SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt.

Ltd
Page 1 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

Kavita Dass v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. (Suresh Kait, J.) 747

ILR (2012) 111 DELHI 747

CRL. M.C.

KAVITA DASS ....PETITIONER

VERSUS

NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ....RESPONDENTS

(SURESH KAIT, J.)

CRL. M.C. NO. : 42822011, DATE OF DECISION: 17.04.2012
4283/2011 & CRL. M.A.
NQ. : 19670/2011, 19672/2011(STAY)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,

2005—Section 12—Indian Penal Code—1860—Section—
448—Petitioner sought quashing of FIR under Section
448 IPC registered in Police Station Defence Colony,
New Delhi, against her as well as setting aside of
order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge,
New Delhi—Petitioner urged, she got married to
Respondent no.2 in Delhi and after marriage, they
lived together in Sri Lanka and Australia as husband
and wife for 12 long years—Two sons were born from
their wedlock—Their elder son was married and settled
in London, while younger son was living in Delhi—In
the year 1992, Respondent no.2 acquired licence to
start his Company and couple came back to India and
started living in Defence Colony, New Delhi—During
this period, Respondent no.2 come in contact with
another woman and fell in love with her which spoiled
relationship between petitioner and Respondent no.2—
As a well planned act, sometimes in July, 2009
Respondent no.2 left tenanted premises and
abandoned petitioner and he in connivance with
landlord ‘got an ex-parte eviction order in petition
filed against him as well as against petitioner—
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 2 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

748 Indian Law Reports (Delhi) ILR (2012) 11l Delhi

Accordingly, petitioner was forced to leave the shared

household—Around July 2009, Respondent no.2 after
abandoning petitioner, filed divorce petition—
Petitioner was constrained to file complaint under
Section 12 of Domestic Violence Act and she also
sough various interim measures and interim relief—
Subsequently petitioner came to know that Respondent
no.2 had taken another premises, on rent in Defence
Colony—Accordingly, she entered into the said new
premises being her matrimonial home with the help of
Protection Officer who handed over keys of front
door, bedroom door and balcony door to her—
Thereafter petitioner moved another application in
court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate seeking
protection against her removal from said shared
household—An interim order was passed in favour of
petitioner which was subsequently vacated by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate holding that present
premises was not shared house hold—Aggrieved
petitioner, preferred appeal which was dismissed, thus
she preferred a CRL M.C.—According to petitioner,
she was entitled to reside in new tenanted premises
in Defence Colony being “shared household” under
Act—Held:- A shared household includes any
household owned or tenanted by either of the parties
in respect of which either the aggrieved person/wife
or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, therefore, the petitioner being legally wedded
wife has a right to live with the husband, whether he
lives in an ancestral house or own acquired house or
rented house.

On perusal of aforesaid provisions and laws laid down by

Hon’ble Supreme court, it includes any household owned or
tenanted by either of the parties in respect of which either
the aggrieved person/wife or the respondent or both jointly
or singly have any right, therefore, the petitioner being
legally wedded wife has a right to live with the husband,
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 3 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

Kavita Dass v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. (Suresh Kait, J.) 749
whether he lives in an ancestral house or own acquired
house or rented house. Therefore, if the respondent does
not aliow the aggrieved person then by taking shelter of the
court, the Magistrate may pass the order so that she may
enter in the house or she would not be thrown out from the
house of his husband without due process of law. Certainly,
not otherwise, as directed by the Ld. MM and upheld by the
appellate court. (Para 30)

Important Issue Involved: A shared household includes

any household owned or tenanted by either of the parties in
respect of which either the aggrieved person/wife or the
respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, therefore,
the petitioner being legally wedded wife has a right to live
with the husband, whether he lives in an ancestral house or
own acquired house or rented house.

ISh Kal
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PETITIONER Mr. Vikash Pahwa, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Rohan Garg, Mr. Samarjit
Pathwal and Mr. Arjun Mahajan,
Advocates.

FOR THE RESPONDENTS Ms. Rajdipa Behura, APP for the

Respondent no.1/State with SI
Rampal Singh, PS Defence Colony
Mr. K.K. Manan, Mr. Nipun
Bhardwaj, Mr. Navender and Mr. N.
Gautam, Advocates for Respondents
no.2.

CASES REFERRED TO:

1. Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel vs. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel
reported in (2008) 4 SCC 649.
2. S R Batra and Anr. vs. Smt.Taruna Batra reported in
(2007) 3 SCC 169.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 4 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

750 Indian Law Reports (Dethi) ILR (2012) 1l Delhi

3. Smt. Kanwal Sood vs. Nawal Kishore and Anr. (1983) 3
SCC 25.
RESULT: Petition allowed.
SURESH KAIT, J.

1. Vide this common judgment, I shall dispose of both the above

mentioned petitions.

2. The petitioner has sought to quash FIR No.157 dated 07.12.2011

registered under Section 448 Indian Penal Code, 1860 at PS. Defence
Colony, New Delhi against petitioner/wife and to set aside order dated
28.11.2011 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Saket District
Courts, New Delhi in Appeal CA No.35/11 in case titled ‘Kavita Dass

3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner got married to
respondent No.2 on 26.12.1975 at Delhi. After marriage, the petitioner
and respondent No.2 lived together in abroad (Sri Lanka and Australia)
as husband and wife for 12 long years. Two sons were born out of the
said wedlock in 1978 and 1981 respectively. The elder son Rajad Das is
married and settled in London while the younger son has been living in,
Delhi.

4. In 1992, the respondent No.2 acquired a license to start his own

company in the name & style of ‘Forex Company’. Accordingly, the
couple came back to India and started living in a rented accommodation
bearing address C-293, Defence Colony, New Delhi. During their stay in
India, the respondent No.2 came in contact with another woman, a
spinster and fell in love with her. This was a flash point in the relationship.
All efforts were made by the petitioner to convince the respondent No.2
to give up the illicit liaison with another woman, however, failed.

5. The situation further became worst. The respondent No.2 as a

part of a well planned act, sometime in July, 2009 left the premises C-
293, Defence Colony, New Delhi and abandoned the petitioner/wife.
Thereafter, respondent No.2 in connivance with the then landlord, got an
eviction order in a suit filed against himself as well as the petitioner/wife.
The aforesaid suit for eviction was decided ex parte in favour of the then
landlord, accordingly, petitioner was forced to leave the shared household,
i.e. C-293, Defence Colony, New Delhi on 25.08.2010.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 5 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

Kavita Dass v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. (Suresh Kait, J.) 751

6. After the eviction, the petitioner was literally came on road and
was forced to take shelter at her brother-in-law’s house at C-52, Defence
Colony, New Dethi. Petitioner stayed there from 25.08.2011 till 16.04.2011.
Around July, 2009, the respondent No.2 after abandoning the petitioner,
filed a divorce petition bearing No.1079/2009 against her which is pending
before Ld. Additional District Judge, Saket District Courts, New Delhi.
7. In addition to the divorce petition, the respondent No. 2, around
September, 2009 coerced and virtually cajoled the petitioner to sign an
out of court memorandum of understanding (MOU) by absolutely
fraudulent means of representation, wherein, the respondent No. 2 had
stated that he would pay the permanent alimony of Rs.45lacs to the
petitioner against a divorce by mutual consent.
8. Accordingly, on the basis of the aforesaid MOU, the respondent
No. 2 filed a petition for divorce and dissolution of marriage on the basis
of mutual consent, however, till date not even the first motion has taken
place as the petitioner realized that her signatures on the MOU were
obtained by fraudulent representations. As such she did not act upon the
said MOU being well within her rights to do so.
9. The petitioner was compelled and constrained to approach trial
court with complaint filed under section 12 of the Domestic Violence
Act, seeking interim measures and interim relief in accordance with
provisions of the said Act and in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the trial court vide interim order dated 10.09.2010 directed the respondent
No. 2 to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- to the petitioner as an interim
maintenance, as well as mowthly rent of Rs.25,000/- from the date of
petitioner’s eviction from the then shared household.
10. Subsequently, the petitioner in the month of April, 2011 came
to know that the respondent No. 2 had taken another premises bearing
address D-12, Defence Colony, New Delhi on rent. Accordingly, on
17.04.2011, she entered in to her new matrimonial home D-12, Defence
Colony, New Delhi with the help of Protection Officer Ms.Preeti Saxena,
who handed over to her the keys of the front door, bedroom door and
balcony door from the respondent. Since then, the petitioner has been
residing with respondent No.2 at the aforesaid rented shared
accommodation.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 6 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

752 Indian Law Reports (Delhi) ILR (2012) 11l Delhi

11. Thereafter, the petitioner on 18.04.2011, moved an application

in the court of Ld. MM, Ms. Pooja Talwar, Saket District court seeking
protection against her removal from the aforesaid shared household i.e
D-12 Defence Colony, New Delhi. An interim order dated 19.04.2011 v/
s 17 and 19 of the D.V. Act was passed by the above named Ld.
Magistrate, whereby the petitioner was granted right to live with the
respondent No.2 in above mentioned shared household. However,
subsequently, Ld. MM vide order dated 28.04.2011 vacated the earlier
order dated 19.04.2011.
12. In the order dated 28.04.2011, Ld. MM observed that the
present premises was not a shared household. The petitioner while signing
the MOU was fully aware that she had to vacate the said premises,
therefore, there was no reason for the petitioner to enter the house of
respondent No.2 forcefully, accordingly, the Ld. MM directed that the
petitioner may be removed from the premises by raking due recourse of
law.
13. Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Ld. Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was forced to give an out of
court undertaking on 05.06.2011 stating that she will vacate the premises
as directed by the Ld. Trial court. Subsequently, the petitioner, against
order dated 28.04.201 1, filed an Appeal under Section 29 of the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before Ld. Sessions Court,
Saket District Court, New Delhi. Smt.Raj Rani Mitra, Ld. ASJ, Saket
Courts, New Delhi, granted an ex-parte stay on order of Ld. MM dated
28.04.2011, which was subsequently vacated vide order dated 09.06.2011
passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge on an application of respondent
No.2, and the matter was transferred to Sh. A.K. Garg, Ld. ADJ, Saket
District Courts, New Delhi, which court was in seize of a connected
appeal in the same matter.

14. Sh. AK. Garg, Ld. ASJ, Saket Courts heard the arguments in
Appeal No.35/i1 and reserved for order on 12.10.2011. Thereafter, Ld.
ASJ adjourned the pronouncement on 13 occasions before finally
dismissing the appeal and upheld the Ld. MM’s order dated 28.04.2011,
whereby, the petitioner was directed to be removed from Respondent
No.2/husband’s rented premises on the ground that the said premises
was not a shared household and the petitioner had no right to enter the
said premises forcefully.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 7 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

Kavita Dass v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. (Suresh Kait, J.) 753

15. Ld. counsel for the petitioner further submitted that FIR No.157
dated 07.12.2011 registered at P.S. Defence colony. is legally and factually
unsustainable in law. Ld. ASJ has committed a serious error in ignoring
the fact that the house in question was a matrimonial home and shared
household. Moreover, no evidentiary value can be given to out of court,
settlement deed entered into between the parties, which MOU was signed
by the petitioner under duress.

16. Further submitted that no divorce has taken place between the
parties, therefore, the petitioner has legal right to stay with her husband,
it being her matrimonial home.
17. Further Ld. Counsel for the petitioner refers to a judgment
passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled as “S R_Batra and
Anr. Vs. Smt.Taruna Batra reported in (2007) 3 SCC 169, wherein,
it was held as under:-
“....a ‘shared household” would only mean the house belonging
to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs
to the joint family of which the husband is a member....

“.....the definition of ‘shared household” in Section 2(s) of the

Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of
clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which
is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society”.

18. Further refers to a case decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel Vs. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel reported in
(2008) 4 SCC 649, wherein, it was observed as under :-

“...The Domestic Violence Act provides for a higher right in

favour of a wife. She not only acquires a right to be maintained
but also thereunder acquires a right of residence. The right of
residence s a higher right. The said right as per the legislation
extends to joint properties in which the husband has a share...”

19. On perusal of the impugned order, 1d. Judge was of the view
that in no circumstances, D-12, Defence Colony can be said to be shared
household. In addition to that since both the parties never resided together
in the said house, therefore, that house cannét be-termed as shared
household as per provision of Section 2(f), 2(s) r.w.S. 17 of PWDV Act.
When the order was being dictated, counsel for the appellant had appeared
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 8 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

754 Indian Law Reports (Dethi) ILR (2012) 111 Delhi

and stated that though the MOU was executed between the parties but
the complainant did not wish to abide by the same for the reasons known
to the appellant. It was mentioned in the order dated 18.04.2011, that the
respondent was fully aware that she had to vacate the earlier premises,
therefore, there was no reason for her to enter the house of the respondent
forcefully, since the said house cannot be said to a ‘shared household’,
therefore, she may be removed from the premises by taking recourse to
due process of law.
20. It was further observed in the order passed by Ld. Additional
Sessions Judge, Saket courts, New Delhi, while deciding the appeals of
the appellant that the appellant’s main grievance is that the order has been
passed for registration of the FIR w/s 31 of the Act which the magistrate
is not empowered under the Act because the word ‘respondent’ is
specifically defined in the Act. Under the Act respondent means an adult
male person and it is very clear that the respondent would be a person
from the family of the husband only in the case the applicant is a wife.
21. Protection order was obtained w/s 18. It is true that D.V. Act
has been enacted to provide for more effective protection of the right of
women guaranteed under the constitution who are victim of the violence
of any kind. Section 2(a) of the Act defines the aggrieved person.
Aggrieved person means any women who is or has been in a domestic
relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected
to any act of violence by the respondent.
22. It was fyrther observed by Ld. Additional Sessions Judge that
the appellant had*ntered in the house of the respondent without having
any right, therefore, in these circumstances, order passed by Ld. MM on
10.06.2011 is deemed to be an order passed w's 448 Indian Penal Code,
1860 for the offence of house trespass. In view of that, both the appeals
of the appellant was dismissed with direction to register an FIR uw/S 448
Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the appellant.
23. Mr. K.K. Manan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No. 2 submits that respondent No. 2 and the petitioner entered
in MOU and the respondent No.2/husband agreed to pay a sum of Rs.45
lacs to the appellant with the condition that she agreed to grant divorce
by mutual consent. However, she did not come forward for the same
and the present house, which is on rent is not shared household. She had
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 9 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

Kavita Dass v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. (Suresh Kait, J.) 755

neither complied with the conditions of MOU nor had she complied with
order passed by learned trial court.
24. Further submitted that the impugned order does not suffer froi:
any illegality and therefore, the instant petitions may be dismissed with
exemplary costs.
25. Ld. Senior Counsel for petitioner on rebuttal submitted that the
courts below have wrongly passed the orders by directing SHO concerned
to lodge FIR under Section 448 Indian Penal Code, 1860. 26. Ld. Counsel
further refers to Section 441 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 according to
which the trespass should be with intention to commit an offence or to
intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or
having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains
there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person,
or with intent to commit an offence. 27. The petitioner herein did not
entered in anybody’s property, but it was the house of her husband and
entered with the help of Protection Officer under the protection of
Domestic Violence Act. Therefore, she rightly entered the house which
E
is her matrimonial house.
28. Therefore, he submitted that the case against the petitioner
cannot be lodged for the criminal trespass. In Section 442 of IPC, the
definition of house trespass is given, which reads as under:-
“Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining
in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any
building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the
custody of property, is said to commit “house-‘respass”. G
29. In the instant case, the petitioner is legally wedded wife of
respondent No. 2; there is no divorce taken place, she entered into the
house of respondent No.2 with no intention of committing offence and
the petitionc: has not committed any offence. Therefore, both the court
i.e. Trial and appellate court have gone wrong by directing her to vacate
the house which was taken on rent by her husband/respondent No.2 and
to lodge an FIR against her. ‘
30. Presently, where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband
or his relative, it is an offence committed under Section 498A of Indian
Penal Code, 1860. The Civil Law does not further address this phenomenal
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 10 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

756 Indian Law Reports (Delhi) ILR (2012) I1T Delhi

A in its entirety. Therefore, it is by virtue of Protection of women against

Domestic Violence Act. which interalia seeks to provide as under :-

(s) “ shared household” means a household where the person

aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship
B either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
“aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by
either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or
C the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, titie,
interest or equity and includes such a household which may
belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person
has any right, title or interest in ke shared household;”

31. I have noted that in the judgment delivered by Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the matter of Sm 1 Vs. Nawal Kishore and Anr.
(1983) 3 SCC 25, referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner, it has
g been observed as under :-
“10 It may be pointed out that the appellant was allowed to
occupy the premises in 1967 by Shri R.C. Sood. Under the
terms of gift-deed Shri Sood was entitled to remain in occupation
F of the premises during his iife time. He could as well grant, leave
and licence to p the appellant to occupy the premises along with
him. Now the question arises about her status after the death of
Shri R.C. Sood. At the most, it.can be said that after the death
G of Shri Scod the leave and license granted by Shri Sood came
to an end and if she stayed in the premises after the death of Shri
Sood, her possession may be that of a trespasser but every
trespass does not amount to criminal trespass within the meaning
of section 141 of the Indian- Penal Code. In order to satisfy the
H conditions of section 441 it must be established that the appellant
entered in possession over the premises with intent to commit an
offence. A bare persual of the complaint filed by Respondent
No. I makes it abundantly clear that there is absolutely no allegation
1 about the intention of the appellant to commit any offence or to
intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession, as will be
evident from three material paragraphs which are quoted below:
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 11 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

Kavita Dass v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. (Suresh Kait, J.) 757

“2. That the late Shri R.C. Sood was occupying the said
premises in accordance with clause No. I of a gift-deed
executed by him in favour of Shri Anand Mayee Sangh
and after his demise the said premises had to be delivered
to Shri Anand Mayee Sangh.
3. That after the demise of Shri R.”. Sood, the accused
was repeatedly requested to voluntarily vacate and deliver
the possession of the said premises to the Sangh but the
accused paid no heed and hence a notice dated 13.11.1973,
copy of which enclosed, was sent to the accused as
required by U.P. Amendment of Section 448 LP.C. the
said notice was served upon accused on 14.11.73 as per
postal A.D. receipt attached herewith.
4. That the accused was required to quit and vacate the
said premises by the 20th day of November, 1973 but
instead of vacating the premises the accused has been
making unusual pretext and has thus committed an offence
under section 448 LP.C.”
11 The appellant may be fondly thinking that she had a right to
occupy the premises even after the death of Shri R.C. Sood. If
a suit for eviction is filed in Civil Court she might be in a position
to vindicate her right and justify her possession. This is essentially
a civil matter which could be properly adjudicated upon by a
competent Civil Court. To initiate criminal proceedings in the
circumstances appears to be only an abuse of the process of the
Court.”
32. On perusal of aforesaid provisions and laws laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme court, it includes any household owned or tenanted by
cither of the parties in respect of which either the aggrieved person/wife
or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, therefore, the
petitioner being legally wedded wife has a right to live with the husband,
whether he lives in an ancestral house or own acquired house or rented
house. Therefore, if the respondent does not allow the aggrieved person
then by taking shelter of the court, the Magistrate may pass the order so
that she may enter in the house or she would not be thrown out from
the house of his husband without due process of law. Certainly, not
otherwise, as directed by the Ld. MM and upheld by the appellate court.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd
Page 12 Tuesday, October 22, 2024
Printed For: Mr. Ishan Sanghi
SCC Online Web Edition: https:/www.scconline.com
TruePrint™ source: ILR (Delhi), © 2024 Delhi High Court.

758 Indian Law Reports (Delhi) ILR (2012) ITI Dethi

33. In my opinion, the court cannot ask the aggrieved person to

vacate the house, even though, may be on rent. However, she carnot be
directed to vacate the same without due process of law. The second
direction of the court to register a case against the aggrieved person on
not vacating the house of her husband is not only bad in law but is ailso
against the mandate of the Act. The issue on shared household has
already been decided by the Apex Court in case of S.R. Batra (supra).

34, The impugned orders passed by the two courts below i.e the
court of Ld. MM and court of Ld. Additional Sessions Judge have
defeated the very purpose of Act, and therefore, the instant petitions are
allowed and the impugned order mentioned above are set aside.

35. Accordingly, the FIR No.157 dated 07.12.2011 registered under

Section 448 Indian Penal Code, 1860 at PS. Defence Colony, New Delhi
against petitioner/wife is quashed along with all the emanating proceedings
there from.
36. Both the petitions are allowed and disposed of on above terms.
37. The applications for stay in both the petitions are disposed of
being infructous.

38. No order as to costs.