taken by Ethiopia to attract foreign capital, and the presence of a
docile, if lethargic and disenchanted, labour force, intimidated to
accommodate the worst excesses and dictates of the regime. Since 1983,
there have been subtle but intermittent attempts by the authorities to

1 Colin Legum, 'Ethiopia. The Politics of Food: what hopes for recovery after the famine?', in
ibid. 7 February I985, p. 2.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 491

improve relations with the West in general

particular.1 Most recently, the new polici
Union have had an impact on Ethiopia's lead
must be seen in the light of changes in Mo
Ababa.

Ethiopia's noticeable increase in trade with countries in the socialist

bloc that practise barter means that it is now facing more serio
balance-of-trade and debt-servicing problems than it would have don
if this strategy had not been adopted at the expense of trade relation
with the capitalist countries of the West.2

2. Military Capabilities

Beset by so many internal stresses and strains, as well as by variou

external conflicts, the acquisition of arms has historically been one o
the most important foreign-policy goals of the rulers of Ethiopia,3 a
so remains today. Indeed, despite generous help from the Soviet Unio
the Government appears to be willing almost indefinitely to alloca
either directly or indirectly, more than 60 per cent of the countr
annual budget on the armed forces, now the largest in black Afri
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studie
Ethiopia's military establishment by 1986 included 243,000 men a
women on active combat duty in all the services, about I ,ooo tanks a
250 armoured vehicles, over 700 pieces of artillery, 45 surface-t
surface and 28 surface-to-air missile battalions, 175 combat aircr
(including 30 helicopters), and 36 naval vessels. Statistics for
neighbouring states indicate Ethiopian superiority in quality as well a
in quantity in all areas.4 In addition, a factory to make machine-g
and light-arms has been built with assistance from North Korea,5 an
Czechoslovakia has helped to expand and modernise the production
munitions in Addis Ababa.
As long as there is no durable peace in the Horn of Africa and
within Ethiopia, the latter's heavy dependence on military purchase

1 Legum, 'Moscow's Closest Ally in Africa', p. I, and The New York Times, 27 March I988
2 'Ethiopia: external debt', in Indian Ocean Newsletter, 24, 30 August I986, p. 8.
3 Richard Pankhurst, 'The History of Fire Arms in Ethiopia Prior to the Nineteenth Century
in Ethiopia Observer (Addis Ababa), xi, 3, 1967, Pp. 202 and 208. Also Saadia Touval, Soma
Nationalism: international politics and the drivefor unity in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge, Mass., 1963),
p. 48.
4 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, i986-87 (London, 1987):
Djibouti, p. 122; Ethiopia, p. 123; Kenya, p. I26; and Somalia, p. I34. No figures were given for
the Sudan.

5 Agreement was reached during Mengistu's visit to Pyongyang in I984.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 AMARE TEKLE
492

and aid from the Soviet Union is likely to continue: of the total
imported armaments valued at more than $4,ooo million by 1985, only
two per cent came from other sources.1 However, it is not possible to
predict the direction of the country's foreign policy after - or even
before - i991, since Moscow has reportedly given notice that it is not
willing to provide military supplies at the present rate when the existing
agreement expires.
Armaments alone do not produce results. Sections of the Ethiopian
army are poorly trained, have little attachment to the Government,
and suffer from bad morale. In spite of so much external assistance, the
armed forces have had to resort to forced conscription because of their
heavy losses, not only against the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(E.P.L.F.), which once again controls almost all of the rural areas, but
also in Tigray, Begmeder, Wollo, Ogaden, Bale, Arsi, and Wollega.2
The Government's only real victory has been against the miniscule and
little-known Sidamo Liberation Front in I983.

3. International Political Development and Instability

The political evolution of Ethiopia has been handicapped since the

revolution by the disunity of its peoples and, consequently, by
widespread instability. To conceive of present-day Ethiopia as a
cohesive entity is to ignore concrete realities, and to be unaware that all
attempts to forge such a society have foundered on the monumental
blunders of successive regimes, because they have tried to impose a
single set of values on a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, polyglot
population. It is simply not possible to insist that there exists an
'Ethiopian culture' and a common 'Ethiopian heritage' which reflects
both the past achievements and future aspirations of an 'Ethiopian'
people.3 Today, Amharas, Eritreans, Oromos, Tigreans, Somalis,
Afars, Sidamas, etcetera, co-habit an empire created and preserved by
violence, seething with hatred and tormented by conflict.
Any state must embody a consensus of beliefs, values, and aspirations,
and needs to instill in its inhabitants a basic trust in its institutions,
laws, administrative processes, and leaders if it is to ensure its survival

1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook, i985 (Stockholm, i986), pp. 134,
355, and 396.
2 Colin Legum, 'The Soviet Union's Afghanistan in Africa', in Third World Reports, 15 June
I984.
3 P. T. W. Baxter and Hector Blackhurst, 'Some Problems Arising from Levine's Inclusion of
the Oromo in his Delineation of Ethiopia as a Cultural Area', in Vercingetorix in Ethiopian (Paris),
9, I978, p. I59.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 493

by securing their allegiance. Otherwise, that

civil strife or disappear in disorder. Modern
attempt to devise a political framework tha
national consciousness and a feeling of basic
ethnic and religious groups. On its assumptio
soon realised that its initial promise to move in
fulfilled only by the establishment of a moder
recognises the equality of all its people, and
popular feelings, and aspirations, including a
question based solely on the wishes of the peo
of the matter is that the present regime
dictatorship, and because of its ethnic composit
of its historical heritage, it is unable and unwil
policy.
Even after the adoption of a new, purportedly egalitarian con-
stitution, the peoples of the 'Provinces', who together form a majority
of the population, find that they have a proportionately smaller stake
in the administration of the state, as well as fewer economic, social, and
cultural benefits. The few concessions that were made in their favour
have become meaningless as the central authorities issued an endless
series of regulations, directives, and decrees amending the original
documents. When viewed in absolute terms, the plight of the majority
of the inhabitants remains as bad as it had been previously; indeed, it
has been claimed that the present Ethiopian state continues to be ruled
by an 'Amharic, imperialist regime that may not be different in the
eyes of its disaffected minorities or its rural poor from the imperial
government of Haile Selassie'.2
There is no doubt that serious internal political contradictions
continue to characterise Ethiopia, and that they are a cause of concern
for the Marxist leaders, both in terms of the continued unity of the state
and their own stay in power. Significant numbers of people in southern,
western, eastern, and south-eastern Ethiopia are smouldering with
resentment about what is perceived to be their continued Amhara
domination.3

1 Africa Confidential (London), 19 September i984.

2 Dennis Austin, 'Things Fall Apart?', in Orbis (Philadelphia), 25, 4, 1981, p. 922.
3 See, for example, 'Ethiopia's Hidden War: the Oromo liberation struggle', in Horn of Africa
(Summit, NJ.), 5, I, 1982, p. 63.

18 MOA 27

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
494 AMARE TEKLE

4. Historical Legacy

Obviously, a state created by the conquest and subjugation of

smaller and weaker kingdoms and principalities,1 and governed by
endless pacification campaigns and expeditions to collect tribute, must
be wary about the continuing loyalty of at least some components of its
heterogeneous population, and militarily prepared to deal with them.
But another historical worry has also dominated the perception and
attitudes of all Ethiopian regimes: suspicion of their neighbours, rooted
in the memory of past confrontations. The Christian ruling classes of
Ethiopia have long been convinced that 'Arabs' and 'Muslims' can
never be reconciled with their nation's interests, nor perhaps even with
its continued existence.2 They therefore view the policies of several
Arab and Muslim states with grave misgivings and suspicion, always
searching for hidden, sinister motives even in inocuous actions and
pronouncements. This obsession haunts the Government and causes it
to make needless, unwarranted, and unsubstantiated accusations
against 'reactionary Arab states'.
These historical predispositions have forced the present rulers, as
their predecessors, to conceive a four-tracked foreign-policy strategy:
(i) to wedge divisions between Arab states, (ii) to pit Africans against
Arabs, (iii) to make arrangements with those in a position to influence
Arabs, and (iv) to search for a powerful patron. To these ends, the
Government has fostered dissension in, for example, the Sudan and the
Yemen Arab Republic; entered into friendly relations with South
Yemen, and even Libya, whose position on Eritrea is, at best,
ambivalent; attempted to forge a consensus against Arab states in the
O.A.U.; actively cultivated the friendship of the most influential
members of the Non-Aligned Movement, notably India and Yugo-
slavia, as well as such western countries as Italy and West Germany;
and, of course, has become the most faithful ally of the Soviet Union in
Africa. President Mengistu's official visit to Syria in I986 was part of
Ethiopia's continuing diplomatic efforts to gain more friends in the
Middle East.

The above historical legacy has turned the Horn of Africa an

Ethiopia into both symbols and battlegrounds, because it has gi
birth to a conflict between a state which refuses to entertain any dou

1 Edward W. Poison Newman, Ethiopian Realities (London, I936), pp. 46-7.

2 Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: the widening storm (New York, 1979 edn.),
I4-I5, refers to the issue as the 'rooted perception of an irremedial enemy'.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 495

about its legitimacy as a nation, and its interna

it as a moribund anachronism.

5. Ideology

Marxism-Leninism was initially adopted as an ideology mainly to

accommodate, and perhaps co-opt, the various left-wing parties and
other organisations which had sprouted, seemingly overnight, at the
beginning of the popular uprising against the ancien regime. But the
Dergue also needed an attractive political slogan, as well as a clear set
of guiding principles that would enable its decision-makers, inter alia, to
evaluate, correlate, and react correctly to international phenomena at
all levels of the political environment.
At first, the military rulers simply divided the world into two hostile
camps - the socialists and the imperialists. This simplistic perspective
provided simple, uncomplicated, and ready answers to their questions.
The Soviet Union, by virtue of its ideology, would not only be a
logical friend and ally, but would also be able to supply military,
economic, and political assistance upon request; and the United States
could serve as a focus for hate, to be conveniently blamed for past,
present, and future calamities and sinister conspiracies.
Ideology led Marxist Ethiopia to espouse 'proletarian international-
ism', to project a 'progressive' image, and to forge close ties with all
regimes, parties, and movements that were linked in any way to the
Soviet Union. All public and official Ethiopian documents underlined
the need to strengthen the bonds of unity and friendship among
socialist and 'progressive' countries. Hence the positions taken by the
Government on, for example, Afghanistan and Nicaragua, the Los
Angeles and Seoul Olympics, and its recognition of the African
National Congress (A.N.C.) as the sole legitimate representative of the
people of South Africa, contrary to the decisions and stance of the
O.A.U.1
This ideological element in foreign policy more often than not
contradicted national interests, and had negative effects and disap-
pointing results, especially in much of Africa, where Ethiopia came to
be viewed as a Soviet surrogate ready to export Marxist revolutions at
Moscow's command. Despite the fact that the Government has
contributed heavily to the liberation movements in Namibia and South
Africa, their leaders are rather cautious about the risk of giving an

1 Colin Legum, in Third World Reports, I November 1983, p. 2.

18-2

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
496 AMARE TEKLE
excuse for greater western intervention
by the luke-warm and even negative re
'progressive' Arab states, except for So
consistent moral support of Arab and Pa
for example, have expressed their readines
unity of an Ethiopia that does not include
Mengistu's visit to Damascus eliminated
Libyans are equivocal about the appropri
by openly supporting Mogadishu aga
Movement, Gadhafi has destroyed an im
tripartite agreement between Ethiop
Democratic Republic of Yemen, the onl
Ethio-Arab co-operation, other than Et
Yemen.

6. The Leadership and Its Images

Theoretically, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (W.P.E.) is now the

repository of power in the Marxist state, and its supreme organ, the
Politburo, is supposed to formulate and transmit policy hierarchically,
on the basis of democratic centralism, to the party and state
bureaucracy. However, since the Politburo is composed of men selected
for their unswerving loyalty to Mengistu Haile Mariam - who is not
only the Secretary-General of the W.P.E. but also the President of the
People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces - all party and state officials serve at his will and
execute his commands.
In Ethiopia, Marxism-Leninism has been virtually feudalised, and a
new oligarchy has been created that behaves much like the one that
had kept the Emperor in power for so long. Personal loyalty to the
leader rather than belief in, and commitment to, an ideological system
and its principles is the cardinal - some say the sole - criterion for
upward mobility and the key to success. Absolute rule proscribes
disagreement, and Mengistu dominates political life in Ethiopia in a
way that not even Haile Selassie could ever have imagined. He takes a
particularly close interest in, and exerts great control over, the regime's
foreign policy, almost every detail of which has been dictated or
approved by him. Indeed, to a great extent, the outcome is a reflection
of the President's idiosyncracies and amour propre.
Mengistu's success in imposing himself on the fledgling committee or
Dergue that gradually evolved into the Provisional Military Ad-

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 497

ministrative Council (P.M.A.C.), and thence i

Government of the People's Democratic Republic
and educational background and unimpressiv
made him over-confident. The successful promot
cult, coupled with the exhilirating experience of
cringing bureaucrats, has made him arrogant
of his erstwhile colleagues in the P.M.A.C. It
conviction, often expressed in exasperation,
messianic mission to chart the destiny of the na
- or burdensome duty - of deciding its fate. Thi
as a millenial leader who, much like Theodros
only against foreign and domestic enemies
shortsightedness and indifference of his hapless
regime as arbitrary as it is brutal.
As a result, major decisions in foreign policy h
sufficient thought about their implications, o
equally rash decisions soon thereafter. At least
were simply summoned by Mengistu to be g
sometimes they did not even know that other m
had been assigned foreign-policy duties, or m
committees. Although the present Foreign Minis
Politburo, having been previously head of
Directorate of both the P.M.A.C. and the Com
the Party of the Workers in Ethiopia (C.O.P.W
present head of the Foreign Relations Director
influential member of its Central Committee, th
only lieutenants who receive orders from, and im
made by, Mengistu. This monopoly of au
institutionalisation, in spite of an elaborate part
affects adversely the predictability and clarit
policy, and makes its systematic formulation
difficult.

The Foreign Ministry, previously a compar

bureaucracy, has lost influence and is in dang
irrelevant. In spite of the theoretical supremacy
state bureaucracy, an unresolved feud, po
Mengistu himself, smoulders between the lead
Relations Directorate of C.O.P.W.E. (and now

1 Mengistu Haile Mariam often attempts to compare himself wi

his other r6le-model, Menelik II.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
498 AMARE TEKLE

are supposedly in charge of the Foreign Ministry.1 To make matters

worse, other Ministries, notably State and Public Security, Defence,
and Foreign Trade, as well as the Central Planning Supreme Council,
have succeeded in bypassing the Foreign Ministry, sometimes even
conducting their own unauthorised diplomatic activity, albeit with the
knowledge and approval of Mengistu. Hence the occasional gaffes and
embarrassment as different ministry officials have adopted contra-
dictory positions and mutually excluding policies regarding the same
issues.2 Under these circumstances, diplomats from the socialist bloc,
particularly the Soviets and Cubans, have not only ignored the Foreign
Ministry, but have sometimes tried to get its decisions reversed by
encouraging interventions in their favour by important members of the
new oligarchy.
If it is justified to interpret the determination and conduct of
Ethiopian foreign policy, at least to some extent, on the basis of the
President's ideas and images, then two traits in his character are
relevant. First, Mengistu has an almost pathological hatred for Somalia
and the Eritrean liberation movements. Like many other Ethiopian
decision-makers, official propaganda notwithstanding, he finds no
distinction between the Government and the people of Somalia, and
actually believes that no Somali will waive his claim to any 'territory
where a Somali cow grazes'.3 He is equally unable to understand why
so many Eritreans have been fighting for so many years against
Ethiopia, and his animus against their liberation movements, whom he
considers to be satanic, precludes rational consideration of the problem,
let alone a peaceful solution, in spite of some public commitments.
Secondly, Mengistu aspires to carve an eminent place for himself in
African history by ensuring that Marxist Ethiopia plays a significant
r6le in the future development of the continent. He is convinced that
destiny calls him to lead a vanguard of' progressive' African forces that
will further the goals of socialism, end imperialism, neo-colonialism,

1 Foreign Minister Feleke Gedle-Giorgis had to compete with his own deputy, Dawit Wolde
Giorgis, who had equal access to Mengistu. The feuds between Feleke and Berhanu Bayih (head
of C.O.P.W.E. External Relations before i983), Goshu Wolde (Foreign Minister, 1983-6), and
Ashagre Yigletu (head of W.P.E. External Relations since I984), were open secrets in the party
and state bureaucracies. Even today, when Politburo member Berhanu Bayih is Foreign Minister,
the feud continues, albeit at a lower level of intensity.
2 The case of Pastor Gudina Tumsa became a cause celebre during I979-80, with the r6gime
presenting three versions at the same time concerning his fate. It should be noted that Ethiopia
hosts two Palestinian movements, because the Democratic Front and the P.L.O. were respectively
invited by C.O.P.W.E. and by the state bureaucracy, each obviously unaware of the other's
action.
3 Mengistu's statement at the I977 O.A.U. summit, Libreville, Gabon.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY
499

and apartheid, and promote world peace. H

Ethiopia to undertakings unwarranted by
provision of training, arms, and propagan
movements in Southern Africa.

By way of contrast, a number of professional diplomats and foreign-

service personnel, encouraged by some pragmatists in the part
hierarchy, continue to advocate a more realistic foreign policy tha
would be built on the accepted principles and conduct of international
relations, while accommodating Ethiopia's special relationship with i
new allies. They contend that a degree of doctrinal flexibility
necessary, since the country's needs cannot be met fully by the Soviet
Union and other Marxist regimes, and have therefore advocated a
expansion of relations with the West. On the other hand, there is n
doubt that the majority in the party, and their supporters in th
Foreign Ministry, still subscribe to a narrow ideological interpretation
of the dynamics of the alleged global struggle, in which the evil agent
of imperialism and capitalism are determined to destroy socialism and
the forces of progress. They believe that relationships across this
dichotomy cannot, therefore, be fruitful, and may even be harmful by
inviting destabilisation, as in Chile.1

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made to identify and exam

that have determined the foreign policy of M
relations with Somalia, conflict in Eritrea, a
Ethiopia, albeit within the framework of a speci
Soviet Union and its allies. However, it is also clear that the leader-
ship's perceptions of both the internal and external environments are
extremely important, since in the final analysis it is human beings, and
not 'situations' that make decisions and formulate policies.2 Hence the
conclusion that if the attainment of peace, security, stability, and social
progress is the acid test for the success or failure of a regime, then
Ethiopia has not benefited much from its foreign policy.
Having adopted Marxism-Leninism, the military leaders opted for
a clear identification with, and uncritical support of, the Soviet Union
and its allies, and an equally indiscriminate condemnation of the West,

1 'Another Envoy Defects', in Indian Ocean Newsletter, 247, I3 September I986, p. 3. The R.A.F.
Hercules which airlifted food during the 984-5 famine were considered as 'a cover for imperialist
penetration and attempted subversion'.
2 Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York, I964), p. I24.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
500 AMARE TEKLE

especially the United States, even when there was no obvious necessity.
Of course, underlying this seemingly rash and reckless support for
Moscow's views and actions was the unrelenting quest for an early
external commitment to safeguard the revolution and the state.
Indeed, it seems that the Dergue's strategy was vindicated by the
decision of the Soviet Union to airlift a massive supply of armaments in
I977, and the following year to cement their new relationship by means
of a treaty of friendship and co-operation. Rare is the African regime
which has shown such eagerness to enter into an unequal partnership
with the Soviet Union.
Small states are often told what to do, or even pushed around, by th
great powers, and the degree of coercion is generally related to th
extent of their dependency. On the other hand, the major task of the
foreign policy of weak regimes is to attempt to reduce such extern
pressures by minimising their dependence and by maximising the
scope of manoeuvreability in international affairs. However, although
Ethiopia depends so heavily on its Marxist allies for military suppli
and other vital resources, including oil, it must be pointed out that th
Soviet Union also needs Ethiopia, not least if it is to maintain an
credibility about the effectiveness of its ideology, as well as its ow
reputation, in the less-developed world. Needless-to-say, the presen
heavily-imbalanced relationship stems from Ethiopia's internal con
ditions and conflicts, and they show little sign of being solved unless th
Government rectifies the structural weaknesses of the economy, an
successfully implements the recently launched ten-year developme
plan with the help of a massive injection of foreign capital, techni
assistance, and aid. Since it is increasingly unlikely that this can b
provided by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the authorities
Addis Ababa may have to look again at how they propose to tack
their internal problems and conduct their economic diplomacy.
Perhaps the most perilous aspect of Ethiopia's foreign policy is i
commitment to a military solution of both domestic and regiona
problems irrespective of its fearful consequences for the welfare a
interests of all concerned. After more than 15 years of turmoil, war,
famine, and pestilence, the Ethiopian people are fervently desirous
tranquillity at home and peace with their neighbours. Unfortunately,
the most influential decision-makers continue to commit the major pa
of the meagre resources of their debt-ridden country, as well as extern
assistance, including humanitarian aid, to the enlargement an
maintenance of the regime's military juggernaut.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 50I

Take, for example, Ethiopia's conflict with

ought to be in a position to recognise the le
claims as well as their limitations, and to em
of action which would make a mutually acc
solution possible.
As regards the Eritrean conflict, the leaders
a remarkable lack of vision, not least because t
backed offensive against the Eritrean liberatio
illusions of military victory and precluded a
solution. However, the unfolding drama therea
monumental disasters of the Red Star (1982
campaigns, involving almost the entirety o
Ethiopia, as well as the heavy losses caused b
the vicinity of Af-Abet ( 987 and I988), should
clear that an obdurate adherence to a mi
unwarranted as it is unfeasible and irresponsib
remains, irrespective of some self-serving pea
all as only convenient time-buying subterfuge
political climate in Ethiopia stifles bold and
much so that any forceful advocacy of a p
Eritrean conflict has hitherto been considered
resulting in an Hobbesian-type end to the live
But what of the future? Despite hopes
constitution might, inter alia, increase and ins
in the process of making governmental decisio
end of the almost exclusive role played by one
the final document only serves to legitimise t
power and, consequently, Mengistu's strang
ment. Given the total lack of criticism and
options are impetuously adopted before dipl
been exhausted, not least because the fusion of
in both foreign and military affairs has
boundary between the realms of diplomacy
Although it can safely be predicted tha
continue to have close links with the Soviet Union and its socialist

1 Major Sissay Habte, the first head of the Political and Foreign Relations Department of th
P.M.A.C. (1976), Brigadier Getachew Nadew, Commander of the Northern Army in Eritre
(I976), and perhaps even Atnafu Abate, Deputy Chairman of the P.M.A.C. (I977), were the
more important Ethiopians among the many that met with sudden, nasty, and brutish deaths fo
expressing such opinions openly and forcefully.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 AMARE TEKLE
502

allies, there are perhaps three ways that foreign policy could be affected
without a change in ideology.
First, the regime led by Mengistu may approach the West in earnest,
with the concurrence and encouragement of the Soviet Union, in order
to explore avenues of possible co-operation to mitigate Ethiopia's
economic predicaments. Indeed, recent events indicate that the Soviet
Union has found it to be in its own interest to insist on the cultivation
of such a relationship.1 This will have a marginal effect on the basic
policies of the present rulers, or the prospect for peace and stability in
the region, if not coupled with Soviet insistence on finding solutions to
the on-going conflicts, because any additional external help would only
strengthen their power base by easing domestic pressure. In fact,
western support and aid, signifying acceptance of W.P.E. policies, may
only encourage the regime to be more repressive and stubborn.
Second, there could be a change in leadership from within the
regime itself, possibly engineered by Moscow. An attempt might be
made to solve the Eritrean conflict under the aegis of the Soviet Union,
which may want to make an honourable withdrawal before further
deterioration makes its involvement even more uncomfortable and
expensive.
Third, there might be a change of policy as the result of a ne
leadership being virtually imposed on Ethiopia by the Soviet Union, a
had been done in Afghanistan (i985) and South Yemen ( 986). Bu
while such an intervention might have been authorised by Brezhnev
will not be by Gorbachev. However, a new and more 'open' Marx
Government might be able to find solutions to the major problems of
both Ethiopia and the region as a whole, especially if backed
massive western assistance.

Of course, as has been the experience of so many other countries,

there is yet another possible scenario; namely, the forceful removal of
the current regime and its replacement by a group espousing another
ideology and a different national strategy, including foreign policy
The new leaders might well be ready not only to adopt more realisti
and imaginative measures in order to create a stable and peaceful
Ethiopia, and to make a permanently acceptable arrangement in the
Ogaden, but also to support a radical political solution to end the
Eritrean conflict.

1 The P.M.A.C. softened its position on the issue of compensation for nationalised property
(especially American) only after the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa forcefully advocated such a
policy.

This content downloaded from

196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms