MANSLAUGHTER

Manslaughter may be divided into two broad categories. These are Voluntary
and Involuntary Manslaughter.

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

When the prosecution can prove that the defendant has caused a victim's
death and has the necessary mens rea for murder, conviction for murder
may be avoided by establishing that the defendant comes within the scope
of one of the partial defenses of either: Diminished Responsibility,
Provocation, Suicide Pact or Infanticide.

In each case, if the defendant succeeds with the defence, his liability is
reduced from murder to manslaughter, the sentence for which is at the
discretion of the judge. This form of manslaughter is described as
"voluntary" because there will have been evidence that the defendant
did intend to kill or cause Grievous Bodily Harm (G.B.H.) but certain
kinds of extenuating circumstances partially excuse his conduct.
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
If the defendant can prove a defence of diminished responsibility, he will be
guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. Section 5 of the Offences
Against the Person Act provides:
"Where a person kills or is party to a killing of another, he shall not be
convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of
mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as to
substantially impaire his mental responsibility for his acts and
omissions in doing or being a party to the killing."
Note carefully that a person cannot succeed in raising diminished
responsibility as a defence unless he can prove the following:
1. an abnormality of the mind
2. that such abnormality of the mind arose from any of the following:

1
 a. a condition of arrested development of the mind
b. a condition of retarded development of the mind (the person is
slow)
c. any inherent causes
d. disease
e injury

3. such abnormality of the mind must have substantially impaired the Defendant’s
mental responsibility for his acts and omissions.

ABNORMALITY OF MIND

An abnormality of mind is a state of mind which the reasonable man

would consider abnormal. It is thus defined widely.
The meaning of the phrase was considered by the Court of Appeal in the case
of R v. Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396. In this case the defendant had strangled a
young woman and then mutilated her body. He claimed he was subject to an
irresistible impulse because of violent perverted sexual desires which
overcame him and had done so since he was a boy. There was evidence that
he was a sexual psychopath and could exercise but little control over his
actions. The defence of diminished responsibility was rejected by the trial
judge, and the defendant was convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal
allowed the defendant's appeal on the basis that the trial judge had been
wrong to exclude, from the scope of the defence, situations where a
defendant was simply unable to exercise any self-control over his actions.
(This would cover the irresistible impulse situation.)
Lord Parker CJ stated:
“Abnormality of mind" … means a state of mind so different from
that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term
it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind's
activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts
and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgment whether an
act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to
control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment.”

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His Lordship pointed out that whether the defendant was suffering from any
"abnormality of mind" is a question for the jury.
On this question medical evidence is of importance but the jury is entitled to
take into consideration all the evidence including acts or statements of the
defendant and his demeanour.
They are not bound to accept the medical evidence, if there is other material
before them which, in their judgment, conflicts with it and outweighs it. The
cause of the abnormality of mind does, however, seem to be a matter to be
determined on expert evidence.
According to Clarkson and Keating, Criminal Law, diminished responsibility
has been pleaded with success in cases involving mercy killers, deserted
spouses or disappointed lovers who kill while in a state of depression,
reactive depressions, chronic anxiety states, alcoholism, women suffering
from "pre-menstrual syndrome", and "battered wife syndrome" cases (e.g., R
v. Ahluwaliah [1992] 4 All ER 889 and R v. Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER
1023.
In Ahluwaliah the D who had been subjected to 10 years of spousal violence
and degradation, threw petrol in her husband's bedroom and set it alight,
causing his death. The Court of Appeal admitted evidence that D suffered
from a post-traumatic stress disorder or 'Battered Woman Syndrome' and
quashed the murder conviction on the basis of the D's depressive condition.
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and at re-trial her plea of
manslaughter by defence of diminished responsibility was accepted.

While in Thornton, the wife gave evidence at the trial that on the night in
question she first found the deceased, her husband, still lying inert on their
couch. She went upstairs, changed into her night-clothes and came down
again to persuade the deceased to come to bed. He insulted her, calling her a
whore and accused her of selling her body. He wanted her out of the house
and threatened to kill her. She went to the kitchen to calm down. She decided
to try again to persuade him to come to bed but looked for a truncheon
retained from when he had been a policeman so as to protect herself if he
became violent. Not finding the truncheon, she picked up a large kitchen

3
knife. She returned to the deceased, who again threatened to kill her and
called her a whore. She stood beside him, lifted the knife and then brought it
down slowly. A post-mortem examination showed the single stab had entered
just below the ribs and penetrated deeply through to the back of the ribcage.
In evidence the appellant said she did not stab the deceased deliberately.

For a possible window into the mind of someone allegedly suffering

from an abnormality of the mind see below the summary of the
actions of the defendant in Thornton on the night of the killing:

Per Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ:

The appellant was from “a comfortable background, but from childhood

onwards her life was punctuated by problems and unhappy incidents. She
was asked to leave her boarding school. She twice had pregnancies which
were terminated before meeting her first husband by whom she had her one
child, Luisa. She went abroad with that husband but left him in Venezuela
because of his drinking and there was a divorce. She made a number of
attempts at suicide by cutting her wrists, by cutting her throat and by
overdose of drugs. In March 1981 she was admitted to a hospital for a period
under the Mental Health Act 1959. She had a third abortion in 1983. It was
common ground that this history was attributable to the fact that the
appellant suffered and continues to suffer from a personality disorder,
although after 1981 there appeared generally to be some improvement in
her mental state.

She met the deceased, her second husband, in May 1987. Like her, he had
been married before and he had a son, Martin, aged 18. The appellant and
the deceased began living together in the autumn of 1987 and were married
in August 1988. Even before the marriage, it was clear that the deceased had
a serious drinking problem. He underwent treatment for alcoholism but his
condition and behaviour deteriorated in 1989. As a result, the marriage was
stormy. There were angry arguments when the deceased was drunk, and he
used violence on the appellant. In her evidence she described a number of

4
assaults. It is unnecessary to specify all the incidents prior to the final
weekend, but on about 20 May the appellant left the house (which was in
their joint names) after the deceased had punched her in the face and
knocked her out. She reported that incident to the police and the deceased
was charged with assault. The case was pending at the time of his death.
After the appellant left, the deceased’s son, Martin, came to stay at the
house. On 26 May the appellant and her daughter returned.

Matters came to a head between Saturday, 10 and Tuesday, 13 June. On the

Saturday, the appellant was attending a conference in Coventry in
connection with her work. According to her, she learnt by telephone that the
deceased had either assaulted Luisa or otherwise driven her from the home,
so that she was in night-clothes at a taxi rank. Mrs Thomas, a friend and
fellow employee of the appellant, gave evidence that the appellant said after
the phone call ‘I am going to kill him’, adding that she was not prepared to
lose everything. The appellant, in evidence, denied saying these things.

On 11 June she returned home accompanied by Mrs Thomas. The deceased

had been drinking and there was an angry altercation. It continued after Mrs
Thomas left. The deceased picked up a guitar and threatened to hit the
appellant with it. She had a kitchen knife in her hand. According to Martin,
she said ‘You touch my daughter, you bastard, and I’ll kill you’, pointing the
knife at the deceased and holding it in both hands. Martin claimed he had to
take the knife from her. The appellant’s account was that she had the knife in
the normal course of preparing lunch, that she made no threat to kill the
deceased and was not disarmed by Martin. On the same day, when the
deceased was in the bath, the appellant gave him Mogadon tablets. Martin
saw her administer two, but she crushed four more and concealed them
amongst pieces of chicken she fed to the deceased. She then telephoned the
doctor saying he had taken an overdose and was suicidal, which, as she
admitted in evidence, was a deliberate lie. An ambulance and the police were
called but the deceased refused to go to hospital. After they left there was an
angry scene. The deceased threw a chair, which broke the glass in the
kitchen door. The police were called again.

5
Still later on that day, the appellant spoke to Mrs Thomas on the telephone.
According to the latter, the appellant talked of divorce, said she was not
prepared to give everything up for the deceased and that she would set
about forging some cheques. In evidence the appellant denied that account
of the conversation.

Next day, 12 June, according to the appellant, the deceased said he wanted
her and her daughter out of the house. He then went drinking. On his return,
he was sick in the kitchen, he later burnt a hole in the armchair and he spent
the night on the couch.

Tuesday, 13 June brought the fatal dénouement. The deceased was again
drunk. When he arrived home, he noticed the appellant was not wearing her
wedding ring. She said they did not have much of a marriage. He then threw
his wedding ring into the garden. He abused the appellant, telling her to get
out and take Luisa. Clothes were thrown out of the window. Luisa left. The
appellant spoke to Mrs Thomas on the telephone, saying: ’I’m going to have
to do what I said I’d do.’ The appellant said in evidence, that meant merely
that she going to leave. She wrote in lipstick on her bedroom mirror: ’Bastard
Thornton, I hate you.’ Later, she and Martin went out leaving the deceased
dozing on the couch. Martin returned home first and went upstairs. The
appellant got a taxi home. The taxi driver said she was arrogant and
quarrelsome, which she denies.

Martin [D’s stepson] who was upstairs when the appellant came home, had
heard no quarrel or raised voices. What he did hear was the rattling of cutlery
in the drawer, followed by a scream from his father. He went downstairs. The
appellant said in a cold matter-of-fact tone: ‘I’ve killed your father.’ She
telephoned for an ambulance and said: ‘I’ve just killed my husband. I’ve
stuck a six-inch carving knife in his belly on the left-hand side.’ The
ambulance and police came. To a police officer the appellant said: ‘I’ve
stabbed him with this carving knife.’ Asked ‘Have you tried to kill him? she

6
said: ‘I wanted to kill him.’ When the emergency service was making efforts
to save him the appellant said: ‘I don’t know why you are bothering, let him
die.’ Martin heard her say: ‘Let the bastard die.’ The police officer asked: ‘Do
you understand what you are saying?’ She replied: ‘Yes, I know exactly what I
am saying. I sharpened up the knife so I could kill him. Do you know what he
has done to me in the past?’ Asked ‘When did you sharpen the bread-knife?’
she replied, ‘After I went to see him in there. I said are you coming to bed
love and he told me to fuck off out and fuck some blokes to get some money,
so I just walked into the kitchen, got the knife, sharpened it up and stuck it in
his belly.”

HOW THE ABNORMALITY ARISES

This is very widely defined. It covers:

 (a) A condition of arrested or retarded development of the mind,
 (b) Any inherent causes
 (c) Disease or injury.
Although this excludes drink or drugs it does cover disease caused by long
term alcoholism or drug-taking. Alcoholism is enough if it injures the brain ,
causing impairment of judgment and emotional responses, or causes the
drinking to become involuntary: R v. Tandy [1988] 1 All ER 267.

THE EFFECT OF THE ABNORMALITY OF MIND

The abnormality of mind must substantially impair the defendant's mental

responsibility. The impairment, therefore, need not be total, but it
must be more than trivial or minimal. The defendant may know what
he is doing, know it is wrong, and have some control over himself
but find it substantially more difficult than a normal person would to
control his actions, e.g., as in Byrne.
In R v. Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470, the Court of Appeal approved the following
direction (suggested in R v. Lloyd [1967] 1 All ER 107) on the meaning of
"substantial" impairment, to the effect that:

7
  the jury should approach the word in a broad common-sense way, and
that
 the word meant "more than some trivial degree of impairment
which does not make any appreciable difference to a person's
ability to control himself, but it means less than total
impairment … ".

DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND INTOXICATION

The fact that a defendant might have been drunk at the time of committing a
murder is largely irrelevant to the issues of diminished responsibility, as it will
not constitute an "inherent cause" within Section 5 of the OAPA:
See the case of the R v. Gittens [1984] QB 698 where the defendant
suffered from depression and had been in hospital. On a visit home he had an
argument with his wife, and he clubbed her to death. He then raped and
killed his stepdaughter. He had been drinking and taking drugs for
medication. The Court of Appeal suggested that where the jury had to deal
with both diminished responsibility and intoxication, they should be directed
to consider:
(1) whether the defendant would have killed as he did without having
been intoxicated, and if the answer to that was yes,
(2) whether he would have been suffering from diminished responsibility
when he did so.
This approach has subsequently been approved by the Court of Appeal in R
v. Atkinson [1985] Crim LR 314 and R v. Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470.
Chronic Alcoholism
Chronic alcoholism can become a relevant factor. Where a craving
for drink causes an abnormality of mind, the defence of diminished
responsibility will be made out.
Where however, the abnormality of mind causes a craving for drink, the
defence will not be available:
R v Tandy [1989] 1 All ER 267.

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The defendant was an alcoholic who had drunk much more than normal and
then strangled her 11-year-old daughter. She did not claim that she could not
stop herself from drinking and admitted that she was able to exercise some
control over her drinking initially. The trial judge withdrew the defence of
diminished responsibility. The defendant appealed but failed. The Court of
Appeal accepted that where a defendant could show that she was
suffering from an abnormality of the mind, that it was induced by
disease (namely alcoholism), and that it substantially impaired her
responsibility for her actions, then the defence of diminished
responsibility would be made out. In the present case, the craving
for alcohol did not render the use of alcohol involuntary - she was in
control when she started voluntarily drinking, and that, therefore,
her state of mind was merely induced by the alcohol. (The defendant
had control at the beginning of drinking).
The principles developed in Tandy have been extended to other types of
substance abuse. For example, long term use of heroine and cocaine in R v
Sanderson (1994) 98 Cr App R 325.

BURDEN OF PROOF

Section 5(2) of the OAPA states clearly that the burden of proving the
defence rests upon the defendant. Though the question of whether the
defendant was suffering from diminished responsibility at the time of the
offence is a question of fact to be determined by the jury on the evidence
presented, the defendant will invariably have to obtain cogent medical
evidence as to his condition.
SENTENCE

If successfully pleaded, the defence avoids the imposition of a murder

conviction and its attendant sentencing.

PROVOCATION

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Provocation originated in England, during the period when the penalty for
murder was death. The law allows the defense in “compassion to human
infirmity.”
At common law, therefore, the use of violence in the heat of the moment was
understandable and provided a partial excuse for murder.
There were two exceptions - discovery by a husband of a wife in the act of
committing adultery and the discovery by a father of someone committing
sodomy on his son.
Insulting words or gestures unaccompanied by physical attack did not in law
amount to provocation.
Holmes confirmed that words alone, except in extreme and exceptional
circumstances were incapable of constituting provocation.
In Bedder the accused killed a prostitute. He was sexually impotent, and she
taunted him with his failure to have sex with her. The taunts were
unaccompanied by any physical violence in an attempt to get away from him.
The common law as it relates to provocation is based on R v. Duffy where it
was defined as:
some act, or series of acts, done by the victim to the accused which
would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the
accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control.
In order to be successful in raising this defense, two elements must be
proven:
1) D acted on a sudden impulse, without premeditation
2) D acted as a reasonable man would have acted.
Provocation is a common law defence which has been modified by Section 6
of the Offences Against the Person Act which provides:
"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find
that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things
said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the
provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left
to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall

10
take into account everything both done and said according to the effect
which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man."
Section 6 of the OAPA does not state the effect of a successful defence - it is
by virtue of the common law that the offence is reduced to manslaughter.
The procedure is as follows:
 (1) Once the judge has decided there is sufficient evidence that the
defendant was provoked, whether or not the defence has been raised
expressly by the defendant, he must leave it to the jury to answer the
questions:
 (a) Was the defendant provoked to lose his self-control? and
 (b) Was the provocation enough to make a reasonable man do as he
did?

EVIDENCE OF PROVOCATION

Section 6 places an evidential burden on the defendant. He must raise

sufficient evidence of provocation for the judge to leave the defence to the
jury.
Whether the defendant has produced sufficient evidence is a matter of law
for the trial judge alone to decide. This evidence can be provided by any
witness at the trial, not necessarily by the defendant alone.
The statutory amendments of the common law render anything capable of
constituting provocation, including words alone, actions by third parties, and
provocation directed at third parties. For example:
R v. Doughty [1986] Crim LR 625. The defendant had killed his baby and
wanted to argue that he had been provoked by the child's persistent crying.
On appeal it was held to be a misdirection for the trial judge to tell the jury
that the persistent crying of a 17-day old baby could not constitute
provocation, and therefore, quashed the murder conviction and substituted a
conviction for manslaughter. The jury should have been directed to consider
how the reasonable man would have responded.
This point was recently reaffirmed by the House of Lords in R v Acott [1997]
1 All ER 706.

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 WAS THE DEFENDANT PROVOKED?

The first element of the provocation test is subjective - the requirement that
the defendant must be shown to have actually lost his self-control. If there is
evidence that his actions were premeditated, or that he had been able to
compose himself between the provocation and the killing, then the defence
cannot be left to the jury.
In R v. Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932, Devlin J stated that the provocation must
cause “a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the
accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment
not master of his mind".
Where there is a gap in time between the provocation and the killing
(described as "cooling off period"), the defendant may encounter difficulties
in trying to establish the defence of provocation.
R v. Coker [1989] - W suffered from an incapacitating incurable disease. H
looked after her for 11 years. W repeatedly requested H to kill her.
Eventually, during one sleepless night and after persistent pestering, H put a
pillow over W's face an asphyxiated her. Held: H had not been provoked to
lose his self-control.
Ibrams and Gregory (1981) - The appellants and a young woman had been
bullied and terrorized by Monk over a period of time. They had been unable
to obtain effective police protection. They put a plan into effect. Nothing
happened on the night of the killing which caused Ibrams to lose his self-
control. The law does not recognise instances when cumulative acts by the
deceased can amount to provocation although there were provocative acts of
the past. There must, however, be some act which triggers the accused’s
response, however minor.
This was expressed in R v. Ahluwalia [1992] where it was appreciated that
in some cases the accused may have a delayed reaction, but it still has to be
established that there was a sudden and temporary loss of self-control which
was triggered by the provocatory acts in the past. But the longer the delay,
and the stronger the evidence of deliberation, the more likely provocation will
be negatived.

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R v. Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306 - A wife who had been treated brutally by
her husband over a period of months and had earlier declared her intention
of killing him, after a fresh provocation went to the kitchen, took and
sharpened a carving knife and returned to another room where she stabbed
him. The trial judge left the defence to the jury, directing them that
provocation required evidence of some sudden and temporary loss of self-
control on the part of the defendant. The defence was rejected by the jury.
The defendant appealed on the ground that s 3 required the jury to have
regard to "everything both said and done according to the effect which in
their opinion it would have on a reasonable man". The direction given would
concentrate the minds of the jury on the final outburst, when they should be
concentrating on the events over the years leading up to the killing. In
rejecting this contention, Beldam LJ stated: "In every such case the
question for the jury is whether at the moment the fatal blow was
struck the accused had been deprived for that moment of the self-
control which previously he or she had been able to exercise".
Note: This principle was reaffirmed in R v. Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER
1023. However, following the introduction of fresh evidence, a retrial was
ordered by the Court of Appeal to consider the effect of Battered Woman
Syndrome and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter on the ground
of diminished responsibility.
Phillips v. R 1969 - A and the deceased had separated. A’s mother and the
deceased were quarreling, and they spat at each other. A chopped her with a
machete his mother was carrying. He claimed he was provoked. It was held
that there was no ‘sudden impulse.’
No amount of provocation would assist D if he managed to retain his self-
control. The sudden and temporary loss of self-control does not mean total
loss of self-control. D may still be conscious of his acts, but he must be
unable to restrain himself. There must be no time for emotions to subside or
anger to cool off nor should there be a period of planning or revenge. Loss of
self-control implies an impulsive reaction which occurs quickly.

THE REASONABLE MAN TEST

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Having decided that the defendant was provoked, the jury must
decide whether a reasonable man would have acted as the
defendant did - the objective test.
A crucial element of the defense is that the circumstances must cause the
accused to lose his self-control ALSO a reasonable man would do as he did.
The purpose of this requirement is to provide some limits to invoking the
defense. The law does not intend to excuse intentional killings because the
accused claims he is provoked. In everyday social intercourse, people are
subjected to irritants. An ordinary person who possesses self-control does not
kill in response to such irritation, so the law is not inclined to excuse those
who do.
The question is who is the reasonable man? Is he 35 years old, married
with children, has a degree and a nice house? If so, what is the effect of a
racial insult directed to a 20-year-old black Sophia youth? Should his reaction
be assessed according to the effect that the words would have on the
reasonable man above? Such a conclusion seems ridiculous.
There is much debate on this issue which has created inconsistency in the
law. The moot has been centered on the extent to which the court should
invest the hypothetical reasonable man with the actual characteristics at the
time of the offence, of the accused person. For example:
age and sex DPP v. Complin (1978)
addiction to glue sniffing R v. Morhall (1995)
battered wife syndrome R v. Ahluwalia, R v. Thornton
The case Bedder v. DPP has now been overruled. That case refused to take
into account the fact that the accused was sexually impotent which was a
significant element in the circumstances which led the accused to kill the
prostitute.
It is important to note that the reasonable man is attributed with the
defendant's particular characteristics which might be relevant to the
provocation.
DPP v. Camplin [1978] AC 705 - The defendant was a 15-year-old boy who,
having been buggered by the deceased, was then taunted by him. The

14
defendant killed the deceased by hitting him over the head with a heavy
frying pan. He was convicted of murder following a direction by the trial judge
to the jury that they were to judge him by the standards of the reasonable
adult, not by a reasonable 15-year-old boy. The Court of Appeal allowed
the defendant's appeal on the basis that the more subjective test,
which took account of the defendant's age, should have been
applied. This was endorsed by the House of Lords.
 Lord Diplock gave the following definition of the reasonable
man:

"… the "reasonable man" has never been confined to the adult
male. It means an ordinary person of either sex, not
exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed of such
powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that
his fellow citizens will exercise in society as it is today."

 The judge should, according to Lord Diplock, explain to the jury

that the reasonable man referred to in the section is a person
having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary
person of the sex and age of the defendant, but in all other
respects showing such of the defendant's characteristics as
they think would affect the gravity of the provocation to him.
The question is not merely whether such a person would in the
circumstances be provoked to lose his self-control but also whether he
would react to the provocation as the defendant did.

 Hence, whilst the age and sex of the defendant would always
be attributed to the reasonable man, other characteristics
such as racial origin, or physical peculiarity, would only be
considered to the extent that they were relevant. Thus, in the
present case, the reasonable man would be the reasonable 15-
year- old, as the defendant's youth was a relevant
characteristic. As certain characteristics such as intoxication or
excitability would be ignored for policy reasons, the
defendant's drunkenness was irrelevant.

15
The House of Lords more recently had to decide whether the judge should
exclude from the jury's consideration characteristics and past behaviour of
the defendant at which the taunts are directed, which in the judge's view are
inconsistent with the concept of a reasonable man:
R v Morhall [1995] 3 All ER 659 - The defendant, who had been indulging in
glue sniffing, was taunted about his addiction by V. A fight ensued, in the
course of which D stabbed V, who subsequently died. When directing the
jury, the trial judge made no reference to any special characteristics of the D
which the jury might think would affect the gravity of the provocation. D was
convicted and appealed, contending that his addiction to glue
sniffing was a special characteristic which should have been taken
into account as affecting the gravity of the provocation. The Court of
Appeal dismissed the appeal, purporting to follow DPP v. Camplin
and R v Newell (1980) 71 Cr App R 331, and referring to the New
Zealand case of McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069. Characteristics
repugnant to the concept of the reasonable man could not possibly
be included, for example, alcoholism, drug addiction, paedophilia
(contrasted with included characteristics such as physical deformity,
colour, race, creed, impotence, homosexuality). Consequently, the
self-induced addiction to glue sniffing could not be included within
those characteristics capable of being attributed to the reasonable
man. However, the House of Lords allowed the appeal and
substituted a conviction for manslaughter.
Lord Goff made the following points:
 In DPP v. Camplin, the House of Lords had stressed that the
jury should take into account "all those factors" or "the entire
factual situation" which would affect the gravity of the
provocation. There was nothing in that judgment to rule out
any disreputable characteristics;
 The reasonable man test introduces a standard of self-control which
had to be complied with if provocation was to be established in law;
 D's addiction to glue sniffing should have been taken into account as
affecting the gravity of the provocation, since it was a characteristic of

16
 particular relevance as the words of the deceased which were said to
constitute the provocation were directed towards D's addiction to glue
sniffing and his inability to break himself of it;
 A distinction may have to be drawn between two situations: (a)
where the D is taunted with his addiction (for example, that he
is an alcoholic, or a drug addict, or a glue sniffer), or even with
having been intoxicated on some previous occasion, in which
case it may, where relevant, be taken into account as going to
the gravity of the provocation, and (b) where the D was
intoxicated (being drunk, or high with drugs or glue) at the
relevant time, which may not be so taken into account,
because that, like displaying a lack of ordinary self-control, is
excluded as a matter of policy;
 The Court of Appeal in Newell may have placed too exclusive an
emphasis on the word "characteristic" as a result of relying on the case
of McGregor. It is more important to consider "the entire factual
situation", so that there will be some circumstances affecting the
gravity of the provocation which do not fall within the description of
"characteristics", such as D's history or the circumstances in which he
is placed at the relevant time.
The House of Lords was recently asked to consider whether characteristics,
other than age and sex, attributable to a reasonable man were relevant not
only to the gravity of the provocation but also to the standard of control to be
expected:
R v. Smith [2000] 4 All ER 289 - The defendant was charged with murder
and relied on the defence of provocation, alleging that he had been suffering
from serious clinical depression and had been so provoked by the deceased
as to lose his self-control.
 The House of Lords held that for the pusposes of s3 of the U.K
Homicide Act 1957 (which is the same as Section 6 of the OAPA), the
jury was allowed to take into account not only those
characteristics of the accused which were relevant to the
gravity of the provocation, but also those which affected his

17
 powers of self-control. However, the judge was not obliged to
let the jury imagine that the law regarded anything which
caused loss of self-control as necessarily being an acceptable
reason for such a loss of control.
 Nor was he required to describe the objective element in the
provocation defence by reference to the reasonable man, with
or without attribution of personal characteristics. Instead, he
might find it more helpful to explain in simple language the
principles of the doctrine of provocation, instructing the jury
that it was not sufficient that something had caused the
accused to lose self-control, that the law expected people to
exercise control over their emotions and that a tendency to
violent rages or childish tantrums was a defect in character
rather than an excuse.
 The jury had to think that the circumstances were such as to
make the loss of self-control sufficiently excusable to reduce
the gravity of the offence from murder to manslaughter. They
were required to apply what they considered to be appropriate
standards of behaviour, making allowance for human nature
and the power of emotions, but not allowing someone to rely
upon his own violent dispositions.

SELF-INDUCED PROVOCATION-inducing provocation by some act of

your own…

If the defendant induces the provocation by some act of his own, the defence
will still be available:
In R v. Johnson [1989] 2 All ER 839, the defendant had made unpleasant
comments to the deceased and his female companion. The victim retaliated
by threatening the defendant with a beer glass. The defendant responded by
fatally stabbing the victim with a flick knife. At his trial the judge, following
the Privy Council decision in Edwards v. R [1973] AC 648, refused to leave
the defence of provocation to the jury on the basis that it had been self-
induced. The defendant was convicted of murder (his defence of self-defence

18
had failed) and appealed. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction for
murder and substituted one of manslaughter.
They held that s3 of the U.K. Homicide Act 1957 provides that
anything can amount to provocation, including actions provoked by
the defendant. The defendant had been deprived of the opportunity of
having his defence considered properly by the jury, following the trial judge's
ruling that he was bound to follow Edwards.
SENTENCING FOR MANSLAUGHTER
Note that pursuant to Section 9 of the OAPA whosoever shall be convicted of
manslaughter shall be liable to:

(a) be imprisoned for life, with or without hard labour, or

(b) to pay such fine as the court shall award in addition to or without any
such other discretionary punishment as aforesaid.

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

Involuntary manslaughter is the term given to an unlawful killing where the

necessary mens rea for murder is not present - the defendant will not have
had any intention to kill or cause G.B.H. In fact, the defendant will probably
not have contemplated the death of the victim at all. There are three broad
categories of involuntary manslaughter:
 Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act;
 Manslaughter by gross negligence, and (this excludes motor
manslaughter and includes [cases where D owe a duty of care] i)
owe a duty of care ii) breach iii) result in death iv) D’s
negligence was gross & went beyond a matter of mere
compensation)
 Manslaughter with subjective recklessness as to the risk of
death or bodily harm.
(Criminal damage of person/property and motor manslaughter cases)

19
As with voluntary manslaughter, if a defendant is convicted of involuntary
manslaughter the sentence is at the discretion of the trial judge and can
range between life imprisonment and an unconditional discharge.
UNLAWFUL ACT MANSLAUGHTER
This type of manslaughter is committed when the defendant has caused the
death of a person by an unlawful and dangerous act. The Court of Appeal in R
v Mitchell [1983] 2 WLR 938 (below) said that to establish this type of
manslaughter it had to be shown:
a. that the accused had committed an unlawful act;
b. that the act was dangerous in the sense that a sober and reasonable
person would inevitably recognize that it carried some risk of harm;
c. that the act was a substantial cause of death; and
d. that the accused intended to commit the act as distinct from intending
its consequence.
In order to have a clearer understanding one has to examine each element
individually.
AN UNLAWFUL ACT
Since the decision in R v. Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163, unlawful act
manslaughter has been based on a criminal act. Therefore, if the
prosecution cannot establish a criminal act on the part of the
defendant, the defendant will not be liable for unlawful act
manslaughter. In Franklin the defendant while walking along a pier, took
up a "good sized box" from a stall and threw it into the sea where it struck a
swimmer and killed him. The defendant was held to be guilty of manslaughter
as death arose from an unlawful act, i.e., taking another's property and
throwing it into the sea.
This position was recently affirmed in the case of R v. Kennedy (2007) UKHL
38. The House of Lords stated that to establish the crime of unlawful act
manslaughter it must be shown that:
a. The defendant committed an unlawful act
b. That such an act was a crime
c. That the defendant’s unlawful act was a significant cause of the
death of the defendant.

20
Compare:
R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981
The defendant pointed a loaded gun at his friend in jest. He did not intend to
injure or alarm the victim and the victim was not alarmed. There were two
bullets in the chambers, but neither was in the chamber opposite the barrel.
Because they did not understand how a revolver works, both thought there
was no danger in pulling the trigger. But when the defendant did so, the
barrel rotated placing a bullet opposite the firing pin and the victim was
killed. The defendant was not guilty of a criminal assault or battery because
he did not foresee that his victim would be alarmed or injured, as such, he
could not be found guilty of unlawful act manslaughter.

R v Arobieke [1988] Crim LR 314

The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter on the basis that his
presence at a railway station had caused the victim, whom he knew to be
terrified of him, to attempt an escape by crossing the railway tracks, with the
result that he was electrocuted. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction
on the ground that there had been no criminal act by the defendant, as the
evidence did not show that the defendant had physically threatened or
chased the deceased.
The consent of the victim will not prevent an act from being
unlawful. See:
R v. Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110
The defendant and the victim agreed to inject each other with heroin. The
victim had consented to a number of such injections during the course of an
evening. The following morning, he was found to have died from the effects
of the drug-taking. The defendant was convicted of maliciously administering
a noxious substance contrary to s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act
1861, and of manslaughter, either on the basis that his unlawful act had
caused death, or on the basis that he had recklessly caused the victim's
death.
The Court of Appeal held that the defendant had been properly convicted.
Lord Widgery CJ stated that heroin was a noxious substance on the basis that

21
it was likely to injure in common use, and that the defendant had
administered it knowing of its noxious qualities. The victim's consent to suffer
harm of this nature could never relieve the defendant of his liability or
destroy the unlawfulness of the defendant's act.
Note that the decision in Cato has been criticized as it was suggested obiter
that the unlawful act need not be a crime. Note this runs contrary to the first
criterion of this test that the unlawful act must be crime as recognized by
both Franklin and Kennedy above.

THE ACT MUST BE DANGEROUS

The act must be dangerous in the sense that the average person would
recognize that it could cause some form of physical harm to another
person. See:
R v. Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217
The defendant waved a razor about intending to frighten his mistress's lover.
His mistress, who was drunk, blundered against the razor and was killed. The
defendant was convicted of manslaughter. It was held that where the act
which a person is engaged in performing is unlawful, then, if at the same
time it is an act likely to injure another person, and that person dies, the
accused is guilty of manslaughter.

R v. Church [1966] 1 QB 59 (distinguish between R v. Thabo Meli-

difference between either would appear to be based on the intention at the
inception/occurrence of the action)
The defendant had gone to his van with a woman for sexual purposes. She
mocked his impotence and he had attacked her, knocking her out. The
defendant panicked, and wrongfully thinking he had killed her, threw her
unconscious body into a river, where she drowned. The defendant was
convicted of manslaughter. He had acted unlawfully towards the victim in a
way that sober and reasonable people would appreciate involved a risk of
injury to the victim.

22
Edmund-Davies J provided a definition of dangerousness when he stated:
"the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would
inevitably recognize must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of
some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm".
WHAT TYPE OF HARM HAS TO BE REASONABLY FORESEEABLE?
The jury must be directed to consider the possibility of physical harm as
opposed to merely emotional harm. See:
R v. Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150
The defendant and two other men carried out an attempted robbery at a
petrol station. The cashier at the petrol station was a 60-year-old man who,
unknown to the defendants, suffered from a heart disease. Dawson had
pointed a replica handgun at the victim and his partner had banged a pick-
axe handle on the counter. Money was demanded, but the victim pressed the
alarm button and the defendants fled empty handed. Shortly afterwards the
victim collapsed and died from a heart attack.
The defendants were convicted and successfully appealed to the Court of
Appeal, following a misdirection by the trial judge.
Watkins LJ held that:
(a) if the jury acted upon the basis that emotional disturbance was enough
to constitute harm then, they would have done so upon a misdirection.
A proper direction would have been that the requisite harm is
caused if the unlawful act so shocks the victim as to cause him
physical injury.
(b) Regarding the test for determining whether or not the unlawful act was
dangerous, he stated: "This test can only be undertaken upon the
basis of the knowledge gained by a sober and reasonable man
as though he were present at the scene of the crime and
watched the unlawful act being performed, he has the same
knowledge as the man attempting to rob and no more."
Thus, the reasonable man must be taken to know only the facts and
circumstances which the defendant knew. It was never suggested that any of
the defendants knew that their victim had a bad heart; therefore, the

23
reasonable man would not know this. Note however, the extension of this
principle as stated in Watson below: the reasonable man is to be endowed
with the knowledge the defendant would have gained in his burglarious
trespass.

HOW MUCH KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES DOES ONE

ATTRIBUTE TO THE BYSTANDER?
In R v. Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684, it was held that the sober and
reasonable" bystander was to be endowed with whatever knowledge the
defendant possessed.
In Watson the defendant had burgled a house occupied by an 87-year-old
man who suffered from a heart condition. The defendant disturbed the victim,
and verbally abused him, but made off without stealing anything. The police
were called shortly afterwards, and a local council workman arrived to repair
the windows broken by the defendant in gaining entry. An hour and a half
after the burglary the victim had a heart attack and died. The defendant was
convicted of manslaughter but appealed successfully on the issue of
causation – it had not been proven that the intrusion caused the death of the
deceased.
As to the nature of the unlawful act however, the Court of Appeal recognised
that, following Dawson and applying the test established by Watkins LJ, the
unlawful act had to be dangerous in the sense that all sober and reasonable
persons would foresee that it created a risk of some physical harm occurring
to the victim, but added that in applying this test, the reasonable
person was to be imbued with all the knowledge that the defendant
had gained throughout his burglarious trespass (i.e. his realization
of the victim's frailty) and not just the defendant's limited or non-
existent knowledge at the moment he first entered the property.
Note: On this basis therefore, the burglary did constitute a dangerous
unlawful act, but only because the court assumed that the defendant, during
the course of the unlawful act, must have become aware of the frailty of the
victim.

24
In R v. Ball [1989] Crim LR 730, however, it was emphasised that the sober
and reasonable bystander could not be endowed with any mistaken belief
held by the defendant.
In Ball the defendant had been involved in a dispute with his neighbour, the
victim, over her parking her vehicle on his land. The victim, accompanied by
two men, called on the defendant to investigate the disappearance of her
vehicle. An argument developed which culminated in the defendant grabbing
a handful of cartridges, loading his shotgun, and firing at the victim. The
victim was killed in the attack. The defendant was acquitted of murder, on
the basis that he had honestly believed that he had loaded the gun with
blank cartridges and had only intended to frighten the victim but was
convicted of manslaughter.
The defendant appealed on the basis that the trial judge had erred in
directing the jury as to how they should have assessed the 'dangerousness'
of his unlawful act, in that they had not been told to bear in mind the
defendant's mistaken belief, that he was firing blanks, when applying the
Dawson test.
In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that once it was
established that the defendant had intentionally committed an unlawful act
(in this case an assault) the question of its dangerousness was to be decided
by applying the objective test (as in Dawson). The court refused to impute to
the reasonable man the defendant's mistake of fact, i.e., believing the live
cartridges to be blanks.

SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF DEATH

The unlawful and dangerous act must be a substantial cause of death.
Must the act be directed at the victim?
It had been suggested that because the unlawful act must expose the victim
to the risk of some bodily harm, it must be aimed at that victim. See:
R v. Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425
The defendant was a drug addict who lawfully obtained drugs on prescription.
He gave some of the tablets to the victim, also known to be a drug addict.

25
The victim had consumed a large quantity of the drug in one session, and
subsequently injected himself with other substances. The following morning,
he was found to have died of a drug overdose.
The defendant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, based on his
unlawful supply of the controlled drug, and he appealed on the basis that his
supply of the drug was not a dangerous act which had operated as the direct
cause of death. He contended that the death was due to the victim's act in
consuming such a large dose of the drug in such a short space of time. The
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, Waller LJ holding that the defendant's act
had not in any event been the direct cause of death but had merely made it
possible for the victim to kill himself. His Lordship stated that where
manslaughter was based on an unlawful and dangerous act, it had to be an
act directed at the victim, which was likely to cause immediate injury, albeit
slight. In this case, the Court held that it was the victim’s own use of the drug
in a form and quantity which was dangerous which caused the harm. It
should therefore be noted in the principle of Dalby that the charge of
unlawful act manslaughter cannot be founded on the act of supplying drugs
alone. The idea is that the victim’s free willed and voluntary act of taking the
drugs breaks the chain of causation: R v. Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 96; R v.
Kennedy No. 2[2007] UKHL 38 House of Lords
The case of Dalby seemed to introduce an extra element of mens rea into
the offence by requiring the defendant to 'direct' his action against the
victim. The significance of Dalby on this point has been greatly reduced
however by the two following cases and it is clear that the issue is now one
of causation. See:
R v. Mitchell [1983] 2 WLR 938
R v. Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23
R v. Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684.
Attorney- General Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1998] A.C. 245
The above cases make it very clear that there is no requirement that the
unlawful act be directed at the victim, neither is there a requirement that the
danger or risk of harm be perceived in respect of the actual victim - a risk of
harm to someone else arising from the unlawful act will suffice.

26
As it relates to the criminal liability of a person who supplies drugs to
someone else who subsequently dies from an overdose of same, note the
case of Kennedy where the question of “when is it appropriate to find
someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been involved in the
supply of a class A controlled drug, which is then freely and voluntarily self-
administered by the person to whom it is supplied and the administration of
the drug then causes his death?”was referred to the House of Lords as a
certified question on a point of law. In answer to the question before it, the
court replied: “In the case of a fully – informed and responsible adult, never.”
See case of Kennedy.
MENS REA
The mens rea for unlawful act manslaughter consists of mens rea as to the
unlawful act itself (ie, intention or recklessness depending on what the
necessary mens rea is for the act). The defendant need not realise the risk of
causing some harm. As long as the reasonable man in his position would
have so realised, this is sufficient mens rea. The House of Lords reaffirmed
this point in:
DPP v. Newbury and Jones [1976] AC 500
The defendants, both teenage boys, had thrown a piece of paving stone from
a railway bridge onto a train which had been passing beneath them. The
object struck and killed the guard who had been sitting in the driver's
compartment. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, and
unsuccessfully appealed, on the ground that they had not foreseen that their
actions might cause harm to any other person.
Lord Salmon explained that a defendant was guilty of manslaughter if it was
proved that he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous
and that act caused death, and that it was unnecessary that the defendant
had known that the act in question was unlawful or dangerous.
If there is no mens rea for the unlawful act the defendant will not be
liable; see R v. Lamb.
MANSLAUGHTER BY GROSS NEGLIGENCE (N.B. similarity between
Special relationship and gross negligence cases)
The essential elements of the offence are:

27
(1) existence of the duty;
(2) breach of the duty causing death; and
(3) gross negligence which the jury considers justifies criminal conviction,
(4) the gross negligence was a substantial cause of the death

In the case of R v. Bateman (1925) 9 Crim. App. Rev. 8, the defendant, a

doctor attended the confinement of a woman who died while giving birth.

It was held that where a doctor is consulted, by or on behalf of a patient, he

owes a duty to that patient to use due caution in undertaking the treatment.
If he accepts the responsibility, he owes a duty to the patient to use a fair
and reasonable degree of diligence, care, knowledge, skill, and caution in
administering the treatment.

Per Lord Hewart CJ:

“…in order to establish criminal liability, the facts must be such

that, in the opinion of the jury the negligence of the accused went
beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and
showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount
to a crime against the state and conduct deserving punishment.”

Who can be liable for the death?

This question was raised in the case of In R v Bennett (1858) D had

unlawfully kept in his house a quantity of fireworks, which, through the
negligence of his employees, were set on fire, and thus caused the death of
the deceased, and it was held that the accused could not be convicted of
manslaughter. D is not responsible criminally if the death was directly caused
in his absence by the negligence of his employees or others. It is no defence
that the death was caused by the negligence of others as well as of the
accused; if death is occasioned by the act or default of several, they are all
guilty of manslaughter.

28
See the cases of:
R v Benge (1865)
R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) (convicted of murder)
R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] CA.

The particular negligence imputed to the accused must, however, have been
a substantial cause of the death.

NOTE: Duty of care extends to a person upon whom the law imposes
a duty of care or who has taken upon himself a duty, to preserve
life.

D is liable where that duty exists or has been undertaken and D, regardless of
the life, safety, welfare and health of others, neglects to perform that duty or
performs it negligently and thereby causes the death of another person.

See for example:

R v Pittwood (1902)
R v Stone & Dobinson [1977].

Duty of care can be between Doctor/patient

A duty of care has been held to apply to a doctor towards his patient: R v.
Adomako (1994)

R v. Adomako – The defendant, an anaesthetist, failed to observe during an

eye operation that the tube inserted in V’s mouth had become detached from
the ventilator, causing V to suffer a cardiac arrest and eventually die.

29
Held: D was guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence, which is established
where D breached a duty of care towards V that caused V’s death and that
amounted to gross negligence.

Lord MacKay LC:

“…gross negligence…depends…on the seriousness of the

breach of the duty committed by the defendant in all the
circumstances in which he was placed when it occurred and
whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the
conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances
as to amount in the jury’s judgment to a criminal act or
omission”.

Duty of care can be between Manager of property/tenant

A manager and maintainer of property has a duty of care where there was a
faulty gas fire:

R v. Singh (1999) - the Defendant managed a block of flats where one of

the tenants died of carbon monoxide poisoning. The gas fires in many of the
flats were unsafe, and there had been complaints from other tenants. The
defendant was held to have a duty of care.

Master of sailing ship/crew: the owner and master of a sailing ship to the
crew:

R v. Litchfield (l998) - the Defendant, a ship’s captain, followed an unsafe

course and relied too heavily on his engines even though he knew the fuel
was contaminated. The ship foundered off the Cornish coast and three crew
members were drowned.

Duty to summon medical assistance

30
In R v. Khan (1998) a duty situation was held to include a duty to summon
medical assistance in some situations.

In Khan the defendant, a drug dealer, supplied a 15-year-old girl with heroin.
It became apparent that the girl was in need of medical attention, but the
defendants left her alone until the next day when they found her dead. They
dumped her body on waste ground.

The actus reus of the offence was the omission to summon medical
assistance and not the supply of heroin. To say a drug dealer owed a duty of
care to a person to whom he supplied heroin would be too wide an extension.

The jury should have been directed to decide whether a duty of care was
owed by the defendants to the girl, whether there was a breach of that duty
and whether that breach constituted gross negligence and was therefore a
criminal act.

MENS REA IN CASES OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE MANSLAUGHTER

The mens rea required was set forth in the case of Bateman and endorsed in
the case of Adamako.

Note the following table:

Mens rea of Gross Negligence Manslaughter

Gross negligence In Adomako (1994) the following were held to

could include: constitute gross negligence
indifference,  indifference to an obvious risk of injury to
actual foresight, or health
inattention  actual foresight of the risk coupled with the
determination nevertheless to run it;
 actual foresight of the risk together with an
intention to avoid it but involving such a
high degree of negligence in the attempted
avoidance as the jury considered justified

31
 conviction;
 inattention or failure to avert to a serious
risk going beyond mere inadvertence in
respect of an important matter which the
defendant’s duty demanded he should
address.

Mere carelessness A higher degree of negligence is necessary

is not enough to render a person guilty of manslaughter
than to establish civil liability against him.

Whether negligence is sufficient to warrant

criminal sanctions it is a question for the jury and
depends on the facts of the particular case.

Negligence must go This requirement was laid down by Lord Mackay in

beyond that Bateman (1925) where there was delay in
required for civil sending patient to hospital.
liability, which is a "In explaining to juries the test which they should
question of degree apply to determine whether the negligence, in the
for the jury particular case, amounted or did not amount to a
crime, the judges have used many epithets, such
as "culpable," "criminal," "gross," "wicked,"
"clear," "complete." But whatever epithet be
used and whether an epithet be used or not,
in order to establish criminal liability, the
facts must be such that, in the opinion of the
jury..."... the negligence of the accused went
beyond a mere matter of compensation
between subjects and showed such
disregard for the life and safety of others as
to amount to a crime against the state and
conduct deserving punishment.'"

How ‘negligent’? The negligence has to be 'gross'.

How 'gross'? The standard applied is defined in R v Bateman

(1925)

Examples of  A person who deals with dangerous

conduct which if medicines or undertakes a dangerous
recklessness or operation may be guilty of manslaughter if
grossly negligent death occurs.
creates a liability  Criminal negligence in driving a motor
vehicle or other vehicle or in riding or
navigating a vessel.
 A driver, fireman or other railway employee
may be guilty of the manslaughter of
persons killed as a result of the criminally

32
 negligent performance of his duties.
 Negligent use of a dangerous weapon or
other dangerous thing likely to cause death
in an improper place or without taking
proper precautions to avoid injury.
 A person who is in charge of a mine or of
machinery if an accident occurs.

RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER
This type of manslaughter covers the situation where a person kills, being
aware of the risk of some physical harm to the victim. Subjective reckless
manslaughter requires proof that D foresaw a serious (significant) risk that V
would suffer serious injury or death and took the risk anyway.

See:

R v. Lawrence [1981] 1 ALL ER 974

R v. Seymour [1983] 2 ALL ER 1058
Kong Chuek Kwan (1985) 82 Crim Appeal Review 18

33