PERSPECTIVE

Modi’s China Policy and the

Road to Confrontation
Kanti Bajpai

Abstract
The Doklam confrontation between India and China in the summer of
2017 was symbolic of the brewing tensions in their relationship. While the
confrontation was resolved peacefully, its roots go back at least to 2007. Both
the Manmohan Singh government and the Narendra Modi government
pushed back against what they perceived to be a series of moves on bilateral,
regional, and international issues that went against Indian interests. Modi’s
responses have been more aggressive than Manmohan Singh’s in two ways.
First, under Modi, India has more openly than ever before attempted
to construct a coalition of militarily powerful states in the Asia-Pacific to
increase Delhi’s bargaining power with Beijing. Second, India has sought to
change the terms of engagement on the border conflict in three respects:
a return to clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as the first
step in border negotiations; linking further normalization between the
two countries to progress towards a final border settlement; and seeking to
inject a greater sense of urgency in the search for a settlement. This article
concludes by asking why Modi responded more aggressively to China. It
presents four explanations and concludes that Modi’s election in May 2014
coincided with a growing sense of strategic exasperation in India over its
China policy, which questioned the value of the post-1988 commitment
to normalization. The paper suggests that Modi shared that sense of
exasperation, hence the rapid change in India’s stance within months of
his coming to power.

Keywords: Doklam, conflict, border, coalition, normalization, change,

Modi
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2018912245

T
he India-China confrontation at Doklam between June and August
2017 was the most serious military standoff between the two countries
after the Sumdurong Chu episode of 1986–1987. We are too close to
the events to know why China violated an agreement on road-building in
the area, causing Indian troops, in an unprecedented move, to confront
Chinese troops on Bhutanese territory. This essay argues that the events of
_________________
Kanti Bajpai is the Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies and Director, Centre on Asia and Globalisation,
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. His most recent book is
China-India Relations: Cooperation and Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2016), co-edited with Huang Jing
and Kishore Mahbubani. Email: sppkpb@nus.edu.sg.

© Pacific Affairs: Volume 91, No. 2 June 2018 245

 Pacific Affairs: Volume 91, No. 2 – June 2018

2017 must be seen against the steady deterioration of relations from 2007
and the coming to power of Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi.
In his cogent companion essay, Sumit Ganguly argues that China’s
pressures on India over the course of several years led Modi, unlike his
predecessor, Manmohan Singh, to respond aggressively. I argue that while
Chinese policies certainly challenged Delhi’s conceptions of its status and
security, India under Modi contributed to the unprecedented spoiling of
relations. Ganguly is right that it is important to pay attention to China’s
role. But it is also crucial to assess the part played by Indian policy under
Modi who, within months of coming to power, signalled two crucial changes
to a policy stance that had been set in 1988. The first was to significantly
deepen relations with the US and a trio of Asia-Pacific powers ( Japan,
Australia, and Vietnam) as part of a new “Act East” policy; and the second
was to challenge the view that a gradual normalization of relations and
dogged negotiations between the two countries would set the stage for a
final resolution of the border dispute.
The paper charts the changes under Modi and asks why he chose a more
aggressive course. It presents four explanations and concludes that Modi
came to power at a time of growing strategic exasperation with China.
Hawkish opinion in India had lost patience with the orthodoxy of China
policy going back to 1988. Modi’s views seemed to mirror their frustration,
and his China policy grew out of a sense that normalization and routine
negotiations were infructuous. The standoff in Doklam resulted from a
process of mutual irritation between India and China.

China’s Policies, India’s Responses Under Manmohan Singh, and the Modi
Transition
With Ganguly, we can agree that a series of Chinese moves challenged India
between 2007 and 2013 during Manmohan Singh’s tenure. These included:
the denial of visas to Indian military officers as well as to Indian citizens from
the contested state of Arunachal Pradesh; objections to Indian leaders visiting
Arunachal Pradesh; military incursions across the border (particularly
Demchok in 2009 and Daulat Beg Oldi in 2013); a growing Chinese military
presence in the Pakistan-occupied side of the contested state of Kashmir;
and growing Chinese military and economic ties with India’s South Asian
neighbours. China’s intent, it is generally thought and Ganguly agrees, was
to reduce India’s influence in South Asia and to signal its displeasure over
Delhi’s strategic ties with Washington.
One could add to this list. After 2003, while China accepted that Sikkim
was part of India, it failed to say so unequivocally.1 Despite signing the 2005
__________________
1
Ivan Lidarev, “The Sikkim Anniversary,” The Diplomat, 31 December 2015, https://thediplomat.
com/2015/12/the-sikkim-anniversary/.

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 Modi’s China Policy

agreement on “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement

of the India-China Boundary Question,” in 2007 Beijing questioned a key
clause in the agreement.2 More worryingly, from the early 2000s China
invested massively in Tibet’s infrastructure and military modernization.3
Internationally, it only grudgingly accepted Indian membership of the East
Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, refused to endorse India for a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council even after the US did so in 2010, and opened
discussions with Pakistan on an economic corridor linking the two countries
in 2013 (which in 2015 became the China Pakistan Economic Corridor).4
On Manmohan Singh’s responses to China, Ganguly concludes that India
remained conciliatory even as Beijing became more aggressive. That said,
as he notes, the Manmohan Singh government initiated a number of changes
to counter growing Chinese power along the border: the improvement of
border roads, the raising of two new mountain divisions, and the purchase
of 300 light tanks for mountainous terrain.
In fact, the Manmohan Singh government did more. In 2005, it authorized
the re-operationalization of a series of border airfields, the construction of
new border roads, and the stationing of heavy-lift C-130 aircraft and two
squadrons of Sukhoi 30 fighters to advanced positions in Assam.5 Beginning
in 2010, it may have taken a decision to deploy the nuclear-capable Akash
short-range missile, the Agni II missile (with a range of 2000 kilometres),
and the Agni III (with a range of 3000 to 3500 kilometres) in more forward
positions for use against China.6 Finally, on the diplomatic front, in 2008,
2010, and 2013, India stopped endorsing Tibet as a part of China in the
summit joint statements. More importantly, to balance China, it deepened
relations with the US and various Asia-Pacific powers and ASEAN. At the
apex of this diplomacy was the India-US nuclear deal of 2005, which removed
the most important strategic irritant between the two countries.
When Modi came to power, he was widely regarded as being more
“hardline” on foreign policy. During the election campaign, he had castigated
the Manmohan Singh government on Pakistan and China policy. However,

__________________
2
Ranjit Singh Kalha, India-China Boundary Issues: Quest for Settlement (New Delhi: Indian Council
of World Affairs and Pentagon Press, 2014), 225.
3
Monika Chansoria, “China’s Infrastructure Development in Tibet: Evaluating Trendlines,”
Manekshaw Paper 32 (New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), 2011), 4, on the start
of Tibet’s infrastructure modernization.
4
Arif Rafiq, “The China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Barriers and Impacts,” Peaceworks 135,
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017), 135; Amitav Acharya, “India’s ‘Look East’
Policy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, eds. David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath
Raghavan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 462, on the East Asia Summit.
5
Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Penguin/
Allen Lane, 2016), 33.
6
See “Agni Missiles Moved To China Border,” India TV, 25 August 2010, https://www.
indiatvnews.com/news/india/agni-missiles-moved-to-china-border-4367.html; and Rajat Pandit, “With
Eye on China, India Deploys Akash Missiles in Northeast,” Times of India, 22 August 2014.

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his early days in office suggested a dovish stance. Thus, Modi’s first foreign
policy action was to invite India’s South Asian neighbours to attend his
inauguration. This included Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
With China, too, he began dovishly. As chief minister of Gujarat, he had
visited China five times and hosted several Chinese business delegations—
perhaps not surprisingly, the first congratulatory phone call from a foreign
dignitary after his electoral victory was from Premier Li Keqiang. This was
followed by a visit from Foreign Minister Wang Yi, an invitation to President
Xi Jinping to a summit, and trips by the Indian vice president and chief of
Army to Beijing in June 2014. Finally, in July, Modi struck a deal on the
BRICS’ New Development Bank. He agreed that the bank should be
headquartered in Shanghai; in return, Xi accepted that the first president
of the bank would be an Indian.
In retrospect, this was a false dawn. Modi’s subsequent policies suggest
he was determined to adopt a more assertive policy towards China. The new
policy had two central components: to deepen strategic diplomatic and
military relations with a coalition of Asia-Pacific powers against China; and
to change the approach to the border conflict.

Forging a Coalition with the US and Asia-Pacific Powers

From August 2014 onwards, Modi laid the basis for India’s anti-China coalition
in the Asia-Pacific.7 While the outlines of this coalition were becoming visible
in Manmohan Singh’s time, Modi took several key decisions to bring it into
sharper relief. It bears saying the coalition is not an alliance directed at an
enemy state. Instead, it aims to increase Delhi’s bargaining power with China
in the company of militarily powerful friends: the US, Australia, Japan, and
Vietnam.
India’s relationship with the US had matured ever since Atal Behari
Vajpayee in the late 1990s described the two countries as “natural allies.” In
2005, Manmohan Singh built on the growing convergence with Washington
when he signed the nuclear deal with the Bush administration. Modi quickly
took the relationship further, making two major breaks with the past.
The first was to signal that India would work more closely with the US in
East Asia. In 2011, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had invited India
to not only “Look East” but also to “Act East,” Delhi had ignored Washington’s
call.8 In August 2014, within weeks of taking office, Foreign Minister Sushma

__________________
7
I draw in this section on my paper, “Narendra Modi’s Pakistan and China Policy: Assertive
Bilateral Diplomacy, Active Coalition Diplomacy,” International Affairs 93, no. 1 (January 2017): 69–91.
8
On Clinton’s statement and India’s caution, see S. D. Muni, “Obama’s Asia Pacific Doctrine:
India’s Options,” ISAS Insights 144, 22 November 2011, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136596/
ISAS_Insights_144_-_Obamas_Asia-Pacific_Doctrine_-_Indias_Options_29112011114318.pdf.

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Swaraj publicly called for India to Act East.9 During Modi’s first trip to the
US he gave clearer expression to Act East. In September 2014, just days after
Xi’s trip to India, Modi and President Barack Obama pledged to maintain
freedom of navigation on the high seas—the first time the two countries had
jointly mentioned the issue.10 When Obama visited India in January 2015,
the two countries also signed the “US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,” which once again endorsed freedom
of navigation and indicated India would cooperate with the US in a much
broader region.11
The second break in India’s US policy was to reach an agreement on
stronger military ties. While Indo-US defence ties had grown since the nuclear
deal, India had failed to procure any major weapon systems or secure co-
production rights. Modi inked two key deals. In 2016, the US agreed to aid
India’s aircraft carrier, submarine safety, and anti-submarine warfare
capabilities. In order to make this possible, India finally accepted the Logistics
Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which allows both
countries to access supplies, spare parts, and services from each other’s
facilities—an agreement the previous government had refused to accept for
ten years.12
Even as India drew closer to the US, Modi decided to break new ground
with Australia. Relations with Canberra, going back to the 1980s, had been
complicated by Cold War alignments, differences over nuclear proliferation,
and Australian immigration policies. While the Manmohan Singh government
had deepened ties, Delhi was reluctant to openly avow strategic cooperation.13
By contrast, Modi went to Australia in November 2014 with the express
intent of embracing Canberra in public. He became the first Indian prime
minister to visit the country in twenty-eight years and to address the Australian
parliament. In his address, he described Australia rather hyperbolically as
one of India’s “foremost strategic partners.”14 As part of the new partnership,
__________________
9
“Sushma Swaraj Tells Indian Envoys to Act East and Not Just Look East,” Economic Times, 24
August 2014, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/sushma-swaraj-tells-
indian-envoys-to-act-east-and-not-just-look-east/articleshow/40907671.cms.
10
Narendra Modi and Barack Obama, “A Renewed U.S.-India Partnership for the 21st Century,”
Washington Post, 30 September 2014.
11
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,” 25 January 2015, Washington, DC, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-
region.
12
Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, US Reach Agreement on Logistics, Boost Defense Ties,” Defense
News, 12 April 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/2016/04/12/india-
us-reach-agreement-logistics-boost-defense-ties/82936758/.
13
On Manmohan Singh’s hesitations, see Ben Doherty, “Why the Indian Prime Minister Won’t
Visit Australia,” Sydney Morning Herald, 29 August 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/
political-opinion/why-the-indian-prime-minister-wont-visit-australia-20120828-24yn8.html.
14
“Narendra Modi’s Speech to the Australian Parliament in Full,” Wall Street Journal, 18 November
2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2014/11/18/narendra-modis-speech-to-the-australian-
parliament-in-full/.

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 Pacific Affairs: Volume 91, No. 2 – June 2018

the two sides signed a framework for security cooperation that included
regular high-level dialogue, collaboration in defence R&D, joint military
exercises, and uranium sales to India.15
Modi also pushed relations with Japan. Delhi and Tokyo had been coming
together under the urging of Shinzo Abe and the Manmohan Singh
government. For instance, after the 2013 confrontation with China,
Manmohan Singh had suddenly extended his visit to Japan to underline
Delhi’s unhappiness over the incident.16 In addition, discussions had begun
on a nuclear deal and on arms purchases. Japan was also an occasional
participant in the Malabar naval exercises with India and the US—occasional
because Delhi was fearful of offending Beijing.17
Signalling a desire for even closer ties, Modi made Japan his first bilateral
visit outside South Asia. The two countries now agreed to upgrade the
relationship to a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” Japan committed
US$35 billion to infrastructure investment and entered into serious
discussions on the sale of Japanese defence equipment.18 The key moment
in the visit, though, was Modi’s public deriding of China, saying that the
world “is divided into two camps… . One camp believes in expansionist
policies, while the other believes in development.”19 The reference to
expansionism, unthinkable from Manmohan Singh, was a clear dig at Beijing
and echoed Modi’s election campaign rhetoric.20 Significantly, the remark
came just days before Xi landed in Gujarat for his first bilateral summit with
India.
Since 2014, Modi and Abe have met annually, as agreed upon during
Modi’s first visit. The most important of their subsequent summits was in
2015, when they announced an agreement on a nuclear deal that had been
in discussions going back to the India-US nuclear deal of 2005. The summit
accord included an overseas development assistance loan of 400 billion yen,
the highest ever to India, and Tokyo’s decision to build India’s first bullet
__________________
15
“Framework for Security Cooperation Between India and Australia,” official agreement between
India and Australia, on Modi’s website, 18 November 2014, http://www.narendramodi.in/framework-
for-security-cooperation-between-india-and-australia-6907.
16
Sachin Parashar, “Manmohan Singh Extends Japan Trip, Sends a Strong Message to China,”
Times of India, 5 May 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Manmohan Singh-extends-
Japan-trip-sends-a-strong-message-to-China/articleshow/19888746.cms.
17
Bharat Karnad, “Flinching on Malabar,” Security Wise, 23 May 2015, https://bharatkarnad.
com/2015/05/13/flinching-on-japan-in-malabar/ on avoiding offending Beijing.
18
“Japan Promises Narendra Modi $35 Billion Inflows, but Holds out on Nuclear Deal,” Times
of India, 2 September 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Japan-promises-Narendra-
Modi-35-billion-inflows-but-holds-out-on-nuclear-deal/articleshow/41458837.cms; Isabel Reynolds,
Iain Marlow, and Nc Bipindra, “Japan and India Discuss Defense as China Gets Bolder,” Bloomberg, 14
September 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-13/abe-modi-bromance-may-
not-overcome-hurdles-to-submarine-sale.
19
Quoted in “The China Bogey,” Indian Express, 16 January 2017, http://indianexpress.com/
article/opinion/editorials/the-china-bogey-senate-armed-forces-committee-general-james-n-mattis/.
20
“Modi Hits out at Chinese Expansionism,” Financial Times, 24 February 2014, https://www.
ft.com/content/65df3de0-9d1f-11e3-83c5-00144feab7de.

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train, between Ahmedabad and Mumbai.21 Also in 2015, Modi changed long-
standing Indian policy and invited Japan to be a permanent invitee to the
Malabar naval exercises.22
The fourth country in Modi’s anti-China coalition is Vietnam. Since the
early 1990s, Delhi had courted Southeast Asia for geopolitical and economic
reasons. India-Vietnam defence cooperation began as early as 1994 with the
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, followed by a defence protocol
in 2000 which provided for defence sales, repair of Vietnam’s Soviet
equipment, training of personnel, joint naval and coast guard exercises, and
the institution of defence dialogues. By 2007, the two countries had agreed
to be strategic partners. In 2013, during Manmohan Singh’s prime
ministership, Delhi offered Hanoi a line of credit for military equipment
worth US$100 million.23
Indian policy under Modi built on earlier areas of cooperation, but
symbolically and materially Delhi injected a greater sense of commitment.
Between August and October 2014, India and Vietnam rather unusually
organized three high-level meetings on either side of Xi’s visit to India. On
August 24, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Hanoi. This was followed
by President Pranab Mukherjee’s state visit on September 14 to 17, just before
Xi’s visit. A month after Xi’s visit, the Vietnamese prime minister came to
Delhi to meet Modi.
Delhi’s moves were not just symbolic. It renewed the US$100 million in
defence credits, first offered in 2013, and appeared inclined to approve the
sale of the Indo-Russian Brahmos missile.24 Despite Chinese objections, India
indicated it would proceed with oil and gas exploration in the South China
Sea.25 Finally, jointly with Hanoi, it called for all states to respect freedom of
the high seas.26 In 2015, it signed a Joint Vision Statement with Hanoi to

__________________
21
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global
Partnership: Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World,”
12 December 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000432.html.
22
Franz-Stefan Gady, “Confirmed: Japan Will Permanently Join US-India Naval Exercises,” The
Diplomat, 13 October 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/confirmed-japan-will-permanently-
join-us-india-naval-exercises/.
23
Sandeep Dikshit, “India Offers Vietnam Credit for Military Ware,” The Hindu, 28 July 2013,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-offers-vietnam-credit-for-military-ware/
article4960731.ece.
24
Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “To Counter China, Indian BrahMos Missiles, Patrol Boats for Vietnam?”
NDTV, 28 October 2014, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/to-counter-china-indian-brahmos-missiles-
patrol-boats-for-vietnam-685503.
25
Saibal Dasgupta, “India-Vietnam Offshore Oil-Exploration Agreement Faces China Wall,”
Times of India, 17 September 2014, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Vietnam-offshore-
oil-exploration-agreement-faces-China-wall/articleshow/42655569.cms.
26
See “Joint Communiqué between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of
India,” 15 September 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23997/; and Indrani
Bagchi, “India Ignores China’s Frown, Offers Defence Boost to Vietnam,” Times of India, 29 October
2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-ignores-Chinas-frown-offers-defence-boost-to-
Vietnam/articleshow/44965272.cms.

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further institutionalize defence ties. The following year, Modi went to

Vietnam, the first visit by an Indian prime minister in fifteen years. Delhi
continued to emphasize support for the whole range of defence cooperation
it had built over the years with Hanoi: strategic dialogue, service-to-service
cooperation, naval ship visits, training and capacity building (e.g., in
submarine operations), and defence procurement. More importantly, it
raised its line of defence credits from US$100 million to $500 million.27
Modi’s greater engagement with these four powers did not end with
stronger bilateral defence and diplomatic ties. Bilateral ties were
supplemented by coalitions of three or more players, all concerned about
Chinese power. Thus, Delhi helped forge two “trilaterals”: India-Japan-US,
and India-Japan-Australia. A trilateral between India, Japan, and Vietnam
could be next.28 So far, the India-Japan-US trilateral is the only one with a
real military component. This is the Malabar naval exercise which, as noted
earlier, was an India-US bilateral mechanism until 2015, when Modi made
Japan a permanent member. Under Modi, India has gradually moved towards
the idea of a quadrilateral with the US, Japan, and Australia. Washington
had urged Delhi to turn Malabar into not just a trilateral with Japan but also
a quadrilateral with Australian participation.29 While Modi initially demurred,
in 2015, even as Japan joined Malabar, India held its first ever bilateral naval
exercise with Australia.30 Two years later, India joined the resurrected quad
of Australia, India, Japan, and the US. The idea of a strategic quadrilateral
had come and gone in the wake of their 2004 tsunami collaboration, in part
due to Australian hesitation, but the continuing rise of China and changes
of government in the quad countries eventually brought it back to life, with
Abe’s Japan in the lead.31

Challenging Normalization and Being More Assertive

Beyond coalition building against China, Modi embarked on a course of
assertive bilateral diplomacy, at the heart of which was a challenge to the
__________________
27
Ho Binh Minh, “India Offers $500 Million Defense Credit as Vietnam Seeks Arms Boost,”
Reuters, 3 September 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-india/india-offers-500-million-
defense-credit-as-vietnam-seeks-arms-boost-idUSKCN11905U. Modi made the offer in his press
statement, not in the joint communique.
28
Bagchi, “India Ignores China’s Frown.”
29
Sanjeev Miglani, “India Won’t Include Australia in Naval Drills, Fears China Backlash,” Reuters,
30 May 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-navy-exercises/india-wont-include-australia-
in-naval-drills-fears-china-backlash-idUSKBN18Q1VD.
30
Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Japan to Join Malabar as Permanent Participant,” Defense News, 13 October
2015, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2015/10/13/japan-to-join-malabar-as-permanent-
participant/; and “India-Australia Naval Exercise ‘AUSINDEX 15’ to Begin Tomorrow,” The Times of
India, 11 September 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Australia-naval-exercise-
AUSINDEX-15-to-begin-tomorrow/articleshow/48916443.cms.
31
Cary Huang, “US, Japan, India, Australia ... Is Quad the First Step to an Asian NATO?” South
China Morning Post, 25 November 2017, http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2121474/
us-japan-india-australia-quad-first-step-asian-nato.

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existing strategy regarding the border dispute. While Delhi has not
repudiated normalization, it has made clear that routine interactions are
not enough.
After the 1962 war, India’s stand was that there could be no real
normalization until China settled the border conflict. However, in 1988,
Delhi accepted Beijing’s contention that the two countries needed to
normalize in preparation for a final settlement of the border.32 From 1988
to May 2014, Indian policy was to normalize relations based on four pillars
of interaction: border negotiations; confidence-building measures; summits
and other high-level meetings; and enhanced trade and people-to-people
(P2P) links.
Border negotiations, stalled since 1962, resumed in 1981. After the 1988
summit, the two sides raised the level of talks from routine bilateral talks to
a joint working group (JWG). That mechanism and variants continued to
operate without substantial interruption. In 1999, this led to a breakthrough,
namely, to provide each other with their perception of the alignment of the
Line of Actual Control (LAC). In 2000 and 2002, they exchanged maps of
the middle and western sector, respectively. As both sides presented
“maximalist positions” in 2002, they did not proceed any further with map
exchanges.33 The exchange of LAC maps should have set the stage for serious
negotiations on a final border settlement. In its absence, in 2003, Delhi and
Beijing agreed to seek a settlement, keeping in mind the larger political
context and longer-term interests of the two sides. This resulted in the 2005
agreement, “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement
of the India-China Boundary Question.”34
The second pillar, intended to bolster the first, was confidence building
for border stability. This started out with the 1993 and 1996 accords, followed
by a series of agreements in more recent years. The 1993 and 1996 measures
were a result of the Sumdurong confrontation, the more recent initiatives
from the increasing numbers of incursions and the standoffs of 2013 and
2014. The third pillar of India-China normalization was the institutionalization
of summits and other high-level meetings. In aggregate, the Indian prime
minister and the Chinese president, as well as other senior officials, came to
meet several times a year, bilaterally as well as multilaterally. Finally, trade
and P2P interactions grew apace on the back of the normalization decision.
Bilateral trade, a mere US$1.8 billion in 1997, rose to $72 billion dollars in
2014.35 In 2008, only 98,700 Chinese tourists visited India and 436,600 Indians
__________________
32
Kalha, India-China Boundary Issues, 206.
33
Kalha, India-China Boundary Issues, 215–220.
34
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Agreement between the Government of
the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters
and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question,” 11 April 2005,
http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6534/.
35
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, “Total Trade: Top Countries,”
Export Import Data Bank, accessed 29 September 2017, http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopnq.asp.

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visited China.36 By 2013, the respective figures were 175,000 and 676,000.37
Modi has not repudiated normalization. The confidence-building
measures (CBMs) of 1993, 1996, 2013, and 2014 remain in place, Indian and
Chinese leaders continue to meet bilaterally and multilaterally (though the
last real official summit was in 2015), and trade, tourism, and P2P continue
to flourish. However, on border negotiations, Modi has changed India’s
stance in three ways. Delhi now wants the following: first, a return to the
pre-2005 process of defining the LAC before trying to settle the border;
second, progress on the LAC/border to come before further normalization,
a reversion to the pre-1988 orthodoxy of Indian policy; and third,
acknowledgment that a final border settlement cannot be postponed
indefinitely.
India’s stiffening attitude towards the border was evident at the first summit
in September 2014. Even as Modi greeted Xi on his arrival, Indian and
Chinese troops were squaring off in Chumar. In 2013, a few hundred Indian
and Chinese troops had glowered at each other in Daulat Beg Oldi. In 2014,
Modi rapidly moved 9000 Indian troops to the conflict area, to face some
1500 Chinese troops.38 More importantly, he used the summit to publicly
complain about Chinese behaviour and to communicate India’s new stance
on the border. In his comments at the press briefing with Xi, he noted:

…a climate of mutual trust and confidence; respect for each other’s

sensitivities and concerns; and, peace and stability in our relations and along
our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations.

I raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border.
We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential
foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential
of our relationship. This is an important understanding… .While our border
related agreements and confidence building measures have worked well,
I also suggested that clarification of Line of Actual Control would greatly
contribute to our efforts to maintain peace and tranquility and requested
President Xi to resume the stalled process of clarifying the LAC. We
should also seek an early settlement of the boundary question.

I also believe that our efforts to rebuild physical connectivity in the region
would also require a peaceful, stable and cooperative environment.39 [emphasis
added]
__________________
36
Xiang Baoyun, “Sino-Indian Cultural Differences and Their Impact on Tourism,” in China
and India: History, Culture, Cooperation and Competition, eds. Paramita Mukherjee, Arnab K. Deb, and
Miao Pang (New Delhi: Sage, 2016), 30.
37
“China and India: The World’s Two Largest Countries but Only 5 Daily Flights Link 2.6 Billion
People,” CAPA Centre for Aviation, 6 November 2016, https://centreforaviation.com/insights/
analysis/china-and-india-the-worlds-two-largest-countries-but-only-5-daily-flights-link-26-billion-
people-249028.
38
Nitin Gokhale, Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More (New Delhi:
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 128.
39
“Full Text of Modi’s Speech at the Press Briefing with Xi Jinping,” The Hindu, 20 September

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While this statement may seem innocuous, for India-China watchers it

was significant. In it, Modi conveyed a desire to return to the pre-2003
position, i.e., a clarification of the LAC to stabilize the border regions. He
argued that stability at the border was needed to “realize the full potential”
of the relationship (i.e., normal economic and P2P intercourse), rather than
normal intercourse being the condition for stability. The statement also
challenged China’s long-standing assertion that the border question should
be left to future generations.
The second summit with Xi, slated for May 2015, gave Modi another
chance to toughen India’s diplomacy. In February 2015, he visited Arunachal
Pradesh, a state that China claims as “South Tibet.” Beijing protested
vigorously, and in March 2015 Chinese troops intruded into the Burtse and
Depsang areas of Ladakh.40 Undeterred, the Indian defence minister and
deputy defence minister travelled to the state with some fanfare, days before
Modi’s China summit. Following up, the Indian foreign secretary publicly
repeated that Arunachal was an inalienable part of India.41 At the summit
press conference, Modi called for Beijing to change its stance on various
bilateral issues, to take a longer view of the relationship, and, most
importantly, to clarify the LAC:

I stressed the need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the
issues that hold us back from realizing [the] full potential of our partnership. I
suggested that China should take a strategic and long term view of our
relations…

I also reiterated the importance of clarification of [the] Line of Actual Control

in this regard.42 [emphasis added]

In his speech at Tsinghua University, during the same visit, Modi

summarized his views:

In recent years, we have deepened our political engagement. We have

kept our borders peaceful…

Yet, if we have to realise the extraordinary potential of our partnership, we must

__________________
2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/Full-text-of-Modis-speech-at-the-press-briefing-with-
Xi-Jinping/article11142090.ece.
40
Sutirtho Patranobis, “China Furious at Narendra Modi’s Arunachal Pradesh Visit,” Hindustan
Times, 20 February 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/china-furious-at-narendra-modi-s-
arunachal-pradesh-visit/story-2CLDk6bXSfJQfbit9z3s4M.html. On the intrusion, see D.S. Rajan,
“Chinese Intrusions into India’s Borders Ever End?” South Asia Analysis Group, 14 April 2015, http://
www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1758.
41
Tanvi Madan, “Indian Prime Minister Modi Visits China,” Brookings, 13 May 2015, http://
www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/05/13-modi-china-visit.
42
“India’s Narendra Modi Gives Speech in China: In Full,” Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2015,
https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/05/15/indias-narendra-modi-gives-speech-in-china-in-
full/.

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also address the issues that lead to hesitation and doubts….

First, we must try to settle the boundary question quickly.

But, a shadow of uncertainty always hangs over the sensitive areas of the
border region.

It is because neither side knows where the Line of Actual Control is in these
areas.

That is why I have proposed resuming the process of clarifying it. We can do
this without prejudice to our position on the boundary question.43
[emphasis added]

Once again, Modi underlined that further normalization depended on

progress on the LAC/border negotiations, that the border should be settled
sooner rather than later, and that clarifying the LAC was the priority.
Modi followed up his revisionist stance on normalization and the border
with some contrarian diplomacy. Responding to Xi’s launch of the Belt-and-
Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Delhi refused to join, saying Beijing had not
consulted other countries.44 When Beijing held a BRI forum in Beijing in
May 2017, India was the only major power that refused to attend, arguing
the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) part of the initiative breached
Indian sovereignty in Kashmir and more generally risked leading smaller
countries into a debt trap.45 Despite China’s rejection of UN action against
Pakistan-based militants in 2010, 2014, and 2015, Delhi presented the case
of Masood Azhar in 2016. When China again vetoed it, India gave Uighur
dissident Isa Dolgun a visa for a conference in Dharamsala, the Indian home
of the Dalai Lama.46 In May 2015, Modi asked Beijing to support India’s
application for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Despite
the personal request to Xi, China said no. Shortly after, in May 2016, President
Pranab Mukherjee raised the issue in Beijing. When Beijing again said no,
__________________
43
“Read Full Text: PM Modi’s Speech at Tsinghua University, Beijing,” Times of India, 15 May
2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Read-full-text-PM-Modis-speech-at-Tsinghua-
University-Beijing/articleshow/47295807.cms.
44
Peter Cal, “Why India Distrusts China’s One Belt One Road Initiative,” The Interpreter, The
Lowy Institute, Canberra, 2 September 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-
india-distrusts-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative.
45
Srikanth Kondapalli, “Why India is Not Part of the Belt and Road Initiative Summit,” Indian
Express, 5 May 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/why-india-is-not-part-of-the-belt-and-
road-initiative-summit-4656150/.
46
Shubhajit Roy and Sagnik Chowdhury, “Red Faces in Govt, Uighur Leader Dolkun Isa’s Visa
Cancelled after Chinese Protests,” Indian Express, 26 April 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/
india/india-news-india/india-withdraws-visa-issued-to-uyghur-leader-dolkun-isa-after-chinese-
protests-2769087/. China had vetoed similar Indian moves in the UN in 2010, 2014, and 2015.

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Modi engaged Xi on the sidelines of the G20 summit in September 2016,

with little success.47 Undaunted by Chinese vetoes, Delhi continued to ask
the UN for action against terrorists and for membership in the NSG and
other arms control agreements.

Explaining Modi’s China Policy

From 2007 on, China took a series of decisions to challenge Delhi. Both
Manmohan Singh and Modi pushed back, but Modi pushed harder. On this,
Ganguly and I are in agreement. The question is: Why was Modi more
aggressive?
One possibility is that Modi and his team were more clearsighted in
assessing China’s policies and were bolder in responding. This is more or
less the position of Ganguly’s essay: Manmohan Singh’s fuzzy appeasement
was replaced by Modi’s clear-eyed resistance. A second possibility is that
China’s design took time to become apparent, and this clarity coincided with
Modi’s coming to power. It was not that Manmohan Singh lacked strategic
insight or courage; rather, there was a time-lag between Chinese actions and
Indian understanding of their import. A third possibility is that the challenge
was more serious in Modi’s time and this, naturally enough, brought forth
a more combative response. Finally, Modi and his team may have turned to
a more aggressive policy out of a sense that the earlier policy, having been
tried since 1988, was simply not working: incursions along the LAC/border
continued; the two sides had made no progress on delineating either the
LAC or settling the border since at least 2005; and normalization in respect
of trade and P2P seemed to favour China, with a huge and growing trade
deficit and a tourist gap. In addition, Beijing felt free to enlarge its influence
in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. Put differently, Modi’s policy came
from a sense of strategic exasperation. If the old policy had not worked,
perhaps standing the policy on its head, or at least threatening to do so,
would work better.
On the first two possibilities, much rests on a judgment about the quality
of advice to Manmohan Singh and Modi. Manmohan Singh’s ten years
featured China specialists at the top of his foreign policy and national security
team. In his first term, India’s foreign secretaries were Shyam Saran,
Shivshankar Menon, and Nirupama Rao, all of whom had served in Beijing

__________________
47
“PM Narendra Modi Asks China to Back India’s Bid for UNSC Seat, NSG Membership,” Times
of India, 15 May 2015, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-narendra-
modi-asks-china-to-back-indias-bid-for-unsc-seat-nsg-membership/articleshow/47301076.cms; Saibal
Dasgupta, “Pranab Mukherjee Raises Thorny Issues with Chinese Leaders,” Times of India, 26 May
2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pranab-Mukherjee-raises-thorny-issues-with-Chinese-
leaders/articleshow/52454802.cms; and Elizabeth Roche, “Need to Respect Each Other’s Aspirations,
Narendra Modi Tells Xi Jinping,” Livemint, 5 September 2016, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/
ji2OfZeBqr5vebaryr4kFN/PM-Modi-raises-Indias-concern-over-CPEC-with-Chinas-Xi-Jin.html.

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(the latter two as ambassadors) and had specialized on China in their careers.
Both Saran and Menon are Mandarin speakers and are regarded as amongst
India’s foremost China hands. In Manmohan Singh’s second term, Menon
went on to serve as national security advisor. Thus, over Manmohan Singh’s
decade in power, he had the benefit of China expertise right at the helm of
his team as no Indian prime minister has matched. Modi’s foreign secretaries
were Sujatha Singh and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, with Ajit Doval as national
security advisor. Of these three, only Jaishankar ever served in China (he was
ambassador for over four years). However, Jaishankar’s diplomatic career
was mostly spent in dealing with the US. On the other hand, Team Modi
possessed one advantage over Team Manmohan Singh: a prime minister
with a wealth of personal experience in dealing with China. As noted earlier,
Modi had been to China five times before he became prime minister and
had frequently hosted Chinese officials and businessmen in Gujarat.
On balance, then, who had the stronger China team? The quality of China
advice may have been stronger in Manmohan Singh’s time if we go by the
country expertise of the foreign secretaries and national security advisors
under the two prime ministers. One could object that China hands are liable
to “clientitis,” and so Manmohan Singh may have got a rosier picture than
was warranted. Equally, one could say that Modi’s team was relatively thin
on China expertise, and so he may have been exposed to a more hawkish
view than was justified. Given Modi’s own personal experience of dealing
with China as chief minister of Gujarat, I would argue that overall there is
not much to choose between the two teams in terms of China expertise. If
so, the argument that Modi read China better than Manmohan Singh does
not seem terribly compelling.
As for the challenges emanating from China being more serious in Modi’s
time and therefore eliciting a stronger response from Delhi, this argument
also on balance does not seem very convincing. We noted earlier China’s
moves on visa issuance, military incursions, Beijing’s growing influence in
South Asia, and its coolness to India’s multilateral ambitions during
Manmohan Singh’s era (e.g., UN Security Council membership, EAS
membership). After Modi’s arrival, it is fair to say China continued to
undermine Indian status and security in similar areas and in largely
comparable measure. Visa problems remained unresolved. Military incursions
at critical moments continued (in September 2014 and in March 2015).
Chinese influence-seeking in South Asia continued apace, with Chinese
submarines calling at Sri Lankan ports in 2014 and China’s commitment of
$46 billion to the CPEC.48 This was followed in 2016 by Beijing vetoing India’s
membership in the NSG and rejecting Delhi’s attempt to get the UN to take
__________________
48
Vijay Sakhuja, “Chinese Submarines in Sri Lanka Unnerve India: Next Stop Pakistan?” China
Brief 15, issue 11, 29 May 2015, https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-submarines-in-sri-lanka-
unnerve-india-next-stop-pakistan/.

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action against terrorists with Pakistani ties. Except for the submarine episode,
China’s actions during Modi’s time do not seem unusually provocative.
Finally, then, was Modi’s China policy borne of strategic exasperation?
The evidence strongly suggests a hardline revisionism was setting in and that
Modi’s own views supported this position. A growing perception in India was
that the post-1988 normalization policy was a dead end and that China was
taking India for a ride. Thus, in May 2013, reflecting on relations with China
in the wake of the 2013 confrontation, hawkish former Foreign Secretary
Kanwal Sibal concluded that Delhi’s accommodating “win-win” attitude had
led nowhere: “In return we have obtained virtually nothing on the boundary
and trans-border river issues, our Nuclear Suppliers Group and Security
Council membership, China’s disruptive policies in our neighbourhood, as
well as the terrorism threat we face.”49 Weeks later, in August 2013, another
senior former diplomat, G. Parthasarathy, wrote equally irritably:

Instead of directly confronting Chinese “assertiveness” on the border

issue, New Delhi has been a mere spectator. China has made inroads,
undermining Indian influence in Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal, while
building bridges to a possible Khaleda Zia dispensation in Bangladesh.
China has even undermined India’s defence ties with the US and Japan….
While Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Delhi was linked to his trip to Pakistan,
would Manmohan Singh reciprocate by visiting Vietnam, Japan and the
Philippines after his forthcoming visit to China? Should we not engage
Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and others for devising a “string of
pearls” in the South China Sea?50

In May 2014, days before Modi took office, in another article, Kanwal
Sibal captured the overall mood of hardline exasperation perfectly: “China
is thus setting the agenda for our bilateral engagement, advancing its
interests, keeping us on the defensive with calculated provocations and
evading any serious response to our concerns.”51
Modi himself came into office with a negative view of prevailing China
policy, noting “India is making a mockery of itself with its limited and timid
approach.”52 Instead, he insisted, “There should not be any compromise on
India’s interest … We [India and China] … should look at each other eye to

__________________
49
Kanwal Sibal, “India’s China Syndrome,” Indian Defence Review, 29 May 2013, http://www.
indiandefencereview.com/news/indias-china-syndrome-2/.
50
G. Parthasarathy, “Why is New Delhi Dithering?” The Hindu Business Line, 13 August 2013,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/why-is-new-delhi-
dithering/article5019410.ece.
51
Kanwal Sibal, “Our Foreign Policy Needs Adjustment,” India Today, 6 May 2014, https://www.
indiatoday.in/opinion/kanwal-sibal/story/narendra-modi-india-foreign-policy-siachen-pakistan-
china-191715-2014-05-06.
52
Quoted in Dhruva Jaishankar, “Eeny, Meeny, Miney, Modi,” Foreign Policy, 19 May 2014, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/19/eeny-meeny-miney-modi/.

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eye not lower our eyes.”53 General V. K. Singh, minister of state for external
affairs under Modi, revealed after the September 2014 standoff that the
government had entered office with a tough-minded view: “Sometimes (in
the past), I think for political reasons or other reasons, we would have said
OK [to the standoff], leave it. But that perpetuates the problem, it doesn’t
solve the problem… . You keep giving a concession, it only perpetuates the
problem. So somewhere up the hierarchy someone has to say ‘let’s hold on.’”54

Conclusion
Modi came to power at a time when Indian frustration with China was
bubbling. Rightly or wrongly, the post-1988 policy of normalization and
steady border negotiations was increasingly regarded as having run its course,
with little to show. The new prime minister and his team turned policy upside
down. India had been averse to combining with other powers against China;
a concerted effort would now be made to do exactly that. Delhi had hoped
for years that normalization would deliver a border settlement; progress
towards a settlement would now be the condition of further normalization.
Has Modi’s China policy worked? Doklam suggests the new policy has not
had great success. After the confrontation, China continues to hold to long-
held stances on bilateral issues, to expand its influence in South Asia, and
to disrupt India’s larger diplomatic efforts such as in the UN. Nor is there
any sign that Beijing has changed its mind on the nature of border
negotiations. Worse, six months after the crisis, Chinese troop numbers and
logistics in the area have increased. Modi’s China policy therefore finds itself
in a state of limbo and faced with the possibility of more Doklams around
the corner.

National University of Singapore, Singapore, January 2018

__________________
53
“I Want to Run the Government Professionally: Narendra Modi,” Narendra Modi website, 17
April 2014, http://www.narendramodi.in/i-want-to-run-the-government-professionally-narendra-
modi-3173.
54
Sanjeev Miglani, “Insight—With Canal and Hut, India Stands up to China on Disputed
Frontier,” Reuters.in, 25 September 2014, https://in.reuters.com/article/india-china-modi-chumar-
army-ladakh/insight-with-canal-and-hut-india-stands-up-to-china-on-disputed-frontier-
idINKCN0HJ2FU20140924.

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