CASE 2

G.R. No. 137792 August 12, 2003

SPOUSES RICARDO ROSALES and ERLINDA SIBUG, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES ALFONSO and LOURDES SUBA, THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Challenged in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions1 dated November 25, 1998
and February 26, 1999 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No.
49634, "Spouses Ricardo Rosales and Erlinda Sibug vs. Alfonso and Lourdes Suba."

On June 13, 1997, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila rendered a Decision 2 in Civil Cases Nos. 94-
72303 and 94-72379, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale of Exhibit D, G and I, affecting the property in question, as an equitable
mortgage;

(2) Declaring the parties Erlinda Sibug and Ricardo Rosales, within 90 days from finality of this Decision,
to deposit with the Clerk of Court, for payment to the parties Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao, the
sum of ₱65,000.00, with interest at nine (9) percent per annum from September 30, 1982 until payment
is made, plus the sum of ₱219.76 as reimbursement for real estate taxes;

(3) Directing the parties Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao, upon the deposit on their behalf of the
amounts specified in the foregoing paragraph, to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property in
question to Erlinda Sibug, married to Ricardo Rosales, and the Register of Deeds of Manila shall cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150540 in the name of the Macaspacs (Exh. E) and issue new title in the
name of Sibug;

(4) For non-compliance by Sibug and Rosales of the directive in paragraph (2) of this dispositive portion,
let the property be sold in accordance with the Rules of Court for the release of the mortgage debt and
the issuance of title to the purchaser.

"SO ORDERED."3

The decision became final and executory. Spouses Ricardo and Erlinda Rosales, judgment debtors and
herein petitioners, failed to comply with paragraph 2 quoted above, i.e., to deposit with the Clerk of
Court, within 90 days from finality of the Decision, ₱65,000.00, etc., to be paid to Felicisimo Macaspac
and Elena Jiao. This prompted Macaspac, as judgment creditor, to file with the trial court a motion for
execution.

Petitioners opposed the motion for being premature, asserting that the decision has not yet attained
finality. On March 5, 1998, they filed a manifestation and motion informing the court of their difficulty in
paying Macaspac as there is no correct computation of the judgment debt.
On February 23, 1998, Macaspac filed a supplemental motion for execution stating that the amount due
him is ₱243,864.08.

Petitioners failed to pay the amount. On March 25, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of execution
ordering the sale of the property subject of litigation for the satisfaction of the judgment.

On May 15, 1998, an auction sale of the property was held wherein petitioners participated. However,
the property was sold for ₱285,000.00 to spouses Alfonso and Lourdes Suba, herein respondents, being
the highest bidders. On July 15, 1998, the trial court issued an order confirming the sale of the property
and directing the sheriff to issue a final deed of sale in their favor.

On July 28, 1998, Macaspac filed a motion praying for the release to him of the amount of ₱176,176.06
from the proceeds of the auction sale, prompting petitioners to file a motion praying that an
independent certified public accountant be appointed to settle the exact amount due to movant
Macaspac.

Meanwhile, on August 3, 1998, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a new Transfer Certificate of Title
over the subject property in the names of respondents.

On August 18, 1998, respondents filed with the trial court a motion for a writ of possession, contending
that the confirmation of the sale "effectively cut off petitioners’ equity of redemption." Petitioners on
the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 15, 1998 confirming the sale of
the property to respondents.

On October 19, 1998, the trial court, acting upon both motions, issued an order (1) granting
respondents’ prayer for a writ of possession and (2) denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The
trial court ruled that petitioners have no right to redeem the property since the case is for judicial
foreclosure of mortgage under Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Hence,
respondents, as purchasers of the property, are entitled to its possession as a matter of right.

Forthwith, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
49634, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing a writ of possession to respondents and in denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order dated July 15, 1998 confirming the sale of the property to said respondents.

On November 25, 1998, the CA dismissed outright the petition for lack of merit, holding that there is no
right of redemption in case of judicial foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
was also denied.

Hence this petition.

In the main, petitioners fault the Appellate Court in applying the rules on judicial foreclosure of
mortgage. They contend that their loan with Macaspac is unsecured, hence, its payment entails an
execution of judgment for money under Section 9 in relation to Section 25, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended,4 allowing the judgment debtor one (1) year from the date of registration
of the certificate of sale within which to redeem the foreclosed property.
Respondents, upon the other hand, insist that petitioners are actually questioning the decision of the
trial court dated June 13, 1997 which has long become final and executory; and that the latter have no
right to redeem a mortgaged property which has been judicially foreclosed.

Petitioners’ contention lacks merit. The decision of the trial court, which is final and executory, declared
the transaction between petitioners and Macaspac an equitable mortgage. In Matanguihan vs. Court of
Appeals,5 this Court defined an equitable mortgage as "one which although lacking in some formality, or
form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the
parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to
law." An equitable mortgage is not different from a real estate mortgage, and the lien created thereby
ought not to be defeated by requiring compliance with the formalities necessary to the validity of a
voluntary real estate mortgage.6 Since the parties’ transaction is an equitable mortgage and that the trial
court ordered its foreclosure, execution of judgment is governed by Sections 2 and 3, Rule 68 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, quoted as follows:

SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. – If upon the trial in such action the court shall find
the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the
mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs,
and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the court or to
the judgment obligee within a period of not less that ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred
twenty (120) days from the entry of judgment, and that in default of such payment the property shall
be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.

SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged property, effect. – When the defendant, after being directed to do so as
provided in the next preceding section, fails to pay the amount of the judgment within the period
specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold in the manner and under
the provisions of Rule 39 and other regulations governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale
shall not effect the rights of persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof,
and when confirmed by an order of the court, also upon motion, it shall operate to divest the rights in
the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such
rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.

x x x."

In Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,7 we held that the right of redemption is not recognized
in a judicial foreclosure, thus:

"The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage–understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-

acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale–exists only in the case of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except
only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National bank or a bank or a banking institution.

"Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of
redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure sale.

"Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The
law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the court, x x x shall
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.’ Such rights exceptionally ‘allowed by
law’ (i.e., even after the confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the
Philippine National Bank (Act Nos. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A.337). These laws
confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right
to redeem the property sold on foreclosure–after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale–
which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.

"But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the
mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, ‘when
confirmed by an order of the court, x x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.’ There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its
confirmation.

xxx

"This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by
him even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the
foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of
confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer." (Italics supplied)

Clearly, as a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The only
exemption is when the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or a banking institution.
Since the mortgagee in this case is not one of those mentioned, no right of redemption exists in favor of
petitioners. They merely have an equity of redemption, which, to reiterate, is simply their right, as
mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt
prior to the confirmation of the foreclosure sale. However, instead of exercising this equity of
redemption, petitioners chose to delay the proceedings by filing several manifestations with the trial
court. Thus, they only have themselves to blame for the consequent loss of their property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 1998
and February 26, 1999 in CA G.R. SP No. 49634 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Rollo at 24, 28; penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez (now a member of this Court) and Renato C. Dacudao.
2
By Judge Mario Guarina III (now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals).
3
RTC Decision at 5-6; Rollo at 34-35.
4
Section 9. Execution of judgment for money, how enforced. –

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Satisfaction by levy. – If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified
bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon
the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of
for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose
which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment
obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and
then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor
which has been levied upon.

When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and lawful fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or
personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.

Sec. 25. Conveyance of real property; certificate thereof given to purchaser and filed with registry of
deeds. – Upon a sale of real property, the officer must give to the purchaser a certificate of sale
containing:

(a) A particular description of the real property sold;

(b) The price paid for each distinct lot or parcel;

(c) The whole price paid by him;

(d) A statement that the right of redemption expires one (1) year from the date of the registration of
the certificate of sale.

Such certificate must be registered in the registry of deeds of the place where the property is situated.

G.R. No. 214803

ALONA G. ROLDAN, Petitioner

vs
SPOUSES CLARENCE I. BARRIOS and ANNA LEE T. BARRIOS, ROMMEL MATORRES, and HON. JEMENA
ABELLAR ARBIS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Aldan, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order1 dated July 22, 2014 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan as well as the Order2 dated August 18, 2014 denying reconsideration
thereof.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On February 3, 2014, petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action3 for foreclosure of real estate mortgage
against respondents spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios and respondent Romel D.
Matorres, docketed as Civil Case No. 9811. She alleged the following:

xxxx

2. That on October 13, 2008, defendants borrowed from plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱250,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable within the period of one (1) year from said
date, with an interest thereon at the rate of 5% per month; and to secure the prompt and full payment
of the principal and interest, defendants made and executed on October 13, 2008 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of plaintiff upon a parcel of land and improvements thereon described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 5891-A-4) situated in Baybay, Makato, Aklan, containing an area of four hundred
seventy-eight (478) square meters, more or less x x x declared in the name of Spouses Clarence Barrios
and Anna Lee T. Barrios, assessed in the sum of ₱13,380.00, tax effectivity for the year 2008. Said land is
covered by OCT No. P-5561 pt.

xxx

3. That the condition of said mortgage, as stated therein, is such, that if within the period of one year
from October 13, 2008, the defendants shall pay or cause to be paid to the plaintiff, her heirs and
assigns, the said sum of ₱250,000.00 together with the agreed interest, then the said mortgage shall be
discharged; otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect, to be enforceable in the manner provided
by law.

4. That the time for payment of said loan is overdue and defendants failed and refused to pay both the
principal obligation and the interest due starting from February 2011 to the present notwithstanding
repeated demands;

5. That there are no other persons having or claiming interest in the mortgaged property except Romel
D. Matorres whom plaintiff recently discovered that the defendants mortgaged again to the said person
the same property subject of this suit for One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos, (₱150,000.00) on June 11,
2012 x x x The said Romel D. Matorres is however a mortgagee in bad faith.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that upon due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered ordering
defendants SPS. CLARENCE I. BARRIOS and ANNA LEE T. BARRIOS:

1. To pay unto the court within the reglementary period of ninety days the sum of ₱250,000.00 together
with the stipulated interest at five percent (5%) per month starting from February 2011 to the present,
plus the additional sum of ₱25,000.00 the total amount due for attorney's fees; litigation expenses and
costs; and that in default of such payment, the above-mentioned property be ordered sold to pay off the
mortgage debt and its accumulated interest;
2. To teach the defendants a lesson for having mortgaged the property subject of this suit without
plaintiffs consent or knowledge, the defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

3. That plaintiff be granted such other relief in law and equity.4

Respondents spouses Barrios filed their Answer5 with Special and Affirmative Defenses contending that
the computation of their alleged loan obligation was not accurate; that they had filed with the RTC a
petition for rehabilitation of a financially distressed individuals under Special Proceeding No. 9845, thus
there is a need to suspend the foreclosure proceed1ngs. On the other hand, respondent Matorres filed
his Answer6 with Special and Affirmative Defenses admitting that the subject land was mortgaged to him;
that he had also filed a judicial foreclosure case against respondents spouses Barrios pending with the
RTC of Kalibo Aldan, Branch 6, docketed as Civil Case No. 9642; that petitioner had no cause of action
against him as they did not have any transaction with each other; and prayed for damages and attorney's
fees, and cross-claim against respondent spouses for moral damages.

On July 22, 2014, the RTC issued the assailed Order as follows:

Civil Cases Nos. 9642 and 9811 are complaints for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage that involved the
same property, Lot 5891-A-4, situated in Baybay, Makato, Aklan, owned by Spouses Clarence Barrios and
Anna Lee Barrios.

It appearing from the complaint that the assessed value of the property mortgaged is only ₱13,380.00
and the instant cases being a real action, the assessed value of the property determines the
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The assessed value of the property involved being below ₱20,000.00, it is the first
level court that has jurisdiction over the cases. Premises considered, for lack of jurisdiction, Civil Cases
Nos. 9642 and 9811 are ordered DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner and respondent Matorres filed their respective motions for reconsideration.

In an Order dated August 18, 2014, the RTC denied petitioner's motion as follows:

xxxx

Petitioner in her Motion argued that foreclosure of real estate mortgage is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner's argument is devoid of merit.

A petition for foreclosure of real estate mortgage is a real action and the assessed value of the property
determines jurisdiction while location of the property determines the venue.

Premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8

Respondent Matorres' motion for reconsideration was also denied in an Order9 dated September 1,
2014.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC
when it ordered the dismissal of her foreclosure case without prejudice and denying her motion for
reconsideration. She argues that foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

In his Comment, respondent Matorres joins the position and arguments of petitioner that the cause of
action of the foreclosure cases is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, falling within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.

Respondents spouses Barrios filed their Explanation and Comment alleging that petitioner violated the
Tax Reform Act of 1997 for her failure to issue official receipts on the payments made by them; that she
failed to show any proof of authority from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas relative to her money-lending
activities.

The issue for resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
foreclosure cases filed with it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Preliminarily, we need to point out that generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it
violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this
Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom· of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition. 10 However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. A strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions. 11 Since petitioner raises a pure question of
law pertaining to the court's jurisdiction on complaint for judicial foreclosure of sale, we would allow
petitioner's direct resort to us.

The RTC dismissed the foreclosure cases finding that being a real action and the assessed value of the
mortgaged property is only ₱13,380.00, it is the first level court which has jurisdiction over the case and
not the RTC.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground
cannot be waived by the parties. 12 To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. 13

Batas Pambansa Big. (BP) 129 as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7691 pertinently provides for the
jurisdiction of the RTC and the first level courts as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

and

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in civil cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:

xxxx

3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

From the foregoing, the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions where the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also has jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to, or
possession of, real property or any interest in it where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds ₱20,000.00, and if it is below 1!20,000.00, it is the first level court which has jurisdiction. An
action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that
he owns such property or that he has the legal right to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of the same. 14

The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for foreclosure of mortgage showed that the loan
obtained by respondents spouses Barrios from petitioner fell due and they failed to pay such loan which
was secured by a mortgage on the property of the respondents spouses; and prayed that in case of
default of payment of such mortgage indebtedness to the court, the property be ordered sold to answer
for the obligation under the mortgage contract and the accumulated interest. It is worthy to mention
that the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set
apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or
the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default in
payment. 15 Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage
indebtedness. 16 In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the
mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the
view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. 17 Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real
action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order
for the sale of the res. 18

Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil19to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. We are not persuaded. In
the Russell case, we held:

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,
annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically
mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real
property involved does exceed ₱20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or ₱50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the
value exceeds ₱20,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL
PARTITION.20

Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not for recovery of
money, the court's jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value of the property involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED as we find no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

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