2023 LiveLaw (SC) 225

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
B.R. GAVAI; J., VIKRAM NATH; J., SANJAY KAROL; J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1109 - 1110 OF 2010; 16 March, 2023
RAVASAHEB @ RAVASAHEBGOUDA ETC. versus STATE OF KARNATAKA
Murder Trial - Whether on the basis of testimony of a solitary witness, eight men
can be allowed to suffer incarceration for life? Held, Credible testimony of a
single eyewitness sufficient to prove case beyond reasonable doubt - Merely
because no recovery was made from anyone apart from accused Nos.2 and 4
would not mean that others were not present at the scene of the crime; simply
because a number of witnesses had turned hostile, does not on its own give a
ground to reject the evidence of PW-1; and that PW-1 being the brother of the
deceased and therefore, is an interested as well a chance witness, are untenable
submissions. (Para 21)
Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 149 - Cases involving several accused
Persons - Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is declaratory of the vicarious
liability of the members of an unlawful assembly for acts done in prosecution
of the common object of that assembly or for such offences as the members of
the unlawful assembly knew would be committed in prosecution of that object.
If an unlawful assembly is formed with the common object of committing an
offence, and if that offence is committed in prosecution of the object by any
member of the unlawful assembly, all the members of the assembly will be
vicariously liable for that offence even if one or more, but not all committed the
offence. Again, if an offence is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly
and that offence is one which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to
be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, every member
who had that knowledge will be guilty of the offence so committed. While overt
act and active participation may indicate common intention of the person
perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten
vicariously criminal liability under Section 149. When a case involves large
number of assailants it is not possible for the witness to describe the part
played therein by each of such persons. It is not necessary for the prosecution
to prove each of the members’ involvement especially regarding which or what
act. (Para 17.8) [followed Hari v. State of UP 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1131; Shambhu Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 725; Lalji v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437; Masalti v.
State of UP AIR 1965 SC 202]
Evidence of Hostile Witness - a) Corroborated part of the evidence of a hostile
witness regarding the commission of offence is admissible. Merely because
there is deviation from the statement in the FIR, the witness’s statements cannot
be termed totally unreliable; b) the evidence of a hostile witness can form the
basis of conviction. c) The general principle of appreciating the evidence of eye-
witnesses is that when a case involves a large number of offenders, prudently,
it is necessary, but not always, for the Court to seek corroboration from at least
two more witnesses as a measure of caution. Be that as it may, the principle is
quality over quantity of witnesses. (Para 17.1) [Followed Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura
(2011) 9 SCC 479]

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Evidence Law - Effect of omissions, deficiencies - Evidence examined as a
whole, must reflect/ring of truth. The court must not give undue importance to
omissions and discrepancies which do not shake the foundations of the
prosecution’s case. (Para 17.2) [Followed Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana (2013) 14
SCC 434; Bhagwan Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra (2016) 10 SCC 537; and
Karan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 6 SCC 52]
Evidence Law - Reliance on Single Witness - If a witness is absolutely reliable
then conviction based thereupon cannot be said to be infirm in any manner.
(Para 17.3) [Followed Karunakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (1976) 1 SCC 434; and Sadhuram
v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 11 SCC 231]
Evidence Law - Testimony of a close relative - A witness being a close relative
is not a ground enough to reject his testimony. Mechanical rejection of an even
“partisan” or “interested” witness may lead to failure of justice. The principle of
“falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is not one of general application. (Para 17.4)
[Followed Bhagwan Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra (2016) 10 SCC 537]
Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Last seen theory - On its own, last seen
theory is considered to be a weak basis for conviction. However, when the same
is coupled with other factors such as when the deceased was last seen with the
accused, proximity of time to the recovery of the body of deceased etc., the
accused is bound to give an explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
1872. If he does not do so, or furnishes what may be termed as wrong
explanation or if a motive is established – pleading securely to the conviction
of the accused closing out the possibility of any other hypothesis, then a
conviction can be based thereon. (Para 17.7) [Followed Satpal Singh v. State of
Haryana (2018) 6 SCC 610; and Ram Gopal v. State of M.P. (2023) SCC OnLine 158]
Criminal Trial - Delay in sending FIR - Unless serious prejudice is caused, mere
delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate would not, by itself, have a negative
effect on the case of the prosecution. One of the external checks against ante-
dating or antetiming an FIR is the time of its dispatch to the Magistrate or its
receipt by the Magistrate. A dispatch of a copy of the FIR forthwith ensures that
there is no manipulation or interpolation in the FIR. (Para 17.6) [Followed State of
Rajasthan v. Doud Khan (2016) 2 SCC 607; Mehraj v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188; and
Ombir Singh v. State of U.P. (2020) 6 SCC 378]
Criminal Trial - Delay in the FIR reaching the Magistrate - It is the settled position
of law that each and every delay caused is not fatal to a case in the absence of
demonstrated prejudice. In the present case, though, while there is reliance at
the Bar on this principle no submission has been made to show prejudice
having been caused to the accused. Statements sans adequate backing cannot
sway the Court. Even the delay in the receipt of the FIR with the concerned
Magistrate cannot be a reason to disbelieve the prosecution case. It is not a
case of non-compliance of provisions equally the delay is not inordinate so as
to cast any doubt. (Para 20) [followed Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh v. State of
Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 421]
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 136 - Power of the Supreme Court - In the
absence of very special circumstances or in the presence of gross errors of law
committed by the High Court, the Supreme Court does not interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact of the courts below. The limitations under Article 136
are self-imposed limitations where in the ordinary course appreciation of
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evidence is not to be done in the absence of manifest error or the judgment,
subject matter of the special leave, being ex facie perverse. (Para 17.10) [Followed
[Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116]; Kalamani Tex v. P.
Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283]
Criminal Trial - Power of Court of Appeal - The Court of appeal has wide powers
of appreciation of evidence in an order of acquittal as in the order of conviction,
along with the rider of presumption of innocence which continues across all
stages of a case. Such Court should give due importance to the judgment
rendered by the Trial Court. The High Court, being the First Appellate Court
must discuss/re-appreciate the evidence on record. Failure to do so is a good
ground enough to remand the matter for consideration. (Para 17.9) [Followed Atley
v. State of UP AIR 1955 SC 807; Gurudutt Pathak v. State of U.P. [(2021) 6 SCC 116]; Geeta
Devi v. State of U.P. [2022 SCC OnLine 57]
Criminal Trial - Preponderance of probabilities - To entitle a person to the benefit
of a doubt arising from a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the
accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. (Para 17.5)
[Followed Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355]
WITH Crl. A. No. 1229/2011, Crl. A. No. 1230/2011, Crl. A. No. 213/2012 & Crl. A. No. 682/2013
For Appellant(s) Ms. Abha R. Sharma, AOR Ms. N. Annapoorani, AOR Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,
AOR Mr. C M Angadi, Adv. Mr. Manish Goswami, Adv. Mr. M Venkatesulu, Adv. Ms. Manisha Chava,
Adv. Ms. Himani Pandey, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR Mr. Manendra Pal Gupta, Adv. Mr. Shubhranshu
Padhi, AOR Mr. Vishal Banshal, Adv. Ms. Rajeshawari Shankar, Adv. Mr. Niroop Sukirithy, Adv. Mr.
Mohd Ovais, Adv.
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL J.
1. The only point which arises for consideration is whether on the basis of
testimony of a solitary witness, eight men can be allowed to suffer incarceration for
life, as has been concurrently held by the courts below. In the aforesaid backdrop, we
are duty bound to examine as to whether the testimony of this sole eyewitness
Yankappa Panchagavi (PW-1) is worthy of credence; Is he trustworthy?; Has he
deposed truthfully?; Is his testimony believable and free from embellishments,
improvements or material discrepancies so as to render it shaky or doubtful?; and as
to whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt, against
all accused persons or not? All this is what we are called upon to examine.
2. It is not in dispute that one Satyappa was found to have been murdered in broad
day light in village Kaltippi, Jamakhandi Taluka. It is also not in dispute that in relation
to the said incident, the very same day, i.e., on 13.08.2004 at 04.00 p.m. a report was
lodged with Terdal Police Station, District Bagalkot, Karnataka. It is also not in dispute
that the I.O Shri Hanamappa Sangappa Keri (PW-32), who conducted the
investigation reached the spot and after making preliminary inquiries and conducting
investigation, recovered the dead body and sent it for postmortem which was
conducted by Dr. Shabbir Patel, PW-27. The post-mortem report (Ex.P-25) duly
proven by the said expert, does establish the deceased to have sustained 21 stab
injuries inflicted on different vital parts of the body. The multiple injuries serious in
nature, were caused by sharp-edged weapon(s). They being on all the vital parts of
the body, resulted into the death of the deceased. Herein only, this Court notices, that

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in relation to the said crime, the trial court convicted all the eight accused persons,
namely, Ramappa (accused No.1), Shanker (accused No.2), Krishnappa (accused
No.3), Gulappa Gavappa Karigar ( accused No.4), Beerappa (accused No.5),
Ravasaheb Laxman Patil (accused No.6), Yankappa Shivappa Naik (accused No.7)
and Parappa @ Gulappa (accused No.8), for having committed murder of the
deceased with the use of different weapons, i.e., jambia/jambe (sharp-edged
weapon), button knives. Chilli powder was also used as a weapon of assault.
3. In the considered view of the trial court, despite most of the prosecution
witnesses (32 in number) having turned hostile, the prosecution case stood
established beyond reasonable doubt, through the unrefuted testimony of PW-1 as
supported by the unrefuted part of testimony on the hostile witness, namely, Shasappa
Reddi (PW-7). Hence, the trial court convicted the accused and sentenced them to
undergo imprisonment as indicated in the tabular form hereunder :
Sr. Name Section under which sentence was awarded
No. under Indian Penal Code, 1860
1 Ramappa Shanker (A-1) 143 - 6 months simple imprisonment & fine of
2 Shanker (A-2) Rs. 500/- each
3 Krishnappa (A-3)
4 Gulappa Gavappa Karigar 147 - 6 months simple imprisonment & fine of
(A-4) Rs. 500/- each
5 Beerappa (A-5) 148 – 1 year simple imprisonment & fine of
6 Ravasaheb Laxman Patil Rs.1000/- each
(A-6) 504 – 1 year simple imprisonment & fine of
7 Yankappa Shivappa Naik Rs.1000/- each
(A-7)
302 – Life Imprisonment & fine of Rs. 1 ,000/-
8 Parappa @ Gulappa (A-8) each

The sentences, identical for all accused persons, were awarded to run concurrently.
4. The High Court, while concurring with the reasons and findings returned by the
trial court, also took note of the factum of prior animosity inter se the parties in relation
to a land/boundary dispute.
5. Before us, only three accused, namely, (i) Ravasaheb @ Ravasahebgouda (A-
6), (ii) Yankappa Shivappa Naik (A-7) and (iii) Parappa @ Gulappa (A-8), have
assailed the said judgment by way of these two appeals by special leave.
6. Briefly, we may summarise that the deceased died as a result of multiple injuries
inflicted with sharp-edged weapons. For the sake of brevity, we need not repeat, as
already noticed supra, the injuries and the incised wounds sustained by the deceased
on different parts of the body. Most of the spot witnesses or the witness to the events
prior or leading to the incident have not supported the prosecution. However, that
would not mean that the testimonies of all these witnesses would automatically stand
discarded, with the natural corollary being acquittal of the accused.
7. In the exercise of the power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this
Court, normally would not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, except in very
special circumstances or in the case of a gross error committed by the courts below.
Only where the High Court ignores or overlooks "crying circumstances" and “proven
4
facts” or “violates and misapplies well established principles of criminal jurisprudence”
or refuses to give benefit of doubt to the accused persons, etc., would this Court step
in to correct the legally erroneous decisions. We are also not to interfere only for the
reason that we may arrive at a different conclusion, unless, of course, there are
compelling circumstances to tinker with conclusions drawn and that the accused were
innocent/guilty. Undoubtedly, there are limitations in interfering with the findings of
conviction, concurrent in nature.
8. We are not dealing with a case of circumstantial evidence. Here, the evidence
is direct both in relation to the crime as also the reason thereof.
9. At this juncture, we may record the relationship between the accused and the
deceased who were far off cousins. Both the parties were holding lands adjacent to
each other. Deceased (Satyappa) is the real brother of Yanakappa Panchagavi (PW
-1). Accused Nos.4 and 5 are real brothers of accused No.1 and accused Nos.2 and
3 are sons of accused No.1. Accused Nos.6 to 8 are all relatives of accused Nos. 1 to
5. It has come forth in the testimony of the witnesses especially PW-1, which, to this
extent stands unrefuted that there was a dispute inter se the opposing parties with
respect to the use of bullock cart road. In relation to it, six months prior to the incident
a quarrel had taken place when accused No.1 had filed a complaint with respect
thereto. The dispute was resolved with the intervention of the elders of the
family/village. But nonetheless, allegedly, as per the statement of the said witness, the
dispute persisted. Shasappa Reddi (PW-7) who is also a relative of the parties, though
initially stated that there was no dispute between the deceased Satyappa and accused
but then, in the very same breath, clarifies that, 15 days prior to the incident, dispute
in relation to the land had arisen and "as per my advise accused No. 1 Ramappa has
not provided passers way to Satyappa". Even Pandappa Sidareddi (PW-8) does
depose the factum of the dispute between the parties in relation to the land. Thus, to
our mind the findings of the courts below in relation to the factum of the inter se dispute
cannot be said to be not borne from the material on record or incorrect appreciation
of evidence led by the prosecution.
10. The next question which arises for consideration is as to who committed the
crime, and in what manner. The courts below have concurrently, fully appreciating the
testimony of PW-1, found the accused to have committed the same by using different
weapons referred to supra.
11. Elaborating further, having perused the testimony of PW-1 we notice him to
have deposed that on the fateful day, i.e, 13.08.2004 both he and the deceased had
met at a place known as Terdal where the deceased handed him a sum of
Rs.50,000/which he had withdrawn from the Grameen Bank Sasalatti branch. The
deceased, after purchasing fodder started returning on his bicycle to the Kaltippi
Village (Place of his residence). This witness along with a pillion rider, Ashok
Mareguddi (PW-19), started following him. On the way, around 2.45 p.m. the witness
found all the accused (Nos.1 to 8), who had been hiding in the jali kanti trees, running
towards the deceased. Accused Nos.2 and 8 started abusing that ‘found satya
Sulemagane Ninnanu Kondu Hakut teve’ (You son of a whore, we will kill you).
Noticing them, the deceased leaving his bicycle started running away from the spot
with all the accused chasing him. Thereafter, accused No.8 Parappa @ Gulappa threw
chilli powder on the face of the deceased; accused Nos.1 and 2 gave blows with
jambia/jambe on the left side of the neck and chest of the deceased; accused Nos.3

5
to 7 gave blows with button knives on various parts of the body, which led to the death
of the deceased on the spot. Soon accused fled away towards Golabhavi village. The
witness cried for help when Shasappa Reddi (PW-7), Pandappa Sidareddi PW-8),
Shrishail (PW-11) and Ramappa (PW-12) arrived at the spot. Also, adjacent land
owners, namely, Lakawwa Siddapur (PW-9) and Sushilawwa (PW-13) arrived. He got
a complaint drafted through an Advocate, namely Hanamant Bhimappa Reddi (PW24)
and being illiterate, affixed his thumb impression, and lodged report with the police.
12. Here only, we may record that the presence of the accused on the spot is not
disputed by anyone of them. This we may say so not only from the line of their cross-
examination of the witnesses but also as we would notice hereinafter, to have come
on record through the testimonies of the witnesses, who despite not having supported
the prosecution on the issue of the accused having assaulted the deceased, have
supported on this count. Perusal of cross-examination part of the testimony of PW-1
unrefutedly reveals all the accused hiding in bushes at the spot. This witness, despite
being cross-examined extensively, is consistent in his testimony to the effect that the
accused caught hold of the deceased and inflicted serious injuries upon his person.
The accused had used chilli powder as a weapon to stop him from fleeing away and
pushed him to the ground. Though, the witness is not clear as to which one of the
accused had assaulted the deceased after he fell down, but then he is categorical with
regard to the role played by each one of them.
13. PW-7, despite being hostile, in his undisputed testimony, has recorded the
presence of accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 on the spot. Immediately after the incident they
were seen fleeing towards Golabhavi Village. Further he noticed the deceased to be
inflicted with several injuries as also chilli powder found on his body. Here only we
may record that Lakkappa Siddapur (PW-9) and Ashok Mareguddi (PW-19) though
turned hostile in Court, had in fact made statements to similar effect before the police,
with which they were confronted, which fact, in any event stands proven through other
prosecution witnesses.
14. In view of the aforesaid, the questions in respect of the testimony of the sole
eye-witness PW-1 being worthy of credence, trust-worthy, truthful and believable are
answered in the affirmative.
15. To answer the point of law as to whether the testimony of a single eye-witness
is sufficient to put all the eight persons behind bars, for life or not, we must deal with
the submissions made at the bar.
16. It is stated that it is the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses that matters
and since, PW-1 is an interested witness being the brother of the deceased, and that
his statement is not “inherently believable” or of “sterling quality” as recently held by
this Court, in the presence of two possible versions, the one that favours the accused
is required to be taken.
In support of their submissions, the learned senior counsel rely primarily on
Marudanal Augusti Vs. State of Kerala (1980) 4 SCC 425, specifically on the part
where the learned Division Bench notes that 29 hours’ delay in the FIR reaching the
Magistrate despite the same having been sent by express delivery, as a “serious
infirmity”; and the recent judgment in Chotkau Vs. State of U.P. (2022) SCC OnLine
1313. Both these cases have been cited to substantiate the submission that there is
a delay in the FIR reaching the Magistrate.

6
17. This Court has on numerous occasions considered cases similar in nature, and,
from such consideration emanated various principles in deciding the cases. Some of
the principles essential for the instant lis to be decided are –
17.1 Evidence of hostile witness:
a) Corroborated part of the evidence of a hostile witness regarding the commission of offence
is admissible. Merely because there is deviation from the statement in the FIR, the witness’s
statements cannot be termed totally unreliable;
b) The evidence of a hostile witness can form the basis of conviction.
c) The general principle of appreciating the evidence of eye-witnesses is that when a case
involves a large number of offenders, prudently, it is necessary, but not always, for the Court
to seek corroboration from at least two more witnesses as a measure of caution. Be that as
it may, the principle is quality over quantity of witnesses. [Mrinal Das Vs. State of Tripura
(2011) 9 SCC 479]
17.2 Effect of omissions, deficiencies:
Evidence examined as a whole, must reflect/ring of truth. The court must not give
undue importance to omissions and discrepancies which do not shake the foundations of the
prosecution’s case. [Rohtash Kumar Vs. State of Haryana (2013) 14 SCC 434; Bhagwan
Jagannath Markad Vs. State of Maharashtra (2016) 10 SCC 537; and Karan Singh Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 6 SCC 52]
17.3 Reliance on single witness:
If a witness is absolutely reliable then conviction based thereupon cannot be said to
be infirm in any manner. [Karunakaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1976) 1 SCC 434; and
Sadhuram Vs. State of Rajasthan (2003) 11 SCC 231]
17.4 Testimony of a close relative:
A witness being a close relative is not a ground enough to reject his testimony.
Mechanical rejection of an even “partisan” or “interested” witness may lead to failure of
justice. The principle of “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is not one of general application.
[Bhagwan Jagannath Markad Vs. State of Maharashtra (2016) 10 SCC 537]
17.5 Preponderance of probabilities:
To entitle a person to the benefit of a doubt arising from a duality of views, the possible
view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him.
[Gopal Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355]
17.6 Delay in sending FIR:
Unless serious prejudice is caused, mere delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate
would not, by itself, have a negative effect on the case of the prosecution. [[State of
Rajasthan Vs. Doud Khan (2016) 2 SCC 607]
One of the external checks against ante-dating or antetiming an FIR is the time of its
dispatch to the Magistrate or its receipt by the Magistrate. A dispatch of a copy of the FIR
forthwith ensures that there is no manipulation or interpolation in the FIR. [Mehraj Vs. State
of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188; and Ombir Singh Vs. State of U.P. (2020) 6 SCC 378]
17.7 Last seen theory :
On its own, last seen theory is considered to be a weak basis for conviction. However,
when the same is coupled with other factors such as when the deceased was last seen with
the accused, proximity of time to the recovery of the body of deceased etc. The accused is
bound to give an explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. If he does not do
so, or furnishes what may be termed as wrong explanation or if a motive is established –

7
pleading securely to the conviction of the accused closing out the possibility of any other
hypothesis, then a conviction can be based thereon. [Satpal Singh Vs. State of Haryana
(2018) 6 SCC 610; and Ram Gopal Vs. State of M.P. (2023) SCC OnLine 158]
17.8 Cases involving several accused Persons
A three judge bench of which one of us (B.R Gavai J.) was a member, observed as
under in respect of the application of Section 149, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860-
“30. Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is declaratory of the vicarious liability of the members of
an unlawful assembly for acts done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or for such
offences as the members of the unlawful assembly knew would be committed in prosecution of that
object. If an unlawful assembly is formed with the common object of committing an offence, and if that
offence is committed in prosecution of the object by any member of the unlawful assembly, all the
members of the assembly will be vicariously liable for that offence even if one or more, but not all
committed the offence. Again, if an offence is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly and
that offence is one which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of the common object, every member who had that knowledge will be guilty of the offence
so committed.” [Hari v. State of UP 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1131; Shambhu Nath Singh v. State of
Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 725]
While overt act and active participation may indicate common intention of the person
perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten vicariously
criminal liability under Section 149. [Lalji Vs. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437]
When a case involves large number of assailants it is not possible for the witness to
describe the part played therein by each of such persons. It is not necessary for the
prosecution to prove each of the members’ involvement especially regarding which or what
act. [Masalti Vs. State of UP AIR 1965 SC 202]
17.9 Power of Court of Appeal:
a) The Court of appeal has wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an order of
acquittal as in the order of conviction, along with the rider of presumption of innocence which
continues across all stages of a case. Such Court should give due importance to the judgment
rendered by the Trial Court. [Atley Vs. State of UP AIR 1955 SC 807]
b) Referring to Gurudutt Pathak Vs. State of U.P. [(2021) 6 SCC 116] the judgment in
Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. [2022 SCC OnLine 57], this Court appreciated the law on this
aspect and then observed that the High Court, being the First Appellate Court must
discuss/re-appreciate the evidence on record. Failure to do so is a good ground enough to
remand the matter for consideration.
17.10 Power of the Supreme Court under Article 136: In the absence of very special
circumstances or in the presence of gross errors of law committed by the High Court, this
Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below. [Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116]
The limitations under Article 136 are self-imposed limitations where in the ordinary
course appreciation of evidence is not to be done in the absence of manifest error or the
judgment, subject matter of the special leave, being ex facie perverse. [Kalamani Tex Vs. P.
Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283]
18. Learned counsel for the appellants would have this Court hold that the learned
Trial Court and the High Court erred in convicting the accused as PW-1’s statements,
which are indirect in respect of number of the accused in no way form a solid basis for
the conviction to hold.
19. Having considered the submissions across the Bar, the material objects and the
exhibits forming the record of the case, the learned Trial Court observed that on the

8
basis of the sole evidence of the complainant PW-1 and the supporting evidence of
PW-7 (a hostile witness) the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable
doubt. It was observed as under:
“The prosecution has proved its case against the accused persons by adducing acceptable
evidence of the complainant and other witnesses referred to above and as such the accused
persons are found guilty of the offences of unlawful assembly, commission of rioting who
were armed with deadly weapons and they have abused the deceased Satyappa in filthy
language and then they have committed murder of the deceased Satyappa on 13.08.2004 in
the afternoon at about 3.00 p.m., on a public road leading from Terdal to Kaltippi and as such
they have to be punished accordingly.”
The view stands affirmed by the High Court substantiating cogent reasons, in full
appreciation of entire evidence on record that the assistance of Hanamant Bhimappa
Reddi (PW-24) in drafting the complaint does not put a question to its credibility;
discrepancy in the time of entrustment of FIR to PW-28 as to the working hours being
8 a.m. to 8.00 p.m. does not dislodge the statement in the examination-in-chief where
the time mentioned was 4.45 p.m.
20. In regard to the delay in the FIR reaching the Magistrate, it is the settled position
of law that each and every delay caused is not fatal to a case in the absence of
demonstrated prejudice [Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh Vs. State of Haryana
(2011) 7 SCC 421]. In Chotkau (supra) it has been held that a Court is “duty bound
to see the effect of such delay on investigation and even the credit worthiness of the
investigation.” In the present case, though, while there is reliance at the Bar on this
principle no submission has been made to show prejudice having been caused to the
accused. Statements sans adequate backing cannot sway the Court. Even the delay
in the receipt of the FIR with the concerned Magistrate cannot be a reason to
disbelieve the prosecution case. It is not a case of non-compliance of provisions
equally the delay is not inordinate so as to cast any doubt. For an FIR registered on
13.08.2004 at 4.45 p.m. was immediately forwarded and received at 1.15 a.m.
21. Merely because no recovery was made from anyone apart from accused Nos.2
and 4 would not mean that others were not present at the scene of the crime; simply
because a number of witnesses had turned hostile, does not on its own give a ground
to reject the evidence of PW-1; and that PW-1 being the brother of the deceased and
therefore, is an interested as well a chance witness, are untenable submissions. It is
in the backdrop that we do not find favour with the submissions of Mr. Nagamuthu S.,
and Dr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that
the conviction of eight persons based on solitary evidence is not justified, particularly
when there is no vagueness in his testimony with respect to the role ascribed to each
one of the accused.
22. The role of PW-24 in drafting the complaint cannot be taken as negative simply
because he was an advocate and so he paid attention to detail. PW-1 has stated in
his complaint that he does not know how to read and write. The person to whom the
role of summoning PW-24 to write the complaint may be attributed or the discrepancy
in drafting either on the instructions of PW-1 or on the basis of the notes prepared by
the police is not so stark, keeping in view the limited span of time within which all these
activities took place for it to lend credence to the grounds urged in these appeals by
special leave petitions with respect to the approach of the learned Sessions Judge
being entirely erroneous or illegal. The genesis of the prosecution case cannot be said
to have been shaken or rendered doubtful. The complaint was alleged to have been
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drafted by an advocate (PW-24), and not by the petitioner with the help of the police
personnel. Does it cast doubt on the prosecution case? In our considered view, none.
For, as we have noticed the defence to have admitted their presence on the spot and
the independent witnesses ascribed a specific role to each of the accused.
That a murder has been committed, has been unequivocally and concurrently
held by both the courts below. It is then for the appellants before us to establish the
existence of special circumstances or any equally probable version of facts opposite
to the one taken by the courts, they seek to challenge.
23. The primary submission led was that reliance on a solitary witness to convict as
many as eight people (now six, with proceedings against two having abated on their
death) is excessive. On a specific query by the Court as to what the learned counsel
can point to, to impeach the veracity of PW-1’s testimony the answer was to say that
looking at a number of external factors as also the testimonies of other witnesses, the
elements to demolish the credibility are present – which to our mind does not merit
interference. For the heightened scrutiny requirement, as observed by this Court in
Jagdish Vs. State of Haryana [(2019) 7 SCC 711] to be held as unsatisfied, the
surrounding evidence would have to be called into credible question, which it was not.
The admissions made by PW-7 in his examination in chief have not been disputed
and neither has, as already observed earlier, the presence of any of the accused been
disputed. Keeping in view the principles noted in Mrinal Das (supra), Rohtash Kumar
(supra), Karan Singh (supra) and Karunakaran (supra), the testimony of PW-1 can
undoubtedly form the basis of conviction of the accused persons.
24. We have also noticed the holding in the landmark Masalti (supra), where four
learned judges have held that the prosecution need not prove specific acts to specific
persons. With neither the number nor the presence of the accused being disputed, we
cannot, within law, hold that the accused have been wrongly convicted by the courts
below.
25. PW-1 is an interested witness, being the brother of the deceased; as also he
being the solitary witness upon which reliance is placed by the learned Trial Court is
put forward as a ground before us to question the verdicts. The position of law as held
in Harbans Kaur Vs. State of Haryana [(2005) 9 SCC 195] is clear in stating that
there is no proposition of law which doubts the statement of a close relative simply for
that reason. There is a note of caution sounded in Bhaskarrao Vs. State of
Maharashtra [(2018) 6 SCC 591] which is undoubtedly on point but we may also note
the observation of this Court in Rajesh Yadav Vs. State of U.P. [2022 SCC OnLine
150] wherein it has been observed:
“30. Once again, we reiterate with a word of caution, the trial court is the best court to decide
on the aforesaid aspect as no mathematical calculation or straightjacket formula can be made
on the assessment of a witness, as the journey towards the truth can be seen better through
the eyes of the trial judge. In fact, this is the real objective behind the enactment itself which
extends the maximum discretion to the court.”
26. The courts below, as we have already observed, have found no reason to
disbelieve the testimony of PW-1. In fact, to the exact opposite it has relied on it.
Keeping in view the holdings in Bhagwan Jagannath Markad (supra), State of
Rajasthan Vs. Madan [(2019) 13 SCC 653], we cannot find ourselves in agreement
with the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard.

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27. In view of the aforesaid background, submissions advanced, law appreciated
and analysed we find the present appeals to be lacking in merit and therefore, the
same are dismissed. Accused, if on bail, are directed to immediately surrender before
the Court concerned.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

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